[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 193 (Friday, October 4, 2002)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 62294-62306]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-25051]



[[Page 62293]]

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Part II





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Part 121



Improved Seats in Air Carrier Transport Category Airplanes; Proposed 
Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 193 / Friday, October 4, 2002 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 62294]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 121

[Docket No. FAA-2002-13464; Notice No. 02-17]
RIN 2120-AC84


Improved Seats in Air Carrier Transport Category Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM).

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SUMMARY: The Federal Aviation Administration proposes to require that 
all passenger and flight attendant seats in transport category 
airplanes used in part 121 passenger-carrying operations meet improved 
crashworthiness standards. This proposed rule is necessary to provide 
an increased level of safety for part 121 operations. The intended 
effect of this proposed rulemaking is to increase passenger protection 
and survivability in impact-survivable accidents.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before December 3, 2002.

ADDRESSES: Address your comments to the Docket Management System, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street, NW., 
Washington, DC 20590-0001. You must identify the docket number FAA 
2002-13464 at the beginning of your comments, and you should submit two 
copies of your comments. If you wish to receive confirmation that FAA 
has received your comments, include a self-addressed, stamped postcard.
    You may also submit comments through the Internet to http://dms.dot.gov. You may review the public docket containing comments to 
these proposed regulations in person in the Docket Office between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The 
Docket Office is on the plaza level of the NASSIF Building at the 
Department of Transportation at the above address. Also, you may review 
public dockets on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Hal Jensen, Aircraft Certification 
Service, Aircraft Engineering Division, AIR-120, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone (202) 267-8807; facsimile (202) 267-5340.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the 
proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments, as 
they may desire. Comments relating to the environmental, energy, 
federalism, or economic impact that might result from adopting the 
proposals in this notice are also invited. Substantive comments should 
be accompanied by cost estimates. Comments must identify the regulatory 
docket or notice number and be submitted in duplicative to the DOT 
Rules Docket address specified above.
    All comments received, as well as a report summarizing each 
substantive public contact with FAA personnel on this rulemaking, will 
be filed in the docket. The docket is available for public inspection 
before and after the comment closing date.
    All comments received on or before the closing date will be 
considered by the Administrator before taking action on this proposed 
rulemaking. Comments filed late will be considered as far as possible 
without incurring expense or delay. The proposals contained in this 
notice may be changed in light of the comments received.
    Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments 
submitted in response to this notice must include a pre-addressed, 
stamped postcard with those comments on which the following statement 
is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-2002-13464.'' The postcard will 
be date stamped and mailed to the commenter.

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by taking the 
following steps:
    (1) Go to the search function of the Department of Transportation's 
electronic Docket Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search).
    (2) On the search page, type in the last four digits of the docket 
number shown at the beginning of this notice. Click on ``search.''
    (3) On the next page, which contains the docket summary information 
for the docket you selected, click on the document number of the item 
you wish to view.
    You can also get an electronic copy using the Internet through the 
FAA's Web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.html or the 
Federal Register's web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.
    You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make 
sure to identify the docket number, notice number, or amendment number 
of this rulemaking.

Background

Statutory Requirement

    Title III, section 303(b), of the Airport and Airway Safety and 
Capacity Expansion Act of 1987 (Act of 1987) directs the Secretary of 
Transportation to initiate rulemaking to consider requiring all seats 
onboard all air carrier aircraft to meet improved crashworthiness 
standards based on the best available testing standards for 
crashworthiness. On May 17, 1988, the FAA published Notice No. 88-8, 
Retrofit of Improved Seats In Air Carrier Transport Category Airplanes; 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (53 FR 17650). That notice proposed to 
require all seats of transport category airplanes used under part 121 
and part 135 to comply with improved crashworthiness standards. The 
NPRM proposed to prohibit the operation of these airplanes unless all 
seats meet the crashworthiness performance standards required by 
Amendment No. 25-64, Improved Seat Safety Standards; Final Rule (53 FR 
17640, May 17, 1988).

Improved Seat Safety Standards--Amendment No. 25-64

    Amendment No. 25-64 upgraded the certification standards for 
occupant protection during emergency landing conditions in transport 
category airplanes. Based on research, testing, and service experience, 
the amendment revised the seat and restraint system requirements and 
defined occupant injury criteria for impact conditions. The improved 
seating systems provide increased occupant protection in airplanes 
involved in impact-survivable accidents.
    Specifically, Amendment No. 25-64 revised Sec.  25.561(b)(3) to 
increase the ultimate inertial forces in the upward, sideward, and 
downward directions, and to add an ultimate inertial force requirement 
in the aft direction. The ultimate inertial forces prescribed in Sec.  
25.561(b)(3) are static load forces, and the type-certificate applicant 
must show that the airplane, including seating systems and items of 
mass (and their supporting structure), can withstand these forces. The 
static load requirements of Sec.  25.561(b)(3) increased the ultimate 
inertial forces (expressed in multiples of the acceleration of gravity, 
or g) for emergency landing conditions

[[Page 62295]]

from (1) 2.0g to 3.0g in the upward direction; (2) 1.5g to 3.0g on the 
airframe and 1.5g to 4.0g on seats and seat attachments in the sideward 
direction; and (3) 4.5g to 6.0g in the downward direction. The 
amendment also added a 1.5g requirement in the rearward direction. 
Revised Sec.  25.561(d) requires that seats and items of mass (and 
their supporting structure) meet the static load requirements without 
deforming in a manner that would impede rapid evacuation of the 
occupants from the airplane. The static load factors adopted by 
Amendment No. 25-64 were selected to reflect industry design practices 
and to take advantage of existing airframe floor strength.
    Amendment No. 25-64 also added Sec.  25.562 to include new dynamic 
performance standards for seating systems to provide increased occupant 
protection in airplanes involved in impact-survivable accidents. 
Specifically, Sec.  25.562 (b)(1) and (b)(2) provide that each seat 
type design approved for crew or passenger occupancy during takeoff and 
landing must successfully withstand--(1) a change in downward vertical 
velocity ([Delta]V) of not less than 35 feet per second, with the 
airplane's longitudinal axis canted downward 30 degrees with respect to 
the horizontal plane and with the wings level. Peak floor deceleration 
must occur in not more than 0.08 seconds after impact and must reach a 
minimum of 14g and (2) a change in forward longitudinal velocity 
([Delta]V) of not less than 44 feet per second, with the airplane's 
longitudinal axis horizontal and yawed 10 degrees either right or left 
with the wings level. Peak floor deceleration must occur in not more 
than 0.09 seconds after impact and must reach a minimum of 16g. Where 
floor rails or floor fittings are used to attach the seating devices to 
the test fixture, the rails or fittings must be misaligned with respect 
to the adjacent set of rails or fittings by at least 10 degrees 
vertically with one rolled 10 degrees.
    Section 25.562(c) requires an assessment of certain performance 
criteria during the dynamic tests described in Sec.  25.562(b)(1) and 
(b)(2) to assess the potential for serious injury to an occupant. Among 
these criteria are--(1) the maximum strap tension for upper torso 
restraints of crewmembers; (2) the maximum compressive load measured 
between the pelvis and the lumbar column of the anthropomorphic dummy; 
(3) the positioning criteria for the upper torso restraint straps, 
where installed, and the lap safety belt; (4) the criterion for 
preventing serious head injury; and (5) the maximum compressive load in 
each femur of the test dummy. Additionally, the performance criteria 
require that the seat remain attached at all points of attachment and 
not yield under either of the dynamic load tests to the extent rapid 
evacuation of the airplane would be impeded.
    Section 25.785(a), currently Sec.  25.785(b), was revised and 
requires that each seat, berth, safety belt, harness, and adjacent part 
of the airplane at each station designated as occupiable during takeoff 
and landing be designed so that a person making proper use of these 
facilities will not suffer serious injury in an emergency landing as a 
result of the inertial forces specified in Sec. Sec.  25.561 and 
25.562.

Retrofit of Improved Seats in Air Carrier Transport Category 
Airplanes--Notice No. 88-8

    In Notice No. 88-8, the FAA proposed to add a new paragraph to 
Sec. Sec.  121.311 and 135.169 to prohibit after June 16, 1995, the 
operation of transport category airplanes under part 121 and part 135 
that were type-certificated after January 1, 1958, unless all seats 
onboard the airplanes are equipped with seats that meet the applicable 
certification requirements in Sec.  25.785 in effect on June 16, 1988. 
Even though the Act of 1987 addressed seats on all air carrier 
aircraft, the development of new crashworthiness standards for seats in 
normal and transport category rotorcraft had not been completed, and 
new seat standards for airplanes type certificated in the commuter 
category had not been proposed. Therefore, Notice No. 88-8 did not 
propose the retrofit of seats in those categories of aircraft.
    The 1988 proposal was directed at all seats (passenger seats, 
including divans and sidefacing seats, flight attendant seats, flight 
crew seats, observer seats, and courier seats), safety belts, 
harnesses, and adjacent parts of transport category airplanes used in 
passenger- and cargo-carrying operations under part 121 and scheduled 
intrastate common carriage under part 135. Notice No. 88-8 did not 
propose to require an upgrade of the static strength standards for 
fixed items of mass (other than seats) and their support structures, 
and did not propose to require modifications to the floor structure.
    The FAA received 70 comments to the NPRM during the comment period. 
Forty-five commenters agreed with the proposal, 14 opposed it, and 11 
supported the intent of the proposal but did not agree with all the 
provisions. The substance of these comments will be discussed later in 
this document under the section titled New Proposal. The FAA received 
approximately 16 additional comments to the docket between the close of 
the NPRM comment period and December 1998.
    Based on comments on Notice No. 88-8, the FAA decided that it 
needed additional information to determine the impact of that proposal 
on the aviation community. Even though considerable research and 
development in dynamic testing of seats had been done over the 
preceding years to support the adoption of the 16g standard in Sec.  
25.562, the process of certifying seats to be used in production to the 
16g standards was still in its infancy. Furthermore, the dynamic 
testing requirements for 16g seats represented a monumental increase in 
sophistication and complexity over the simpler static testing used for 
9g seats. Therefore, the aviation industry and the FAA had many issues 
to iron out in the preparation, execution, and evaluation of a 16g seat 
dynamic test program for seats to be manufactured in mass production. 
In 1990, the FAA developed an advisory circular (AC) to provide 
industry guidance on the dynamic test process (AC 25.562-1, Dynamic 
Evaluation of Seat Restraint Systems & Occupant Protection on Transport 
Airplanes, March 6, 1990; superceded by AC 25.562-1A, January 19, 
1996). Additionally, the FAA worked with industry through the Society 
of Automotive Engineers SEAT Committee to develop a standard that would 
detail the requirements for dynamic testing of a 16g seat. That 
standard (Aerospace Standard 8049, Performance Standard for Seats in 
Civil Rotorcraft, Transport Aircraft and General Aviation Aircraft) was 
incorporated in Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C127 (Rotorcraft, 
Transport Airplane, and Normal and Utility Airplane Seating Systems) in 
1992 and revised in 1998 (TSO-C127a) to include additional 
clarification.
    The FAA's guidance and standards material evolved over several 
years as the industry transitioned from producing 9g seats to 16g seats 
that could meet FAA requirements. The FAA never lost sight of the goal 
of improving the crashworthiness of seats in transport category 
airplanes. However, industry needed time to work out the technical 
problems of meeting the 16g seat standard, and the FAA needed time to 
evaluate specific problems presented by industry and to develop proper 
guidance material for obtaining 16g seat certification.
    The FAA held a public meeting on October 23 and 24, 1995, in 
Seattle, Washington, to gather information on 16g dynamic seats. The 
FAA presented

[[Page 62296]]

its views and listened to comments from the aviation industry at that 
meeting. The information gained during this public meeting led the FAA 
to reconsider the original proposed rule in Notice No. 88-8.
    From the mid-to-late 1990s, although industry and the FAA continued 
to address significant 16g seat issues, enough progress had been made 
that 16g seats were being produced and certificated on a regular basis. 
Therefore, the FAA believed it was appropriate to move forward with its 
proposed rulemaking to improve seats on transport category airplanes. 
As a result, the FAA held a public meeting on December 8 and 9, 1998, 
to discuss its proposed revisions to the 1988 proposal and obtain more 
current information and views.

December 1998 Public Meeting

    In the 1998 public meeting proposal, the FAA deleted its proposal 
to revise part 135 and proposed to add a new paragraph to Sec.  121.311 
that would prohibit the operation of any transport category airplane 
type-certificated after January 1, 1958, on which all passenger and 
flight attendant seats did not fully meet the requirements of Sec.  
25.562. The FAA also indicated it was considering an exception for 
airplanes operated in all-cargo operations. At that time, the proposed 
requirements would be effective four years after publication of a final 
rule, which would have been approximately January 2003.
    The FAA also proposed an alternative in another paragraph in Sec.  
121.311 that would allow a transport category airplane type-
certificated after January 1, 1958, to continue to be operated after 
four years after the publication of a final rule provided all passenger 
and flight attendant seats met the requirements of Sec.  25.562 or were 
properly marked as 16g-compatible. The FAA stated that a seat could 
properly be marked as 16g-compatible if it was manufactured before the 
four-year compliance date and underwent a supplemental certification. 
Under the 1998 proposal, an applicant for a 16g-compatible seat would 
be required to show that the seat or seat type would withstand the 
dynamic loads set forth in Sec.  25.562(a) and (b) without structural 
separation of the seat's primary structure. The applicant also would 
need to demonstrate that the occupant dummy would remain in the seat 
during the test and not be entrapped by the test article. In addition, 
the FAA indicated it would not require the retrofit of seats of 
aircraft operated under part 135.
    Much of the discussion at the public meeting addressed the meaning 
of 16g-compatible and the process for establishing compatibility. 
Industry expressed concern about the FAA's ability to handle increased 
certification projects and the seat manufacturers' ability to produce 
enough seats in four years to meet the other requirements of the 
proposal. Furthermore, industry criticized the FAA data used to support 
the safety benefits of the proposal as outdated and argued that the 
number of potential lives saved would not warrant the costs associated 
with the proposal. In addition, comments presented at the public 
meeting addressed the expense associated with previously adopted 
regulations addressing accident prevention. Other industry 
representatives also recommended that regulatory requirements involving 
significant costs should focus on accident prevention rather than 
aircraft crashworthiness. Finally, some industry representatives urged 
that the FAA permit air carriers to replace seats based on business 
needs.
    In addition to comments offered at the public meeting, the FAA 
reopened the docket for comments through January 8, 1999. The FAA 
received approximately 40 additional comments by the close of this 
comment period. The commenters generally opposed certain aspects of the 
proposal. The substances of these comments are discussed in this SNPRM 
under the section titled New Proposal.

New Proposal

    Based on the comments received in response to Notice No. 88-8 and 
the 1995 and 1998 public meetings, as well as new survivable accident 
data and cost-benefit analysis developed following the 1998 public 
meeting, the FAA has determined that it is appropriate to issue an 
SNPRM.
    The FAA is proposing a two-tiered time table--one that would 
require newly-manufactured airplanes to be equipped with the improved 
seats first, and allow more time for the remainder of the fleet to be 
retrofitted with those seats. In order to ensure that newly-
manufactured airplanes--those that will be in the fleet the longest--
have the improved seats first, the FAA proposes to prohibit the 
operation in passenger-carrying service of any transport category 
airplane manufactured after four years from the effective date of the 
final rule unless all passenger and flight attendant seats on that 
airplane meet the requirements of Sec.  25.562. At the outer limit, 
after 14 years from the effective date of the final rule, no transport 
category airplane could be operated in passenger-carrying service 
unless all passenger and flight attendant seats on that airplane meet 
the requirements of Sec.  25.562. In addition, in order to accelerate 
the retrofit of the fleet, the FAA is proposing that, after four years 
from the effective date of the rule, whenever an operator of a 
transport category airplane replaces an existing passenger or flight 
attendant seat with a different type of seat, the operator must equip 
the airplane with seats that meet the requirements of Sec.  25.562 
before the airplane could be operated in passenger-carrying service.
    For existing airplanes, this SNPRM would give part 121 operators 
discretion in replacing the existing seats on any airplane with 16g 
seats for a period of 14 years after the effective date of the final 
rule. An operator would be required to replace all passenger seats and 
all flight attendant seats on an airplane only when the operator 
chooses to replace any passenger seat or flight attendant seat on that 
airplane. Therefore, an operator could elect to make no seat 
replacements for up to 14 years. However, after 14 years all passenger 
seats and all flight attendant seats on all transport category 
airplanes operated under part 121 must meet the 16g standard as defined 
in Sec.  25.562. The SNPRM would not apply to the removal and 
reinstallation of the same seat or an identical seat in the same 
airplane for the purpose of seat maintenance or cabin interior 
maintenance. Also, under this SNPRM, the replacement of seat cushions 
and seat dress covers is not considered seat replacement and upgrading 
to the 16g standard will not be required. For the purpose of this 
SNPRM, seat replacement means the removal of an existing seat and the 
re-installation of a seat other than the one removed or other than an 
seat identical to the one removed. This allows a spare or new seat to 
replace a damaged seat provided the part numbers are the same. The 
intent of this SNPRM is to allow the replacement of a damaged seat 
without requiring the operator to upgrade the entire airplane with 16g 
seats.
    This proposal was developed after carefully considering the 
viewpoints presented at the 1998 public meeting. The FAA believes this 
SNPRM will provide the best solution for upgrading the entire fleet of 
part 121 transport category airplanes with safer seats in a reasonable 
timeframe. A wide range of options was considered for seat replacement 
on existing aircraft that ranged from voluntary replacement to 
mandatory replacement under several different timeframes of compliance. 
Evaluations included giving credit for certain era seats believed to be 
compliant with some parts of Sec.  25.562. The degree to which the 
replacement seats would have to comply with

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Sec.  25.562 was also evaluated. The issue of ``16g-compatible'' seats 
presented at the 1998 public meeting has been remedied in this SNPRM by 
ensuring one level of safety that requires full compliance with Sec.  
25.562. The proposals in this SNPRM also would eliminate the need for 
recertification of existing seats already installed on airplanes to 
show they were 16g compatible. Some options would have required seats 
in existing aircraft to be replaced per a fixed accelerated schedule; 
however, the FAA believes that replacement of the seats based on 
current business practices will effectively update the existing fleet 
and allow the airlines flexibility in achieving this goal.
    The FAA has chosen a final compliance timeframe that is quite 
liberal in allowing airlines to exercise their own discretion in seat 
replacement and yet ensures that the transport fleet will be upgraded 
to the 16g standard.
    This SNPRM reduces the overall cost compared to other proposed rule 
options since operators are not locked into accelerated seat 
replacement schedules for their existing aircraft. However, this SNPRM 
ensures that when the operators elect to replace their seats, the new 
seats will be ``full'' 16g (i.e., must meet all requirements of Sec.  
25.562) and one level of safety for seats will be developed throughout 
the fleet. This SNPRM also was chosen because it would mandate that the 
newly manufactured airplanes, or those airplanes that will be in the 
fleet the longest, will be required to meet full 16g seat certification 
the soonest.

Compliance Schedule

    Notice No. 88-8 proposed that all transport category airplanes must 
meet the requirements proposed by June 16, 1995, which gave operators 7 
years to comply. The 1998 public meeting proposed that all transport 
category airplanes meet the newly proposed requirements four years 
after publication of the final rule.
    The following compliance table summarizes what this SNPRM proposes:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  4 years after        14 years after
 Timeframe affected aircraft    effective date of     effective date of
                                   final rule            final rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Existing Airplanes            Compliance to 25.562  Compliance to 25.562
 (airplanes manufactured       is required for the   is required for all
 before 4 years after          airplane when its     airplanes.
 effective date of final       seats are replaced.
 rule).
Newly Manufactured Airplanes  Compliance to 25.562  Compliance to 25.562
 (airplanes manufactured       required.             required.
 after 4 years after
 effective date of final
 rule).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Numerous commenters to Notice No. 88-8 indicated that the 7-year 
time period for compliance as proposed was too long and would 
unnecessarily reduce safety, and they recommended a compliance period 
anywhere from 2 to 5 years after publication of the final rule. Certain 
airplane manufacturers, seat manufacturers, and air carriers stated 
that the 7-year compliance date in Notice No. 88-8 was too soon. 
Service experience has shown that the life of an airplane passenger 
seat is greater than the service life used as the basis for the 
proposal. Several commenters indicated that the typical replacement age 
of seats is between 10 and 21 years, with an average seat life being 14 
years. Furthermore, two commenters to the 1998 public meeting proposal 
indicated that the average age of their retired airplanes is 23 and 42 
years, and one commenter indicated that it has no airplanes older than 
25 years.
    Some commenters to Notice No. 88-8 suggested that there should be 
two compliance periods: one for newly manufactured airplanes and one 
for existing airplanes. The commenters indicated that newly 
manufactured airplanes should have 16g seats installed by a specific 
time and that air carriers should accomplish retrofit during the first 
complete refurbishment of the cabin or seats. The commenters also 
suggested that retrofit should not be required when seats are removed 
and replaced during normal maintenance cycles. Other commenters 
supported the current voluntary program for installing 16g seats. 
However, several commenters did not support the retrofit of 16g seats. 
These commenters indicated that most transport category airplanes will 
have 16g seats by 2001 to 2005, there are no certification standards 
for 16g seats, and it is unfair to retrofit an airplane to a standard 
that was not in effect when the airplane was certificated, bought, or 
leased.
    After considering the numerous comments and taking into account 
seat manufacturing and replacement practices, the FAA has determined 
that a four-year compliance period is sufficient to ensure seat 
manufacturers will be able to provide 16g seats for these airplanes. 
Furthermore, the FAA has established two compliance schedules: one for 
newly manufactured airplanes and one for existing airplanes. For newly 
manufactured airplanes, this proposal is consistent with the proposal 
discussed at the 1998 public meeting. This SNPRM would ensure that 16g 
seats are installed on the newest airplanes, which will be in the fleet 
the longest amount of time.

16g Seats

    Notice No. 88-8 applied to all seats occupiable during takeoff and 
landing. Those seats included passenger, flight attendant, flightcrew, 
observer, and courier seats. The 1998 public meeting proposal applied 
only to all passenger and flight attendant seats. Similarly, the FAA 
notes that this SNPRM applies only to passenger and flight attendant 
seats; flight deck, observer, and courier seats are not included. 
Numerous commenters, including passengers, supported the requirement 
for 16g seats and indicated that passengers would be willing to pay for 
increased ticket prices attributable to the cost of the retrofit.
    Two commenters to Notice No. 88-8 indicated that the proposal 
should apply to flight deck seats. However, numerous other commenters 
did not support improved flight deck seats contending that flight deck 
seats are unique to each airplane model, are not track mounted, and 
typically last the life of the airplane. Furthermore, these commenters 
indicated that they are not aware of any statistics relating to 
fatalities or serious injuries where flight deck seats were involved 
and that all the test data referenced in Notice No. 88-8 applied only 
to passenger seats.
    The FAA is unable to conclude that upgrading the survivability 
aspect of flight deck seats would result in a significant, overall 
improvement in safety. In fact, there is evidence to the contrary. The 
FAA determined that the flight deck seat structure differs 
significantly from the structure of passenger seats. The flight deck 
floor structure is heavier and far more rigid than the floor structure 
in much of the passenger compartment. As part of the evaluation of 
comments on flight deck seats, the FAA reviewed post-1983 transport 
category airplane accident data. One of the accidents reviewed 
confirmed the differences between airframe structural performance and 
failure modes of flight deck seats and

[[Page 62298]]

passenger seats. In that accident, the floor structure surrounding the 
pilot's seat separated from the airplane with the seat intact. Neither 
the pilot seat nor its floor attachments had failed. Throughout the 
remainder of the cabin, however, passenger seats consistently exhibited 
typical floor attachment and leg failures, which are the failure modes 
this regulatory action seeks to mitigate. For the reasons stated above, 
the FAA concludes that there is insufficient basis to consider flight 
deck seats in the retrofit requirement.
    Four commenters contended that because flight attendants perform 
critical functions in the post-accident time frame, flight attendant 
seats should be included in the proposal. However, other commenters did 
not believe flight attendant seats should be included because they are 
unique to the specific airplane model and are not track mounted. These 
commenters further stated that the proposal in Notice No. 88-8 is based 
on data collected for passenger-seat weights, prices, replacement 
times, and passenger fatalities. These commenters suggest a separate 
analysis be conducted for flight attendant seats.
    After reviewing the comments, the FAA finds that flight attendants 
have critical life-saving duties to perform following an emergency 
landing and has determined that flight attendant seats will be included 
in this SNPRM. The FAA notes that flight attendants must assist 
passengers with emergency egress through emergency exits to safety 
outside the airplane. Therefore, flight attendant seats are located in 
the passenger compartment. Therefore, it is imperative that flight 
attendant seats provide impact protection comparable to passenger seats 
to ensure flight attendants will not be incapacitated by an emergency 
landing and will be available to assist in emergency evacuations.
    Several commenters indicated that the airplane structures might not 
be compatible with the 16g load requirement and noted that structural 
modifications may be required to take advantage of 16g seats. One 
commenter stated that not all of the floors of all in-service transport 
category airplanes are compatible with the 16g dynamic load standards. 
Several commenters indicated that the FAA should address airplanes with 
weak tracks. A commenter stated that even though a seat may stay 
attached to a representative track during dynamic testing, other 
components of the system (the floors, beams, and fuselage) may fail; 
therefore, the load imposed on the seat tracks during dynamic testing 
should not exceed the ultimate allowable floor strength.
    The 16g dynamic standard (14 CFR 25.562) that became effective in 
1988 was developed to be compatible with the floor strength of existing 
aircraft. The current static requirements for seats (14 CFR 25.561) 
include a 9g forward load, originally adopted in 1956, and were the 
basis for evaluating seat to floor strength issues when Sec.  25.562 
was added. The 16g standard was added knowing that seat design had 
progressed to the point that the energy from a 16g impact could be 
attenuated in the seat structure without exceeding prevalent seat track 
and floor strengths. This SNPRM addresses only the replacement of seats 
and does not require the modification of the floor structure of 
existing airplanes or of airplanes manufactured under existing type 
certificates. It was stated in the NPRM that transport category 
airplane structure remains substantially intact and provides a livable 
volume for occupants throughout a survivable impact accident. To take 
advantage of existing floor strength without requiring significant 
structural modifications or weight increases, the FAA selected the 
static load factors adopted in Amendment No. 25-64. Additionally, the 
FAA had an objective to ensure that seats complying with improved 
crashworthiness standards could be effectively used in existing and 
newly manufactured airplanes. This will be achieved if the seats are 
designed properly. The FAA also points out that an airplane with light 
duty tracks also would have low track loads created by multiple seat 
legs as opposed to an airplane in which heavy duty tracks are used to 
compensate for fewer seat legs.
    Five commenters to Notice No. 88-8 indicated that the FAA 
underestimated the additional weight of the improved seats. The 
commenters noted that the weight increase could be double what the FAA 
indicated in Notice No. 88-8. The commenters added that the FAA based 
its weight estimate on new materials that are not proven. One commenter 
indicated that there are no specific cases where the new 16g seats were 
lighter in weight than the seats they replaced. A participant at the 
1998 public meeting indicated that a 16g seat weighs approximately 10 
pounds more than a 9g seat; another commenter indicated an increase of 
3 kilograms per seat; and a third commenter indicated an increase of 
400 pounds per airplane.
    As the FAA stated in Notice No. 88-8, although reduced weight is 
not guaranteed, it is still likely. The FAA also points out that it did 
not imply there were improved seats weighing less than seats currently 
used in air transportation. The FAA notes that it consistently used a 
0.6-pound weight increase estimate for analysis purposes in Notice No. 
88-8 and Amendment 25-64. Furthermore, based on current information 
from seat manufacturers, the FAA maintains there is not a significant 
increase in weight between a 9g passenger seat and a 16g passenger 
seat. Therefore, the FAA used a 0-pound increase for passenger seats 
and a 0.5-pound weight increase for flight attendant seats in the 
current cost analysis in this SNPRM. The FAA maintains that the current 
trend of installing additional equipment on seats for passenger 
convenience and entertainment, primarily causes seat weight increases. 
Devices like telephones and video screens are common additions to seats 
that, along with their supporting structure, increase seat weight. The 
FAA maintains that if any increases in weight between a 9g seat without 
extra features and a 16g seat without extra features exist, they are 
small and the resultant increase in safety is justified. In addition, 
if the airlines find that seat weight increases from added devices pose 
a significant operational cost, they have the option of removing or 
modifying the non-required equipment currently installed on the seat.

16g-Compatible Seats

    In its 1998 public meeting proposal, the FAA proposed an 
alternative that would allow the use of seats that are properly marked 
as ``16g-compatible.'' The FAA stated that a seat could be marked as 
16g-compatible if it is manufactured before the four-year compliance 
date and the Administrator has determined the seat type to be capable 
of carrying the resultant dynamic loads required in Sec.  25.562 (a) 
and (b) without structural separation of primary attachments.
    As previously noted, the FAA did not adopt its 1998 proposal 
regarding 16g-compatible seats. The commenters from the 1998 public 
meeting indicated that the FAA underestimated the number of seat model 
certifications needed. The commenters further noted that the FAA did 
not consider the costs associated with the complete 16g-compatible seat 
verification process. The FAA agrees with the commenters and has 
abandoned the proposal for certification of seats as 16g-compatible 
because it would be impractical. Therefore, this SNPRM does not contain 
the 1998 public meeting 16g-compatible alternative. As noted at the 
public meeting and in the comments, the process for establishing seats 
as 16g-

[[Page 62299]]

compatible could prove to be too burdensome for the operators and the 
FAA.

Requirements of Sec.  25.562

    Amendment No. 25-64 added section 25.562 that defines emergency 
landing dynamic conditions with which transport category airplane seats 
and restraint systems must comply. The conditions include two dynamic 
tests of the seat and restraint system; one is a simulated combined 
vertical/longitudinal crash condition reaching at least 14g's and the 
other test is a simulated longitudinal crash condition reaching at 
least 16g's. The seats must demonstrate the capability of providing 
protection of their occupants when exposed to the loads of these tests. 
That protection includes insuring the seat system remains attached to 
the airplane as intended and that none of several occupant protection 
criteria are exceeded. Those occupant protection criteria significantly 
improve the likelihood that the occupant survives the impact and does 
not suffer an injury to a degree that would make evacuation from the 
airplane unlikely. Finally the criteria under Sec.  25.562 insure that 
the seat does not deform during the crash conditions to an extent that 
would impede rapid evacuation from the airplane.
    Notice No. 88-8 required all seats to meet the applicable standards 
in Sec.  25.785. The 1998 public meeting proposal required seats to 
meet the requirements in Sec.  25.562. The FAA notes that Sec.  25.785 
references the requirements in Sec.  25.562, which addresses 
crashworthiness standards. However, the FAA points out that the 
requirements in Sec.  25.785 address more than crashworthiness 
standards and those requirements are not included in this proposed 
rulemaking. Therefore, this proposal has been revised to reference 
Sec.  25.562 instead of Sec.  25.785.
    Commenters noted that the FAA should provide uniform and 
standardized guidance procedures for the dynamic testing required under 
Sec.  25.562. One commenter to Notice No. 88-8 indicated that neither 
the FAA nor members of the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) 
committee had been able to define a workable statement of deformation 
limits. That commenter also stated that the floor warping definition in 
Sec.  25.562(b)(2) does not adequately define a warped floor plane. The 
commenters further noted that the FAA should define the maximum seat 
encroachment allowed.
    A commenter to the 1998 public meeting stated that no seat 
manufacturers had achieved satisfactory results for front row head 
injury criteria (HIC). Another commenter to Notice No. 88-8 requested 
that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208) be 
used for HIC measurements and limited to a 36 millisecond duration. The 
commenter also opposed testing for HIC during a double row test with 
floor deformation of the forward seat. Furthermore, the commenter 
stated that HIC limits should not be applicable to bulkheads, 
partitions, and dividers used in currently certificated airplanes. 
Commenters to the 1998 public meeting indicated that to comply with the 
front-row HIC requirements they would have to sacrifice seat pitch (the 
distance along the airplane's longitudinal axis from a point on one 
seat to the identical point on the next seat) in the back rows, remove 
the first row of seats, add y-belts (a lap belt that uses two load 
paths and anchor points for each half of the belt) or airbags, or make 
bulkhead modifications. The commenters indicated that removing a row of 
seats is the only way to comply with HIC if they do not want to 
sacrifice seat pitch.
    The FAA points out that the new crashworthiness standards are in 
effect and seats are certificated to those performance standards. The 
criteria for the improved crashworthiness standards have been verified 
through research testing by the FAA and static and dynamic testing by 
seat manufactures to demonstrate compliance with the provisions of 
Amendment 25-64. The FAA agrees that appropriate guidance is necessary 
to make the certification process easier for all concerned. That 
guidance is provided in Advisory Circular 25.562-1A, Dynamic Evaluation 
of Seat Restraint Systems and Occupant Protection on Transport 
Airplanes, revised on January 1, 1996; SAE Aerospace Standard 8049, 
issued in July 1990; and Technical Standard Order (TSO) C127a, 
Rotorcraft, Transport Airplane, and Normal and Utility Airplane Seating 
Systems, revised on August 21, 1998.

Applicability

    Notice No. 88-8 proposed changes to all transport category 
airplanes operated under part 121 and part 135. The FAA's 1998 public 
meeting proposal applied to transport category airplanes operated under 
part 121. Similarly, this SNPRM would not affect airplanes currently 
operated under part 135. Numerous commenters to Notice No. 88-8 opposed 
the inclusion of part 135 on-demand operators. However, several 
commenters indicated that the proposal should apply to on-demand 
operators because of the increasing number of such operations.
    At the time Notice No. 88-8 was published, a significant number of 
transport category airplanes were operated under part 135. Accordingly, 
Notice No. 88-8 proposed that seats on transport category airplanes 
operated under part 135 in air carrier operations or scheduled 
intrastate common carriage meet the same standards as seats on 
transport category airplanes operated under part 121. In 1995 the FAA 
issued Amendment Nos. 119, 121-251, and 135-58, Commuter Operations and 
General Certification and Operations Requirements; Final Rule (60 FR 
65832; December 20, 1995) (the commuter rule). The commuter rule 
requires all operators conducting scheduled passenger-carrying 
operations in airplanes that have passenger seating configurations of 
10 through 30 seats (excluding crewmember seats) and in turbojet 
airplanes regardless of seating configuration that formerly conducted 
operations under part 135, to conduct operations under part 121. As a 
consequence of the commuter rule, the operation of some nontransport 
category airplanes now comes under the purview of part 121 as do some 
transport category airplanes that used to be operated under part 135. 
Only nonscheduled, on-demand operations remain in part 135.
    Several commenters questioned the need to require improved 
passenger seats on all-cargo airplanes and airplanes with convertible 
or combination configurations. The FAA notes that this SNPRM does not 
apply to airplanes used in all-cargo operations because these airplanes 
do not carry passengers for compensation or hire. However, transport 
category airplanes type certificated after January 1, 1958, that have 
convertible or combination configurations would be required to meet the 
same seat standards required for all-passenger carrying transport 
category airplanes operated under part 121 because those airplanes 
carry passengers.
    The FAA also notes that an improved seat need not be provided for 
the carriage of a person listed in Sec.  121.583. Therefore, this 
proposal also amends Sec.  121.583(a) to add Sec.  121.311(j) and (k) 
to the list of sections excluded from compliance.
    In Notice No. 88-8, the FAA requested comments on whether improved 
seats should be required in rotorcraft. Two helicopter manufacturers 
noted that the retrofit of 16g seats in rotorcraft would necessitate 
airframe modifications that would increase the weight and decrease the

[[Page 62300]]

payload and productivity of the aircraft. The FAA agrees with the 
commenter that the necessary airframe modifications for existing 
rotorcraft are not feasible. It has never been the intent of a 
rulemaking to improve the crashworthiness of seats on any type of 
aircraft to require modifications below the seat-to-floor interface, 
and therefore airframe modifications would not be included. A 
fundamental concept when developing regulations for improved seat 
crashworthiness (eg. Sec.  25.562) has been to match the proposed 
increases in seat strength to the existing aircraft floor strengths to 
preclude the need for additional reinforcement of the airframe. Since 
the NPRM, the FAA has developed improved crashworthiness standards for 
rotorcraft type certificated after November 13, 1998. Amendment Nos. 
27-25 and 29-29 (54 FR 47318; November 13, 1998) incorporate these 
standards in 14 CFR parts 27 and 29. However, the FAA points out that 
they were not in effect when Notice No. 88-8 was published on May 17, 
1988; therefore, this SNPRM does not include rotorcraft.

Torso Restraint

    An association noted that Notice No. 88-8 did not address lap belt 
restraint capability in forward facing seats and is concerned because 
the head and upper body is unrestrained.
    The FAA points out that the intent of Notice No. 88-8 and this 
SNPRM is to require the installation of improved seats to provide 
increased passenger and flight attendant safety resulting from fewer 
seat failures. The intent is not to require restraints for the upper 
torso. While the comment may have merit, the focus of Notice No. 88-8 
and this SNPRM is on improved seats.

Reference Material

    A Benefit Analysis for Aircraft 16g Dynamic Seats (Report DOT/FAA/
AR-00/13/April 2000) predicted the benefits for accidents studied from 
1984 to 1998 if 16g seats had been installed in the airplanes. This 
document is available to the public through the National Technical 
Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. It can also be 
accessed through the FAA's William J. Hughes Technical Center Full Text 
Technical Reports Internet site at http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/reports/report2.stm in Adobe Acrobat Portable Document Format (PDF).

Related Activity

    The FAA tasked the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) to 
provide advice and recommendations on harmonizing with the JAA and 
Transport Canada requirements for passenger seats. (63 FR 46272, August 
31, 1998). The FAA stated that the objective was to harmonize test 
article selection and other methods of compliance with Sec.  25.562, 
including pass/fail criteria and test methodology.
    ARAC assigned the task to the existing Seat Testing Harmonization 
Working Group. If adopted by the FAA, the ARAC recommendations 
regarding a simplification of the test article selection process and 
pass/fail criteria should provide a much shorter test plan approval 
cycle and reduce the number of tests required.
    On April 6, 2000, the Wendel H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform 
Act (HR 1000) was enacted into law. Section 757 of Public Law 106-81 
contains information directing the Administrator (FAA) to take specific 
measures aimed at streamlining the seats and restraint systems 
certification process and 16g dynamic testing requirements.
    In August 2000, the FAA formed a joint government/industry team 
that consisted of FAA, JAA, airlines, seat manufacturers, airframe 
manufacturers, and the Association of Flight Attendants. This Charter 
Team looked at the various initiatives that were already underway that, 
if implemented, would streamline or otherwise improve the seat and 
restraint system certification process. The Charter Team identified 
issues in the current seat certification process that, if effectively 
resolved, may reduce the time and cost of seat certification programs 
by as much as 50 percent. With that goal in mind, the Charter Team 
agreed to a plan of action that focuses on four areas in seat 
certification: policy related to seat certification, the Technical 
Standard Orders (TSO) for seats (i.e., TSO C39b and TSO C127a), 
utilization of local authorities (both domestic and foreign) in seat 
certification, and alternative methods for seat certification. The 
specific tasks within each of these areas have been determined and are 
being worked by both industry and FAA members of the Charter Team.
    The first part of the plan requires a review of existing policy on 
seat certification by both industry and the FAA. The review will 
identify policy that is not clear, inappropriately applied, or is 
inconsistent or conflicts with other policy. Industry will identify to 
the FAA key seat certification issues that have proven problematic and 
relevant policy, if it exists, will be reviewed. Additionally, both 
industry and the FAA can identify areas where development of new policy 
could simplify seat compliance. In each case, the goal is to clarify or 
interpret current policy or develop new policy to address the specific 
issue.
    The second part of the plan focuses on the TSO program for seats. 
Tasks within the plan have been set to ensure that the TSO remains a 
valid approval basis for seats and is recognized as such. Tasks are 
also in place to provide clarification and standardization on the 
extent that the TSO approval or activities associated with obtaining 
that approval can be utilized to demonstrate compliance with the 
airworthiness requirements of part 25 of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations. In addition, the TSOs will be developed to maximize the 
amount of data that can be obtained during the TSO process that can 
also be used to meet airworthiness requirements.
    The third part of the plan involves use of local authorities to 
maximize use of foreign and domestic regional approvals to improve the 
seat certification process. The plan calls for development of 
agreements between seat suppliers and the regulatory offices (e.g., 
aircraft certification offices in the U.S.) overseeing the suppliers. 
The agreement provides a roadmap for all stakeholders to understand 
responsibilities and relationships in the certification process and 
defines a process for resolving problems when they occur. Great benefit 
will be gained by mapping out this process which provides opportunities 
to identify potential problems early in the program and to avoid 
similar problems in subsequent programs. The plan also addresses 
inconsistencies between how domestic seat approvals and foreign seat 
approvals are made. The goal is to ensure that methods to facilitate 
seat approvals are equivalent without compromising safety standards.
    The fourth and final part of the Charter Team plan looks at 
alternative methods from more traditional ways of approving seats for 
use in aircraft. This area has concentrated on the use of analytical 
modeling in seat certification as well as systems that simulate a 
portion of the dynamic testing process (``component testers'') without 
the necessity of a complete test. A specific task is to issue guidance 
for the use of computer simulation in lieu of full scale testing. Other 
tasks include guidance on the use of specific component testers to 
address occupant injury criteria in lieu of full scale testing.
    The four elements of the Charter Team plan are being worked 
concurrently with continuous review by industry and the FAA for 
progress towards implementation and to refine the plan as mutually 
agreed upon.

[[Page 62301]]

    The FAA requests comment on the plan as outlined above as well as 
other suggestions for making the approval of seats more efficient while 
maintaining required safety standards.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires 
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information 
collection burdens imposed on the public. We have determined that there 
are no new information collection requirements associated with this 
proposed rule.

International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA 
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices 
that correspond to these proposed regulations.

Economic Evaluation Summary

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs each Federal agency 
proposing or adopting a regulation to first make a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its 
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies 
to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. 
Third, the Trade Agreements Act prohibits agencies from setting 
standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of 
the United States. In developing U.S. standards, this act requires 
agencies to consider international standards, and use them where 
appropriate as the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires agencies to prepare a written 
assessment of the costs and benefits and other effects of proposed and 
final rules. An assessment must be prepared only for rules that impose 
a Federal mandate on State, local or tribal governments, or on the 
private sector, likely to result in a total expenditure of $100 million 
or more in any one year (adjusted for inflation.)
    In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined this rule: (1) 
Has benefits that do justify its costs, (2) is a significant regulatory 
action; (3) would not have a significant impact on a substantial number 
of small entities; (4) would have neutral impact on international 
trade; and (5) does not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or 
tribal governments, or on the private sector. The FAA has placed these 
analyses in the docket and summarized them below.
    The economic evaluation of this proposed rulemaking is based 
primarily on a November 2000 study titled ``Improved Seats in Transport 
Category Airplanes: Analysis of Options,'' prepared by the FAA's Office 
of System Safety (ASY).) The report is hereinafter referred to as the 
ASY 16g-seat options study, or in short, the ``ASY 16g-seat study.'' 
The study evaluated costs and benefits for the period 2000-2020 
(although the final rule probably would not be implemented until 2002, 
the benefit/cost relationship would essentially be the same). A 
modified option 5 of that analysis is the basis of the new requirements 
proposed in this SNPRM. The SNPRM incorporates a 14-year deadline date 
beyond which all airplanes must be in compliance; as a result, the 
cost/benefit data in this analysis differ somewhat from option 5 in the 
study cited. The study has been placed in FAA's docket file associated 
with this rulemaking. Besides incorporating a 14-year deadline date for 
compliance, the subject evaluation differs from the ASY 16g-seat study 
in that it uses $3 million for a fatality averted (vs. $2.7 million).

Regulatory Evaluation

    This section explains and summarizes the relevant data used in this 
analysis and describes the methodology used to calculate benefits and 
costs. Total estimated dollar benefits and costs are presented in the 
Benefit/Cost Summary at the end of the section.
    To estimate the potential benefits and costs of this new proposal, 
it was first necessary to divide seat installations into three broad 
``compliance'' categories: (1) ``Full 16g'' seat installations are 
compliant with 14 CFR 25.562 (a), (b), and (c). (2) ``Partial 16g'' 
seat installations are compliant with some of 14 CFR 25.562 (a), (b), 
and (c) but have not been tested to meet all occupant injury criteria. 
(3) ``9g'' seat installations refer to older vintages of seats that 
meet 9g structural requirements only.
    In addition, the projected population of seats was divided into 
five different groups depending on the date of aircraft manufacture and 
the projected date of seat replacement. Replacement seats are assumed 
to be distributed according to the estimated proportion of full 16g-, 
partial 16g-, and 9g-seat certification programs. For example, if 10% 
of seat certification programs are for 9g-seats, it is assumed 
approximately 10% of seats installed or replaced will be 9g-seats.
    The analysis projected the distribution of seats in the absence of 
regulatory action. The distribution was based on the following 
assumptions:
    1. Part 121 airplanes are retired after 42 years of service.
    2. Seat replacement uniformly distributed with mean seat life of 14 
years.
    3. Fleet/seat growth based on FAA Aerospace Forecast.
    4. Relationship of full 16g- to partial 16g-seats stays the same.
    The distribution of seat types is as follows:
    [sbull] Group I: Airplanes manufactured before 1992 having seats 
installed before 1992. While 16g-seats were being installed before this 
date, the majority of these seats are 9g.
    [sbull] Group II: Airplanes manufactured before 1992 having 
replacement seats installed after 1991. Some (unknown) proportion of 
seats in this group may have partial 16g performance although no 
airplane model in this group is 16g-certificated. Note that the sum of 
Group I and Group II declines over time as these airplanes/seats are 
retired from passenger service.
    [sbull] Group III: Airplanes manufactured after 1991. Some 
(unknown) proportion of seats in this group may have partial 16g 
performance.
    [sbull] Group IV: Airplanes manufactured after 1992 and compliant 
with some parts of 14 CFR 25.562 (certificated partial 16g capability).
    [sbull] Group V: Airplanes manufactured after 1992 and fully 
compliant with 14 CFR 25.562 (e.g. certification basis includes 
Amendment 25-64, or full 16g testing was performed voluntarily). If 
this proposal were in effect, Group V seats would be projected to 
increase from approximately 23,000 at year end 1999 to 1.8 million in 
2020 (versus approx. 560,000 in 2020 under the ``baseline'' 
assumption).
    Two critical questions are: (1) What is the performance of Group 
II/III seat installations relative to full 16g and partial 16g 
installations? (2) How will the composition of Group II/III 
installations change over time? Will operators continue to upgrade 
these seats in the absence of rulemaking?
    Projected (2000-2020) fatality and serious injury rates are equal 
to the fatality and injury rates for U.S. 14 CFR part 121 (scheduled 
and nonscheduled) operations for the period 1984-1998, which is the 
time period used in Report DOT/FAA/AR-00/13/April 2000, ``A Benefit 
Analysis for Aircraft 16g Dynamic Seats'' (which has also been placed 
in the docket and is hereinafter

[[Page 62302]]

termed the ``DOT/FAA report''). Although the report evaluated worldwide 
accidents to determine the degree to which 16g-seats would reduce 
casualties in a typical accident (note that a typical U.S. accident is 
not significantly different from a typical non-U.S. accident in terms 
of accident outcomes), it is important to emphasize that the benefits 
in this regulatory evaluation are based on the U.S. part 121 accident 
rate.
    The Benefits Section explains the method used to estimate benefits, 
constructs baseline estimates of the population of affected airplanes, 
projects the distribution of part 121 seat types for the period 2000-
2020 (assuming no future regulatory action), and forecasts future 
fatality and serious injury rates. The Cost Section explains the 
methods used to estimate costs and constructs baseline cost estimates 
for passenger and flight attendant (hereinafter, ``FA'') seats.

A. Benefits Model

    Estimates of the safety benefits of 16g-seats are based on a study 
of 25 impact-related accidents involving airplanes operating under 14 
CFR part 121 (or equivalent) during the period 1984-1998. The DOT/FAA 
report projects that the baseline fatality and serious injury rates for 
the period 2000-2020 will be 0.2868 and 0.0436 per million 
enplanements, respectively. (See also Section II of the ASY 16g-seat 
study.)
    Based on engineering assessments of the possible effects of full 
16g-seats, Monte Carlo simulations were used to assess a high, median, 
and low value for the total achievable (net) reduction in fatalities 
and serious injuries for each accident/scenario. Risk reduction 
benefits for the U.S. part 121 fleet, then, were estimated in three 
ways:
    First, the DOT/FAA report estimated the number of averted U.S. 
casualties by assuming that the ratio of U.S./World casualties averted 
is proportional to the ratio of U.S./World accidents (see Table II.4 in 
the ASY 16g-seat study). Second, it estimated the number of U.S. 
casualties averted strictly based on the part 121 accidents studied 
(Table II.5 in the ASY study). Third, it extrapolated the U.S.-specific 
data, to U.S. part 121 ground-impact accidents that were not studied.
    Baseline risk estimates are computed as follows:
    [sbull] Construct an estimate of the future number of domestic 
enplanements. Estimates of the number of future enplanements were 
derived from the FAA Aerospace Forecasts, Fiscal Years 1999-2010; 
enplanements are projected to increase from 676.9 million in 2000 to 
1,450.3 million in 2020. Enplanement totals are then combined with 
fatality/serious-injury rates and seat distribution to assess risk 
reduction potential per seat type (see below).
    [sbull] Construct a baseline estimate of the distribution of seat 
types. This analysis divides the projected population of seats into 
different groups (see the discussion below) depending on the date of 
aircraft manufacture and the projected date of seat replacement. The 
distribution of enplanements across seat groups is assumed to be 
proportional to the number of seats in each group. Replacement seats 
are assumed to be distributed according to the estimated proportion of 
full 16g-, partial 16g-, and 9g-seat certification programs. For 
example, if 10% of seat certification programs are for 9g-seats, it is 
assumed approximately 10% of seats installed or replaced will be 9g-
seats.
    [sbull] Forecast fatality and serious injury rates. This analysis 
postulates that the projected rates of fatalities and serious injuries 
per enplanement during the forecast period are equal to the rates 
observed during the period 1984 to 1998 (U.S. 14 CFR part 121 fleet 
only). Key assumptions: (1) The rate is assumed to reflect a 9g 
baseline, (2) no improvements in historical fatality or injury rates 
are expected to occur during the forecast period, and (3) the risk 
reduction potential of 16g-seats is not expected to improve (e.g., due 
to the introduction of additional cabin safety measures). Example: 
Three-hundred-and-twenty-nine (329) serious injuries were recorded 
during 14 CFR part 121 operations during the study period 1984 to 1998 
(see Table II.3 of the ASY 16g-seat study). In the same period, part 
121 operators accumulated 7,540.9 million enplanements. Therefore, the 
historical (and projected) rate of serious injuries is 329 / 7,540.9 = 
0.0436 per million enplanements.
    [sbull] Estimate the reduction in fatalities and serious injuries 
during the study period (1984-1998). Example: Based on the DOT/FAA 
report (part 121 benefits based on worldwide fleet accident 
characteristics), the fleetwide use of full 16g-seats would have 
averted 68 fatalities and 79 serious injuries (net) during the study 
period.
    [sbull] Estimate the percentage reduction in fatalities and serious 
injuries during the study period. The number of fatalities averted due 
to 16g-seats divided by the total number of fatalities during the study 
period yields an estimate of the percentage reduction in fatalities 
that would be achieved by requiring 16g-seats. Similarly, the number of 
serious injuries averted due to 16g-seats divided by the total number 
of serious injuries yields an estimate of the percentage reduction in 
injuries that would be achieved by requiring 16g-seats. Example: There 
were a total of 329 injuries during the study period (U.S. 14 CFR part 
121). According to the DOT/FAA report, 79 serious injuries could have 
been averted had 16g-seats been installed in the part 121 fleet. 
Therefore, a 16g-seat requirement could have averted 79/329 = 24% of 
serious injuries during the study period.
    [sbull] Determine adjustment factors for each seat group. The 
degree to which a new seat reduces fatality and injury risks is a 
function of the vintage of seat it is replacing. As noted elsewhere in 
this study, however, the DOT/FAA report did not estimate the relative 
performance of full and partial 16g-seats. Aircraft Certification 
Service engineers provided subjective estimates of the performance of 
seats in Groups I-V (see discussion below). Example: A Group V seat 
(full compliance with 14 CFR 25.562) has an effectiveness rating of 
1.0. Therefore, this type of seat is expected to reduce serious 
injuries by 1.0 x 24% = 24% relative to a 9g-seat. A Group II seat 
(i.e., does not meet occupant injury criteria) has an effectiveness 
rating of 0.1, or 10% of the effectiveness of a full 16g-seat. 
Therefore, Group II seats are expected to reduce serious injuries by .1 
x 24% = 2.4% relative to a 9g-seat.
    [sbull] Forecast baseline fatality and serious injury rates. 
Baseline estimates of the numbers of fatalities and serious injuries 
for the forecast period are obtained by combining: (1) The baseline 
(9g) fatality and serious injury rates; (2) the baseline distribution 
of seat types and enplanements; (3) the risk reduction potential of 
16g-seats; and (4) the adjustment factors.
    [sbull] Forecast the effect of each option on the distribution of 
seats. Potential benefits, then, reflect the degree to which any option 
alters the future distribution of seat types (relative to the projected 
baseline distribution). That is, the more the distribution shifts to 
full 16g- and partial 16g-seats, the lower the expected future rates of 
fatalities and serious injuries.
    The steps outlined above are used to derive baseline estimates of 
fatalities and serious injuries. The baseline estimates, then, are 
compared to fatality/serious-injury estimates based on the expected 
distribution of seats following full implementation of the rule.
    Passenger seat benefits--Over the 2000-2020 period of analysis, the 
proposed requirements would avert 112.1 fatalities and 130.2 serious 
injuries. Using $3.0 million as the

[[Page 62303]]

monetary equivalent of a statistical fatality averted and $0.5 million 
per serious injury averted, this is equivalent to a benefit of $401.4 
million undiscounted, or $131.9 million discounted.
    Flight attendant seat benefits--Over the 2000-2020 period, the 
proposed requirements would avert 2.3 FA fatalities and 2.7 FA serious 
injuries; this equates to $8.2 million undiscounted, or $2.7 million 
discounted. However, as delineated below, the FAA believes the direct 
quantified benefits of averted FA casualties could lead to significant 
additional benefits in terms of averted passenger casualties (i.e., the 
value of trained FAs in assisting passengers in emergency egress 
situations).

B. Determination of Costs

    The analysis presented at the 1998 public meeting considered a 
proposal that would have required full 16g compliance for newly 
manufactured airplanes and complete retrofit with 16g compatible seats 
for in-service airplanes (see Table ES-1 in ASY 16g-seat study). Seat 
replacement costs associated with that proposal would have exceeded 
significantly those of this SNPRM as a result of incremental costs to 
recertify seats already installed on aircraft, which would have been 
required under ``16g-compatibility.'' In addition, the current proposal 
includes more accurate (in this case, lower) estimates of seat 
certification costs. The regulatory evaluation for the original 1988 
NPRM identified seat weight, seat replacement, and seat certification 
as the largest sources of incremental costs.
    The FAA has chosen a final compliance timeframe in this SNPRM that 
allows airlines to exercise their own discretion in seat replacement up 
to 14 years after the rule is enacted, but then ensures that the 
transport fleet will be upgraded to the 16g-standard. New information 
provided by seat manufacturers indicates that, at least with respect to 
passenger seats, the weight and costs of 16g-seats are the same as 9g-
seats; in fact, current 16g-seats are in some cases lighter than older 
seats. In addition, the options considered in this analysis emphasize 
``discretionary replacement.'' That is, requiring compliance for in-
service aircraft only when operators choose to replace seats (rather 
than stipulating a short-term mandatory retrofit period). The data show 
that only about 7.5% of seats would require premature replacement at 
the end of the 14-year ``discretionary'' period. This results in 
approximately a two percent increase in costs over that estimated 
without the 14-year deadline. The FAA requests specific comments on the 
compliance timeframe proposed for seat replacement. Substantive 
comments should be accompanied by cost estimates, to the extent 
possible.
    The following discussion outlines the process used to determine 
baseline passenger and FA seat costs.
    The current number of seat certification programs and the current 
distribution of seat certification programs (9g, partial 16g, full 16g) 
both based on FAA data, were extrapolated forward using the same rate 
of growth as the number of seat replacements and installations. That 
is, the number of seat certification programs in the future is assumed 
to be a constant fraction of the number of seats projected to be 
installed/replaced. Information on the average cost of a certification 
program was obtained from industry sources; these costs were projected 
into the future under each alternative option and compared to the 
baseline (i.e. voluntary industry action) to determine incremental 
certification costs.
    Passenger seat costs. Industry data indicates an average 
incremental 16g-seat certification cost of $300,000, which may be 
amortized over several aircraft types with the same installations; on 
average, one certification would be applicable to approximately 1,200 
seats. The proposed requirement entails no incremental seat replacement 
costs, since the cost of a new upgraded seat and its installation is 
the same as for a non-upgraded seat. Current data show that 
approximately 44% of current programs are for full 16g-, 55% are for 
partial 16g-, and one percent of programs are for 9g-seats.
    Over the 2000-2020 period of analysis, total costs attributable to 
upgrading passenger seats equal $232.9 million undiscounted, or $105.4 
million discounted.
    Flight attendant seat costs. The same process used to estimate 
incremental passenger seat certification costs was used to estimate 
incremental FA seat certification costs.
    Current and projected number of certification programs. The current 
number of FA seat certification programs was estimated from industry 
sources and extrapolated using the process described above. As before, 
the ratio of certification programs to seats installed/replaced is 
assumed to be roughly constant during the 2000-2020 forecast period. 
Following the assumption used in the 1998 regulatory evaluation, the 
number of FA seats are assumed to equal two percent of passenger seats; 
that is, one FA seat per 40-50 passenger seats.
    Current and projected distribution of FA seat certification 
programs. The current distribution of FA seat certification programs 
was determined from data obtained from industry: (1) Full 16g, 
approximately 33%; (2) partial 16g, approximately 42%; (3) 9g, 
approximately 25%. Again, in the absence of additional rulemaking, this 
distribution is assumed to be constant during the forecast period.
    Full 16g-certification program costs for FA seats are approximately 
$250,000 per program. The average replacement cost is $5,400 per seat 
and $85 for installation. This analysis assumes that FA seats are 
rarely replaced, since they usually last the life of the airframe. 
Additional fuel costs associated with increased weight equals 
approximately $13 per seat per year.
    Over the 2000-2020 period of analysis, total costs attributable to 
upgrading FA seats equal $285.7 million undiscounted, or $139.3 million 
discounted.

Upcoming FAA Certification-Streamlining Efforts

    As outlined in the Related Activity section of this SNPRM, the FAA 
is initiating changes to the airplane seat certification process that 
are expected to result in reductions in required testing for both 
passenger and FA seats. These streamlining efforts may eliminate some 
dynamic seat tests and make other tests simpler to perform. For 
example, in-service changes or variation in design that currently 
require a full-scale test may instead be substantiated through a 
component level test(s). Such tests are currently being developed and 
evaluated to address both lumbar and head injury criteria (HIC), which 
may have relevance for FA seat programs in particular. In either of 
these cases, the scope of the test program would be reduced as would 
the associated costs.
    Part of the overall objective of the streamlining program is to 
capitalize on the work and expertise of the seat manufacturers, and 
prevent duplicate review by the FAA or airframe manufacturer(s). The 
current process often results in Technical Standard Order (TSO) 
qualification and installation qualification requiring separate, rather 
than complementary, effort. This administrative cost is significant 
and, if reduced or eliminated, would reduce the overall certification 
burden. Note that in addition to reducing specific certification (e.g. 
testing) costs, streamlining would reduce the time required to gain 
seat approval, which

[[Page 62304]]

often is cited as a major component of certification costs.
    The aforementioned benefits expected to accrue from the 
streamlining initiatives would be more heavily weighted to passenger 
seat programs than to FA seat programs, since the latter tend to have 
fewer tests per program. However, all the reductions in certification 
procedures specified would also benefit FA seat programs and would have 
a substantive effect on reducing costs of those programs as well. Once 
streamlining is implemented, the FAA believes a significant reduction 
in tests for both FA seats and passenger seats would be achieved. 
Although a definitive estimate of the cost savings that a reduction in 
testing translates to is not yet determinable, the FAA believes it 
could potentially result in a considerable reduction in nonrecurring 
certification program costs.
    The FAA requests specific comments on how we might streamline 
certification costs. Substantive comments should be accompanied by cost 
estimates to the extent possible.

Benefit/Cost Summary

    As previously stated, the FAA estimates that this proposed rule to 
require upgraded passenger and FA seats for both new and in-service 
airplanes would statistically avert approximately 114 fatalities and 
133 serious injuries during a 20-year period following the effective 
date of the rule. At $3.0 million per statistical fatality averted and 
$0.5 million per statistical serious injury averted, the estimated 
benefits equal $409.6 million, or $134.6 million at present value (year 
2000 dollars). The total associated costs are approximately $518.6 
million, or $244.7 million at present value. These costs are based on 
current certification programs and testing methods. Implementation of 
the streamlining procedures previously noted would no doubt reduce the 
estimated costs.
    Of the $518.6 million in undiscounted total costs for the proposed 
rule, $285.7 million, or 55%, are attributed to upgrading FA seats. 
Compared to passenger seats, FA seats have relatively high 
certification costs, as well as significant variable costs to replace. 
The high replacement costs of FA seats occurs because the proposed rule 
would require these seats to be upgraded at the same time as passenger 
seats, whereas FA seats normally last the life-time of the airplane. 
However, the higher costs are offset by increased per-seat benefits 
since the seats prevent injury to the FA and therefore permit them to 
perform safety functions and help save the lives of passengers (see 
further discussion below on the benefits attributable to FAs).
    The proposed rule allows passenger seats to be upgraded at a normal 
replacement time up to 14 years after the publication of the rule. Due 
to technological improvements, there is essentially no difference in 
weight or cost between a 9g- and 16g-passenger seat. The only 
additional cost of upgrading passenger seats in the normal replacement 
period is the higher expense of a 16g-certification program. Unlike the 
passenger seat upgrade, the entire cost of upgrading FA seats is 
attributed to the rule. The cost of replacing FA seats includes seat 
certification, procurement, installation, and increased fuel burn 
because of the higher operating weight.
    Because slightly more than half of the estimated cost of this 
proposal is attributed to upgrading FA seats, the FAA considered an 
alternative that would have required upgrading only passenger seats at 
the normal replacement time. The FAA rejected that alternative, as it 
would have resulted in FA seats being less safe than passenger seats. 
FAs have the critical responsibility to perform life-saving duties in 
precisely the kind of impact-accident wherein 16g-seats enhance the 
survivability of passengers.
    The FAA estimated the additional number of passenger-averted-
fatalities (i.e., those attributable to the actions of FA's who 
survived impact as a result of improved 16g-seats) required to increase 
the value of benefits sufficient to equal costs. In the data presented 
above, the undiscounted costs exceed benefits by $109 million. As noted 
in the benefits section, the proposed requirements would avert 2.3 FA 
fatalities and 2.7 FA serious injuries, resulting in five additional 
functioning FAs. If those five FAs assist 36 passengers, thus averting 
36 potential fatalities (or, seven per FA), the estimated benefits 
would equal the costs (i.e., $109 million divided by $3 million (value 
of averted fatality) = approximately 36 averted fatalities).
    The evidence supports the FAA position that the actions of five 
additional functioning FAs can avert at least an additional 36 
fatalities in one or more survivable accidents. A majority (perhaps 60-
70 percent) of the 25 total accidents evaluated were survivable in that 
the initial impact did not kill or severely incapacitate all occupants 
onboard the aircraft. In 11 of the survivable accidents, FAs were 
instrumental in assisting passengers and/or shouting instructions to 
passengers during the emergency evacuation(s). After excluding three 
accidents in which the accident reports only generalized the FA's 
actions, the FAA evaluated eight accidents to determine how many 
additional passengers were saved from fatal or serious injury by the 
actions of able-bodied FAs. One accident in particular clearly 
illustrates the FAs crucial role(s). In that accident, nearly three 
quarters of the passengers survived the initial impact, but most were 
seriously injured. As noted on pg. A-179 of the DOT/FAA report: ``The 
prompt and successful evacuation of 63 persons out of the passenger 
cabin during increasing smoke and extensive fire was directly due to 
the behavior of the cabin crew, in spite of their injuries. The two 
active cabin attendants played a significant and unquestionable role in 
preventing the panic and organizing the movement of passengers to the 
exits.'' In fact, in the eight sample accidents, 13 FAs were 
responsible for the safe egress of approximately 140 passengers, or 
about 11 passengers per FA.
    The DOT/FAA report provides additional evidence of the implicit 
value of FAs, but from the opposite perspective, i.e., passenger-
survival outcomes in accidents wherein FAs were incapacitated. In the 
report, there were three U.S. survivable accidents in which six FAs 
died or were seriously injured from impact; and, in these accidents, 44 
passengers died primarily from fire or smoke inhalation. The FAA cannot 
state with certainty how many of these passengers could have been saved 
by the FAs had the latter survived initial impact(s); however, in the 
light of the survival outcomes described above (with able-bodied FAs) 
the FAA believes most of the cited 44 passenger fatalities could have 
been averted. And, with the incorporation of current fire protection 
standards into new-production airplanes (increasing time-margins for 
safe egress), surviving able-bodied FAs could save even more lives in 
future accidents.
    Based on the accident circumstances just described, the FAA 
strongly believes the projected five additional FAs would save at least 
an additional 36 passengers (i.e., seven per FA) in future accidents 
over the next 20 years. Consequently, the costs of retrofitting the FA 
seats are justified. The FAA maintains this is a reasonable contention, 
given the conservative methodology applied-i.e. including only those 
survivable accidents in which FA's actions and/or their ``capability-
states'' were clearly described or determined.
    The FAA is aware of some studies demonstrating the value of cabin 
crew during emergency evacuations and

[[Page 62305]]

request comments with documented evidence regarding the value of FAs in 
airplane evacuations.
    In conclusion, since the 16g-seat-derived benefits of averted 
passenger and FA casualties combined with the additional passenger 
lives saved by able-bodied FAs exceed the total seat-replacement costs, 
the FAA deems this SNPRM to be cost-beneficial.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a 
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, 
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes, 
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the 
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to 
regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the Act requires agencies to 
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the 
rationale for their actions. The Act covers a wide-range of small 
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and 
small governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. If the determination is that it will, the 
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in 
the Act. However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule 
is not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 act provides that 
the head of the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility 
analysis is not required. The certification must include a statement 
providing the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning 
should be clear.
    There are approximately 100 part 121 operators in the potential 
pool of small entities. The FAA performed a detailed analysis of the 
economic impacts on 33 of these operators who clearly: (1) Had less 
than 1,500 employees (the size threshold for classification as a small 
entity); (2) were not subsidiaries of larger organizations; and, (3) 
reported operating revenue to the Department of Transportation. The FAA 
believes these 33 are representative of the affected small firms.
    The FAA's methodology in assessing economic impact for small 
entities for this proposed rule is as follows. Recent data indicates 
that airplane seats are replaced about every 14 years. The FAA assumed 
that the current fleet inventory of passenger seats (and now, by virtue 
of this proposal, flight attendant seats also) would, on average, need 
replacement in seven years (for cost analysis purposes, operators on 
average would need to retrofit halfway into the 14-year replacement 
cycle; this is obviously a conservative assumption). These retrofit 
costs were then annualized using the sinking-fund methodology whereby 
an annual amount is set aside each year for the relevant number of 
years (in this case, seven years) accumulating to the required capital 
expenditure. The FAA then compared each firm's required annual seat 
replacement cost to the firm's annual operating revenue. The calculated 
annual-cost(s)-as-a-percent-of-annual-operating-revenue(s) ranged from 
lows of less than one-tenth of one percent (in 14 of the firms) to a 
maximum of only 1.1 percent (in one firm). Based on the described 
expense/revenue relationships, the FAA believes that the proposed rule 
would ``not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities.'' The FAA invites comments on the estimated small 
entity impact from interested and affected parties.

International Trade Impact Assessment

    Consistent with the Administration's belief in the general 
superiority, desirability, and efficacy of free trade, it is the policy 
of the Administrator to remove or diminish, to the extent feasible, 
barriers to international trade, including both barriers affecting the 
export of American goods and services to foreign countries and those 
affecting the import of foreign goods and services into the United 
States. The net effect of this SNPRM is to raise the cost and value of 
exported and imported compliant transport category airplanes. The FAA 
believes the costs are offset by the value and thus the rule has a 
neutral impact on international trade.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), 
enacted as Public Law 104-4 on March 22, 1995, requires each Federal 
agency, to the extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment 
of the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency 
rule that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. 
Section 204(a) of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal 
agency to develop an effective process to permit timely input by 
elected officers (or their designees) of State, local, and tribal 
governments on a proposed ``significant intergovernmental mandate.'' A 
``significant intergovernmental mandate'' under the Act is any 
provision in a Federal agency regulation that will impose an 
enforceable duty upon State, local, and tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one 
year. Section 203 of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which supplements section 
204(a), provides that before establishing any regulatory requirements 
that might significantly or uniquely affect small governments, the 
agency shall have developed a plan that, among other things, provides 
for notice to potentially affected small governments, if any, and for a 
meaningful and timely opportunity to provide input in the development 
of regulatory proposals.
    The FAA determines that this proposed rule does not contain a 
significant intergovernmental mandate.

Regulations Affecting Interstate Aviation in Alaska

    Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 
3213) requires the Administrator, when modifying regulations in title 
14 of the CFR in manner affecting interstate aviation in Alaska, to 
consider the extent to which Alaska is not served by transportation 
modes other than aviation, and to establish such regulatory 
distinctions as he or she considers appropriate. Because this proposed 
rule would apply to transport category airplanes and their subsequent 
operation, it could, if adopted, affect interstate aviation in Alaska. 
The FAA therefore specifically requests comments on whether there is 
justification for applying the proposed rule differently in interstate 
operations in Alaska.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this 
action would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the 
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government. Therefore, we determined that this notice of proposed 
rulemaking would not have federalism implications.

Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically 
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
environmental impact statement. In

[[Page 62306]]

accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, appendix 4, paragraph 4(j), this 
proposed rulemaking action qualifies for a categorical exclusion.

Energy Impact

    The energy impact of the proposed rulemaking has been assessed in 
accordance with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) Pub. L. 
94-163, as amended (42 U.S.C. 6362) and FAA Order 1053.1. It has been 
determined that this proposed rulemaking is not a major regulatory 
action under the provisions of the EPCA.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 121

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety, Transportation.

The Proposed Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration proposes to amend part 121 of Title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations (14 CFR part 121) as follows:

PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
OPERATIONS

    1. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 44101, 44701-44702, 
44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901, 44903-44904, 
44912, 46105.

    2. Amend Sec.  121.311 by adding paragraphs (j) and (k) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  121.311  Seats, safety belts, and shoulder harnesses.

* * * * *
    (j) On and after [insert date four years after effective date of 
final rule], no person may operate a transport category airplane type 
certificated after January 1, 1958, in passenger-carrying operations 
under this part unless--
    (1) For airplanes manufactured on and after [insert date four years 
after the effective date of final rule], all passenger and all flight 
attendant seats on the airplane meet the requirements of Sec.  25.562 
of this chapter in effect on June 16, 1988.
    (2) For airplanes manufactured before [insert date four years after 
the effective date of final rule], all passenger seats and all flight 
attendant seats on the airplane meet the requirements of Sec.  25.562 
of this chapter in effect on June 16, 1988, after any passenger seat or 
any flight attendant seat on that airplane is replaced.
    (k) On and after [insert date 14 years after the effective date of 
final rule], no person may operate a transport category airplane type 
certificated after January 1, 1958, in passenger-carrying operations 
under this part unless all passenger and all flight attendant seats on 
the airplane meet the requirements of Sec.  25.562 of this chapter in 
effect on June 16, 1988.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on September 26, 2002.
John J. Hickey,
Director, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 02-25051 Filed 10-3-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P