[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 122 (Tuesday, June 25, 2002)]
[Notices]
[Pages 42810-42814]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-16097]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-395]


South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, South Carolina Public 
Service Authority; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment To 
Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards 
Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-12 issued to South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (the licensee) 
for operation of the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1 
(VCSNS), located in Fairfield County, South Carolina.
    The proposed amendment would increase the pool capacity by 
replacing all 11 existing rack modules with 12 new high density storage 
racks.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(10 CFR), Section 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in 
accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required 
by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

    South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) has evaluated the 
proposed changes to the VCSNS TS [Technical Specifications] 
described above against the Significant Hazards Criteria of 10 CFR 
50.92 and has determined that the changes do not involve any 
significant hazard. The following is provided in support of this 
conclusion.
    1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    In the analysis of the safety issues concerning the expanded 
pool storage capacity, the following previously postulated accident 
scenarios have been considered:

a. A spent fuel assembly drop in the Spent Fuel Pool
b. Loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling flow
c. A seismic event
d. Misloaded fuel assembly

    The probability that any of the accidents in the above list can 
occur is not significantly increased by the modification itself. The 
probabilities of a seismic event or loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling 
flow are not influenced by the proposed changes. The probabilities 
of accidental fuel assembly drops or misloadings are primarily 
influenced by the methods used to lift and move these loads. The 
method of handling loads during normal plant operations is not 
significantly changed, since the same equipment (i.e., Spent Fuel 
Bridge Crane) and procedures will be used. Since the methods used to 
move loads during normal operations remain nearly the same as those 
used previously, there is no significant increase in the probability 
of an accident.
    During rack removal and installation, all work in the pool area 
will be controlled and performed in strict accordance with specific 
written procedures. Any movement of fuel assemblies required to be 
performed to support the modification (e.g., removal and 
installation of racks) will be performed in the same manner as 
during normal fuel handling operations. Shipping cask movements will 
not be performed during the modification period.
    Accordingly, the proposed modification does not involve a 
significant increase in the probability of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    The consequences of the previously postulated scenarios for an 
accidental drop of a fuel assembly in the Spent Fuel Pool have been 
re-evaluated for the proposed change. The results show that the 
postulated accident

[[Page 42811]]

of a fuel assembly striking the top of the storage racks will not 
distort the racks sufficiently to impair their functionality. The 
minimum subcriticality margin, Keff less than or equal to 
0.95, will be maintained. The structural damage to the Fuel Handling 
Building, pool liner, and fuel assembly resulting from a fuel 
assembly drop striking the pool floor or another assembly located 
within the racks is primarily dependent on the mass of the failing 
object and the drop height. Since these two parameters are not 
changed by the proposed modification, the postulated structural 
damage to these items remains unchanged. The radiological dose at 
the exclusion area boundary will increase due to the changes in in-
core hold time and burnup. The previously calculated doses to 
thyroid and whole body were 10.6 and 0.52 rem, respectively. The new 
Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) thyroid and whole body doses based on 
the proposed change will be 12.97 and 0.678 rem, respectively. These 
dose levels will remain ``well within'' the levels required by 10 
CFR 100, paragraph 11, as defined in Section 15.7.4.11.1 of the 
Standard Review Plan. Therefore, the increase in dose is not 
considered a significant increase in consequence.
    The consequences of the previously postulated scenarios for an 
accidental drop of a fuel assembly in the Reactor Building have also 
been re-evaluated for the proposed change to assess the affect of 
higher burnup and shorter cooling time. The proposed re-racking does 
not affect the fuel assembly mass or drop height parameters. 
Therefore, the previously determined fuel damage and resulting 
criticality assessments remain unchanged. However, the radiological 
dose at the exclusion area boundary will increase due to the changes 
in in-core hold time and burnup. The previously calculated doses to 
thyroid were 211 rem. With no action to limit the consequences of 
the fuel handling accident in the reactor building, the new EAB 
thyroid dose would be 259 rem. The whole-body would be the same as 
the doses for the accident in the fuel handling building, since 
those doses are caused by radionuclides that, in the Fuel-Handling-
Building accident, were not affected by the charcoal filters in the 
building exhaust. This hypothetical thyroid dose would be higher 
than the criterion of the Standard Review Plan. However, as 
described in Section 15.4.5.1.4 of the VCSNS FSAR [Final Safety 
Analysis Report] instrumentation is available to detect the release 
of radioactivity and to close the Reactor Building Purge System. 
This action essentially precludes any radioactive release to the 
environment for this accident. Thus, the results of the postulated 
fuel drop accidents remain acceptable and do not represent a 
significant increase in consequences from any of the same previously 
evaluated accidents that have been reviewed and found acceptable by 
the NRC.
    The consequences of a loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling have been 
evaluated and found to have no increase. The concern with this 
accident is a reduction of Spent Fuel Pool water inventory from bulk 
pool boiling resulting in uncovering fuel assemblies. This situation 
could lead to fuel failure and subsequent significant increase in 
offsite dose. Loss of spent fuel pool cooling at V.C. Summer is 
mitigated in the usual manner by ensuring that a sufficient time 
lapse exists between the loss of forced cooling and uncovering fuel. 
This period of time is compared against a reasonable period to 
reestablish cooling or supply an alternative water source. 
Evaluation of this accident usually includes determination of the 
time to boil. This time period is much less than the onset of any 
significant increase in offsite dose, since once boiling begins it 
would have to continue unchecked until the pool surface was lowered 
to the point of exposing active fuel. The time to boil represents 
the onset of loss of pool water inventory and is commonly used as a 
gage for establishing the comparison of consequences before and 
after a reracking project. The heat up rate in the Spent Fuel Pool 
is a nearly linear function of the fuel decay heat load. The fuel 
decay heat load will increase subsequent to the proposed changes 
because of the increase in the number of assemblies, shorter hold 
times, and higher fuel burn-ups. The thermal-hydraulic analysis 
determined that the minimum time to boil is more than two hours 
subsequent to complete loss of forced cooling and a minimum of 24 
hours between loss of forced cooling and a drop of water level to 
within 10 feet of the top of the racks. In the unlikely event that 
all pool cooling is lost, sufficient time will still be available 
subsequent to the proposed changes for the operators to provide 
alternate means of cooling before the water shielding above the top 
of the racks falls below 10 feet. Therefore, the proposed change 
represents no increase in the consequences of loss of pool cooling.
    The consequences of a design basis seismic event are not 
increased. The consequences of this accident are evaluated on the 
basis of subsequent fuel damage or compromise of the fuel storage or 
building configurations leading to radiological or criticality 
concerns. The new racks have been analyzed in their new 
configuration and found safe during seismic motion. Fuel has been 
determined to remain intact and the storage racks maintain the fuel 
and fixed poison configurations subsequent to a seismic event. The 
structural capability of the pool and liner will not be exceeded 
under the appropriate combinations of dead weight, thermal, and 
seismic loads. The Fuel Handling Building structure will remain 
intact during a seismic event and will continue to adequately 
support and protect the fuel racks, storage array, and pool 
moderator/coolant. Thus, the consequences of a seismic event are not 
increased.
    Fuel misloading accidents were previously postulated 
occurrences. The consequence of this type of accident has been 
analyzed for the worst possible storage configuration subsequent to 
the proposed modification and it has been shown that the 
consequences remain acceptable with respect to the same criteria 
used previously. Therefore, there is no increase in consequences.
    2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    To assess the possibility of new or different kind of accidents, 
a list of the important parameters required to ensure safe fuel 
storage was established. Safe fuel storage is defined here as 
providing an environment which would not present any significant 
threats to workers or the general public. In other words, meeting 
the requirements of 10 CFR 100 and 10 CFR 20. Any new events, which 
would modify these parameters sufficiently to place them outside of 
the boundaries analyzed for normal conditions and/or outside of the 
boundaries previously considered for accidents, would be considered 
a new or different accident. The criticality and radiological safety 
evaluations were reviewed to establish the list of important 
parameters. The fuel configuration and the existence of the 
moderator/coolant were identified as the only two parameters 
important to safe fuel storage. Significant modification of these 
two parameters represents the only possibility of an unsafe storage 
condition. Once the two important parameters were established, an 
additional step was taken to determine what events (which were not 
previously considered) could result in changes to the storage 
configuration or moderator/coolant presence during or subsequent to 
the proposed changes. This process was adopted to ensure that the 
possibility of any new or different accident scenario or event would 
be identified.
    Due to the proposed changes, an accidental drop of a rack module 
during construction activity in the pool was considered as the only 
event, which might represent a new or different kind of accident.
    A construction accident of a rack dropping onto stored spent 
fuel or the pool floor liner is not a postulated event due to the 
defense-in-depth approach to be taken, as discussed in detail within 
Section 3.5 of the attached Licensing Report (Attachment V). A new 
temporary crane, hoist, and rack lifting rig will be introduced to 
remove the existing racks and install the new racks. These temporary 
lift items have been designed to meet the requirements of NUREG 0612 
and ANSI N14.6. A rack drop event is commonly referred to as a 
``heavy load drop'' over the pools. Racks will not be allowed to 
travel over any racks containing fuel assemblies, thus a rack drop 
onto fuel is precluded. A rack drop to the pool liner is not a 
postulated event, since all of the mechanical lifting components 
either provide redundancy in load path or are designed with safety 
margins greater than a factor of ten. All movements of heavy loads 
over the pool will comply with the applicable administrative 
controls and guidelines (i.e. plant procedures, NUREG 0612, etc.). 
Nevertheless, the analysis of a rack dropping to the liner has been 
performed and shown to be acceptable. A rack drop would not alter 
the storage configuration or moderator/coolant presence. Therefore, 
the rack drop does not represent a new or different kind of 
accident.
    The proposed change does not alter the operating requirements of 
the plant or of the equipment credited in the mitigation of the 
design basis accidents. The proposed change does not affect any of 
the important parameters required to ensure safe fuel storage. 
Therefore, the potential for a new or previously unanalyzed accident 
is not created.

[[Page 42812]]

    3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in margin of 
safety?
    The function of the Spent Fuel Pool is to store the fuel 
assemblies in a subcritical and coolable configuration through all 
environmental and abnormal loadings, such as an earthquake or fuel 
assembly drop. The new rack design must meet all applicable 
requirements for safe storage and be functionally compatible with 
the Spent Fuel Pool.
    SCE&G has addressed the safety issues related to the expanded 
pool storage capacity in the following areas:
    1. Material, mechanical and structural considerations.
    2. Nuclear criticality.
    3. Thermal-hydraulic and pool cooling.
    The mechanical, material, and structural designs of the new 
racks have been reviewed in accordance with the applicable 
provisions of the NRC Guidance entitled, ``OT Position for Review 
and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications''. 
The rack materials used are compatible with the spent fuel 
assemblies and the Spent Fuel Pool environment. The design of the 
new racks preserves the proper margin of safety during abnormal 
loads such as a dropped assembly and tensile loads from a stuck 
assembly. It has been shown that such loads will not invalidate the 
mechanical design and material selection to safely store fuel in a 
coolable and subcritical configuration.
    The methodology used in the criticality analysis of the expanded 
Spent Fuel Pool meets the appropriate NRC guidelines and the ANSI 
standards (GDC 62, NUREG 0800, Section 9.1.2, the OT Position for 
Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling 
Applications, Reg. Guide 1.13, and ANSI ANS 8.17). The margin of 
safety for subcriticality is maintained by having the neutron 
multiplication factor equal to, or less than, 0.95 under all normal 
storage, fuel handling, and accident conditions, including 
uncertainties.
    An additional Technical Specification has been added to require 
a minimum of 500 ppm boron whenever new or irradiated fuel is being 
moved (non-refueling movement) in the spent fuel pool, fuel transfer 
canal, or cask loading pit. This minimum boron concentration will 
ensure that the fuel remains subcritical under any normal fuel 
handling or misloading/mispositioning accidents.
    The criterion of having the neutron multiplication factor equal 
to, or less than, 0.95 during storage or fuel movement is the same 
as that used previously to establish criticality safety evaluation 
acceptance. Therefore, the accepted margin of safety remains the 
same.
    The thermal-hydraulic and cooling evaluation of the pool 
demonstrated that the pool can be maintained below the specified 
thermal limits under the conditions of the maximum heat load and 
during all credible accident sequences and seismic events. The pool 
temperature will not exceed 170 deg.F during the worst single 
failure of a cooling pump. The maximum local water temperature in 
the hot channel will remain below the boiling point. The fuel will 
not undergo any significant heat up after an accidental drop of a 
fuel assembly on top of the rack blocking the flow path. A loss of 
cooling to the pool will allow sufficient time (24 hours) for the 
operators to intervene and line up alternate cooling paths and the 
means of inventory make-up before the water shielding above the top 
of the racks falls below 10 feet. The thermal limits specified for 
the evaluations performed to support the proposed change are the 
same as those which were used in the previous evaluations. 
Therefore, the accepted margin of safety remains the same.
    Thus, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a 
significant reduction in the margin of safety.
    The NRC has provided guidance concerning the application of 
standards in 10 CFR 50.92 by providing certain examples (51 FR 7751, 
March 6, 1986) of amendments that are considered not likely to 
involve a SHC [Significant Hazards Considerations]. The proposed 
changes for V.C. Summer are similar to Example (x): an expansion of 
the storage capacity of Spent Fuel Pool when all of the following 
are satisfied:
    (1) The storage expansion method consists of either replacing 
existing racks with a design that allows closer spacing between 
stored spent fuel assemblies or placing additional racks of the 
original design on the pool floor if space permits.
    The V.C. Summer reracking modification involves replacement of 
the existing racks with a design that will allow closer spacing of 
the stored fuel assemblies. Also includes installing one new rack in 
the existing space in the NE corner of the spent fuel pool.
    (2) The storage expansion method does not involve rod 
consolidation or double tiers.
    The V.C. Summer reracking does not involve fuel consolidation. 
The racks will not be double tiered; no fuel assemblies will be 
stored above other assemblies.
    (3) The Keff of the pool is maintained less than, or 
equal to, 0.95.
    The design of the new racks integrates a neutron absorber, 
Boral, within the racks to allow closer storage of spent fuel 
assemblies while ensuring that Keff remains less than 
0.95 under all conditions. Additionally, the water in the Spent Fuel 
Pool does contain boron as further assurance that Keff 
remains less than 0.95.
    (4) No new technology or unproven technology is utilized in 
either the construction process or the analytical techniques 
necessary to justify the expansion.
    The rack vendor has successfully participated in the licensing 
of numerous other racks of a similar design. The construction 
process and the analytical techniques of the V.C. Summer pool 
expansion are substantially the same as in the other completed 
rerack projects. Thus, no new or unproven technology is used in the 
V.C. Summer reracking.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91, the preceding analyses provides a 
determination that the proposed Technical Specifications change 
poses no significant hazard as delineated by 10 CFR 50.92.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Documents may 
be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document 
Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first 
floor), Rockville, Maryland.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By July 25, 2002, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for

[[Page 42813]]

Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons 
should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714, \1\ which is available 
at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint 
North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, or 
electronically on the Internet at the NRC Web site http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If there are problems in accessing the 
document, contact the Public Document Room Reference staff at 1-800-
397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to [email protected]. If a request for a 
hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, 
the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by 
the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing 
Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the 
Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will 
issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
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    \1\ The most recent version of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, published January 1, 2002, inadvertently omitted the 
last sentence of 10 CFR 2.741(d) and subparagraphs (d)(1) and (2), 
regarding petitions to intervene and contentions. Those provisions 
are extant and still applicable to petitions to intervene. Those 
provisions are as follows: ``In all other circumstances, such ruling 
body or officer shall, in ruling on--
    (1) A petition for leave to intervene or a request for hearing, 
consider the following factors, among other things:
    (i) The nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be 
made a party to the proceeding.
    (ii) The nature and extent of the petitioner's property, 
financial, or other interest in the proceeding.
    (iii) The possible effect of any order that may be entered in 
the proceeding on the petitioner's interest .
    (2) The admissibility of a contention, refuse to admit a 
contention if:
    (i) The contention and supporting material fail to satisfy the 
requirements of paragraph (b)(2) of this section; or
    (ii) The contention, if proven, would be of no consequence in 
the proceeding because it would not entitle petitioner to relief.''
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    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 
Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the above date. Because of 
the continuing disruptions in delivery of mail to United States 
Government offices, it is requested that petitions for leave to 
intervene and requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary of 
the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-
1101 or by e-mail to [email protected]. A copy of the petition for 
leave to intervene and request for hearing should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and because of continuing disruptions in 
delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is requested 
that copies be transmitted either by means of facsimile transmission to 
301-415-3725 or by e-mail to [email protected]. A copy of the 
request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be 
sent to Thomas G. Eppink, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, Post 
Office Box 764, Columbia, South Carolina 29218, attorney for the 
licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    The Commission hereby provides notice that this is a proceeding on 
an application for a license amendment falling within the scope of 
section 134 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 42 U.S.C. 
10154. Under section 134 of the NWPA, the Commission, at the request of 
any party to the proceeding, must use hybrid hearing procedures with 
respect to ``any matter which the Commission determines to be in 
controversy among the parties.''
    The hybrid procedures in section 134 provide for oral argument on 
matters in

[[Page 42814]]

controversy, preceded by discovery under the Commission's rules and the 
designation, following argument of only those factual issues that 
involve a genuine and substantial dispute, together with any remaining 
questions of law, to be resolved in an adjudicatory hearing. Actual 
adjudicatory hearings are to be held on only those issues found to meet 
the criteria of section 134 and set for hearing after oral argument.
    The Commission's rules implementing section 134 of the NWPA are 
found in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart K, ``Hybrid Hearing Procedures for 
Expansion of Spent Fuel Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear Power 
Reactors'' (published at 50 FR 41662 dated October 15, 1985). Under 
those rules, any party to the proceeding may invoke the hybrid hearing 
procedures by filing with the presiding officer a written request for 
oral argument under 10 CFR 2.1109. To be timely, the request must be 
filed within ten (10) days of an order granting a request for hearing 
or petition to intervene. The presiding officer must grant a timely 
request for oral argument. The presiding officer may grant an untimely 
request for oral argument only upon a showing of good cause by the 
requesting party for the failure to file on time and after providing 
the other parties an opportunity to respond to the untimely request. If 
the presiding officer grants a request for oral argument, any hearing 
held on the application must be conducted in accordance with the hybrid 
hearing procedures. In essence, those procedures limit the time 
available for discovery and require that an oral argument be held to 
determine whether any contentions must be resolved in an adjudicatory 
hearing. If no party to the proceeding timely requests oral argument, 
and if all untimely requests for oral argument are denied, then the 
usual procedures in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G apply.
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated July 24, 2001, which is available for 
public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint 
North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 
Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide 
Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic 
Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who 
encounter problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, should 
contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 
301-415-4737, or by e-mail to [email protected].

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 21st day of June 2002.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Karen R. Cotton,
Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate II, Division of 
Licensing Project Management.
[FR Doc. 02-16097 Filed 6-24-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P