[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 10 (Tuesday, January 15, 2002)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 2118-2128]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-965]
[[Page 2117]]
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Part V
Department of Transportation
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Federal Aviation Administration
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14 CFR Parts 25 and 121
Security Considerations in the Design of the Flightdeck on Transport
Category Airplanes; Final Rule
Advisory Circulars (AC) 25.795-1, Flightdeck Intrusion Resistance, and
AC 25.795-2, Flightdeck Penetration Resistance; Notice
Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 10 / Tuesday, January 15, 2002 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 2118]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 25 and 121
[Docket No. FAA-2001-11032; Amendment No. 25-106 and 121-288]
RIN 2120-AH56
Security Considerations in the Design of the Flightdeck on
Transport Category Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: This amendment implements two security design requirements
governing transport category airplanes. This amendment requires a means
to protect the flightdeck from unauthorized intrusion and small arms
fire or fragmentation devices. The FAA is also requiring that certain
airplanes operating in part 121 service comply with this amendment to
prevent unauthorized access to the flightdeck. These amendments are
being adopted to further enhance air carrier security in response to
the heightened threat to U.S. civil aviation.
DATES: This amendment is effective January 15, 2002. Comments must be
received on or before March 18, 2002.
ADDRESSES: Address your comments to the Docket Management System, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20590-0001. You must identify the docket number FAA-
2001-11032 at the beginning of your comments, and you should submit two
copies of your comments. If you wish to receive confirmation that FAA
received your comments, include a self-addressed, stamped postcard.
You may also submit comments through the Internet to http://dms.dot.gov. You may review the public docket containing comments to
this final rule in person in the Dockets Office between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Dockets
Office is on the plaza level of the NASSIF Building at the Department
of Transportation at the above address. Also, you may review public
dockets on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov.
Comments that you may consider to be of a sensitive security nature
should not be sent to the docket management system. Send those comments
to the FAA, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW,
Washington DC 20591.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff Gardlin, FAA Airframe and Cabin
Safety Branch, ANM-115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055-
4056; telephone (425) 227-2136, facsimile (425) 227-1149, e-mail:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
This final rule is being adopted without prior notice and prior
public comment. The Regulatory Policies and Procedures of the
Department of Transportation (DOT) (44 FR 1134; February 26, 1979),
however, provides that, to the maximum extent possible, operating
administrations of the DOT should provide an opportunity for public
comment on regulations issued without prior notice. Accordingly,
interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by
submitting such written data, views, or arguments, as they may desire.
Comments relating to the environmental, energy, federalism, or
international trade impacts that might result from this amendment are
also invited. Comments must include the regulatory docket or amendment
number and must be submitted in duplicate to the DOT Rules Docket
address specified above.
All comments received, as well as a report summarizing each
substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this final
rule; and request for comments, will be filed in the docket. The docket
is available for public inspection before and after the comment closing
date.
The FAA will consider all comments received on or before the
closing date for comments. Late filed comments will be considered to
the extent practicable. This final rule may be amended in light of the
comments received.
Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments
submitted in response to this document must include a pre-addressed,
stamped postcard with those comments on which the following statement
is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-2001-11032.'' The postcard will
be date stamped and mailed to the commenter.
Availability of Rulemaking Documents
You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by taking the
following steps:
(1) Go to the search function of the Department of Transportation's
electronic Docket Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search).
(2) On the search page type in the last four digits of the Docket
number shown at the beginning of this amendment. Click on ``search.''
(3) On the next page, which contains the Docket summary information
for the Docket you selected, click on the document number of the item
you wish to view.
You can also get an electronic copy using the Internet through
FAA's Web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the
Federal Register's Web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.
You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make
sure to identify the docket number and amendment number of this
rulemaking.
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requirements for
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations
within its jurisdiction. Therefore, any small entity that has a
question regarding this document may contact their local FAA official,
or the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. You can
find out more about SBREFA on the Internet at our site, http://www.gov/avr/arm/sbrefa.htm. For more information on SBREFA, e-mail us at [email protected].
Background
On September 11, 2001, the United States experienced terrorist
attacks when airplanes were commandeered and used as weapons. These
actions demonstrated the need to improve the security of the
flightdeck. On November 19, 2001, Congress enacted Public Law 107-71,
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (the Act). Section 104 (a)
of the Act, Improved Flight Deck Integrity Measures, states:
(a) IN GENERAL.--As soon as possible after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
shall--
(1) Issue an order (without regard to the provisions of chapter 5
of title 5, United States Code)--
(A) Prohibiting access to the flightdeck of aircraft engaged in
passenger air transportation or intrastate air transportation that are
required to have a door between the passenger and pilot compartments
under title 14, Code
[[Page 2119]]
of Federal Regulations, except to authorized persons;
(B) Requiring the strengthening of the flightdeck door and locks on
any such aircraft operating in air transportation or intrastate air
transportation that has a rigid door in a bulkhead between the
flightdeck and the passenger area to ensure that the door cannot be
forced open from the passenger compartment;
(C) Requiring that such flightdeck doors remain locked while any
such aircraft is in flight except when necessary to permit access and
egress by authorized persons; and
(D) Prohibiting the possession of a key to any such flightdeck door
by any member of the flightcrew who is not assigned to the flightdeck;
(2) Take such other action, including modification of safety and
security procedures and flightdeck redesign, as may be necessary to
ensure the safety and security of the aircraft.
The Act directs that the FAA issue an order fulfilling the
requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of Section 104 as a final rule,
without seeking public comment prior to adoption. The Act specifies
that improved flightdeck security must be applied to airplanes
operating in air transportation that are currently required to have
flightdeck doors.
This final rule is intended to implement Section 104(a) of the Act.
Thus, as explained more fully below, it prohibits access to the
flightdeck, requires strengthening of the flightdeck doors, requires
flightdeck doors to remain locked, and prohibits possession of keys to
the flightdeck door by those members of the crew not assigned to the
flightdeck. While the Act and the deadlines established in the Act
provide both the impetus and the authority for issuance of this rule as
a final rule without notice and comment, both the FAA and the broader
aviation community have for some time been engaged in efforts to
address the issue of flightdeck security. In addition, since the events
of September 11, the FAA has issued a series of Special Federal
Aviation Regulations (SFAR 92, 92-1, and 92-2) which are also pertinent
to the issues addressed in this final rule. Before describing the terms
of the final rule, therefore, we summarize below for context the
various regulatory efforts that have considered flightdeck security and
which further support the issuance of this final rule.
FAA/Industry/International Design Efforts
Because of the work on flight deck security that had been initiated
by the FAA and the aviation community through the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee (ARAC), the objectives of this amendment already have broad
acceptance. The ICAO is an international body consisting of 187 member
countries which has adopted standards under Amendment 97 to ICAO Annex
8 relating to the incorporation of security into the design of
airplanes including the following subjects:
(1) Survivability of systems,
(2) Fire suppression,
(3) Smoke and fumes protection (cabin and flightdeck),
(4) Least risk bomb location and design,
(5) Pilot compartment small arms and shrapnel penetration, and
(6) Interior design to deter hiding of dangerous articles and
enhance searching.
This rule only addresses ICAO requirements regarding protecting the
pilot compartment. The remainder of the ICAO requirements will be
addressed in subsequent rulemaking action.
In addition to participating in the development of international
standards through the ICAO, the FAA considers maintaining harmonized
standards between the United States and Europe to be a high priority.
The FAA has found that carrying out this harmonization task is best
achieved by a joint activity with its European counterpart, the Joint
Aviation Authorities (JAA) and through ARAC, the FAA developed
protection for the pilot compartment beyond the ICAO standard.
The ARAC is composed of 76 member organizations with a wide range
of interests in the aviation community and provides the FAA with
firsthand information and insight regarding proposed new or revised
rules. In 1999, ARAC established a Working Group of airplane design
specialists and aviation security specialists from the aviation
industry and the governments of Europe, the United States, Brazil and
Canada. The Working Group was tasked to develop harmonized security
related design provisions based on Amendment 97 to Annex 8 of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation. One of the requirements
covered by the tasking is protection of the flightdeck. The Working
Group was also tasked to consider improving the resistance to
flightdeck intrusions while still ensuring compliance with the other
requirements.
The Working Group developed specific recommendations for
implementing security provisions into the design of transport category
airplanes. The ARAC has approved those recommendations with respect to
protection of the flightdeck and recommended them to the FAA for
rulemaking. The FAA has accepted ARAC's recommendations, and the
rulemaking contained in this amendment follows from those
recommendations and the activity of the Working Group.
The FAA is expediting rulemaking action with regard to protection
of the flightdeck based on the events of September 11, 2001, and the
requirements of the Act. The remainder of the tasks assigned to the
working group will be completed and forwarded to the FAA in the near
future. The FAA intends to go forward with additional rulemaking after
those recommendations are received.
Other Rulemaking To Protect the Flightdeck
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the FAA issued a series
of Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFAR 92, 92-1 and 92-2) to
enable passenger air carriers to make short-term modifications to their
flightdeck doors to enhance security. These modifications can be made
quickly and will significantly improve the intrusion resistance of the
flightdeck, even though they might not meet all regulatory
requirements. The SFARs provided temporary regulatory relief from
certain airworthiness standards so that security enhancements could be
made as quickly as possible. In contrast, this amendment establishes
the long-term standards for doors. This amendment will supersede the
short-term SFAR requirements before the SFAR expires.
To date the SFAR 92 series rules have authorized, but not required,
the short-term modifications. Concurrent with this amendment the FAA is
issuing an SFAR 92-3 that will require the short-term modifications.
The level of security enhancement mandated by SFAR 92-3 is intended to
mirror those changes already made voluntarily by operators.
Discussion of the Final Rule
Part 25 Requirements
Applicability
As directed by Section 104 of the Act, this amendment applies to
``aircraft engaged in passenger air transportation or intrastate air
transportation that are required to have a door between the passenger
and pilot compartments under title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.''
The only regulation currently addressing this issue is 14 CFR
[[Page 2120]]
121.313(f), which, for airplanes operated under that part, requires
installation of a ``door between the passenger and pilot compartments,
with a locking means to prevent passengers from opening it without the
pilot's permission, except that nontransport category airplanes
certificated after December 31, 1964, are not required to comply with
this paragraph.'' The exception for nontransport category airplanes
certificated after December 31, 1964, generally covers smaller commuter
category airplanes. This amendment applies to the airplanes subject to
the 14 CFR 121.313(f) requirement. In addition, as discussed under the
heading ``Operating Requirements,'' we are amending Sec. 121.313 to
apply these requirements to transport category all-cargo airplanes that
have flightdeck doors installed on the effective date of this
amendment. As discussed under the heading, ``Future Rulemaking,'' the
FAA may consider imposing similar requirements for other airplanes in
the future.
Section 104(a)(1)(B) of the Act provides that this new requirement
must apply to affected aircraft that have a ``rigid'' door. Neither the
Act nor 14 CFR 121.313(f) distinguishes between rigid doors and non-
rigid doors, and the FAA is not aware of a practicable distinction
between such doors that could be used in this rulemaking or in the
implementation of the new regulation. Therefore, this amendment applies
to all affected doors between pilot and passenger compartments, without
distinction based on rigidity. To the extent that such application may
be seen as exceeding the authority provided by Section 104 of the Act
to issue this regulation without notice and comment procedures, we find
good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) for not following those
procedures. As explained, it is impracticable to define a distinction
based on rigidity that would enable the FAA to comply with the Act's
requirement to issue this regulation for ``rigid'' doors, while
excluding ``non-rigid'' doors. In addition, we find that, even if such
a distinction could be drawn, it would be contrary to the intent of the
Act, and the purpose of this rulemaking, which is to enhance the
security of flightdeck doors for airplanes that are required to have
them.
Accordingly, this amendment adds a new Sec. 25.795 addressing the
incorporation of security into transport category airplane flightdeck
design. This rule applies whenever the airplane is required to have a
flightdeck door. Some airplanes are equipped with crew rest areas that
have doors that lead from the passenger cabin into the crew rest area,
as well as a door from the crew rest area into the flightdeck. For the
purposes of compliance with this amendment, the door leading into the
crew rest area from the passenger cabin is the affected door.
The FAA invites comments on the applicability of this regulation.
Commenters should clearly delineate their rationale for a different
applicability in terms of how the security and safety issues are
addressed. Because such discussions are also sensitive from a security
standpoint, the FAA may screen such comments before placing them in the
public docket. Send those comments to the FAA, Office of Rulemaking,
ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington DC 20591.
Flightdeck Security Intrusion by Persons
Section 25.795(a)(1) requires that the flightdeck door installation
be designed to resist intrusion by any person who attempts to enter the
flightdeck by physically forcing his or her way through the door. In
this context, the door installation includes the door, its means of
attachment to the surrounding structure, and the attachment structure
on the bulkhead itself. The integrity of the locking/latching/hinge
mechanism, as well as the door panel itself, can be improved so that
intrusion resistance is significantly enhanced.
There are numerous data concerning the forces a person can exert on
a door. National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
(NILECJ) standard 0306.00 released in May 1976, for the Physical
Security of Door Assemblies and Components, provides standards and
guidance to assess a door's resistance to intrusion. The highest level
of intrusion resistance in the NILECJ standard uses impacts of 200
Joules. In conjunction with industry, the FAA determined that a higher
standard was necessary and achievable. This final regulation requires
that the door resist impacts with energies equal to 300 Joules (221.3
foot-pounds), which is fifty percent higher than the highest level of
intrusion resistance in the NILECJ standard. In order to address
resistance to pulling on the doorknob or handle, the regulation also
includes a requirement for application of a 250 pound tensile load.
This value was selected to provide intrusion resistance from pulling
comparable to the 300 Joules impact resistance requirement. The
requirement is not intended to prevent entry by a person using
extraordinary means or with a large amount of time to work on opening
the door. It is intended to deter attempts at entry and delay attempts
until other actions can be taken to prevent entry.
The FAA has captured applicable reference data and test methods in
Advisory Circular (AC) 25.795-1, ``Flightdeck Intrusion Resistance,''
and considers these acceptable for demonstrating compliance. The
methods of compliance described in the AC consist of impact tests at
critical points on the door, as well as resistance to pulling. Critical
locations are expected to be the door latch and hinge, as well as the
panel itself, but will depend on the design. The FAA will also consider
other valid compliance methods if proposed by an applicant.
An additional aspect of intrusion resistance is the interior
configuration in the vicinity of the door. Small changes to the
interior can make it difficult for an intruder to have direct access to
the door, and therefore difficult to exert much force. Changes to the
interior should also be included as part of the design considerations
to meet this requirement.
Ballistic Penetration
Section 25.795(a)(2) requires design precautions to be taken to
minimize the penetration of shrapnel from a fragmentation device and
small arms projectiles (i.e., ballistics) which might be fired through
the flightdeck doors from occupied compartments. While not explicitly
mentioned in the Act, these protections are key elements of protecting
the flightdeck from intrusion as required by Sec. 104(a)(1)(B) of the
Act because any compromise to the integrity of the flightdeck door from
a ballistic threat could enable an intruder to gain access to the
flightdeck. It would be impracticable to protect the door without
including a ballistic protection component. To the extent that this may
be seen as exceeding the authority provided by Section 104 of the Act
to issue this regulation without notice and comment procedures, we find
good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) for not following those
procedures.
Ballistic resistance will also protect the pilot from trauma from
ballistics entering the flightdeck. Further, the potential loss of
critical flight instrumentation and control is also acute if ballistics
penetrate the flightdeck. The disabling of critical systems from a
single ballistic penetration is achievable with the concentration of
most systems controls within a small sector of the flightdeck.
Electronic displays of basic flight information are similarly
unprotected and vulnerable. It is not the intent of this requirement to
make the flightdeck
[[Page 2121]]
``impenetrable,'' but to provide a high level of protection.
This final rule requires protection for all features of the
flightdeck door to the extent necessary to prevent penetration of
likely projectiles. We have determined protection equivalent to Level
IIIA of the National Institute of Justice Standard (NIJ) standard
0101.04 is sufficient to protect against the most powerful handgun
projectiles and grenade shrapnel that could be encountered on civil
airplanes, and have adapted the relevant portions of this standard for
this application in AC 25.795-2, Flightdeck Penetration Resistance.
Protection would be required at all points where penetration of small
arms fire could cause a hazard. This would include design details such
as hinges, grills, and latches.
The FAA has reviewed several material concepts to address this
requirement, including metallic alloys, ceramics, cermets, polymers,
strong fibers and composites, and determined that the proposal is both
practical and cost-effective. Advisory Circular 25.795-2 includes a
detailed discussion of both material types and methods of compliance. A
notice of issuance of AC 25.795-1 and AC 25.795-2 is published in this
same part of the Federal Register. However, it is the FAA's intention
to accept certain material types and installation approaches without
the need for actual test if it can be shown that the material and its
installation would meet the intent of the rule. If an applicant elected
to use other means, the AC would also provide for use of alternative
materials and installations in compliance with performance standards
specified in the rule.
Existing Requirements
The flightdeck door is subject to several requirements that affect
its structural integrity. These include protection during decompression
where the door may incorporate venting features to prevent a large
pressure differential build up; egress considerations to permit the
flightcrew to enter the passenger cabin in the event the door becomes
jammed during an accident; and provisions to enable rescue personnel to
enter the flightdeck in the event members of the flightcrew are unable
to exit on their own. The door may also be integral in meeting
ventilation requirements. There is, of course, the potential for
designs that meet this new rule to conflict with existing requirements,
but the FAA has determined that all the requirements can be
accommodated by proper design of the door installation.
The balance between providing access to rescue personnel while
providing intrusion resistance may be the most difficult element. On
some airplanes, there are exits inside the flightdeck that can be
opened from the outside and in such cases, there is no requirement for
the flightdeck door to have provision for entry by rescue personnel.
For future airplanes, this is the most direct way to address the
potential conflicts in the requirements. On airplanes where the
flightdeck exits cannot be opened from the outside, rescue personnel
must gain access to the flightdeck via the flightdeck door. As stated
earlier, the objective of this amendment is to either directly prevent
the entry of a person or sufficiently delay them until other actions
could be taken to prevent them from being able to continue their
attempted entry. In that regard, to meet the intent of this amendment,
the size and location of any removable panels should be sufficiently
awkward to inhibit that person's entry. The FAA expects that rescue
personnel would have additional equipment at their disposal to gain
access through the flightdeck door and be able to exert more force than
would an individual acting in flight. Therefore, there should be no
inherent reason that the two requirements cannot both be met.
Inflight Access by Cabin Crew
While not explicitly a current requirement, the FAA has long
recognized a need to provide for in-flight flightdeck entry by the
cabin crew should a flightcrew member become incapacitated; because the
consequences of not providing such access could be catastrophic. Since
Sec. 121.313(g) resulted in flight attendants having access to a key to
the flightdeck door, this issue has been addressed fairly simply in the
past. As required by Section 104(a)(1)(D) of the Act, however this rule
will prohibit the possession of flightdeck door keys by the cabin crew
during flight, as discussed under ``Operating Requirements.''
The FAA expects that other means to enable a flight attendant to
enter the flightdeck, without the use of force, will be available
through more sophisticated systems that do not require forcible entry,
and that these means will be available only to the cabin crew and only
in an emergency situation. Various approaches are possible and do not
require detailed discussion here. This capability is considered
necessary, however, and it would be impractical to impose the
requirement for intrusion resistant flightdeck doors without addressing
this issue at the same time. Indeed, Congress recognized in
Sec. 104(a)(1)(c) of the Act that there would be times when it would be
necessary for authorized persons to enter the flightdeck.
Therefore, Sec. 25.772 is being amended to require that there be a
means to allow the flight attendants to enter the flightdeck should the
flightcrew become incapacitated. Such means are only intended to be
used in an emergency situation, and would require complementary
operational procedures to facilitate their use. As discussed below,
Sec. 121.313(j) permits a combination of procedures and hardware to
provide access by flight attendants in light of this aggressive
compliance schedule specified in this amendment.
We have concluded that this requirement is comfortably within the
scope of those provisions authorized by Section 104 of the Act as with
other provisions discussed previously, however, to the extent that this
provision may be seen as exceeding the authority provided by Section
104 to issue this regulation without notice and comment procedures, the
FAA finds good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) for not following
those procedures on the grounds that strengthening the flightdeck door,
as required by the Act, without providing for access to the flightdeck
by authorized personnel in case of flightcrew incapacitation, would
create a serious safety problem that was not intended by Congress.
Therefore, providing notice and prior opportunity to comment on this
provision is impracticable and contrary to the public interest.
Operating Requirements
Flightdeck Door Requirements
As required by the Act, the FAA is revising Sec. 121.313 to impose
new flightdeck door requirements on existing airplanes that are
required to have such doors. The FAA has also considered the issue of
airplanes that carry cargo, but are permitted to also carry certain
persons as defined in Sec. 121.583 who are not flightcrew members. On
many of these airplanes, there is a door between the flightdeck and the
occupied compartment. Current regulations do not ensure that a person
intent on using an airplane as a weapon would be unable to board all-
cargo airplanes. Therefore, in cases where these airplanes already have
a flightdeck door, the FAA has determined that the door should meet the
new standards adopted here. As already noted for other provisions, this
requirement is not specifically addressed in the Act. To the extent
that this provision may be seen
[[Page 2122]]
as exceeding the authority provided by Section 104 to issue this
regulation without notice and comment procedures, the FAA finds good
cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) for not following those procedures on
the grounds that addressing only passenger carrying airplanes with
flightdeck doors would omit a significant number of airplanes that are
similarly situated.
Section 121.313(f) does not require such all-cargo airplanes to
have a door between the flightcrew compartment and other occupied
compartments. In order to preclude removal of flightdeck doors as a
means to avoid compliance with this requirement, the rule applies to
all-cargo airplanes that have flightdeck doors installed on the
effective date of this amendment.
In addition, as discussed under the heading ``Future Rulemaking,''
the FAA is considering the need to require a flightdeck door on all-
cargo airplanes. Such action will be considered in light of comments
received and would be an expansion of the requirements of
Sec. 121.313(f).
A new Sec. 121.313(j) is added to reference the new part 25
standard for the door separating the flightdeck from the passenger
compartment. With respect to the requirements of Sec. 25.772(c), which
would require systems that would permit entry by flight attendants but
not permit entry by other persons, these systems must have a high
degree of reliability, and the FAA considers that it may not be
practical to develop and install such systems within the compliance
time of this rule. However, operational procedures coupled with
simpler, more robust systems could be readily implemented. Procedures
could include having a flight attendant occupy a flightdeck seat
whenever one pilot must leave the flightdeck. Any system that must be
activated by a flightcrew member (either to permit or deny entry) must
be operable from the crewmember's duty station. Therefore,
Sec. 121.313(j) will require each operator to establish methods to
enable a flight attendant to enter the flightdeck in the event that a
flightcrew member becomes incapacitated. As with Sec. 25.772(c), these
methods are intended to be used under emergency conditions and not for
routine access to the flightdeck.
As noted previously, some airplanes are equipped with a crew rest
area that is accessible from both the flightdeck and the passenger
compartment. Current practice in the application of section 121.313(f)
is that the entry to such areas from the passenger compartment is
required to have a locked door. Section 121.313(f) is revised to
clarify this requirement, and the new requirement of section 121.313(j)
for strengthened doors also applies to these doors.
The rule will require that doors meeting this standard be installed
no later than April 9, 2003. The FAA evaluated several factors in
establishing this compliance time. Before enactment of the Act,
multiple industry groups had developed a proposal for the performance
of flightdeck doors that addresses intrusion and ballistic protection.
The industry proposal closely parallels the changes to part 25 adopted
by this rule. Therefore, the FAA does not anticipate significant
problems in complying with this requirement. The FAA is requiring that
all airplanes affected by Sec. 121.313(f) incorporate flightdeck doors
meeting the requirements of Sec. 25.795 (a)(1) and (2) by April 9,
2003. This date corresponds to the termination date of the previously
issued SFAR 92 (and its successors), and is the date by which all
airplanes modified under the provisions of the SFAR must be in full
compliance with their respective airworthiness requirements. This is an
aggressive schedule; given events of September 11, 2001, however, the
nature of the issue demands aggressive action.
Flightdeck Access Provisions
This amendment also changes the requirements governing access to
the flightdeck in flight. Section 104(a)(1)(D) of the Act requires the
Administrator to issue an order prohibiting possession of flightdeck
door keys by other than flightdeck crewmembers. The FAA has determined
that this limitation is intended to address operations in flight,
rather than possession of keys at all times. Section 121.313(g)
currently requires that non-flightdeck crewmembers have keys in flight
and this rule amends (g) to meet Section 104(a)(1)(D) of the Act.
Section 121.313(g) is revised to achieve three important safety goals.
In the first sentence, the requirement is to have keys available that
will unlock doors that lead from a passenger compartment to an
emergency exit. The second regulatory requirement is that each
crewmember has a key to doors specified in the first sentence, unless
that door is a flightdeck door.
The last regulatory requirement is that before April 9, 2003, other
crewmembers, (e.g. flight attendants) may have a key but only if the
flightdeck door has an internal locking device installed, operative,
and in use. This exception is a result of SFAR 92-2. The SFAR
authorizes short-term flightdeck door reinforcement efforts, which
include internal locks. When those locks are installed and in use, the
key to the door will no longer open the door so it is ineffective as a
key. As noted in the SFAR, such internal flightdeck locking devices
have to be designed so that they can only be unlocked from inside the
flightdeck (e.g. deadbolt locks or bars). The keys themselves have
multiple uses in the passenger cabin such as opening medical supplies,
defibrillators and cabin crew rest areas. Denying access to the keys
when they will not open the flightdeck door only inconveniences the
cabincrew with no benefit of safety. The exception, which expires with
the SFAR in April 9, 2003, will satisfy the requirement of the Act to
prohibit possession by flight attendants of keys that can be used to
gain entry to the flightdeck.
Section 121.547 addresses who may be admitted to the flightdeck and
in some cases the conditions for admission to the flightdeck. Section
121.547(a)(1) and (a)(2) remain unchanged and thus crewmembers, FAA
inspectors, and NTSB representatives who are performing official duties
may be admitted to the flightdeck.
Several changes have been made to Sec. 121.547(a)(3). In the
current Sec. 121.547(a)(3), only the pilot in command (PIC) had to give
permission for the people listed in paragraph (a)(3) to be admitted to
the flightdeck. Because of the demands of aviation safety and security,
in the amended section, admission to the flightdeck is also conditioned
on the permission of the part 119 certificate holder and the
Administrator. To the extent this provision may be seen as exceeding
the authority provided by Section 104 of the Act to issue this
regulation without notice and comment procedures, we find good cause
under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) for not following those procedures. The Act
requires limitations on those authorized access to the flightdeck.
Inherent in issuing such a rule is a basis for determining
authorization and it would be impracticable to issue a rule without
such procedures. This amendment is being made pursuant to 5 USC
553(b)(3)(B), 49 USC Section 44701(a)(5), and Section 104(a)(2) of the
Act.
In complying with Secs. 121.547(a)(3) and 121.547(c)(4), the air
carrier must keep security directives in mind when deciding whether to
issue authorization to enter the flightdeck for purposes of riding in
the jumpseat. The changes to the regulatory text in Sec. 121.547(a)(4)
are clarifying in nature and need not undergo normal notice and comment
procedures. As the discussion in this
[[Page 2123]]
preamble indicates, the discretion the FAA had with the current
Sec. 121.547(a)(4) to issue authorization to enter the flightdeck will
now be systemically overseen and controlled.
Existing Sec. 121.547(a)(4) is modified slightly in the new rule
for clarification purposes only. In the current rule in order for a
person to gain entry to the flightdeck that person must have permission
of three people including the ``certificate holder.'' In the revised
language the agency adds the phrase ``an appropriate management
official of part 119'' certificate holder to make clear which
certificate holder the agency is referring to. Similar changes have
been made to Sec. 121.547(c)(4), (c)(5) and (c)(6). Because these
changes are clarifying in nature, notice and comment procedures are not
required.
In current Sec. 121.581(c), the regulations allowed on certain
aircraft, that did not have an observer seat on the flightdeck, that
the cockpit door could remain open when an FAA inspector is conducting
an inspection. Under the current rule the FAA inspector would conduct
the inspection in a forward passenger seat. The last section of current
Sec. 121.581(c) is being deleted because allowing cockpit doors to
remain open during flight is inconsistent with Section 104(a)(1)(C) of
the Act. This amendment is being adopted without following APA notice
and comment procedures pursuant to Section 104(a)(1) of the Act.
Section 121.587 is being revised to require that the flightcrew
compartment door be closed and locked at all times when the aircraft is
being operated. Previously, the rules only required the door to be
closed and locked during flight. With this amendment, the door will
also have to be closed and locked during taxi, takeoff, and landing
roll. The ``good cause'' justification for not using the normal APA
notice and comment procedures is that the recent terrorist attacks make
clear that security and safety dictate that--except as provided in
Sec. 121.587(b)-- the door shall be closed and locked at all times when
the aircraft is being operated. As has been discussed regarding other
provisions of this amendment, to the extent this provision may be seen
as exceeding the authority provided by Section 104 of the Act to issue
this regulation without notice and comment procedures, the FAA finds
good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) for not following those
procedures. Prohibiting access, as required by the Act, without
addressing all phases of operation, would leave a potentially serious
loophole in the requirement that was not intended by Congress.
Therefore, providing notice and prior opportunity to comment on this
provision is impracticable and contrary to the public interest.
Current Sec. 121.587(b)(1) allows the flightdeck door to remain
opened during takeoff and landing if the crew compartment door is the
means of access to a required passenger emergency exit or floor level
exit. This section is being deleted for the same reasons that
Sec. 121.587(a) is being amended.
Section 121.587(b)(3) currently permits the flightdeck door to be
open if the use of the observer seat (jumpseat) will not permit the
door to be closed. This section is deleted because Section 104(a)(1)(C)
of the Act does not allow for such a provision. Thus, the flightdeck
door may not be ajar to accommodate a jumpseat occupant for the
duration of the flight. The legislative history for Section 104(a) of
the Act indicates that on the rare occasions when a flightdeck door
will be opened during flight, Congress expected the opening of that
door to be brief and that the door will be closed and locked quickly.
Future Rulemaking
As noted previously, the regulations currently only require the
installation of a flightdeck door for passenger-carrying transport
category airplanes operating under part 121. In light of the events of
September 11, 2001, and in accordance with Sections 104(a)(1)(c) and
104(a)(2) of the Act, the FAA is reviewing the need for flightdeck
doors on all air carrier airplanes, including US cargo operations. In
addition, as the events of September 11, 2001, make clear, additional
security measures will also be required for aircraft operated by
foreign operators. The 33\rd\ ICAO Assembly unanimously passed a
resolution that calls on all States to implement additional security
measures and directs the ICAO Council to strengthen ICAO security
standards. The FAA is working with civil aviation authorities and with
ICAO to rapidly develop and implement measures that will improve
flightdeck security.
The FAA expects that ICAO will adopt requirements for intrusion
resistant flightdeck doors to complement the existing Annex 8
requirements, and make those requirements a condition of operation
under Annex 6. The FAA is aware of efforts underway in ICAO to do this,
and will support those efforts. The FAA also expects that the CAA of
those countries overseeing operators with part 129 operations
specifications approvals will adopt their own standards for improved
flightdeck security, similar to what the FAA is adopting here, and make
those requirements applicable to their existing fleets. Given the
urgency of the situation, such requirements and modifications necessary
to meet those requirements should be established by April 2002, such
that airplanes operating in the United States, whether foreign or
domestic, will have improved flightdeck security by April 9, 2003.
To facilitate and promote a global effort such as this, the FAA
intends to consult and work with other regulatory authorities over the
next several months. On the basis of these consultations, the FAA will
determine whether specific rulemaking in part 129 is required. Such a
rule, if necessary, would likely require compliance with the same
standards imposed by this amendment, or with an equivalent standard
imposed by the State of Registry or the equivalent ICAO requirement, at
the discretion of the Administrator.
As discussed earlier, the FAA issued the SFAR 92 series of rules to
authorize, and now mandate, installation of internal locking devices on
flight deck doors on part 121 aircraft. These modifications provide
immediate flightdeck security improvements until the installation of
permanent solutions as outlined in this amendment. The SFAR 92
authority was first issued on October 9, 2001, and operators
immediately began modifying doors. The FAA expects part 129 operators
to install and use similar locking devices and that their States of
Registry would issue waivers similar to SFAR 92 to allow these
modifications. The FAA views these modifications as essential to near-
term security of aircraft, whether they are operated in part 121, or
part 129 operations to and from the US. The FAA has the continued
expectation that part 129 operators and their States of Registry will
take the necessary actions to install internal locking devices and that
those modifications will be made on or before the date set for full
part 121 installation in February 2002 by SFAR 92-3. The FAA will
closely monitor the activities of part 129 operators to determine if
the locking devices are installed and used in the time frame provided
by SFAR 92-3 and will initiate rulemaking if they are not.
In addition, Section 104(c) of the Act states the following:
``The Administrator shall investigate means of securing the
flightdeck of scheduled passenger aircraft operating in air
transportation or intrastate air transportation that do not have a
rigid fixed door with a lock between the passenger compartment and the
[[Page 2124]]
flightdeck and issue such an order as the Administrator deems
appropriate to ensure the inaccessibility, to the greatest extent
feasible, of the flightdeck while the aircraft is so operating, taking
into consideration such aircraft operating in regions where there is
minimal threat to aviation security or national security.'' This
section addresses both airplane type and mode of operation.
The FAA will consider whether other types of airplanes should be
equipped with flightdeck doors meeting the standards of this amendment,
and solicits comments on this issue. Commuter category airplanes will
be a focus of the FAA's deliberations on potential future
applicability. Other changes, as outlined in Section 104(a)(2) of the
Act, may also be proposed.
The FAA solicits comments on the need to expand the requirement for
installation of a flightdeck door to other domestic operations. The FAA
intends to propose further rulemaking if it determines that the current
requirements of Sec. 121.313(f) need to be expanded to other
operations. For example, during cargo operations under part 121,
operators are allowed to transport certain persons that are identified
in Sec. 121.583. The FAA is considering whether it is necessary to
require improved flightdeck security on all cargo airplanes. The FAA is
also considering whether to require strengthening flightdeck doors on
transport category aircraft operated under parts 91, 125 and 135. We
solicit comments on this issue.
As noted, this amendment only addresses the flightdeck door, as
required by the Act. However, the FAA considers that a comprehensive
assessment of flightdeck security must include all barriers between the
flightdeck and occupied areas. Therefore, the FAA intends to propose
further rulemaking that would apply the requirements adopted here to
flightdeck bulkheads, floors and ceilings that separate the pilot and
passenger compartments for new type designs under part 25. At that
time, the need to consider the ballistic protection capability of the
door after it has been tested for intrusion resistance would also
become a requirement.
The FAA also expects to further amend new Sec. 25.795 to add the
remainder of the ARAC recommendations concerning survivability of
systems, cargo fire suppression, smoke and fumes protection (cabin and
flightdeck), least risk bomb location and design, and interior design
to deter hiding of dangerous articles and enhance searching. Therefore
other paragraphs in Sec. 25.795 of this amendment are identified and
marked as ``reserved.''
Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3507(d)), the FAA has determined that there are no requirements for
information collection associated with this rule.
International Compatibility
In keeping with US obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. As discussed
earlier, this rule is partially responsive to Amendment 97 to ICAO
Annex 8, and the FAA plans further action to address the remainder of
the Amendment 97 requirements.
Good Cause for Immediate Adoption
As discussed previously, the Act requires that this regulation be
issued without prior public notice and opportunity to comment.
For those provisions that are arguably not required to be adopted
by the Act, Section 553(b)(3)(B) and 553(d)(3) of the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. Secs. 553(b)(3)(B) and 553(d)(3)
authorize agencies to dispense with certain notice procedures for rules
when they find ``good cause'' to do so. Under Sec. 553(b)(3)(B), the
requirements of notice and opportunity for comment do not apply when
the agency, for good cause, finds that those procedures are
``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.''
Section 553(d)(3) allows an agency, upon finding good cause, to make a
rule effective immediately, thereby avoiding the 30-day delay effective
date requirement in Sec. 553.
For the reasons discussed previously, the FAA finds that notice and
public comment on this final rule are impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest. The provisions of this final rule
require implementation of two security design requirements related to
protection of the flightdeck. It provides means to protect the
flightdeck from small arms fire or fragmentation devices, as well as
means to protect against intrusion into the flightdeck by unauthorized
persons.
Regulatory Evaluation Summary
Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs each Federal agency
proposing or adopting regulation to first make a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second,
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the
economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the
Trade Agreements Act prohibits agencies from setting standards that
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. In developing US standards, this act requires agencies to
consider international standards, and use them where appropriate as the
basis for US standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995
requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs and
benefits, and other effects of proposed and final rules. An assessment
must be prepared only for rules that impose a Federal mandate on state,
local, or tribal governments, or on the private sector, likely to
result in a total expenditure of $100 million or more (adjusted for
inflation) in any one year.
In conducting these analyses, the FAA determined that this rule has
benefits that justify the costs; will not have a significant impact on
a substantial number of small entities; has no effect on trade-
sensitive activity; and does not impose an unfunded mandate on state,
local, or tribal government, or on the private sector.
Benefits and Costs
This rule is the first of a series of FAA rules to improve
flightdeck integrity, as directed by the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act. This rule establishes the requirements for flightdeck
door enhancements. As such, the benefits of this rule are to ensure the
safety and security of the flying public. Since this rule is one of
several being introduced to avoid a reoccurrence of an event like that
of September 11, 2001, the benefits will be shared by the entire set of
rules designed to prevent such a reoccurrence.
Once the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the
potential damage from using an aircraft as a weapon of mass
destruction, flightdeck security was catapulted as an issue of very
high public interest. Only days after the September 11, 2001, attacks,
President Bush identified flightdeck security as an issue requiring
immediate action, and improvements to flightdeck security is one of
several recommendations set forth by the Secretary of Transportation's
Rapid Response Team on Aircraft Security. Congress followed with the
introduction of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, and many
carriers have voluntarily retrofitted their fleets with improved
flightdeck doors.
[[Page 2125]]
The cost of the September 11, 2001, catastrophic terrorist act
cannot be measured easily in dollars. While those losses are estimated
to be potentially in the tens of billions of dollars, the costs of
another incident could possibly be even higher. Based on changes in the
aviation security risk, and the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act, the FAA believes that the benefit of this regulation is warranted
to prevent flightdeck access by unauthorized persons.
Applicants for new, amended, or supplemental type certificates
under part 25 will be affected by this rule. These applicants typically
include manufacturers and modifiers. The additional cost to an airplane
manufacturer is the additional cost of the door, because the flightdeck
door installation costs in a new airplane are roughly equal. The
increased purchase cost of a $9,000 hardened flightdeck door over that
of a $6,000 current door is $3,000. Based on this incremental cost of
$3,000, and the expected manufacturing of 360 airplanes under a new
type certificate, the cost of this rule to part 25 manufacturers is
expected to be $1.1 million ($0.7 million, discounted). Additionally,
some certification costs will be incurred to prove compliance of the
new door, but these costs are expected to be relatively small, at
approximately $0.1 million.
For the analysis affecting part 121 operators, the aviation
industry provided estimated purchase and installation costs of future
compliant flightdeck doors to range from a base case of $12,000 ($9,000
for the door and $3,000 for installation) to an upper bound of $17,000,
which includes the certification costs. Our current information
indicates that $12,000 will provide a door that meets the standards set
forth in this rule. Alaska Airlines removed and installed doors thought
to meet the new specifications for $12,000 per airplane, and jetBlue
was able to do so for $10,000 per aircraft. Even though multiple
sources have lent support to the base case cost of $12,000, no
flightdeck door has been approved to the new specification. Given the
uncertainty as to the actual cost of purchasing and installing approved
flightdeck doors, the FAA has provided an upper-bound estimate of
$17,000. The FAA solicits comments with supporting documentation with
respect to projected costs of upgrading flightdeck doors.
The FAA expects that, now that the specifications are published,
many carriers will initiate steps toward compliance even before the
rule takes effect. Approximately 340 aircraft are expected to already
be compliant with this rule. Operators beyond those that are affected
by this rule may also choose to voluntarily comply. The FAA estimates
that 6,631 transport category airplanes flown in scheduled commercial
service will still need to have their flightdeck doors hardened. The
base case cost of purchase and installation of these doors results in a
$79.6 million expense to the operators with the upper bound costs
reaching $112.7 million.
In addition, the FAA estimates that the additional 50 pounds
resulting from a heavier door will result in additional fuel
requirement costs of $27.5 million ($20.7 million, discounted) over ten
years. Without exception, every flightdeck door manufacturer claimed
that their version of a secure flightdeck door could be installed by
airline technicians overnight, or during an extended overnight. Several
carriers have already begun, and in some cases completed, the retrofit.
These carriers were able to perform the retrofit during overnight
maintenance on 340 aircraft in less than two months. Based on this
information, the FAA believes that all carriers will have an
opportunity to have the doors installed overnight or during a
maintenance check, thereby eliminating the need to take the aircraft
out of service for any amount of time.
The total cost of this rule to part 121 operators is, therefore,
expected to range from the base case of $107.1 million ($98.5 million,
discounted) to $140.2 million ($131.0 million, discounted) over the 10-
year period. The FAA requests comments as to how many aircraft are
already compliant with the rule, the costs incurred in retrofitting
such aircraft (including down-time costs), and how many carriers are
expected to be compliant prior to the implementation of the rule. Since
the FAA may extend the flightdeck door requirements in the future, the
FAA requests similar comments from part 91, 125, and 135 operators.
This rule is part of a series of FAA rules intended to prevent
another attack similar to the one of September 11, 2001. The FAA cannot
provide a reasonable quantitative estimate of benefits because the
extremely high benefits that are involved in avoiding another similar
attack, both in terms of averted loss of life and property, and avoided
damage to the economy, will most likely be in the tens of billions of
dollars, a figure that overshadows any cost associated with this series
of rules. The purpose of this particular rule concerning flightdeck
security is to expedite an important element of the Aviation
Transportation Security Act. Accordingly, the FAA believes that the
rule is cost-beneficial and is necessary to ensure a high level of
aviation safety by providing compliance specification for hardened
flightdeck door standards to the industry.
Regulatory Flexibility Determination
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor,
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes,
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the RFA requires agencies to
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the
rationale for their actions. The RFA covers a wide range of small
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and
small governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. If the determination is that it will, the
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in
the RFA.
However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule is
not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 act provides that
the head of the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility
analysis is not required. The certification must include a statement
providing the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning
should be clear.
In response to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, this
rule requires the strengthening of the flightdeck doors for part 25
manufacturers, and all aircraft with cockpit doors that operate under
part 121. A full Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is not necessary for
the reasons presented below.
The Small Business Administration classifies aircraft manufacturers
with less than 1,500 employees as small entities. All part 25 US
transport-aircraft category manufacturers have more than 1,500
employees. The current United States part 25 airplane manufacturers
include: Boeing, Cessna Aircraft, Gulfstream Aerospace, Learjet (owned
by Bombardier), Lockheed Martin, McDonnell Douglas (a wholly-owned
subsidiary of The Boeing Company), Raytheon Aircraft, and Sabreliner
Corporation. Thus, no part 25
[[Page 2126]]
manufacturer is considered a small entity.
To determine the potential economic impact on small entities
conducting business as part 121 operators, the FAA performed the
following analysis. First, the FAA estimated the number of small
entities affected by this final rule. Next, the FAA estimated the
compliance cost, and then the economic impact.
This final rule requires enhanced cockpit doors and other
improvements to be made by part 121 operators who operate transport
category, passenger and cargo aircraft which have a door between the
cockpit and passenger compartments. Using the criterion from the North
American Industry Classification System of the SBA, the affected
entities that had less than 1,500 employees were estimated. This
procedure resulted in a list of 43 US operators with less than 1,500
employees, operating under part 121 that would be affected by this
rule.
The estimated compliance cost and economic impact for each small
entity involved several analytical steps. First, the fleet of aircraft
operated by part 121 small entities was determined. The FAA obtained
the small entities' fleets using data from the BACK Associates Fleet
Database. The BACK Associates Fleet Database provided US operator and
airplane detail by FAR part number and operator. Second, the purchase
and installation cost of the hardened flightdeck doors was then
estimated for the fleet of each small entity. Third, an annual
reoccurring cost was estimated for the additional fuel required as a
result of the increased weight of the hardened doors.
The estimated total compliance cost of each small entity equals the
sum of the costs of the enhanced cockpit door plus the additional
annual cost attributable to the increased fuel consumption. The
purchase and installation cost of the enhanced cockpit doors was
estimated to be in the range between $12,000 and $17,000 per airplane.
Additional fuel cost was calculated using data from the FAA's Economic
Values for Evaluation of Federal Aviation Administration Investment and
Regulatory Programs, the December 7, 2001 update of Energy Information
Administration's Weekly Petroleum Status Report, and the FAA Aerospace
Forecasts.
The increase cost in fuel consumption was based on the projected
aircraft Utilization and rate of fuel burn increase. This cost was
obtained by multiplying the fifty pounds of additional weight times the
carrier hours flown times the fuel burn rate in gallons/pound/hour
times the cost of fuel per gallon. This calculation was performed for
each of the next ten years using the projected cost of fuel discounted
to the present value.
The degree to which small entities can ``afford'' the cost of
compliance is determined by the availability of financial resources.
The initial implementation costs of the final rule may be financed from
a variety of sources. As a proxy for the firm's ability to afford the
cost of compliance, the FAA calculated the ratio of the total present
value cost of the rule as a percentage of annual revenue. (The FAA
obtained annual operator revenue from current public filings, the 2000
winter edition of the World Aviation Directory, and US DOT Form 41
schedules). Using this methodology, it was found that of the 43 small
entities potentially affected by this final rule, the total present
value cost of the rule exceeded 2 percent of only two entities' total
revenue.
In the interest of fully assessing the impact of this final rule on
small entities, the FAA explored the potential competitive impact. The
route structures and specific markets of five firms were examined. The
affected firms sometimes compete with large carriers. These large
carriers will incur the same fixed and marginal cost per airplane. Many
routes served by the five small entities could be considered local
monopolies in which the affected carrier is the only provider of
service. As a result of operating in these ``niche'' markets, a carrier
would be able to pass some of the cost to its passengers. Thus, as a
result of this rule there is expected to be little change in
competition, and little change in market share within the industry.
The FAA has determined that:
(1) No part 25 manufacturers are small entities.
(2) A substantial number of small operators will not be
significantly impacted by this rule.
Accordingly, pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.
605(b), the Federal Aviation Administration certifies that this final
rule will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of
small entities.
Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from
engaging in any standards or related activities that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Legitimate
domestic objectives, such as safety, are not considered unnecessary
obstacles. The statute also requires consideration of international
standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis for US
standards.
In accordance with the above statute, the FAA has assessed the
potential effect of this rule and has determined that the objective of
this rule is the safety and security of the United States, and
therefore not considered an unnecessary obstacle to international
trade.
Unfunded Mandates Act Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act),
enacted as Pub. L. 104-4 on March 22, 1995, requires each Federal
agency, to the extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment
of the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency
rule that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year.
Section 204(a) of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal
agency to develop an effective process to permit timely input by
elected officers (or their designees) of state, local, and tribal
governments on a proposed ``significant intergovernmental mandate.'' A
``significant intergovernmental mandate'' under the Act is any
provision in a Federal agency regulation that will impose an
enforceable duty upon state, local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one
year. Section 203 of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which supplements section
204(a), provides that before establishing any regulatory requirements
that might significantly or uniquely affect small governments, the
agency shall have developed a plan that, among other things, provides
for notice to potentially affected small governments, if any, and for a
meaningful and timely opportunity to provide input in the development
of regulatory proposals or rules.
This final rule does not contain any Federal intergovernmental or
private sector mandate because Congress has authorized money for the
purpose of implementing aircraft security initiatives, including the
fortification of cockpit doors. Therefore, the requirements of Title II
of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply.
Regulations Affecting Interstate Aviation in Alaska
Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat.
3213) requires the Administrator, when modifying regulations in title
14 of the CFR in manner affecting interstate
[[Page 2127]]
aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to which Alaska is not
served by transportation modes other than aviation, and to establish
such regulatory distinctions as he or she considers appropriate.
Because this rule applies to the certification of transport category
airplanes and their operation, it could affect interstate aviation in
Alaska. The FAA therefore specifically requests comments on whether
there is justification for applying the rule differently in interstate
operations in Alaska.
Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this rule under the principles and criteria of
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this action would
not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
Therefore, we determined that this rule would not have federalism
implications.
Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
environmental impact statement. In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D,
appendix 4, paragraph 4(j), this rulemaking action qualifies for a
categorical exclusion.
Energy Impact
The energy impact of the notice has been assessed in accordance
with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) Pub. L. 94-163, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 6362) and FAA Order 1053.1. It has been determined
that this rulemaking action is not a major regulatory action under the
provisions of the EPCA.
List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Federal Aviation Administration,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
14 CFR Part 121
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Safety, Transportation.
The Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) amends parts 25 and 121 of Title 14 Code of
Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES
1. The authority citation for parts 25 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 4794.
2. Section 25.772 is amended by revising the introductory language
and paragraph (a) and by adding a new paragraph (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 25.772 Pilot compartment doors.
For an airplane that has a lockable door installed between the
pilot compartment and the passenger compartment:
(a) For airplanes with a maximum passenger seating configuration of
more than 20 seats, the emergency exit configuration must be designed
so that neither crewmembers nor passengers require use of the
flightdeck door in order to reach the emergency exits provided for
them; and
* * * * *
(c) There must be an emergency means to enable a flight attendant
to enter the pilot compartment in the event that the flightcrew becomes
incapacitated.
3. Part 25 is amended by adding a new Sec. 25.795 to read as
follows:
Sec. 25.795 Security considerations.
(a) Protection of flightdeck. If a flightdeck door is required by
operating rules, the door installation must be designed to:
(1) Resist forcible intrusion by unauthorized persons and be
capable of withstanding impacts of 300 Joules (221.3 foot-pounds) at
the critical locations on the door, as well as a 250 pound (1113
Newtons) constant tensile load on the knob or handle, and
(2) Resist penetration by small arms fire and fragmentation devices
to a level equivalent to level IIIa of the National Institute of
Justice Standard (NIJ) 0101.04.
(b) [Reserved]
PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL
OPERATIONS
4. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 44101, 44701-44702,
44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901, 44903-44904,
44912, 46105.
5. Section 121.313 is amended by revising paragraphs (f) and (g)
and adding paragraph (j) to read as follows:
Sec. 121.313 Miscellaneous equipment.
* * * * *
(f) A door between the passenger and pilot compartments (i.e.,
flightdeck door), with a locking means to prevent passengers from
opening it without the pilot's permission, except that nontransport
category airplanes certificated after December 31, 1964, are not
required to comply with this paragraph. For airplanes equipped with a
crew rest area having separate entries from the flightdeck and the
passenger compartment, a door with such a locking means must be
provided between the crew rest area and the passenger compartment.
(g) A key for each door that separates a passenger compartment from
another compartment that has emergency exit provisions. Except for
flightdeck doors, a key must be readily available for each crewmember.
Except as provided below, no person other than a person who is assigned
to perform duty on the flightdeck may have a key to the flightdeck
door. Before April 22, 2003, any crewmember may have a key to the
flightdeck door but only if the flightdeck door has an internal
flightdeck locking device installed, operative, and in use. Such
``internal flightdeck locking device'' has to be designed so that it
can only be unlocked from inside the flightdeck.
* * * * *
(j) After April 9, 2003, for airplanes required by paragraph (f) of
this section to have a door between the passenger and pilot or crew
rest compartments, and for transport category, all-cargo airplanes that
have a door installed between the pilot compartment and any other
occupied compartment on January 15, 2002;
(1) Each such door must meet the requirements of Secs. 25.795
(a)(1) and (2) in effect on January 15, 2002; and
(2) Each operator must establish methods to enable a flight
attendant to enter the pilot compartment in the event that a flightcrew
member becomes incapacitated. Any associated signal or confirmation
system must be operable by each flightcrew member from that flightcrew
member's duty station.
6. Section 121.547 is amended by revising paragraphs (a) (3) and
(4) and paragraphs (c)(4) through (6) to read as follow:
Sec. 121.547 Admission to flight deck.
(a) * * *
(3) Any person who--
(i) Has permission of the pilot in command, an appropriate
management official of the part 119 certificate holder, and the
Administrator; and
(ii) Is an employee of--
(A) The United States, or
[[Page 2128]]
(B) A part 119 certificate holder and whose duties are such that
admission to the flightdeck is necessary or advantageous for safe
operation; or
(C) An aeronautical enterprise certificated by the Administrator
and whose duties are such that admission to the flightdeck is necessary
or advantageous for safe operation.
(4) Any person who has the permission of the pilot in command, an
appropriate management official of the part 119 certificate holder and
the Administrator. Paragraph (a)(2) of this section does not limit the
emergency authority of the pilot in command to exclude any person from
the flightdeck in the interests of safety.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(4) A certificated airman employed by another part 119 certificate
holder whose duties with that part 119 certificate holder require an
airman certificate and who is authorized by the part 119 certificate
holder operating the aircraft to make specific trips over a route;
(5) An employee of the part 119 certificate holder operating the
aircraft whose duty is directly related to the conduct or planning of
flight operations or the in-flight monitoring of aircraft equipment or
operating procedures, if his presence on the flightdeck is necessary to
perform his duties and he has been authorized in writing by a
responsible supervisor, listed in the Operations Manual as having that
authority; and
(6) A technical representative of the manufacturer of the aircraft
or its components whose duties are directly related to the in-flight
monitoring of aircraft equipment or operating procedures, if his
presence on the flightdeck is necessary to perform his duties and he
has been authorized in writing by the Administrator and by a
responsible supervisor of the operations department of the part 119
certificate holder, listed in the Operations Manual as having that
authority.
7. Section 121.581 is amended by revising paragraph (c) to read as
follows:
Sec. 121.581 Observer's seat; en route inspections.
* * * * *
(c) For any airplane type certificated before December 20, 1995,
for not more than 30 passengers that does not have an observer seat on
the flightdeck, the certificate holder must provide a forward passenger
seat with headset or speaker for occupancy by the Administrator while
conducting en route inspections.
8. Section 121.587 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 121.587 Closing and locking of flightcrew compartment door.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, a pilot in
command of an airplane that has a lockable flightcrew compartment door
in accordance with Sec. 121.313 and that is carrying passengers shall
ensure that the door separating the flightcrew compartment from the
passenger compartment is closed and locked at all times when the
aircraft is being operated.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section do not apply at
any time when it is necessary to permit access and egress by persons
authorized in accordance with Sec. 121.547 and provided the part 119
operator complies with FAA approved procedures regarding the opening,
closing and locking of the flightdeck doors.
Issued in Washington, DC, on January 10, 2002.
Jane F. Garvey,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 02-965 Filed 1-10-02; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P