[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 233 (Wednesday, December 4, 2002)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 72122-72126]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-30316]



[[Page 72122]]

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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

20 CFR Part 604

RIN 1205-AB33


Unemployment Compensation--Trust Fund Integrity Rule: Birth and 
Adoption Unemployment Compensation; Removal of Regulations

AGENCY: Employment and Training Administration, Labor.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rule making (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The Department of Labor (Department or DOL) is proposing to 
remove the Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation (BAA-UC) 
regulations. Those regulations provide an experimental opportunity for 
states to provide, in the form of unemployment compensation (UC), 
partial wage replacement for parents taking approved leave or otherwise 
leaving employment while caring for their newborns or newly-adopted 
children.

DATES: DOL invites written comments on this proposal. Comments must be 
submitted by February 3, 2003.

ADDRESSES: Submit written comments to Cheryl Atkinson, Administrator, 
Office of Workforce Security, Employment and Training Administration 
(ETA), U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW., Room S-
4231, Washington, DC, 20210. E-mail: [email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gerard Hildebrand, Office of Workforce 
Security, ETA, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW., 
Room C-4518, Washington, DC 20210. Telephone: (202) 693-3038 (voice) 
(this is not a toll-free number); 1-800-326-2577 (TDD); facsimile: 
(202) 693-2874; e-mail: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June 13, 2000, the BAA-UC Final Rule was 
published in the Federal Register at 65 FR 37210 (June 13, 2000) and 
codified at 20 CFR Part 604. It implemented an experimental opportunity 
for state agencies responsible for administering the Federal-State UC 
program to provide partial wage replacement for parents taking approved 
leave, or otherwise leaving employment, following the birth or 
placement for adoption of a child. In qualifying for UC, the individual 
would not have to be able to or available for work, commonly known as 
the able and available (A&A) requirements, in the sense traditionally 
used by the Department. Instead, parents of newborns and newly-adopted 
children would be viewed as meeting the federal A&A requirements (as 
implemented in state law) under the premise that the parents' long-term 
attachment to the workforce would be strengthened and promoted by the 
payment of UC, which would provide some financial support to accompany 
the introduction of a new child into the family.
    As we noted during the final rulemaking, the BAA-UC experiment was 
``a reversal of our position taken in 1997,'' when the Department 
advised a state that UC could not be used in this manner. (65 FR 37212 
(June 13, 2000).) The BAA-UC experiment was described as ``part of an 
evolving interpretation of the Federal A&A requirements that recognizes 
practical and economic realities.'' (Id.) Simply stated, the A&A 
requirements were interpreted in a new and different way that 
emphasized the individual's potential attachment to the workforce. BAA-
UC was intended to test whether individuals would be more attached to 
the workforce, even if their current separation from the workforce was 
either a conscious decision on their part, or due to compelling 
personal and family reasons relating to the birth or adoption of a 
child. Significantly, since the Department made the BAA-UC experiment 
available in 2000, no state has elected to participate.
    The Department has now reviewed the BAA-UC Final Rule as part of a 
Department-wide review of all regulations. This review was conducted in 
the context of a substantial downturn in the economy, resulting in 
substantially lower state unemployment fund balances than in 2000. The 
review was also conducted in the context of a legal challenge in 
federal district court that the BAA-UC rule was inconsistent with 
federal UC law. Although the case was dismissed on procedural grounds, 
LPA, Inc. v. Chao, 211 F.Supp. 2d 160 (D.D.C. 2002), it did cause the 
Department to scrutinize the underlying statutory authority for BAA-UC.
    Upon completion of this review, our conclusion is that the BAA-UC 
experiment is poor policy and a misapplication of federal UC law 
relating to the A&A requirements. Therefore, we are proposing to remove 
the BAA-UC regulations. As will be discussed below, the UC program is 
designed to provide temporary wage replacement to individuals who are 
unemployed due to lack of suitable work. However, the intended 
recipients of BAA-UC generally do not meet this test as they have 
initiated their separation from the workforce and it is their personal 
situation, rather than the lack of available work, that has removed 
them from the labor market. Because the BAA-UC experiment is based on 
an assumption of increased future labor force attachment, the payment 
of BAA-UC will likely be made for periods where parents have completely 
suspended their labor force attachment. Indeed, in cases where the 
parent is on approved leave from a job, BAA-UC more closely resembles a 
paid-leave program than a UC program.
    As noted above, to date no state has elected to participate in the 
BAA-UC experiment. Therefore, terminating the experiment will not 
result in any state withdrawing benefits it previously granted. The 
only effect of the removal of the regulations is that it reduces state 
flexibility since a state could no longer elect to use its unemployment 
fund to pay BAA-UC. The Department's position on the A&A requirements 
will revert to that in existence before publication of the BAA-UC rule. 
Thus, to be eligible for UC an individual must, among other things, 
demonstrate current labor force attachment by meeting the A&A 
requirements. Each state remains free to create a paid family leave-
type program using state moneys from sources other than its 
unemployment fund. Indeed, as discussed below, one state has already 
done so.
    Policy. The UC program is designed as wage insurance for 
individuals who are unemployed due to lack of suitable work. This would 
generally not be the case for parents who would avail themselves of 
BAA-UC. Such parents would be out of work because they both initiated 
their separation from the workforce and are currently unavailable for 
work; they would have effectively withdrawn from the labor market for a 
brief period. For those individuals who were taking approved leave when 
an employer is holding a job open for them, BAA-UC would be a payment 
for voluntarily taking time off work rather than payment due to lack of 
suitable work. As such, it would be paid leave, which was not 
envisioned in the design of the UC program.
    We again note that no state has actually enacted BAA-UC legislation 
since being given DOL clearance to do so. While we recognize that 
declining unemployment fund balances may have some bearing on this, the 
fact that one state has enacted a broad paid leave program suggests 
that there may be other factors. California recently passed legislation 
(enacted Senate Bill 1661; Chapter No. 901) that contains features of 
BAA-UC, as well as many features beyond the scope of BAA-UC. Notably,

[[Page 72123]]

it authorizes payments to certain individuals who take time off from 
work to care for a sick or injured child, spouse, parent or domestic 
partner as well as for foster care placements of a new child. The 
California law does not use its unemployment fund as a funding source, 
but instead uses employee contributions to its Temporary Disability 
Insurance fund.
    The restrictive nature of the BAA-UC rule, which limits the 
eligible population to parents taking leave or otherwise leaving 
employment to be with their newborns or newly-adopted children, would 
not have granted California the flexibility it desired. Similarly, the 
BAA-UC rule limits the types of eligibility conditions that may be 
imposed on individuals. Other flexibility issues may also exist. For 
example, we expressed concern with a state bill that appeared to be 
close to enactment because it appeared to be inconsistent with Section 
3304(a)(6)(A) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). This bill 
would have made BAA-UC mandatory for all services performed in the 
state, except for services performed for certain governmental and 
nonprofit entities that could elect to participate. Since federal law 
requires that, with respect to these governmental and nonprofit 
services, UC must be paid ``in the same amount, on the same terms, and 
subject to the same conditions'' as UC payable on other services 
performed under state law, we advised the state that this legislation, 
if enacted, would be inconsistent with Section 3304(a)(6)(A) of the 
FUTA. In sum, it appears that the limited flexibility of the BAA-UC 
approach may not be conducive to state needs and, therefore, may have 
contributed to the lack of state enactments.
    Finally, since the implementation of the BAA-UC Final Rule in 2000, 
many states have seen a drastic decline in their unemployment fund 
balances, and most states are below our recommended 1.00 average high-
cost multiple. (The average high-cost multiple indicates how many years 
of benefits a state has available under a recessionary scenario. A 
rating of 1.00 indicates the state has one year's worth of benefits on 
hand. The Department recommends a 1.00 high-cost multiple as a 
reasonable margin of safety to ensure trust fund solvency in periods of 
high unemployment.) Recognizing that fund levels were dropping, the 
Administration supported Congress's enactment of legislation 
distributing $8 billion to states to assist in the payment of UC and 
for other purposes. (Section 209 of Public Law 107-147, March 9, 2002.) 
Indeed, but for this extraordinary infusion of funds, some states would 
have had to borrow money from the federal government to keep their 
unemployment funds solvent. While we recognize that some states still 
have adequate reserves, we are concerned that current fund balances 
would be even lower had states enacted the BAA-UC experiment. Indeed, 
one of the policy arguments made for using a state's unemployment fund 
for BAA-UC was the claim that states had ``surpluses'' in their 
unemployment funds, which funds could be made immediately available to 
implement a BAA-UC experiment. The sudden and rapid decline in fund 
balances undercuts this argument.
    Legal. The Department and its predecessors (the Social Security 
Board and the Federal Security Agency) have interpreted and enforced 
federal A&A requirements since the inception of the federal-state UC 
program. Although no A&A requirements are explicitly stated in federal 
law, the Department and its predecessors interpreted four provisions of 
federal UC law, contained in the Social Security Act (SSA) and FUTA, as 
requiring that states condition the payment of UC upon a claimant being 
able to and available for work. Two of these provisions, at section 
3304(a)(4), FUTA, and section 303(a)(5), SSA, limit withdrawals, with 
specific exceptions, from a state's unemployment fund to the payment of 
``compensation.'' Section 3306(h), FUTA, defines ``compensation'' as 
``cash benefits payable to individuals with respect to their 
unemployment.'' The A&A requirements provide a federal test of an 
individual's continuing ``unemployment.'' (The meaning of 
``unemployment'' in this statutory framework is discussed below.) The 
other two provisions, found in section 3304(a)(1), FUTA, and section 
303(a)(2), SSA, require that compensation ``be paid through public 
employment offices.'' The requirement that UC be paid through the 
public employment system (the purpose of which is to find people jobs) 
ties the payment of UC to both an individual's ability to work and 
availability for work. These A&A requirements serve, in effect, to 
limit UC eligibility.
    The basis for the federal A&A requirements was summarized in a 
March 11, 1939, letter from the Chair of the Social Security Board to 
the Governor of California, concerning whether the state could make 
payments with respect to temporary disability from its unemployment 
fund:

    The entire legislative history [of the UC titles of the original 
SSA] including the Report to the President of the Committee on 
Economic Security, the report of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means, the report of the Senate Committee on Finance, and the 
Congressional debates all indicate, either expressly or by 
implication, the compensation contemplated under [these titles] is 
compensation to individuals who are able to work but are unemployed 
by reason of lack of work. Several provisions of those titles are 
meaningful only if applied to State laws for the payment of such 
compensation. For example, the requirement that compensation be paid 
through public employment offices, or the requirement that States 
make [certain information] available to agencies of the United 
States charged with the administration of public works or assistance 
through public employment, are obviously without reasonable basis if 
applied to payments to disabled individuals. Many of the standards 
contained [in the experience rating provisions] are similarly 
without reasonable basis if applied to a State law for the payment 
of disability compensation.
    For these reasons, the Board is of the opinion that the [UC 
titles of the SSA] are applicable solely to State laws for the 
payment of compensation to individuals who are able to work and are 
unemployed by reason of lack of work.'' [Emphasis added.]

    That involuntary unemployment due to lack of suitable work was the 
key test is supported by the Congressional Committee Reports:

    The essential idea in unemployment compensation* * * is the 
accumulation of reserves in time of employment from which partial 
compensation may be paid to workers who become unemployed and are 
unable to find work.* * * In normal times it will enable most 
workers who lose their jobs to tide themselves over, until they get 
back to their old work or find other employment without having to 
resort to relief.* * * [H. Rep. 615, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. 1935 Page 
5.]
    The essential idea in unemployment compensation is the creation 
of reserves during periods of employment from which compensation is 
paid to workmen who lose their positions when employment slackens 
and who cannot find other work. Unemployment compensation differs 
from relief in that payments are made as a matter of right, not on a 
needs basis, but only while the worker is involuntarily unemployed.* 
* * Payment of compensation is conditioned upon continued 
involuntary unemployment. Beneficiaries must accept suitable 
employment offered them or they lose their right to compensation. 
[S. Rep. 628, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. 1935 Page 11.]
    * * * In normal times most workers will secure other employment 
before exhaustion of their benefit rights.* * * For the great bulk 
of industrial workers unemployment compensation will mean security 
during the period following unemployment while they are seeking 
another job, or are waiting to return to their old position. [Id. 
Page 12.]

    As illustrated by the above, the Federal A&A requirements are 
placed on claimants to test whether the fact that they did not work for 
any week was

[[Page 72124]]

involuntary due to the unavailability of work. Since the BAA-UC 
experiment did not examine the Federal A&A requirements from this 
perspective, it permits the payment of UC to individuals for whom 
suitable work may exist, thus contradicting the basic purpose of the 
A&A requirements.
    The legislative history quoted above indicates that eligibility for 
UC is not based on the individual's personal need, except to the extent 
that his/her ``need'' is created by lack of suitable work. (Note that 
this test looks only to whether the unemployment is due to lack of work 
for each given week of benefits claimed. That is, it does not require 
that states hold an individual ineligible based on the reason for 
separation from employment, except to the extent that the individual 
may have not been A&A for the particular week of the separation.) BAA-
UC, however, extended eligibility for UC to parents based on 
considerations of compelling personal or family need regardless of 
whether there is a lack of work. While the idea of providing UC to 
parents or families experiencing birth or adoption may be admirable, it 
is not in keeping with the fundamental limitation of paying UC only to 
individuals who are unemployed due to lack of work.
    The legislative history also establishes a link between the public 
works programs in existence in 1935 and the UC program that bears on 
the A&A requirements. As noted in the Social Security Board's 
contemporaneous interpretation, an SSA provision (section 303(a)(7)) 
requires that states make available to agencies of the United States 
charged with the administration of public works or assistance through 
public employment, the name, address, ordinary occupation, and the 
government's employment status of UC recipients. This requirement is 
predicated upon the understanding that UC recipients must be out of 
work due to a lack of available work. It would make no sense to refer 
an individual, for whom work was available, to a public works program, 
which should be the employer of last resort. Senator Wagner, who 
introduced the SSA in the Senate, described the relationship between 
the proposed UC program and the government's public works programs (as 
well as public employment offices) as follows in the floor debate on 
the SSA:

    [unemployment insurance] is not designed to supplant, but rather 
to supplement the public-works projects which must absorb the bulk 
of persons who may be disinherited for long periods of time by 
private industry.* * * A provision in the present bill requires that 
the Federal tax rebate shall be used to encourage a close connection 
between State job-insurance laws and unemployment-exchange offices. 
This provision emphasizes the fact that the [monetary] relief of 
existent unemployment is but a subordinate phase of the main task of 
providing work for all who are strong and willing. [79 Cong. Rec. 
9284 (June 14, 1934).]

    Thus, Congress intended the UC system to be subordinate to the main 
task of getting people back to work, which is, as noted above, 
implemented through the A&A requirements. BAA-UC is not consistent with 
this goal since it encourages parents to refuse available work.
    Finally, as noted in the Social Security Board's letter, experience 
rating standards are meaningless if the test of involuntary 
unemployment due to lack of work is not used. Experience rating was 
originally established to ensure an equitable distribution among 
employers of the cost of the system, and to encourage employers to 
stabilize their work forces. (``Credits'' will be provided ``in the 
form of lower contribution rates * * * to employers who have stabilized 
their employment.'' (S. Rep. 628, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. 1935 Page 14.)) 
BAA-UC contradicts the intent of experience rating since it allows 
payments based on a worker's own actions without regard to an 
employer's attempt to stabilize employment by offering suitable work to 
its current and former employees. Indeed, if BAA-UC (and similar-type 
payments which might be allowed) is paid to individuals who are not 
A&A, the states' experience rating systems could be overwhelmed to the 
point where an employer's efforts to stabilize its workforce through 
its continuing willingness to employ the worker is ignored, thereby 
effectively nullifying one of the primary purposes of experience 
rating.
    In the preamble to the BAA-UC Final Rule, we addressed four 
situations--illness, jury duty, approved training, and temporary 
layoffs--that affected individuals' ability ``to meet the stricter 
interpretations of the A&A requirements.'' (65 FR 37213 (June 13, 
2000).) Although we also noted that ``none of these situations 
precisely parallels the payment of BAA-UC, they do operate on the same 
premises: that situations exist in which it is important to allow a 
flexible demonstration of availability and in which attachment to the 
workforce can be demonstrated, and indeed strengthened, without 
requiring a current demonstration of availability.'' (Id.) Upon re-
examination, we note that, unlike the BAA-UC experiment, none of these 
situations permit a voluntary withdrawal from the workforce:
    [sbull] Illness. The interpretation pertaining to illness applies 
only to individuals who initially meet the A&A requirements, but who 
then become ill and who do not refuse suitable work. Until work is 
refused, the unemployment is due to lack of work, which is what the A&A 
requirements are designed to test. The A&A requirements are preserved 
because the individual must initially demonstrate availability before 
the illness and must be held ineligible if s/he refuses suitable work 
offered.
    [sbull] Jury Duty. The interpretation pertaining to jury duty 
applies only to individuals who initially meet the A&A requirements, 
but who are then called for jury duty. It is unreasonable for a state 
to compel jury service for previously eligible individuals and at the 
same time hold such individuals ineligible for complying. Indeed, 
attendance at jury duty may be taken as evidence that the individual 
would otherwise be available for work.
    [sbull] Approved training. Approved training is limited to 
situations where the state determines that short-term training will 
improve an individual's job prospects. Attendance at such training is 
accepted as evidence of availability for work. Indeed, if the 
individual refuses training, or fails to attend training, the states 
will evaluate eligibility under their A&A provisions.
    [sbull] Temporary lay-offs. An individual on temporary layoff must 
be available to work for the employer who laid-off the individual. 
While this requires an individual's availability for work with only one 
employer, it is nonetheless a test of whether the unemployment is due 
to lack of suitable work.
    None of these precedents is consistent with BAA-UC. Unlike the 
illness exception, an offer of suitable work under BAA-UC may be 
refused with no effect on eligibility. Unlike the illness and jury duty 
exceptions, no initial establishment of A&A is required. Unlike jury 
duty, there is no governmental compulsion. Unlike approved training, 
BAA-UC does not address a situation where an individual is attempting 
to remedy his or her continuing unemployment; indeed BAA-UC addresses a 
situation where a parent is responsible for his or her separation from 
the workforce. Also, for approved training, the state must approve the 
training as increasing the individual's job prospects; no similar 
requirement exists for BAA-UC, with the result that increased 
attachment to the workforce for any one individual is highly 
speculative. Finally, unlike temporary lay-offs, there is no 
requirement that the individual be available for at least one job; 
indeed, an offer of suitable work may be refused

[[Page 72125]]

with no effect on eligibility. These precedents differ from BAA-UC in 
that they do not permit an individual to voluntarily remove him/herself 
from the labor market for a given week. BAA-UC, on the other hand, 
allows parents who have initiated their separation from the workforce 
and whose personal situation, rather than the lack of available work, 
that makes them unavailable for other employment.
    In summary, A&A tests involuntary unemployment due to a continuing 
lack of suitable work. The legislative history amply supports this. The 
BAA-UC rule not only failed to recognize this, but is in fact contrary 
to the A&A requirement.

Executive Order 12866

    This proposal to remove 20 CFR part 604 is a ``significant 
regulatory action'' within the meaning of section 3(f)(4) of Executive 
Order 12866 because it raises novel legal or policy issues arising out 
of legal mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set 
forth in the Executive Order. Accordingly, this proposal was submitted 
to, and reviewed by, the Office of Management and Budget.
    Before publication of the BAA-UC final rule (65 FR 37210 (June 13, 
2000)), the Department prepared a Regulatory Impact Analysis, which 
estimated that the rule would result in costs ranging from zero to $196 
million, depending upon the number of states enacting BAA-UC. Since 
publication of the BAA-UC final rule, no state enacted BAA-UC meaning 
that no benefits have been paid, nor administrative costs expended. 
Removing the BAA-UC rule would end the possibility that BAA-UC and its 
associated administrative costs will be paid out of state unemployment 
funds with the result that the estimated costs would not be incurred. 
Therefore, the removal of the rule would result in no costs or cost 
savings and potentially prevent costs from being incurred in the 
future. Because the Department expects the immediate economic impact of 
removing the rule to involve no costs, this regulatory action is 
unlikely to have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or 
more and, consequently, is not ``economically significant'' within the 
meaning of Section 3(f)(1) of that Executive Order.
    Finally, we have evaluated this regulatory action and find it 
consistent with the regulatory philosophy and principles set forth in 
Executive Order 12866. Though this action would remove authority for 
states to fund family leave from the state's unemployment fund, states 
would have flexibility to provide paid family leave from other funding 
sources. Further, because no state has enacted BAA-UC, no state would 
be adversely affected in a material way by having to dismantle such an 
experiment. Finally, this action removes a regulation and imposes no 
alternative regulatory requirements.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This regulatory action contains no information collection 
requirements.

Executive Order 13132

    We have reviewed this proposal in accordance with Executive Order 
13132 regarding federalism. That order requires agencies, when 
formulating and implementing policies that have federalism 
implications, to refrain from limiting state policy options, to consult 
with states before taking any action which would restrict states' 
policy options, and to take such action only where there is clear 
statutory or constitutional authority and the presence of a problem of 
national scope. Policies with federalism implications are those with 
substantial direct effects on the states, on the relationship between 
the national government and the states, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    Because this regulatory action would limit state policy options, by 
eliminating authority to pay for family leave out of unemployment 
funds, we will consult with organizations representing state elected 
officials at the Department of Labor in the upcoming weeks. We solicit 
comment on the federalism implications and the impact of this 
regulation on the relationship between the national government and the 
states.

Executive Order 13084

    This regulatory action does not impose any regulatory requirements 
on Indian tribal governments and therefore does not impose substantial 
direct compliance costs on Indian tribal governments.

Executive Order 12988

    This proposal has been drafted and reviewed in accordance with 
Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform, and will not unduly burden 
the federal court system. The proposal, a mere one sentence, removes 20 
CFR part 604. In its brevity, it is not likely to lead to litigation 
resulting from drafting errors or ambiguities.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    This proposal has been reviewed in accordance with the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (2 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.) and does not 
include any unfunded federal mandate.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    This regulatory action will not have a significant economic impact 
on a substantial number of small entities. This action affects states 
and state agencies, which are not within the definition of ``small 
entity'' under 5 U.S.C. 601(6). Under 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Secretary 
has certified to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration to this effect. Accordingly, no regulatory flexibility 
analysis is required.

Effect on Family Life

    We certify that this regulatory action has been assessed in 
accordance with section 654 of Public Law 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, for 
its effect on family well-being. We conclude that this action would not 
adversely affect the well-being of the nation's families. No state has 
enacted BAA-UC; consequently no families would experience a termination 
of BAA-UC benefits. Though this proposed rule would withdraw 
authorization for states to pay for such benefits from the state's 
unemployment fund, paid family leave could be provided from other state 
funding sources. This proposal would preserve the availability of state 
unemployment funds for times when workers, who may support families, 
are unemployed due to lack of work.

Congressional Review Act

    This proposed rule is not a ``major rule'' as defined by the 
Congressional Review Act (section 804 of the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996). This proposed rule would not result 
in an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; a major 
increase in costs or prices; or significant adverse effects on 
competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or the 
ability of United States-based companies to compete with foreign-based 
companies in domestic and export markets.

Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Number

    20 CFR Part 604 is listed in the Catalogue of Federal Domestic 
Assistance at No. 17.225, Unemployment Insurance.

List of Subjects in 20 CFR Part 604

    Unemployment compensation.


[[Page 72126]]


    Signed at Washington, DC on November 25, 2002.
Emily Stover DeRocco,
Assistant Secretary of Labor.

Words of Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in this preamble, Chapter V of Title 20, 
Code of Federal Regulations, is proposed to be amended by removing part 
604.

[FR Doc. 02-30316 Filed 12-3-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-30-P