[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 185 (Tuesday, September 24, 2002)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 59800-59809]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-24236]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. NHTSA 02-13393; Notice 1]
RIN 2127-AI71


Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking; response to petitions for 
rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: This document responds to petitions for rulemaking from the 
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Toyota, and DaimlerChrysler 
requesting changes in the advanced air bag final rule that we published 
in May 2000. The requirements of that rule are being phased in during 
two stages, the first of which takes place from September 1, 2003 to 
August 31, 2006.
    In response to the petitions, we are proposing in this document to 
reduce the percentage of vehicles that must comply with the advanced 
air bag requirements during the first year of the phase-in, i.e., from 
September 1, 2003 through August 31, 2004, from 35 percent to 20 
percent. This proposed change reflects the technical challenges being 
faced by the vehicle manufacturers in meeting the new requirements and 
the fact that two of the automotive suppliers have dropped plans to 
offer devices that suppress the passenger air bag when a child is 
present. We are otherwise either denying the petitions or, as to 
certain requests, dismissing them because the agency has subsequently 
considered or is considering the same requests in the context of 
another rulemaking proceeding.
    In addition, in response to a petition for rulemaking from Porsche, 
we are considering possible adjustments in the alternative phase-in 
requirements available to limited line manufacturers.

DATES: You should submit your comments early enough to ensure that 
Docket Management receives them not later than October 24, 2002.

ADDRESSES: You may submit your comments in writing to: Docket 
Management, Room PL-401, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590. 
Alternatively, you may submit your comments electronically by logging 
onto the Docket Management System (DMS) Web site at http://dms.dot.gov. 
Click on ``Help & Information'' or ``Help/Info'' to view instructions 
for filing your comments electronically. Regardless of how you submit 
your comments, you should mention the docket number of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The following persons at the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
Washington, DC, 20590:
For technical issues:
    Mr. Louis Molino, Office of Crashworthiness Standards, NPS-11, 
telephone (202) 366-2264, facsimile (202) 493-2739.
For legal issues:
    Mr. Edward Glancy, Office of the Chief Counsel, NCC-20, telephone 
(202) 366-2992, facsimile (202) 366-3820.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Background: The Advanced Air Bag Final Rule
II. Petitions for Rulemaking
    A. Alliance Petition
    B. Toyota Petition
    C. DaimlerChrysler Petition
III. Response to Petitions and Proposal to Revise Percentage Phase-
in Requirement for First Year of Phase-In
    A. Requests That Have Been Overtaken by Events
    B. Request for Deferral of Requirements Using 6-year-old Child 
Dummies
    C. Requests for Expanded Availability of On-off Switches
    D. Request for Allowance of Transponder Technology for Reliable 
Child Restraint System Detection
    E. Requests for Revisions to Percentage Phase-in Requirements 
and Proposal To Revise First-year Percentage
IV. Petition for Rulemaking from Porsche Concerning the Alternative 
Phase-in Available to Limited Line Manufacturers
V. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
VI. Submission of Comments

I. Background: The Advanced Air Bag Final Rule

    On May 12, 2000, we published in the Federal Register (65 FR 30680) 
a rule to require advanced air bags. (Docket No. NHTSA 00-7013; Notice 
1.) The rule amended Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection, to 
require that future air bags be designed so that, compared to current 
air bags, they create less risk of serious air bag-induced injuries, 
particularly for small women and young children, and provide improved 
frontal crash protection for all occupants, by means that include 
advanced air bag technology.
    To achieve these goals, the rule added a wide variety of new 
requirements, test procedures, and injury criteria, based on the use of 
an assortment of new dummies. Among other things, it replaced the 
current optional sled test with a rigid barrier crash test for 
assessing the protection of unbelted occupants.
    The issuance of the rule completed the implementation of our 1996 
comprehensive plan for reducing air bag risks. It was also required by 
the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA 21), which was 
enacted in 1998. That Act required us to issue a rule amending Standard 
No. 208:

    to improve occupant protection for occupants of different sizes, 
belted and unbelted, under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 
208, while minimizing the risk to infants, children, and other 
occupants

[[Page 59801]]

from injuries and deaths caused by air bags, by means that include 
advanced air bags.
(Emphasis added.)

    The rule will improve protection and minimize risk by requiring new 
tests and injury criteria and specifying the use of an entire family of 
test dummies: the existing dummy representing 50th percentile adult 
males, and new dummies representing 5th percentile adult females, 6-
year-old children, 3-year-old children, and 1-year-old infants. With 
the addition of those dummies, Standard No. 208 will more fully reflect 
the range in sizes of vehicle occupants.
    The rule will be phased in during two stages. The first stage 
phase-in will improve protection by requiring vehicles to be certified 
as passing the unbelted test requirements \1\ for both the 5th 
percentile adult female and 50th percentile adult male dummies in a 32-
40 km/h (20-25 mph) rigid barrier crash, and belted test requirements 
\2\ for the same two dummies in a rigid barrier crash with a maximum 
test speed of 48 km/h (30 mph). In addition, the first stage will 
minimize the risk of injury from air bags by requiring vehicles to 
include technologies that will minimize the risk of air bag-induced 
injuries for young children and small adults.
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    \1\ ``Unbelted test requirements'' are requirements that specify 
the use of unbelted dummies in testing vehicles.
    \2\ ``Belted test requirements'' are requirements that specify 
the use of belted dummies in testing vehicles.
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    During the first stage phase-in, from September 1, 2003 to August 
31, 2006, increasing percentages of motor vehicles will be required to 
meet requirements for minimizing air bag risks, primarily by either 
automatically turning off the air bag when young children are present 
or deploying the air bag more benignly so that it is much less likely 
to cause serious or fatal injury to out-of-position occupants.\3\ If 
they so wish, manufacturers may choose to use a combination of those 
approaches. All of the petitions addressed in this notice asked for 
modifications to the risk minimization requirements.
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    \3\ The rule also establishes very general performance 
requirements for dynamic automatic suppression systems (DASS) and a 
special expedited petitioning and rulemaking process for considering 
procedures for testing advanced air bag systems incorporating a 
DASS.
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    Manufacturers that decide to turn off the passenger air bag will 
use weight sensors and/or other means of detecting the presence of 
young children. To test the ability of those means to detect the 
presence of children, the rule specifies that child dummies be placed 
in child seats that are, in turn, placed on the passenger seat in both 
proper and (to simulate misuse) improper ways. It also specifies tests 
that are conducted with unrestrained child dummies sitting, kneeling, 
standing, or lying on the passenger seat.
    The ability of air bags to deploy in a low-risk manner will be 
tested using child dummies on the passenger side and the small adult 
female dummy on the driver side. For manufacturers that decide to 
design their passenger air bags to deploy in a low risk manner, the 
rule specifies that unbelted child dummies be placed against the 
instrument panel in two different positions. The air bag is then 
deployed with the dummies in each position. This placement was 
specified because pre-crash braking can cause unrestrained children to 
move forward into or near the instrument panel before the air bag 
deploys. The ability of driver air bags to deploy in a low risk manner 
will be tested by placing the 5th percentile adult female dummy against 
the steering wheel in two different positions and then deploying the 
air bag with the dummy in each position.
    The second stage phase-in will require vehicles to be certified as 
passing the belted test requirements for the 50th percentile adult male 
dummy at a test speed up to 56 km/h (35 mph). This requirement will 
provide improved protection for belted occupants.
    On December 18, 2001, we published in the Federal Register (66 FR 
65376) a final rule that responded to petitions for reconsideration of 
the advanced air bag final rule. We granted portions of the petitions 
and denied other portions of the petitions. We made several changes to 
the advanced air bag final rule in response to the petitions. These 
changes included a number of refinements to the positioning procedures 
for the low risk deployment tests and, to a lesser degree, for the 
automatic suppression tests. We also changed the test duration for the 
low risk deployment tests. In addition, the test used for determining 
the stage(s) of the air bag to be used for the passenger side low risk 
tests was modified. Other changes included modifying the definition of 
``small volume manufacturer'' for the purpose of the rule's phase-in 
schedule and adding an option to use human children instead of the 
newborn or 12-month-old dummies to test a vehicle's occupant 
recognition system.

II. Petitions for Rulemaking

    In October 2001, NHTSA received three petitions for rulemaking 
requesting changes in the advanced air bag final rule that we published 
in May 2000. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance), 
Toyota, and DaimlerChrysler submitted these petitions.\4\
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    \4\ DaimlerChrysler's petition was submitted on behalf of 
DaimlerChrysler and Mercedes-Benz USA.
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A. Alliance Petition

    The Alliance made four requests in its petition for rulemaking.
    First, that organization requested that implementation of the 
static out-of-position requirements using dummies representing 6-year-
old children be temporarily deferred for three years. The Alliance 
argued that the development of occupant classification technologies has 
not advanced as rapidly as expected, and that prototype occupant 
classification systems currently available for installation in 
September 2003 are not able to consistently and reliably distinguish 
between the Hybrid III 6-year-old child dummy and the Hybrid III 5th 
percentile adult female dummy. That organization argued that 
manufacturers choosing suppression as the means to reduce the risk to 
children are faced with the probability that, in the real world, the 
air bag will not deploy in some instances when it is potentially 
beneficial for a small adult, or will deploy in some instances when it 
is not wanted because a child is present. The Alliance argued that a 
delay in the requirements using dummies representing 6-year-old 
children would permit optimization of the advanced air bag system to 
make it more likely that the air bag will deploy when it is needed for 
small adults in the real world.
    Second, the Alliance asked that the specified 300 millisecond time 
period for measuring injury criteria in the low risk deployment tests 
be adjusted to 10 milliseconds after dummy interaction with the air bag 
ceases, to facilitate the adoption of low risk deployment air bags as 
either a compliance option or as a redundant protection system for 
vehicles certified under the suppression option.
    Third, the Alliance requested that manufacturers be permitted to 
provide a manual three-way override switch (on-off-automatic) for 
passenger-side air bags in vehicles with three-position front seating 
systems. That petitioner argued that currently available prototype 
occupant classification systems cannot detect and classify right front 
occupants consistently and properly when a center occupant is present 
on a three-position front bench seat. According to the Alliance, the 
most serious risk is that the sensor will misunderstand the weight 
distribution of the two passengers and erroneously conclude that one 
adult is present

[[Page 59802]]

instead of two children. Under these circumstances, the sensor will 
direct the air bag system to deploy when it should have been 
suppressed. A manual three-way override switch would enable the driver 
to override the occupancy classification decision by manually setting 
the switch to ``on'' or ``off.''
    Fourth, the Alliance petitioned that we revise the first year's 
phase-in requirement from 35 percent to 10 percent of a manufacturer's 
production. The petitioner stated that this change is necessitated by 
the unanticipated technical challenges of making occupant sensing 
technology work properly in reasonable foreseeable real world 
conditions, and by the departure from the market of some major 
suppliers.

B. Toyota Petition

    Toyota requested that manufacturers be permitted to provide a 
manual three-way override switch (on-off-automatic) for passenger-side 
air bags in all vehicles with advanced air bags. It stated that while 
occupant classification systems exist which comply with the technical 
requirements of Standard No. 208, manufacturers have serious concerns 
with the ability of these systems to adequately characterize all real-
world situations. Toyota stated that air bag systems which are designed 
to assure suppression for six-year-old child dummies while providing 
deployment for 5th percentile adult female dummies will sometimes 
suppress the air bag for small statured adults in the real world. That 
company stated that if manufacturers choose to drop the sensor output 
to ensure deployment for all adults, the air bag will no longer 
reliably suppress the air bag for six-year-old children and will in 
many cases deploy for larger and older children. Toyota argued that, 
given these limitations, customers should have the ability to override 
the ``decision'' made by the suppression system by means of a manual 
three-way override switch.

C. DaimlerChrysler Petition

    DaimlerChrysler requested the following five changes to the 
advanced air bag requirements:
    (1) Allow passenger air bag ``on/off/auto'' switches for vehicles 
with three-across front seating;
    (2) Allow transponder technology for reliable child restraint 
system detection;
    (3) Provide at least a 9 mph speed separation between the low risk 
deployment threshold and lowest speed unbelted rigid barrier test and 
for the 16 mph threshold test, specify the 5th percentile adult female 
dummy or allow, at the manufacturer's option, the same dummy as the one 
used in the static low risk deployment test;
    (4) Revise the ``low risk'' deployment out-of-position test 
duration to less than 100 milliseconds; and
    (5) Revise the percentage phase-in requirements from 35-65-100 
percent to 10-40-100 percent for Phase I of the new requirements.

III. Response to Petitions and Proposal To Revise Percentage Phase-In 
Requirement for First Year of Phase-In

A. Requests That Have Been Overtaken by Events

    In responding to the petitions for rulemaking, we begin by noting 
that several of the requests have been overtaken by events. When the 
three petitions for rulemaking were submitted, i.e., in October of 
2001, the agency was still in the process of considering a number of 
petitions for reconsideration of the May 2000 final rule on advanced 
air bags. As indicated above, in December of 2001, we published a final 
rule responding to those petitions for reconsideration. Moreover, we 
have now received, and are in the process of considering, several 
petitions for reconsideration of the December 2001 final rule.
    One of the issues that we addressed in the December 2001 final rule 
was the appropriateness of the 300 millisecond time period for 
measuring injury criteria in the low risk deployment tests. In response 
to the petitions, we changed that time period. We note, however, that 
petitions for reconsideration of our December 2001 final rule have 
requested further changes. Given that we addressed this issue in the 
December 2001 final rule, subsequent to the filing of the petitions for 
rulemaking addressed in this document, and are also considering the 
issue in the context of the petitions for reconsideration of the 
December 2001 final rule, we are dismissing the Alliance's petition 
with respect to its second request identified above, and 
DaimlerChrysler's petition with respect to its fourth request 
identified above.
    We are similarly dismissing DaimlerChrysler's petition with respect 
to its third request identified above, i.e., its request that we 
provide at least a 9 mph speed separation between the low risk 
deployment threshold and lowest speed unbelted rigid barrier test and 
for the 16 mph threshold test, specify the 5th percentile adult female 
dummy or allow, at the manufacturer's option, the same dummy as the one 
used in the static low risk deployment test. We addressed these issues 
in the December 2001 final rule and decided to specify use of the 5th 
percentile adult female dummy on the passenger side for the 16 mph 
threshold test. We are also considering the speed separation issue 
further in the context of a petition for reconsideration of the 
December 2001 final rule submitted by DaimlerChrysler.

B. Request for Deferral of Requirements Using 6-year-old Child Dummies

    As noted earlier, the Alliance requested that implementation of the 
static out-of-position requirements using dummies representing 6-year-
old children be temporarily deferred for three years. That organization 
argued that the development of occupant classification technologies has 
not advanced as rapidly as expected, and that prototype occupant 
classification systems currently available for installation in 
September 2003 are not able to consistently and reliably distinguish 
between the Hybrid III 6-year-old child dummy and the Hybrid III 5th 
percentile adult female dummy. The Alliance cited a June 2001 report of 
the United States General Accounting Office, titled ``Vehicle Safety: 
Technologies, Challenges, and Research and Development Expenditures for 
Advanced Air Bags,'' in support of this position.
    The Alliance argued that manufacturers choosing suppression as the 
means to reduce the risk to children are faced with the probability 
that, in the real world, the air bag will not deploy in some instances 
when it is potentially beneficial for a small adult, or will deploy in 
some instances when it is not wanted because a child is present. The 
Alliance argued that a delay in the requirements using dummies 
representing 6-year-old children would permit optimization of the 
advanced air bag system to make it more likely that the air bag will 
deploy when it is needed for small adults in the real world.
    According to the Alliance, it is at least 15 times more likely that 
an adult or teenager will be sitting in front of a passenger-side air 
bag, when those seating positions are occupied during a frontal crash, 
than a sub teen (children between 5 and 12 years old). The Alliance 
stated that this fact, in combination with the current development 
status of prototype occupant classification technology, leads it to 
believe that the prudent public policy choice is to suspend temporarily 
the test requirements applicable to the Hybrid III 6-year-old child 
dummy, because of the compromise in safety to small adults in the real 
world under those requirements. The Alliance stated that it

[[Page 59803]]

anticipates that improvements in occupant classification sensor 
technology are likely to permit the test requirements to be met by MY 
2007.
    In responding to the Alliance, it is helpful to distinguish between 
compliance issues and real world safety issues. Our concern about 
compliance issues arises in part from our statutory mandate to ensure 
that our safety standards are ``objective'' and ``practicable.'' To the 
extent that vehicles can't be built to achieve the specified 
performance requirement or there is uncertainty about what performance 
is required, the American public does not realize the expected benefit 
of the performance requirement.
    It is our understanding that there are not currently any compliance 
issues with respect to occupant classification sensors. This 
understanding is based in part on meetings we have had with vehicle 
manufacturers to discuss the status of their plans for meeting the 
advanced air bag requirements, which have included the discussion of 
confidential information. The Alliance petition notes these meetings. 
Toyota's petition acknowledged in its discussion of suppression systems 
that ``systems exist which have demonstrated an ability to 'comply' 
with the technical requirements of FMVSS 208 in a laboratory test 
environment under tightly controlled test conditions.'' Thus, we do not 
understand that there are compliance issues related to the ability of 
occupant classification sensor technology to distinguish between 6-
year-old child dummies and small adult dummies.
    However, being able to demonstrate compliance in a laboratory is 
important primarily because it is expected to translate into effective 
safety protection to real people in real traffic situations. To the 
extent that the vehicle manufacturers are suggesting in their petitions 
that the real world effectiveness of occupant classification sensor 
technology is inadequately assessed by the current compliance test 
procedures, we are very concerned.
    First, the real world data make it clear that a technology to 
distinguish between 6-year-old children and small adults is needed, so 
long as suppression is the selected means for minimizing risks to 
children. As we discussed in the preamble to the May 2000 final rule on 
advanced air bags, while air bags have been highly effective in 
reducing fatalities from frontal crashes, they have sometimes caused 
fatalities, especially to children, in relatively low speed crashes. As 
of April 1, 2002, NHTSA's Special Crash Investigation (SCI) program had 
confirmed a total of 208 fatalities induced by the deployment of an air 
bag. Of that total, 129 were children, 69 were drivers, and 10 were 
adult passengers.
    Deferring the requirements using the 6-year-old child dummy could 
eliminate, for the duration of the deferral, nearly two-thirds of the 
benefits for children age 1 to 12 that we expect from advanced air 
bags.
    In the agency's Final Economic Assessment (FEA), we estimated that, 
assuming all vehicles in the on-road fleet had pre-MY 1998 air bags, a 
total of 105 children aged 1 to 12 years old would be projected to be 
killed by air bags annually. This figure provided a baseline for 
estimating potential benefits from the various advanced air bag 
requirements.
    The static suppression tests would not address all of the 105 
children. First, the tests would only address children who weighed 54 
pounds or less, as the 6-year-old child dummy weighs 54 pounds. Since 
suppression devices classify occupants based on weight or similar 
factors, they are assumed to be effective for occupants up to the 
weight of the specified dummy, but not for occupants above that weight. 
About 83 of the 105 children were estimated to weigh 54 pounds or less. 
Moreover, eight of these children were estimated to be sitting on the 
lap of an adult passenger and would thus not likely be identified as a 
child. Therefore, in the FEA, the agency estimated that the static 
suppression tests would save 75 children (the 83 children minus the 
eight on adult laps).
    If we deferred the tests using the 6-year-old child dummy, however, 
the remaining tests would only directly address children who weighed 36 
pounds or less, as the 3-year-old child dummy weighs 36 pounds. Of the 
75 children aged 1 to 12 who were estimated to be saved by suppression, 
about 49 weighed between 36 and 54 pounds. If the tests using the 6-
year-old child dummy were eliminated, we could no longer assume that 
these 49 children (nearly two-thirds of the total of 75) would be 
saved.
    We note that, due to a combination of air bag design changes and 
behavioral changes, the number of children who are being killed by air 
bags has significantly declined since the pre-MY 1998 period which the 
FEA used as the baseline for estimating benefits. However, the fact 
that children weighing between 36 and 54 pounds (children represented 
by the six-year-old child dummy and not the three-year-old child dummy) 
represent a high-risk group has not changed. Given that the tests using 
6-year-old child dummies account for nearly two thirds of the benefits 
for children aged 1 to 12 that we expect from advanced air bags, we are 
obviously reluctant to defer it. We have, nonetheless, carefully 
considered the petitioners' arguments that a delay in the requirements 
using dummies representing 6-year-old children would permit 
optimization of the advanced air bag system to make it more likely that 
the air bag will deploy when it is needed for small adults in the real 
world. After considering these arguments, however, we have concluded 
that the petitioners have not presented information that would justify 
a deferral of these requirements.
    NHTSA notes that if a manufacturer selects the suppression option 
for one or more of the child dummies, the vehicle must also meet 
requirements to help ensure that the air bag is not inappropriately 
suppressed for small-statured adults. The air bag must be activated 
during several static tests using a 5th percentile adult female dummy 
(or a human being of a weight and size similar to that dummy) in the 
right front passenger seat. Moreover, Standard No. 208 includes high-
speed tests using both 5th percentile adult female dummies and 50th 
percentile adult male dummies.
    Given these tests, we believe the current requirements will ensure 
appropriate air bag protection for those occupants for whom air bags 
have proven to be a valuable safety measure. We recognize that, 
assuming a manufacturer selects the suppression option for the six-
year-old child dummy, Standard No. 208 does not specify whether the air 
bag should deploy for occupants between the weight of the six-year-old 
dummy and the 5th percentile adult female dummy, i.e., between 54 
pounds and 108 pounds. The deploy/non-deploy decision for occupants 
within this weight range is left to the vehicle manufacturer's design 
choices, including the nominal weight threshold it selects and the 
technologies it uses, and presumably will also reflect technological 
limitations. In addition, for whatever occupant weight a manufacturer 
selects as the nominal threshold for deployment, there will be some 
gray zone. However, the gray zone issue is not a new one and is 
comparable to the gray zone issue that exists for deployment/non-
deployment based on crash severity.
    Similarly, the petitioners have not demonstrated that possible non-
deployment of the air bag for adults in non-normal seating positions 
will create any significant safety problem. We note that 
DaimlerChrysler submitted a chart,

[[Page 59804]]

on a page titled ``Known Challenges for Interim Technology,'' showing 
four seating positions in which an adult might be classified as a 
child. These positions can generally be described as the occupant 
leaning back with his/her feet on top of the dashboard, leaning back 
with his/her legs braced against the dashboard, leaning back with the 
seatback in a reclined position, and in a forward position with his/her 
knees against the dashboard and hands on top of the dashboard. 
DaimlerChrysler expressed concern that variation in sitting posture may 
create consumer dissatisfaction and loss of confidence in the system, 
citing the telltale that illuminates when the passenger air bag is off.
    We agree that an air bag should not become deactivated as a result 
of normally seated adults making minor adjustments in their posture. 
However, the petitioners are not discussing that situation. The issue 
is instead one of possible non-deployment of the passenger air bag for 
adults in non-normal seating positions.
    We believe this concern is appropriately addressed by the 
requirement for a telltale that illuminates when the passenger air bag 
is off. If a non-normal seating position results in the passenger air 
bag being deactivated, illumination of the telltale will warn the 
passenger and encourage him/her to adopt a normal seating position. We 
also observe that the benefits of air bags to occupants in non-normal 
seating positions are uncertain. Moreover, with reference to some of 
the positions cited by DaimlerChrysler, in which the occupant is 
extremely close to the air bag and even in contact with the air bag 
cover, suppression of the air bag might be preferable to activation, 
even for adults.\5\
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    \5\ We note that our DASS requirements contemplate the 
possibility of air bags being suppressed for adults who are 
extremely close to the air bag.
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    We note that a supplier and a large-volume vehicle manufacturer 
have developed an algorithm that minimizes deactivation of the air bag 
in these types of circumstances. That algorithm is available to 
petitioners.
    We recognize that owners of vehicles equipped with weight-based 
suppression systems need to be informed about how the systems work, the 
telltale, and the appropriate action to take when the telltale is 
illuminated. This type of information should be provided in the owner's 
manual.

C. Requests for Expanded Availability of On-Off Switches

    Three of the petitioners requested expanded availability of on-off 
switches. The Alliance and Daimler Chrysler requested that 
manufacturers be permitted to provide a manual three-way override 
switch (on-off-automatic) for passenger-side air bags in vehicles with 
three-position front seating systems, while Toyota requested that 
manufacturers be permitted to provide these switches on all vehicles 
with advanced air bags.
    The Alliance argued that currently available prototype occupant 
classification systems cannot detect and classify right front occupants 
consistently and properly when a center occupant is present on a three-
position front bench seat. According to the petitioner, the most 
serious risk is that the sensor will misunderstand the weight 
distribution of the two passengers and erroneously conclude that one 
adult is present instead of two children. Under these circumstances, 
the sensor will direct the air bag system to deploy when it should have 
been suppressed. A manual three-way override switch would enable the 
driver to override the occupancy classification decision by manually 
setting the switch to ``on'' or ``off.''
    Toyota stated that while occupant classification systems exist 
which comply with the technical requirements of Standard No. 208, 
manufacturers have serious concerns with the ability of these systems 
to adequately characterize all real-world situations. Toyota stated 
that air bag systems which are designed to assure suppression for six-
year-old child dummies while providing deployment for 5th percentile 
adult female dummies will sometimes suppress the air bag for small 
statured adults in the real world. That company stated that if 
manufacturers choose to drop the sensor output to ensure deployment for 
all adults, the air bag will no longer reliably suppress the air bag 
for six-year-old children and will in many cases deploy for larger and 
older children. Toyota argued that, given these limitations, customers 
should have the ability to override the ``decision'' made by the 
suppression system by means of a manual three-way override switch.
    In addressing the subject of on-off switches, we begin by noting 
that, as part of our May 2000 decision on advanced air bags, we decided 
to allow both original equipment and retrofit air bag on-off switches 
until September 1, 2012, under the same circumstances under which they 
have been permitted for the past several years. Thus, during this time 
period, vehicle manufacturers are permitted to provide as original 
equipment manual on-off switches for passenger air bags in vehicles 
without rear seats or with rear seats too small to accommodate a rear 
facing child safety seat. Similarly, 49 CFR part 595, Retrofit On-Off 
Switches for Air Bags, covers vehicles manufactured during this time 
period. This regulation exempts, under certain conditions, motor 
vehicle dealers and repair businesses from the ``make inoperative'' 
prohibition in 49 U.S.C. 30122 by allowing them to install retrofit 
manual on-off switches for passenger and driver air bags in vehicles 
owned by people whose request for a switch is authorized by NHTSA.
    In our May 2000 decision on advanced air bags, we explained that we 
believe that by the end of the initial phase-in, i.e., August 31, 2006, 
manufacturers will have developed advanced air bag systems for most 
vehicles that are sufficiently reliable to obviate the need for manual 
air bag on-off switches. However, public acceptance of those advanced 
air bag systems may not be assured. Allowing on-off switches for some 
period after all vehicles are equipped with advanced air bag systems 
will provide parents with additional confidence until the reliability 
of all such systems has been verified based on real-world experience.
    We also explained that we continue to believe that allowing 
manufacturers to install switches indefinitely would be counter-
productive. The switches provide an opportunity for misuse. Adults 
could turn off their passenger air bag systems even though those 
systems pose virtually no risk to an adult occupant, particularly one 
who is belted. In such circumstances, the occupant would not receive 
the benefit of the air bag in a high-speed crash. The same possibility 
for misuse would exist for children in vehicles certified to the low 
risk deployment option.
    We accordingly decided to allow both original equipment and 
retrofit air bag on-off switches until September 1, 2012, two years 
after the end of the second phase-in. This additional time was intended 
to allow manufacturers to perfect the suppression and low risk 
deployment systems in all their vehicles. Additionally, it will provide 
parents with additional time to satisfy themselves that the advanced 
systems work.
    We also noted that there will be some need for deactivation of some 
sort (via on-off switch or permanently) for at-risk individuals who 
cannot be accommodated through sensors or other suppression technology 
(such as

[[Page 59805]]

handicapped individuals or individuals with certain medical 
conditions). We stated that, at this time, we believe such needs can be 
best accommodated through the permanent deactivation authorization 
system currently used by NHTSA.
    The Alliance, DaimlerChrysler and Toyota petitions all requested 
expanded availability of on-off switches for advanced air bags, beyond 
the circumstances that we have previously determined to be appropriate 
for non-advanced air bags. For reasons discussed below, we believe such 
expanded availability would adversely affect safety.
    We have conducted an analysis of FARS data and the available data 
concerning the use of existing on-off switches to calculate the 
potential safety consequences of expanding the availability of on-off 
switches to permit a manual three-way override switch (on-off-
automatic) for passenger-side air bags in vehicles with three-position 
front seating systems. The misuse rate of existing passenger air bag 
on-off switches for occupants over 12 years old was 18 percent in a 
recent NHTSA survey, i.e., the air bag was turned off when it should 
have been turned on. (Evaluation Note, Preliminary Results of the 
Survey on the Use of Passenger Air Bag On-Off Switches, Christina 
Morgan, July 2001, DOT HS 809 306) Our analysis shows that, given this 
misuse rate, expanding the availability of on-off switches in the 
manner requested by the Alliance and DaimlerChrysler could result in 
nearly 100 additional fatalities to teenage and adult passengers each 
year. This disbenefit would overwhelm any possible benefit that might 
result from the on-off switch. The potential disbenefits, and net 
disbenefits, would be even greater for the expanded availability of on-
off switches requested by Toyota. A copy of our analysis has been 
placed in the docket.\6\ (Analysis of Allowing a 3-Way On/Off Override 
Switch for 3-Position Front Seating Positions)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ NHTSA-2001-11110-21
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As to the concerns that Toyota raised about the limitations of 
occupant classification systems, much of our discussion in the 
preceding section concerning the request of other petitioners to defer 
requirements using 6-year-old child dummies is relevant to this topic.
    First, the deploy/non-deploy decision for occupants between the 
weight of the six-year-old dummy and the 5th percentile adult female 
dummy is left to the vehicle manufacturer's design choices, including 
the nominal weight threshold it selects and the technologies it uses, 
and will include some gray zone. However, the gray zone issue is not a 
new one and is comparable to the gray zone issue that exists for 
deployment/non-deployment based on crash severity.
    Second, the petitioners have not provided data to demonstrate that 
possible non-deployment of the air bag for adults in non-normal seating 
positions will create any significant safety problem. Moreover, this 
concern is appropriately addressed by the requirement for a telltale 
that illuminates when the passenger air bag is off.
    Third, to the extent vehicle manufacturers using suppression 
systems wish to reduce the nominal weight threshold for deployment/non-
deployment to a level where an air bag might deploy for occupants who 
are the weight of the six-year-old child dummy, they are free to do so 
if they certify compliance with the low risk deployment option for the 
six-year-old child dummy. This option has always been available under 
the advanced air bag rule.
    To the extent Toyota or other vehicle manufacturers wish to ensure 
provision of air bag deployment for occupants smaller than 5th 
percentile adult females, whether very small statured adults or 
children, but find that reducing the nominal weight threshold for 
deployment/non-deployment might result in deployment for six-year-old 
children, the appropriate solution is to comply with the low risk 
deployment option for the six-year-old child dummy. We specifically 
provided the low risk deployment option for six-year-old (and three-
year-old) child dummies in light of possible air bag benefits to small 
occupants.
    Expanded availability of on-off switches that provide the ability 
to override the suppression system is not an appropriate answer, 
because of the problem of misuse.
    We note that Toyota claimed in its petition that ``(a)ccording to 
FMVSS 208, adults should always receive an air bag while children below 
age 12 should never receive an air bag.'' This is an 
overgeneralization.
    Toyota's statement was made in a section of its petition titled 
``Background-Suppression Systems.'' Assuming that a vehicle 
manufacturer selects the suppression option for all of the child 
dummies, i.e., the infant dummy, three-year-old child dummy, and six-
year-old child dummy, suppression is only required for children up to 
the weight of the six-year-old child dummy, i.e., 54 pounds. If a 
manufacturer selects the option to certify to the suppression 
requirements using human children, suppression is only required for 
children weighing up to 56 pounds.
    Moreover, the activation requirements require activation of the air 
bag for 5th percentile adult female dummies. These dummies weigh 108 
pounds. If a manufacturer selects the option to certify to the 
activation requirements using human adult females, activation is only 
required for adult females of weights beginning at 103 pounds.
    Standard No. 208 does not specify deployment or non-deployment of 
the air bag for occupants between the weights of the six-year-old child 
dummy and the 5th percentile adult female dummy (or between the 
specified similar weights for human children and human adult females). 
Thus, manufacturers are free to deploy their air bags for occupants in 
this weight range, if they believe that is helpful, or not deploy them, 
if they believe that is appropriate.
    The low risk deployment requirements, of course, contemplate the 
possibility of air bag deployments for children of all ages. The DASS 
requirements contemplate the possibility of systems that suppress air 
bag deployments whenever an occupant is extremely close to the air bag, 
whether that occupant is a child or an adult.
    NHTSA's policy concerning air bags and children remains that the 
back seat is the safest place for children whether or not there is an 
air bag, and that a rear-facing child seat should never be put in the 
front seat unless an air bag is off.

D. Request for Allowance of Transponder Technology for Reliable Child 
Restraint System Detection

    DaimlerChrysler requested that we allow ``transponder-based, 
tagging detection systems for child restraint systems.'' It made this 
request in the context of a stated concern that current sensing systems 
cannot discriminate adults from children in child restraint systems for 
all real world conditions. That company stated that transponder 
technology is the most reliable means to detect child restraints and 
suppress air bag deployment. The petitioner cited the agency's action 
in the LATCH rulemaking, in which it recognized the need for both child 
restraint and motor vehicle manufacturers to take action to protect 
children, as a model that could be followed in this area. 
DaimlerChrysler stated that the same could be done here, where both 
future vehicles and child restraints would have compatible transponder/
receiver

[[Page 59806]]

devices. The petitioner stated that it takes note of the agency's 
concern about a transition period, but believes action should be 
initiated now.
    We begin by noting that, if a vehicle manufacturer selects the 
suppression option for the infant dummy, 3-year-old dummy, and/or 6-
year-old dummy, it must certify compliance using the dummy (or a human 
child) in any child restraint on a specified list of representative 
child restraints that are appropriate for a child the size of the 
applicable dummy. We believe the specified child restraints \7\ are 
adequately representative of the restraints generally being sold to 
help ensure that the air bag will be suppressed regardless of the 
particular brand and model child restraint actually being used. Parents 
or other caregivers will be able to look at the telltale to confirm 
whether the air bag is suppressed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ We note that we are considering issues relating to the 
availability of the specified child restraints in the context of the 
petitions for reconsideration of our December 2001 final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In our May 2000 final rule, we addressed a previous request by 
DaimlerChrysler and one by International Electronics Engineering (IEE) 
to permit certification to the suppression requirements using tag-based 
systems. See 65 FR at 30710-12. We recognized that these companies 
might be correct in saying that tag-type systems could offer greater 
reliability, assuming that the correct tagged child restraint is also 
used. We explained, however, that such systems would not ensure safety 
for the numerous different child restraint designs and potential 
restraint positions that are used by the general public. We also noted 
that even making tags widely available, as DaimlerChrysler suggested, 
would not account for those individuals who do not have a tag on their 
particular child restraint, either because the restraint is not 
generally used in a given vehicle, or because they are unaware that the 
tags are available. Additionally, simply providing the tags would not 
assure that they were installed on the restraint properly or that the 
tag was properly aligned when the restraint was set in the vehicle 
seat.
    We stated that technology like the tag-type Mercedes BabySmart 
appears to provide a reliable method of preventing air bag deployments 
when used properly. We also stated that while we do not believe that 
these types of suppression systems alone will adequately meet the needs 
of motor vehicle safety, we do believe that they remain an excellent 
supplement to other systems.
    After considering DaimlerChrysler's petition, we do not see any 
reason to change our position. DaimlerChrysler and other vehicle 
manufacturers are already allowed to use transponder-based, tagging 
detection systems for child restraint systems; however, they cannot 
certify to the suppression requirements based on these systems. 
Instead, these types of suppression systems must be considered a 
supplement to other systems that suppress the air bag even if a tag is 
not present on a child restraint. This is because systems that rely on 
tagging alone would not ensure safety for the numerous different child 
restraints that are used by the general public, including older ones. 
Such systems would also not ensure safety for young children who are 
not in child restraints.
    Finally, to the extent DaimlerChrysler would like us to require 
tagging in addition to our current requirements, it has not shown a 
safety need for such a requirement. While that company may be correct 
that tag-type systems could offer greater reliability, assuming that 
the correct tagged child restraint is also used, it has not shown any 
safety problems with the non-tag-based sensing systems now under 
development.

E. Requests for Revisions to Percentage Phase-in Requirements and 
Proposal To Revise First-year Percentage

    The Alliance petitioned that we revise the first year's phase-in 
requirement from 35 percent to 10 percent of a manufacturer's 
production. The petitioner stated that this change is necessitated by 
the unanticipated technical challenges of making occupant sensing 
technology work properly in reasonable foreseeable real world 
conditions, and by the departure from the market of some major 
suppliers.
    The Alliance stated that the difficulties encountered in developing 
robust occupant classification sensors resulted in two significant 
manufacturers--Siemens and Bosch--deciding to discontinue the 
development of promising technologies. The Alliance also stated that 
one motor vehicle manufacturer invested in and prepared at least three 
separate occupant classification programs that were scheduled to be 
introduced into production before December 2000. However, none of the 
programs made it into production due to various system failures with 
the developing technologies.
    The Alliance stated that, notwithstanding substantial good-faith 
efforts to meet and exceed the 35 percent target in the first year, the 
technical challenges with prototype occupant sensing technology have 
required some Alliance members to shift compliance strategies. 
According to the Alliance, this has often required them to start over 
in testing and qualifying advanced air bag systems with much less lead 
time to address and solve issues as they arise.
    DaimlerChrysler petitioned us to revise the percentage phase-in 
requirements from 35-65-100 percent to 10-40-100 percent for Phase I of 
the new requirements. Thus, its request was the same as that of the 
Alliance for the first year of the phase-in, but it also requested a 
reduction in the percentage specified for the second year of the phase-
in. DaimlerChrysler stated that it was making this request in light of 
uncertainty surrounding the status of the numerous outstanding 
petitions to the May 2000 final rule, supplier capacity assurances and 
the performance capability of current level of technology. According to 
that company, lack of technology readiness and capacity for meeting the 
advanced air bag requirements of Standard No. 208 have reduced the 
production tooling lead-time to a precarious situation.
    In considering the petitioners' requests to reduce the percentage 
phase-in requirements for the first year or two of the phase-in, we 
believe it is important to take account of both the need to ensure that 
the industry provides advanced air bags as quickly as is reasonably 
possible, yet also to avoid a situation in which the industry must put 
new technologies into vehicles before they have been fully tested.
    We recognize that the vehicle manufacturers have made significant 
efforts to develop effective occupant sensing technology, as part of 
their efforts to meet the requirements for advanced air bags, and that 
some of these efforts have been unsuccessful. We have been made aware 
of many of the details of these efforts in meetings with vehicle 
manufacturers, but much of this has been confidential information. As 
noted by the Alliance, however, two significant manufacturers, Siemens 
and Bosch, decided to discontinue development of certain promising 
occupant classification technologies. We also note the example cited by 
the Alliance of one motor vehicle manufacturer investing in and 
preparing at least three separate occupant classification programs that 
were scheduled to be introduced into production before December 2000, 
with none of the programs making it into

[[Page 59807]]

production due to various system failures with the developing 
technologies.
    While other efforts to develop effective occupant sensing 
technology have been successful, the unsuccessful ones have diverted 
scarce resources and placed many vehicle manufacturers at risk of not 
being able to meet the 35 percent requirement for the first year of the 
phase-in. Because each vehicle manufacturer has had its own plans to 
meet the phase-in requirements, they are each affected differently. We 
observe that one consequence of the longer-than-expected time it has 
taken to develop effective occupant sensing technology is that 
manufacturers are less likely to be able to earn significant credits 
before the phase-in begins. Since the percentage requirements for this 
phase-in increase quickly, i.e., from 35 percent the first year to 65 
percent the second year to 100 percent the third year (credits may be 
applied toward the 100 percent requirement for this year), the loss of 
expected credits from the time before the phase-in begins has the 
effect of requiring a greater percentage of models to be certified to 
the advanced air bag requirements sooner, including ones that may pose 
greater technical challenges.
    Given the supplier and technical challenges that have been 
demonstrated by the vehicle manufacturers, we believe some adjustment 
to the first year percentage phase-in requirement is appropriate. We 
have tentatively concluded that a reduction in the first year's phase-
in requirement from 35 percent to 20 percent of a manufacturer's 
production strikes a reasonable balance between ensuring that the 
industry provides advanced air bags as quickly as is reasonably 
possible, while avoiding a situation in which the industry must put new 
technologies into vehicles before they have been fully tested. We note 
that, because of the credit provisions, different vehicle manufacturers 
could, as a practical matter, use this additional flexibility for 
different years of the phase-in, as needed. Thus, we believe 
DaimlerChrysler's request for a reduction of the second year phase-in 
percentage is unnecessary.
    While the petitioners demonstrated unexpected supplier and 
technical challenges, they did not demonstrate a need to reduce the 
first year requirement to a percentage as low as the requested 10 
percent. We are concerned that such a low percentage would not lead the 
industry to provide advanced air bags as quickly as is reasonably 
possible.
    We are providing a comment period of 30 days on our proposal to 
reduce the first year's phase-in requirement from 35 percent to 20 
percent of a vehicle manufacturer's production. Given the immediacy of 
the decisions the vehicle manufacturers need to make concerning the 
vehicles that will be produced during the first production year, we 
believe that it is important to resolve the percentage phase-in 
requirement as soon as possible. For this reason, we believe a comment 
period of 30 days, rather than a longer one, is in the public interest. 
We also believe that a 30-day comment period is ample for interested 
persons to prepare and submit comments on this issue.

IV. Petition for Rulemaking From Porsche Concerning the Alternative 
Phase-in Available to Limited Line Manufacturers

    A phase-in for new requirements generally permits vehicle 
manufacturers flexibility to choose which of their vehicles will be the 
first that they redesign to comply with those requirements. However, if 
a manufacturer produces a very limited number of lines, e.g., one or 
two, a phase-in would provide little, if any, flexibility.
    Accordingly, as part of the advanced air bag final rule, we decided 
to permit manufacturers that sell two or fewer carlines in the United 
States at the beginning of the first year of each of the two phase-ins 
(September 1, 2003 and September 1, 2007) the option of omitting the 
first year of each phase-in if they achieve full compliance by 
September 1, 2004, the beginning of the second year of the first phase-
in and September 1, 2008, the beginning of the second year of the 
subsequent phase-in. This option is available only for limited line 
manufacturers since it would otherwise be possible for the industry as 
a whole to delay introducing any advanced air bags for a year. The 
advanced air bag final rule also includes an exclusion from the phase-
in requirements for small volume manufacturers. This exclusion is 
limited to manufacturers that produce or assemble not more than 5,000 
vehicles for the U.S. market each year.
    On August 19, 2002, we received a petition for rulemaking from 
Porsche requesting changes in the special phase-in provisions available 
to limited-line manufacturers. Specifically, Porsche requested that the 
agency consider adding an additional definition of ``carline'' specific 
to Standard No. 208 and providing manufacturers that sell two or fewer 
carlines in the U.S. the flexibility to comply at the 100 percent level 
starting with the third year of the phase-in.
    According to Porsche, small limited-line manufacturers like Porsche 
have and will continue to have difficulties attracting the attention of 
technology suppliers because of the limited value associated with small 
development contracts. That company stated that whether or not it 
produces only 500, 5,000, or 10,000 vehicles on a worldwide basis, it 
is, in today's world, an extremely small vehicle manufacturer relative 
to others selling in the U.S. Porsche stated that it is one of the few 
remaining independent vehicle manufacturers with no direct relationship 
to any other vehicle manufacturer. It stated that, unlike various other 
small manufacturers, it does not have a parent company willing to 
assume its production as part of its fleet compliance schedule.
    In light of our proposal to adjust the phase-in requirements 
applicable to large manufacturers, we believe it is appropriate to 
consider whether some further type of adjustment is needed for 
companies like Porsche. Many of the difficulties cited by large-volume 
manufacturers, such as the technical challenges being faced by the 
vehicle manufacturers in meeting the new requirements and the fact that 
two of the automotive suppliers have dropped plans to offer devices 
that suppress the passenger air bag when a child is present, affect 
small companies like Porsche.
    We note that the specific concerns cited by Porsche relate more to 
its small size than to the number of carlines it sells. While Porsche 
is larger than the companies that are traditionally viewed as small 
volume manufacturers, it is very small compared to the large 
manufacturers.
    We request comments on the need for relief for companies like 
Porsche, the specific amendments it requested, and alternative ways of 
providing relief. The agency could, for example, provide a new phase-in 
option that combines relatively small volume (but volume higher than 
that specified for exclusion from the phase-in) with small number of 
carlines. It could also provide a new phase-in option, based solely on 
relatively small volume (but volume higher than that specified for 
exclusion from the phase-in). The agency requests that commenters 
recommending relief address how the agency could ensure that any relief 
provided is not overly broad. Depending on the comments, the agency may 
provide some type of relief in the final rule.

[[Page 59808]]

V. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    NHTSA has considered the impact of this proposed rule under 
Executive Order 12866 and the Department of Transportation's regulatory 
policies and procedures. This proposed rule was not reviewed under 
Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review.'' This action 
is not ``significant'' under the Department of Transportation's 
regulatory policies and procedures.
    This document proposes a reduction in the percentage of vehicles 
that must comply with the advanced air bag requirements during the 
first year of the phase-in, i.e., from September 1, 2003 through August 
31, 2004, from 35 percent to 20 percent. However, the document does not 
propose any changes in the requirements for vehicles equipped with 
advanced air bags. Readers who are interested in the costs and benefits 
of advanced air bags are referred to the agency's Final Economic 
Assessment (FEA) for the May 2000 final rule. The estimated benefits 
compared to pre-MY 1998 (pre-depowered air bags) in that rule for the 
suppression technologies were estimated to be 93 fatalities and 151 AIS 
3-5 injuries. These benefits can be considered to accrue over the 20-25 
year lifetime of one model year's fleet. Reducing the phase-in schedule 
for the MY 2004 fleet from 35 percent to 20 percent (a 15 percentage 
point reduction), would result in the potential loss in benefits over 
the lifetime of the MY 2004 fleet of 14 lives and 23 AIS 3-5 injuries.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    We have considered the effects of this rulemaking action under the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.). I certify that the 
proposed amendment would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. A Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 
was prepared for the May 2000 final rule as part of the FEA. This 
action would not have not have a significant economic impact on small 
businesses because the only change it would make to the May 2000 final 
rule is to reduce the percentage of vehicles that must comply with that 
rule during the first year of the phase-in. Small organizations and 
small governmental units would not be significantly affected since the 
potential cost impacts associated with this proposed amendment should 
only slightly affect the price of new motor vehicles.

C. National Environmental Policy Act

    NHTSA has analyzed this proposed amendment for the purposes of the 
National Environmental Policy Act and determined that it will not have 
any significant impact on the quality of the human environment.

D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

    The agency has analyzed this rulemaking action in accordance with 
the principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132 and has 
determined that it does not have sufficient federalism implications to 
warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation 
of a federalism summary impact statement. The proposed rule would have 
no substantial effects on the States, or on the current Federal-State 
relationship, or on the current distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various local officials.

E. Unfunded Mandate Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires agencies to 
prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits and other effects 
of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to 
result in the expenditure by State, local or tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, or by the private sector, of more than $100 million annually 
(adjusted for inflation with base year of 1995). While the May 2000 
final rule is likely to result in over $100 million of annual 
expenditures by the private sector, the only effect of today's proposed 
amendment would be to reduce the percentage of vehicles that must 
comply with that rule during the first year of the phase-in. 
Accordingly, this proposed rule would not mandate any expenditures by 
State, local or tribal governments, or by the private sector.

F. Executive Order 12778 (Civil Justice Reform)

    The proposed rule does not have any retroactive effect. Under 
section 49 U.S.C. 30103, whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety 
standard is in effect, a state may not adopt or maintain a safety 
standard applicable to the same aspect of performance which is not 
identical to the Federal standard, except to the extent that the state 
requirement imposes a higher level of performance and applies only to 
vehicles procured for the State's use. Section 49 U.S.C. 30161 sets 
forth a procedure for judicial review of final rules establishing, 
amending or revoking Federal motor vehicle safety standards. That 
section does not require submission of a petition for reconsideration 
or other administrative proceedings before parties may file suit in 
court.

G. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, a person is not required 
to respond to a collection of information by a Federal agency unless 
the collection displays a valid OMB control number. This document does 
not propose any new information collection requirements.

H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

    The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier 
number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of 
Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center 
publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may 
use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document 
to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

I. Plain Language

    Executive Order 12866 requires Federal agencies to write all rules 
in plain language. Application of the principles of plain language 
includes consideration of the following questions:

--Has the agency organized the material to suit the public's needs?
--Are the requirements in the rule clearly stated?
--Does the rule contain technical language or jargon that is not clear?
--Would a different format (grouping and order of sections, use of 
headings, paragraphing) make the rule easier to understand?
--Would more (but shorter) sections be better?
--Could the agency improve clarity by adding tables, lists, or 
diagrams?
--What else could the agency do to make this rulemaking easier to 
understand?

    If you have any responses to these questions, please include them 
in your comments on this NPRM.

VI. Submission of Comments

How Do I Prepare and Submit Comments?

    Your comments must be written and in English. To ensure that your 
comments are correctly filed in the Docket, please include the docket 
number of this document in your comments.
    Your comments must not be more than 15 pages long. (49 CFR 553.21). 
We established this limit to encourage you to write your primary 
comments in a concise fashion. However, you may

[[Page 59809]]

attach necessary additional documents to your comments. There is no 
limit on the length of the attachments.
    Please submit two copies of your comments, including the 
attachments, to Docket Management at the address given above under 
ADDRESSES.

How Can I Be Sure That My Comments Were Received?

    If you wish Docket Management to notify you upon its receipt of 
your comments, enclose a self-addressed, stamped postcard in the 
envelope containing your comments. Upon receiving your comments, Docket 
Management will return the postcard by mail.

How Do I Submit Confidential Business Information?

    If you wish to submit any information under a claim of 
confidentiality, you should submit three copies of your complete 
submission, including the information you claim to be confidential 
business information, to the Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the address given 
above under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. In addition, you should 
submit two copies, from which you have deleted the claimed confidential 
business information, to Docket Management at the address given above 
under ADDRESSES. When you send a comment containing information claimed 
to be confidential business information, you should include a cover 
letter setting forth the information specified in our confidential 
business information regulation. (49 CFR part 512.)

Will the Agency Consider Late Comments?

    We will consider all comments that Docket Management receives 
before the close of business on the comment closing date indicated 
above under DATES. To the extent possible, we will also consider 
comments that Docket Management receives after that date. If Docket 
Management receives a comment too late for us to consider it in 
developing a final rule (assuming that one is issued), we will consider 
that comment as an informal suggestion for future rulemaking action.

How Can I Read the Comments Submitted by Other People?

    You may read the comments received by Docket Management at the 
address given above under ADDRESSES. The hours of the Docket are 
indicated above in the same location.
    You may also see the comments on the Internet. To read the comments 
on the Internet, take the following steps:
    Go to the Docket Management System (DMS) Web page of the Department 
of Transportation (http://dms.dot.gov/).
    On that page, click on ``search.''
    On the next page (http://dms.dot.gov/search/), type in the four-
digit docket number shown at the beginning of this document. Example: 
If the docket number were ``NHTSA-1998-1234,'' you would type ``1234.'' 
After typing the docket number, click on ``search.''
    On the next page, which contains docket summary information for the 
docket you selected, click on the desired comments. You may download 
the comments.
    Please note that even after the comment closing date, we will 
continue to file relevant information in the Docket as it becomes 
available. Further, some people may submit late comments. Accordingly, 
we recommend that you periodically check the Docket for new material.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571

    Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Tires.
    In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA proposes to amend 49 CFR 
Chapter V as follows:

PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS

    1. The authority citation for Part 571 of Title 49 would continue 
to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166; 
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

    2. Section 571.208 would be amended by revising S14.1.1.1 to read 
as follows:


Sec.  571.208  Standard No. 208; Occupant crash protection.

* * * * *
    S14.1.1.1 Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2003, and 
before September 1, 2004. Subject to S14.1.2(a), for vehicles 
manufactured by a manufacturer on or after September 1, 2003, and 
before September 1, 2004, the amount of vehicles complying with 
S14.5.1(a), S14.5.2, S15.1, S15.2, S17, S19, S21, S23, and S25, shall 
be not less than 20 percent of:
    (a) If the manufacturer has manufactured vehicles for sale in the 
United States during both of the two production years prior to 
September 1, 2003, the manufacturer's average annual production of 
vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2001, and before 
September 1, 2004, or
    (b) The manufacturer's production on or after September 1, 2003, 
and before September 1, 2004.
* * * * *

    Issued: September 19, 2002.
Roger A. Saul,
Director, Office of Crashworthiness Standards.
[FR Doc. 02-24236 Filed 9-19-02; 3:57 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P