[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 39 (Wednesday, February 27, 2002)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8978-8982]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-4743]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Report No. AUC-02-45-A (Auction No. 45); DA 02-265]


Auction No. 45 Cellular Licenses for Rural Service Areas 
Scheduled for May 29, 2002; Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or Minimum 
Opening Bids and Other Auction Procedures

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This document announces the auction of three cellular Rural 
Service Area licenses to commence on May 29, 2002 (Auction No. 45) and 
seeks comment on auction procedures.

DATES: Comments are due on or before February 19, 2002 and reply 
comments are due on or before February 26, 2002.

ADDRESSES: The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (``Bureau'') requires 
that all comments and reply comments be sent by electronic mail to the 
following address: [email protected]. The electronic mail containing 
the comments or reply comments must include a subject or caption 
referring to Auction No. 45 Comments. The Bureau requests that parties 
format any attachments to electronic mail as Adobe 
Acrobat (pdf) or Microsoft Word documents. Copies 
of comments and reply comments will be available for public inspection 
during regular business hours in the FCC Public Reference Room, Room 
CY-A257, 445 12th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Legal questions: Denise Coca (202) 
418-0660. For general auction questions: Jeff Crooks (202) 418-0660, 
Lisa Stover (717) 338-2888. For service rule questions: Dwain 
Livingston (202) 418-1338.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction No. 45 
Comment Public Notice released February 5, 2002. The complete text of 
the Auction No. 45 Comment Public Notice, including attachments, is 
available for public inspection and copying during regular business 
hours at the FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th 
Street, SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. The Auction No. 45 
Comment Public Notice may also be purchased from the Commission's 
duplicating contractor, Qualex International, Portals II, 445 12th 
Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone 202-863-
2893, facsimile 202-863-2898, or via e-mail [email protected].

I. General Information

    1. By the Auction No. 45 Comment Public Notice, the Bureau 
announces the auction of three cellular Rural Service Area (RSA) 
licenses to commence on May 29, 2002 (``Auction No. 45''). This auction 
will include cellular frequency block A in each of the following RSA 
markets: 332--Polk, AR; 582--Barnes, ND; and 727--Ceiba, PR. A 
description of these licenses is included as Attachment A of the 
Auction No. 45 Comment Public Notice.
    2. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires the Commission to 
``ensure that, in the scheduling of any competitive bidding under this 
subsection, an adequate period is allowed * * * before issuance of 
bidding rules, to permit notice and comment on proposed auction 
procedures * * *.'' Consistent with the provisions of the Balanced 
Budget Act and to ensure that potential bidders have adequate time to 
familiarize themselves with the specific rules that will govern the 
day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission directed the Bureau, 
under its existing delegated authority, to seek comment on a variety of 
auction-specific procedures prior to the start of each auction. The 
Bureau therefore seeks comment on the following issues relating to 
Auction No. 45.

II. Auction Structure

A. Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction Design

    3. The Bureau proposes to award all licenses included in Auction 
No. 45 in a single, simultaneous multiple-round auction. As described 
further, this methodology offers every license for bid at the same time 
with successive bidding rounds in which bidders may place bids. The 
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

B. Upfront Payments and Initial Maximum Eligibility

    4. The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine 
an appropriate upfront payment for each cellular RSA license being 
auctioned, taking into account such factors as the population in each 
geographic license area, and the value of similar spectrum. As 
described further, the upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by 
each bidder to establish eligibility to

[[Page 8979]]

bid on licenses. Upfront payments related to the specific spectrum 
subject to auction protect against frivolous or insincere bidding and 
provide the Commission with a source of funds from which to collect 
payments owed at the close of the auction. With these guidelines in 
mind for Auction No. 45, the Bureau proposes to calculate upfront 
payments on a license-by-license basis using the following formula:

$0.0125 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000 per 
license.

    5. Accordingly, the Bureau lists all licenses, including the 
related license area population and proposed upfront payment for each, 
in Attachment A of the Auction No. 45 Comment Public Notice. The Bureau 
seeks comment on this proposal.
    6. The Bureau further proposes that the amount of the upfront 
payment submitted by a bidder will determine the number of bidding 
units on which a bidder may place bids. This limit is a bidder's 
``maximum initial eligibility.'' Each license is assigned a specific 
number of bidding units equal to the upfront payment listed in 
Attachment A of the Auction No. 45 Comment Public Notice, on a bidding 
unit per dollar basis. This number does not change as prices rise 
during the auction. A bidder's upfront payment is not attributed to 
specific licenses. Rather, a bidder may place bids on any combination 
of licenses as long as the total number of bidding units associated 
with those licenses does not exceed its maximum initial eligibility. 
Eligibility cannot be increased during the auction. Thus, in 
calculating its upfront payment amount, an applicant must determine the 
maximum number of bidding units it may wish to bid on (or hold high 
bids on) in any single round, and submit an upfront payment covering 
that number of bidding units. The Bureau seeks comment on this 
proposal.

C. Activity Rules

    7. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable 
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively on a 
percentage of their current bidding eligibility and/or be the standing 
high bidder during each round of the auction rather than waiting until 
the end to participate.
    8. The Bureau proposes a single stage auction with the following 
activity requirement. In each round of the auction, a bidder desiring 
to maintain its eligibility to participate in the auction is required 
to be active on one hundred (100) percent of its bidding eligibility. A 
bidder's activity will be the sum of the bidding units associated with 
(i) licenses upon which it places bids during the current round, and 
(ii) licenses upon which it is the standing high bidder. Failure to 
maintain the requisite activity level will result in the use of an 
activity rule waiver, if any remain, or a reduction in the bidder's 
bidding eligibility. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

D. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility

    9. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current 
bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round 
being below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies 
to an entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity 
waivers are principally a mechanism for auction participants to avoid 
the loss of auction eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances 
prevent them from placing a bid in a particular round.
    10. The Automated Auction System assumes that bidders with 
insufficient activity would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if 
available) rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system 
will automatically apply a waiver (known as an ``automatic waiver'') at 
the end of any bidding period where a bidder's activity level is below 
the minimum required unless: (i) There are no activity rule waivers 
available; or (ii) the bidder overrides the automatic application of a 
waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the minimum 
requirements.
    11. A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its 
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the 
bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism 
during the bidding period by using the reduce eligibility function in 
the bidding system. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is 
permanently reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the 
activity rules as described previously. Once eligibility has been 
reduced, a bidder will not be permitted to regain its lost bidding 
eligibility.
    12. A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means 
to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a 
proactive waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding 
system) during a bidding period in which no bids or withdrawals are 
submitted, the auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility 
will be preserved. An automatic waiver invoked in a round in which 
there are no new valid bids or withdrawals will not keep the auction 
open.
    13. The Bureau proposes that each bidder be provided with three 
activity rule waivers that may be used at the bidder's discretion 
during the course of the auction as set forth previously. The Bureau 
seeks comment on this proposal.

E. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation

    14. For Auction No. 45, the Bureau proposes that, by public notice 
or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend, 
or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical 
obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding 
activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason 
that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In 
such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the 
auction starting from the beginning of the current round, resume the 
auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its 
entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend 
the auction. The Bureau emphasizes that exercise of this authority is 
solely within the discretion of the Bureau, and its use is not intended 
to be a substitute for situations in which bidders may wish to apply 
their activity rule waivers. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

III. Bidding Procedures

A. Round Structure

    15. The Commission will conduct Auction No. 45 over the Internet. 
Telephonic Bidding will also be available. As a contingency, the FCC 
Wide Area Network, which requires access to a 900 number telephone 
service, will be available as well. Prospective bidders concerned about 
their access to the Internet may want to establish a connection to the 
FCC Wide Area Network as a backup. Full information regarding how to 
establish such a connection, and related charges, will be provided in 
the public notice announcing details of auction procedures.
    16. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public 
notice to be released at least one week before the start of the 
auction, and will be included in the registration mailings. The 
simultaneous multiple round format will consist of sequential bidding 
rounds, each followed by the release of round results. Details 
regarding the location and format of round results will be included in 
the same public notice.
    17. The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in 
order to foster an auction pace that reasonably

[[Page 8980]]

balances speed with the bidders' need to study round results and adjust 
their bidding strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the 
amount of time for the bidding rounds and review periods, or the number 
of rounds per day, depending upon the bidding activity level and other 
factors. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

B. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid

    18. The Balanced Budget Act calls upon the Commission to prescribe 
methods for establishing a reasonable reserve price or a minimum 
opening bid when FCC licenses are subject to auction unless the 
Commission determines that a reserve price or minimum opening bid is 
not in the public interest. Consistent with this mandate, the 
Commission has directed the Bureau to seek comment on the use of a 
minimum opening bid and/or reserve price prior to the start of each 
auction.
    19. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below 
which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can 
be either published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other 
hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction 
below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate 
the competitive bidding process. Also, the auctioneer often has the 
discretion to lower the minimum opening bid amount later in the 
auction. It is also possible for the minimum opening bid and the 
reserve price to be the same amount.
    20. In light of the Balanced Budget Act's requirements, the Bureau 
proposes to establish minimum opening bids for Auction No. 45. The 
Bureau believes a minimum opening bid, which has been utilized in other 
auctions, is an effective bidding tool.
    21. Specifically, for Auction No. 45, the Commission proposes the 
following license-by-license formula for calculating minimum opening 
bids:

$0.0250 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000 per 
license.

The specific minimum opening bid for each license available in Auction 
No. 45 is set forth in Attachment A of the Auction No. 45 Comment 
Public Notice. Comment is sought on this proposal.
    22. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bids will 
result in substantial numbers of unsold licenses, or are not reasonable 
amounts, or should instead operate as reserve prices, they should 
explain why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an 
alternative approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims 
with valuation analyses and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening 
bid levels or formulas. In establishing the minimum opening bids, the 
Bureau particularly seeks comment on such factors as the amount of 
spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of 
technology to provide service, the size of the geographic service 
areas, issues of interference with other spectrum bands and any other 
relevant factors that could reasonably have an impact on valuation of 
the cellular spectrum. Alternatively, comment is sought on whether, 
consistent with the Balanced Budget Act, the public interest would be 
served by having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.

C. Minimum Acceptable Bids and Bid Increments

    23. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on a 
given license in any of nine different amounts. The Automated Auction 
System interface will list the nine acceptable bid amounts for each 
license.
    24. Once there is a standing high bid on a license, the Automated 
Auction System will calculate a minimum acceptable bid for that license 
for the following round, as described further. The difference between 
the minimum acceptable bid and the standing high bid for each license 
will define the bid increment. The nine acceptable bid amounts for each 
license consist of the minimum acceptable bid (the standing high bid 
plus one bid increment) and additional amounts calculated using 
multiple bid increments (i.e., the second bid amount equals the 
standing high bid plus two times the bid increment, the third bid 
amount equals the standing high bid plus three times the bid increment, 
etc.).
    25. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum 
acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening 
bid. The additional bid amounts for licenses that have not yet received 
a bid will be calculated differently, as explained further.
    26. For Auction No. 45, the Bureau proposes to calculate minimum 
acceptable bids by using a smoothing methodology, as the Bureau has 
done in several other auctions. The smoothing formula calculates 
minimum acceptable bids by first calculating a percentage increment, 
not to be confused with the bid increment, for each license based on a 
weighted average of the activity received on that particular license in 
all previous rounds. This methodology tailors the percentage increment 
for each license based on activity, rather than setting a global 
increment for all licenses.
    27. In a given round, the calculation of the percentage increment 
for each license is made at the end of the previous round. The 
computation is based on an activity index, which is calculated as the 
weighted average of the activity in that round and the activity index 
from the prior round. The activity index at the start of the auction 
(round 0) will be set at 0. The current activity index is equal to a 
weighting factor times the number of new bids received on the license 
in the most recent bidding round plus one minus the weighting factor 
times the activity index from the prior round. The activity index is 
then used to calculate a percentage increment by multiplying a minimum 
percentage increment by one plus the activity index with that result 
being subject to a maximum percentage increment. The Commission will 
initially set the weighting factor at 0.5, the minimum percentage 
increment at 0.1 (10%), and the maximum percentage increment at 0.2 
(20%).
Equations
Ai = (C * Bi) + ((1-C) * Ai-1)
Ii+1 = smaller of ((I + Ai) * N) and M
X i+1 = Ii+1 * Yi
Where,

Ai = activity index for the current round (round i)
C = activity weight factor
Bi = number of bids in the current round (round i)
Ai-1 = activity index from previous round (round i-1), 
A0 is 0
Ii+1 = percentage increment for the next round (round i+1)
N = minimum percentage increment or percentage increment floor
M = maximum percentage increment or percentage increment ceiling
Xi+1 = dollar amount associated with the percentage 
increment
Yi = high bid from the current round

    28. Under the smoothing methodology, once a bid has been received 
on a license, the minimum acceptable bid for that license in the 
following round will be the high bid from the current round plus the 
dollar amount associated with the percentage increment, with the result 
rounded to the nearest thousand if it is over $10,000, to the nearest 
hundred if it is under $10,000 but over $1,000, or to the nearest ten 
if it is below $1,000.
Examples
License 1
C = 0.5, N = 0.1, M = 0.2
Round 1 (2 new bids, high bid = $1,000,000)


[[Page 8981]]


    i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 2 using the 
smoothing formula:

A1 = (0.5 * 2) + (0.5 * 0) = 1
I2 = The smaller of ((1 + 1) * 0.1) = 0.2 or 0.2 (the 
maximum percentage increment)

    ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage 
increment for round 2 (using I2):

X2 = 0.2 * $1,000,000 = $200,000

    iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 2 = $1,200,000

Round 2 (3 new bids, high bid = $2,000,000)

    i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 3 using the 
smoothing formula:

A2 = (0.5 * 3) + (0.5 * 1) = 2
I3 = The smaller of ((1 + 2) * 0.1) = 0.3 or 0.2 (the 
maximum percentage increment)

    ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage 
increment for round 3 (using I3):

X3 = 0.2 * $2,000,000 = $400,000

    iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 3 = $2,400,000

Round 3 (1 new bid, high bid = $2,400,000)

    i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 4 using the 
smoothing formula:

A3 = (0.5 * 1) + (0.5 * 2) = 1.5
I4 = The smaller of ((1 + 1.5) * 0.1) = 0.25 or 0.2 (the 
maximum percentage increment)

    ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage 
increment for round 4 (using I4):

X4 = 0.2 * $2,400,000 = $480,000

    iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 4 = $2,880,000
    29. As stated previously, until a bid has been placed on a license, 
the minimum acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its 
minimum opening bid. The additional bid amounts are calculated using 
the difference between the minimum opening bid times one plus the 
minimum percentage increment, rounded as described previously, and the 
minimum opening bid. That is, I = (minimum opening bid)(1 + N){rounded} 
- (minimum opening bid). Therefore, when N equals 0.1, the first 
additional bid amount will be approximately ten percent higher than the 
minimum opening bid; the second, twenty percent; the third, thirty 
percent; etc.
    30. In the case of a license for which the standing high bid has 
been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid will equal the second 
highest bid received for the license. The additional bid amounts are 
calculated using the difference between the second highest bid times 
one plus the minimum percentage increment, rounded, and the second 
highest bid.
    31. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum 
acceptable bids and bid increments if it determines that circumstances 
so dictate. The Bureau will do so by announcement in the Automated 
Auction System. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.

D. High Bids

    32. At the end of a bidding round, the Automated Auction System 
will determine the high bid on each license. In the event of identical 
high bids on a license in a given round (i.e., tied bids), the Bureau 
proposes to use a random number generator to select a high bid from 
among the tied bids. Remaining bidders will be able to submit higher 
bids in subsequent rounds.
    33. A high bid will remain the high bid until there is a higher bid 
on the same license at the close of a subsequent round. A high bid from 
a previous round is sometimes referred to as a ``standing high bid.'' 
Bidders are reminded that standing high bids confer activity credit.

E. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal

    34. For Auction No. 45, the Bureau proposes the following bid 
removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding 
period, a bidder has the option of removing any bid placed in that 
round. By using the remove selected bids function in the bidding 
system, a bidder may effectively ``unsubmit'' any bid placed within 
that round. A bidder removing a bid placed in the same round is not 
subject to a withdrawal payment. Once a round closes, a bidder may no 
longer ``remove'' a bid.
    35. A high bidder may withdraw its standing high bids from previous 
rounds using the, withdraw function in the bidding system. A high 
bidder that withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round is 
subject to the bid withdrawal payment provisions of the Commission 
rules. The Bureau seeks comment on these bid removal and bid withdrawal 
procedures.
    36. In the Part 1 Third Report and Order, 63 FR 2315 (January 15, 
1998), the Commission explained that allowing bid withdrawals 
facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses and the pursuit of 
efficient backup strategies as information becomes available during the 
course of an auction. The Commission noted, however, that in some 
instances bidders may seek to withdraw bids for improper reasons. The 
Bureau, therefore, has discretion in managing the auction to limit the 
number of withdrawals to prevent any bidding abuses. The Commission 
stated that the Bureau should assertively exercise its discretion, 
consider limiting the number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw 
bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market if the 
Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal 
procedures.
    37. Applying this reasoning, the Bureau proposes to limit each 
bidder in Auction No. 45 to withdrawing standing high bids in no more 
than one round during the course of the auction. To permit a bidder to 
withdraw bids in more than one round would likely encourage insincere 
bidding or the use of withdrawals for anti-competitive purposes. The 
round in which withdrawals are utilized will be at the bidder's 
discretion; withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the 
Commission's rules. There is no limit on the number of standing high 
bids that may be withdrawn in the round in which withdrawals are 
utilized. Withdrawals will remain subject to the bid withdrawal payment 
provisions specified in the Commission's rules. The Bureau seeks 
comment on this proposal.

F. Stopping Rule

    38. The Bureau has discretion ``to establish stopping rules before 
or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auction 
within a reasonable time.'' For Auction No. 45, the Bureau proposes to 
employ a simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping 
rule means that all licenses remain open until bidding closes 
simultaneously on all licenses.
    39. Bidding will close simultaneously on all licenses after the 
first round in which no new acceptable bids, proactive waivers, or 
withdrawals are received. Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, 
bidding will remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on every 
license.
    40. However, the Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to 
exercise any of the following options during Auction No. 45:
    i. Utilize a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. 
The modified stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses 
after the first round in which no bidder submits a proactive waiver, 
withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on which it is not the standing 
high bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing

[[Page 8982]]

a new bid on a license for which it is the standing high bidder would 
not keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule.
    ii. Keep the auction open even if no new acceptable bids or 
proactive waivers are submitted and no previous high bids are 
withdrawn. In this event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder 
had submitted a proactive waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will 
apply as usual, and a bidder with insufficient activity will either 
lose bidding eligibility or use a remaining activity rule waiver.
    iii. Declare that the auction will end after a specified number of 
additional rounds (``special stopping rule''). If the Bureau invokes 
this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final 
round(s) only for licenses on which the high bid increased in at least 
one of a specified preceding number of rounds.
    41.The Bureau proposes to exercise these options only in certain 
circumstances, such as, for example, where the auction is proceeding 
very slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears 
likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of 
time. Before exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt 
to increase the pace of the auction by, for example, increasing the 
number of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the 
minimum bid increments for the limited number of licenses where there 
is still a high level of bidding activity. The Bureau seeks comment on 
these proposals.

IV. Conclusion

    42. Comments are due on or before February 19, 2002, and reply 
comments are due on or before February 26, 2002. Because of the 
disruption of regular mail and other deliveries in Washington, DC, the 
Bureau requires that all comments and reply comments be filed 
electronically. Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic 
mail to the following address: [email protected]. The electronic mail 
containing the comments or reply comments must include a subject or 
caption referring to Auction No. 45 Comments. The Bureau requests that 
parties format any attachments to electronic mail as Adobe 
Acrobat (pdf) or Microsoft Word documents. Copies 
of comments and reply comments will be available for public inspection 
during regular business hours in the FCC Public Reference Room, Room 
CY-A257, 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20554.
    43. In addition, the Bureau requests that commenters fax a courtesy 
copy of their comments and reply comments to the attention of Kathryn 
Garland at (717) 338-2850.
    44.This proceeding has been designated as a ``permit-but-disclose'' 
proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons 
making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda 
summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the substance 
of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects 
discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the views and 
arguments presented is generally required. Other rules pertaining to 
oral and written ex parte presentations in permit-but-disclose 
proceedings are set forth in Sec. 1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules.

Federal Communications Commission.
Margaret Wiener,
Chief, Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, WTB.
[FR Doc. 02-4743 Filed 2-26-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P