[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 43 (Tuesday, March 5, 2002)]
[Notices]
[Pages 9889-9893]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-5331]


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[[Page 9889]]
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  Federal Registerï¿½1A/ï¿½1AVol. 67, No. 43ï¿½1A/ï¿½1ATuesday, 
March 5, 2002ï¿½1A/ï¿½1APresidential Documents  

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 Title 3_
 The President


                Presidential Determination No. 2002-07 of 
                February 23, 2002

                
President's Report to Congress on Major Drug 
                Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries under 
                the FY 2002 Modification to the Annual Drug 
                Certification Procedures

                Memorandum for the Secretary of State

                This report is submitted under section 591 of the 
                Kenneth H. Ludden Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
                and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 
                107-115) (the ``FY 2002 FOAA''). 
                Pursuant to section 591 of the FY 2002 FOAA, I hereby 
                identify the following countries as major drug-transit 
                or major illicit drug producing countries: Afghanistan, 
                The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, China, Colombia, 
                Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, 
                Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, 
                Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam. I 
                previously identified these same countries as major 
                drug-transit or major illicit drug producing countries 
                on November 1, 2001, pursuant to section 490(h) of the 
                Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the 
                ``FAA'').

                Pursuant to section 591 of the FY 2002 FOAA, I hereby 
                designate Afghanistan, Burma and Haiti as countries 
                that failed demonstrably, during the previous 12 
                months, to adhere to their obligations under 
                international counternarcotics agreements and to take 
                the counternarcotics measures set forth in section 
                489(a) (1) of the FAA. I have attached a justification 
                for each of the countries so designated, as required by 
                section 591.

                Pursuant to section 591(3), I hereby also determine 
                that provision of United States assistance to 
                Afghanistan and Haiti in FY 2002 under the FY 2002 FOAA 
                is vital to the national interests of the United 
                States.

                You are hereby authorized and directed to transmit this 
                report to the Congress and to publish it in the Federal 
                Register.

                    (Presidential Sig.)B

                THE WHITE HOUSE,

                    Washington, February 23, 2002.

Billing code 4710-10-M



[[Page 9890]]

                STATEMENT OF EXPLANATION

                    Afghanistan

                Afghanistan has failed demonstrably during the previous 
                12 months to make significant efforts to adhere to its 
                obligations under international counternarcotics 
                agreements and to take the counternarcotics measures 
                set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the Foreign 
                Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Provision of United 
                States assistance to Afghanistan in Fiscal Year 2002 
                under the Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign Operations, Export 
                Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
                2002 (P.L. 107-115) is vital to the national 
                interests of the United States.

                After the Taliban began enforcing a ban on the 
                cultivation of opium poppy in September 2000, the total 
                production of opium in Afghanistan dropped by 94 
                percent, thereby reducing the global annual supply by 
                nearly 75 percent. Although the Taliban successfully 
                prevented cultivation, opium trafficking and heroin 
                processing continued unabated through 2001, indicating 
                the existence of large stockpiles of opium in the 
                region used to control the opium market. At no point 
                did the Taliban take any steps to adhere to its 
                international obligations to interrupt opium 
                trafficking or trade. In addition, cultivation and 
                opium production increased in former Northern Alliance 
                territory of Afghanistan. Drug traffickers in 
                Afghanistan have switched allegiances from the Taliban 
                to local commanders and warlords and available 
                information indicates that poppy cultivation has 
                resumed in several areas of Afghanistan since last 
                fall.

                Although the new Afghan Interim Authority led by Hamid 
                Karzai has made a commitment to fight the production 
                and trafficking of drugs in Afghanistan consistent with 
                the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, it will take 
                several months and significant assistance from the 
                international community before the Interim Authority 
                can take concrete measures to eradicate poppy and 
                counter drug trafficking in Afghanistan. In the coming 
                months, I will continue to monitor the Interim 
                Authority's counternarcotics efforts closely. In the 
                meantime, it is in the vital national interest of the 
                United States to provide the full range of U.S. 
                assistance to support the reconstruction of 
                Afghanistan. Afghanistan poppy farmers must have viable 
                alternatives to poppy cultivation that provide a 
                sustainable income. The Afghan Interim Authority will 
                need to establish rule of law and a basic law 
                enforcement capacity at the local and regional level 
                for its counternarcotics strategy to succeed. More 
                broadly, although the United States' military campaign 
                in Afghanistan has been successful, it is essential to 
                ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a haven 
                for terrorists. Stabilizing Afghanistan by providing 
                various forms of assistance, including economic and 
                military assistance in addition to counternarcotics, 
                anti-crime, and humanitarian assistance is essential.

                    STATEMENT OF EXPLANATION

                    Burma

                Burma has failed demonstrably during the last 12 months 
                to make substantial efforts to adhere to its 
                obligations under international counternarcotics 
                agreements and to take the counternarcotics measures 
                set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the Foreign 
                Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. With the ban on 
                opium production in Afghanistan imposed by the Taliban 
                in 2001, Burma returned to its position as the world's 
                largest producer of illicit opium. Burma is also the 
                primary source of methamphetamines trafficked 
                throughout Southeast Asia and has done little to stop 
                the production of an estimated 800 million tablets 
                annually and trafficking of these drugs.

                Burma has taken some useful counternarcotics measures 
                in the last year, but these measures are too limited in 
                duration and scope to constitute a substantial effort 
                to meet the standards set forth under U.S. law.

[[Page 9891]]

                Burma's 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
                Law conforms to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and 
                contains useful legal tools for addressing money 
                laundering, seizing drug-related assets, and 
                prosecuting drug conspiracy cases, but the Government 
                of Burma (GOB) has been slow to implement the law. 
                Burma has not enforced its existing money-laundering 
                laws. In 2001, Burma was placed on the Financial Action 
                Task Force's List of Non-Cooperating Countries and 
                Territories. To its credit Burma responded by drafting 
                new anti-money-laundering legislation, but its passage 
                has been delayed until sometime in 2002.

                In 2001, the GOB took stronger, more aggressive law-
                enforcement actions against some ethnic groups, notably 
                the Kokang Chinese, engaged in drug production and 
                trafficking and considerably improved counternarcotics 
                cooperation with China and Thailand. In areas 
                controlled by the United Wa State Army (the principal 
                drug-producing and drug-trafficking organization in 
                Burma) the government has been very cautious, only 
                slowly expanding its administrative presence, but not 
                yet attempting any aggressive law-enforcement 
                operations comparable to those it has staged elsewhere. 
                Although unwilling to risk confronting the Wa, a potent 
                organization with a well-manned and well-trained 
                military force, the GOB did take the modest steps of 
                establishing a police presence in the Wa territories in 
                2001 and, in December 2001, opening its first military 
                intelligence office in the Wa territories.

                Seizures of opium in 2001 modestly exceeded the amounts 
                seized last year, but seizures of heroin declined for 
                the fourth straight year. Burmese law-enforcement 
                agencies seized approximately 1,629 kilograms of raw 
                opium and 98 kilograms of heroin during 2001. Heroin 
                seized in 2000 totaled 159 kilograms compared to 273 
                kilograms in 1999 and 404 kilograms in 1998.

                The GOB has not yet taken effective action against 
                methamphetamine production and trafficking. Considering 
                that an estimated 800 million methamphetamine tablets 
                are produced in Burma each year, the amounts seized in 
                each of the past two years represent only small 
                fraction of the total produced and have no real effect 
                on the overall scope of the problem. In 2001, Burma 
                seized 32.4 million methamphetamine pills, compared to 
                26.7 million pills seized during 2000.

                The GOB continued to refuse to transfer to U.S. custody 
                drug lord Chang Qifu (Khun Sa), who resides in Rangoon, 
                on grounds that he had not violated his 1996 surrender 
                agreement. The 1988 UN Drug Convention obligates 
                parties, including Burma, to prosecute such 
                traffickers.

                While recognizing that Burma has intensified its 
                counternarcotics efforts in 2001, particularly during 
                the second half of the year, those efforts must be 
                sustained and expanded, if they are to have a 
                significant impact on the overall scope of the 
                production and trafficking problem. Burma has not yet 
                curbed involvement in illicit narcotics perpetrated by 
                the largest, most powerful and most important 
                trafficking organization within its borders, the United 
                Wa State Army.

                On balance, the United States Government remains 
                concerned that the GOB's efforts are not commensurate 
                with the extent of Burma's illicit drug problem and 
                believes that Burma has failed demonstrably to make 
                substantial efforts to adhere to its obligations under 
                international counternarcotics agreements and to take 
                the counternarcotics measures set forth in section 
                489(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act. Large-scale 
                poppy cultivation and opium production continue and 
                enormous quantities of methamphetamines are produced in 
                and trafficked from Burma, having serious adverse 
                effects on neighboring countries and throughout the 
                region. Its toleration of money laundering, its 
                unwillingness to implement fully its counterdrug laws, 
                and its failure to transfer notorious trafficker Chang 
                Qifu (Khun Sa) under indictment in the United States 
                are all serious concerns.

[[Page 9892]]

                Although the GOB's actions in 2001, particularly in 
                cooperation with China and Thailand, demonstrated a new 
                commitment to effective counternarcotics measures; the 
                GOB has failed to enforce its narcotics laws, to 
                eradicate systematically all forms of illicit drugs, 
                including methamphetamines, and to address meaningfully 
                the growing problem of drug abuse and HIV/AIDS.

                The GOB must aggressively pursue drug traffickers, 
                including the most prominent trafficking groups and 
                organizations, most particularly the United Wa State 
                Army. The GOB should continue and expand its 
                cooperation with other countries in the region, 
                particularly those most seriously affected by drugs 
                trafficked from Burma. Although Burma's 
                counternarcotics record in 2001 is noticeably improved 
                over that of prior years, its efforts need to be 
                sustained, expanded, and intensified over the next 
                year.

                    STATEMENT OF EXPLANATION

                    Haiti

                Haiti has failed demonstrably during the last 12 months 
                to make substantial efforts to adhere to its 
                obligations under international counternarcotics 
                agreements and to take the counternarcotics measures 
                set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the Foreign 
                Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. However, it is in 
                the vital national interests of the United States to 
                continue to provide assistance to the Government of 
                Haiti (GOH) under the Kenneth M. Ludden, Foreign 
                Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Act, 
                2002 (P.L. 107-115). Haiti remains a significant 
                transshipment point for drugs, primarily cocaine, 
                moving through the Caribbean from South America to the 
                United States.

                Although tactical cooperation by the GOH modestly 
                improved, Haiti's overall counterdrug commitment 
                remined weak, in part due to political instability and 
                low levels of assistance. Such instability coupled with 
                economic degradation has led to an increase in criminal 
                and political violence and compromised internal 
                security. Aristide has attempted to shore up his 
                personal and political security by politicizing the 
                police. Continued politicization of the Haitian 
                National Police, in contravention to one of President 
                Aristide's commitments to the United States Government, 
                bodes ill for an effective counternarcotics effort.

                Amid political and economic instability and in spite of 
                limited resources, the GOH made some efforts to 
                cooperate with counternarcotics initiatives. Due 
                largely to the efforts of the Haitian Minister of 
                Justice, the GOH made efforts to curb corruption in the 
                judiciary, joined the Caribbean Financial Action Task 
                Force (CFATF), and formed a Financial Intelligence Unit 
                to combat money laundering. The GOH also, with the 
                assistance of U.S. law enforcement, increased the 
                amount of cocaine seized in 2001 over that seized in 
                2000. The GOH honored all United States Government 
                requests for expulsion and extradition in 2001 by 
                expelling two non-Haitian drug traffickers. The GOH 
                cooperated with U.S. and Dominician Republic law 
                enforcement by participating in a two-week 
                counternarcotics operation and maintaining subsequent 
                contact with U.S. and Dominican anti-drug units. 
                Finally, the GOH honored the terms of a Bilateral 
                Maritime Counternarcotics Interdiction Agreement 
                pending formal official acceptance by the GOH since 
                1997.

                However, Haiti failed to take many other significant 
                counterdrug actions. These actions can be categorized 
                into the areas of anti-corruption, anti-money 
                laundering, law enforcement, prosecution, and 
                international cooperation: the GOH did not deposit an 
                instrument of ratification of the OAS Inter-American 
                Convention Against Corruption; introduce anti-
                corruption legislation; prosecute drug-related public 
                (including police) corruption; put into force the anti-
                money laundering law passed in January 2001; enforce 
                existing anti-money laundering guidelines issued by the 
                Central Bank; require cross-border currency 
                declarations and provide penalties for noncompliance; 
                increase the number of arrests of major traffickers; 
                increase the size of the antidrug squad (BLTS) to 75 
                officers; establish a permanent BLTS office

[[Page 9893]]

                outside Port au Prince; take steps to ensure the 
                integrity of the BLTS; provide training to judges, 
                prosecutors, and law enforcement officials; waive 
                Haiti's primary right to exercise prosecutorial 
                jurisdiction over non-Haitian flag vessels interdicted 
                by the U.S. Coast Guard in Haitian waters; or put into 
                force the 1997 U.S.-Haiti Bilateral Maritime 
                Counternarcotics Interdiction Agreement. The GOH did 
                not sign a counterdrug Letter of Agreement with the 
                United States Government.

                Despite Haiti's demonstrable failure on 
                counternarcotics issues, U.S. vital national interests 
                require that U.S. assistance to Haiti continue. Because 
                Haiti is the hemisphere's poorest country, there is 
                need for continued assistance to programs that 
                alleviate hunger, increase access to education, combat 
                environmental degradation, fight the spread of HIV/
                AIDS, and foster the development of civil society. 
                These programs create an environment conductive to 
                building democracy and reducing illegal migration. They 
                also address the root causes of poverty and 
                hopelessness in Haiti, which are important contributing 
                factors behind Haitian involvement in the drug trade. 
                Additionally, suspension of assistance to Haiti would 
                result in the further deterioration of Haitian 
                institutions essential to combat increasing 
                criminality.

[FR Doc. 02-5331
Filed 3-4-02; 8:45 am]
Billing code 4710-01-M