[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 114 (Thursday, June 13, 2002)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 40622-40623]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-14906]


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 Proposed Rules
                                                 Federal Register
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 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
 the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
 notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
 the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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  Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 114 / Thursday, June 13, 2002 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 40622]]



NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[Docket No. PRM-50-77]


Performance Technology; Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; Notice of receipt.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received and 
requests public comment on a petition for rulemaking filed by 
Performance Technology. The petition has been docketed by the NRC and 
has been assigned Docket No. PRM-50-77. The petitioner is requesting 
that certain general design criteria in the NRC regulations governing 
domestic licensing of production and utilization facilities be amended 
to increase emergency diesel generator start times, enhance operator 
training, and delete the requirement that offsite electrical power is 
assumed disconnected from the nuclear unit switchyard during postulated 
accidents. The petitioner believes that its proposed amendments would 
increase safety at licensed nuclear facilities.

DATES: Submit comments by August 27, 2002. Comments received after this 
date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of 
consideration cannot be given except as to comments received on or 
before this date.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Attention: Rulemaking and 
Adjudications staff.
    Deliver comments to 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 
between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.
    You may also provide comments via the NRC's interactive rulemaking 
website through the NRC home page (http://ruleforum.llnl.gov). At this 
site, you may view the petition for rulemaking, this Federal Register 
notice of receipt, and any comments received by the NRC in response to 
this notice of receipt. Additionally, you may upload comments as files 
(any format), if your web browser supports that function. For 
information about the interactive rulemaking website, contact Ms. Carol 
Gallagher, (301) 415-5905 (e-mail: [email protected]).
    Documents related to this action are available for public 
inspection at the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) located at 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland.
    Documents created or received at the NRC after November 1, 1999 are 
also available electronically at the NRC's Public electronic Reading 
Room on the Internet at http://www.nrc.gov/reading--rm/adams.html. From 
this site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide 
Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and 
image files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to 
ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in 
ADAMS, contact the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737 or by e-mail to [email protected].
    For a copy of the petition, write to Michael T. Lesar, Chief, Rules 
and Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Lesar, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555. Telephone: 301-415-7163 or Toll-Free: 1-800-368-5642 or E-mail: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The NRC has received a petition for rulemaking dated May 2, 2002, 
submitted by Performance Technology (petitioner) requesting that 
certain general design criteria at 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, be 
amended to increase short-term equipment response times of emergency 
diesel generators that it believes are inappropriate and detrimental to 
safety. The petitioner also believes that training nuclear power plant 
operators for accidents it believes are not realistic is detrimental to 
safety. The petitioner further recommends that the requirement that 
offsite electrical power is assumed disconnected from the nuclear unit 
switchyard during postulated accidents be deleted, and that this 
requirement be retained only for anticipated operational occurrences. 
Specifically, the petitioner is proposing amendments to Criterion 17, 
``Electric power systems'' and conforming amendments to Criterion 35, 
``Emergency core cooling,'' Criterion 38, ``Containment heat removal,'' 
Criterion 41, ``Containment atmosphere cleanup,'' and Criterion 44, 
``Cooling water.''
    The NRC has determined that the petition meets the threshold 
sufficiency requirements for a petition for rulemaking under 10 CFR 
2.802. The petition has been docketed as PRM-50-77. The NRC is 
soliciting public comment on the petition for rulemaking.

Discussion of the Petition

    The petitioner believes that some short-term equipment response 
times are inappropriate and detrimental to safety and, in addition to 
its May 2, 2002, letter that accompanies this petition for rulemaking, 
cites a October 7, 1999, letter to the NRC where the petitioner raised 
concerns about the 10-second emergency diesel generator start time. The 
petitioner has also attached a report on the Tenth ASME International 
Conference on Nuclear Engineering (ICONE 10) entitled, ``Are We 
Forgetting the Lessons from the Accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, 
March 1979-A Case Study.'' The ICONE 10 report describes a Licensee 
Event Report from the Monticello facility that the petitioner cites as 
indicating that one of the assumptions of the design basis accident 
analyses that is detrimental to safety is the requirement to assume a 
postulated accident coincident with the loss of offsite power. The 
petitioner contends that this requirement was placed in the regulations 
to try to capture the worst possible accident scenario so that lesser 
accidents do not need to be considered. The petitioner believes that 
its proposed changes will eliminate the requirement for coincident 
postulated accidents and the loss of offsite power.
    The petitioner's proposed changes to 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, 
Criterion 17 and conforming changes to Criterion 35, Criterion 38, 
Criterion 41 and Criterion 44 are as follows:

[[Page 40623]]

Proposed Criterion 17--Electric Power Systems

    An offsite electric power system and an onsite electrical power 
system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, 
and components important to safety.
    The safety function for the offsite electric power system shall be 
to provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that (1) 
specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the 
reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of 
anticipated operational occurrences and (2) the reactor core is cooled 
and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in 
the event of postulated accidents.
    Electric power from the transmission network to the onsite electric 
distribution system shall be supplied by two physically independent 
circuits (not necessarily on separate rights of way) designed and 
located so as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of 
their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and 
environmental conditions. A switchyard common to both circuits is 
acceptable. Each of these offsite circuits shall be designed to be 
available in sufficient time following a loss of the other offsite 
electric power circuit, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design 
limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary 
are not exceeded.
    The safety function for the onsite electric power system (assuming 
the offsite electric power system is not functioning) shall be to 
provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that specified 
acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor 
coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded and the reactor is cooled 
and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in 
the event of anticipated operational occurrences.
    The onsite electric power supplies, including the onsite batteries, 
the onsite electric ac power source, and the onsite electric 
distribution system, shall have sufficient independence, redundancy, 
and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a single 
failure.
    Provisions shall be included to minimize the probability of losing 
electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of, or 
coincident with, the loss of power generated by the nuclear power 
plant, the loss of power from the transmission network, or the loss of 
power from the onsite electric power supplies.

Proposed Criterion 35--Emergency Core Planning

    A system to provide abundant emergency core cooling shall be 
provided. The system safety function shall be to transfer heat from the 
reactor core following any loss of reactor coolant at a rate such that 
fuel and clad damage that could interfere with continued effective 
reactor core cooling is prevented.
    Suitable redundancy in components and feature, and suitable 
interconnections, leak detection, isolation, and containment 
capabilities shall be provided to assure that the system safety 
function can be accomplished assuming a single failure. The offsite and 
onsite electrical power systems available to assure this system safety 
function shall be as described in Criterion 17.

Proposed Criterion 38--Containment Heat Removal

    A system to remove heat from the reactor containment shall be 
provided. The system safety function shall be to reduce rapidly, 
consistent with the functioning of other associated systems, the 
containment pressure and temperature following any loss-of-coolant 
accident and maintain them at acceptably low levels.
    Suitable redundancy in components and feature, and suitable 
interconnections, leak detection, isolation, and containment 
capabilities shall be provided to assure that the system safety 
function can be accomplished assuming a single failure. The offsite and 
onsite electrical power systems available to assure this system safety 
function shall be as described in Criterion 17.

Proposed Criterion 41--Containment Atmosphere Cleanup

    As necessary, systems to control fission products, hydrogen, 
oxygen, and other substances which may be released into the reactor 
containment shall be provided, consistent with the functioning of other 
associated systems, to assure that reactor containment integrity is 
maintained for accidents where there is a high probability that fission 
products may be present in the reactor containment.
    Suitable redundancy in components and feature, and suitable 
interconnections, leak detection, isolation, and containment 
capabilities shall be provided to assure that the system safety 
function can be accomplished assuming a single failure. The offsite and 
onsite electrical power systems available to assure this system safety 
function shall be as described in Criterion 17.

Proposed Criterion 44--Cooling Water

    A system to transfer heat from structures, systems, and components 
important to safety, to an ultimate heat sink shall be provided. The 
system safety function shall be to transfer the combined heat load of 
these structures, systems and components under normal operating and 
accident conditions.
    Suitable redundancy in components and feature, and suitable 
interconnections, leak detection, isolation, and containment 
capabilities shall be provided to assure that the system safety 
function can be accomplished assuming a single failure. The offsite and 
onsite electrical power systems available to assure this system safety 
function shall be as described in Criterion 17.

The Petitioner's Conclusions

    The petitioner concludes that the NRC requirements specified in 
certain general design criteria at 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, should 
be amended to increase short-term equipment response times of emergency 
diesel generators at nuclear power facilities, enhance operating 
training to eliminate training for accidents that it believes are not 
realistic, and delete the requirement that offsite electrical power is 
assumed disconnected from the nuclear unit switchyard during postulated 
accidents while retaining this requirement during anticipated 
operational occurrences. The petitioner requests that the criteria at 
10 CFR part 50, appendix A, be amended as detailed in its petition for 
rulemaking.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of June, 2002.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 02-14906 Filed 6-12-02; 8:45 am]
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