[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 233 (Wednesday, December 4, 2002)]
[Notices]
[Pages 72265-72266]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-30735]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)


Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Denial of petition to upgrade and expand the scope of a defect 
investigation.

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SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the reasons for the denial of a 
petition submitted by Mr. Clarence Ditlow, dated July 22, 2002, to 
NHTSA under 49 U.S.C. Sec.  30162, which requested an ongoing 
investigation (SQ01-014) be upgrade to an Engineering Analysis to 
determine whether a safety defect trend exists in Model Year (MY) 1992-
2001 Ford Crown Victoria, Mercury Grand Marquis, and Lincoln Town Car 
vehicles. The petition also requested that the scope of the 
investigation be broadened to include all subject vehicle fuel-fed 
crashes regardless of the direction of the impact and to include 
vehicle-to-object impacts. After reviewing the petition and other 
information, NHTSA has concluded that further expenditure of the 
agency's investigative resources on the issues raised by the petition 
does not appear to be warranted. The agency accordingly denies the 
petition.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Frank Borris, Safety Defects 
Engineer,

[[Page 72266]]

Vehicle Integrity Division, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA, 400 
Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone (202) 366-5202.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In a letter dated July 20, 2000, Clarence M. 
Ditlow, Executive Director of the Center for Auto Safety in Washington, 
DC, petitioned NHTSA to expand a then-pending investigation (SQ01-014) 
involving post-rear crash fires in certain Model Year (MY) 1992-2001 
Ford Crown Victoria, Lincoln Town Car, and Mercury Grand Marquis 
vehicles. These are known as Panther Platform vehicles. The Office of 
Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Service Query (SQ01-014) after 
reviewing a Technical Service Bulletin (TSB) (Ford Article 01-21-14) 
issued by Ford Motor Company (Ford). The TSB provides information and 
suggests modifications aimed at reducing the potential for post-rear 
crash fuel tank punctures in Ford's Panther Platform vehicles produced 
during MY 1992-2001.
    Prior to the publication of the TSB, ODI received three letters 
from law enforcement organizations expressing concern or requesting an 
investigation into the potential for fuel leaks in Crown Victoria 
Police Interceptor (CVPI) vehicles following rear impact crashes. ODI 
requested additional information from one correspondent (National 
Troopers Coalition) and received summaries of 17 incidents alleging 
post-rear crash fires (PRCF) in CVPI vehicles from calendar year (CY) 
1983 to 2001. The summaries included allegations of 11 deaths, of which 
4 occurred during CY 2001. All the target vehicles involved were CVPIs, 
and 14 were within the scope of the TSB. It stands to reason that the 
majority of PRCF's would occur within the law enforcement population of 
Panther vehicles due to their use on highways where high-energy 
collisions are most likely to occur. Law enforcement officers routinely 
pull motorists to the shoulder area, exposing their vehicles to a 
greater risk of rear impact.
    A search of ODI's consumer complaint database revealed one incident 
involving a MY 2000 CVPI that burst into flames following a high-energy 
rear impact. Fortunately, the officer escaped with relatively minor 
injuries.
    Based on information available at the time of opening SQ01-014 
indicating that each of the post-crash fires resulted from rear 
impacts, ODI limited the scope of its investigation to crashes where 
the initial impact point was between the 5 o'clock and 7 o'clock 
positions (with 12 o'clock representing the center of the front 
bumper). NHTSA requested information from Ford on all post-rear crash 
incidents resulting in fuel loss or fire in Panther Platform vehicles. 
A similar information request was sent to General Motors with respect 
to MY 1986-1996 Chevrolet B-Body (Caprice and Impala models) vehicles. 
The B-Body vehicles represent the closest comparative vehicle to the 
subject vehicles, since they have similar weight and dimensions, 
utilize a rear-mounted fuel tank, and were also used by law enforcement 
agencies.
    ODI closed its investigation October 3, 2002, determining that 
further investigation would be unlikely to produce sufficient evidence 
to demonstrate the existence of a safety-related defect in the subject 
vehicles. To address assertions made by the petitioner and determine 
whether to grant the petition, ODI analyzed information produced during 
SQ01-014 and real-world crash data in NHTSA's Fatality Analysis 
Reporting System (FARS).

Analysis

    To ascertain whether the Panther Platform vehicles have an elevated 
risk of fire following crashes (including high-energy crashes) compared 
to other sedans, ODI conducted searches of the FARS database for 
information on all MY 1992-2001 Panther vehicles and all other sedans 
(AOS) for fatal crashes involving fire. These searches included all 
impact locations and were executed both including police vehicles and 
excluding police vehicles. The risk of fire is expressed as a ratio of 
fires in fatal vehicles per total fatal vehicles. For the Ford Panther 
compared to AOS, with police vehicles included, the risk is identical 
at 0.033. Excluding police vehicles yields a ratio of 0.029 for the 
Ford Panther versus 0.033 for AOS. These results indicate that the 
subject vehicles are not over-represented with respect to the risk of 
fire in real-world high-energy crashes.
    A further discussion of issues related to post-crash fires in 
Panther Platform vehicles is set out in the closing report for SQ01-
014, which has been placed in the docket for this petition. It can be 
viewed at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/current/crownvic/index.htm.

Conclusion

    According to the analysis of FARS data, the subject vehicles are 
not over-represented with respect to the risk of fire following a high-
energy crash in all impact directions as alleged in the petition. In 
fact, the data show that the civilian population of Panther vehicles 
has an overall lower risk of post-crash fires than AOS when all impact 
points are considered.
    After reviewing the petition and its supporting materials, as well 
as information furnished by Ford and GM, and information within the 
agency's possession from previous investigations and other related 
actions, NHTSA has concluded that further investigation concerning 
post-crash fires in the subject vehicles is not likely to lead to a 
decision that the vehicles contain a safety defect.
    For the foregoing reasons, further expenditure of the agency's 
investigative resources on the allegation in the petition does not 
appear to be warranted. Therefore, the petition is denied.

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations of authority at 49 
CFR 1.50 and 501.8.

Kenneth N. Weinstein,
Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 02-30735 Filed 12-3-02; 8:45 am]
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