[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 175 (Tuesday, September 10, 2002)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 57352-57354]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-22943]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 135

[Docket No. 28937; Notice No. 97-10]
RIN 2120-AG42


Revised Standards for Cargo or Baggage Compartments in Transport 
Category Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM); withdrawal and 
disposition of comments.

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SUMMARY: The FAA is withdrawing a portion of Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking No. 97-10 which proposed to upgrade fire safety standards 
for cargo or baggage compartments in certain transport category 
aircraft and remove Class D compartments as an alternative for future 
type certification. The FAA published a final rule that adopted the 
NPRM's proposed amendments to parts 25 and 121, but requested further 
comments on the issues relating to part 135. We are withdrawing the 
part 135 proposal based on the existing safety record and the cost/
benefit analysis revised in the light of comments received.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary Davis, Flight Standards Service, 
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., 
Washington, DC 20591; telephone 202-497-4857.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Between 1946 and 1958, the FAA created five categories of baggage 
or cargo compartments, assigned letters A through E. In recent years 
there have been a number of fires in the baggage or cargo compartments 
of transport category airplanes, especially in Class D compartments. 
Both Class C and Class D compartments are airtight compartments with 
protective liners. Unlike Class C compartments, Class D compartments do 
not have fire detection or suppression capabilities. On some occasions, 
fires in these compartments have caused accidents and loss of life. In 
May 1996, a fire that originated in a Class D compartment of a 
McDonnell Douglas DC-9 operated by Valujet Airlines caused the aircraft 
to crash. As a result, 110 passengers and crewmembers lost their lives.
    Class D compartments have a higher risk of an unknown fire 
developing and burning out of control because they

[[Page 57353]]

have no detection or suppression capability and are inaccessible in 
flight. Class D compartments are larger than the other categories of 
baggage or cargo compartment. The quantity of oxygen available within 
the compartment due to its size allows a fire to spread to the point of 
breaking the protective liner and allowing outside air to enter the 
compartment.
    To address Class D compartment issues, the FAA established 
successively more restrictive standards for Class C and D compartments 
(51 FR 18236, May 16, 1986 and 54 FR 7384, February 17, 1989). The 
increase in fires in Class D compartments caused the FAA to further 
amend portions of 14 CFR parts 25 and 121 by requiring Class D 
compartments to meet the fire detection and suppression standards for 
Class C compartments (63 FR 8032, February 17, 1998).
    Notice of Proposed Rulemaking No. 97-10 (63 FR 32412, June 13, 
1997) proposed amendments to parts 25, 121, and 135 of title 14 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations that would have eliminated Class D 
compartments or converted them to Class C compartments by requiring 
detection and suppression capability. The final rule adopted only those 
amendments affecting parts 25 and 121. In response to Notice No. 97-10, 
several commenters recommended that the FAA exclude airplanes operated 
under part 135 from the proposed rulemaking because of the anticipated 
high cost of implementation. Based on comments received to the notice, 
the FAA deferred the proposed amendment to part 135 pending receipt of 
additional information. The 1998 final rule requested responses to 13 
questions related to the impact of the rulemaking on part 135 
operators. The comment period closed on June 17, 1998.

Discussion of Comments

    The FAA received eight comments on the final rule. Generally, most 
of these comments are critical of the FAA's action. Some commenters 
suggest changes to the final rule. Others mention safety issues, such 
as the size of the compartments and the amount of ventilation in cargo 
or baggage compartments. Additional issues addressed include inadequacy 
of the regulatory flexibility analysis and the length of the compliance 
period.

Compartment Size

    The primary aim of the final rule was to prevent future fires in 
the baggage or cargo compartments of airplanes. The FAA noted that the 
size of compartments, particularly Class D compartments, was a vital 
factor in the spreading of fires throughout airplanes. Although the FAA 
originally placed limits on the size of Class D compartments, the 
subsequent widespread transportation of flammable aerosols in cargo 
compartments led to this final rule eliminating Class D compartments 
and converting current Class D compartments to Class C compartments by 
requiring detection and suppression capability.
    Two commenters, including the National Air Transportation 
Association (NATA), discuss various aspects of compartment size. One 
commenter suggests that Class D compartments should be kept, but only 
with certain modifications. One suggests placing a more stringent limit 
on the size of Class D compartments compared to the limits formerly 
imposed by the FAA. Specifically, a maximum size of 200 cubic feet is 
suggested, while the former limit placed by the FAA was 1,000 cubic 
feet. NATA asserts that previous actions made by the FAA demonstrate 
that fires in cargo or baggage compartments correlate with the 
compartment's size. They state that transport airplane manufacturers 
generally limit the size of Class D compartments to only 200 cubic 
feet, and executive airplanes normally have a size of twenty to forty 
cubic feet. They assert that on-demand passenger carriers maintain 
closer control of the contents of baggage in Class D compartments.
    FAA Response: The FAA does not fully concur with NATA's assertion 
that on-demand passenger carriers maintain closer control of the 
contents of baggage placed in their Class D compartments, since that 
would entail inspecting each passenger's baggage before flight. It 
does, however, acknowledge that on-demand operators tend to have better 
control of the contents of their baggage compartments than scheduled 
operators due to their closer working relationship with their 
customers. The FAA concurs that it would be unlikely that on-demand 
operators would transport other types of cargo other than baggage, and 
that it is less likely that Class D compartments in on-demand 
operators' airplanes would contain other types of cargo that could 
cause a fire to start. As stated by NATA, the FAA has no record of an 
uncontrolled fire occurring in a Class D compartment in an airplane 
designed for business use.

Necessity for Rule

    NATA states that a precedent exists to exclude part 135 airplanes. 
They cite a 1991 amendment, Amendment 135-31, which allowed Class D 
compartments only if they were less than 200 cubic feet. They note that 
most airplanes with compartments of over 200 cubic feet would be 
complying under part 121. Thus, the final rule becomes repetitive and 
unnecessary, according to NATA.
    FAA Response: The FAA agrees that many airplanes would already be 
complying under part 121. Some larger airplanes with 30 or fewer 
passenger seats may still be used for on-demand service under part 135. 
The primary effect would be on ``business jets'' or ``commuter 
category'' airplanes used in on-demand passenger carrying and all-cargo 
operations. As stated previously, the FAA recognizes that the Class D 
compartments in these airplanes are much smaller and the risk of 
additional flammable material being carried in these compartments is 
not as great.

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    NATA states that the FAA's regulatory flexibility analysis 
indicates the final rule is expected to impact only a few operators in 
a negligible manner. NATA contends that FAA's analysis is incomplete 
and insufficient. The FAA estimates that there will be only 35 
unscheduled operators that will be adversely affected by this measure; 
however, NATA believes that there will be more than 1,500 operators 
adversely affected by the final rule.
    FAA Response: The adoption of the Commuter Rule (Commuter 
Operations and General Certification and Operations Requirements, 60 FR 
65832, December 20, 1995) greatly reduced the scope of operations that 
may be conducted under the provisions of part 135. The proposed 
amendments to part 135 would affect few, if any, airplanes used in 
scheduled service. As stated above, the primary effect would be on 
``business jets'' and commuter category airplanes being used in on-
demand passenger carrying and all-cargo operations. NATA's figure is 
large because they include as examples Learjets, Cessna Citations, and 
Beechcraft (with a nose or tail baggage area outside the pressure 
vessel) in their comment.
    Our original analysis considered factors related to all three 
regulatory parts of the proposal--parts 25, 121, and 135. In subsequent 
analysis on only part 135 factors, we determined that the cost of 
installation of detection and suppression equipment is not 
insignificant. There is no record of incident to support the need for 
the part 135 proposal. Based on the existing safety record and the 
cost/benefit analysis revised in the light of these comments, the FAA 
has concluded the cost of requiring part 135 operators to comply with 
new cargo compartment

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standards would not result in an increase in safety that would justify 
the cost. Therefore, the proposed amendment to part 135 would be of 
substantial cost, and based on the history, would be of marginal 
benefit.

Compartment Location

    One commenter proposes that Class D compartments should be allowed 
in specific areas of the airplane. He believes that they should be 
permitted to be located outside of the cabin pressure vessel. Such a 
measure, along with the installation of a fire detection system, would 
help avoid the spreading of fires, according to the commenter. Such 
compartments would be relatively small, have carefully controlled 
ventilation, and be located outside the cabin pressure vessel.
    FAA Response: In regards to future certification of transport 
category airplanes with Class D compartments, the FAA does not agree 
that such compartments would provide an acceptable level of safety. 
Such compartments would still be inaccessible in flight, and lacking in 
fire suppression capability; and therefore, with only detection 
capability, Class D compartments would not be as safe as other 
compartments.

Conclusion

    Based on the existing safety record and the cost/benefit analysis 
revised in the light of these comments, the FAA has concluded the cost 
of requiring part 135 operators to comply with new cargo compartment 
standards would not result in an increase in safety that would justify 
the cost. The FAA has determined that no further rulemaking action is 
appropriate, and is not adopting the amendment to part 135 proposed in 
Notice No. 97-10. Therefore, the FAA withdraws the amendment to part 
135 proposed in Notice No. 97-10 published June 13, 1997 at 62 FR 
32412. The amendments to 14 CFR parts 25 and 121 remain in effect as 
adopted in the final rule.

    Issued in Washington, DC on August 30, 2002.
Luis C. Cusimano,
Acting Director, Flight Standards Service.
[FR Doc. 02-22943 Filed 9-9-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P