[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 132 (Wednesday, July 10, 2002)]
[Notices]
[Pages 45710-45712]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-17283]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Interim Management of Nuclear Materials

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Supplemental record of decision.

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SUMMARY: On December 12, 1995, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 
issued a Record of Decision (ROD) and Notice of Preferred Alternatives, 
60 FR 65300 (December 19, 1995), for the final environmental impact 
statement, Interim Management of Nuclear Materials (IMNM EIS) (DOE/EIS-
0220, October 1995), at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South 
Carolina. As part of that ROD, DOE decided to stabilize plutonium-239 
solutions stored in H-Canyon by one of three methods: processing to 
metal in FB-Line, processing to oxide in H-Area facilities, or 
vitrification in F-Canyon. In that same ROD, the Department announced 
that ``a subsequent Record of Decision will be issued to specify the 
final strategy for stabilizing the plutonium-239 solutions'' (60 FR 
65302). DOE issued a Supplemental ROD on September 6, 1996 (61 FR 
48474, September 13, 1996), selecting the Process to Metal alternative 
for managing the H-Canyon plutonium-239 solutions. DOE subsequently 
amended this decision (62 FR 61099, November 14, 1997) and instead 
selected the Process to Oxide alternative for managing these solutions.
    Now, after further review of stabilization costs, schedules, and 
program requirements, DOE has decided to implement the Processing and 
Storage for Vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility 
alternative as well as the Process to Oxide alternative previously 
selected for the management of the H-Canyon plutonium solutions. The 
environmental impacts of the newly-selected alternative were analyzed 
in the IMNM EIS. This alternative includes the transfer of the 
solutions to the SRS high-level waste (HLW) system, vitrification of 
the liquid HLW in the Defense Waste Processing Facility, and storage of 
the resultant canisters in appropriate waste storage facilities at the 
SRS pending disposal in a geologic repository.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION: For further information on the interim 
management of nuclear materials at the SRS, to receive a copy of the 
final IMNM EIS or the IMNM ROD(s), contact: Andrew R. Grainger, 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Compliance Officer, U.S. 
Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office, Building 730B, 
Room 2418, Aiken, South Carolina 29802, (800) 881-7292. Internet: 
[email protected].
    For further information on the DOE NEPA process, contact: Carol M. 
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (EH-42), U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 
20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

NEPA Reviews and Decisions

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a final environmental 
impact statement, Interim Management of Nuclear Materials (IMNM EIS) 
(DOE/EIS-0220, October 1995), in accordance with the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Council on Environmental Quality 
regulations implementing NEPA, and DOE implementing procedures. The 
IMNM EIS assessed the potential environmental impacts of actions 
necessary to safely manage nuclear materials at the SRS, near Aiken, 
South Carolina, until decisions on their future use or ultimate 
disposition are made and implemented. The IMNM EIS grouped the nuclear 
materials at the SRS into three categories: Stable, Programmatic (three 
material types), and Candidates for Stabilization (seven material 
types). Some of the ``Programmatic'' and all of the ``Candidates for 
Stabilization'' materials could have presented environmental, safety 
and health vulnerabilities in their then-current storage condition. For 
materials that could present environmental, safety, or health 
vulnerabilities within approximately 10 years of the NEPA analysis 
(performed in 1995), the implementation of the IMNM EIS action 
alternatives would allow safe storage of plutonium and uranium 
materials pending decisions and actions on the ultimate disposition of 
the materials.
    The IMNM EIS analyzed several alternatives, including the No Action 
alternative (Continued Storage), for the interim management of eleven 
(11) types of nuclear materials at the SRS. All of the alternatives, 
except No Action, would support DOE's objective of removing nuclear 
materials from vulnerable conditions and from vulnerable facilities in 
preparation for facility decontamination and decommissioning. For ten 
of these material types (all but Stable), DOE evaluated the impacts of 
the Processing for Storage and Vitrification in the Defense Waste 
Processing Facility alternative. The previously-issued

[[Page 45711]]

IMNM RODs include decisions to undertake stabilization and processing 
actions for all ten nuclear material types categorized as ``Candidates 
for Stabilization'' and ``Programmatic.'' DOE decided to continue 
existing actions for the ``Stable'' nuclear material category.
    On December 12, 1995, DOE issued a Record of Decision (ROD) and 
Notice of Preferred Alternatives [60 FR 65300, published December 19, 
1995], on the interim management of several categories of nuclear 
materials at the SRS. As part of that ROD, DOE decided to stabilize 
plutonium-239 solutions stored in H-Canyon by one of three methods: 
processing to metal in FB-Line, processing to oxide, or by 
vitrification in F-Canyon. In that same ROD, DOE announced that a 
subsequent ROD would be issued to select a final strategy for managing 
these solutions. Accordingly, DOE issued a Supplemental ROD on 
September 6, 1996 (61 FR 48474, September 13, 1996), selecting the 
Process to Metal alternative for managing the H-Canyon plutonium-239 
solutions. DOE subsequently amended this decision (62 FR 61099, 
November 14, 1997) and instead selected the Process to Oxide 
alternative for managing these solutions.

Potential Environmental Impacts

    The IMNM EIS analyzed potential impacts of alternatives for 
managing all SRS nuclear materials, both those materials that were 
expected to present environment, safety, or health vulnerabilities, as 
well as those determined to be stable. Summaries of potential impacts 
from the alternatives are presented in the IMNM EIS, Table 2-2 through 
Table 2-12 (pp. 2-48 through 2-58).
    The IMNM EIS indicated that there would be minimal environmental 
impacts from the implementation of any alternative (including 
stabilization in the Defense Waste Processing Facility) in the areas of 
geologic, ecological, cultural, aesthetic and scenic resources, noise, 
and land use. Impacts in these areas would be limited because facility 
modifications or construction of new facilities would occur within 
existing buildings or industrialized portions of the SRS. The existing 
SRS workforce would support any construction projects and other 
activities required to implement any of the alternatives, and thus 
negligible socioeconomic impacts would be expected from implementing 
any of the alternatives.
    Emissions of hazardous air pollutants and releases of hazardous 
liquid effluents from any of the alternatives would be very small and 
well within, often by several orders of magnitude, applicable standards 
and existing regulatory permits for the SRS facilities. DOE expects 
minimal impacts from any of these releases. Similarly, for any of the 
IMNM EIS alternatives, potential transuranic waste, mixed hazardous 
waste, and low-level solid waste generated would be handled by existing 
waste management (treatment, storage, and disposal) facilities at the 
SRS.

Processing for Storage and Vitrification in the Defense Waste 
Processing Facility

    While the IMNM EIS indicates that potential environmental impacts 
from any of the nuclear material management alternatives are small, 
those management alternatives requiring the processing of nuclear 
material through the large chemical separations facilities (F- or H-
Canyon and FB- or HB-Line), or processing plutonium materials for 
vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility, would have the 
greatest environmental impacts during the time that dissolving, 
processing or conversion activities are underway, as compared to the 
time when these facilities are merely storing nuclear materials. The 
plutonium within the H-Canyon plutonium solutions had already been 
dissolved and transferred to storage tanks at the time the IMNM EIS was 
prepared. The impacts of storage of these solutions were fully 
evaluated in the IMNM EIS.
    The IMNM EIS describes several technical challenges that would have 
to be overcome in order to stabilize plutonium solutions using the HLW 
system and the Defense Waste Processing Facility. Since the preparation 
of the IMNM EIS, technical and operational developments have led DOE to 
reassess this alternative for the H-Canyon plutonium solutions. As a 
result, DOE has determined that the two primary challenges described in 
the IMNM EIS, prevention of nuclear criticality for significant 
quantities of plutonium solutions, and management of the solutions in 
the SRS Tank Farm, have now been overcome. Specifically, the 
reassessment indicates that: (1) Gadolinium is a suitable alternate 
neutron poison for quantities of plutonium of a criticality concern; 
(2) gadolinium is compatible with the existing Canyon and HLW 
processes; (3) very little dilution is expected to be required, so that 
there would be only a slight increase in the number of waste canisters 
required to be produced at the Defense Waste Processing Facility; and 
(4) the transferred plutonium solution could be sent directly from H-
Canyon to the Defense Waste Processing Facility feed tank and vitrified 
with the subsequent sludge batch, thereby bypassing the Tank Farm.
    For that portion of the H-Canyon plutonium solutions managed under 
this approach, implementation of the Processing and Storage for 
Vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility alternative 
would avoid the impacts of processing the solutions through HB-Line, 
and the impacts of the subsequent packaging and storage of the 
resultant plutonium oxide. Additionally, by vitrifying the plutonium in 
HLW canisters at the Defense Waste Processing Facility, the plutonium 
would be stabilized in a form suitable for ultimate disposition in a 
geologic repository. In the IMNM EIS, DOE evaluated the impacts of the 
Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the Defense Waste 
Processing Facility for the H-Canyon plutonium solutions, and found the 
potential impacts to be similar to the impacts of the Process to Metal 
or the Process to Oxide alternatives.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

    The IMNM EIS indicated that while certain management alternatives 
are expected to result in lower environmental impacts than others, a 
single alternative was rarely estimated to have lower impacts for all 
environmental factors evaluated by DOE. The health effects from any of 
the alternatives are all low and well within regulatory limits. In its 
December 1995 ROD (60 FR 65300), DOE indicated that the environmentally 
preferable alternative for the H-Canyon plutonium solutions was the 
``Vitrification (F-Canyon)'' alternative. This alternative would have 
involved use of equipment that would have been installed in a portion 
of F-Canyon for vitrification of certain programmatic material. 
However, DOE subsequently cancelled this project (66 FR 55166, November 
1, 2001) due to project cost growth and schedule extension. Of the 
remaining alternatives, DOE believes that the Process to Oxide 
alternative is the environmentally preferable alternative for the H-
Canyon plutonium solutions. The Process to Oxide alternative would 
result in the smallest health effects and less HLW, low-level 
radioactive waste, and saltstone waste, although it would result in 
greater volumes of transuranic and mixed waste than the Processing for 
Storage and Vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility 
alternative.

Decision

    After review of plutonium stabilization costs, facility operation 
schedules, and programmatic requirements, including preparation of

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material for disposition, DOE is supplementing its November 1997 
Supplemental ROD (62 FR 61099) in regard to stabilization of plutonium 
solutions stored in H-Canyon. DOE will stabilize these solutions using 
either the Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the Defense 
Waste Processing Facility alternative, as described and evaluated in 
the IMNM EIS, or the previously selected Process to Oxide alternative. 
Under the newly-selected alternative, the solutions will be transferred 
to the HLW system prior to vitrification with HLW in the Defense Waste 
Processing Facility.
    Using both of these methods will allow DOE to optimize the use of 
the HB-Line Phase II facility for plutonium-239 and neptunium-237 
stabilization. Implementation of this additional management method will 
reduce the amount of plutonium that would need to be processed to meet 
the plutonium storage standard (DOE-STD-3013), reduce vault storage 
space requirements for plutonium and the associated storage container, 
lower vault surveillance and maintenance costs, and enable the 
plutonium to be ultimately disposed of in a geologic repository. There 
is no programmatic need for the plutonium contained in these solutions.

    Issued at Washington, DC, June 26, 2002.
Jessie Hill Roberson,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.
[FR Doc. 02-17283 Filed 7-9-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P