[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 151 (Tuesday, August 6, 2002)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 50824-50835]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-19840]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs Administration

49 CFR Part 192

[Docket No. RSPA-00-7666; Amendment 192-77]
RIN 2137-AD64


Pipeline Safety: High Consequence Areas For Gas Transmission 
Pipelines

AGENCY: Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Research and Special Programs 
Administration (RSPA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This final rule defines areas of high consequence where the 
potential consequences of a gas pipeline accident may be significant or 
may do considerable harm to people and their property. The definition 
includes: current class 3 and 4 locations; facilities with persons who 
are mobility-impaired, confined, or hard to evacuate, and places where 
people gather for recreational and other purposes. For facilities with 
mobility-impaired, confined, or hard-to-evacuate persons and places 
where people gather, the corridor of protection from the pipeline is 
300 feet, 660 feet or 1000 feet depending on the pipeline's diameter 
and operating pressure. This final rule

[[Page 50825]]

is the first step in a two-step process to develop integrity management 
program requirements for gas transmission operators. In the second 
step, the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) will 
propose requirements to improve the integrity of gas transmission 
pipelines located in these high consequence areas. This definition 
satisfies, in part, the Congressional mandate in 49 U.S.C. 60109 for 
RSPA to prescribe standards that establish criteria for identifying 
each gas pipeline facility located in a high-density population area.
    RSPA developed the definition from the comments received on the 
notice of proposed rulemaking, and the earlier notice that invited 
public comment about integrity management concepts as they relate to 
gas pipelines. The definition does not yet require any specific action 
by gas transmission pipeline operators. Action will not be required 
until we issue integrity management program requirements that use the 
definition.

DATES: This rule is effective September 5, 2002.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mike Israni by telephone at (202) 366-
4571, by fax at (202) 366-4566, or by e-mail at 
[email protected], regarding the subject matter of this rule; or 
the Docket Facility (202) 366-9329, for copies of this rule or other 
material in the docket. All materials in the docket may be accessed 
electronically at http://dms.dot.gov. General information about the 
RSPA/OPS programs may be obtained by accessing OPS's Internet page at 
http://ops.dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On January 9, 2002, RSPA published a notice of proposed rulemaking 
(67 FR 1108) that proposed to define areas of high consequence where a 
gas pipeline accident could do considerable harm to people and their 
property. The proposed definition included as high consequence areas: 
Class 3 and 4 locations as defined in 49 CFR part 192; areas where a 
pipeline is within 660 or 1000 feet of a building with mobility-
impaired or confined persons (hospitals, schools, retirement and day-
care facilities); and areas where a pipeline is within 660 or 1000 feet 
of a place where 20 or more people gather at least 50 days in any 12-
month period (playground, camping ground). The 1000-foot area was 
proposed for a pipeline with a diameter larger than 30 inches and 
operating at a pressure greater than 1000 psig.
    In the Notice proposing the definition, we explained that because 
of differences in the physical properties and consequences of a gas 
release versus a hazardous liquid release, and the benefits of gas 
transmission operators already maintaining accurate data on population 
near their pipelines, the definition differed from the definition we 
developed for hazardous liquid pipelines (49 CFR 195.450). The primary 
differences were that we structured the proposed definition to use the 
data pipeline companies already collect and maintain, and we did not 
include environmentally sensitive areas. A more detailed discussion of 
why the definitions were structured differently for liquid and gas 
pipelines can be found in the NPRM (67 FR 1108; Jan. 9, 2002).

Advisory Committee Consideration

    On July 18, 2002, the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committee 
(TPSSC) met to review the proposed high consequence area definition for 
gas transmission pipelines. TPSSC is the Federal advisory committee 
charged with responsibility for advising on the technical feasibility, 
reasonableness, cost-effectiveness, and practicability of proposed 
natural gas pipeline safety standards. The committee voted unanimously 
to approve our proceeding with the high consequence area rule with 
consideration of several issues. First, the committee recommended that 
the preamble clarify that, although the definition requires no specific 
action on the part of operators, the rule applies only to gas 
transmission pipelines. RSPA has made the clarification. Second, the 
committee recommended that wording be included in the preamble 
clarifying that the definition is the first step in the process of 
defining requirements for managing the integrity of gas pipelines. RSPA 
has clarified the preamble. The upcoming proposed integrity management 
rule for gas transmission pipelines will describe the additional 
integrity assurance measures gas transmission operators will be 
required to implement for pipeline segments that are located in high 
consequence areas. Third, the committee recommended that we modify the 
provision defining areas where people congregate to add the word 
``known.'' RSPA agrees with the intent of this comment and has revised 
the definition and preamble to reflect this intent. Finally, the 
committee recommended that RSPA consider renaming the definition as 
``Potential'' High Consequence Areas. In making this recommendation, 
the committee was under the impression that the proposed integrity 
management rule would give operators the opportunity to analyze high 
consequence areas using the ``potential impact zone'' concept to 
identify areas within the high consequence area where no additional 
integrity management measures would be required. Because this issue 
will be addressed directly in the upcoming proposed integrity 
management rule, RSPA believes that renaming the definition would not 
be appropriate.

Comments to NPRM

    We received comments from 28 sources in response to the NPRM:

Three (3) public interest groups or individual members of the public
    Citizens for Safe Pipelines (a New Mexico citizens' group)
    Cook Inlet Keeper
    Gary L. Smith
Five (5) state agencies
    Iowa Utilities Board
    State of New York Department of Public Service (NYDPS)
    State of New York, Office of the Attorney General
    Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology)
    Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC)
Five (5) industry associations
    American Gas Association (AGA)
    American Public Gas Association (APGA)
    Gas Piping Technology Committee (GPTC)
    Interstate National Gas Association of America (INGAA)
    New York Gas Group (NYGAS)
18 natural gas pipeline operators
    Baltimore Gas & Electric Company, ChevronTexaco, CMS Energy, 
Consumers Energy Company, Duke Energy Gas Transmission, El Paso 
Corporation, Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., Enron Transportation 
Services, Kinder Morgan, National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation, the 
Energy Distribution Segment of NiSource Inc. (NiSource EDG), North 
Shore Gas Company, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, PECO Energy, 
Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company, Questar Regulated Services, 
Southwest Gas and, Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Company.
One (1) risk management consulting company
    Accufacts, Inc.
One (1) suspension bridge engineering and construction company
    SEFBO Pipeline Bridge, Inc.

    In the following section we discuss these comments and how we 
addressed them in developing the final definition

[[Page 50826]]

of high consequence areas for gas transmission pipelines.

General Comments

Placement of Definition

    The Notice proposed to place the definition of high consequence 
areas in a new section in Part 192, subpart M on integrity management.
    Southwest Gas Corporation suggested that the definition of high 
consequence area be added to the general definition section in part 192 
(Sec. 192.3) so that all definitions are in the same location.
    Response: We will leave the definition of high consequence areas in 
the section on integrity management. Because this definition will be 
used in the forthcoming integrity management program regulations, it 
fits better in this section rather than in the section on general 
definitions.

Lines Covered

    The proposed definition of high consequence areas applied to all 
gas transmission pipelines.
    Several commenters recommended excluding certain low stress 
pipelines from the definition. These commenters explained that lower 
stress pipelines tend to result in leaks, rather than ruptures. 
Suggestions varied on which low stress pipelines we should exclude.
    Many of the commenters (AGA, APGA, Consumers Energy, National Fuel 
Gas Supply Corporation, North Shore Gas, New York Gas Group, Peoples 
Gas, Questar, Southwest Gas) recommended that the definition be limited 
to transmission pipelines operating at or above 20% of specified 
minimum yield strength. Baltimore Gas & Electric recommended exempting 
transmission piping operated as part of and integral to a distribution 
system if the piping is operated below a determined pressure, such as 
300 psig and is less than a determined diameter, such as 30 inches. CMS 
Energy recommended excluding from the definition pipelines that operate 
at pressures lower than 40% of the maximum hoop stress. Energy 
Distribution Segment of NiSource Inc. recommended that high consequence 
areas be limited to pipelines operating at or above 30% SMYS.
    The Iowa Utilities Board suggested RSPA consider developing 
separate integrity management program requirements for pipelines 
operating at stress levels below 30% SMYS. The Utilities Board 
maintained that the C-FER method is not an appropriate indicator of the 
high consequence area for pipelines operating at stress levels below 
30% SMYS. The Iowa Board explained that because these pipelines fail by 
leakage rather than by rupture, the C-FER formula significantly 
overestimates the potential impact zone. (More discussion on the C-FER 
formula appears later in this document.)
    New York State Department of Public Service urged that integrity 
management be applied to all gas transmission pipelines, not just those 
that traverse a high consequence area. The Department suggested that 
pipelines in high consequence areas could have higher priority for 
testing and repair.
    Response: We have not revised the definition to exclude pipelines 
operating below a certain stress level. The high consequence area 
definition applies to gas transmission pipelines, as those lines are 
defined in part 192. Lines not falling withing the definition of 
transmission line are not covered. We will consider ways to address 
transmission pipelines operating at lower stress in developing the 
proposed integrity management rule for gas transmission pipelines.
    However, as discussed later in this document, we have added to the 
definition a 300-foot zone for small diameter pipelines operating at 
lower pressure.
    As for extending integrity management to all transmission lines, 
RSPA's initial goal is to provide greater assurance of pipeline 
integrity in geographic areas where a gas pipeline rupture could do the 
most harm to people. Once we propose and implement the integrity 
management program requirements for the areas we define, we will study 
the results and consider how effective it would be to extend added 
protection to other areas.

Class 3 and 4 Locations--Proposed 49 CFR 192.761 (a) and (b)

    The proposed definition of high consequence areas included class 3 
and class 4 locations, as those areas are defined in Sec. 192.5. In the 
Notice, we said that because class location definitions are based on 
population density, gas operators already maintain current data on the 
location of people in areas adjacent to their pipelines. It seemed more 
logical to structure a definition using this data rather than basing 
the definition on a Census Bureau definition, as we had done for 
hazardous liquid pipelines.
    All commenters supported basing the definition of high consequence 
areas on current class location regulations.
    However, several pipeline distribution companies (Baltimore Gas & 
Electric, NiSource EDG, PECO Energy) objected to RSPA's assumption that 
information about population density is in the hands of operators. 
These commenters explained that many local distribution companies 
utilized class four criteria when constructing a facility, and, 
therefore, never established a population density baseline and do not 
track changes in population density.
    AGA and APGA disagreed with our statements in the NPRM about the 
quality, timeliness and accuracy of class location data. AGA and APGA 
objected to the assumption that class location regulations require 
operators to periodically monitor and record data on increases in 
population near their pipelines, and that this data monitoring gives an 
accurate picture of where people live and work who can be affected by a 
release. These associations explained that many operators in 
metropolitan areas design their transmission lines for a Class 4 
location even though the classification might be a class 2 or 3; 
therefore, subsequent population increases do not require detailed 
surveys of the area. Or if a pipeline is in a class 3 location, the 
operator need only determine if buildings of four or more stories 
become prevalent, rather than perform a survey of population density. 
AGA and APGA further objected to our characterizing the data operators 
have on buildings within 660 feet as adequate to identify the high 
consequence areas. They explained that the existing house count data is 
good information but it may not be extensive, detailed or approach 
real-time analysis.
    Consumers Energy pointed out that by including class 3 areas, the 
burden is placed on local distribution company feeder systems. The 
company explained that its entire system would be treated as a high 
consequence area whereas many cross-country pipelines have few class 3 
areas. PECO Energy commented that annual aerial photography and weekly 
aerial or foot patrols would be needed to keep current information on 
populations or buildings within 660 feet of its pipeline.
    Response: RSPA recognizes that some operators, particularly local 
distribution companies, may have designed their pipelines for a class 4 
location, and, as a consequence, may not maintain current data on the 
number and location of buildings near their pipelines. However, we 
continue to believe that it is preferable to base a definition for high 
consequence areas for gas transmission operators on the existing class 
location definitions, and to allow the majority of operators to use the 
information they have on people and buildings near their pipelines 
rather than to base the definition on the Census Bureau

[[Page 50827]]

definitions. An operator who does not maintain the data needed to 
define a class location will need to decide whether to treat its entire 
system as being within a high consequence area, or to take steps to 
identify which segments of the system are actually in high consequence 
areas. Either decision will be acceptable to OPS.

Hard-To-Evacuate Facilities--Proposed Secs. 192.761 (c) and (d)

    The NPRM proposed to include areas where a pipeline lies within 660 
feet of a hospital, school, day-care facility, retirement facility, 
prison, or other facility having persons who are confined, are of 
impaired mobility or would be difficult to evacuate. The proposed area 
of protection increased to 1000 feet for a pipeline greater than 30 
inches in diameter and operating at a maximum allowable operating 
pressure greater than 1000 psig. In the NPRM, we said we wanted to 
ensure that areas where there are facilities with people who may not be 
able to evacuate the area quickly are better protected from a potential 
release.
    The State of New York's Office of the Attorney General supported 
the proposed definition. As discussed below, other commenters 
recommended revisions.
    AGA and APGA supported including areas with buildings occupied by 
persons with limited mobility, but maintained that we should better 
define these facilities to allow operators a reasonable chance of 
identifying them. The trade associations explained that it would be 
impractical for operators to identify ``other facilities having persons 
who are confined, are impaired, or would be difficult to evacuate'' 
because these facilities could include home-based day-care facilities 
housing only one or two people. APA and APGA proposed that we include 
clarifying language such as ``licensed facilities'' or ``known 
facilities that are visibly marked and occupied by a defined number of 
people.'' AGA and APGA also noted that the phrase ``difficult to 
evacuate'' could refer to either the building itself or to the 
occupants of the building.
    Baltimore Gas & Electric maintained that it would have problems 
identifying facilities unless there is some publicly available data 
source. The distribution system operator argued that without 
corresponding data validation source references, the definition creates 
an unattainable requirement on system operators.
    CMS Energy argued that there was no method for distinguishing what 
constitutes a facility or how many people need to occupy a building for 
it to be considered a school or hospital. The transmission system 
operator commented that a definition needs a minimum number of people 
that have to be associated with a day care facility, school or 
retirement facility to prevent including residences that are used for 
such purposes. CMS Energy suggested using the number from the outside 
area of the class 3 definition, because operators could use information 
currently available to them and minimal retraining of field personnel 
would be needed.
    Consumers Energy commented that facilities, such as day care 
facilities, are difficult to discover because they may be small, 
located within homes and have short business lives. The company 
recommended adding a requirement that at least 20 persons occupy a 
facility for it to be included. Consumers Energy further suggested 
revising the phrase difficult to evacuate because the phrase could be 
interpreted as meaning the people are difficult to evacuate, or the 
facility is difficult to evacuate because of lack of staff.
    Duke Energy recommended that the language be clarified to state 
that facilities must be public, licensed, and marked visibly as viewed 
from the nearest public roadway. Duke Energy argued that operators 
cannot be expected to determine the locations of private, home-based 
day-care facilities or private homes. The company further recommended 
that the phrase difficult to evacuate be removed because the language 
is vague.
    El Paso commented that revising the definition to include 
facilities that are public, licensed and visibly marked when viewed 
from the nearest public roadway would help operators identify the 
facilities.
    Enbridge recommended specifying that facilities have to be clearly 
identified by external signs. Enbridge explained that there are 
numerous family day-care settings, group homes for home-schooled foster 
children, ill or elderly, but that operators cannot be expected to 
identify these facilities unless they are marked. Enbridge further 
explained that because licensing requirements vary, operators cannot 
always get this information through public officials.
    Enron Transportation supported including these facilities in the 
definition but suggested we clarify the definition by adding ``or other 
similar, well defined facility having persons who are confined * * *''
    The Gas Piping Technology Committee suggested that RSPA discuss 
what attributes qualify a facility for coverage, whether commercial 
databases are available, and if public officials have this information. 
The technical committee recommended that facilities be known, and that 
they normally have at least 20 persons.
    INGAA recommended that the facilities included in the definition be 
public, licensed and marked visibly from the nearest public roadway, 
because operators could not be expected to identify private, home-based 
daycare facilities or private homes with retirement-age people. INGAA 
further argued that the phrase difficult to evacuate is vague.
    National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation suggested we more closely 
delineate the facilities covered by the definition because operators 
cannot identify unmarked homes with handicapped persons.
    New York Gas Group commented that local distribution companies 
would not be able to identify these facilities. The trade association 
explained that unless the facilities are licensed or are on lists 
maintained by local municipalities, it would be too resource intensive 
and impractical to locate these facilities. New York Gas Group 
recommended that we require operators to obtain the lists on a periodic 
basis.
    North Shore objected that the proposed language did not include a 
minimum number of people that have to be in a facility, and suggested a 
20-person minimum. North Shore argued that without a minimum, places 
such as a small police station or in-home day care would be included. 
The distribution company further suggested that the definition require 
facilities to be known, and the phrase difficult to evacuate be 
clarified to apply only to facilities with confined or mobility-
impaired persons.
    Pacific Gas and Electric Company recommended specifying a minimum 
number of 20 persons in a facility. The company also recommended we 
require that the facility be licensed to help ensure the information is 
available or that we work with the states to develop a database of all 
facilities that should be considered high consequence areas.
    PECO Energy recommended specifying that the facilities be known 
facilities to ensure that operators have knowledge of the facility. The 
company explained that small operators might not have knowledge of 
newer facilities constructed or buildings renovated for these purposes.
    Peoples Gas recommended adding a lower bound on the number of 
people that are present in the facility, and to add the word ``known.'' 
Peoples Gas suggested that the phrase difficult to

[[Page 50828]]

evacuate apply to facilities with confined or mobility-impaired persons 
and not be an additional, separate factor because any structure in an 
emergency could be difficult to evacuate.
    Questar commented that it was unclear if the proposed language 
refers to buildings that are difficult to evacuate because of the 
number of occupants, the design of the building, or because the 
occupants are confined or are impaired. Questar argued that the focus 
should not be on building design. Questar was not in favor of including 
schools in the examples. Questar explained that schools would probably 
be covered under the existing class location definitions, and that many 
types of schools are not in use all week and are not occupied by 
persons with impaired mobility. The company suggested that because day-
care facilities may be home-based, and not visibly marked, and not 
known to local governments, and because certain types of retirement 
facilities may be difficult to identify, we should limit the definition 
to licensed day care and retirement facilities that are clearly marked 
and visible from a public roadway. Questar further recommended adding a 
threshold number of occupants, such as 20.
    Gary Smith favored including a distance greater than 660 feet from 
a larger diameter pipeline for individuals with limited mobility, but 
did not know how realistic it would be to monitor for such individuals.
    Response: RSPA has revised the definition to better define the 
types of facilities that are to be included. We have clarified that the 
facilities we are focusing on have people that because of impaired 
mobility or because they are confined, or because of other reasons, 
such as age, would be difficult to evacuate. The definition makes clear 
that it is focusing on the occupants not the design of the building.
    We have added a requirement that the building with the occupants 
who are confined, mobility-impaired, or hard to evacuate has to be an 
identified site. An identified site is a building that can be 
identified through any of the following means--it has a sign; it is 
licensed or registered by a federal, state or local agency; it is known 
to public safety officials; or it appears on a list or map that is 
available through a federal, state or local agency, or through a 
publicly available or commercially available database. This revision 
should alleviate the concern that operators will be required to 
identity a family home that has elderly or disabled persons, or day-
care age children.
    We have kept schools in the list of examples. We agree that many 
schools will likely fall within the definition for a class 3 or 4 
location, and that many may not contain persons who are mobility-
impaired. However, schools are facilities occupied by groups of people, 
most likely children, who may, because of their age, number or fear, be 
difficult to organize and evacuate during an emergency.
    We have not required that these be public facilities. Many day care 
facilities and assisted-living and retirement facilities and 
communities are private. To limit the definition to public facilities 
would eliminate a great number of facilities housing children and the 
elderly. We have not specified a minimum number of occupants that need 
to be in these facilities because the populations in these facilities 
are in constant flux. Although a facility can be identified because it 
has a sign or is on a list maintained by a governmental agency, it is 
unlikely there would be information on how many persons occupy the 
facility.
    The information many operators currently maintain on people and 
buildings near their pipelines should help operators to identify these 
facilities. This information may have to be supplemented with patrols 
that specifically look for these types of facilities along the right-
of-way. This information will need to be periodically updated to ensure 
that newer facilities are not overlooked. To supplement this 
information, government websites provide listings of nursing homes, 
assisted-living facilities and communities that house elderly. For 
example, the Federal Government's Firstgov (www.firstgov.gov) website 
provides information on nursing home and elder care facilities in all 
areas of the country, as well as providing information on state 
websites, and state and local agencies that can be contacted for 
information to help locate facilities. The website also provides a 
hyperlink to the National Center for Education Statistics, which lists 
all private and public schools in any geographic area. In addition, 
telephone directories offer a listing source for many of the types of 
facilities an operator will need to identify. Addresses obtained 
through phone listings can be located using commercially available Web 
sites such as mapblast (www.mapblast.com) or mapquest 
(www.mapquest.com).

Areas Where People Congregate--Proposed Sec. 192.761(e)

    The proposed definition of high consequence area included an area 
where a pipeline was within 660 feet or 1000 feet, depending on the 
diameter and operating pressure of the pipeline, of a place where 20 or 
more persons gather at least 50 days in any 12-month period. We listed 
examples of beaches, camping grounds, recreational facilities and 
museums. The 20-person minimum used in the proposed definition was 
based on the number used in the current definition of a class 3 
location, and it was a number we believed typical of the number of 
people that frequent a recreational area. We stated that although gas 
transmission operators are not currently required to maintain data on 
areas where people congregate near their pipelines, they are required 
to patrol their pipeline rights-of-way, and should have knowledge about 
these areas. We further stated that this information should also be 
available from local public safety officials.
    AGA and APGA thought this part of the definition should be limited 
to well-defined outside areas. The associations were against including 
buildings, such as museums, because they are likely covered by other 
parts of the definition, and against including seldom-used or unmarked 
buildings, which would require daily patrols to identify. AGA and APGA 
further suggested that the frequency of usage be 20 or more persons at 
least 5 days a weeks for ten weeks, because that is consistent with 
current regulations requiring operators to survey areas within 330 feet 
of the pipeline for well-defined areas.
    Baltimore Gas & Electric maintained it was not practical or 
attainable to analyze every place where people may congregate on an 
intermittent basis.
    Chevron Texaco was opposed to including places where people might 
congregate, and preferred focusing the definition on cities, towns, 
buildings and roads. Chevron thought that using Carlsbad as an example 
was too broad and could end up including all areas unless on company-
owned property.
    Citizens for Safe Pipelines urged that public recreation areas be 
included. The group thought that the proposed standard was too high and 
would be difficult to measure, and suggested that the standard should 
simply be evidence of public use, including evidence of vehicle traffic 
or camping sites, particularly near watercourses. The citizens' group 
explained that in the west, watercourses are places where people 
congregate on public land for recreation. The group recommended that 
operators use regular aerial patrol and consult with public land 
management and local government officials to identify these areas. The 
group also recommended including religious buildings, because 
significant numbers of people regularly congregate in these buildings.

[[Page 50829]]

    Consumers Energy commented that the example of a museum did not fit 
because the proposed definition was aimed at outdoor facilities. The 
company maintained that the language was too broad and should be 
limited to well-defined areas, or data would be difficult to develop 
and maintain. Consumers Energy further maintained that the proposed 
occupation period was too restrictive, and too hard to identify, and 
suggested using a weekly basis for the occupation period or eliminating 
it.
    Cook Inlet Keeper was not convinced that the proposed definition 
would cover the location of the Carlsbad pipeline accident. The 
organization recommended that to ensure that Carlsbad and similar areas 
are covered, we lower the proposed 50-day threshold, and instead, use 
as the trigger whether the operator has any knowledge of periodic use 
for recreational or other purposes.
    CMS Energy maintained that the proposed definition would require 
operators to monitor pipelines 24-hours, 7 days a week, 365 days a 
year. The company objected that the proposed language could be 
interpreted to include areas, such as large parks or golf courses where 
people might not be close to the pipeline. CMS Energy objected to the 
example of a museum because this expands the definition to include 
buildings, and buildings such as rural churches might be covered. The 
company recommended limiting the area to a small, well-defined area 
within 220 yards (or 333 yards for larger pipelines).
    Duke Energy acknowledged the difficulty in defining areas where 
people gather. The company suggested using 50 days when defining the 
frequency of use, a rate that would cover one day per week or a full 
weekend during the summer months. Duke maintained that the word area by 
itself was too illusive, and should be modified by the phrase ``small, 
well-defined outside area.'' Duke explained that without this 
modification, operators would have to include beaches, parks or other 
large areas. Duke suggested removing museums as an example because 
current regulations address land use associated with structures such as 
office buildings, restaurants and museums, but do not address outdoor 
areas where people gather for weekend-type use. Duke argued that use of 
the word outside is critical to capture the recreational land user.
    Enbridge recommended that we revise the definition to focus on 
areas of significantly higher consequence. Enbridge suggested focusing 
on areas of significant, specific, well-defined outdoor congregation, 
otherwise, the proposed criteria would incorporate rural places of 
worship or other facilities used only for an hour or two per week. 
Enbridge further recommended that the definition specify areas that are 
clearly and publicly identified, because operators can only be expected 
to identify areas that have visible signs, or are on official local 
maps or in public information sources. The operator suggested that we 
base the definition on data that is public, accessible and verifiable.
    Enron was against including buildings such as museums because these 
have multiple exits and would be protected from an accident. Enron 
recommended that the definition focus on small, well-defined outdoor 
areas, because operators will not be able to identify areas used on 
occasional weekends or evenings unless they are defined.
    The Gas Piping Technology Committee noted that the proposed 
definition targets weekend activity, which will require operators to 
conduct weekend patrols at some frequency. The committee suggested RSPA 
clarify if its intent is to include organized congregation in camping 
grounds and other areas or to include any place where people 
congregate. The committee suggested revising the definition to include 
known areas, at established weekend or seasonal recreational 
facilities, such as campgrounds, beaches, or parks within a well-
defined area.
    INGAA expressed concerns with the proposed definition. INGAA argued 
that local officials could only be expected to identify well-defined 
and frequently-used areas, and that it was unreasonable to expect 
operators to identify areas, similar to the Carlsbad site, that are 
undefined and infrequently used. The industry association objected to 
including museums in the examples of areas where people congregate, 
because operators would have to include buildings or structures, 
particularly, seldom-used buildings, such as rural churches or bingo 
halls. INGAA commented that having to include these seldom-used 
structures would require operators to increase the frequency of 
monitoring, and to monitor on weekends and evenings. INGAA submitted 
substitute language that it maintained is more consistent with existing 
regulations, and easier for operators to comply with. This language 
defined the areas as small, well-defined outside areas within 660 feet 
of a pipeline, and occupied by 20 or more people on at least 5 days a 
week for ten weeks in any 12-month period. The association argued this 
language would preclude operators from having to include large 
facilities of low usage, such as golf courses or national parks. INGAA 
explained that requiring an area to be well-defined would allow better 
utilization of land use data operators have collected, and that a usage 
rate of 5 days a week would not require surveillance during evening and 
weekend hours and is more consistent with existing regulations.
    Kinder Morgan suggested that areas where people congregate only be 
included if they are within the pipeline's defined hazard area 
calculated from the C-FER model.
    National Fuel commented that the proposed area would be too 
difficult to define, and should be revised to refer to small, well-
defined outside areas.
    NiSource EDG disagreed with our statement in the NPRM that the 
patrolling frequency required in the class location regulations is 
sufficient for an operator to have knowledge of where people congregate 
near its pipeline. The company thought only daily patrolling would 
uncover the proposed level of use. NiSource EDG was not aware of any 
public safety agency that collects, maintains and distributes 
recreational land use information on a statewide basis. NiSource EDG 
further commented that the proposed definition was subjective and 
imprecise, and should be revised to enable operators to identify with a 
level of certainty and precision the kinds of facilities that make an 
area high consequence.
    New York Gas Group commented that based on its members' experience, 
it is unlikely that the proposed areas could be identified under 
current patrolling requirements. The trade association maintained that 
securing this information would require an excessive resource 
expenditure for expanded patrolling. New York Gas Group further 
maintained that such information is not available from local officials 
or available in standardized format.
    New York State Department of Public Service commented that it is 
unclear whether we intended for areas where people congregate to 
include facilities such as transportation terminals, manufacturing 
facilities or business locations, and recommended clarifying the 
language to include these facilities. The Department of Public Service 
questioned the basis for the 20 or more persons congregating at least 
50 days in a 12-month period, and explained that a stadium or arena may 
be used less than 50 days per year but, nonetheless, attract large 
crowds to individual events.

[[Page 50830]]

    North Shore Gas suggested that the areas where people congregate be 
known and well-defined. The company also suggested the usage rate 
should be 5 days a week for 10 weeks in a 12-month period instead of 
the proposed 50 days in 12 months, because it would be easier for 
operators to monitor. North Shore Gas thought that the example of a 
museum is out of place if outside areas are being targeted.
    Pacific Gas recommended that RSPA provide the pipeline industry 
with references to help identify public gathering areas or provide 
additional guidance for identifying these locations. The company 
further recommended that we revise the definition to known locations 
that can be identified by patrols during the business week.
    PECO Energy suggested adding the words known or established because 
small operators might not have knowledge of these facilities. The 
company argued that operators could be forced to instigate weekend 
surveillance to identify the proposed areas.
    Peoples Gas recommended that areas an operator has to identify be 
known and well-defined. Peoples Gas suggested changing the proposed 50 
days of occupancy to 5 days per week for 10 weeks, otherwise, increased 
monitoring is needed. The company further suggested that we delete 
museum from the examples to focus on outdoor areas.
    Questar recommended focusing the definition on well-defined outside 
areas where large groups of people congregate near gas transmission 
pipelines, and requiring that the areas be known and controlled by 
public officials. Questar was opposed to including buildings because 
they are picked up in other sections of the definition, and seldom-used 
buildings would be difficult to identify.
    Response: We have revised the part of the definition addressing 
areas where people congregate. The intent in including these areas was 
to pick up areas that are used for recreational purposes. Such areas 
typically are used on weekends, and after business hours. Although an 
operator may only patrol during business hours during the week, it may 
have to expand its efforts to identify areas that people frequent at 
other hours. A pipeline does not shut down during evening and weekend 
hours, when people are using these areas. Even if an operator does not 
expand its patrolling, it should be able to identify these areas 
through its procedures for continuing surveillance or through its 
communications with local public safety officials.
    We have revised the definition to require that there be evidence of 
use at an identified site. As with the buildings with mobility-impaired 
or confined persons, an identified site is a building or outside area 
that has a visible sign, is registered or licensed by a Federal, State 
or local agency, is known by public officials, or is on a list or map 
available through a Federal, State or local agency or that can be 
obtained through a publicly available or commercially available 
database. At the site there needs to be evidence that the site is used 
by 20 or more persons on at least 50 days in any 12-month period. These 
revisions should alleviate concerns operators expressed about the 
proposed definition being too vague and the areas too difficult to 
identify. The definition now provides criteria for identifying 
locations where people congregate.
    We have revised the examples. In the list of examples, we have 
included stadiums. Although stadiums holding large crowds may be 
located in Class 3 or 4 locations, we want to ensure such facilities 
are not ignored if they are located in a less densely populated area. 
We have added buildings used for religious purposes because groups of 
people are likely to gather in these buildings on weekends and in the 
evening. We have also added crossings of water bodies to the examples. 
We agree with the comment that the area near a pipeline crossing of a 
waterway may be used as a camping or recreational area.
    We have not added modifiers, such as small and well-known. An 
adjective such as the word small is open to interpretation. One 
person's idea of small could be 10 feet, whereas another operator might 
consider 500 feet as small. Similarly, there would likely be 
disagreement about what makes an area a known area. Would it be enough 
that local residents know and frequent the area or would it have to be 
on a list maintained by a local agency for it to be known? What if it 
is an area known by local officials but the operator only conducts 
patrols during the week and has no knowledge that it is being used on 
weekends? By requiring that there be evidence of use at an identified 
site we are focusing on any area that can be identified as an area 
where there is regular activity by people around the pipeline.
    Although concern was expressed that golf courses and national parks 
may have to be included, the area that needs to be looked at is only 
300, 660 or 1000 feet from a pipeline. Even if the area falls within a 
large area as a golf course or park, the operator only has to determine 
if the specified area around the pipeline shows evidence of regular use 
by people, or the operator can assume that people regularly frequent 
the area near the pipeline.
    We have not limited the definition to outside areas but have 
included other structures that may be used for recreational or other 
purposes during weeknight or weekend hours. As explained above we 
included in the examples stadiums and religious buildings. We have 
taken out the example of a museum, because we agree that this type of 
building is most likely covered under the class location definitions.
    We have not changed the usage rate from what was proposed. We 
believe this is a valid rate to pick up areas that are used as 
recreational areas because the rate will support identification of 
areas that are used only during week days in a typical ten (10) week 
summer, and areas that are used only on weekends throughout the entire 
year. The number of people is appropriate for a recreational activity 
such as baseball, football or soccer, and for a moderately used 
facility such as a campground.
    We continue to believe that evidence of recreational use can be 
determined through required patrols of the pipeline right-of-way, 
perhaps, supplemented with patrol on a weekend or after business hours 
during the week. Operators are already required to have procedures for 
continuing surveillance and to have emergency procedures that provide 
for maintaining communication with public officials. Thus, it should 
not be burdensome for operators to consult with these officials to 
determine if the officials have knowledge about these areas. In 
addition, most recreational areas will be designated areas such as 
parks or campgrounds for which records are retained by governmental 
units at the local, county or state level.

660 and 1000-Foot Corridors

    Where a pipeline is near a building with mobility-impaired or 
confined persons, or near an area where people congregate, we proposed 
that the protected area from the pipeline should be 660 feet or 1000 
feet, depending on the diameter and operating pressure of the pipeline. 
In the NPRM we explained that we based the proposed 660-foot and 1000-
foot corridors on a model developed by C-FER, a Canadian research and 
consulting organization. (More information on this model is in Docket 
7666). The C-FER analysis was based on a simplified model of a 
gas pipeline rupture. The model included a simplified mathematical 
treatment of several phenomena important to characterizing the extent 
of damage following a pipeline rupture, as for

[[Page 50831]]

example, critical heat flux, the time of ignition of the escaping gas, 
the height of the burning jet, and the pipe decompression rate. The 
model also included estimates of several important parameters 
associated with the phenomena. The model validated the distance of 660 
feet as the impact area for pipelines smaller than 30 inches in 
diameter and operating at 1000 psig or less. The model also showed that 
a pipeline with a diameter greater than 30 inches and operated at a 
pressure greater than 1000 psig has the potential to impact an area 
greater than 660 feet from the pipeline.
    Several commenters supported our expanding the area of protection 
from 660 feet to 1000 feet to accommodate large pipelines operating at 
high pressure, but recommended decreasing the area for small-diameter 
pipelines operating at low pressure. These operators maintained that a 
decreased area would reduce the costs of surveillance and record 
keeping.
    APA and APGA recommended that instead of the proposed 660 and 1000 
foot corridors, a high consequence area be defined by the C-FER 
equation. AGA and APGA explained that this equation would calculate the 
pipeline affected zone i.e., the zone affected by the heat emitted from 
the burning gas.
    CMS Energy urged RSPA to include along with the proposed 660-foot 
and 1000-foot corridors, a smaller corridor for small diameter, lower 
pressure lines. CMS explained that this would more accurately use the 
information in the C-FER report and allow operators to use technical 
justification to concentrate on areas of greater consequence.
    Consumers Energy observed that using the C-FER model for smaller 
pipelines operating below 1000 psig would reduce the area of influence 
but that the model is more useful because it uses actual pipeline 
attribute data to determine the heat affected zone.
    El Paso encouraged that, instead of the 660 and 1000-foot areas, we 
incorporate into the definition the concept of a pipeline-affected 
zone, as used in the C-FER study. Enbridge made the same 
recommendation.
    GPTC commented that the C-FER Report forms a sound technical basis 
for determining a zone of thermal influence for a potential gas 
pipeline rupture, but that the simplified model we used does not 
consider small diameter low pressure pipelines.
    INGAA recommended that we include the pipeline-affected zone 
equation used in the C-FER study so that operators could better use the 
data they have been collecting since 1970. INGAA argued that use of 
programmed distances, such as the proposed 660 feet and 1000 feet, does 
not utilize the findings of the C-FER study.
    The Iowa Utilities Board commented that two pipelines in the State 
and at least one that is proposed for construction in Iowa would have 
impact zone widths of greater than 1000 feet, using the C-FER formula. 
The Board also pointed out that the C-FER formula will predict smaller 
impact zones than those proposed for some pipelines having diameter 
greater than 30 inches with operating pressure over 1000 psig. The Iowa 
Board suggested we consider specifying operators use the C-FER formula 
for pipelines with diameter greater than 30 inches and operating 
pressure over 1000 psig rather than the proposed 1000-feet limit.
    New York Department of Public Service maintained that the heat flux 
value of 5000 btu/hr-ft\2\ used in the C-FER formula is too high. A 
lower critical heat flux value should be used, which would increase the 
width of the predicted impact zone.
    Pacific Gas and Electric recommended using the C-FER equation in 
class 3 and 4 areas to determine which portions of these areas require 
an integrity management plan, and focusing efforts on those portions 
where the pipeline's impact zone encompasses a structure such as a 
school or hospital containing a specified number of people. The company 
further suggested that the definition use the C-FER equation to 
determine the extent of the pipeline that requires integrity 
verification.
    Questar recommended that operators be allowed to use the C-FER 
equation to determine the pipeline affected zone rather than the 
proposed 660 or 1000 feet.
    The State of New York, Office of the Attorney General supported the 
660 and 1000-foot areas, but cautioned that the C-FER model used to 
define these dimensions does not consider low-angle, horizontal jet 
fires. The New York State Attorney General's office explained that this 
type of rupture would cause more of the heat-radiating flame surface to 
be concentered near the ground surface in the direction of the initial 
horizontal jet, potentially creating a heat flux for more than 1000 
feet.
    Williston Basin agreed that zones of damage can extend out from the 
current class location defined distance of 660 feet during a release, 
but disagreed with applying the C-FER model only when the hazard radius 
exceeds 660 feet. The company thought the model should be applied over 
the full spectrum of pipeline operating conditions because more can be 
accomplished by focusing resources on the hazard radius area.
    Response: RSPA has revised the definition to include a third zone 
for small diameter, low pressure pipelines. For a pipeline with a 
diameter of 12 inches or less and an operating pressure of 1200 psig or 
less, the area of protection will be 300 feet. Although the C-FER model 
predicted a potential impact area of less than 300 feet for a pipeline 
of the above-specified size, we will not include an area smaller than 
300 feet. In addition, RSPA is further exploring ways to address low 
stress pipelines in the proposed gas pipeline integrity management 
rule. We are also considering the comment about use of the C-FER model 
in calculating the zone of impact in developing that proposed rule. 
While arguments, such as that by the New York State Attorney General's 
Office, may be theoretically possible, the actual incident data 
developed at gas pipeline rupture sites over a twenty-year period were 
used to validate the predictions of the C-FER model. Thus, a spectrum 
of different events produced burn radii that were reasonably accurately 
predicted by the simple formulation contained in the C-FER model. The 
forthcoming proposed integrity management rule will address situations 
where the pipe diameter and operating pressure are sufficiently large 
that the predicted impact zone using the C-FER model could exceed 1000 
feet.

Other Area of Potential High Consequence Not Proposed

Environmental Areas

    In the NPRM we explained because of the way gas products behave, a 
rupture would affect a very limited area, and would not pollute 
drinking water or ecological resources. Because any environmental 
consequences following a rupture would be limited, we did not include 
environmentally sensitive areas in the proposed definition.
    Citizens for Safe Pipelines recommended adding watercourses to 
better protect these areas from spills of natural gas condensates.
    Cook Inlet Keeper favored adding environmentally sensitive areas 
because natural gas condensates form in transmission pipelines and can 
pose environmental hazards. Cook Inlet Keeper also listed eight recent 
releases of natural gas pipeline condensates (spills of up to 10 
gallons of condensate) in the Cook Inlet region in Alaska.
    The State of New York, Office of the Attorney General recommended 
including pipelines within the Great Lakes because of environmental 
sensitivity.
    The Washington State Department of Ecology recommended including

[[Page 50832]]

unusually sensitive areas and navigable waterways as high consequence 
areas, because these may be affected by a fire ignited by a gas 
pipeline rupture. The Department also recommended that we require 
operators to consult with state and local government officials to 
identify environmentally sensitive areas.
    The Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission urged RSPA 
to include environmentally sensitive areas in the definition. The 
Commission explained that a habitat for a threatened or endangered 
species in the heat affected zone could be destroyed by a pipeline 
rupture and ignition. The Commission also urged that operators be 
required to consult with state and local government agencies to ensure 
that environmentally sensitive high consequence areas have been 
correctly identified.
    Response: As we explained above in the section discussing areas 
where people congregate, we have added recreational areas near water 
bodies to the definition. However, we have not revised the definition 
to include environmental areas. RSPA believes that the limited physical 
impact of a gas pipeline rupture and the short duration of the impact 
justify excluding these areas. A natural gas release is limited to the 
area immediately adjacent to the pipeline, so that any resulting fire 
would do limited damage to a sensitive area or to a species in the 
area. We recognize that gas condensates that form in gas transmission 
pipelines can pose an environmental hazard should the pipeline rupture. 
However, because we believe that these discharges tend to be small and 
do limited damage, we are not at this stage including these areas in 
the definition.

Other Areas

    Cook Inlet Keeper recommended adding to the definition high-traffic 
areas and passenger and flammable cargo rail areas. The organization 
also recommend including religious buildings because significant 
numbers of individuals are confined in these buildings on a regular 
basis.
    The New York State Department of Public Service thought the 
definition should be expanded to consider important infrastructure 
including major electric transmission corridors and substations, other 
pipeline facilities, bridges, major roads and railways. The Department 
recommended we also consider historic landmarks near transmission 
pipelines and services that would be disrupted and would have a major 
impact on people and businesses.
    SEFBO argued that pipeline bridges represent potential high 
consequence areas in themselves, and should be separately included as 
high consequence areas. SEFBO agreed that pipeline crossings of roads, 
highways and railroads should not be included because disruption from 
an explosion of a gas pipeline at such a crossing should be fairly 
localized and relatively short. According to SEFBO, an explosion of a 
natural gas pipeline on a bridge poses a unique risk of substantial 
economic disruption, and on a heavily traveled bridge may cause injury 
or death to a substantial number of persons.
    Washington State Department of Ecology pointed out that recent 
experience has shown that a rupture of a gas pipeline could impact a 
near-by liquid pipeline (within 1000 feet), causing an explosion or oil 
spill.
    Response: The primary purpose of this definition is to define areas 
where a pipeline rupture would lead to the greatest consequences to the 
public. Most areas are adequately protected by current pipeline safety 
regulations. In most cases, a rupture of a gas pipeline will result in 
limited physical damage from a pipeline rupture, and be of short 
duration (one or more hours). We are focusing the definition on those 
areas where additional protection may be necessary because the 
consequences to people are potentially the greatest. Except for those 
areas previously discussed, we have not revised the definition to 
include the suggested areas.
    Our review of accident data concluded that the maximum spill from a 
gas rupture resulting in a spill from a liquid pipeline has been too 
small to necessitate additional protection. We believe the impact of 
pipelines on infrastructure is adequately treated by existing 
regulations, although we will consider the comments about pipeline 
bridges in developing the integrity management program requirements. 
For example, pipelines supported by bridges (vehicular, railroad, 
pedestrian, pipeline), or that cross public roads, highways or 
railroads have special design factors. (Sec. 192.111). Special welding 
requirements apply to pipeline crossings of rivers, railroads, 
highways, tunnels and bridges (Sec. 192.243 ). More frequent patrols 
are required at highway and railroad crossings (Sec. 192.705).
    As previously discussed, we added religious buildings to the list 
of examples of areas where people congregate. Transportation terminals, 
manufacturing facilities or business locations would usually fall 
within a class 3 or 4 location, or be covered under the high 
consequence area definition if they normally have 20 or more people on 
at least 50 days a year.

Costs Associated With the Definition

    In the NPRM, we explained that the proposed definition had no cost 
impact on the pipeline industry because the definition did not by 
itself require an operator to take action. Costs would be incurred once 
we issued integrity management program requirements that required an 
operator to take action on transmission pipelines located in these 
areas.
    AGA and APGA thought we should consider in this rulemaking the 
initial costs associated with determining the high consequence areas, 
including identifying the areas, documenting them and verifying them 
periodically.
    The Gas Piping Technology Committee also pointed out that we had 
not considered the initial costs, the frequency of verification and the 
potential recurring costs associated with determining the high 
consequence areas. The Committee recommended we consider these costs in 
this rulemaking so as not to overlook them in the integrity management 
program rulemaking.
    Kinder Morgan commented that operators will incur additional costs 
to determine the applicability of the definition, and will have to 
gather additional information to identify the facilities with mobility-
impaired persons and areas where people congregate. The company noted 
that operators will also have to conduct additional field surveys to 
identify the facilities and areas within 1000 feet of a pipeline.
    New York Gas Group commented that the definition would require 
additional company resources and significant paperwork to identify 
facilities with mobility-impaired persons and areas where people 
congregate in class 1 and 2 areas.
    NiSource EDG observed that this definition will drive future costs 
because it will dictate the integrity management actions an operator 
will have to take with respect to those pipelines located in the high 
consequence areas.
    Questar commented that we need to discuss the incremental costs 
associated with determining the high consequence areas, such as the 
incremental costs for identifying, documenting and re-verifying the 
high consequence areas, and expanding the survey corridor.
    Williston Basin commented that assessment costs are a significant 
expense and that the definition will directly affect assessment costs. 
The company argued that because the high

[[Page 50833]]

consequence area definition and integrity management rulemaking are 
directly related, the definition cannot be complete without evaluating 
the definition under the requirements of the integrity management rule.
    Response: We have not changed our conclusion that there are no 
costs associated with the definition because the definition by itself 
does not require an operator to take any action. We recognize that once 
we issue regulations requiring action based on this definition, there 
will be costs. Thus, when RSPA issues its notice of proposed rulemaking 
for gas integrity management, RSPA will estimate the cost to gas 
pipeline operators to determine which segments in its system satisfy 
the definition of high consequence areas, and other costs associated 
with identifying and periodically re-verifying the areas.

The Final Rule

    In the final rule RSPA has defined high consequence areas to 
include--
     Class 3 areas. A Class 3 area is defined in the pipeline 
safety regulations as a class location unit with 46 or more buildings 
intended for human occupancy. A class location unit is an area that 
extends 220 yards on either side of the centerline of any continuous 
one-mile length of pipeline. A class 3 area is also an area where the 
pipeline lies within 100 yards of either a building or a small, well-
defined outside area, such as a playground, recreation area, outdoor 
theater, or other place of public assembly, which is occupied by 20 or 
more persons on at least 5 days a week for 10 weeks in any 12-month 
period. Neither the days nor the weeks need be consecutive.
     Class 4 areas. A Class 4 area is any class location unit 
where buildings with four or more stories are prevalent.
    We have included class 3 and 4 location areas, as those areas are 
defined in Sec. 192.5, to give additional protection to populated areas 
from a gas release. These areas will encompass about 85% of populated 
areas. These are the areas where most gas transmission pipeline 
operators maintain data on population and buildings near their 
pipelines. However, because the class location definitions may not 
cover all areas where a pipeline may pose a risk to the public, we have 
also included as high consequence areas:
     Areas where the pipeline is within 300, 660 or 1000 feet 
of a building occupied by persons who are confined, or are of impaired 
mobility, or would be difficult to evacuate, and
     Areas where the pipeline is within 300, 660 or 1000 feet 
of a building or outside area where 20 or more persons congregate at 
least 50 days in any 12-month period. (The days need not be 
consecutive.)
    The definition picks up facilities with people who may not be able 
to evacuate an area quickly and most recreational areas or other areas 
where the public may not live, but may gather regularly for 
recreational or other purposes. Our analysis of data on the area 
affected by a pipeline accident demonstrated the need for special 
consideration of buildings located near a pipeline that house people 
with limited mobility and of areas where people congregate. These last 
two elements explicitly include distances between the pipeline and the 
facility or recreational area where greater protection will be 
provided. Defining these distances is necessary for two reasons. First, 
there is a need to limit the magnitude of the search to identify 
facilities and recreational areas that can potentially be affected by a 
pipeline rupture. Second, recently completed research has defined the 
extent of the area potentially affected by a pipeline rupture and 
subsequent ignition and fire. The results from this research has been 
used to define the distances we have included in the definition.
    Our analysis of research data on the area affected by a pipeline 
accident demonstrated that, for most pipelines, the area affected by 
the rupture and fire extended no greater than 660 feet from the 
pipeline. The recently completed research demonstrated that the extent 
of the area potentially affected by a rupture increases in direct 
proportion to the square root of the pressure at which the pipeline is 
operated, and increases in direct proportion to the pipe diameter. 
Therefore, the rupture of smaller pipelines can impact facilities and 
recreational areas at distances less than 660 feet, and the rupture of 
larger pipelines can impact facilities and recreational areas at 
distances greater than 660 feet. Our analysis determined that, for a 
pipeline with a diameter of 12 inches or less and a maximum allowable 
operating pressure of 1200 psig or less, the distance from the pipeline 
of potential impact is 300 feet. For pipelines with a diameter greater 
than 30 inches and a maximum allowable operating pressure greater than 
1000 psig, the distance from the pipeline of potential impact is 1000 
feet.
    The research that we used as the basis for the 300, 660 and 1000-
feet distances is in the docket and is referred to as the C-FER model. 
We compared the predictions from the C-FER model against RSPA accident 
data and concluded that the impact distances predicted by the model are 
consistent with the burn radii observed in accidents that have occurred 
during the past twenty years. For example, a rupture of a 30-inch 
diameter pipeline operating at a maximum pressure of 1000 psig would 
affect an area no greater than 660 feet from the pipeline. Our research 
also showed that a rupture or release from a smaller-sized pipeline (a 
pipeline 12 inches or less in diameter and operating at a pressure of 
1200 psig or less) would affect an area no larger than 300 feet from 
the pipeline. Therefore, for these smaller pipelines, we have defined a 
smaller area in which operators must identify buildings housing 
mobility-impaired or confined people and areas where people congregate. 
Similarly, for larger pipelines (a pipeline with a diameter greater 
than 30 inches and operating at a pressure greater than 1000 psig), we 
have defined a larger area of 1000 feet from the pipeline.
    Because operators were concerned that they would be required to 
identify home-based day care and private homes with elderly occupants, 
the definition provides that the facility has to be an identified site. 
An identified site would be a building with confined or mobility-
impaired persons that can be identified by any of several means: it has 
a sign; it is licensed or registered by a Federal, State or local 
authority; or it is on a list or map that is available from a Federal, 
State or local authority, or through a publicly available or 
commercially available database. Similarly, because of concerns raised 
about identifying recreational areas where people congregate, we have 
required that the building or outside area be an identified site 
(described above) that has evidence of use by 20 or more persons on at 
least 50 days a year.
    The areas we have defined as high consequence areas go beyond 
current pipeline safety regulations in the following ways:
    1. A current Class 3 location includes buildings or areas where 
people congregate located within 300 feet of the pipeline. The 
definition extends these areas out to 660 feet for pipelines of 
diameter greater than 12 inches and out to 1000 feet for larger 
pipelines (those greater than 30 inches in diameter and operating at 
pressures greater than 1000 psig).
    2. Current Class location regulations include no explicit provision 
for facilities housing people with limited mobility. The definition 
includes these facilities.
    3. The definition places more emphasis on areas where people 
congregate near a pipeline, such as

[[Page 50834]]

camping grounds and recreational areas near bodies of water. These 
areas may not be identified under the current class 3 location 
definition.

Regulatory Analyses and Notices

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    DOT considers this action to be a non-significant regulatory action 
under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 958 FR 57135;October 4, 
1993). Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not 
reviewed this rulemaking document. This final rule is also not 
significant under DOT's regulatory policies and procedures (44 FR 
11034; February 26, 1979).
    Several commenters to the proposed rule (67 FR 1108-1115, January 
9, 2002) disagreed with RSPA's determination that the proposed rule 
would incur no costs because it was only a definition. These comments 
were discussed above. As we previously explained, this definition does 
not require operators to take any action. Until there are requirements 
for the pipeline segments that are located in the high consequence 
areas we have defined, there are no cost impacts on the pipeline 
industry or the public. The costs will be incurred when we issue 
integrity management program regulations that require gas transmission 
operators to take actions on pipelines located in the high consequence 
areas. When we issue proposed regulations on integrity management for 
gas operators, we will then consider the costs involved in identifying 
and periodically re-verifying the high consequence areas.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601, et seq.) RSPA 
must consider whether a rulemaking would have a significant impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. This final rulemaking will not 
impose additional requirements on pipeline operators, including small 
entities that operate regulated pipelines. As this action only involves 
a definition, there are no cost implications, and thus we have 
determined it has no immediate impact on small entities. Costs are 
likely to result once we issue requirements for actions that use this 
definition. When RSPA proposes integrity management requirements for 
gas transmission pipelines in high consequence areas, RSPA will then 
examine the costs and benefits of the proposed requirements, including 
actions based on the high consequence area definition. Based on this 
information demonstrating that this rulemaking will not have an 
economic impact, I certify that this final rule will not have a 
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This final rule contains no information collection subject to 
review by OMB under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507 
(d)). Therefore, RSPA concludes the final rule contains no paperwork 
burden and is not subject to OMB review under the paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1995.
    This final rule defines high consequence areas, but does not 
require an operator to take any action. The definition will be used in 
the forthcoming rulemaking on ``Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity 
Management in High Consequence Areas (Gas Transmission Operators)''. 
RSPA will prepare a paperwork burden analysis for that proposed rule.

Executive Order 13084

    This final rule was analyzed in accordance with the principles and 
criteria contained in Executive Order 13084 (``Consultation and 
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments''). Because this final rule 
does not significantly or uniquely affect the communities of the Indian 
tribal governments and does not impose substantial direct compliance 
costs, the funding and consultation requirements of Executive Order 
13084 do not apply.

Executive Order 13132

    This final rule was analyzed in accordance with the principles and 
criteria contained in Executive Order 13132 (``Federalism''). This 
final rule does not have any requirement that:
    (1) has substantial direct effects on the States, the relationship 
between the national government and the States, or the distribution of 
power and responsibilities among the various levels of government;
    (2) imposes substantial direct compliance costs on States and local 
governments; or
    (3) preempts state law.
    Therefore, the consultation and funding requirements of Executive 
Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; August 10, 1999) do not apply. Nevertheless, 
in public meetings on November 18-19, 1999, and February 12-14, 2001, 
RSPA invited the National Association of Pipeline Safety 
Representatives (NAPSR), an organization that includes State pipeline 
safety regulators, to participate in a general discussion on pipeline 
integrity. RSPA also had conference calls with NAPSR to receive their 
input before proposing a definition of high consequence areas. Several 
state agencies responded to the NPRM and their comments were considered 
in developing the final definition.

Unfunded Mandates

    This final rule does not impose unfunded mandates under the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does not result in costs of 
$100 million or more to either State, local, or tribal governments, in 
the aggregate, or to the private sector, and is the least burdensome 
alternative that achieves the objective of the rule.

National Environmental Policy Act

    We analyzed the final rule for purposes of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and determined the 
action would not significantly affect the quality of the human 
environment. The Environmental Assessment is available for review in 
the docket.
    The Environmental Assessment (EA) considered the impacts of the 
definition, in conjunction with future requirements of an integrity 
management rule. The EA found that the definition by itself, did not by 
itself have any impact on the environment. When integrity management 
program requirements are issued which will incorporate the definition, 
there should be positive environmental benefits for the areas receiving 
additional protection. However, because the environmental consequences 
from a gas release are limited, any impact is expected to be minimal. 
Therefore, the definition of high consequence areas for gas pipeline 
integrity management will not have a significant environmental impact.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 192

    Pipeline safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.


    In consideration of the foregoing, RSPA is amending part 192 of 
title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 192--[AMENDED]

    1. The authority citation for part 192 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5103, 60102, 60104, 60108, 60109, 60110, 
60113, and 60118; and 49 CFR 1.53.


    2. Section 192.761 is added under a new undesignated centerheading 
of ``High Consequence Areas'' in subpart M to read as follows:

Subpart M--Maintenance

* * * * *

[[Page 50835]]

HIGH CONSEQUENCE AREAS


Sec. 192.761  Definitions.

    The following definitions apply to this section and Sec. 192.763:
    A high consequence area means any of the following areas:
    (a) An area defined as a Class 3 location under Sec. 192.5;
    (b) An area defined as a Class 4 location under Sec. 192.5;
    (c) For a pipeline not more than 12 inches in nominal diameter and 
operating at a maximum allowable operating pressure of not more than 
1200 p.s.i.g., an area which extends 300 feet from the centerline of 
the pipeline to the identified site;
    (d) For a pipeline greater than 30 inches in nominal diameter and 
operating at a maximum allowable operating pressure greater than 1000 
p.s.i.g., an area which extends 1000 feet from the centerline of the 
pipeline to the identified site; and
    (e) For a pipeline not described in paragraph (c) or (d) of this 
section, an area which extends 660 feet from the centerline of the 
pipeline to the identified site.
    (f) An identified site. An identified site is a building or outside 
area that--
    (1) Is visibly marked;
    (2) Is licensed or registered by a Federal, State, or local agency;
    (3) Is known by public officials; or
    (4) Is on a list or map maintained by or available from a Federal, 
State, or local agency or a publicly or commercially available 
database; and
    (5) Is occupied by persons who are confined, are of impaired 
mobility, or would be difficult to evacuate. Examples include, but are 
not limited to hospitals, prisons, schools, day-care facilities, 
retirement facilities, and assisted-living facilities; or
    (6) There is evidence of use of the site by at least 20 or more 
persons on at least 50 days in any 12-month period. (The days need not 
be consecutive.) Examples include, but are not limited to, beaches, 
playgrounds, recreational facilities, camping grounds, outdoor 
theaters, stadiums, religious facilities, and recreational areas near 
bodies of water.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on August 1, 2002.
Ellen G. Engleman,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 02-19840 Filed 8-5-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P