[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 10 (Tuesday, January 15, 2002)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 2118-2128]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-965]



[[Page 2117]]

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Part V





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Parts 25 and 121



Security Considerations in the Design of the Flightdeck on Transport 
Category Airplanes; Final Rule



Advisory Circulars (AC) 25.795-1, Flightdeck Intrusion Resistance, and 
AC 25.795-2, Flightdeck Penetration Resistance; Notice

  Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 10 / Tuesday, January 15, 2002 / 
Rules and Regulations  

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 25 and 121

[Docket No. FAA-2001-11032; Amendment No. 25-106 and 121-288]
RIN 2120-AH56


Security Considerations in the Design of the Flightdeck on 
Transport Category Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: This amendment implements two security design requirements 
governing transport category airplanes. This amendment requires a means 
to protect the flightdeck from unauthorized intrusion and small arms 
fire or fragmentation devices. The FAA is also requiring that certain 
airplanes operating in part 121 service comply with this amendment to 
prevent unauthorized access to the flightdeck. These amendments are 
being adopted to further enhance air carrier security in response to 
the heightened threat to U.S. civil aviation.

DATES: This amendment is effective January 15, 2002. Comments must be 
received on or before March 18, 2002.

ADDRESSES: Address your comments to the Docket Management System, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20590-0001. You must identify the docket number FAA-
2001-11032 at the beginning of your comments, and you should submit two 
copies of your comments. If you wish to receive confirmation that FAA 
received your comments, include a self-addressed, stamped postcard.
    You may also submit comments through the Internet to http://dms.dot.gov. You may review the public docket containing comments to 
this final rule in person in the Dockets Office between 9 a.m. and 5 
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Dockets 
Office is on the plaza level of the NASSIF Building at the Department 
of Transportation at the above address. Also, you may review public 
dockets on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov.
    Comments that you may consider to be of a sensitive security nature 
should not be sent to the docket management system. Send those comments 
to the FAA, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW, 
Washington DC 20591.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff Gardlin, FAA Airframe and Cabin 
Safety Branch, ANM-115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 
Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055-
4056; telephone (425) 227-2136, facsimile (425) 227-1149, e-mail: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    This final rule is being adopted without prior notice and prior 
public comment. The Regulatory Policies and Procedures of the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) (44 FR 1134; February 26, 1979), 
however, provides that, to the maximum extent possible, operating 
administrations of the DOT should provide an opportunity for public 
comment on regulations issued without prior notice. Accordingly, 
interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by 
submitting such written data, views, or arguments, as they may desire. 
Comments relating to the environmental, energy, federalism, or 
international trade impacts that might result from this amendment are 
also invited. Comments must include the regulatory docket or amendment 
number and must be submitted in duplicate to the DOT Rules Docket 
address specified above.
    All comments received, as well as a report summarizing each 
substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this final 
rule; and request for comments, will be filed in the docket. The docket 
is available for public inspection before and after the comment closing 
date.
    The FAA will consider all comments received on or before the 
closing date for comments. Late filed comments will be considered to 
the extent practicable. This final rule may be amended in light of the 
comments received.
    Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments 
submitted in response to this document must include a pre-addressed, 
stamped postcard with those comments on which the following statement 
is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-2001-11032.'' The postcard will 
be date stamped and mailed to the commenter.

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by taking the 
following steps:
    (1) Go to the search function of the Department of Transportation's 
electronic Docket Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search).
    (2) On the search page type in the last four digits of the Docket 
number shown at the beginning of this amendment. Click on ``search.''
    (3) On the next page, which contains the Docket summary information 
for the Docket you selected, click on the document number of the item 
you wish to view.
    You can also get an electronic copy using the Internet through 
FAA's Web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the 
Federal Register's Web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.
    You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make 
sure to identify the docket number and amendment number of this 
rulemaking.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requirements for 
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations 
within its jurisdiction. Therefore, any small entity that has a 
question regarding this document may contact their local FAA official, 
or the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. You can 
find out more about SBREFA on the Internet at our site, http://www.gov/avr/arm/sbrefa.htm. For more information on SBREFA, e-mail us at [email protected].

Background

    On September 11, 2001, the United States experienced terrorist 
attacks when airplanes were commandeered and used as weapons. These 
actions demonstrated the need to improve the security of the 
flightdeck. On November 19, 2001, Congress enacted Public Law 107-71, 
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (the Act). Section 104 (a) 
of the Act, Improved Flight Deck Integrity Measures, states:
    (a) IN GENERAL.--As soon as possible after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 
shall--
    (1) Issue an order (without regard to the provisions of chapter 5 
of title 5, United States Code)--
    (A) Prohibiting access to the flightdeck of aircraft engaged in 
passenger air transportation or intrastate air transportation that are 
required to have a door between the passenger and pilot compartments 
under title 14, Code

[[Page 2119]]

of Federal Regulations, except to authorized persons;
    (B) Requiring the strengthening of the flightdeck door and locks on 
any such aircraft operating in air transportation or intrastate air 
transportation that has a rigid door in a bulkhead between the 
flightdeck and the passenger area to ensure that the door cannot be 
forced open from the passenger compartment;
    (C) Requiring that such flightdeck doors remain locked while any 
such aircraft is in flight except when necessary to permit access and 
egress by authorized persons; and
    (D) Prohibiting the possession of a key to any such flightdeck door 
by any member of the flightcrew who is not assigned to the flightdeck;
    (2) Take such other action, including modification of safety and 
security procedures and flightdeck redesign, as may be necessary to 
ensure the safety and security of the aircraft.
    The Act directs that the FAA issue an order fulfilling the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of Section 104 as a final rule, 
without seeking public comment prior to adoption. The Act specifies 
that improved flightdeck security must be applied to airplanes 
operating in air transportation that are currently required to have 
flightdeck doors.
    This final rule is intended to implement Section 104(a) of the Act. 
Thus, as explained more fully below, it prohibits access to the 
flightdeck, requires strengthening of the flightdeck doors, requires 
flightdeck doors to remain locked, and prohibits possession of keys to 
the flightdeck door by those members of the crew not assigned to the 
flightdeck. While the Act and the deadlines established in the Act 
provide both the impetus and the authority for issuance of this rule as 
a final rule without notice and comment, both the FAA and the broader 
aviation community have for some time been engaged in efforts to 
address the issue of flightdeck security. In addition, since the events 
of September 11, the FAA has issued a series of Special Federal 
Aviation Regulations (SFAR 92, 92-1, and 92-2) which are also pertinent 
to the issues addressed in this final rule. Before describing the terms 
of the final rule, therefore, we summarize below for context the 
various regulatory efforts that have considered flightdeck security and 
which further support the issuance of this final rule.

FAA/Industry/International Design Efforts

    Because of the work on flight deck security that had been initiated 
by the FAA and the aviation community through the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 
Committee (ARAC), the objectives of this amendment already have broad 
acceptance. The ICAO is an international body consisting of 187 member 
countries which has adopted standards under Amendment 97 to ICAO Annex 
8 relating to the incorporation of security into the design of 
airplanes including the following subjects:
    (1) Survivability of systems,
    (2) Fire suppression,
    (3) Smoke and fumes protection (cabin and flightdeck),
    (4) Least risk bomb location and design,
    (5) Pilot compartment small arms and shrapnel penetration, and
    (6) Interior design to deter hiding of dangerous articles and 
enhance searching.
    This rule only addresses ICAO requirements regarding protecting the 
pilot compartment. The remainder of the ICAO requirements will be 
addressed in subsequent rulemaking action.
    In addition to participating in the development of international 
standards through the ICAO, the FAA considers maintaining harmonized 
standards between the United States and Europe to be a high priority. 
The FAA has found that carrying out this harmonization task is best 
achieved by a joint activity with its European counterpart, the Joint 
Aviation Authorities (JAA) and through ARAC, the FAA developed 
protection for the pilot compartment beyond the ICAO standard.
    The ARAC is composed of 76 member organizations with a wide range 
of interests in the aviation community and provides the FAA with 
firsthand information and insight regarding proposed new or revised 
rules. In 1999, ARAC established a Working Group of airplane design 
specialists and aviation security specialists from the aviation 
industry and the governments of Europe, the United States, Brazil and 
Canada. The Working Group was tasked to develop harmonized security 
related design provisions based on Amendment 97 to Annex 8 of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation. One of the requirements 
covered by the tasking is protection of the flightdeck. The Working 
Group was also tasked to consider improving the resistance to 
flightdeck intrusions while still ensuring compliance with the other 
requirements.
    The Working Group developed specific recommendations for 
implementing security provisions into the design of transport category 
airplanes. The ARAC has approved those recommendations with respect to 
protection of the flightdeck and recommended them to the FAA for 
rulemaking. The FAA has accepted ARAC's recommendations, and the 
rulemaking contained in this amendment follows from those 
recommendations and the activity of the Working Group.
    The FAA is expediting rulemaking action with regard to protection 
of the flightdeck based on the events of September 11, 2001, and the 
requirements of the Act. The remainder of the tasks assigned to the 
working group will be completed and forwarded to the FAA in the near 
future. The FAA intends to go forward with additional rulemaking after 
those recommendations are received.

Other Rulemaking To Protect the Flightdeck

    Following the events of September 11, 2001, the FAA issued a series 
of Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFAR 92, 92-1 and 92-2) to 
enable passenger air carriers to make short-term modifications to their 
flightdeck doors to enhance security. These modifications can be made 
quickly and will significantly improve the intrusion resistance of the 
flightdeck, even though they might not meet all regulatory 
requirements. The SFARs provided temporary regulatory relief from 
certain airworthiness standards so that security enhancements could be 
made as quickly as possible. In contrast, this amendment establishes 
the long-term standards for doors. This amendment will supersede the 
short-term SFAR requirements before the SFAR expires.
    To date the SFAR 92 series rules have authorized, but not required, 
the short-term modifications. Concurrent with this amendment the FAA is 
issuing an SFAR 92-3 that will require the short-term modifications. 
The level of security enhancement mandated by SFAR 92-3 is intended to 
mirror those changes already made voluntarily by operators.

Discussion of the Final Rule

Part 25 Requirements

Applicability
    As directed by Section 104 of the Act, this amendment applies to 
``aircraft engaged in passenger air transportation or intrastate air 
transportation that are required to have a door between the passenger 
and pilot compartments under title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.''
    The only regulation currently addressing this issue is 14 CFR

[[Page 2120]]

121.313(f), which, for airplanes operated under that part, requires 
installation of a ``door between the passenger and pilot compartments, 
with a locking means to prevent passengers from opening it without the 
pilot's permission, except that nontransport category airplanes 
certificated after December 31, 1964, are not required to comply with 
this paragraph.'' The exception for nontransport category airplanes 
certificated after December 31, 1964, generally covers smaller commuter 
category airplanes. This amendment applies to the airplanes subject to 
the 14 CFR 121.313(f) requirement. In addition, as discussed under the 
heading ``Operating Requirements,'' we are amending Sec. 121.313 to 
apply these requirements to transport category all-cargo airplanes that 
have flightdeck doors installed on the effective date of this 
amendment. As discussed under the heading, ``Future Rulemaking,'' the 
FAA may consider imposing similar requirements for other airplanes in 
the future.
    Section 104(a)(1)(B) of the Act provides that this new requirement 
must apply to affected aircraft that have a ``rigid'' door. Neither the 
Act nor 14 CFR 121.313(f) distinguishes between rigid doors and non-
rigid doors, and the FAA is not aware of a practicable distinction 
between such doors that could be used in this rulemaking or in the 
implementation of the new regulation. Therefore, this amendment applies 
to all affected doors between pilot and passenger compartments, without 
distinction based on rigidity. To the extent that such application may 
be seen as exceeding the authority provided by Section 104 of the Act 
to issue this regulation without notice and comment procedures, we find 
good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) for not following those 
procedures. As explained, it is impracticable to define a distinction 
based on rigidity that would enable the FAA to comply with the Act's 
requirement to issue this regulation for ``rigid'' doors, while 
excluding ``non-rigid'' doors. In addition, we find that, even if such 
a distinction could be drawn, it would be contrary to the intent of the 
Act, and the purpose of this rulemaking, which is to enhance the 
security of flightdeck doors for airplanes that are required to have 
them.
    Accordingly, this amendment adds a new Sec. 25.795 addressing the 
incorporation of security into transport category airplane flightdeck 
design. This rule applies whenever the airplane is required to have a 
flightdeck door. Some airplanes are equipped with crew rest areas that 
have doors that lead from the passenger cabin into the crew rest area, 
as well as a door from the crew rest area into the flightdeck. For the 
purposes of compliance with this amendment, the door leading into the 
crew rest area from the passenger cabin is the affected door.
    The FAA invites comments on the applicability of this regulation. 
Commenters should clearly delineate their rationale for a different 
applicability in terms of how the security and safety issues are 
addressed. Because such discussions are also sensitive from a security 
standpoint, the FAA may screen such comments before placing them in the 
public docket. Send those comments to the FAA, Office of Rulemaking, 
ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington DC 20591.
Flightdeck Security Intrusion by Persons
    Section 25.795(a)(1) requires that the flightdeck door installation 
be designed to resist intrusion by any person who attempts to enter the 
flightdeck by physically forcing his or her way through the door. In 
this context, the door installation includes the door, its means of 
attachment to the surrounding structure, and the attachment structure 
on the bulkhead itself. The integrity of the locking/latching/hinge 
mechanism, as well as the door panel itself, can be improved so that 
intrusion resistance is significantly enhanced.
    There are numerous data concerning the forces a person can exert on 
a door. National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 
(NILECJ) standard 0306.00 released in May 1976, for the Physical 
Security of Door Assemblies and Components, provides standards and 
guidance to assess a door's resistance to intrusion. The highest level 
of intrusion resistance in the NILECJ standard uses impacts of 200 
Joules. In conjunction with industry, the FAA determined that a higher 
standard was necessary and achievable. This final regulation requires 
that the door resist impacts with energies equal to 300 Joules (221.3 
foot-pounds), which is fifty percent higher than the highest level of 
intrusion resistance in the NILECJ standard. In order to address 
resistance to pulling on the doorknob or handle, the regulation also 
includes a requirement for application of a 250 pound tensile load. 
This value was selected to provide intrusion resistance from pulling 
comparable to the 300 Joules impact resistance requirement. The 
requirement is not intended to prevent entry by a person using 
extraordinary means or with a large amount of time to work on opening 
the door. It is intended to deter attempts at entry and delay attempts 
until other actions can be taken to prevent entry.
    The FAA has captured applicable reference data and test methods in 
Advisory Circular (AC) 25.795-1, ``Flightdeck Intrusion Resistance,'' 
and considers these acceptable for demonstrating compliance. The 
methods of compliance described in the AC consist of impact tests at 
critical points on the door, as well as resistance to pulling. Critical 
locations are expected to be the door latch and hinge, as well as the 
panel itself, but will depend on the design. The FAA will also consider 
other valid compliance methods if proposed by an applicant.
    An additional aspect of intrusion resistance is the interior 
configuration in the vicinity of the door. Small changes to the 
interior can make it difficult for an intruder to have direct access to 
the door, and therefore difficult to exert much force. Changes to the 
interior should also be included as part of the design considerations 
to meet this requirement.
Ballistic Penetration
    Section 25.795(a)(2) requires design precautions to be taken to 
minimize the penetration of shrapnel from a fragmentation device and 
small arms projectiles (i.e., ballistics) which might be fired through 
the flightdeck doors from occupied compartments. While not explicitly 
mentioned in the Act, these protections are key elements of protecting 
the flightdeck from intrusion as required by Sec. 104(a)(1)(B) of the 
Act because any compromise to the integrity of the flightdeck door from 
a ballistic threat could enable an intruder to gain access to the 
flightdeck. It would be impracticable to protect the door without 
including a ballistic protection component. To the extent that this may 
be seen as exceeding the authority provided by Section 104 of the Act 
to issue this regulation without notice and comment procedures, we find 
good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) for not following those 
procedures.
    Ballistic resistance will also protect the pilot from trauma from 
ballistics entering the flightdeck. Further, the potential loss of 
critical flight instrumentation and control is also acute if ballistics 
penetrate the flightdeck. The disabling of critical systems from a 
single ballistic penetration is achievable with the concentration of 
most systems controls within a small sector of the flightdeck. 
Electronic displays of basic flight information are similarly 
unprotected and vulnerable. It is not the intent of this requirement to 
make the flightdeck

[[Page 2121]]

``impenetrable,'' but to provide a high level of protection.
    This final rule requires protection for all features of the 
flightdeck door to the extent necessary to prevent penetration of 
likely projectiles. We have determined protection equivalent to Level 
IIIA of the National Institute of Justice Standard (NIJ) standard 
0101.04 is sufficient to protect against the most powerful handgun 
projectiles and grenade shrapnel that could be encountered on civil 
airplanes, and have adapted the relevant portions of this standard for 
this application in AC 25.795-2, Flightdeck Penetration Resistance. 
Protection would be required at all points where penetration of small 
arms fire could cause a hazard. This would include design details such 
as hinges, grills, and latches.
    The FAA has reviewed several material concepts to address this 
requirement, including metallic alloys, ceramics, cermets, polymers, 
strong fibers and composites, and determined that the proposal is both 
practical and cost-effective. Advisory Circular 25.795-2 includes a 
detailed discussion of both material types and methods of compliance. A 
notice of issuance of AC 25.795-1 and AC 25.795-2 is published in this 
same part of the Federal Register. However, it is the FAA's intention 
to accept certain material types and installation approaches without 
the need for actual test if it can be shown that the material and its 
installation would meet the intent of the rule. If an applicant elected 
to use other means, the AC would also provide for use of alternative 
materials and installations in compliance with performance standards 
specified in the rule.
Existing Requirements
    The flightdeck door is subject to several requirements that affect 
its structural integrity. These include protection during decompression 
where the door may incorporate venting features to prevent a large 
pressure differential build up; egress considerations to permit the 
flightcrew to enter the passenger cabin in the event the door becomes 
jammed during an accident; and provisions to enable rescue personnel to 
enter the flightdeck in the event members of the flightcrew are unable 
to exit on their own. The door may also be integral in meeting 
ventilation requirements. There is, of course, the potential for 
designs that meet this new rule to conflict with existing requirements, 
but the FAA has determined that all the requirements can be 
accommodated by proper design of the door installation.
    The balance between providing access to rescue personnel while 
providing intrusion resistance may be the most difficult element. On 
some airplanes, there are exits inside the flightdeck that can be 
opened from the outside and in such cases, there is no requirement for 
the flightdeck door to have provision for entry by rescue personnel. 
For future airplanes, this is the most direct way to address the 
potential conflicts in the requirements. On airplanes where the 
flightdeck exits cannot be opened from the outside, rescue personnel 
must gain access to the flightdeck via the flightdeck door. As stated 
earlier, the objective of this amendment is to either directly prevent 
the entry of a person or sufficiently delay them until other actions 
could be taken to prevent them from being able to continue their 
attempted entry. In that regard, to meet the intent of this amendment, 
the size and location of any removable panels should be sufficiently 
awkward to inhibit that person's entry. The FAA expects that rescue 
personnel would have additional equipment at their disposal to gain 
access through the flightdeck door and be able to exert more force than 
would an individual acting in flight. Therefore, there should be no 
inherent reason that the two requirements cannot both be met.
Inflight Access by Cabin Crew
    While not explicitly a current requirement, the FAA has long 
recognized a need to provide for in-flight flightdeck entry by the 
cabin crew should a flightcrew member become incapacitated; because the 
consequences of not providing such access could be catastrophic. Since 
Sec. 121.313(g) resulted in flight attendants having access to a key to 
the flightdeck door, this issue has been addressed fairly simply in the 
past. As required by Section 104(a)(1)(D) of the Act, however this rule 
will prohibit the possession of flightdeck door keys by the cabin crew 
during flight, as discussed under ``Operating Requirements.''
    The FAA expects that other means to enable a flight attendant to 
enter the flightdeck, without the use of force, will be available 
through more sophisticated systems that do not require forcible entry, 
and that these means will be available only to the cabin crew and only 
in an emergency situation. Various approaches are possible and do not 
require detailed discussion here. This capability is considered 
necessary, however, and it would be impractical to impose the 
requirement for intrusion resistant flightdeck doors without addressing 
this issue at the same time. Indeed, Congress recognized in 
Sec. 104(a)(1)(c) of the Act that there would be times when it would be 
necessary for authorized persons to enter the flightdeck.
    Therefore, Sec. 25.772 is being amended to require that there be a 
means to allow the flight attendants to enter the flightdeck should the 
flightcrew become incapacitated. Such means are only intended to be 
used in an emergency situation, and would require complementary 
operational procedures to facilitate their use. As discussed below, 
Sec. 121.313(j) permits a combination of procedures and hardware to 
provide access by flight attendants in light of this aggressive 
compliance schedule specified in this amendment.
    We have concluded that this requirement is comfortably within the 
scope of those provisions authorized by Section 104 of the Act as with 
other provisions discussed previously, however, to the extent that this 
provision may be seen as exceeding the authority provided by Section 
104 to issue this regulation without notice and comment procedures, the 
FAA finds good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) for not following 
those procedures on the grounds that strengthening the flightdeck door, 
as required by the Act, without providing for access to the flightdeck 
by authorized personnel in case of flightcrew incapacitation, would 
create a serious safety problem that was not intended by Congress. 
Therefore, providing notice and prior opportunity to comment on this 
provision is impracticable and contrary to the public interest.

Operating Requirements

Flightdeck Door Requirements

    As required by the Act, the FAA is revising Sec. 121.313 to impose 
new flightdeck door requirements on existing airplanes that are 
required to have such doors. The FAA has also considered the issue of 
airplanes that carry cargo, but are permitted to also carry certain 
persons as defined in Sec. 121.583 who are not flightcrew members. On 
many of these airplanes, there is a door between the flightdeck and the 
occupied compartment. Current regulations do not ensure that a person 
intent on using an airplane as a weapon would be unable to board all-
cargo airplanes. Therefore, in cases where these airplanes already have 
a flightdeck door, the FAA has determined that the door should meet the 
new standards adopted here. As already noted for other provisions, this 
requirement is not specifically addressed in the Act. To the extent 
that this provision may be seen

[[Page 2122]]

as exceeding the authority provided by Section 104 to issue this 
regulation without notice and comment procedures, the FAA finds good 
cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) for not following those procedures on 
the grounds that addressing only passenger carrying airplanes with 
flightdeck doors would omit a significant number of airplanes that are 
similarly situated.
    Section 121.313(f) does not require such all-cargo airplanes to 
have a door between the flightcrew compartment and other occupied 
compartments. In order to preclude removal of flightdeck doors as a 
means to avoid compliance with this requirement, the rule applies to 
all-cargo airplanes that have flightdeck doors installed on the 
effective date of this amendment.
    In addition, as discussed under the heading ``Future Rulemaking,'' 
the FAA is considering the need to require a flightdeck door on all-
cargo airplanes. Such action will be considered in light of comments 
received and would be an expansion of the requirements of 
Sec. 121.313(f).
    A new Sec. 121.313(j) is added to reference the new part 25 
standard for the door separating the flightdeck from the passenger 
compartment. With respect to the requirements of Sec. 25.772(c), which 
would require systems that would permit entry by flight attendants but 
not permit entry by other persons, these systems must have a high 
degree of reliability, and the FAA considers that it may not be 
practical to develop and install such systems within the compliance 
time of this rule. However, operational procedures coupled with 
simpler, more robust systems could be readily implemented. Procedures 
could include having a flight attendant occupy a flightdeck seat 
whenever one pilot must leave the flightdeck. Any system that must be 
activated by a flightcrew member (either to permit or deny entry) must 
be operable from the crewmember's duty station. Therefore, 
Sec. 121.313(j) will require each operator to establish methods to 
enable a flight attendant to enter the flightdeck in the event that a 
flightcrew member becomes incapacitated. As with Sec. 25.772(c), these 
methods are intended to be used under emergency conditions and not for 
routine access to the flightdeck.
    As noted previously, some airplanes are equipped with a crew rest 
area that is accessible from both the flightdeck and the passenger 
compartment. Current practice in the application of section 121.313(f) 
is that the entry to such areas from the passenger compartment is 
required to have a locked door. Section 121.313(f) is revised to 
clarify this requirement, and the new requirement of section 121.313(j) 
for strengthened doors also applies to these doors.
    The rule will require that doors meeting this standard be installed 
no later than April 9, 2003. The FAA evaluated several factors in 
establishing this compliance time. Before enactment of the Act, 
multiple industry groups had developed a proposal for the performance 
of flightdeck doors that addresses intrusion and ballistic protection. 
The industry proposal closely parallels the changes to part 25 adopted 
by this rule. Therefore, the FAA does not anticipate significant 
problems in complying with this requirement. The FAA is requiring that 
all airplanes affected by Sec. 121.313(f) incorporate flightdeck doors 
meeting the requirements of Sec. 25.795 (a)(1) and (2) by April 9, 
2003. This date corresponds to the termination date of the previously 
issued SFAR 92 (and its successors), and is the date by which all 
airplanes modified under the provisions of the SFAR must be in full 
compliance with their respective airworthiness requirements. This is an 
aggressive schedule; given events of September 11, 2001, however, the 
nature of the issue demands aggressive action.

Flightdeck Access Provisions

    This amendment also changes the requirements governing access to 
the flightdeck in flight. Section 104(a)(1)(D) of the Act requires the 
Administrator to issue an order prohibiting possession of flightdeck 
door keys by other than flightdeck crewmembers. The FAA has determined 
that this limitation is intended to address operations in flight, 
rather than possession of keys at all times. Section 121.313(g) 
currently requires that non-flightdeck crewmembers have keys in flight 
and this rule amends (g) to meet Section 104(a)(1)(D) of the Act. 
Section 121.313(g) is revised to achieve three important safety goals. 
In the first sentence, the requirement is to have keys available that 
will unlock doors that lead from a passenger compartment to an 
emergency exit. The second regulatory requirement is that each 
crewmember has a key to doors specified in the first sentence, unless 
that door is a flightdeck door.
    The last regulatory requirement is that before April 9, 2003, other 
crewmembers, (e.g. flight attendants) may have a key but only if the 
flightdeck door has an internal locking device installed, operative, 
and in use. This exception is a result of SFAR 92-2. The SFAR 
authorizes short-term flightdeck door reinforcement efforts, which 
include internal locks. When those locks are installed and in use, the 
key to the door will no longer open the door so it is ineffective as a 
key. As noted in the SFAR, such internal flightdeck locking devices 
have to be designed so that they can only be unlocked from inside the 
flightdeck (e.g. deadbolt locks or bars). The keys themselves have 
multiple uses in the passenger cabin such as opening medical supplies, 
defibrillators and cabin crew rest areas. Denying access to the keys 
when they will not open the flightdeck door only inconveniences the 
cabincrew with no benefit of safety. The exception, which expires with 
the SFAR in April 9, 2003, will satisfy the requirement of the Act to 
prohibit possession by flight attendants of keys that can be used to 
gain entry to the flightdeck.
    Section 121.547 addresses who may be admitted to the flightdeck and 
in some cases the conditions for admission to the flightdeck. Section 
121.547(a)(1) and (a)(2) remain unchanged and thus crewmembers, FAA 
inspectors, and NTSB representatives who are performing official duties 
may be admitted to the flightdeck.
    Several changes have been made to Sec. 121.547(a)(3). In the 
current Sec. 121.547(a)(3), only the pilot in command (PIC) had to give 
permission for the people listed in paragraph (a)(3) to be admitted to 
the flightdeck. Because of the demands of aviation safety and security, 
in the amended section, admission to the flightdeck is also conditioned 
on the permission of the part 119 certificate holder and the 
Administrator. To the extent this provision may be seen as exceeding 
the authority provided by Section 104 of the Act to issue this 
regulation without notice and comment procedures, we find good cause 
under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) for not following those procedures. The Act 
requires limitations on those authorized access to the flightdeck. 
Inherent in issuing such a rule is a basis for determining 
authorization and it would be impracticable to issue a rule without 
such procedures. This amendment is being made pursuant to 5 USC 
553(b)(3)(B), 49 USC Section 44701(a)(5), and Section 104(a)(2) of the 
Act.
    In complying with Secs. 121.547(a)(3) and 121.547(c)(4), the air 
carrier must keep security directives in mind when deciding whether to 
issue authorization to enter the flightdeck for purposes of riding in 
the jumpseat. The changes to the regulatory text in Sec. 121.547(a)(4) 
are clarifying in nature and need not undergo normal notice and comment 
procedures. As the discussion in this

[[Page 2123]]

preamble indicates, the discretion the FAA had with the current 
Sec. 121.547(a)(4) to issue authorization to enter the flightdeck will 
now be systemically overseen and controlled.
    Existing Sec. 121.547(a)(4) is modified slightly in the new rule 
for clarification purposes only. In the current rule in order for a 
person to gain entry to the flightdeck that person must have permission 
of three people including the ``certificate holder.'' In the revised 
language the agency adds the phrase ``an appropriate management 
official of part 119'' certificate holder to make clear which 
certificate holder the agency is referring to. Similar changes have 
been made to Sec. 121.547(c)(4), (c)(5) and (c)(6). Because these 
changes are clarifying in nature, notice and comment procedures are not 
required.
    In current Sec. 121.581(c), the regulations allowed on certain 
aircraft, that did not have an observer seat on the flightdeck, that 
the cockpit door could remain open when an FAA inspector is conducting 
an inspection. Under the current rule the FAA inspector would conduct 
the inspection in a forward passenger seat. The last section of current 
Sec. 121.581(c) is being deleted because allowing cockpit doors to 
remain open during flight is inconsistent with Section 104(a)(1)(C) of 
the Act. This amendment is being adopted without following APA notice 
and comment procedures pursuant to Section 104(a)(1) of the Act.
    Section 121.587 is being revised to require that the flightcrew 
compartment door be closed and locked at all times when the aircraft is 
being operated. Previously, the rules only required the door to be 
closed and locked during flight. With this amendment, the door will 
also have to be closed and locked during taxi, takeoff, and landing 
roll. The ``good cause'' justification for not using the normal APA 
notice and comment procedures is that the recent terrorist attacks make 
clear that security and safety dictate that--except as provided in 
Sec. 121.587(b)-- the door shall be closed and locked at all times when 
the aircraft is being operated. As has been discussed regarding other 
provisions of this amendment, to the extent this provision may be seen 
as exceeding the authority provided by Section 104 of the Act to issue 
this regulation without notice and comment procedures, the FAA finds 
good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B) for not following those 
procedures. Prohibiting access, as required by the Act, without 
addressing all phases of operation, would leave a potentially serious 
loophole in the requirement that was not intended by Congress. 
Therefore, providing notice and prior opportunity to comment on this 
provision is impracticable and contrary to the public interest.
    Current Sec. 121.587(b)(1) allows the flightdeck door to remain 
opened during takeoff and landing if the crew compartment door is the 
means of access to a required passenger emergency exit or floor level 
exit. This section is being deleted for the same reasons that 
Sec. 121.587(a) is being amended.
    Section 121.587(b)(3) currently permits the flightdeck door to be 
open if the use of the observer seat (jumpseat) will not permit the 
door to be closed. This section is deleted because Section 104(a)(1)(C) 
of the Act does not allow for such a provision. Thus, the flightdeck 
door may not be ajar to accommodate a jumpseat occupant for the 
duration of the flight. The legislative history for Section 104(a) of 
the Act indicates that on the rare occasions when a flightdeck door 
will be opened during flight, Congress expected the opening of that 
door to be brief and that the door will be closed and locked quickly.

Future Rulemaking

    As noted previously, the regulations currently only require the 
installation of a flightdeck door for passenger-carrying transport 
category airplanes operating under part 121. In light of the events of 
September 11, 2001, and in accordance with Sections 104(a)(1)(c) and 
104(a)(2) of the Act, the FAA is reviewing the need for flightdeck 
doors on all air carrier airplanes, including US cargo operations. In 
addition, as the events of September 11, 2001, make clear, additional 
security measures will also be required for aircraft operated by 
foreign operators. The 33\rd\ ICAO Assembly unanimously passed a 
resolution that calls on all States to implement additional security 
measures and directs the ICAO Council to strengthen ICAO security 
standards. The FAA is working with civil aviation authorities and with 
ICAO to rapidly develop and implement measures that will improve 
flightdeck security.
    The FAA expects that ICAO will adopt requirements for intrusion 
resistant flightdeck doors to complement the existing Annex 8 
requirements, and make those requirements a condition of operation 
under Annex 6. The FAA is aware of efforts underway in ICAO to do this, 
and will support those efforts. The FAA also expects that the CAA of 
those countries overseeing operators with part 129 operations 
specifications approvals will adopt their own standards for improved 
flightdeck security, similar to what the FAA is adopting here, and make 
those requirements applicable to their existing fleets. Given the 
urgency of the situation, such requirements and modifications necessary 
to meet those requirements should be established by April 2002, such 
that airplanes operating in the United States, whether foreign or 
domestic, will have improved flightdeck security by April 9, 2003.
    To facilitate and promote a global effort such as this, the FAA 
intends to consult and work with other regulatory authorities over the 
next several months. On the basis of these consultations, the FAA will 
determine whether specific rulemaking in part 129 is required. Such a 
rule, if necessary, would likely require compliance with the same 
standards imposed by this amendment, or with an equivalent standard 
imposed by the State of Registry or the equivalent ICAO requirement, at 
the discretion of the Administrator.
    As discussed earlier, the FAA issued the SFAR 92 series of rules to 
authorize, and now mandate, installation of internal locking devices on 
flight deck doors on part 121 aircraft. These modifications provide 
immediate flightdeck security improvements until the installation of 
permanent solutions as outlined in this amendment. The SFAR 92 
authority was first issued on October 9, 2001, and operators 
immediately began modifying doors. The FAA expects part 129 operators 
to install and use similar locking devices and that their States of 
Registry would issue waivers similar to SFAR 92 to allow these 
modifications. The FAA views these modifications as essential to near-
term security of aircraft, whether they are operated in part 121, or 
part 129 operations to and from the US. The FAA has the continued 
expectation that part 129 operators and their States of Registry will 
take the necessary actions to install internal locking devices and that 
those modifications will be made on or before the date set for full 
part 121 installation in February 2002 by SFAR 92-3. The FAA will 
closely monitor the activities of part 129 operators to determine if 
the locking devices are installed and used in the time frame provided 
by SFAR 92-3 and will initiate rulemaking if they are not.
    In addition, Section 104(c) of the Act states the following:
    ``The Administrator shall investigate means of securing the 
flightdeck of scheduled passenger aircraft operating in air 
transportation or intrastate air transportation that do not have a 
rigid fixed door with a lock between the passenger compartment and the

[[Page 2124]]

flightdeck and issue such an order as the Administrator deems 
appropriate to ensure the inaccessibility, to the greatest extent 
feasible, of the flightdeck while the aircraft is so operating, taking 
into consideration such aircraft operating in regions where there is 
minimal threat to aviation security or national security.'' This 
section addresses both airplane type and mode of operation.
    The FAA will consider whether other types of airplanes should be 
equipped with flightdeck doors meeting the standards of this amendment, 
and solicits comments on this issue. Commuter category airplanes will 
be a focus of the FAA's deliberations on potential future 
applicability. Other changes, as outlined in Section 104(a)(2) of the 
Act, may also be proposed.
    The FAA solicits comments on the need to expand the requirement for 
installation of a flightdeck door to other domestic operations. The FAA 
intends to propose further rulemaking if it determines that the current 
requirements of Sec. 121.313(f) need to be expanded to other 
operations. For example, during cargo operations under part 121, 
operators are allowed to transport certain persons that are identified 
in Sec. 121.583. The FAA is considering whether it is necessary to 
require improved flightdeck security on all cargo airplanes. The FAA is 
also considering whether to require strengthening flightdeck doors on 
transport category aircraft operated under parts 91, 125 and 135. We 
solicit comments on this issue.
    As noted, this amendment only addresses the flightdeck door, as 
required by the Act. However, the FAA considers that a comprehensive 
assessment of flightdeck security must include all barriers between the 
flightdeck and occupied areas. Therefore, the FAA intends to propose 
further rulemaking that would apply the requirements adopted here to 
flightdeck bulkheads, floors and ceilings that separate the pilot and 
passenger compartments for new type designs under part 25. At that 
time, the need to consider the ballistic protection capability of the 
door after it has been tested for intrusion resistance would also 
become a requirement.
    The FAA also expects to further amend new Sec. 25.795 to add the 
remainder of the ARAC recommendations concerning survivability of 
systems, cargo fire suppression, smoke and fumes protection (cabin and 
flightdeck), least risk bomb location and design, and interior design 
to deter hiding of dangerous articles and enhance searching. Therefore 
other paragraphs in Sec. 25.795 of this amendment are identified and 
marked as ``reserved.''

Paperwork Reduction Act

    In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 
3507(d)), the FAA has determined that there are no requirements for 
information collection associated with this rule.

International Compatibility

    In keeping with US obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. As discussed 
earlier, this rule is partially responsive to Amendment 97 to ICAO 
Annex 8, and the FAA plans further action to address the remainder of 
the Amendment 97 requirements.

Good Cause for Immediate Adoption

    As discussed previously, the Act requires that this regulation be 
issued without prior public notice and opportunity to comment.
    For those provisions that are arguably not required to be adopted 
by the Act, Section 553(b)(3)(B) and 553(d)(3) of the Administrative 
Procedures Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. Secs. 553(b)(3)(B) and 553(d)(3) 
authorize agencies to dispense with certain notice procedures for rules 
when they find ``good cause'' to do so. Under Sec. 553(b)(3)(B), the 
requirements of notice and opportunity for comment do not apply when 
the agency, for good cause, finds that those procedures are 
``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'' 
Section 553(d)(3) allows an agency, upon finding good cause, to make a 
rule effective immediately, thereby avoiding the 30-day delay effective 
date requirement in Sec. 553.
    For the reasons discussed previously, the FAA finds that notice and 
public comment on this final rule are impracticable, unnecessary, or 
contrary to the public interest. The provisions of this final rule 
require implementation of two security design requirements related to 
protection of the flightdeck. It provides means to protect the 
flightdeck from small arms fire or fragmentation devices, as well as 
means to protect against intrusion into the flightdeck by unauthorized 
persons.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs each Federal agency 
proposing or adopting regulation to first make a reasoned determination 
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the 
economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the 
Trade Agreements Act prohibits agencies from setting standards that 
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. In developing US standards, this act requires agencies to 
consider international standards, and use them where appropriate as the 
basis for US standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995 
requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs and 
benefits, and other effects of proposed and final rules. An assessment 
must be prepared only for rules that impose a Federal mandate on state, 
local, or tribal governments, or on the private sector, likely to 
result in a total expenditure of $100 million or more (adjusted for 
inflation) in any one year.
    In conducting these analyses, the FAA determined that this rule has 
benefits that justify the costs; will not have a significant impact on 
a substantial number of small entities; has no effect on trade-
sensitive activity; and does not impose an unfunded mandate on state, 
local, or tribal government, or on the private sector.

Benefits and Costs

    This rule is the first of a series of FAA rules to improve 
flightdeck integrity, as directed by the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act. This rule establishes the requirements for flightdeck 
door enhancements. As such, the benefits of this rule are to ensure the 
safety and security of the flying public. Since this rule is one of 
several being introduced to avoid a reoccurrence of an event like that 
of September 11, 2001, the benefits will be shared by the entire set of 
rules designed to prevent such a reoccurrence.
    Once the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the 
potential damage from using an aircraft as a weapon of mass 
destruction, flightdeck security was catapulted as an issue of very 
high public interest. Only days after the September 11, 2001, attacks, 
President Bush identified flightdeck security as an issue requiring 
immediate action, and improvements to flightdeck security is one of 
several recommendations set forth by the Secretary of Transportation's 
Rapid Response Team on Aircraft Security. Congress followed with the 
introduction of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, and many 
carriers have voluntarily retrofitted their fleets with improved 
flightdeck doors.

[[Page 2125]]

    The cost of the September 11, 2001, catastrophic terrorist act 
cannot be measured easily in dollars. While those losses are estimated 
to be potentially in the tens of billions of dollars, the costs of 
another incident could possibly be even higher. Based on changes in the 
aviation security risk, and the Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act, the FAA believes that the benefit of this regulation is warranted 
to prevent flightdeck access by unauthorized persons.
    Applicants for new, amended, or supplemental type certificates 
under part 25 will be affected by this rule. These applicants typically 
include manufacturers and modifiers. The additional cost to an airplane 
manufacturer is the additional cost of the door, because the flightdeck 
door installation costs in a new airplane are roughly equal. The 
increased purchase cost of a $9,000 hardened flightdeck door over that 
of a $6,000 current door is $3,000. Based on this incremental cost of 
$3,000, and the expected manufacturing of 360 airplanes under a new 
type certificate, the cost of this rule to part 25 manufacturers is 
expected to be $1.1 million ($0.7 million, discounted). Additionally, 
some certification costs will be incurred to prove compliance of the 
new door, but these costs are expected to be relatively small, at 
approximately $0.1 million.
    For the analysis affecting part 121 operators, the aviation 
industry provided estimated purchase and installation costs of future 
compliant flightdeck doors to range from a base case of $12,000 ($9,000 
for the door and $3,000 for installation) to an upper bound of $17,000, 
which includes the certification costs. Our current information 
indicates that $12,000 will provide a door that meets the standards set 
forth in this rule. Alaska Airlines removed and installed doors thought 
to meet the new specifications for $12,000 per airplane, and jetBlue 
was able to do so for $10,000 per aircraft. Even though multiple 
sources have lent support to the base case cost of $12,000, no 
flightdeck door has been approved to the new specification. Given the 
uncertainty as to the actual cost of purchasing and installing approved 
flightdeck doors, the FAA has provided an upper-bound estimate of 
$17,000. The FAA solicits comments with supporting documentation with 
respect to projected costs of upgrading flightdeck doors.
    The FAA expects that, now that the specifications are published, 
many carriers will initiate steps toward compliance even before the 
rule takes effect. Approximately 340 aircraft are expected to already 
be compliant with this rule. Operators beyond those that are affected 
by this rule may also choose to voluntarily comply. The FAA estimates 
that 6,631 transport category airplanes flown in scheduled commercial 
service will still need to have their flightdeck doors hardened. The 
base case cost of purchase and installation of these doors results in a 
$79.6 million expense to the operators with the upper bound costs 
reaching $112.7 million.
    In addition, the FAA estimates that the additional 50 pounds 
resulting from a heavier door will result in additional fuel 
requirement costs of $27.5 million ($20.7 million, discounted) over ten 
years. Without exception, every flightdeck door manufacturer claimed 
that their version of a secure flightdeck door could be installed by 
airline technicians overnight, or during an extended overnight. Several 
carriers have already begun, and in some cases completed, the retrofit. 
These carriers were able to perform the retrofit during overnight 
maintenance on 340 aircraft in less than two months. Based on this 
information, the FAA believes that all carriers will have an 
opportunity to have the doors installed overnight or during a 
maintenance check, thereby eliminating the need to take the aircraft 
out of service for any amount of time.
    The total cost of this rule to part 121 operators is, therefore, 
expected to range from the base case of $107.1 million ($98.5 million, 
discounted) to $140.2 million ($131.0 million, discounted) over the 10-
year period. The FAA requests comments as to how many aircraft are 
already compliant with the rule, the costs incurred in retrofitting 
such aircraft (including down-time costs), and how many carriers are 
expected to be compliant prior to the implementation of the rule. Since 
the FAA may extend the flightdeck door requirements in the future, the 
FAA requests similar comments from part 91, 125, and 135 operators.
    This rule is part of a series of FAA rules intended to prevent 
another attack similar to the one of September 11, 2001. The FAA cannot 
provide a reasonable quantitative estimate of benefits because the 
extremely high benefits that are involved in avoiding another similar 
attack, both in terms of averted loss of life and property, and avoided 
damage to the economy, will most likely be in the tens of billions of 
dollars, a figure that overshadows any cost associated with this series 
of rules. The purpose of this particular rule concerning flightdeck 
security is to expedite an important element of the Aviation 
Transportation Security Act. Accordingly, the FAA believes that the 
rule is cost-beneficial and is necessary to ensure a high level of 
aviation safety by providing compliance specification for hardened 
flightdeck door standards to the industry.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a 
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, 
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes, 
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the 
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to 
regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the RFA requires agencies to 
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the 
rationale for their actions. The RFA covers a wide range of small 
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and 
small governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. If the determination is that it will, the 
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in 
the RFA.
    However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule is 
not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 act provides that 
the head of the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility 
analysis is not required. The certification must include a statement 
providing the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning 
should be clear.
    In response to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, this 
rule requires the strengthening of the flightdeck doors for part 25 
manufacturers, and all aircraft with cockpit doors that operate under 
part 121. A full Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is not necessary for 
the reasons presented below.
    The Small Business Administration classifies aircraft manufacturers 
with less than 1,500 employees as small entities. All part 25 US 
transport-aircraft category manufacturers have more than 1,500 
employees. The current United States part 25 airplane manufacturers 
include: Boeing, Cessna Aircraft, Gulfstream Aerospace, Learjet (owned 
by Bombardier), Lockheed Martin, McDonnell Douglas (a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of The Boeing Company), Raytheon Aircraft, and Sabreliner 
Corporation. Thus, no part 25

[[Page 2126]]

manufacturer is considered a small entity.
    To determine the potential economic impact on small entities 
conducting business as part 121 operators, the FAA performed the 
following analysis. First, the FAA estimated the number of small 
entities affected by this final rule. Next, the FAA estimated the 
compliance cost, and then the economic impact.
    This final rule requires enhanced cockpit doors and other 
improvements to be made by part 121 operators who operate transport 
category, passenger and cargo aircraft which have a door between the 
cockpit and passenger compartments. Using the criterion from the North 
American Industry Classification System of the SBA, the affected 
entities that had less than 1,500 employees were estimated. This 
procedure resulted in a list of 43 US operators with less than 1,500 
employees, operating under part 121 that would be affected by this 
rule.
    The estimated compliance cost and economic impact for each small 
entity involved several analytical steps. First, the fleet of aircraft 
operated by part 121 small entities was determined. The FAA obtained 
the small entities' fleets using data from the BACK Associates Fleet 
Database. The BACK Associates Fleet Database provided US operator and 
airplane detail by FAR part number and operator. Second, the purchase 
and installation cost of the hardened flightdeck doors was then 
estimated for the fleet of each small entity. Third, an annual 
reoccurring cost was estimated for the additional fuel required as a 
result of the increased weight of the hardened doors.
    The estimated total compliance cost of each small entity equals the 
sum of the costs of the enhanced cockpit door plus the additional 
annual cost attributable to the increased fuel consumption. The 
purchase and installation cost of the enhanced cockpit doors was 
estimated to be in the range between $12,000 and $17,000 per airplane. 
Additional fuel cost was calculated using data from the FAA's Economic 
Values for Evaluation of Federal Aviation Administration Investment and 
Regulatory Programs, the December 7, 2001 update of Energy Information 
Administration's Weekly Petroleum Status Report, and the FAA Aerospace 
Forecasts.
    The increase cost in fuel consumption was based on the projected 
aircraft Utilization and rate of fuel burn increase. This cost was 
obtained by multiplying the fifty pounds of additional weight times the 
carrier hours flown times the fuel burn rate in gallons/pound/hour 
times the cost of fuel per gallon. This calculation was performed for 
each of the next ten years using the projected cost of fuel discounted 
to the present value.
    The degree to which small entities can ``afford'' the cost of 
compliance is determined by the availability of financial resources. 
The initial implementation costs of the final rule may be financed from 
a variety of sources. As a proxy for the firm's ability to afford the 
cost of compliance, the FAA calculated the ratio of the total present 
value cost of the rule as a percentage of annual revenue. (The FAA 
obtained annual operator revenue from current public filings, the 2000 
winter edition of the World Aviation Directory, and US DOT Form 41 
schedules). Using this methodology, it was found that of the 43 small 
entities potentially affected by this final rule, the total present 
value cost of the rule exceeded 2 percent of only two entities' total 
revenue.
    In the interest of fully assessing the impact of this final rule on 
small entities, the FAA explored the potential competitive impact. The 
route structures and specific markets of five firms were examined. The 
affected firms sometimes compete with large carriers. These large 
carriers will incur the same fixed and marginal cost per airplane. Many 
routes served by the five small entities could be considered local 
monopolies in which the affected carrier is the only provider of 
service. As a result of operating in these ``niche'' markets, a carrier 
would be able to pass some of the cost to its passengers. Thus, as a 
result of this rule there is expected to be little change in 
competition, and little change in market share within the industry.
    The FAA has determined that:
    (1) No part 25 manufacturers are small entities.
    (2) A substantial number of small operators will not be 
significantly impacted by this rule.
    Accordingly, pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 
605(b), the Federal Aviation Administration certifies that this final 
rule will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of 
small entities.

Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from 
engaging in any standards or related activities that create unnecessary 
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Legitimate 
domestic objectives, such as safety, are not considered unnecessary 
obstacles. The statute also requires consideration of international 
standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis for US 
standards.
    In accordance with the above statute, the FAA has assessed the 
potential effect of this rule and has determined that the objective of 
this rule is the safety and security of the United States, and 
therefore not considered an unnecessary obstacle to international 
trade.

Unfunded Mandates Act Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), 
enacted as Pub. L. 104-4 on March 22, 1995, requires each Federal 
agency, to the extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment 
of the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency 
rule that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. 
Section 204(a) of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal 
agency to develop an effective process to permit timely input by 
elected officers (or their designees) of state, local, and tribal 
governments on a proposed ``significant intergovernmental mandate.'' A 
``significant intergovernmental mandate'' under the Act is any 
provision in a Federal agency regulation that will impose an 
enforceable duty upon state, local, and tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one 
year. Section 203 of the Act, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which supplements section 
204(a), provides that before establishing any regulatory requirements 
that might significantly or uniquely affect small governments, the 
agency shall have developed a plan that, among other things, provides 
for notice to potentially affected small governments, if any, and for a 
meaningful and timely opportunity to provide input in the development 
of regulatory proposals or rules.
    This final rule does not contain any Federal intergovernmental or 
private sector mandate because Congress has authorized money for the 
purpose of implementing aircraft security initiatives, including the 
fortification of cockpit doors. Therefore, the requirements of Title II 
of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply.

Regulations Affecting Interstate Aviation in Alaska

    Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 
3213) requires the Administrator, when modifying regulations in title 
14 of the CFR in manner affecting interstate

[[Page 2127]]

aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to which Alaska is not 
served by transportation modes other than aviation, and to establish 
such regulatory distinctions as he or she considers appropriate. 
Because this rule applies to the certification of transport category 
airplanes and their operation, it could affect interstate aviation in 
Alaska. The FAA therefore specifically requests comments on whether 
there is justification for applying the rule differently in interstate 
operations in Alaska.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this rule under the principles and criteria of 
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this action would 
not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. 
Therefore, we determined that this rule would not have federalism 
implications.

Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically 
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
environmental impact statement. In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, 
appendix 4, paragraph 4(j), this rulemaking action qualifies for a 
categorical exclusion.

Energy Impact

    The energy impact of the notice has been assessed in accordance 
with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) Pub. L. 94-163, as 
amended (42 U.S.C. 6362) and FAA Order 1053.1. It has been determined 
that this rulemaking action is not a major regulatory action under the 
provisions of the EPCA.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Federal Aviation Administration, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

14 CFR Part 121

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Safety, Transportation.

The Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) amends parts 25 and 121 of Title 14 Code of 
Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES

    1. The authority citation for parts 25 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 4794.


    2. Section 25.772 is amended by revising the introductory language 
and paragraph (a) and by adding a new paragraph (c) to read as follows:


Sec. 25.772  Pilot compartment doors.

    For an airplane that has a lockable door installed between the 
pilot compartment and the passenger compartment:
    (a) For airplanes with a maximum passenger seating configuration of 
more than 20 seats, the emergency exit configuration must be designed 
so that neither crewmembers nor passengers require use of the 
flightdeck door in order to reach the emergency exits provided for 
them; and
* * * * *
    (c) There must be an emergency means to enable a flight attendant 
to enter the pilot compartment in the event that the flightcrew becomes 
incapacitated.

    3. Part 25 is amended by adding a new Sec. 25.795 to read as 
follows:


Sec. 25.795  Security considerations.

    (a) Protection of flightdeck. If a flightdeck door is required by 
operating rules, the door installation must be designed to:
    (1) Resist forcible intrusion by unauthorized persons and be 
capable of withstanding impacts of 300 Joules (221.3 foot-pounds) at 
the critical locations on the door, as well as a 250 pound (1113 
Newtons) constant tensile load on the knob or handle, and
    (2) Resist penetration by small arms fire and fragmentation devices 
to a level equivalent to level IIIa of the National Institute of 
Justice Standard (NIJ) 0101.04.
    (b) [Reserved]

PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
OPERATIONS

    4. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 44101, 44701-44702, 
44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901, 44903-44904, 
44912, 46105.


    5. Section 121.313 is amended by revising paragraphs (f) and (g) 
and adding paragraph (j) to read as follows:


Sec. 121.313  Miscellaneous equipment.

* * * * *
    (f) A door between the passenger and pilot compartments (i.e., 
flightdeck door), with a locking means to prevent passengers from 
opening it without the pilot's permission, except that nontransport 
category airplanes certificated after December 31, 1964, are not 
required to comply with this paragraph. For airplanes equipped with a 
crew rest area having separate entries from the flightdeck and the 
passenger compartment, a door with such a locking means must be 
provided between the crew rest area and the passenger compartment.
    (g) A key for each door that separates a passenger compartment from 
another compartment that has emergency exit provisions. Except for 
flightdeck doors, a key must be readily available for each crewmember. 
Except as provided below, no person other than a person who is assigned 
to perform duty on the flightdeck may have a key to the flightdeck 
door. Before April 22, 2003, any crewmember may have a key to the 
flightdeck door but only if the flightdeck door has an internal 
flightdeck locking device installed, operative, and in use. Such 
``internal flightdeck locking device'' has to be designed so that it 
can only be unlocked from inside the flightdeck.
* * * * *
    (j) After April 9, 2003, for airplanes required by paragraph (f) of 
this section to have a door between the passenger and pilot or crew 
rest compartments, and for transport category, all-cargo airplanes that 
have a door installed between the pilot compartment and any other 
occupied compartment on January 15, 2002;
    (1) Each such door must meet the requirements of Secs. 25.795 
(a)(1) and (2) in effect on January 15, 2002; and
    (2) Each operator must establish methods to enable a flight 
attendant to enter the pilot compartment in the event that a flightcrew 
member becomes incapacitated. Any associated signal or confirmation 
system must be operable by each flightcrew member from that flightcrew 
member's duty station.

    6. Section 121.547 is amended by revising paragraphs (a) (3) and 
(4) and paragraphs (c)(4) through (6) to read as follow:


Sec. 121.547  Admission to flight deck.

    (a) * * *
    (3) Any person who--
    (i) Has permission of the pilot in command, an appropriate 
management official of the part 119 certificate holder, and the 
Administrator; and
    (ii) Is an employee of--
    (A) The United States, or

[[Page 2128]]

    (B) A part 119 certificate holder and whose duties are such that 
admission to the flightdeck is necessary or advantageous for safe 
operation; or
    (C) An aeronautical enterprise certificated by the Administrator 
and whose duties are such that admission to the flightdeck is necessary 
or advantageous for safe operation.
    (4) Any person who has the permission of the pilot in command, an 
appropriate management official of the part 119 certificate holder and 
the Administrator. Paragraph (a)(2) of this section does not limit the 
emergency authority of the pilot in command to exclude any person from 
the flightdeck in the interests of safety.
* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) A certificated airman employed by another part 119 certificate 
holder whose duties with that part 119 certificate holder require an 
airman certificate and who is authorized by the part 119 certificate 
holder operating the aircraft to make specific trips over a route;
    (5) An employee of the part 119 certificate holder operating the 
aircraft whose duty is directly related to the conduct or planning of 
flight operations or the in-flight monitoring of aircraft equipment or 
operating procedures, if his presence on the flightdeck is necessary to 
perform his duties and he has been authorized in writing by a 
responsible supervisor, listed in the Operations Manual as having that 
authority; and
    (6) A technical representative of the manufacturer of the aircraft 
or its components whose duties are directly related to the in-flight 
monitoring of aircraft equipment or operating procedures, if his 
presence on the flightdeck is necessary to perform his duties and he 
has been authorized in writing by the Administrator and by a 
responsible supervisor of the operations department of the part 119 
certificate holder, listed in the Operations Manual as having that 
authority.

    7. Section 121.581 is amended by revising paragraph (c) to read as 
follows:


Sec. 121.581  Observer's seat; en route inspections.

* * * * *
    (c) For any airplane type certificated before December 20, 1995, 
for not more than 30 passengers that does not have an observer seat on 
the flightdeck, the certificate holder must provide a forward passenger 
seat with headset or speaker for occupancy by the Administrator while 
conducting en route inspections.

    8. Section 121.587 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 121.587  Closing and locking of flightcrew compartment door.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, a pilot in 
command of an airplane that has a lockable flightcrew compartment door 
in accordance with Sec. 121.313 and that is carrying passengers shall 
ensure that the door separating the flightcrew compartment from the 
passenger compartment is closed and locked at all times when the 
aircraft is being operated.
    (b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section do not apply at 
any time when it is necessary to permit access and egress by persons 
authorized in accordance with Sec. 121.547 and provided the part 119 
operator complies with FAA approved procedures regarding the opening, 
closing and locking of the flightdeck doors.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on January 10, 2002.
Jane F. Garvey,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 02-965 Filed 1-10-02; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P