[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 227 (Monday, November 25, 2002)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 70535-70545]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-29910]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary

14 CFR Part 234

[Docket No. OST 2000-8164]
RIN 2139-AA09


Reporting the Causes of Airline Delays and Cancellations

AGENCY: Office of Secretary, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: As required by Federal statute, the Department of 
Transportation is modifying certain reporting requirements. We are 
requiring air carriers that file airline service quality performance 
reports to collect and report the causes of airline

[[Page 70536]]

delays and cancellations. Currently, there is a lack of data on the 
specific causes of airline delays and cancellations. The changes are 
designed to fill the data gaps in reference to the causes of airline 
delays and cancellations and to provide this information to the public 
and other interested parties.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This rule is effective on June 1, 2003.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bernard Stankus or Clay Moritz, Office 
of Airline Information, K-14, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 
Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 
20590-0001, (202) 366-4387 or 366-4385, respectively. You can also 
contact them by e-mail at [email protected] or 
[email protected] or by fax at (202) 366-3383.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Electronic Access

    An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded by using a 
computer, modem, and suitable communications software from the 
Government Printing Office's Electronic Bulletin Board Services at 
(202) 512-1661. Internet users may reach the Office of the Federal 
Register's home page at: http://www.nara.gov/fedreg and the Government 
Printing Office's database at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara. You can 
also view and download this document by going to the webpage of the 
Department's Docket Management System (http://dms.dot.gov/). On that 
page, click on ``search.'' On the next page, type the last four digits 
of the docket number shown in the heading of this document. Then click 
on ``search.''

Background

    Section 227 of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform 
Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21) requires that we modify our airline 
data collection system, 14 CFR Part 234--Airline Service Quality 
Performance Reports, to explain more fully to the public the nature and 
source of airline delays and cancellations (See Pub. L. 106-181, 114 
Stat. 61). AIR-21 also directed that DOT establish a Task Force to 
review airline delays and cancellations and develop recommendations for 
the associated reporting criteria. Since the passage of AIR-21, 
Congress has continued to express concern that DOT needs more accurate 
data to better understand gate, tarmac, and airborne delays. The DOT 
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) also highlighted the need to 
examine airline delays and cancellations in its July 25, 2000 report on 
air carrier flight delays and cancellations. Our own consumer complaint 
statistics also support regulatory action to reduce airline delays. 
Also, passengers have expressed frustration when not advised of the 
cause and length of delays.
    In August 2000, we formed the Air Carrier On-Time Reporting 
Advisory Committee (the Task Force). The Task Force members were chosen 
to reflect a balanced cross section of interests. In addition to 
government representatives, they included representatives from consumer 
airline groups, air carriers, labor unions and airport operators. On 
September 25, 2000, the Task Force was chartered as a Federal advisory 
committee. Its mission was to consider changes to the current on-time 
reporting system so that the public would have clear information about 
the nature and sources of airline delays and cancellations.
    In the Fall of 2000 (i.e., October 25 and 26, November 1 and 2, and 
November 13), the Task Force held several meetings to identify the 
issues surrounding airline delays and cancellations and to develop 
reporting criteria. The meetings were announced in the Federal Register 
(65 FR 63285) and were open to the public. We opened a public docket 
for the submission of comments, Docket OST-2000-8164. On November 29, 
2000, the Task Force submitted its report to DOT. The Task Force made a 
number of recommendations, including that we establish a reporting 
framework for collecting information about the causes of airline delays 
and cancellations. The Task Force also recommended that, prior to 
rulemaking, we conduct a pilot program to test the proposed reporting 
categories. Following up on that recommendation, we contacted a number 
of air carriers; four air carriers agreed to participate in a voluntary 
pilot project. The four carriers were American Airlines, Delta Air 
Lines, Southwest Airlines and United Air Lines. Over several months, we 
met with the four carriers and discussed what causal delay and 
cancellation information should be collected and how best to report 
that delay and cancellation data. After the parties agreed on a 
reporting framework, the carriers began submitting delay and 
cancellation data to us.
    We used the recommendations from the Task Force, the results of our 
pilot project and our outreach efforts to craft the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) which was published on December 27, 2001 (66 FR 
66833). In response to the NPRM, we received 16 comments.

The Proposed Rule

    The Department proposed requiring air carriers that file airline 
service quality performance reports under Part 234 regulations to 
collect and report the causes of airline delays and cancellations. 
There was a lack of data on the specific causes of airline delays and 
cancellations. The Department proposed four delay categories and three 
cancellation categories as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Delays                            Cancellations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Carrier...............................  Air Carrier.
Weather...................................  Weather.
National Aviation System..................  National Aviation System.
Late Arriving Aircraft....................  ............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed changes were designed to fill the data gaps in 
reference to the causes of airline delays and cancellations and to 
provide this information to the traveling public and the parties most 
capable of addressing the causes of the delays and cancellations.

Public Comments

    We received comments from America West Airlines, American Trans 
Air, Southwest Airlines, the Air Transport Association of America 
(ATA), the Regional Airline Association (RAA), the American Society of 
Travel Agents (ASTA), the Airports Council International--North America 
(ACI-NA), the American Automobile Association (AAA), the City of 
Boston, Save the Bay Association, the San Francisco Boardsailing 
Association (SFBA), the Paralyzed Veterans of America, Mr. B.E. 
Wendling, Mr. George Rummell, Ms. Melissa Davis, and Mr. Paul Asmus. 
The substance of these comments is discussed below under a series of 
topical captions.

The Continuing Need for Causal Reporting

    Southwest Airlines believes that the operating environment since 
September 11, 2001, negates the need to impose new reporting 
requirements in the near future.
    Mr. Paul D. Asmus believes that modifying the on-time data 
collection system, to explain more fully to the traveling public the 
source and nature of airline delays, may create a serious safety 
problem. Mr. Asmus states that, ``The NPRM as envisioned, plans to add 
delays for aircraft maintenance in the data that the carriers are 
required to provide.'' He believes this could lead to mechanics being 
pressured ``to work faster and cut corners.'' Mr. Asmus requested an 
Office of the Inspector

[[Page 70537]]

General (IG) audit and, while the IG conducts its audit, that the 
Department place a hold on the rulemaking.
    It is only a matter of time before traffic is back to or above the 
levels of the summers of 2000 and 2001. The Department wants to be pro-
active in identifying problem areas and making the necessary 
improvements to the aviation system to avoid the gridlock which reached 
a peak in the summer of 2000. For the first eight months of 2001, on-
time arrivals increased to 77.4% as compared to 72.7% for the first 
eight months of 2000. This was accomplished despite an increase of 
17,440 flight operations. The improvement was accomplished in a large 
measure because the FAA made significant progress in correcting 
problems identified with respect to improving the flow of traffic 
through seven major airspace choke points in our national airspace 
system, American and Delta reduced operations at peak times at their 
hub airports, and Continental and United increased the size of aircraft 
operated at selected airports. The Department does not want to become 
complacent in its initiative to reduce air carrier delays. In the 
Office of the Inspector General's report titled Actions to Enhance 
Capacity and Reduce Delays and Cancellations (August 17, 2001), the 
number one item listed as needing attention is the creation of a 
uniform system for tracking the causes of flight delays and 
cancellations.
    As to the inclusion of flights that are delayed or cancelled for 
maintenance, the Department has included statistics for such flights 
beginning in January 1995. While the Department tracked whether the 
flights experienced delays, the reasons for delays were not identified. 
The inclusion of all carrier operations in the airline service quality 
performance data base provides consumers with a more accurate picture 
of a carrier's overall on-time record. Moreover, we have seen no 
evidence whatsoever that inclusion of cancellations and delays related 
to maintenance has in any way diminished safety. To the contrary, there 
is an incentive for carriers to keep their equipment in top working 
condition. While the present proposal recommends collection of the 
causes of delays and cancellations, the proposed cause categories are 
broad and do not specifically identify maintenance delays or 
cancellations. As proposed, maintenance delays and cancellations would 
be reported as ``Air Carrier'' caused delays.
    The safety of passengers and crew has always been the most 
important responsibility of air carriers and the number one priority of 
the Department. The Department does not believe a delay in the 
rulemaking is appropriate; however, the Department will investigate any 
specific allegation that air safety is being compromised and take 
appropriate action, including enforcement action, where necessary.
    In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
large certificated air carriers decreased commercial operations by 
about 20 percent, as many airlines grounded large numbers of older less 
efficient aircraft and deferred delivery of new aircraft. As a result 
of a less congested air transportation system, on-time performance has 
improved. In March 2002, the FAA held its Annual Commercial Aviation 
Forecast Conference. During the conference the FAA released The FAA 
Aerospace Forecasts, Fiscal Years 2002-2013, which estimates that 
domestic capacity will gradually return to pre-September 11 capacity 
levels over a 3-year period. At the same time, U.S. regional/commuter 
air operations continue to grow, albeit at a slower rate than the pre-
September 11 growth rate. Thus, although recent on-time performance 
would not in and of itself indicate need for regulatory action, the 
Department's statutory mandate, the growing post September 11 airline 
operations, and our long-range forecasts require regulatory action in 
this area.

Extending the Reporting Requirements to Other Carrier Groups

    We proposed that the requirement to report causes of delays at the 
present time apply only to the air carriers that are already required 
to report on-time data under Part 234. These air carriers not only 
account for the vast majority of domestic operations and enplanements, 
but they are in a position to quickly adopt the new reporting system, 
thus minimizing the regulatory burden on the industry and, at the same 
time, providing valuable information to the public, and to the parties 
best able to rectify delay problems.
    Comments from the ATA, ACI-NA, Save the Bay, SFBA, the City of 
Boston, and Mr. George Rummell were in favor of extending the reporting 
requirements to code-share partners of the major carriers, to national 
air carriers and to large regional air carriers. The RAA is opposed to 
extending the requirements beyond the current major carriers and 
believes that American Eagle should be relieved of its current 
reporting obligation.
    SFBA stated that code-share partners of major airlines should begin 
reporting as soon as practicable. It pointed out that many airports 
have extensive operations by such code-share carriers and the data from 
these flights ``would be valuable in assessing the delay problems.'' 
SFBA stated that although the large certificated air carriers account 
for 87% of domestic enplanements, they account for a lower percentage 
of domestic operations. As an example, SFBA pointed to statistics for 
United Air Lines and its code-share partners at San Francisco-Oakland 
(SFO) airport for March 4, 1999, stating that while United accounted 
for 84% of the available seats at SFO, it accounted for only 69% of the 
operations there. SFBA claims that smaller aircraft ``contribute to 
delay more than larger aircraft'' because smaller aircraft are slower, 
require more space to avoid wake turbulence, and serve less passengers. 
According to SFBA, as a way to minimize reporting burden on code-share 
partners, reporting could be limited to reportable airports where the 
code-share operations account for 10% or more of the operations. A 
reportable airport is an airport that accounts for at least one percent 
of domestic scheduled enplanements.
    The City of Boston believes that excluding from the proposed new 
causal reporting requirement 17% of passenger enplanements limits the 
usefulness of the proposed new data. It stated that ``it will be 
impossible for the DOT to implement well-informed market-based 
approaches to minimize delays,'' without delay information from the 
carriers not required to report.
    ACI-NA believes that DOT must design a system for tracking the 
causes of delays that is accurate and complete. The omission of code-
share partners and other scheduled air carriers which account for 17% 
of passengers distorts and undermines the utility of delay data. 
According to ACI-NA, ``More accurate data will enable smaller and 
regional carriers to understand their flight delay problems and 
ultimately help solve those problems. Currently, there is no mechanism 
that serves this function.''
    ATA stated that ``all major, national and code-sharing partners 
should be included in the Part 234 reporting system,'' and each carrier 
must be responsible for its own reporting. ATA believes that ``The 17% 
of enplanements exempt from reporting contribute a disproportionate, 
higher number of airplanes to the congestion mix since these airplanes 
generally have fewer seats.'' According to ATA, ``By leaving out this 
17%, we may inadvertently deny ourselves the ability to find out the 
triggering causes of delays, which increase exponentially at congested 
airports with each added flight, no

[[Page 70538]]

matter how small the aircraft.'' ATA cited La Guardia as a good example 
of an increase in small aircraft operations overwhelming the system.
    AAA supports extending the reporting requirements to all air 
carriers.
    Mr. George Rummell believes that the airline industry should report 
all delays.
    The RAA strongly opposes the expansion of the reporting 
requirements to all medium and large code-sharing regional airlines. It 
states that regional airlines generally operate routes in the 250 to 
500 mile range, which subjects the regional carriers to a high level of 
ground delays not experienced by major carriers. Regional carriers do 
not have the technology to easily capture delay data. RAA cites a cost 
estimate, provided by one of its members, concerning the additional 
personnel needed to collect and report the data. The estimate places 
the additional costs at $75,000 per year. RAA further claims that, 
given the current environment of increased insurance costs and new 
security fees, the smaller communities served by regional airline may 
not be capable of absorbing higher air fares which the carriers would 
need to charge to recover the reporting costs.
    The Department realizes that it is a difficult decision to 
determine the cutoff for which carriers should report on-time data. 
There were numerous comments that point out the difficulty of making 
accurate and informed decisions about correcting delay problems when 
17% of enplanements and a higher share of operations are omitted. This 
is compounded by the fact that many of the missing operations are flown 
by slower moving aircraft. On the other hand, the Department is 
concerned about adding to the operating cost of small carriers. The 
Department is attempting to strike a balance between the competing 
interests. The public interest is best served at this time by applying 
the new reporting requirements to those airlines that already report 
on-time data to the Department. Therefore we disagree with RAA's 
request to relieve American Eagle from the reporting system. American 
Eagle operated almost 493,000 scheduled domestic passenger flights with 
almost 12 million domestic enplanements. Relieving American Eagle of 
its reporting obligation would create a data gap at a time when the 
Department is looking for economical ways to fill its data needs. 
American Eagle's data are especially important because American Eagle 
is the only carrier reporting regional jet operations.
    The Department intends to revisit, at a later date, the issue of 
whether to expand the air carrier universe for on-time reporting. The 
Department will continue to analyze delay data to see if the reporting 
burden is too costly for smaller carriers to participate in the data 
collection. Also, the Department will look at alternative reporting 
means for less burdensome and costly reporting.

Causal Categories and Methodology

    The City of Boston stated that it was unclear from the proposed 
rule as to which delay category deicing activities should be assigned. 
It also stated that ``bird strikes'' are associated with individual 
airports and should be assigned to the National Aviation System 
(``NAS''). The City of Boston took issue with the following statement 
in the NPRM:

    Consistent high volume delays are an indication to airport 
operators and to state and local governments that there is a need 
for infrastructure investments and improvements.

    It believes volume delays can be addressed by actions such as peak-
period pricing, auctioning of landing and takeoff rights, or increased 
use of secondary airports.
    American Trans Air believes that ``bird strikes'' are acts of God 
and should be reported under ``NAS'' delays. The carrier also stated 
that:

* * * the National Aviation System category for reporting delays is 
not adequately defined. There are codes and situations that fall 
under this category, which are now classified elsewhere or are not 
specific enough to be meaningful. For example, should not airport 
delays due to infrastructure, terminal and runway limitations and 
local and regional curfews fall under NAS? The current allocation of 
codes, we believe, needs to be less subjective, and include more 
government-controlled conditions to be labeled as NAS.

    ATA believes that ``bird strikes'' should be attributed to NAS. FAR 
Part 139 requires airports to have a wildlife management program and 
there are specific air traffic control (ATC) procedures to alerting 
pilots to bird hazards. ATA also believes that data on late arriving 
aircraft is not useful. ``Root delay causes for down-line late arriving 
aircraft cannot be consistently determined when multiple delay causes 
are involved.''
    America West asked, ``What is the difference between extreme and 
non-extreme weather delays?'' It believes that ``bird strikes'' should 
be coded as an external delay/cancellation (e.g. extreme weather), not 
as ``Air Carrier'' or ``NAS.'' America West questions the logic of 
allowing carriers to choose whether or not to report the initial cause 
of delay for late arriving aircraft delays.

Weather

    The Department realizes that reporting the causes of airline delays 
and cancellations adds subjectivity to the reporting system. There is a 
fine line between some delays coded as ``Weather'' (extreme weather) 
and others coded as ``NAS'' (non-extreme weather). The purpose of the 
assignment of codes is to identify the party or organization which is 
in the best position to take corrective action. Delays or cancellations 
coded ``Air Carrier'' are best corrected by the air carriers; delays or 
cancellations coded ``NAS'' are best corrected by the FAA, airport 
operators, or State or local governments; and delays or cancellations 
coded ``Weather'' (extreme weather) cannot be reduced by corrective 
action. Delays or cancellations coded ``NAS'' are the type of weather 
delays that could be reduced with corrective action by the airports or 
the FAA. Therefore, delays attributed to deicing are coded as 
``Weather'' delays.
    Extreme weather delays or cancellations are caused by weather 
conditions (e.g., significant meteorological conditions), actual or 
forecasted at the point of departure, en route, or point of arrival 
that, in accordance with applicable regulatory standards and/or in the 
judgment of the air carrier, prevents operation of that flight and/or 
prevents operations of subsequent flights due to the intended aircraft 
being out of position as a result of a prior delay or cancellation 
attributable to weather.

Security Delays

    Ms. Melissa Davis believes that, in light of the terrorists attacks 
of September 11, 2001, airport disruption or security delays should be 
added to the list of delay or cancellation causes. Ms. Davis cites the 
evacuation of Hartsfield International Airport on November 16, 2001, as 
a prime example of the need for security delay reporting.
    ATA recommends that a separate delay category be established to 
report security delays. ATA asserts that security delays are easily 
identified and these delays should be distinguished from ``NAS'' or 
``Air Carrier'' caused delays.
    The Department agrees with the commenters that requested a separate 
category for delays and cancellations that relate to security. We will 
adopt a new category known as ``Security.'' Congress has assigned 
responsibility for aviation and other transportation security to the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). One of TSA's primary 
functions is to provide security screening of passengers and their

[[Page 70539]]

accessible property transiting from an airport's common areas to its 
sterile areas where passengers board their flights. Delays in flight 
departures are not properly attributable to ``Security'' if they are 
caused by routine passenger screening. Carriers may or may not elect to 
delay a flight's departure for such passengers. Flight delays occurring 
because an air carrier holds a flight for screening are ``Air Carrier'' 
delays not ``Security'' delays. Not all screening and other security-
related delays are attributable to ``Security.'' Some security delays 
may result from actions of air carriers or airport employees who fail 
to follow security requirements. Air carriers should take care to 
ensure that delays and cancellations assigned to the ``Security'' 
category are not attributable to their own actions or caused by their 
own employees.

National Aviation System (NAS)

    Delays and cancellations attributable to ``NAS'' refer to a broad 
set of conditions: weather-non extreme, airport operations, heavy 
traffic volume, air traffic control, etc.
    Delays or cancellations resulting from ``bird strikes'' should be 
coded ``NAS.'' While bird strikes could be viewed as an Act of God, 
improved wildlife management at airports could reduce the frequency of 
bird strikes.
    While air traffic volume delays and cancellations in the short term 
are generally the result of over-scheduling by the airline industry, 
these types of delays and cancellations are coded ``NAS.'' Volume 
delays occur when there are more flights scheduled than the airport can 
handle for a given period of time. An individual air carrier's schedule 
by itself does not create volume delays. Rather, it is the accumulation 
of all the commercial, general aviation, and military operations at the 
airport that contribute to the problem. Air carriers schedule flights 
to meet consumer demand. Volume delays can be reduced in the short term 
through changes in the air carriers' scheduling practices, which 
includes using larger equipment, or as the City of Boston suggests, by 
creating incentives to change consumer preference. Such delays may in 
the long term be reduced by improving the airport's infrastructure 
(e.g. building runways, improving FAA tower facilities, etc.). The 
airline industry must work together reduce volume delays.
    Air carriers only track delays up to ``push back from the gate.'' 
These delays are departure delays. After push back, the aircraft is 
under air traffic control. Delays occurring after departure are 
assigned by air carriers to the NAS. Therefore, whenever the arrival 
delay is greater than the departure delay, the air carriers apportion 
NAS minutes to make up the difference between the departure delay and 
the arrival delay (Departure delay + NAS delay = Arrival delay).
    Whenever the departure delay is more than the arrival delay, the en 
route time savings would be prorated back to the departure delay 
categories. For example, if a 50 minute departure delay consists of a 
15 minute ``Air Carrier'' delay, a 10 minute ``NAS'' delay, and a 25 
minute ``Late Arriving Aircraft,'' then the departure delay would be 
30% ``Air Carrier,'' 20% ``NAS'' and 50% ``Late Arriving Aircraft''. If 
the flight arrived 40 minutes late, this would be reported in minutes 
as 12 minutes ``Air Carrier,'' 8 minutes ``NAS'' and 20 minutes ``Late 
Arriving Aircraft.''
    Using the available internal data, the FAA will review the delays 
reported by the air carriers in the ``NAS'' category to identify the 
actual causes of the delays. Air carriers track delays up to the time 
the aircraft pushes away from the departure gate. Delays that occur 
after ``push-back'' are generally assigned to the ``NAS'' category. The 
FAA has various data sets that can be used to identify delays after 
``push-back.'' One of these is FAA's Air Traffic Operations Network 
(OPSNET) information. This data set provides information on delays 
incurred by aircraft while under the control of the air traffic system.
    In addition, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
provides the FAA with weather information. Airport operators provide 
the FAA with information on runway closures and other airport 
incidents. With these data sets, the FAA has the capability to refine 
the NAS delays into weather-non extreme, volume, equipment outages, 
runway closures, other, or ``no match.''

Carrier Delays

    The Paralyzed Veterans of America requested that the Department 
remove the specific reference to ``handling disabled passengers'' from 
the guidance list of ``Air Carrier'' delays.
    The Department concurs with the request of The Paralyzed Veterans 
of America to remove the specific reference to ``handling disabled 
passengers'' from the guidance list of ``Air Carrier'' delays. Slow 
boarding or seating covers all passengers and there is no intent to 
focus on an individual group. Delays attributed to slow boarding are 
coded as ``Air Carrier.''
    The Department disagrees with the proposal to attribute to ``NAS'' 
a delay caused by an air carrier observing an airport curfew. Curfews 
are in place at many airports and air carriers must plan their 
schedules taking into account these curfews. If a delay or cancellation 
is the result of an airport curfew, the delay is an ``Air Carrier'' 
delay.
    Delays caused by positive passenger/baggage matches are coded ``Air 
Carrier'' when the air carrier is responsible for conducting the match. 
Air carriers are responsible for advising passengers of the time needed 
for pre-boarding clearances and security screening. If delays are 
caused by inoperative security equipment or if the government 
institutes a security action which delays flights, then the delays will 
be coded as ``Security.''

Delays Attributed to Late Arriving Aircraft

    Consumers have an interest in knowing if particular flights are 
consistently late due to late arriving aircraft. Delays reported under 
the ``Late Arriving Aircraft'' category demonstrate the ripple effects 
of an earlier flight delay problem. The cause of the initial delay must 
be addressed to cure the delays associated with late-arriving aircraft. 
Some carriers track the initial causes and use an internal code to 
identify the initial cause for downline late arriving aircraft. Other 
carriers do not track the downline effects of earlier delays and only 
record that the flight was late because of the previous flight's late 
``turn around.'' While data that identify the initial causes of 
downline delays are useful data, they are not critical. Originally, we 
proposed in the NPRM to create a two-tier system where carriers had the 
option to report the root cause of late arriving aircraft delays. We 
agree with ATA that this two-tier reporting system could be confusing 
to data users and not produce the desired results. Therefore, in such 
cases we have decided to require that carriers report only that the 
delay was the result of a ``late arriving aircraft'' and not report the 
initial delay cause. The Department will have the ability to track the 
ripple effects of downline delays since carriers report the aircraft 
tail number, which will enable the Department to follow an aircraft 
through its daily flight schedule.
    Thus, based on our review of the public comments, we are adopting 
the following reporting codes:

Cancellation Codes

    (A) Air Carrier;
    (B) Extreme Weather;
    (C) National Aviation System (NAS); and
    (D) Security.

Delay Causes

    Air Carrier;

[[Page 70540]]

    Extreme Weather;
    National Aviation System (NAS);
    Security; and
    Late Arriving Aircraft.

Delay and Cancellations Causes

    Below is a list of examples of causes for delays and cancellations. 
This list should be used as a guide for relating the types of 
occurrences and the associated delay or cancellation code. This list 
should not be considered a complete list. Carriers report delay 
categories when the arrival delay is 15 minutes or more. The rule does 
not require carriers to report causal data for flights that are 
considered ``on-time.''

Air Carrier

Aircraft cleaning
Aircraft damage (except bird strikes, lightning/hail damage)
Airport curfew
Awaiting the arrival of connecting passengers or crew
Awaiting alcohol test
Awaiting gate space
Baggage loading
Cabin servicing
Cargo loading
Catering
Computer outage--carrier equipment
Crew legality (pilot or attendant rest)
Damage by hazardous goods
Engineering Inspection
Flight paperwork
Fueling
Gate congestion
Government forms not properly completed--INS, FAA, Agriculture, Public 
Health, etc.
Ground equipment out of service
Hot brakes restriction
Last minute passenger
Late mail from Post Office
Late crew
Lavatory servicing
Maintenance
Medical emergency
Out of service aircraft
Oversales
Positive passenger baggage match
Passenger services
Potable water servicing
Pre-flight check
Ramp congestion--blocked by another aircraft under carrier's control
Ramp service
Removal of unruly passenger
Revised weight sheet
Shortage of ramp equipment
Slow boarding or seating
Snow removal (when it is a carrier ramp service function)
Stowing carry-on baggage
Weight and balance delays

Weather

Below minimum conditions
Clear ice inspection
Deicing aircraft
Earthquake
Extreme high or low temperatures
Hail Damage
Holding at gate for enroute weather
Hurricane
Lightning damage
Pre-planned cancellations that result from predicted weather
Snow Storm
Thunder Storm
Tornado

National Aviation System (NAS)

Airport conditions
Airport construction
Air Traffic Control (ATC)
Awaiting ATC clearance while still at gate
Air Traffic Quota Flow Program--ATC
Closed Runways
Computer failure--air carrier equipment
Equipment Outage--ATC
Gate hold--ATC
Ground delay program--ATC
Flow control program--FAA
Other disabled aircraft blocking runway
Ramp congestion--blocked by aircraft not under carrier's control
Ramp Traffic--Air Traffic Control
Restricted aircraft movement on runways
Volume Delays

Security

Bomb threat
Inoperative screening equipment
Evacuation of terminal or concourse or re-boarding aircraft resulting 
from security breech
Weapon confiscation

Late Arriving Aircraft

Means a previous flight with same aircraft arrived late which caused 
the present flight to depart late.

Passenger Notification

    Several commenters stated that they support the rule to collect 
causal data, but more should be done to require passenger notification 
and to relieve passenger inconvenience at the time of the delay or 
cancellation. Mr. Rummell states that a passenger should receive 
compensation, similar to denied boarding compensation, when an air 
carrier's delayed flight causes a passenger to miss a connecting 
flight.
    The Department agrees that air carriers should make their best 
efforts to alert passengers as early as possible of delays, the reason 
for the delay, and the actions the carrier is taking to deal with the 
problem. The instant rulemaking is focused on collecting data that can 
be used by consumers in making future travel plans and by the operators 
and managers of the air transportation system for strategic planning to 
decrease the frequency and severity of flight irregularities. Thus, 
these proposals suggesting notification requirements in the event of 
delays or cancellations as well as the proposal for compensation are 
outside the scope of this rulemaking.

Standardizing Flight Times

    ACI-NA states that the current system does not take into account 
the common practice by air carriers of increasing flight times in their 
schedules to avoid the appearance of frequent delays. According to ACI-
NA system inefficiencies are masked when carriers' flights are counted 
as ``on-time'' only because the air carriers padded their schedules. 
ACI-NA believes that, ``DOT's establishment of a more uniform delay 
reporting system would go a long way towards rectifying these problems, 
but will only do so if most or all air carriers are required to 
comply.''
    We agree that the current reporting system has the capacity to 
conceal inefficiencies in the aviation system. However, we also believe 
that airlines are acting responsibly and in the best interests of the 
public in adjusting their schedules to reflect actual departure and 
arrival times. It is more important for the public to be able to rely 
on the stated time that their flight actually will arrive at its 
destination, than it is for them to know the time the flight would 
arrive if there were no inefficiencies in the system. Generally, 
carriers schedule their flight times based on the unimpeded taxi-out 
time, the unimpeded air time, the unimpeded taxi-in time, and the time 
of all anticipated delays. For example, if each morning an air 
carrier's flight experiences a 20 minute wait in a queue for take-off 
clearance, the air carrier will incorporate those 20 minutes into its 
flight schedule. Flights are late when the carrier experiences an 
unanticipated delay. If events causing delays occur regularly, these 
events are built into a carrier's schedule, which precludes the public 
from otherwise being deceived and permits the public to rely on the 
carrier's stated schedule.
    The Department's Inspector General audited some flights at certain 
heavily used airports and found that scheduled flight times have 
increased in duration over time. The increase in scheduled flight time 
is related to the rise in operations in the aviation system. Generally, 
an increase in the volume of operations at an airport means an increase 
in taxi-out times. This is especially true during peak operating 
periods. Rather than creating a more ``uniform'' system for carriers to 
report

[[Page 70541]]

their scheduled times, the Department has plans to develop an 
efficiency index for routes and airports. The route index would be 
based on the sum of the unimpeded taxi-out time, the unimpeded air 
time, the unimpeded taxi-in time divided into the scheduled times. The 
airport index would be an average of all route indices originating at 
the airport. High indices would represent an inefficiency on the route 
or at the airport. Accordingly, we do not find it in the public 
interest to adopt ACI-NA's suggestion to alter the way on-time flights 
are calculated.

Airline Service Quality Performance Data vs. Operations Network Data

    ACI-NA states that, ``The current system for reporting flight 
delays and cancellations is deeply flawed because of inconsistencies 
between the Airline Service Quality Performance (ASQP) data reported by 
the airlines to the BTS and the delay data collected by FAA personnel 
from manually recording aircraft via the FAA's Operations Network 
(``OPSNET'' data). The OPSNET data are intended to measure system-wide 
ATC performance and to identify areas for ATC operational 
improvement.''
    The Department does not believe the reporting systems are flawed 
because ASQP and OPSNET reports have different delay results. As ACI-NA 
correctly points out, OPSNET measures how well the ATC system is 
performing. If a flight cannot lift-off within 15 minutes after 
departing the boarding gate, OPSNET records a departure delay because 
the ATC system did not service that aircraft in a timely manner. 
Conversely, ASQP measures how well the air carriers are meeting their 
published schedules. The most important delay statistic of ASQP is the 
percentage of scheduled on-time arrivals. As stated earlier, if an air 
carrier's flight routinely experiences a 20 minute wait in a departure 
queue, the carrier will add those 20 minutes into its flight schedule. 
That flight will probably have a consistent OPSNET delay and an on-time 
ASQP arrival. The largest discrepancies between OPSNET and ASQP occur 
when there are long ATC delays in the early morning. In these cases, 
both systems record delays for the initial morning flights. ASQP will 
continue to record delayed flights until the air carriers are able to 
meet their published schedules. OPSNET, on the other hand, would not 
record another delay unless there was another ATC problem.
    The Department does not view different statistics from OPSNET and 
ASQP as flawed data. However, the public can be confused when the media 
uses OPSNET and ASQP data interchangeably without explaining the 
differences in the two systems. We believe that the proper source to 
advise the public of air carrier on-time performance is the ASQP data. 
OPSNET data are the proper data source for analyzing ATC delays. 
However, once causal data are included in the ASQP system, it should 
become the primary source for all delay studies.

Publication of Causal Data

    The ATA believes air carrier causal data are proprietary and 
confidential and should only be released to the public in an aggregate 
form and that no individual carrier causal data should be publicly 
released. ATA also believes that the Department should not release the 
``refined'' NAS data until the Department and airlines have had ample 
time to evaluate its utility for this purpose. In the NPRM, the 
Department stated that it would use OPSNET data and information from 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to identify the 
actual causes of delays reported in the ``NAS'' category.
    Given the existing reporting requirements in this area, ATA has 
failed to demonstrate why causal data should be viewed as proprietary 
data. Indeed, Congress and the Department have made the determination 
that overriding public interest calls for release of the data. 
Moreover, the causal category ``Air Carrier'' is inclusive of all types 
of delays under the control of the carrier. This level of summarization 
does not allow a competitor air carrier to gain a competitive advantage 
by studying another carrier's reported ``Air Carrier'' delays. For 
example, you could not gain insight as to a carrier's policy of holding 
a flight for delayed connecting passengers from delays coded ``Air 
Carrier.''
    The Department also disagrees with the suggestion that the FAA 
should not identify the delays coded ``NAS.'' It is important for 
management purposes for the FAA to identify the specific cause of 
``NAS'' delays. The FAA has had ample experience using OPSNET data to 
identify ATC, airport, and weather related delays. The Department 
realizes that there will be some ``NAS'' delays which it will not be 
able to match with its internal data. For example, there probably will 
not be internal FAA data to identify delays or cancellations caused by 
bird strikes. From the information gathered by the Air Carrier On-Time 
Reporting Advisory Committee and our experience with the follow-on 
pilot program on causal reporting, it appears air carriers presently 
lack the necessary information to code those flight delays which occur 
after the aircraft pushes back from the departure gate. Because of 
this, air carriers code all delays after push back as ``NAS'' delays. 
Since air carriers lack the causal knowledge of delays after push back, 
we believe the FAA is the proper party to identify ``NAS'' delays. 
Moreover, if ``NAS'' delays were not identified, the public may be left 
with the perception that all ``NAS'' delays are solely ATC delays, 
which is not accurate.

Diverted Flights

    We have concluded that air carriers should not report causal codes 
for diverted flights. Air carriers track and code delays only up to the 
time the aircraft pushes back from the gate at the origin airport. 
Carriers are instructed to code delays after push back as ``NAS'' 
delays because, after push back, the aircraft is generally under the 
command of the air traffic control system. Most diversions are caused 
by extreme weather conditions or mechanical malfunctions. There are 
only a minimal number of diverted flights and most diversions would be 
mis-coded if carriers followed the reporting instructions to code in-
flight delays as ``NAS'' delays.

The Five Minute Rule

    In the interest of keeping the reporting burden to a minimum, 
carriers will be required only to track delay causes of five minutes or 
more, however carriers may elect to track delays by the minute. 
Regardless of the method chosen, a carrier must ensure that, in all 
cases, the total minutes of the reported causal delays equal the actual 
minutes of arrival delays. For instructions, see examples 2, 3, 8, and 
11 under the caption ``Examples of delayed flight coding.''

Reporting of Delayed Flights

    Carriers use a fixed-length file format to report on-time data. We 
have added four-position numeric fields for each of the five possible 
causes of delays. Instead of reporting delay codes, carriers will 
report the number of minutes attributed to the cause of delay into the 
assigned fields for the appropriate cause of delay. There often are 
multiple reasons for delayed flights, and we are requiring air carriers 
to report each category of flight delay, as applicable. The Department 
has adopted the fixed-length file format as follows:

[[Page 70542]]



                         Field Specifications for Form 234, On-Time Performance Reports
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Field and description                   Type            Location     Length            Comments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A--Carrier code.......................  Alpha                         1-2           2
B--Flight number......................  Num                           3-6           4
C--Origin airport code................  Alpha                         7-9           3
D--Destination airport code...........  Alpha                       10-12           3
E--Date of flight operation...........  Num                         13-20           8   Format yyyymmdd.
F--Day of the week of flight operation  Num                            21           1   Mon = 1, Sun = 7.
G--Scheduled departure time per OAG...  Num                         22-25           4   Local time 24 hour
                                                                                         clock.
H--Scheduled departure time per CRS...  Num                         26-29           4   Local time 24 hour
                                                                                         clock.
I--Gate departure time (actual).......  Num                         30-33           4   Local time 24 hour
                                                                                         clock.
J--Scheduled arrival time per OAG.....  Num                         34-37           4   Local time 24 hour
                                                                                         clock.
K--Scheduled arrival time per CRS.....  Num                         38-41           4   Local time 24 hour
                                                                                         clock.
L--Gate arrival time (actual).........  Num                         42-45           4   Local time 24 hour
                                                                                         clock.
M--Difference between OAG and CRS       Num                         46-49           4   In minutes (2 hrs = 0120
 scheduled departure times.                                                              min).
N--Difference between OAG and CRS       Num                         50-53           4   In minutes.
 scheduled arrival times.
O--Scheduled elapsed time per CRS.....  Num                         54-57           4   In minutes.
P--Actual gate-to-gate time...........  Num                         58-61           4   In minutes.
Q--Departure delay time (actual         Num                         62-65           4   In minutes.
 minutes CRS).
R--Arrival delay time (actual minutes   Num                         66-69           4   In minutes.
 CRS).
S--Elapsed time difference (actual      Num                         70-73           4   In minutes.
 minutes CRS).
T--Wheels-off time (actual)...........  Num                         74-77           4   Local time 24 hour
                                                                                         clock.
U--Wheels-on time (actual)............  Num                         78-81           4   Local time 24 hour
                                                                                         clock.
V--Aircraft tail number...............  Alpha/Num                   82-87           6   Left justified, trailing
                                                                                         blanks.
W--Cancellation code..................  Num                            88           1   (A, B, C, or D).
X--Minutes late for delay.............  Num                         89-92           4   Carrier Caused Delays--
                                                                                         In minutes.
Y--Minutes late for delay.............  Num                         93-96           4   Extreme Weather Delays--
                                                                                         In minutes.
Z--Minutes late for delay.............  Num                        97-100           4   NAS Delays--In minutes.
AA--Minutes late for delay............  Num                       101-104           4   Security--In minutes.
AB--Minutes late for delay............  Num                       105-108           4   Late Arriving Aircraft--
                                                                                         In Minutes.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Cancellation codes                      Delay causes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A--Carrier Caused.........................  Carrier Caused.
B--Extreme Weather........................  Extreme Weather.
C--National Aviation System...............  National Aviation System.
D--Security...............................  Security.
                                            Late Arriving Aircraft.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All numeric fields for which data are unavailable will be zero-
filled.
    All alpha fields for which data are unavailable will be left 
blank.
    The data fields in this document are Y2K compliant.

    Examples of delayed flight coding: 1. A flight received a 20 minute 
ground hold because of congestion at the destination airport, and the 
flight was 18 minutes late arriving at the destination airport gate. 
The delayed flight would be coded 18 minutes for NAS.
    2. A flight was 4 minutes late pushing back from the gate and 
arrived 21 minutes late. The delayed flight would be coded 21 minutes 
for NAS. Please note in this example that the air carrier delay was 
less than 5 minutes, and thus unless the carrier tracks delays by the 
minute, the 4 minute push-back delay would not be attributed to the air 
carrier.
    3. A flight was delayed 4 minutes due to slow boarding of 
passengers and another 3 minutes to load late-arriving baggage. The 
flight arrived 15 minutes late. The delayed flight would be coded 7 
minutes for air carrier and 8 minutes for NAS. Please note in this 
example that while no single air carrier caused delay was 5 minutes or 
more, the sum of the carrier delay was more than 5 minutes and the 
total delay was 15 minutes, and thus, reportable.
    4. A flight was delayed 20 minutes waiting for connecting 
passengers from another flight and arrived 28 minutes late. The delayed 
flight would be coded 20 minutes for air carrier and 8 minutes for NAS.
    5. A flight had a 16 minute ground hold and arrived 14 minutes 
late. There is no delay coding as the flight arrived within 15 minutes 
of scheduled arrival time, and thus, is considered on-time.
    6. A flight is 20 minutes late because of weather and is coded 20 
minutes for weather. The next flight with that aircraft is 15 minutes 
late leaving the gate and arrives 20 minutes late. The delayed flight 
would be coded 15 minutes for late arriving aircraft and 5 minutes NAS. 
Please note in this example that the air carrier made up 5 minutes of 
the initial late arriving aircraft delay, but then experienced a 5 
minute en-route delay.
    7. A flight was 30 minutes late pushing back from the gate. The 30 
minute delay consisted of 10 minutes for a late arriving aircraft and 
20 minutes for slow boarding process because of an oversales problem. 
The flight arrived 24 minutes late. The delayed flight would be coded 8 
minutes for late arriving flight and 16 minutes for air carrier. Please 
note in this example that the 6 minutes gained after push back was 
prorated back to the two recorded delays. In this example, late 
arriving aircraft was 33.3% of the original delay and the air carrier 
delay was 66.6% of the delay. Therefore, late arriving aircraft was 
computed as 33.3% of 24 which equals 8; and air carrier was computed as 
66.6% of 24 which equals 16.
    8. A flight was 20 minutes late because of a thunderstorm and 6 
minutes late because of a crew problem. The flight arrived 18 minutes 
late. The delayed flight would be coded 14 minutes for weather and 4 
minutes for air carrier. In this example, the air carrier must round 
the prorated minutes to whole numbers. Carriers should not report 
fractions or decimals. Also, the

[[Page 70543]]

carrier would report an air carrier delay of less than 5 minutes 
because the carrier was required to track the crew delay because it was 
5 minutes or more.
    9. Flight number 234 was 20 minutes late departing the gate because 
the air carrier substituted a spare aircraft to reduce a known upcoming 
delay. The flight was scheduled to be operated with an aircraft that, 
at the time, was experiencing a 3 hour extreme weather delay. Flight 
number 234 arrived 16 minutes late, and was reported as a 16 minute 
late arriving aircraft--extreme weather.
    10. A flight was 2 hours late because the carrier's concourse was 
evacuated and passengers re-screened because of a breech of security. 
The flight would be coded 120 minutes--Security.
    11. A flight was 3 minutes late because of late crew and 4 minutes 
late because of severe weather. The flight arrived 19 minutes late. 
Since the flight was 7 minutes late departing the gate, the carrier 
could report the delay as 7 minutes ``Weather'' (the predominant cause 
of the gate delay of over five minutes) and a ``NAS'' delay of 12 
minutes. Also, acceptable would be 3 minutes ``Air Carrier,'' 4 minutes 
``Weather'' and 12 minutes ``NAS.''
    Examples of cancelled flight coding: 1. A flight cancelled because 
of mechanical problems is coded ``A'' for air carrier.
    2. Flight 123, BOS-DCA was cancelled because, overnight, the 
airport had two feet of snow. The cancellation would be coded ``B'' for 
weather.
    3. The next segment of Flight 123, DCA-MIA was cancelled because 
the aircraft that was to be used for this flight is stuck in two feet 
of snow in Boston. The weather in Washington and Miami is clear. The 
cancellation would be coded ``B'' for weather, because the intended 
aircraft was out of position as a result of a prior cancellation 
attributed to weather.
    4. It's a clear day at O'Hare, but there is a ground hold for 
flights to DFW because of a severe thunderstorm around the DFW airport. 
After a 3 hour wait, the weather at DFW has not changed, and the 
carrier cancels the flight. The cancellation would be coded ``B'' for 
weather.
    5. It's a rainy, misty day at O'Hare. Operations have been slow all 
morning. The air carrier receives a call from air traffic control 
asking that it cancel one of its next five flights to allow the airport 
to return to normal operations. Other carriers receive similar calls. 
These cancellations would be coded ``C'' for NAS.
    6. The airport is closed for two hours because of a breech in 
security. The carrier cancelled three flights because the number of 
scheduled departures exceeded airport capacity; and the FAA advised all 
air carriers that they must reduce the remainder of their daily 
schedule. The cancellation would be coded AD'' for Security.

Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This rule is ``significant'' under Executive Order 12866 and the 
regulatory policies and procedures of the Department of Transportation 
(44 FR 11034), and was reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget. 
As discussed above, the purpose of the rule is to disclose more fully 
to the public and aviation managers the nature and source of the delays 
and cancellations experienced by air travelers. This objective is 
achieved by amending 14 CFR 234 to require reporting air carriers to 
identify and report causes of airline delays and cancellations. Based 
on information collected during the pilot project, we estimate that the 
new reporting requirements would require each reporting carrier to 
expend 10-20 hours to reconfigure its data system. Once these initial 
resources are expended, we estimate that there will be no additional 
costs or burdens for delay and cancellation reporting. We estimated 
reprogramming costs of $100.00/hour. Thus, we estimate that for the 10 
reporting air carriers in total, there would be an initial 
reprogramming cost of $10,000--$20,000.
    Prior to the issuance of the NPRM, the Air Carrier Association of 
America stated that the start-up costs for air carriers not presently 
reporting under Part 234 would be approximately $25,000, with annual 
costs as high as $100,000. The Air Carrier Association of America did 
not submit a comment in response to the NPRM. American Trans Air 
estimated its initial programming costs at $136,000 and an annual cost 
of $100,000 ``to report on-time performance as well as causal data.'' 
The ATA stated that it would be ``inappropriate'' for it to estimate 
the costs to its members because ``on-time flight performance reporting 
is the responsibility of each certificated carrier.''
    This final rule applies only to carriers reporting under Part 234 
and, while American Trans Air submitted cost estimates, it has not 
reached the Part 234 reporting threshold at this time and thus, is not 
covered by the requirements of this rule. Thus, none of the air 
carriers covered by this final rule face development costs since they 
are already reporting under Part 234. None of the carriers, presently 
reporting under Part 234, indicated that the annual costs for reporting 
the causes of delays and cancellations would be $100,000 or more. A 
carrier whose business expands to such a point that it meets the Part 
234 reporting requirements, must develop a computer system to file its 
quality performance reports of which the casual delay information would 
be a minor part of the overall development costs.
    Finally, even using slightly higher cost estimates ($25,000-
$50,000), we believe that the benefits to the traveling public and the 
availability of more accurate information for the allocation of 
transportation resources outweigh the modest costs that would be 
incurred by the reporting air carriers.

Executive Order 12612

    This rule has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and 
criteria contained in Executive Order 12612 (``Federalism'') and we 
have determined the rule does not have sufficient federalism 
implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires an 
agency to review its regulations to assess their impact on small 
entities unless the agency determines that a rule is not expected to 
have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
Unless alternative definitions have been established by the agency in 
consultation with the Small Business Administration (SBA), the 
definition of ``small business'' has the same meaning as under the 
Small Business Act (15 CFR parts 631-657c). For those companies 
providing scheduled passenger air transportation, the SBA defines a 
small business as an air carrier that has 1,500 employees or fewer (See 
NAICS Number 48111).
    The rule applies only to those air carriers that meet the Part 234 
reporting criteria (i.e., carriers that hold a certificate under 49 
U.S.C. 41102 and account for at least 1 percent of the domestic 
scheduled-passenger revenues in the past 12 months). We have reviewed 
our data base and find that none of the air carriers that report under 
Part 234 have 1,500 employees or fewer. In fact, our information 
indicates that all of these carriers employ more than 10,000 employees. 
Therefore, we believe that this rule does not apply to any ``small 
business'' as defined by the SBA. Thus, based on the above discussion, 
I certify this rule will not have a

[[Page 70544]]

significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    This rule does not impose unfunded mandates under the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does not result in costs of $100 
million or more to either State, local, or tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, or to the private sector.

Environmental Assessment

    We believe that the changes to the Part 234 reporting system have 
no significant impact on the environment. The changes proposed in this 
final rule should increase the quality of data collected on the causes 
of airline delays and cancellations, thus increasing our ability to 
evaluate potential air traffic problems and allocate the appropriate 
resources toward mitigating these problems. These revisions should 
produce a small net benefit to the environment by improving the data 
sources used in regulatory development. Therefore, we find that there 
are no significant environmental impacts associated with this rule.

Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis

    The reporting and record keeping requirements associated with this 
final rule are being sent to the Office of Management and Budget in 
accordance with 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35 under OMB NO: 2138-0040. 
Administration: Bureau of Transportation Statistics; Title: Airline 
Service Quality Performance Reports; Need for Information: Statistical 
information on the causes of airline delays and cancellations; Proposed 
Use of Information: To disclose more fully to the public the nature and 
source of the delays and cancellations experienced by air travelers; 
Frequency: Monthly; Burden Estimate: 150 hours; Average Annual Burden 
Hours per Respondent After Final Rule is Issued--No burden. Based on 
information collected during the pilot project, we estimate that these 
reporting requirements will require each affected carrier to expend 10-
20 hours to reconfigure its data system. We estimate reprogramming 
costs of $100.00/hour. Thus, we estimate that for the 10 reporting air 
carriers in total, there would be an initial reprogramming cost of 
$10,000-$20,000. Once these initial resources are expended, we estimate 
that there would be no additional annual burden. We invite comments on 
our burden estimates. For further information or to comment on the 
burden hour estimate contact: The Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Room 10235, New Executive 
Office Building, Washington, DC 20503, Attention Desk Office for the 
Department of Transportation or Bernie Stankus at the address listed 
under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.

Regulation Identifier Number

    A regulation identifier number (RIN) is assigned to each regulatory 
action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The 
Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in 
April and October of each year. The RIN number 2139-AA09 contained in 
the heading of this document can be used to cross reference this action 
with the Unified Agenda.

Regulatory Text

    Accordingly, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, under 
delegated authority pursuant to 49 CFR part 1, amends Chapter II of 14 
CFR, as follows:

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 234

    Advertising, Air carriers, Consumer protection, Reporting 
requirements, Travel agents.

PART 234--[AMENDED]

    1. The authority citation for Part 234 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 329 and chapters 401, 413, 417.

    2. Section 234.4 is amended by adding paragraphs (a)(16) through 
(a)(21), revising paragraph (b), and adding paragraph (g), (h) and (i) 
as follows:


Sec.  234.4  Reporting of on-time performance.

    (a) * * *
    (16) Causal code for cancellation, if any.
    (17) Minutes of delay attributed to the air carrier, if any.
    (18) Minutes of delay attributed to extreme weather, if any.
    (19) Minutes of delay attributed to the national aviation system, 
if any.
    (20) Minutes of delay attributed to security, if any.
    (21) Minutes of delay attributed to a previous late arriving 
aircraft, if any.
    (b) When reporting the information specified in paragraph (a) of 
this section for a diverted flight, a reporting carrier shall use the 
original scheduled flight number and the original scheduled origin and 
destination airport codes. Carriers are not required to report causal 
information for diverted flights.
* * * * *
    (g) Reporting carriers should use the following codes to identify 
causes for cancelled flights:

Code
A--Air Carrier
B--Extreme Weather
C--National Aviation System (NAS).
D-Security

    (1) Air Carrier cancellations are due to circumstances that were 
within the control of the air carrier (e.g., lack of flight crew, 
maintenance, etc.).
    (2) Extreme weather cancellations are caused by weather conditions 
(e.g., significant meteorological conditions), actual or forecasted at 
the point of departure, en route, or point of arrival that, in 
accordance with applicable regulatory standards and/or in the judgment 
of the air carrier, prevents operation of that flight and/or prevents 
operations of subsequent flights due to the intended aircraft being out 
of position as a result of a prior cancellation or delay attributable 
to weather.
    (3) NAS cancellations are caused by circumstances within the 
National Aviation System. This term is used to refer to a broad set of 
conditions: weather-non-extreme, airport operations, heavy traffic 
volume, air traffic control, etc.
    (4) Security cancellations may be the result of malfunctioning 
screening or other security equipment or a breech of security that 
causes the evacuation of the airport or individual concourses, or the 
need to re-screen passengers.
    (h) Reporting carriers should use the following causes to identify 
the reasons for delayed flights:

CAUSE
Air Carrier
Extreme weather
NAS
Security
Late arriving aircraft

    (1) Air carrier delays are due to circumstances within the control 
of the air carrier.
    (2) Extreme weather delays are caused by weather conditions (e.g., 
significant meteorological conditions, actual or forecasted at the 
point of departure, en route, or point of arrival that, in accordance 
with applicable regulatory standards and/or in the judgment of the air 
carrier, prevents operation of that flight and/or prevents operations 
of subsequent flights due to the intended aircraft being out of 
position as a result of a prior cancellation or delay attributable to 
weather.
    (3) NAS delays are caused by circumstances within the National 
Aviation System. This term is used to refer to a broad set of 
conditions: weather-non-extreme, airport operations, heavy traffic 
volume, air traffic control, etc.

[[Page 70545]]

    (4) Security delays may be the result of malfunctioning screening 
or other security equipment or a breech of security that causes the 
evacuation of the airport or individual concourses or the need to re-
screen passengers.
    (5) Late arriving aircraft delays are the result of a late incoming 
aircraft from the previous flight.
    (i) When reporting causal codes in paragraph (a) of this section, 
reporting carriers are required to code delays only when the arrival 
delay is 15 minutes or greater; and reporting carriers must report each 
causal component of the reportable delay when the causal component is 5 
minutes or greater.

    3. Section 234.5 is revised as follows:


Sec.  234.5  Form of reports.

    Except where otherwise noted, all reports required by this part 
shall be filed within 15 days of the end of the month for which data 
are reported. The reports must be submitted to the Office of Airline 
Information in a format specified in accounting and reporting 
directives issued by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics' Assistant 
Director for Airline Information.

    Issued in Washington, DC on November 15, 2002.
Rick Kowalewski,
Acting Director, Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
[FR Doc. 02-29910 Filed 11-22-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-62-P