[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 53 (Tuesday, March 19, 2002)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 12820-12824]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-6366]



[[Page 12819]]

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Part XI





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Part 121



Flightcrew Compartment Access and Door Designs; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 53 / Tuesday, March 19, 2002 / Rules 
and Regulations  

[[Page 12820]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 121

[Docket No. FAA-2001-10770; SFAR 92-4]
RIN 2120-AH55


Flightcrew Compartment Access and Door Designs

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This action supersedes Special Federal Aviation Regulation 
(SFAR) 92-3, which was published on January 15, 2002, to allow 
operators to quickly modify the flightcrew compartment door to delay or 
deter unauthorized entry to the flightcrew compartment. This action 
temporarily authorizes variances from existing design standards for the 
doors and certain operational rules associated with the modifications. 
It allows for approval for return to service of modified airplanes 
without prior approved data if the modification constitutes a major 
alteration. This action also mandates these modifications on airplanes 
in certain passenger and cargo carrying operations. This action 
prohibits the possession of flightdeck compartment door keys by other 
than the flightcrew during flight, unless the flightdeck door has an 
internal flightdeck locking device installed, operative, and in use. 
This action is being taken in the wake of the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks against four U.S. commercial airplanes.

DATES: This action is effective from March 19, 2002, until April 9, 
2003.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Carol Martineau, Certification 
Procedures Branch, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone: (202) 267-9568; e-mail address: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Availability of This Action

    You can get an electronic copy of this document from the Internet 
by taking the following steps:
    (1) Go to the search function of the Department of Transportation's 
electronic Docket Management System (DMS) web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search).
    (2) On the search page, type in the last five digits of the docket 
number shown at the beginning of this document. Click on ``search.''
    (3) On the next page, which contains the docket summary 
information, click on the item you want to see.
    You can also get an electronic copy using the Internet through the 
FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nrpm.htm or the 
Government Printing Office's web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.
    You can also get a job by submitting a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make 
sure to identify the docket number of SFAR number of this rulemaking.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for 
information advice about compliance with statutes and regulations 
within the FAAs jurisdiction. Therefore, any small entity that has a 
question regarding this document may contact its local FAA official. 
Internet users can find additional information on SBREFA on the FAAs 
web page at http:www.faa.gov/avr/arm/sbrefa.htm and send electronic 
inquiries to the following Internet address: [email protected].

Background

    The September 11, 2001, hijacking events have demonstrated that 
some persons are willing to hijack airplanes and use them as weapons 
against the citizens of the United States. This is a safety and 
security threat that was not anticipated and, therefore, not considered 
in the design of transport airplanes. The recent hijackings make it 
clear that there is a critical need to improve the security of the 
flightcrew compartment. These improvements should deter terrorist 
activities and, if they are attempted, delay or deny access to the 
cockpit.
    On November 6, 2001, Congress enacted the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act, Public Law 107-71. Section 104(a)(1)(B) of 
the Act requires the FAA to issue an order requiring the strengthening 
of the flightdeck door and locks on certain passenger carrying 
aircraft.

Flightcrew Compartment Door Designs

    Flightcrew compartment doors on transport category airplanes have 
been designed principally to ensure privacy, so pilots could focus 
their entire attention to their normal and emergency flight duties. The 
doors have not been designed to provide an impenetrable barrier between 
the cabin and the flightcrew compartment. Doors have not been required 
to meet any significant security threat, such as small arms fire or 
shrapnel, or the exercise of brute force to enter the flightcrew 
compartment.
    Besides affording an uninterrupted work environment for the 
flightcrew, flightcrew compartment doors often must meet other 
important safety standards. Should there be a sudden decompression of 
the airplane, separate compartments within the airplane, like the cabin 
and the crew compartment, must be designed so that the pressure 
differential that is created does not compromise the basic airplane 
structure. Certification standards require that airplane designs 
provide a method to compensate for decompression in an manner that 
avoids significant damage to the airplane. In many cases, flightcrew 
compartment doors provide the pressure compensation by being vented or 
swinging open to equalize the pressure between the cabin and the 
flightcrew compartment.
    In addition, design standards require that the flightcrew have a 
path to exit the flightcrew compartment in an emergency, if the cockpit 
window exits are not usable. Flightcrew compartment doors have been 
designed to provide this escape path. But this escape feature may also 
enable easier unauthorized entry into the flightcrew compartment from 
the cabin.
    Operating regulations, in particular Sec. 121.379(b) in the case of 
a major alteration, require the work to be done in accordance with 
technical data approved by the Administrator. Operating regulations for 
airlines also require that each crewmember have a key readily available 
to open doors between passengers and an emergency exit. Some airlines 
issue flightcrew compartment door keys to all their crewmembers. This 
allows flight attendants to enter the flightcrew compartment and assist 
the flightcrew in an emergency, such as incapacitation of a flight 
crewmember. But it also offers an opportunity for an individual to 
overpower or coerce a flight attendant, take away the key, and enter 
the flightcrew compartment.

Rapid Response Team

    To evaluate what could be done to improve flightcrew compartment 
security, the Secretary of Transportation formed a Rapid Response Team 
for Aircraft Security. The Team included representatives of airplane 
designers, airline operators, airline pilots, and

[[Page 12821]]

flight attendants. There was a clear consensus from this group, and 
agreement by the FAA, that immediate actions must be taken to 
strengthen the flightcrew compartment door. The short-term options, 
though, in one way or another could conflict with regulatory design 
requirements such as those discussed above.
    The Rapid Response Team addressed the design issues and found the 
relative safety risks to be small in view of the emergent security risk 
of unauthorized flightcrew compartment entry. The FAA agrees with this 
conclusion. The Rapid Response Team report also concluded, and the FAA 
agrees, that all existing design requirements should continue to be 
applied in the long term. Therefore, this SFAR allows a temporary 
period during which non-compliance with design requirements will be 
allowed when improvements to flightcrew compartment security are made.
    In addition to waiving specific airworthiness regulations, the FAA 
is waiving procedural requirements applicable to major alternations 
(Sec. 121.379(b)). Besides the information obtained from the Rapid 
Response Team, the FAA has received technical information from airline 
operators and manufacturers regarding what modifications are possible 
and how quickly they can be incorporated. The technical data reviewed 
by the FAA reflect good design practices, and the FAA is confident that 
installations can be made without unduly compromising safety.
    Given the urgency of the need to take action to reinforce the 
flightcrew compartment doors, the FAA finds that it is in the public 
interest to forego the requirement that major alterations to accomplish 
this task have data previously approved by the Administrator. This 
portion of the SFAR is limited to 6 months. Major alterations performed 
after that data must be in accordance with approved data, and whatever 
the operator installs in the short term must ultimately be brought into 
full regulatory compliance.

The Original SFAR 92 Provisions

    Original SFAR 92 was published on October 9, 2001, and allowed all 
part 121 passenger carrying operators to install fligthcrew compartment 
door improvements and prohibited the possession of flightcrew 
compartment keys by persons other than flight crewmembers during 
flight. It was very broad and allowed maximum short-term flexibility in 
crafting enhanced door security measures. It allowed the doors to be 
modified and airplanes to be operated with modified doors.
    The FAA established an 18-month duration for the portions of the 
SFAR concerning airworthiness requirements. We expected this would give 
the industry sufficient time to design and install more permanent 
changes to door security and establish procedures for flightcrew 
compartment door access that meet regulatory requirements for egress 
and venting.
    The SFAR required operators to submit a report to the FAA that 
detailed the specific modifications they made to the flightcrew 
compartment door. This allowed the FAA to monitor what had been 
installed and take action if the installation created an unacceptable 
safety risk. Further, to monitor progress toward the goal of full 
compliance, the SFAR required a report by April 22, 2002, that 
describes how the operator will meet regulatory compliance for egress 
and venting.
    We also expected that airframe manufacturers and modifiers would 
produce service information to assist operators in developing 
modifications to improve intrusion resistance to the flightcrew 
compartment. While service documents do not require separate approval 
under this SFAR, such modifications may also be installed in production 
airplanes. The modification authority granted by the SFAR also applied 
to manufacturers and other persons that applied for airworthiness 
certificates to enable delivery of airplanes to the operators.
    In addition, we understood that some operators might rely on 
suppliers to produce parts to support these modifications to the 
flightcrew doors. Under normal circumstances, such parts producers are 
subjected to the requirement to obtain parts manufacturer approvals in 
accordance with 14 CFR 21.303. However, to facilitate reinforcement of 
these doors, the SFAR included a provision that overrode the 
requirement for parts production approval in support of these 
activities.
    Should any of the changes to the door constitute a major 
alteration, the SFAR temporarily relieved the operator of having to 
obtain prior approval of the data. As soon as the design data is 
submitted, the FAA will work with the operators to identify a mutually 
acceptable process and time to get the data approved. In the meantime, 
the airworthiness certificates on airplanes that have been modified 
will remain valid. In making returns to service of airplanes modified 
under the SFAR, documents can reflect compliance with regulatory 
requirements by citing the SFAR.
    In addition to the above changes to harden the flighcrew 
compartment doors against intruders, the FAA also believed it was 
prudent to eliminate the ability of intruders to gain access by 
obtaining a flight attendant's key. For that reason, the SFAR 
temporarily changed the requirement in Sec. 121.313(g) by stating that 
only flight crewmembers, and not cabin crewmembers, would have 
flightcrew compartment keys during flight. This lessened the 
opportunity for gaining unauthorized access and reduced the likelihood 
of attacks on cabin crewmembers to obtain keys on airplanes where the 
flightdeck door does not have an internal locking device.

First Revision to SFAR 92--SFAR 92-1

    SFAR 92 has remained substantially as originally written. However, 
modifications have been issued to change the scope of the rule and to 
clarify provisions. SFAR 92 originally authorized only part 121 
passenger carrying operators to make the quick modifications to the 
flightdeck doors. Because of the risk posed by having other than 
flightcrew members onboard the airplane as allowed in Sec. 121.583, 
FedEx petitioned the FAA to allow it to install additional door 
security measures in accordance with the provisions of SFAR 92. The FAA 
determined that the modifications requested by FedEx would apply to 
similarly situated cargo airplane operators and that the threat is 
similar to that of passenger airplanes. SFAR 92-1 was published on 
October 17, 2001, and expanded the modification authority to all part 
121 operators.

Second Revision to SFAR 92--SFAR 92-2

    As originally published, SFAR 92 temporarily changed section 
121.313(g) to prohibit the possession of flightdeck keys by non-
flightdeck crewmembers. Since initial issuance of the SFAR, internal 
locking devices that render the key useless for flightdeck access have 
been installed on many air carrier airplanes. Since the keys have 
multiple uses in the airplane beyond the flightdeck door, prohibiting 
possession of the flightdeck door keys by non-flight crewmembers on 
these airplanes is only an inconvenience to the crew and not a 
deterrent to terrorist activity.
    Allowing non-flight crewmembers access to the keys is acceptable 
when the internal locking device is in use on the airplane. ``In use'' 
contemplates that the device is locked from the inside by the 
flightdeck crew. If a flightdeck crewmember must exit the flightdeck 
for some reason, either the remaining

[[Page 12822]]

flightdeck crewmember, or a cabin crewmember that enters the 
flightdeck, will immediately lock the internal device behind the 
exiting flightdeck crewmember. This provision may also reduce the 
opportunity for coercion, since the flight attendant can safely hand 
over the key.
    As a result, when SFAR 92-2 was published on November 21, 2001, it 
added a phrase to the end of Sec. 121.313(a)(ii) that allowed 
possession of the key under certain circumstances. The limitations on 
keys did not apply to cargo operators because flight attendants are 
only required on passenger airplanes; nor did they apply to part 129 
operators because part 121 regulations do not apply to them. This 
change to 121.313(g) will expire with this SFAR.
    SFAR 92-2 also replaced the 90 day and 180 day reporting and 
termination time frames with specific dates, January 15, 2002, and 
April 22, 2002, respectively. Since SFAR 92 was republished more than 
once, insertion of specific dates eliminated confusion in calculating 
these dates.

Third Revision to SFAR 92--SFAR 92-3

    When SFAR 92 was originally issued, and subsequently revised, it 
was the expectation of the FAA that flightdeck modifications would be 
made as soon as possible. While this was the case for the substantial 
majority of operators, not all had accomplished the short-term 
modifications. Because of the FAA's original expectation, SFAR 92 did 
not contain a provision mandating the internal door modifications. 
Therefore, the FAA determined that a mandate was necessary to assure 
that all part 121 passenger-carrying airplanes required to have 
flightdeck doors were modified. The FAA also considered the issue of 
airplanes that carried only cargo, but are permitted to also carry 
certain persons as defined in Sec. 121.583 as discussed in SFAR 92-1. 
Provisions of the regulations did not ensure that a person who is 
intent on using an airplane as a weapon is unable to board an all-cargo 
airplane in accordance with Sec. 121.583. Therefore, in cases where 
these airplanes already have flightdeck doors, the FAA determined that 
the door should also be modified to improve security.
    Pub. L. 107-71 directed the Administrator of the FAA to issue an 
order that required the strengthening of flightdeck doors and locks. 
SFAR 92-3 was issued and required the installation of internal locking 
devices on flightdeck doors within 45 days of publication of the SFAR. 
The airplanes covered by this provision are passenger-carrying 
airplanes operated under part 121 that are required to have flightdeck 
doors and all-cargo airplanes that have flightdeck doors installed. 
Given the large number of modifications already made on a large variety 
of airplanes within the fleet, the FAA believed that 45 days should 
provide operators who have not made the relevant modifications with 
sufficient time to do so.
    This revision to the SFAR expanded the modification authority to 
U.S. registered, transport category airplanes that are operated under 
part 129, foreign operations. Because these airplanes are U.S. 
registered, the FAA must issue any authorization to modify the 
airplanes. The FAA has received several inquires from such operators 
that requested authorization to make modifications as authorized in 
SFAR 92. SFAR 92-3 has provided such authorization.
    The FAA recognized that mandating the reinforcing modifications for 
part 121 operators and authorizing part 129 operators to make 
modifications may not enable some to make the January 15, 2002, 
reporting requirements in SFAR 92-2. As a result, this revision 
extended the reporting date to February 15, 2002. Finally, this 
revision also made it clear that all operators that must strengthen 
their flightdeck doors in accordance with the new provisions of 
Sec. 121.313 (discussed below) must submit a plan for accomplishing 
those modifications by April 22, 2002. This requirement applies 
regardless of when an operator installs an interim modification, as 
required by the SFAR.

This Revision to SFAR 92--SFAR 92-4

    To date, the SFAR 92 authority to return airplanes to service 
without previously approved data in the case of major alterations will 
terminate on April 22, 2002. Since installation of the internal locking 
devices was originally voluntary, the purpose of this time limit was to 
encourage rapid installation of the devices. SFAR 92-3 required the 
installation of locking devices on or before March 1, 2002 (45 days 
after the January 15, 2002, publication of SFAR 92-3). Since 
installation of an internal locking device is now required, the April 
22, 2002, date is no longer needed as an incentive.
    Further, termination of that portion of the modification authority 
on that date will inhibit conversion and use of airplanes brought into 
an operator's fleet after April 22, 2002, such as airplanes that are 
either newly delivered or re-activated from retirement. As a result, 
this SFAR removes the April 22, 2002, limitation on approval for return 
to service without approved data. Such approvals will be limited only 
by the time limit applied to other provisions of the SFAR, the 
expiration date of April 9, 2003.
    The SFAR 92-3 requirement for modification of flightdeck doors on 
certain airplanes has triggered a potential conflict with requirements 
to have the door open during take-off and landing for emergency 
evacuation purposes. In weighing the competing safety risk between 
emergency egress and terrorist threat, the FAA has determined that for 
the duration of the SFAR, the terrorist threat is a greater risk. As a 
result, this revision to the SFAR explicitly states that operational 
requirements in sections 121.313(h) and 121.583(b)(1) and (2) are 
waived if a conflict exists when internal locks are installed and used. 
The introductory language of paragraph 2 is revised to reflect this 
change.
    The introductory language of paragraph 2 is further revised to 
include reference to Sec. 121.153(c), in order to address airplanes 
that are registered in another country, but are operated by a part 121 
certificate holder. These airplanes would otherwise be required to meet 
all airworthiness requirements.
    Paragraph 2(a)(ii) of the current SFAR has an April 22, 2002, 
reporting requirement. The report must include a schedule for reaching 
full compliance with all applicable airworthiness requirements. As 
structured, this provision only applies to airplanes modified using 
technical data not previously approved by the Administrator. SFAR 92-3 
required all affected airplanes to install internal locking devices. 
Further, the companion rule described below requires installation of 
reinforced doors on or before April 9, 2003. As a result, this version 
of the SFAR changes the reporting requirement in paragraph 2(a)(ii).
    Paragraph 2(a)(ii) is deleted. Instead, a new paragraph 3 is added 
to require operators of all affected airplanes to report what 
modifications will be made and to provide a modification schedule for 
full compliance with the April 9, 2003, retrofit requirement.
    Finally, paragraph 6 is revised to require that cargo airplanes, on 
which flightdeck doors are installed after January 15, 2002, are also 
subject to the strengthening requirement. This was the intent of SFAR 
92-3, but that final rule only explicitly applied to cargo airplanes on 
which flightdeck doors were installed on January 15, 2002.

Other Rulemaking

    In parallel with SFAR 92-3, the FAA issued an immediately adopted 
rule

[[Page 12823]]

(IAR) which adopts new design standards for flightdeck doors in part 25 
of the Code of Federal Regulations. Generally speaking, these new 
standards will enhance resistance to blunt force and ballistic 
intrusion. Also, the IAR requires all airplanes required to have a door 
under section 121.313(f), as well as all-cargo airplanes that have 
flightdeck doors installed, to have a door meeting the new design 
standard. The stronger doors must be installed not later than April 9, 
2003, the expiration date of this SFAR. In essence, the doors meeting 
the new design standards will replace the doors reinforced under this 
SFAR.

Justification for Immediate Adoption

    Because the circumstances described herein warrant immediate action 
by the FAA, the Administrator finds that notice and public comment 
under 5 U.S.C. 553(b) are impracticable and contrary to the public 
interest. Further, the Administrator finds that good cause exists under 
5 U.S.C. 553(d) for making this final rule effective immediately upon 
publication. This action is necessary to prevent a possible imminent 
hazard to airplanes and to protect persons and property within the 
United States.
    Additionally, with respect to the provisions requiring 
modifications to strengthen the flightdeck doors and locks, Public Law 
107-71 authorized the Administrator to issue an order without regard to 
the provisions of chapter 5 of Title 5 of the United States Code. The 
modification to section 121.313 contained in this SFAR is within the 
scope of this authority and is adopted without public notice and a 
prior opportunity to commend.

International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA 
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices 
that correspond to this SFAR.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This emergency final SFAR contains information collection 
activities subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 
3507(d)). In accordance with section 3507(j)(1)(B) of that statute, the 
FAA requested the Office of Management and Budget to grant an immediate 
emergency clearance on the paperwork package. OMB granted an emergency 
clearance and assigned OMB control number 2120-0674. As protection 
provided by the Paperwork Reduction Act, an agency may not conduct or 
sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of 
information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. 
Following is a description of the information collection burden 
associated.
    Title: Flightcrew Compartment Access and Door Designs.
    Summary/Need: The SFAR requires operators to submit a report to the 
FAA by February 15, 2002, that details the specific modifications. This 
will allow the FAA to monitor what has been installed and take action 
if the installation creates an unwarranted safety risk. Further, to 
monitor progress toward the goal of full compliance, the SFAR requires 
a report by April 22, 2002, that describes how the operator will come 
into full regulatory compliance.
    Respondents: The respondents are an estimated 135 airplane 
operators covered under 14 CFR part 121 and 129.
    Burden: The burden associated with this SFAR is 6480 hours.

Regulatory Evaluation

    This rulemaking action is taken under an emergency situation within 
the meaning of Section 6(a)(3)(D) of Executive Order 12866, Regulatory 
Planning and Review. It also is considered an emergency regulation 
under Paragraph 11(g) of the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures. In addition, it is a significant 
rule within the meaning of the Executive Order and DOT's policies and 
procedures. No regulatory analysis or evaluation accompanies the final 
rule. At this time, the FAA is not able to assess whether this final 
rule will have a significant impact on a substantial number of small 
entities as defined in the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as 
amended. However, we will be conducting a regulatory evaluation of the 
cost and benefits of this rulemaking, including any impact on small 
entities, at a later date.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this SFAR under the principles and criteria of 
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We have determined that this action 
will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the 
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government. Therefore, we have determined that this final rule does not 
have federalism implications.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), enacted as 
Public Law 104-4 on March 22, 1995, is intended, among other things, to 
curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal mandates on State, 
local, and tribal governments. Title II of the Act requires each 
Federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing the effects of 
any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule that may result 
in a $100 million or more expenditure (adjusted annually for inflation) 
in any one year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a 
``significant regulatory action.'' This SFAR does not contain such a 
mandate. Therefore, the requirements of Title II of the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply.

Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically 
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
environmental impact statement. In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, 
appendix 4, paragraph 4(j) this rulemaking action qualifies for a 
categorical exclusion.

Energy Impact

    The energy impact of this SFAR has been assessed in accordance with 
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) Public Law 94-163, as 
amended (42 U.S.C. 6362) and FAA Order 1053.1. It has been determined 
that this SFAR is not a major regulatory action under the provisions of 
the EPCA.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 121

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Charter flights, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Safety, Transportation.

The Amendment

    For the reasons set forth above, the Federal Aviation 
Administration amends 14 CFR part 121 as follows:

PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTICS, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
OPERATIONS

    1. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 1153, 40113, 40119, 41706, 44101, 
44701-44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901, 
44903-44904, 44912, 46105.

SFAR No. 92-3  [Removed]


    2. Remove Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 92-3.

[[Page 12824]]


    3. Add Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 92-4 to read as 
follows:

Special Federal Aviation Regulations No. 92-4  Flightcrew Compartment 
Access and Door Designs

    1. Applicability. This Special Federal Aviation Regulation 
(SFAR) applies to all operators that hold an air carrier certificate 
or operating certificate issued under 14 CFR part 119 and that 
conduct operations under this part 121 and to operators of U.S. 
registered transport category aircraft operated under 14 CFR part 
129, except paragraph 5 of this SFAR does not apply to cargo 
operations and 14 CFR part 129 operations. It applies to the 
operators specified in this SFAR that modify airplanes to improve 
the flightcrew compartment door installations to restrict the 
unwanted entry of persons into the flightcrew compartment. This SFAR 
also applies to production certificate holders applicants for 
airworthiness certificates for airplanes to be operated by operators 
specified in this SFAR, and producers of parts to be used in such 
modification.
    2. Regulatory Relief. Contrary provisions of this part 21, and 
Secs. 121.313(h), 121.153(a)(2), 121.153(c), 121.379(b), 
121.583(b)(1) and (2) and 14 CFR 129.13 notwithstanding:
    (a) An operator may operate airplanes modified to improve the 
flightcrew compartment door installations to restrict the 
unauthorized entry of persons into the flightcrew compartment 
without regard to the applicable airworthiness requirements and may 
modify those airplanes for that purpose, using technical data for 
previously approved by the Administrator, subject to the following 
conditions:
    (i) Not later than February 15, 2002, submit to the Director, 
Aircraft Certification Service, a detailed description of the 
changes to the airplanes that have been accomplished before that 
date to enhance the intrusion resistance of the flightcrew 
compartment including identification of what major alterations have 
been done without previously approved data.
    (ii) If, upon reviewing the data submitted in paragraph 2(a)(i) 
of this SFAR, the Administrator determines that a door modification 
presents an unacceptable safety risk, the FAA may issue an order 
requiring changes to such modifications.
    (b) An applicant for an airworthiness certificate may obtain 
such a certificate for modified airplanes to be operated by 
operators described in this SFAR.
    (c) A holder of a production certificate may submit for 
airworthiness certification or approval, modified airplanes to be 
operated by operators described in this SFAR.
    (d) A person may produce parts for installation on airplanes in 
connection with modifications described in this SFAR, without FAA 
parts manufacturer approval (PMA).
    3. Report of Modifications. Not later than April 22, 2002, all 
operators who are required to install flightdeck door modifications 
in accordance with Sec. 121.313(j) must submit a report to the 
Director, Aircraft Certification Service. The report must describe 
the modifications to be made and provide a schedule for the changes 
necessary to restore compliance with all applicable airworthiness 
requirements and to meet the requirements of Sec. 121.313(j). The 
schedule may not extend beyond the termination data of this SFAR.
    4. Return to Service Documentation. Where operators have 
modified airplanes as authorized in this SFAR, the affected airplane 
must be returned to service with a note that it was done under the 
provisions of this SFAR.
    5. Provision for Flightdeck Door Compartment Key. Contrary to 
provisions of Sec. 121.313(g), the following provision applies: A 
key for each door that separates a passenger compartment from an 
emergency exist must be identified to passengers in the briefing 
required by Sec. 121.571(a)(1)(ii). The key required for access to 
the emergency exit must be readily available for each crewmember. No 
key to the flightcrew compartment shall be available to any 
crewmember during flight, except for flight crewmembers, unless an 
internal flightdeck locking device such as a deadbolt or bar is 
installed, operative, and in use.
    6. Door Modification Requirement. After March 1, 2002, for each 
airplane required under Sec. 121.313(f) to have a door between the 
passenger and pilot compartments, and for transport category all-
cargo airplanes that have a door installed between the pilot 
compartment and any other occupied compartment on or after January 
15, 2002, such door must be equipped with an internal locking device 
installed, operative, and in use. Such internal locking device has 
to be designed so that it can only be unlocked from inside the 
flightdeck.
    7. Termination. This SFAR terminates on April 9, 2003.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on March 12, 2002.
Jane F. Garvey,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 02-6366 Filed 3-18-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M