[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 15 (Wednesday, January 23, 2002)]
[Notices]
[Pages 3258-3260]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-1638]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Notice of Safety Advisory 2002-01

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory 2002-01.

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SUMMARY: The FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2002-01 addressing the 
importance of clear, precise, unambiguous railroad safety procedures to 
ensure the safety of highway-rail grade crossing warning systems or 
wayside signal systems that are temporarily removed from service for 
purposes of testing, inspection or repair.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Goodman, Signal and Train 
Control Division, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 1120 
Vermont Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6325) or 
Mark Tessler, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1120 Vermont Avenue, SW., 
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6061), e-mail 
[email protected]. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Highway-rail grade crossing warning devices and wayside train 
signals are among the most important safety systems in the railroad 
industry for preventing train collisions and highway-rail grade 
crossing accidents. Despite the high-degree of reliability of these 
systems, failures occasionally do occur. FRA regulations (49 CFR parts 
234 and 236) require that both grade crossing warning devices and 
wayside signals operate on the ``fail safe'' principle, which causes a 
system to revert to its safest state in the event of a failure or 
malfunction of a vital component of the system. In practical terms, 
fail safe operations means the grade crossing warning devices will 
activate to stop traffic or a wayside signal will stop train movement 
in the event of a component failure. However, under certain 
circumstances, particularly where human error is involved, the fail-
safe features can be deactivated or circumvented, resulting in an 
accident. FRA has noted that several serious highway-rail grade 
crossing accidents and numerous false proceed signal failures have 
occurred in the past three years due to human error failures. While the 
total number of such failures is very small given the more than 60,000 
active highway-rail grade crossing warning systems and approximately 
86,000 track miles of railroad signal systems currently in operation on 
our Nation's railroad network, even a single failure of a grade 
crossing warning system to activate when needed or a single false-
proceed train signal has the potential to result in a serious accident 
or loss of life.
    Grade crossing activation failures are of particular concern, 
because crossing signals are often the primary means of warning 
motorists of an approaching train. Wayside railroad signals are also 
critically important to the safety of train movements; however, there 
are often redundant safety measures in place to help prevent train 
collisions. For example, train movements may be remotely monitored by 
dispatchers at centralized dispatching centers and train crews are 
sometimes made aware of the presence of nearby trains by monitoring 
railroad radio transmissions. However, these redundant safety measures 
are not feasible at grade crossings. It is impossible for train 
dispatchers or train crews to monitor the movement of motor vehicles 
over a highway-railroad grade crossing. Therefore, because grade 
crossing warning devices play an extremely important role in preventing 
grade crossing collisions, it is imperative that every reasonable 
precaution be taken to prevent crossing activation failures.
    FRA recognizes that the railroad industry has long recognized the 
importance of having well defined safety procedures in place to ensure 
the safety of highway-rail grade crossing warning systems and wayside 
signal systems that have been temporarily removed from service for 
purposes of testing, inspection or repair. Most railroads have had such 
safety procedures in place for many years; nevertheless, FRA has been 
concerned that grade crossing accidents and false proceed signals 
continue to occur because of the failure to properly notify approaching 
trains that grade crossing warning devices or wayside signal systems 
have been temporarily removed from service or because of the failure to 
properly restore these safety systems back into service. Therefore, FRA 
believes it is time for the railroad industry to review and re-evaluate 
these safety procedures. Over the past three years, at least five 
serious grade crossing collisions were the result of crossing warning 
device activation failures which were caused, in part, by the failure 
of railroad personnel to follow appropriate safety procedures when the 
crossing warning devices were removed from service for repair, or 
before the crossing warning devices were restored to service after 
repairs had been made. A brief review of these accidents may help 
illustrate the critical importance of railroads having clear, precise, 
and unambiguous railroad safety procedures in place when testing, 
inspecting or repairing highway-rail grade crossing warning systems or 
wayside signal systems.
    In one incident, two teenage boys were killed when the motor 
vehicle they were driving was struck by an approaching train at a 
highway-rail grade crossing where the warning devices, which consisted 
of gates and flashing lights, failed to activate. An investigation of 
this tragic accident revealed that, several hours prior to the 
accident, the grade crossing warning

[[Page 3259]]

devices had been temporarily disabled by a railroad signal maintainer 
for the purpose of making repairs and adjustments to the apparatus, and 
that the crossing warning devices were not tested to determine whether 
they were operating properly before the crossing was restored to 
service.
    Another incident involved a grade crossing warning system which had 
been removed from service for repairs by a signal maintainer. In this 
instance, the signal maintainer did properly notify the railroad train 
dispatcher that the crossing warning devices had been temporarily 
deactivated and removed from service. The same dispatcher did provide 
proper notice to approaching trains that the grade crossing warning 
devices had been deactivated and that it would be necessary for the 
trains to provide flag protection while traversing the crossing. 
However, later during a change of shifts by dispatchers, the relief 
dispatcher was not notified that the grade crossing warning devices had 
been temporarily deactivated and removed from service. Consequently, 
the relief dispatcher did not notify a subsequent train that the grade 
crossing was out of service or that the train crew needed to provide 
flag protection before traversing the crossing. As a result, the train 
struck a motor vehicle at the crossing, killing the occupant.
    In another grade crossing activation failure accident, railroad 
crossing maintenance personnel were utilizing the maintenance-of-way 
department's foul time and failed to follow authorized railroad safety 
procedures when temporarily deactivating the warning devices at a grade 
crossing. In this instance, a vital grade crossing warning system relay 
was inverted by a maintenance person and, subsequently, the 
maintenance-of-way department allowed a passenger train to operate 
through their work limits without notifying the signal personnel. 
Neither the train dispatcher nor the train crew were notified that the 
crossing warning devices had been deactivated. Consequently, a motor 
vehicle struck the side of a passenger train at the crossing, injuring 
the occupant of the motor vehicle.
    Yet another example involved a railroad signal maintainer who had 
permission from the train dispatcher to foul the track and perform 
routine tests and inspections on a grade crossing warning device. 
During the course of inspecting the warning device, the signal 
maintainer applied a jumper wire to a vital warning system relay, 
thereby deactivating the warning device. He was subsequently called to 
investigate a false activation at another crossing and forgot to remove 
the jumper wire and restore the crossing warning device to service. He 
released his foul time with the train dispatcher, the warning system 
failed to activate for an approaching train, resulting in an accident 
which injured the occupant of a motor vehicle.
    One last example involved a situation where a state highway 
department reported a false activation of a highway-rail grade crossing 
warning system to a railroad. The railroad's train dispatcher failed to 
notify train crews of the reported malfunction, which is required by 
Federal regulations. The railroad signal maintainer arrived at the 
crossing and used jumper wires to stop the warning system from falsely 
activating, without taking any measures to provide for the safety of 
highway users (i.e., notifying the dispatcher). He then proceeded to 
walk away from the immediate crossing area while trying to locate the 
cause of the false activation. A passenger train operating at 79 miles 
per hour traversed the crossing, hitting a motor vehicle and killing 
two occupants inside.
    These occurrences resulted from interference with the normal 
functioning of the grade crossing warning systems without measures 
being taken to provide for the safety of highway traffic and train 
operations which depend on the normal functioning of such systems. FRA 
is very concerned about this practice and by issuing this safety 
advisory seeks to draw the attention of the railroad industry to this 
issue to reduce the likelihood of similar incidents in the future.
    Failure to provide for the safety of motorists and train operations 
during all periods while the normal functioning of a system is 
interfered with is a violation of Federal rail safety regulations (See 
49 CFR 234.209 and 236.4). FRA considers this requirement to be 
extremely significant to the safety of railroad employees, highway 
users, and the general public. Accordingly, when a system is completely 
or partially deactivated without adequate protective measures being 
taken, FRA will take firm enforcement action, which could include civil 
penalties against the companies and/or individuals responsible. 
However, preventing such serious failures in the first place is our 
primary goal, and the railroad's consistent application of proper 
procedures is critical in achieving that goal.
    Railroads need to have clear and unambiguous procedures for 
temporarily removing grade crossing warning devices and wayside signal 
systems from service when making repairs, tests or inspections. These 
procedures should also help ensure that these critical safety devices 
are properly tested and known to be in proper working order before they 
are restored to service. Most railroads already have such procedures in 
place; however, in light of the incidents noted above, FRA believes 
that railroads should review existing procedures to ensure that they 
are adequate and should take steps to ensure that these safety 
procedures are followed.
    FRA has reviewed some of the safety procedures for disabling grade 
crossing warning devices and wayside signal system that are in place on 
the major railroads to determine ``best practices'' that have been 
developed in the industry. We found that the most effective safety 
procedures include: (1) Requirements for signal employees to obtain 
proper authority from the train dispatcher or transportation department 
prior to disabling a warning or signal system; (2) documentation of the 
approval to disable the warning or signal system; (3) a requirement 
that all disabled warning systems must be properly inspected and tested 
to ensure proper operation before being restored to service; and (4) a 
procedure for the railroad maintenance personnel to verify with the 
train dispatcher or transportation department that the warning system 
has been properly tested before being restored to service.

Use of Jumper Wires

    There are situations in which it may be necessary to temporarily 
circumvent the normal functioning of a system (i.e., crossing system or 
signal system maintenance, maintenance-of-way activity, defective 
system components not readily available for replacement, trains 
standing within a warning system's approach circuit for extended 
periods, etc.). A common method for such circumventing is by the 
application of jumper wires or some other means of circumventing the 
normal functioning of a system. This is appropriate when done in a safe 
manner. In such situations involving grade crossing warning systems, 
system credibility is maintained. For example, if maintenance-of-way 
work is being performed on trackage which is part of a highway-rail 
grade crossing warning system's train detection circuit, absent the 
application of jumper wires, it is highly probable that the warning 
system will activate, indicating to the motorist that it is not safe to 
cross the railroad tracks, when in fact no train is approaching the 
crossing. In this case, the integrity of the warning system would be 
compromised by the system's

[[Page 3260]]

conveying false information to a motorist such that in the future, the 
motorist would not necessarily comply with the warning system 
indications. Appropriate use of jumper wires, or other safe means of 
bypassing the system, thus prevents the incorrect warning from being 
displayed, and safety is maintained as long as measures are taken to 
provide for the safety of motorists and train operations.
    Although appropriately deactivating the crossing warning devices 
through the application of jumpers or other means is a safe practice 
when combined with protection measures addressed to motorists and train 
operations, if warning devices are allowed to remain deactivated after 
maintenance work is completed and workers leave the scene, the motorist 
may be left with a non-functioning warning system. Similarly, if this 
is done in a signal system, an incorrect false proceed indication may 
be displayed.
    Because the application of jumper wires to vital control relays is 
the most widely accepted method for temporarily disabling a grade 
crossing warning device or wayside signal system, FRA found that the 
most effective safety procedures also mandate that only approved jumper 
wires may be used to bypass vital circuits. Furthermore, these 
procedures require documentation regarding the number of jumper wires 
applied to circuits, the specific location of the wires, and the 
circuitry designation to which the wires are applied. Also, when 
planned maintenance-of-way work is to be performed which could affect 
the operation of a warning system, the safety procedures insist that a 
thorough job briefing be conducted by the employee in charge of 
performing the work on the grade crossing warning devices or wayside 
signal systems. Again, in all of these cases, testing is required to 
ensure the proper operation of the warning system prior to returning 
the warning system to service and the most effective procedures require 
that a record be kept of the tests that were performed.
    In order to mitigate the risks inherent with the circumvention of a 
system, FRA believes it is important that individual railroads have 
standard procedures in place before interfering with the normal 
operation of a system.

Recommended Action

    In recognition of the need to assure safety, FRA strongly 
recommends that:
    1. Each railroad having a highway-rail grade crossing warning 
system or wayside signal system establish specific railroad-wide 
instructions for the proper temporary deactivation of these systems. 
These instructions should address:
    (a) The manner in which the deactivation is authorized;
    (b) The personnel designated to authorize deactivation;
    (c) The protocols for notifying designated persons, especially 
personnel responsible for the movement of trains, that a warning system 
has been deactivated;
    (d) The appropriate methods of providing for the safety of train 
movements while the warning devices are deactivated;
    (e) The requirements necessary to perform an operational test of 
the pertinent system components after the signal system or crossing 
warning device work has been completed and prior to restoring the 
apparatus to service; and
    (f) The protocols for documenting and notifying designated persons 
that the warning devices have been properly tested and restored to 
service.
    2. Each railroad should provide regular periodic training to all 
affected employees to ensure their understanding of instructions for 
the proper temporary deactivation of grade crossing warning or wayside 
signal system, including proper use of jumper wires.

    Issued in Washington, DC on January 16, 2002.
George A. Gavalla,
Associate Administrator for Safety.
[FR Doc. 02-1638 Filed 1-22-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P