[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 233 (Wednesday, December 4, 2002)]
[Notices]
[Pages 72265-72266]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-30735]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Denial of petition to upgrade and expand the scope of a defect
investigation.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the reasons for the denial of a
petition submitted by Mr. Clarence Ditlow, dated July 22, 2002, to
NHTSA under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 30162, which requested an ongoing
investigation (SQ01-014) be upgrade to an Engineering Analysis to
determine whether a safety defect trend exists in Model Year (MY) 1992-
2001 Ford Crown Victoria, Mercury Grand Marquis, and Lincoln Town Car
vehicles. The petition also requested that the scope of the
investigation be broadened to include all subject vehicle fuel-fed
crashes regardless of the direction of the impact and to include
vehicle-to-object impacts. After reviewing the petition and other
information, NHTSA has concluded that further expenditure of the
agency's investigative resources on the issues raised by the petition
does not appear to be warranted. The agency accordingly denies the
petition.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Frank Borris, Safety Defects
Engineer,
[[Page 72266]]
Vehicle Integrity Division, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone (202) 366-5202.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In a letter dated July 20, 2000, Clarence M.
Ditlow, Executive Director of the Center for Auto Safety in Washington,
DC, petitioned NHTSA to expand a then-pending investigation (SQ01-014)
involving post-rear crash fires in certain Model Year (MY) 1992-2001
Ford Crown Victoria, Lincoln Town Car, and Mercury Grand Marquis
vehicles. These are known as Panther Platform vehicles. The Office of
Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Service Query (SQ01-014) after
reviewing a Technical Service Bulletin (TSB) (Ford Article 01-21-14)
issued by Ford Motor Company (Ford). The TSB provides information and
suggests modifications aimed at reducing the potential for post-rear
crash fuel tank punctures in Ford's Panther Platform vehicles produced
during MY 1992-2001.
Prior to the publication of the TSB, ODI received three letters
from law enforcement organizations expressing concern or requesting an
investigation into the potential for fuel leaks in Crown Victoria
Police Interceptor (CVPI) vehicles following rear impact crashes. ODI
requested additional information from one correspondent (National
Troopers Coalition) and received summaries of 17 incidents alleging
post-rear crash fires (PRCF) in CVPI vehicles from calendar year (CY)
1983 to 2001. The summaries included allegations of 11 deaths, of which
4 occurred during CY 2001. All the target vehicles involved were CVPIs,
and 14 were within the scope of the TSB. It stands to reason that the
majority of PRCF's would occur within the law enforcement population of
Panther vehicles due to their use on highways where high-energy
collisions are most likely to occur. Law enforcement officers routinely
pull motorists to the shoulder area, exposing their vehicles to a
greater risk of rear impact.
A search of ODI's consumer complaint database revealed one incident
involving a MY 2000 CVPI that burst into flames following a high-energy
rear impact. Fortunately, the officer escaped with relatively minor
injuries.
Based on information available at the time of opening SQ01-014
indicating that each of the post-crash fires resulted from rear
impacts, ODI limited the scope of its investigation to crashes where
the initial impact point was between the 5 o'clock and 7 o'clock
positions (with 12 o'clock representing the center of the front
bumper). NHTSA requested information from Ford on all post-rear crash
incidents resulting in fuel loss or fire in Panther Platform vehicles.
A similar information request was sent to General Motors with respect
to MY 1986-1996 Chevrolet B-Body (Caprice and Impala models) vehicles.
The B-Body vehicles represent the closest comparative vehicle to the
subject vehicles, since they have similar weight and dimensions,
utilize a rear-mounted fuel tank, and were also used by law enforcement
agencies.
ODI closed its investigation October 3, 2002, determining that
further investigation would be unlikely to produce sufficient evidence
to demonstrate the existence of a safety-related defect in the subject
vehicles. To address assertions made by the petitioner and determine
whether to grant the petition, ODI analyzed information produced during
SQ01-014 and real-world crash data in NHTSA's Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS).
Analysis
To ascertain whether the Panther Platform vehicles have an elevated
risk of fire following crashes (including high-energy crashes) compared
to other sedans, ODI conducted searches of the FARS database for
information on all MY 1992-2001 Panther vehicles and all other sedans
(AOS) for fatal crashes involving fire. These searches included all
impact locations and were executed both including police vehicles and
excluding police vehicles. The risk of fire is expressed as a ratio of
fires in fatal vehicles per total fatal vehicles. For the Ford Panther
compared to AOS, with police vehicles included, the risk is identical
at 0.033. Excluding police vehicles yields a ratio of 0.029 for the
Ford Panther versus 0.033 for AOS. These results indicate that the
subject vehicles are not over-represented with respect to the risk of
fire in real-world high-energy crashes.
A further discussion of issues related to post-crash fires in
Panther Platform vehicles is set out in the closing report for SQ01-
014, which has been placed in the docket for this petition. It can be
viewed at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/current/crownvic/index.htm.
Conclusion
According to the analysis of FARS data, the subject vehicles are
not over-represented with respect to the risk of fire following a high-
energy crash in all impact directions as alleged in the petition. In
fact, the data show that the civilian population of Panther vehicles
has an overall lower risk of post-crash fires than AOS when all impact
points are considered.
After reviewing the petition and its supporting materials, as well
as information furnished by Ford and GM, and information within the
agency's possession from previous investigations and other related
actions, NHTSA has concluded that further investigation concerning
post-crash fires in the subject vehicles is not likely to lead to a
decision that the vehicles contain a safety defect.
For the foregoing reasons, further expenditure of the agency's
investigative resources on the allegation in the petition does not
appear to be warranted. Therefore, the petition is denied.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations of authority at 49
CFR 1.50 and 501.8.
Kenneth N. Weinstein,
Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 02-30735 Filed 12-3-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P