[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 76 (Friday, April 19, 2002)]
[Notices]
[Pages 19432-19435]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-9658]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program
AGENCY: Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration.
ACTION: Amended Record of Decision.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration (DOE/NNSA) is amending the Records of Decision (RODs)
for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials
Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Storage and
Disposition PEIS) and Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental
Impact Statement (SPD EIS). Specifically, DOE/NNSA is announcing the
following three revisions to the decisions contained in those RODs: (1)
Cancellation of the immobilization portion of the disposition
strategies announced in those RODs due to budgetary constraints, (2)
selection of the alternative of immediate implementation of
consolidated long-term storage at the Savannah River Site (SRS) of
surplus non-pit plutonium now stored separately at the Rocky Flats
Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) and SRS, and (3) adjustment in
the manner in which surplus plutonium pits will be stored at the Pantex
Plant (Pantex). Cancellation of the immobilization facility and
selection of this storage alternative remove the basis for the
contingency contained in previous RODs conditioning transport of non-
pit surplus plutonium from RFETS to SRS for storage on the selection of
SRS as the site for the immobilization facilities, and those RODs are
so amended. DOE will notify the Congress and consult with the Governor
of South Carolina before shipping plutonium to SRS, in accordance with
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002.
Under this amended ROD, DOE/NNSA will continue to store surplus
plutonium pits at Pantex in the facility where they are currently
located rather than transfer the pits to a different facility at the
same site, as announced in the Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD.
In response to a statutory directive, DOE/NNSA has submitted to
Congress a report on a strategy for the disposal of surplus plutonium
currently located at, or to be shipped to SRS. That strategy involves
converting this plutonium to a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel and irradiating
it in commercial power reactors. DOE/NNSA is currently evaluating the
changes to the MOX fuel portion of the surplus plutonium disposition
program necessitated by this strategy, including the need for
additional environmental reviews pursuant to the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). No final decisions regarding the MOX portion of the
program will be made until these reviews are completed.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information concerning the
disposition of surplus plutonium or this amended ROD, contact Hitesh
Nigam, Deputy NEPA Compliance Officer, Office of Fissile Materials
Disposition, National Nuclear Security Administration, 1000
Independence Avenue, SW, Washington DC, 20585, 800-820-5134. Additional
information regarding the DOE/NNSA Fissile Materials Disposition
Program is available on the Internet at http://www.doe-md.com (when
accessible).
For further information concerning DOE's NEPA process, contact: Ms.
Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (EH-
42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW,
Washington, DC 20585. Telephone (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at
1-800-472-2756.
Additional information regarding the DOE NEPA process and
activities is also available on the Internet through the NEPA home page
at http://tis.eh.doe.gov/nepa.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
A. Historical Context for the Decisions on the Plutonium Storage and
Disposition Program Announced in This Amended ROD
The end of the Cold War created a legacy of surplus weapons-usable
fissile materials in both the United States and Russia. The United
States and Russia have been working together to reduce
[[Page 19433]]
the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation worldwide by implementing
programs for dispositioning surplus plutonium in a safe, secure,
environmentally acceptable, and timely manner. Russia and the United
States have issued numerous statements and agreements to this effect
since the mid-1990's. The most recent is the Agreement between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of
Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and
Related Cooperation signed in September, 2000. This agreement provides
that the United States and Russia will each dispose of 34 t of
``weapons-grade'' plutonium, and allows for disposition either by
immobilization, or by MOX fuel fabrication and subsequent irradiation.
One purpose of DOE/NNSA's Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program is to
help implement this agreement.
However, in addition to achieving the ultimate goal of permanent
disposition of surplus plutonium materials, DOE independently needs to
improve the configuration of the storage system for these materials,
pending disposition. These improvements will allow DOE to significantly
reduce storage costs, expedite closure and cleanup of sites and
facilities in its nuclear complex, and enhance the security of these
materials.
DOE's Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (now part of NNSA)
has prepared a number of NEPA documents regarding the United States'
Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program. The Storage and Disposition PEIS
(DOE/EIS-0229, December 1996) evaluated alternative strategies and
locations both for long-term storage (up to 50 years) and for
disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials. Among the alternatives
analyzed in that PEIS was consolidated long-term storage at each of
four candidate sites.
The SPD EIS (DOE/EIS-0283, November 1999), which tiered from the
Storage and Disposition PEIS, evaluated site-specific alternatives for
the construction and operation of three facilities for disposition of
up to 50 t \1\ of surplus weapons-usable \2\ (weapons-grade \3\ and
non-weapons-grade) plutonium. These three facilities would have
performed, respectively, pit disassembly and conversion, plutonium
immobilization, and MOX fuel fabrication. The SPD EIS also evaluated
the use of six domestic commercial reactors for irradiation of MOX
fuel.
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\1\ To accommodate the potential declaration of additional
surplus materials in the future.
\2\ Weapons-usable plutonium is plutonium in forms (e.g., metals
or oxides) that can be readily converted for use in nuclear weapons.
Weapons-grade, fuel-grade and power reactor-grade plutonium are all
weapons-usable.
\3\ Weapons-grade plutonium is plutonium with an isotopic ratio
of plutonium 240 to plutonium 239 of no more than 0.10.
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B. Previous Decisions on the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program
In the initial ROD for the Storage and Disposition PEIS
(62 FR 3014, January 21, 1997), DOE made two sets of decisions, one
addressed to disposition of surplus plutonium and one addressed to
storage of this material. With regard to disposition, DOE determined,
consistent with the Preferred Alternative analyzed in the Storage and
Disposition PEIS, to pursue a hybrid approach that would have allowed
for the immobilization of surplus plutonium for eventual disposal in a
geologic repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and use
of MOX fuel in existing, domestic, commercial reactors, with subsequent
disposal of the spent fuel in a geologic repository. This hybrid
approach was selected to provide insurance against technical or
institutional uncertainties that could arise from a single-technology
approach for disposition. DOE selected this approach for the increased
flexibility it provided by ensuring that plutonium disposition could
still be initiated promptly should one of the approaches ultimately
fail or be delayed. In selecting the hybrid approach, DOE established a
means for expeditious plutonium disposition that provided the basis for
an international cooperative effort to achieve reciprocal, irreversible
plutonium disposition actions by Russia.
In addition, with regard to storage, DOE decided in the January 21,
1997 ROD to reduce the number of locations where the various forms of
surplus plutonium were stored. To accomplish this, DOE decided to move
surplus plutonium from RFETS as soon as possible, transporting pits to
Pantex beginning in 1997. Non-pit plutonium materials would be
separated and stabilized, and then transported to SRS. The January 21,
1997 ROD made transport of non-pit surplus plutonium materials from the
RFETS to SRS contingent on DOE selecting SRS as the site for the
immobilization facility in a subsequent ROD. After transport, the non-
pit materials would be stored at SRS in a new facility, the Actinide
Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF), pending disposition.
DOE further decided in the January 21, 1997 ROD to upgrade storage
facilities in Zone 12 South at Pantex (to be completed by 2004) to
store surplus pits already stored at Pantex and surplus pits from
RFETS, pending disposition. Storage facilities in Zone 4 at Pantex
would continue to be used for these pits prior to completion of the
Zone 12 upgrade.
To support early closure of RFETS, DOE subsequently issued
an amended ROD for the Storage and Disposition PEIS (63 FR 43386,
August 13, 1998) that revised some of these decisions. The amended ROD
announced DOE's decision to accelerate shipment of all non-pit surplus
plutonium from RFETS to SRS beginning in 2000, provided, again, that
SRS was selected as the immobilization site. To accommodate the early
receipt and storage of RFETS surplus plutonium (i.e., before completion
of the APSF), DOE decided to undertake modifications to Building 105-K
in the K-Area at SRS (also known as the K-Area Materials Storage [KAMS]
facility). Before issuing the amended ROD, DOE prepared a Supplement
Analysis (SA) pursuant to DOE procedures implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act (10 CFR 1021.314), Supplement Analysis for
Storing Plutonium in the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility and
Building 105-K at the Savannah River Site, (DOE/EIS-0229-SA1). On the
basis of that SA, DOE concluded that storage in KAMS would not result
in a substantial change in environmental concerns compared to storage
in APSF.
In the ROD for the SPD EIS (65 FR 1608, January 11, 2000),
DOE decided to implement the hybrid approach for the disposition of up
to 50 t of surplus plutonium (by fabricating up to 33 t into MOX fuel
and immobilizing approximately 17 t), as described in the Preferred
Alternative in the SPD EIS. SRS was selected as the location for all
three disposition facilities: A pit disassembly and conversion facility
(pit conversion facility), a plutonium immobilization facility, and a
MOX facility.
In an Amended ROD (66 FR 7888, January 26, 2001) for the
EIS on Interim Management of Nuclear Materials (October 1995, DOE/EIS-
0220), DOE canceled construction of the APSF because of cost growth and
resource limitations. It was decided to use existing facilities for
storing surplus plutonium at SRS.
[[Page 19434]]
II. Need To Change Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program
A. Immobilization
The initial Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD noted that ``the
timing and extent to which either or both of these disposition
approaches (immobilization or MOX) are ultimately deployed will depend
upon the results of future technology development and demonstrations,
follow-on (tiered) site-specific environmental review, contract
negotiations, and detailed cost reviews, as well as nonproliferation
considerations, and agreements with Russia and other nations.'' In
2001, the schedule for design, construction and operation of the
plutonium immobilization facility was delayed indefinitely due to
budgetary constraints. DOE/NNSA is now canceling the immobilization
program, including the immobilization facility.
DOE/NNSA has evaluated its ability to continue implementing two
disposition approaches and has determined that in order to make
progress with available funds, only one approach can be supported.
Russia does not consider immobilization alone to be an acceptable
approach because immobilization, unlike the irradiation of MOX fuel,
fails to degrade the isotopic composition of the plutonium. Russia has
contended that the United States could easily obtain plutonium by
removing it from the immobilized waste form in the event of a desire to
reuse the plutonium for nuclear weapons. Because selection of an
immobilization-only approach would lead to loss of Russian interest in
and commitment to surplus plutonium disposition, DOE is of the view
that if only one disposition approach is to be pursued, the MOX
approach rather than the immobilization approach is the preferable one.
Accordingly, it is canceling the immobilization portion of the dual
disposition strategies announced in previous RODs.
B. Consolidated Long-Term Storage of Plutonium at SRS
Canceling the U.S. immobilization program has caused DOE/NNSA to
reevaluate the long-term storage needs of the DOE nuclear complex. Much
of the non-pit surplus plutonium currently stored at various sites in
the complex was originally destined for immobilization. DOE/NNSA is
examining alternative disposition paths for this material, including
use as MOX fuel (see II.D, below). In the meantime, however, DOE needs
to move forward with consolidated storage of some of this material,
which serves independent objectives. In particular, DOE must
consolidate the plutonium in order to close and clean up facilities and
sites in the complex. In the case of RFETS, the schedule for site
closure and cleanup is governed by an agreement between DOE and state
regulators. Shipments from RFETS must begin soon in order to maintain
that schedule. While the material is being safely and securely stored
at all locations, consolidated storage of this material as RFETS is
moving toward closure would afford DOE the opportunity to further
improve the security of the material and at the same time achieve cost
savings.
Long-term storage of surplus plutonium and the ultimate disposition
of that plutonium are separate actions, and these actions were
addressed separately in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. Alternatives
for accomplishing each action were analyzed. While previous RODs that
were issued based on that PEIS combined these two actions, such
combination was not required to implement either decision, and indeed
served no significant programmatic objective. The Storage and
Disposition PEIS analyzed long-term storage at each of four sites: The
Hanford Reservation (Hanford), the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory (now the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory [INEEL]), Pantex and SRS. In this amended ROD, DOE/NNSA is
modifying the earlier RODs to select the option of long-term storage of
non-pit plutonium at SRS on its own merits.
DOE has reviewed the Storage and Disposition PEIS and related
Supplement Analyses and has determined that the analyses remain valid
for the decisions announced herein.
This decision affects only the non-pit surplus plutonium located at
RFETS. This amended ROD does not affect the decision made in the
January 21, 1997 ROD for the Storage and Disposition PEIS to continue
current storage of non-pit surplus plutonium at Hanford, INEEL and
LANL.
1. Shipment of RFETS Material
Shipments of surplus plutonium materials to SRS in support of the
RFETS closure schedule are addressed in existing NEPA documents. In
addition to the analysis contained in the Storage and Disposition PEIS,
the accelerated shipments of surplus plutonium materials from RFETS to
SRS were analyzed in the 1998 SA described above (DOE/EIS-0229-SA1) and
were reflected in the transportation analyses presented in the SPD EIS.
Both the January 17, 1997 initial ROD and the August 13, 1998 amended
ROD for the Storage and Disposition PEIS conditioned shipment of
plutonium from RFETS to SRS for storage on selection of SRS as the site
for the immobilization facility. Cancellation of the immobilization
facility and selection of the consolidated long-term storage
alternative in this amended ROD removes the basis for that contingency.
DOE will notify the Congress and consult with the Governor of South
Carolina before shipping plutonium from RFETS to SRS, in accordance
with The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002.
2. Long-Term Storage of Surplus Plutonium in the KAMS Facility at SRS
DOE/NNSA decided (63 FR 43386, August 13, 1998) to store surplus
plutonium from RFETS at the KAMS facility while the APSF was being
constructed. However, the storage of surplus plutonium in the KAMS
facility could extend beyond the 10-year period estimated in the 1998
Supplement Analysis discussed above (DOE/EIS-0229-SA1). Therefore, DOE
prepared another SA, Supplement Analysis for Storage of Surplus
Plutonium Materials in the K-Area Material Storage Facility at the
Savannah River Site, February 2002 (DOE/EIS-0229-SA2), which evaluated
the potential for storage beyond 10 years at the KAMS facility. That SA
concluded that potential impacts from the continued storage of surplus
plutonium in the KAMS facility at SRS for this additional period are
not substantially different from those addressed in the original
analysis of storage in APSF contained in the Storage and Disposition
PEIS. Therefore, DOE/NNSA is deciding to use the KAMS facility to store
the plutonium transferred from RFETS.
C. Storage of Surplus Plutonium at Pantex
DOE/NNSA now plans to continue storing surplus pits in Zone 4 at
Pantex, as opposed to transferring the pits to an upgraded facility in
Zone 12 by 2004 as announced in the Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD.
Surplus pits would be maintained in storage in Zone 4 pending
disposition at SRS. DOE had intended to relocate all pits in storage at
Pantex to upgraded facilities in Zone 12 and eventually to discontinue
use of Zone 4. However, further analysis of mission needs determined
that Zone 4 would likely be needed well into the future for weapons
dismantlement activities and to comply with possible treaty
requirements. That being the case, cost savings initially postulated
from
[[Page 19435]]
the closure of Zone 4 would not be achieved. This realization, coupled
with the availability of adequate storage space in Zone 4 to
accommodate both surplus pits and weapons dismantlement activities, as
well as concerns expressed by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board over storing both national security and surplus pits in Zone 12,
led DOE to reexamine whether it would be more appropriate to continue
storing surplus pits in Zone 4.
The storage of surplus pits in Zone 4 at Pantex is ongoing and
consistent with the current storage practices and was evaluated as part
of the No Action Alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. The
SPD EIS ROD also acknowledged that DOE was considering leaving the
surplus pits in Zone 4, pending disposition at SRS.
D. MOX Fuel Program
Section 3155(c) of The National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002 required the Department to submit to Congress by
February 1, 2002, a plan for disposal of the surplus plutonium
currently located at SRS or to be shipped to SRS in the future. Section
3155(d) also required the Department to submit a plan for a disposition
path for plutonium that would otherwise have been disposed of at an
immobilization facility or at a MOX facility, if the Department
determines not to proceed with either facility. In response to this
Congressional mandate, DOE/NNSA, on February 15, 2002 (and supplemented
by letter on March 5, 2002) submitted a document entitled Report to
Congress: Disposition of Surplus Defense Plutonium at Savannah River
Site. That report states that DOE/NNSA's current disposition strategy
involves a MOX-only approach, under which DOE/NNSA would dispose of up
to 34 t of surplus plutonium by converting it to MOX fuel and
irradiating it in commercial power reactors. Implementation of this
strategy is key to the successful completion of the agreement between
the U.S. and the Russian Federation discussed in Section I.A., above.
DOE is currently analyzing the changes to the MOX fuel portion of the
surplus plutonium disposition program needed to carry out that
strategy, including analysis conducted pursuant to NEPA. No final
decisions regarding the MOX portion of the surplus plutonium
disposition program will be made until DOE/NNSA has completed this
analysis.
Amended Decisions
DOE/NNSA is modifying its decisions on storage and disposition of
surplus plutonium as follows:
Cancel the immobilization portion of DOE/NNSA's
disposition strategy.
Select the alternative of consolidated long-term storage
at SRS of non-pit surplus plutonium now stored separately at RFETS and
at SRS.
Utilize the KAMS facility for consolidated long-term
storage of surplus plutonium.
Continue storage of surplus pits in Zone 4 at Pantex in
lieu of storage in Zone 12.
Issued in Washington, DC, April 15, 2002.
John A. Gordon,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.
[FR Doc. 02-9658 Filed 4-18-02; 8:45 am]
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