[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 224 (Wednesday, November 20, 2002)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70049-70053]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-29513]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security

[Docket No. 020904209-2209-01]


Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United States of 
America and the International Atomic Energy Agency Concerning the 
Application of Safeguards in the United States of America (short title 
``U.S. Additional Protocol'')

AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of inquiry.

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SUMMARY: On May 9, 2002, the President transmitted the Protocol 
Additional to the Agreement Between the United States and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of 
Safeguards in the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as 
the U.S. Additional Protocol), signed by the United States in 1998, to 
the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The requirements 
of the U.S. Additional Protocol would supplement the existing Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States 
(U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement) by expanding the declaration, 
reporting and on-site access requirements of the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards 
Agreement to capture elements of the domestic nuclear fuel-cycle 
additional to those covered by the present U.S.-IAEA Safeguards 
Agreement. These elements include mining and milling of nuclear 
materials, nuclear-related equipment manufacturing, nuclear-related 
imports and exports, nuclear fuel cycle research and development not 
involving nuclear material, and forms of nuclear material not currently 
subject to the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement. The Department of 
Commerce, in consultation with other Executive Branch agencies, is 
working to reach an understanding of the universe of commercial 
locations that would be affected by implementation of the Additional 
Protocol. This Notice of Inquiry is part of an effort to collect 
information to estimate the potential impact that the implementation of 
the U.S. Additional Protocol will have on U.S. industry and to gain a 
better understanding of the universe of locations that may be affected 
by implementation, should the Additional Protocol enter into effect.

DATES: Comments are due on or before January 21, 2003.

ADDRESSES: Written comments (four copies) should be submitted to 
Willard Fisher, Regulatory Policy Division, Office of Exporter 
Services, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Room 2705, Washington, DC 
20230. In order to meet the due date for comments, single copies may be 
faxed to (202) 482-3355, provided that you follow up by submitting the 
appropriate number (four copies) of written comments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions on the U.S. Additional 
Protocol, contact Brandon Williams, Treaty Compliance Division, Office 
of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry 
and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Phone: (703) 605-4400. For 
questions on the submission of comments, contact Willard Fisher, 
Regulatory Policy Division, Office of Exporter Services, Bureau of 
Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Phone: (202) 482-
2440.

[[Page 70050]]


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The requirement for a comprehensive international safeguards system 
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was first established by the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT was 
signed by the United States on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on 
March 5, 1970. The treaty banned nuclear weapon states (NWS) from 
transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) or 
assisting NNWS to acquire such weapons, and stipulated that each non-
nuclear weapon State Party to the NPT would undertake to accept 
safeguards as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded 
with the IAEA. Although the NPT required the establishment of 
safeguards, the formulation of detailed provisions for a model NPT 
Safeguards Agreement was not completed by the IAEA until 1971. These 
safeguards were designed to provide assurance that the nuclear material 
of States Parties which had not already developed nuclear weapons would 
not be diverted from peaceful use to making nuclear weapons.
    During deliberations of the NPT, several major industrialized 
nations expressed concern that the absence of requirements for IAEA 
safeguards in NWS would place NNWS at a commercial and industrial 
disadvantage in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. 
Specifically, the NNWS were concerned that application of safeguards 
would interfere with the efficient operations of their commercial 
activities and would possibly compromise industrial and trade secrets 
as a result of access by IAEA inspectors to their facilities and 
records. In order to allay these concerns, the United States 
voluntarily offered in 1967 to permit the IAEA to apply safeguards to 
all nuclear facilities in the United States except only for those 
associated with activities of direct national security significance. 
Since then, the other four NWS recognized under the NPT (China, France, 
the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom) have also agreed to 
subject all or part of their civil nuclear activities to IAEA 
safeguards.
    The U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement was signed on November 18, 1977, 
and entered into force on December 9, 1980. At that time the United 
States submitted to the IAEA a list of more than 200 eligible 
facilities for which safeguards could be applied if selected by the 
IAEA. This list included facilities licensed by the NRC and eligible 
Department of Energy facilities. The United States has added additional 
facilities to the eligible facilities list since that time. Under the 
U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, about a dozen commercial facilities 
have been selected for inspection since 1980.
    Although the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement is based on the model 
safeguards agreement developed by the IAEA, the terms of the U.S. offer 
and the obligations of NNWS party to the NPT differ in several 
respects. First, the U.S. offer excludes nuclear facilities associated 
with activities of direct national security significance and does not 
contain any limitations on use of nuclear material by the United 
States. Also, the United States decides which U.S. facilities are 
eligible for safeguards and the IAEA decides which eligible facilities 
will be selected for application of safeguards, although the IAEA need 
not select any. Furthermore, the United States has made separate 
commitments to provide to the IAEA, for safeguards purposes, 
information on exports of nuclear material.
    In the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, international 
inspectors determined that Iraq had been engaged in a clandestine 
nuclear weapon development program at locations not directly subject to 
IAEA safeguards, despite inspections. The international community 
determined that the safeguards system needed to be strengthened and 
negotiated a model Additional Protocol to amend existing bilateral 
safeguards agreements. The model Additional Protocol requires enhanced 
information collection and access to provide IAEA inspectors with 
greater ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities in NNWS, and 
covers almost all of a state's nuclear fuel cycle. The United States, 
as a NWS party to the NPT, is not obligated to accept IAEA safeguards 
on its nuclear activities. However, the United States voluntarily 
signed the U.S. Additional Protocol on June 12, 1998. By submitting 
itself to the same safeguards on all of its civil nuclear activities 
that NNWS parties to the NPT are subject to, the United States intends 
to demonstrate that adherence to the model Additional Protocol does not 
place other countries at a commercial disadvantage. In this Additional 
Protocol, the United States accepts all of the measures of the Model 
Protocol except where their application would result in access by the 
IAEA to activiites with direct national security significance to the 
United States or to locations or information associated with such 
activities.
    On May 9, 2002, the President transmitted the U.S. Additional 
Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The 
U.S. Additional Protocol will not enter into force until the United 
States notifies the IAEA that the statutory and constitutional 
requirements for entry into force have been met. These requirements 
include ratification, implementing legislation, and issuance of 
regulations.
    Declarations submitted under the U.S. Additional Protocol would 
provide the IAEA with information about additional aspects of the U.S. 
nuclear fuel cycle, including mining and milling of nuclear materials, 
nuclear-related equipment manufacturing, nuclear-related imports and 
exports, research and development not involving nuclear material, and 
other nuclear material activities not currently subject to the U.S.-
Safeguards Agreement. There are no routine inspections under the 
Additional Protocol, but IAEA inspectors may be provided access 
(referred to as ``complementary access'') to the U.S. nuclear fuel 
cycle where there is a question or an inconsistency about the 
completeness or correctness of the U.S. declaration, which could relate 
to declared or undeclared industrial locations. Access to industrial 
locations is predicated upon an IAEA request for clarification of a 
declaration and may be exercised by the IAEA with a minimum of 24-hours 
notice. As with the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the IAEA would not 
be required to seek access to any U.S. locations. In carrying out 
responsibilities delegated to it for implementation of the U.S. 
Additional Protocol, the Department would apply a philosophy of 
ensuring compliance while minimizing intrusion and the burden on 
commercial activities.

Discussion and Request for Comments

    The U.S. Additional Protocol is based on the model Additional 
Protocol (INFCIRC/540) which is organized into eighteen different 
Articles. INFCIRC/540 is available on the IAEA website (www.iaea.org). 
Article 2 describes the information required in a U.S. declaration to 
be submitted to the IAEA and in periodic reports and updates. The 
Department recognizes that some of this information is already being 
reported by commercial entities to U.S. Government agencies under U.S. 
Government regulations but is seeking to gain a better understanding of 
the number and type of locations that may be impacted by the 
declaration requirements of the U.S. Additional Protocol in order to 
refine estimates of the potential burden on U.S. industry and design 
future information collection systems. Where practical, the intent is 
to avoid redundancy in reporting required under an existing legislative 
mandate. However, in some of these instances, the

[[Page 70051]]

Additional Protocol may require more information than is currently 
being provided, such as mining capacity or the scale of operations of 
equipment manufactured but not exported. Such cases would require 
additional submission of information. Also, for example, in cases where 
the data has been previously collected by voluntary survey, submissions 
to the Department would be mandated under the U.S. Additional Protocol. 
Data submissions related to activities such as public and private 
research and development are expected to comprise predominantly 
information previously unreported under any existing regulatory 
authority. There are some instances, such as the U.S. right to exclude 
activities or locations with direct national security significance 
under the U.S. Additional Protocol, where the model Additional 
Protocol, designed for NNWS, does not have relevance in the United 
States. This notice takes those instances into account.
    It is the intent of the Department, by publishing this Notice of 
Inquiry, to gauge the scope of the impact of the Additional Protocol, 
both in newly reportable entities and additional impacts on those 
already reporting similar information under existing regulations. 
Information received will be used by the Executive Branch agencies who 
are given responsibility to implement the Additional Protocol a better 
understanding of the universe of commercial locations that will be 
affected. It would be most useful for the Department to receive 
comments on: (1) Estimated numbers of commercial locations that would 
be subject to reporting under the specific declaration elements and (2) 
whether this information is already reported to U.S. Government 
agencies and if so, to whom. For the purpose of this Notice of Inquiry, 
commercial locations are those not owned by or leased to the U.S. 
Government. The Department also welcomes discussion regarding: (1) Any 
concerns with the potential release of proprietary or confidential 
business information; (2) what information should not be subject to 
disclosure; (3) the type of information that could best satisfy the 
Additional Protocol requirements; (4) redundancy of reporting and data 
requirements; (5) the degree to which impacted companies would have new 
reporting requirements; and (6) the burden, including cost estimates, 
represented by requirements for companies to collect and report new 
information both initially and for annual updates. The specific 
elements to be reported to the IAEA in the U.S. declaration and a 
general discussion of the expected sources of this information are 
described below.

1. Research and Development Activities (Public and Private)

    Article 2.a(i) of the model Additional Protocol requires a general 
description and information specifying the location of nuclear fuel 
cycle-related research and development activities not involving nuclear 
material, carried out anywhere, that are funded, specifically 
authorized or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of, the 
government of the United States. Article 2.b(i) requires this 
information for nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development 
activities not involving nuclear material that are not funded, 
specifically authorized or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of, 
the government of the United States. General description requirements 
are expected to include brief information regarding the fuel cycle 
stage to which the project is related, title of the project, the 
project number or other unique designation, description of work being 
performed, objectives of the project, degree of project completion, and 
intended application of the project results.
    For the purpose of the Additional Protocol, ``nuclear material'' is 
defined as any source or special fissionable material (i.e., enriched, 
natural, and depleted uranium and thorium--processed beyond the raw ore 
stage; i.e., mill products and subsequent materials) it does not 
include ore or ore residue. ``Nuclear fuel cycle-related research and 
development activities'' are defined in the Additional Protocol as 
those activities which are specifically related to any process or 
system development aspect of any of the following: conversion (from one 
chemical species to another) of nuclear material, enrichment of nuclear 
material, nuclear fuel fabrication, reactors, critical facilities, 
reprocessing of nuclear fuel, processing (not including repackaging or 
conditioning not involving the separation of elements, for storage or 
disposal) of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, 
high enriched uranium or uranium-233.
    Declaration requirements exclude activities related to theoretical 
or basic scientific research or to research and development on 
industrial radioisotope applications, medical, hydrological and 
agricultural applications, health and environmental effects and 
improved maintenance.

2. Operational Activities of Safeguards Relevance

    Article 2.a(ii) of the model Additional Protocol requires 
information identified by the IAEA on operational activities of 
safeguards relevance at facilities and locations outside facilities 
where nuclear material is customarily used. In the United States, this 
element will apply only at nuclear facilities where the IAEA is 
applying safeguards in the United States and where agreed to by the 
United States Government. At the present time, only four facilities are 
subject to safeguards. Examples of such operational activities include, 
but are not limited to, nuclear material transfers, empty spent fuel 
cask transfers, crane movement records, reactor fuel production, 
isotope production, and maintenance activities. A ``facility'' is 
defined in the Additional Protocol as a reactor, critical facility, 
conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, isotope 
separation plant or separate storage installation, or any location 
where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram 
is customarily used.
    The Department expects that these activities are subject to license 
by the NRC and the collection of this information will be the 
responsibility of the NRC.

3. Nuclear Facility Site Descriptions and Site Maps

    Article 2.a(iii) of the model Additional Protocol requires a 
general description of each building on a site, including the 
building's use and, if not apparent from that description, its 
contents. In the United States, this element will apply only in 
instances where the United States has provided to the IAEA the relevant 
design information. Under the terms of the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards 
Agreement, the U.S. has provided such information on the nuclear 
facilities that have been inspected in the United States. The 
description is expected to include a building number or other 
unambiguous identification, approximate size of the building (i.e., 
number of floors and total area), use of the building, and the main 
contents of the building. A map of the site is also required.
    A ``site'' is defined in the model Additional Protocol as that area 
delimited by the United States in the relevant design information for a 
facility, including a closed-down facility, and in the relevant 
information on a location outside facilities where nuclear material is 
customarily used, including a closed-down location outside facilities 
where nuclear material

[[Page 70052]]

was customarily used (this is limited to locations with hot cells or 
where activities related to conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication or 
reprocessing were carried out). A ``site'' also includes all 
installations, co-located with the facility or location, for the 
provision or use of essential services, including: hot cells for 
processing irradiated materials not containing nuclear material; 
installations for the treatment, storage and disposal of waste; and 
buildings associated with specified activities identified by the United 
States under Article 2.a(iv) (see discussion below under Equipment 
Manufacturers).
    The Department expects that the collection of information 
pertaining to facilities licensed by the NRC will be the responsibility 
of the NRC. However, the definition of ``site'' extends beyond areas 
involving nuclear material activities.

4. Equipment Manufacturers

    Article 2.a(iv) of the model Additional Protocol requires a 
description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in 
certain nuclear-related manufacturing and/or assembly activities 
described in detail in Annex I to the model Additional Protocol and 
listed below (items a-s). The activities relate to equipment and non-
nuclear material listed in Annex II to the model Additional Protocol. 
Scale of operations could mean, for example, approximate production 
capacity and capacity utilization during a declaration period. Although 
information is already being reported to the U.S. Government on the 
export of such equipment, the Department is not aware of any regulatory 
authorities currently collecting information on the scale of operations 
for manufacturing such equipment.
    The model Additional Protocol requires declaration and reporting 
for the following nuclear-related manufacturing activities which are 
focused primarily on the manufacture of items ``especially designed or 
prepared'' for uranium enrichment (a-k) or other items related to the 
nuclear fuel cycle:
    (a) The manufacture of centrifuge rotor tubes or the assembly of 
gas centrifuges that are especially designed or prepared for the 
separation of isotopes of uranium;
    (b) The manufacture of gaseous diffusion barriers with thin, porous 
filters which are especially designed or prepared for the enrichment of 
uranium;
    (c) The manufacture or assembly of laser-based isotope separation 
systems especially designed or prepared for enrichment of uranium;
    (d) The manufacture or assembly of electromagnetic isotope 
separators especially designed or prepared for enrichment of uranium;
    (e) The manufacture or assembly of columns or extraction equipment 
especially designed or prepared for enrichment of uranium;
    (f) Uranium oxidation systems (chemical exchange) especially 
designed or prepared for enrichment of uranium;
    (g) Fast-reacting ion exchange resins/adsorbents (ion exchange) 
especially designed or prepared for enrichment of uranium;
    (h) Ion exchange columns (ion exchange) for isotope separation 
especially designed or prepared for enrichment of uranium;
    (i) Ion exchange reflux systems (ion exchange) for isotope 
separation especially designed or prepared for enrichment of uranium;
    (j) The manufacture of aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex 
tubes especially designed or prepared for enrichment of uranium;
    (k) The manufacture or assembly of uranium plasma generation 
systems especially designed or prepared for enrichment of uranium;
    (l) The manufacture of zirconium tubes especially designed or 
prepared for use in a reactor;
    (m) The manufacture or upgrading of heavy water or deuterium in 
which the ration of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000;
    (n) The manufacture of nuclear grade graphite at a purity level 
better than 5 parts per million boron equivalent and with a density 
greater than 1.50 g/cm \3\
    (o) The manufacture of flasks for irradiated fuel;
    (p) The manufacture of reactor control rods especially designed or 
prepared for the control of the reaction rate in a nuclear reactor;
    (q) The manufacture of criticality safe tanks and vessels 
especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant;
    (r) The manufacture of irradiated fuel element chopping machines 
especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant; and
    (s) The construction of hot cells with a cell or interconnected 
cells totaling at least 6 cubic meters in volume with shielding equal 
to or greater than the equivalent of 0.5 meters of concrete, with a 
density of 3.2 g/cm \3\ or greater, outfitted with equipment for remote 
operations.

5. Uranium and Thorium Mines and Mills

    Article 2.a(v) of the model Additional Protocol requires 
information on the location, operational status and the estimated 
annual production capacity of uranium mines and concentration plants 
and thorium concentration plants, and the current annual production of 
such mines and concentration plants in the United States. Uranium and 
thorium concentration plants engage in the processing and milling of 
ore. Currently, the Department of Energy collects information via the 
Energy Information Agency regarding uranium mines. This includes some 
but not all of the required information regarding ore processing. The 
NRC licenses uranium and thorium mills, and the Department expects the 
collection of this information to be the responsibility of the NRC. 
Information on mine production capacity represents new reporting 
requirements under the Additional Protocol.

6. Source Material Not Suitable for Fuel Fabrication or Isotopic 
Enrichment

    Article 2.a(vi) of the model Additional Protocol requires 
information on natural and depleted uranium in quantities greater than 
10 metric tons or on thorium in quantities greater than 20 metric tons. 
The Department expects that these activities are subject to license by 
the NRC and the collection of this information will be the 
responsibility of the NRC.

7. Nuclear Material Exempted From Safeguards

    Article 2.a(vii) of the model Additional Protocol requires 
information on nuclear material declared by the United States but 
exempted from safeguards by arrangement with the IAEA. There is no such 
material in the United States. If there were, the Department expects 
that the nuclear material would be subject to license by the NRC, and 
the collection of this information would be the responsibility of the 
NRC.

8. Waste for Which Safeguards Have Been Terminated

    Article 2.a(viii) of the model Additional Protocol requires 
information on the location or further processing of intermediate or 
high-level waste containing plutonium, high-enriched uranium or 
uranium-233 on which IAEA safeguards have been terminated. High-
enriched uranium means uranium containing 20 percent or more of the 
isotope uranium-235. There is no nuclear material in the United States 
on which IAEA safeguards have been terminated.

[[Page 70053]]

9. Export and Import of Specified Equipment and Non-Nuclear Material

    Article 2.a(ix) of the model Additional Protocol requires 
information on the export and import of certain nuclear-related 
equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II to the model 
Additional Protocol and listed below (items a-m). These items are 
subject to export license by the NRC and the Department expects the 
collection of this information will be the responsibility of the NRC. 
The Department is not aware of any current regulatory authority for 
collecting information on imports of such equipment and non-nuclear 
material. There will be no routine reporting requirements for import 
data since the submission of import data is upon specific request by 
the IAEA. The equipment and non-nuclear material subject to Article 
2.a(ix) are described in Annex II to the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol 
and include:
    (a) Reactors and equipment including complete nuclear reactors, and 
specially designed reactor pressure vessels, reactor fuel charging and 
discharging machines, reactor control rods, reactor pressure tubes, 
zirconium tubes, primary coolant pumps;
    (b) Non-nuclear materials for reactors including deuterium and 
nuclear grade graphite;
    (c) Specially designed irradiated fuel element chopping machines, 
dissolvers, solvent extractors and solvent extraction equipment, 
chemical holding or storage vessels, plutonium nitrate to oxide 
conversion system, plutonium oxide to metal production system;
    (d) Specially designed equipment that seals the nuclear material 
within the cladding, and any other which normally comes in direct 
contact with, or directly processes, or controls, the production flow 
of nuclear material;
    (e) Specially designed gas centrifuges and assemblies and 
components especially designed or prepared for use in gas centrifuges;
    (f) Specially designed gas diffusion assemblies and components 
especially designed or prepared for use in gas diffusion enrichment;
    (g) Specially designed or prepared systems, equipment and 
components especially designed for use in aerodynamic enrichment 
plants;
    (h) Specially designed or prepared systems, equipment and 
components for use in chemical exchange or ion exchange enrichment 
plants;
    (i) Specially designed or prepared systems, equipment and 
components for use in laser-based enrichment plants;
    (j) Specially designed or prepared systems, equipment and 
components for use in plasma separation enrichment plants;
    (k) Specially designed or prepared systems, equipment and 
components for use in electromagnetic enrichment plants;
    (l) Specially designed or prepared equipment for plants for the 
production of heavy water, deuterium and deuterium compounds; and
    (m) Specially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of 
uranium ore concentrates to UO3, conversion of 
UO3 to UF6, conversion of UO3 to 
UO2, conversion of UO2 to UF4, 
conversion of UF4 to UF6, conversion of 
UF4 to U metal, conversion of UF6 to 
UO2, and conversion of UF6 to UF4.

10. Ten-Year General Plans

    Article 2.a(x) of the model Additional Protocol requires 
information regarding general plans for the succeeding ten-year period 
relevant to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle (including 
planned nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities) 
when approved by the appropriate authorities in the United States. The 
Department expects that the Department of Energy will be the approving 
authority for these plans and will be responsible for the collection of 
such data.

11. Activities Related to a ``Site''

    Article 2.b(ii) requires, upon specific request by the IAEA, a 
general description of activities and the identity of the person or 
entity carrying out activities at a particular location which has not 
been included as part of a ``site'' but which the IAEA considers may be 
functionally related to the activities on a ``site'' declared under 
2(a)(iii) The U.S. Government will review such requests on a case-by-
case basis. This provision relates only to element 3 above, where the 
United States has provided site descriptions and site maps.

Submission of Comments

    All comments must be submitted to the address indicated in this 
notice. The Department requires that all comments be submitted in 
written form.
    The Department encourages interested persons who wish to comment to 
do so at the earliest possible time. The period for submission of 
comments will close January 21, 2003. The Department will consider all 
comments received before the close of the comment period. Comments 
received after the end of the comment period will be considered, if 
possible, but their consideration cannot be assured. The Department 
will not accept comments accompanied by a request that a part or all of 
the material be treated confidentially because of its business 
proprietary nature or for any other reason. The Department will return 
such comments and materials to the persons submitting the comments and 
will not consider them. All comments submitted in response to this 
notice will be a matter of public record and will be available for 
public inspection and copying.
    The Office of Administration, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, displays public comments on the BIS Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) web site at http://www.bis.doc.gov/foia. This 
office does not maintain a separate public inspection facility. If you 
have technical difficulties accessing this web site, please call BIS's 
Office of Administration, at (202) 482-0637, for assistance.

    Dated: November 14, 2002.
James J. Jochum,
Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.
[FR Doc. 02-29513 Filed 11-19-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-33-P