[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 226 (Friday, November 22, 2002)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70467-70468]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-29738]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-286, License Nos. DPR-5, DPR-26, 
and DPR-64]


Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Notice of Issuance of 
Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

    Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, has issued a Director's Decision with regard to a petition 
dated November 8, 2001, filed by Riverkeeper, Inc., et al., hereinafter 
referred to as the ``Petitioners.'' The petition was supplemented on 
December 20, 2001. The petition concerns the operation of the Indian 
Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3 (IP1, 2, and 3).
    The petition requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC): (1) Order the licensee to suspend operations, revoke the 
operating license, or adopt other measures resulting in a temporary 
shutdown of IP2 and 3; (2) order the licensee to conduct a full review 
of the facility's vulnerabilities, security measures, and evacuation 
plans; (3) require the licensee to provide information documenting the 
existing and readily attainable security measures which protect the IP 
facility against land, water, and airborne terrorist attacks; (4) 
immediately modify the IP2 and 3 operating licenses to mandate certain 
specified security measures sufficient to protect the facility; and (5) 
order the revision of the licensee's emergency response plan and 
Westchester County's radiological emergency response plan (RERP) to 
account for possible terrorist attacks and prepare a comprehensive 
response to multiple, simultaneous attacks in the region, which could 
impair the efficient

[[Page 70468]]

evacuation of the area. In addition, the Petitioners requested that the 
NRC take prompt action to permanently retire the facility if, after 
conducting a full review of the facility's vulnerabilities, security 
measures, and evacuation plans, the NRC finds that the IP facility 
cannot be adequately protected against terrorist threats. Further, 
separately from the above issues, the Petitioners requested that the 
NRC order the licensee to undertake the immediate conversion of the 
current water-cooled spent fuel storage system to a dry-cask system.
    As the basis for the November 8, 2001, request, the Petitioners 
stated that: (1) The IP facility is a plausible target of future 
terrorist actions, (2) actual threats against nuclear power plants have 
been documented, (3) IP is currently vulnerable to a catastrophic 
terrorist attack, (4) a terrorist attack on IP2 and 3 would have 
significant public health, environmental, and economic impacts, and (5) 
the Westchester County's RERP is inadequate because it is based on 
erroneous assumptions.
    The NRC sent a copy of the proposed Director's Decision to the 
Petitioners and to the licensee for comment on May 16, 2002. The 
Petitioners responded with comments on August 9, 2002, and the licensee 
had no comments. The Petitioners' comments and the NRC staff's response 
to them are included with the Director's Decision.
    The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has 
determined that the request to order the licensee to suspend 
operations, revoke the operating license, or adopt other measures 
resulting in a temporary shutdown of IP2 and 3, be denied. The reasons 
for this decision, along with the reasons for decisions regarding the 
remaining Petitioners' requests, are explained in the Director's 
Decision pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 (DD 02-06), the complete text of 
which is available in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management 
System (ADAMS) for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 
located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), 
Rockville, Maryland, and from the NRC Web site (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html).
    As stated in its letter to the Petitioners on December 20, 2001, 
the NRC has, in effect, partially granted the Petitioners' request for 
an immediate security upgrade at IP2 and 3. On September 11, 2001, the 
NRC took action to enhance security at all nuclear facilities, 
including IP2 and 3. Immediately after the attacks, the NRC advised all 
nuclear power plants to go to the highest level of security, which they 
promptly did. These facilities have remained at a heightened security 
level since that time. The NRC continues to work with other Federal 
agencies and is monitoring relevant information it receives on security 
matters at nuclear facilities. The NRC is prepared to make immediate 
adjustments as necessary to ensure adequate protection of the public.
    The NRC issued Orders on February 25, 2002, to all commercial 
nuclear power plants to implement interim compensatory security 
measures for the current threat environment. Some of the requirements 
made mandatory by the Orders formalized the security measures that NRC 
licensees had taken in response to advisories issued by the NRC in the 
aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. The Orders also 
imposed additional security enhancements, which have emerged based on 
the NRC's assessment of the current threat environment and its ongoing 
security review. The requirements will remain in effect until the NRC 
determines that the level of threat has diminished, or that other 
security changes are needed. The specific actions are sensitive, but 
include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, 
additional security posts, installation of additional physical 
barriers, vehicle checks at greater stand-off distances, enhanced 
coordination with law enforcement and military authorities and more 
restrictive site access controls for all personnel. Regarding the 
Petitioners' request for specific information about the security 
measures, the NRC's policy is to not release safeguards information to 
the public. Thus, this request is denied.
    The NRC in its February 25, 2002, Orders also directed licensees to 
evaluate and address potential vulnerabilities to maintain or restore 
cooling to the core, containment, and spent fuel pool and to develop 
specific guidance and strategies to respond to an event that damages 
large areas of the plant due to explosions or fires. These strategies 
are intended to help licensees to identify and utilize any remaining 
onsite or offsite equipment and capabilities. If NRC's ongoing security 
review recommends any other security measures, the NRC will take 
appropriate action.
    The NRC denies the Petitioners' request to mandate certain security 
measures, as specified by the Petitioners, for the protection of the 
facility, such as a system to defend a no-fly zone. The NRC considers 
that the collective measures taken since September 11, 2001, provide 
adequate protection of public health and safety.
    The NRC finds that the existing emergency response plans are 
flexible enough to respond to a wide variety of adverse conditions, 
including a terrorist attack. The NRC advisories and the Orders issued 
since September 11, 2001, directed licensees to take specific actions 
deemed appropriate to ensure continued improvements to existing 
emergency response plans. The Petitioners' concern that the emergency 
plans do not contemplate multiple attacks on the infrastructure is 
alleviated by the fact that the emergency plans are intended to be 
broad and flexible enough to respond to a wide spectrum of events. 
Thus, the Petitioners' request that the onsite and offsite emergency 
plans be revised to account for possible terrorist attacks has been, in 
part, granted.
    The NRC finds that the current spent fuel storage system and the 
security provisions at IP adequately protect the spent fuel. Thus, the 
Petitioners' request to order the installation of a dry-cask storage 
facility is denied. However, the licensee has stated its intention to 
add such a facility.
    A copy of the Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary 
of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206 of the Commission's regulations. As provided for by this 
regulation, the Director's Decision will constitute the final action of 
the Commission 25 days after the date of the decision, unless the 
Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Director's 
Decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of November, 2002.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 02-29738 Filed 11-21-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P