[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 6 (Wednesday, January 9, 2002)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 1108-1115]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-543]



[[Page 1108]]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs Administration

49 CFR Part 192

[Docket No. RSPA-00-7666; Notice 3]
RIN 2137-AD64


Pipeline Safety: High Consequence Areas for Gas Transmission 
Pipelines

AGENCY: Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Research and Special Programs 
Administration (RSPA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) is 
proposing to define areas of high consequence where the potential 
consequences of a gas pipeline accident may be significant or may do 
considerable harm to people and their property. This proposed rule is 
the first step in a two step process to address the integrity 
management programs for gas pipelines.
    RSPA created the proposed definition from the comments received on 
the notice that invited further public comment about integrity 
management concepts as they relate to gas pipelines (Information 
Notice). Additionally, RSPA gathered information through a series of 
discussions and meetings with representatives of the gas pipeline 
industry, research institutions, State pipeline safety agencies and 
public interest groups. The proposed definition does not require any 
specific action by pipeline operators, but will be used in the pipeline 
integrity management rule for gas transmission lines that RSPA is 
currently developing.

DATES: Interested persons are invited to submit written comments by 
March 11, 2002. Late-filed comments will be considered to the extent 
practicable.

ADDRESSES:

Filing Information

    You may submit written comments by mail or delivery to the Dockets 
Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room PL-401, 400 Seventh 
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590-0001. It is open from 10 a.m. to 5 
p.m., Monday through Friday, except federal holidays. All written 
comments should identify the docket and notice numbers stated in the 
heading of this notice. Anyone desiring confirmation of mailed comments 
must include a self-addressed stamped postcard.

Electronic Access

    You may also submit written comments to the docket electronically. 
To submit comments electronically, log on to the following Internet Web 
address: http://dms.dot.gov. Click on ``Help & Information'' for 
instructions on how to file a document electronically.

General Information

    You may contact the Dockets Facility by phone at (202) 366-9329, 
for copies of this proposed rule or other material in the docket. All 
materials in this docket may be accessed electronically at http://dms.dot.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mike Israni by phone at (202) 366-
4571, by fax at (202) 366-4566, or by E-mail at 
[email protected], regarding the subject matter of this proposed 
rule. General information about the RSPA/OPS programs may be obtained 
by accessing OPS's Internet page at http://ops.dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    We are issuing integrity management program requirements for 
pipelines in several steps. RSPA began the series of rulemakings by 
issuing requirements pertaining to hazardous liquid and carbon dioxide 
pipeline operators. A final rule which applies to hazardous liquid 
operators with 500 or more miles of pipeline was published on December 
1, 2000 (65 FR 75378). That rule applies to hazardous liquid and carbon 
dioxide pipelines that can affect high consequence areas, which include 
populated areas defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as urbanized areas or 
places, unusually sensitive environmental areas, and commercially 
navigable waterways. We issued a similar proposed rule for hazardous 
liquid operators with less than 500 miles of pipeline (66 FR 15821; 
March 21, 2001).
    We are now beginning the integrity management rulemakings for gas 
transmission lines by first proposing a definition of high consequence 
areas. This definition will be entirely separate from the definition 
established for hazardous liquid pipelines. We will then propose 
requirements for gas transmission pipeline operators to develop and 
implement integrity management programs to provide additional 
protections to those areas. We are proceeding in two steps for several 
reasons. We gathered and reviewed a great deal of information on where 
the potential consequences of a gas pipeline accident may be 
significant or may do considerable harm to people and their property. 
We compared this information to the areas we currently require enhanced 
protections. We are, however, still collecting information on and 
verifying the validity of pipeline assessment methods other than 
internal inspection devices and pressure testing. Information on viable 
alternative assessment methods for gas transmission pipelines is 
critical to our proposal for an integrity management program. Unlike 
hazardous liquid pipelines, a large percent of gas transmission 
pipelines are not configured for the use of internal inspection devices 
or cannot be taken out of service for any length of time due to the 
disruption of critical gas supply to customers. Therefore, we must 
complete this work before we issue a proposal to address protections 
for gas pipelines in high consequence areas.
    Additionally, while a consensus standard on implementing an overall 
integrity management program is complete, many consensus standards on 
pipeline integrity management that could be incorporated into an 
integrity rulemaking are still under development. Therefore, we decided 
to proceed with a definition based on information we analyzed, and 
continue work on proposed assessment and protection requirements for an 
integrity management program.
    RSPA created this definition through a process which began with the 
goal of improving the assurance of pipeline integrity in those 
geographic areas where a rupture could have the most significant 
consequence on people. We thought it necessary to focus on those 
geographic areas to ensure that operators would expend resources in the 
areas where the benefits would be greatest, while the regulatory 
agencies and the industry continued to learn how to effectively improve 
integrity for the entire pipeline system.
    We next assembled technical information to support development of 
rules to define the geographic areas of focus and prescribe the process 
to be used to increase the assurance of pipeline integrity. This was 
accomplished through a series of discussions and meetings with 
representatives of the gas pipeline industry, research institutions, 
State pipeline safety agencies and public interest groups. We digested 
the technical information from these meetings and developed preliminary 
hypotheses about how the rules should be structured. These hypotheses 
were documented in the Information Notice (66 FR 34318; June 27, 2001), 
which invited public comment both on the

[[Page 1109]]

hypotheses and on the technical issues requiring resolution.
    We developed the definition that we are proposing in this 
rulemaking based on the technical input received during the series of 
stakeholder meetings and the comments received on the Federal Register 
Notice. The use of this definition for areas of high consequence, in 
conjunction with implementation of future integrity management 
requirements, represents a major step in increasing the assurance of 
integrity for gas pipeline systems. Once integrity management program 
requirements are in place for the high consequence areas, RSPA will 
review the benefits achieved for future consideration of whether to 
extend integrity management requirements to other areas on pipelines. 
This review will also help us formulate effective practices to further 
enhance the integrity of the entire pipeline infrastructure.
    RSPA's goal in developing the gas pipeline integrity management 
rules is to provide the regulatory structure required for operators to 
focus their resources on improving pipeline integrity in the areas 
where a pipeline failure would have the greatest impact on public 
safety. The RSPA philosophy toward gas pipelines is to build on current 
Class location regulations which require the operator to know what 
people by location would be impacted by a pipeline rupture, and to 
require added assurance of pipeline integrity in the areas where the 
population density is greatest.
    These current Class location regulations, which are unique to gas 
pipelines, require an operator to periodically (typically done 
annually) monitor and record data on increases in population near its 
pipelines. Data monitoring gives a current and very accurate picture of 
where people live and work who could be affected by a pipeline release.
    Since January 2000, RSPA has met with State agencies, 
representatives of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America 
(INGAA), the American Gas Association (AGA), Battelle Memorial 
Institute, the Gas Technology Institute (GTI), Hartford Steam Boiler 
Inspection and Insurance Company, and operators covered under 49 CFR 
part 192. (See DOT Docket No. 7666 for summaries of the meetings.) We 
also met with the Western States' Land Commissioners, National 
Governors Association, National League of Cities, National Council of 
State Legislators, Environmental Defense, Public Interest Reform Group, 
and Working Group on Communities Right-To-Know.
    From these meetings we gained a clearer understanding of four 
significant characteristics of gas pipelines that we used in developing 
a proposed definition of high consequence areas. First, the effects of 
a gas pipeline rupture and subsequent explosion are highly localized. 
The physical properties of natural gas dictate that it rises upward 
from a rupture or hole in the pipeline as the gas expands into the air. 
The observation of damage at the sites of pipeline ruptures confirmed 
this behavior of gas. Second, the zone of damage from an explosion and 
burning of gas following a pipeline rupture is related to the line's 
diameter and the pressure at which the pipeline is operated. Again, 
RSPA confirmed these patterns from observing the heat affected zone 
surrounding actual pipeline ruptures and explosions. We correlated 
these observations using a simplified mathematical model relating the 
properties of the gas, the pipe diameter, and the operating pressure to 
the predicted heat affected zone. Third, the size of the heat affected 
zone from pipeline ruptures where pipe diameter was less than 36 inches 
and operating pressures were at or below 1000 psig, was limited to a 
diameter of approximately 660 feet.
    RSPA corroborated the size of the heat affected zone by observing 
the sites of actual ruptures. The size of the zone is also consistent 
with the current Class location definitions. This consistency is not 
surprising. Thirty-some years ago when the Class location regulations 
were developed, the 660 foot-wide zone around a pipeline was based on 
available data about a heat affected zone. However, at that time data 
only existed on pipeline failures where the pipe diameter was less than 
36 inches and the operating pressures were lower than 1000 psig. The 
fourth piece of information relevant to our proposed definition is that 
the heat affected zone for pipelines of diameter equal to or greater 
than 36 inches, operating at pressures in excess of 1000 psig, can 
extend to as much as 1000 feet from the pipeline. The size of the zone 
for larger pipelines is based on mathematical models verified by 
comparison with data on the areas burned around actual gas pipeline 
ruptures.
    On the dates of February 12-14, 2001, we held a public meeting in 
Arlington, VA, to discuss integrity management requirements for gas 
pipelines in high consequence areas, and ways to enhance communications 
with the public about hazardous liquid and gas pipelines. This meeting 
featured reports on the status of industry and government activities to 
improve the integrity of gas pipelines. Meeting attendees also 
participated in in-depth discussions on the integrity of gas pipelines. 
The reports can be found in the DOT docket (#7666) and on the RSPA Web 
site under Initiatives/Pipeline Integrity Management Program/Gas 
Transmission Operators Rule.
    At the public meeting, industry and State representatives presented 
their perspectives on a number of issues relating to integrity 
management. Several members of the public also made comments. Topics 
included:
     Considerations for defining high consequence areas 
affected by gas pipelines;
     Evaluation of design factors currently used for gas 
transmission pipelines;
     Evaluation of performance history and experience with the 
impact zone in gas transmission failures;
     Integrity management best practices and relationship 
between incident causes and industry practices;
     Options for various forms of direct assessment of the 
integrity of gas pipelines, including costs and effectiveness;
     Basis for establishing test pressure intervals;
     Appropriateness of using pressure (stress) to 
differentiate integrity standards for pipelines
     Status of research activities; and
     Status of development of new national consensus standards.
    These presentations can be viewed on the RSPA Web site under 
Initiatives/Pipeline Integrity Management Program/Gas Transmission 
Operators Rule.
    We integrated the results from this meeting with the list of 
technical perspectives and issues that RSPA developed during the 
stakeholder meetings held over the previous twelve months. We then 
formulated the hypotheses on which we expected to base an integrity 
management rule and questions related to these hypotheses. We published 
both in a Federal Register Notice that we discuss in the next section.

Notice of Request for Comments

    On June 27, 2001, RSPA issued a notice of request for comments (66 
FR 34318) which asked for further information and clarification, and 
invited further public comment, on defining high consequence areas and 
developing integrity management requirements for gas transmission 
lines. In the notice, RSPA stated its objective to develop a rule on 
gas pipeline integrity management to address threats posed by pipeline 
segments in areas where the consequences of potential pipeline 
accidents pose the greatest risk

[[Page 1110]]

to people and property, and provides additional protections for these 
areas. We had a similar objective when we developed the rules on liquid 
pipeline integrity management programs, although environmental 
protection played a larger role in those rules. We also advised on our 
intention to minimize any actual adverse impact of a new safety 
requirement on the supply of natural gas to customers.
    In the notice, we described the seven elements we believed should 
be included in any gas pipeline integrity management rule. We used 
similar elements in developing the liquid pipeline integrity management 
rules. These elements were based on certain hypotheses we discussed in 
detail in the notice. Then, we invited comment about these elements and 
hypotheses. The notice further summarized the areas where RSPA was 
seeking further information before proposing an integrity management 
program rule for gas operators. We categorized these information needs 
into nine categories, seven of which were the elements we described as 
essential to any integrity management program rule. The other two 
categories were to seek information about the costs of an integrity 
management rulemaking, and the rule's potential impact on gas supply.
    The first element we discussed was how to define high consequence 
areas, i.e., those areas where the potential consequences of a gas 
pipeline accident may be significant or may do considerable harm to 
people and their property. We put forth the following hypotheses for 
comment:
     Data from sites where gas pipelines ruptured and exploded 
show that the range of impact of such explosions is limited. Therefore, 
the area in which nearby residents may be harmed or there may be 
property damaged by potential pipeline ruptures, can be mathematically 
modeled as a function of the physical size of the pipeline and the 
material transported (typically, but not exclusively, natural gas).
     Because we require gas pipeline operators to maintain data 
on the number of buildings within 660 feet of their pipelines, the 
definition of potentially high consequence areas where additional 
integrity assurance measures are needed should incorporate these data.
     The range of impact from the rupture and explosion of very 
large diameter (greater than 36 inches) high pressure (greater than 
1000 psi) gas pipelines is greater than the 660 feet currently used in 
the regulations.
     Special consideration must be given to protect people 
living or working near gas pipelines who would have difficulty 
evacuating the area quickly (e.g., schools, hospitals, nursing homes, 
prisons).
     Due to the relatively small radius of impact of a gas 
pipeline rupture and subsequent explosion, and the behavior of gas 
products, environmental consequences are expected to be limited. At 
this time, RSPA has little information to indicate the definition of 
high consequence areas near gas pipelines should include environmental 
factors.
     Given that pipeline operators maintain extensive data on 
the distribution of people near their pipelines, RSPA intends for 
operators to use these data, together with a narrative definition of a 
high consequence area (defined by RSPA), to identify the specific 
locations of high consequence areas.

Electronic Discussion Forum

    To promote greater discussion of these issues, RSPA also initiated 
an electronic discussion forum which was open from June 27 through 
August 13, 2001, at the RSPA Web site under the subheading ``More 
Information Needed on Gas Integrity Management Program.'' A transcript 
of the electronic discussion forum is placed in this docket. Comments 
received relevant to a definition of high consequence areas are 
discussed here.

Comments to FR Notice on Integrity Management Concepts and 
Hypotheses (Gas Transmission Pipelines)

    Comments to the docket were provided by one state public service 
agency, five industry associations (including one association of 
industrial gas consumers), sixteen companies or groups of companies 
that operate gas pipelines, one company that operates hazardous liquid 
pipelines, and one company that builds pipeline bridges. In this 
document we summarized the comments relating to the first element--
Defining High Consequence Areas. We will summarize and discuss comments 
on the remaining elements when we propose a rule on requirements for 
gas pipeline integrity management programs.

Define the Areas of Potentially High Consequence

    This element of a rule would define the areas where the potential 
consequences of a gas pipeline accident may be significant or may do 
considerable harm to people and property. In the Information Notice, we 
discussed a model that was presented at the February public meeting 
relating gas pipeline diameter and operating pressure to the physical 
boundaries of the area impacted by the heat from a gas pipeline rupture 
and subsequent fire. C-FER, a Canadian research and consulting 
organization, developed the model which predicted the extent of the 
heat affected zone would be 660 feet for pipelines of up to 36 inches 
diameter and operating at pressures up to 1000 psig, and 1000 feet for 
larger pipelines operating at 1000 psig or higher. The model used 5000 
BTU/hr-ft\2\ as the critical heat flux for defining the impact radius. 
We requested comment on the validity of this model, and of any other 
models that could be used in developing a definition. We requested 
comment on the validity of limiting an impact zone to areas where there 
are more than 25 houses or a facility housing people of limited 
mobility.
    We requested comment on the feasibility of including all populous 
areas where the impact radius could exceed 660 feet, and of including 
high traffic roadways, railways and places where people are known to 
congregate, such as, churches, beaches, recreational facilities, 
museums, zoos, and camping grounds. We also requested further 
information on the impacts of a gas release on areas of environmental 
significance, and for comment on including any of these areas in a 
definition.

Comments

    AGA and APGA, trade associations representing investor-owned and 
municipally-owned gas utilities, submitted joint comments. They stated 
that high consequence areas should be defined by class location, 
census-based population data and the zone of influence analysis in the 
C-FER report. They commented that operators collect and use information 
establishing class location and that such data can be readily 
incorporated into a definition, but they believe census data should 
also be an option.
    While AGA and APGA agreed with providing special protection for 
facilities housing people with limited mobility, they maintained that 
identifying these facilities may be very difficult if they are not 
licensed and listed by a city or state. They further maintained that it 
is not appropriate to analyze every place where people may congregate 
or every roadway intersection, because this information is very dynamic 
and would be very difficult to keep current. These associations also 
argued against including commercially navigable waterways or 
environmentally sensitive areas because Congress did not mandate

[[Page 1111]]

these areas be included in a gas pipeline integrity rule, and a gas 
release would not present a significant risk to these areas.
    AGA and APGA argued that requiring operators to maintain and submit 
detailed population data is inefficient. They pointed out that some 
operators do not keep current data on populations near their pipelines, 
but rather treat all lines as though they were Class 4. Also, that for 
older pipelines, the most available record would be the class location 
distribution along their pipelines.
    AGL Resources, Inc., a parent company of Atlanta Gas Light Co., 
Chattanooga Gas Co., and Virginia Natural Gas, supported using the 
current definitions of Class 3 and 4 locations because the large 
majority of their transmission lines are designed to operate in class 4 
locations. .
    The Association of Texas Intrastate Natural Gas Pipelines commented 
that using class locations to define high consequence areas would be 
appropriate since operators already maintain this information. The 
Association recommended we only include additional criteria that can be 
applied uniformly across all pipeline systems, such as class locations 
where the impact radius exceeds 660 feet. The Association argued 
against including high traffic roadways and places where people are 
known to congregate because these areas would be too subjective and 
therefore difficult to interpret or enforce uniformly. The Association 
maintained that although gas pipelines pose insignificant environmental 
risks, it would be appropriate to require operators to evaluate their 
systems to determine areas where condensate or other liquids are known 
to accumulate, and where a rupture would lead to release of these 
liquids near sensitive wildlife areas or bodies of water.
    Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (BG&E ), a natural gas 
distribution system operator, commented that a definition should 
incorporate non-population factors, particularly those based on the 
risk posed by a pipe segment, not simply the consequences of failure. 
BG&E also stated that the definition should differentiate transmission 
pipelines which are part of a distribution system where they are 
closely coupled to the distribution process, but did not suggest how to 
do this.
    Chevron Pipe Line Company (CPL) supported protecting areas with 
facilities housing people unable to evacuate the area quickly. CPL was 
not in favor of including places where people congregate, because CPL 
thought the term too broad and it could easily encompass the entire 
length of a pipeline thereby diluting the focus on enhancing integrity 
in high risk areas.
    Consumers Energy Company did not agree with defining high 
consequence area primarily by population density. Rather, Consumers 
Energy thought other factors that affect the overall risk a pipeline 
poses should be considered, such as pipeline operations, performance 
history and wall thickness.
    El Paso Pipeline Group, an operator of five major natural gas 
transmission pipelines, commented that a definition should protect 
those areas where population density is greatest. El Paso urged RSPA to 
develop a workable definition which would take into consideration that 
operators have been collecting land use data relating to dwellings and 
other structures located within 660 feet of their pipelines. El Paso 
further urged RSPA to rely on the Gas Research Institute (GRI) study, 
dated December, 2001 (GRI-00/0189--``A Model for Sizing High 
Consequence Areas Associated With Natural Gas Pipelines'') because this 
study shows that the impact on the heat-affected zone depends on many 
factors beyond the heat flux value. Due to many factors involved, El 
Paso was in favor of the value used in the C-FER analysis as a 
reasonable value.
    Enron Transportation Services (ETS) commented that using the 
current definitions of Class 3 and 4 locations would allow operators to 
integrate the existing population data they maintain (data on populated 
areas within 660 feet of a pipeline) into an integrity management plan. 
ETS maintained that the current definitions of class 3 and 4 areas 
should pick up less densely-populated areas on the fringe of these 
areas. ETS recommended that a definition include locations of 
facilities housing people of impaired mobility because these locations 
are consistent with the purpose of the class location process. ETS 
further added that many operators are already locating these facilities 
as part of their class location survey determination. ETS also 
supported the critical heat flux value used in the C-FER analysis as a 
reasonable value for evaluating a high consequence area.
    ETS was against including crossings of roads and railways because 
of the low relative risk posed by pipelines at these locations, 
compared to the risk presented by vehicle and train traffic. ETS 
maintained that patrols of these locations, as the pipeline safety 
regulations currently require, will identify any potential problems. 
ETS further argued that places where the public congregates are already 
treated as populated areas requiring an increased level of protection. 
As for environmental areas, ETS commented that natural gas presents 
little threat to water and many pipeline rights-of-way have already had 
cultural resource clearance. Although ETS did not dispute that a 
threatened species or habitat could be affected, it did not want such 
areas generally included. ETS recommended operators treat such areas on 
a case-by-case basis, but such areas not be mapped for security reasons 
(e.g., the sole remaining habitat of a threatened or endangered 
species).
    INGAA, a trade organization which represents interstate natural gas 
transmission pipeline companies, offered several comments about the 
hypotheses for the high consequence area definition. INGAA explained 
the 660-foot radius used in developing part 192 was based on 
photographs of actual burn areas from the ignition of a pipeline 
rupture; however, in 1970, few pipelines larger than 30 inches in 
diameter or operating at pressures higher than 1000 psig existed. INGAA 
further explained that the 5000 BTU/hr-ft\2\ radiation heat flux used 
in the C-FER model was developed as part of an integrated analysis to 
define the heat affected zone around a ruptured natural gas pipeline 
and the results of this analysis were validated against data on the 
extent of the burn zone from actual pipeline ruptures. INGAA explained 
that this model produced a 660-foot radius circle for a 30-inch 
diameter pipeline operating at 1000 psig. INGAA did not see why the 
methodology could not be applied to a pipeline transporting hydrogen.
    INGAA stated that a 25-house limit for a high impact zone is 
consistent with the definition for hazardous liquid pipelines, where a 
population density of 1000 people or more per square mile was used. 
INGAA maintained that this translates to 25 houses within a circle of 
660-foot radius, assuming two people per house. INGAA further argued 
that based on typical Class 3 population density, 25 houses is an 
appropriate number and consistent with class location regulations.
    INGAA argued that it would be too expensive to collect data on 
areas beyond the 660-foot radius. However, INGAA would support 
extending the area of protection beyond the 660-foot corridor for 
structures containing concentrations of people with limited mobility, 
such as, hospitals, schools, childcare facilities, retirement 
communities or prisons. INGAA explained that this is consistent with 
the current draft of the Integrity

[[Page 1112]]

Management Appendix to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 
B31.8 Std.
    INGAA argued that current definitions for Class 3 and 4 areas 
probably cover many areas where people congregate. INGAA acknowledged 
that high traffic roadways and railways would not be covered if they 
were not already in Class 3 and 4 areas, but thought these areas are 
probably addressed through design, construction, operation and 
maintenance requirements.
    INGAA was opposed to including any environmental areas in the 
definition. INGAA explained that methane releases would inflict very 
limited collateral damage to wildlife and would not impact water 
supplies.
    Keyspan Energy Delivery, a local distribution company (LDC), was in 
favor of defining high consequence areas as Class 3 and 4 locations 
because its lines comply with the requirements for these class 
locations. Keyspan was also in favor of clearly defined areas, but 
wanted any definition to recognize that LDCs cannot precisely evaluate 
and re-evaluate such areas. Keyspan recommended a definition which 
would allow for performance-based variables but did not provide any 
examples.
    Kinder Morgan, Inc., a large midstream energy company, favored a 
definition of high consequence areas which uses a model, such as the 
one C-FER developed, relating pipeline diameter and operating pressure 
to the physical boundaries of the area of impact. Kinder Morgan 
recommended further that we use a sliding approach where high 
consequence areas would be defined as areas of high population density 
within the C-FER defined hazard area. Kinder Morgan maintained that 
areas where people congregate are currently covered in the definition 
of Class 3, and that these areas should be included in the high 
consequence area definition only if they are located within the defined 
hazard area for a given pipeline.
    MidAmerican Energy Company, a combination gas and electric utility, 
generally agreed with the definitions recommended by AGA/APGA and 
INGAA, because these definitions would not impact its operations. 
MidAmerican commented that if high traffic roadways are included they 
need to be clearly defined, and suggested definitions. MidAmerican also 
clarified that including places where people congregate would have 
minimal impact on its operations.
    The New York Gas Group (NYGAS), a natural gas utility trade 
association, suggested we replace the term high consequence area with a 
less inflammatory term such as Affected Area. NYGAS agreed with 
including Class 3 and 4 locations but argued that it will be virtually 
impossible for local distribution companies to identify facilities 
housing people with impaired mobility unless such facilities are 
licensed or are on a list that an operator can obtain. NYGAS was 
opposed to using census data to determine a high consequence area, 
because they believe the data is not accurate and is updated every ten 
years. NYGAS did not support including high traffic roadways, railways 
and places where people congregate in the definition because of the 
uncertainty and complexity of trying to include these elements.
    New York State Department of Public Service (NYDPS) commented that 
in addition to facilities housing people with limited mobility, 
consideration should be given to special features near pipelines, such 
as places of public assembly, historical landmarks, parks, bridges, 
power line corridors, other pipeline facilities, major roadways, and 
railways.
    NYDPS supported the concept of an impact radius for determining 
high consequence areas, but contended that the C-FER model (using 5000 
BTU/hr-ft\2\) conveniently results in an impact radius of about 660 
feet. Based on this outcome, NYDPS believes the impact zone will never 
extend beyond the current class location for most operators. NYDPS 
suggested defining a more appropriate critical heat flux value (one 
lower than the C-FER model) so the impact radius could extend beyond 
the 660 feet.
    The Energy Distribution Segment of NiSource Inc. (NiSource EDG), 
which is comprised of ten distribution companies, expressed concern 
that basing a high consequence area on the potential for considerable 
harm, would be too expansive to be of any practical value. NiSource EDG 
thought that a definition should consider the number of persons who 
might be harmed, as well as the potential significance of the harm, and 
that it should also include identifiable physical locations where 
people are unable to evacuate or to take protective actions.
    NiSource EDG was against basing an impact zone on the number of 
houses, because data from which an operator could extrapolate the 
number of houses might not exist. NiSource explained that because many 
local distribution companies design their systems to be consistent with 
the requirements of a Class 4 location, they do not monitor housing 
distribution data near their pipelines. Therefore, NiSource EDG argued, 
imposing criteria which would require local distribution companies to 
initiate class location surveys would delay implementation of a rule, 
increase administrative and record-keeping burdens, and be extremely 
expensive.
    NiSource argued against including an environmental component in the 
definition, and against including what it maintained were nebulous 
areas, i.e., high traffic roadways, railways, and places where people 
congregate.
    Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E ), a utility subsidiary of 
PG&E Corporation, supported the use of structure data but noted that 
once a class location reaches 3, the structure data is no longer 
accumulated or may not be kept current. PG&E proposed that operators be 
allowed to use third party data sources which address the location of 
high consequence structures, as well as census data to determine 
whether housing density could reach or exceed 25 structures within a 
circle defined by an analysis such as the C-FER model. PG&E supported 
use of the C-FER model for larger diameter pipelines, and supported 
allowing more extensive models for operators that choose to perform a 
more detailed analysis of the impact zone following a pipeline rupture. 
PG&E supported including day-care facilities with more than 25 people, 
but was opposed to including any environmental component in a 
definition.
    Tosco Corporation, an independent refiner and marketer of gasoline 
and other petroleum products, and a pipeline owner and operator, was in 
favor of using existing class 3 and 4 location criteria. Tosco also 
believed that other relevant factors must be considered in determining 
how to protect an area beyond 660 feet from the pipeline, such as line 
diameter, line pressure and local environmental conditions. Tosco was 
opposed to micro-determining a high consequence area down to a foot 
basis, as maintaining data on such precise areas could be unmanageable. 
Tosco was not in favor of using census data to define its high 
consequence areas, rather, it favored counting structures within 660 
feet of a pipeline.

Electronic Forum Comments

    A commenter to the electronic forum reminded RSPA that the 
Carlsbad, New Mexico, failure happened in a low consequence area, and 
high consequence areas should be defined as areas where there is a high 
probability that the pipeline could be damaged by outside forces.
    Another commenter from a school facilities planning division argued 
that

[[Page 1113]]

schools are extremely high consequence areas and should be explicitly 
mentioned.

The Proposed Rule

    RSPA's goal for the gas integrity management rules (the definition 
and the integrity program requirements) is to provide greater assurance 
of pipeline integrity in geographic areas where a gas pipeline rupture 
could do the most harm to people. Through our proposed definition of 
high consequence areas, and the integrity management program 
requirements now under development, we will ensure that an operator's 
resources are expended on areas where the benefits will be the 
greatest. Once we propose and implement the integrity management 
program requirements for the areas we define, we will study the results 
and consider how effective it would be to extend added protection to 
other areas.
    The areas we propose to define as high consequence areas for gas 
transmission pipelines are different from those we defined for 
hazardous liquid pipelines (see 49 CFR 195.450). The areas we defined 
for hazardous liquid pipelines were without regard to where the 
pipeline was located; whereas the proposed areas for gas transmission 
pipelines are defined with respect to a zone around a pipeline. 
Furthermore, certain sensitive environmental areas were included in the 
high consequence areas for hazardous liquid pipelines but are not 
included in the proposed definition for gas pipelines. The differences 
are due to differences in the physical properties of the products and 
consequences of a gas release versus a hazardous liquid release, and 
the benefits of having accurate data on population already maintained 
by gas transmission operators.
    Due to the physical properties of gas, the rupture of a gas 
pipeline impacts a very limited area adjacent to the location of the 
rupture. In contrast, when a liquid pipeline ruptures, the liquid can 
flow a greater distance from the site of the rupture. Furthermore, 
unlike a liquid release, the rupture of a gas pipeline cannot lead to 
far-reaching damage to habitats of threatened or endangered species. 
Moreover, gas released from a pipeline rupture flows upward into the 
air following a rupture, and so cannot pollute drinking water or 
ecological resources.
    RSPA based the population component of the definition for hazardous 
liquid pipelines on the U.S. Census Bureau's definition of urbanized 
areas and places. As hazardous liquid operators are not required to 
maintain population data, we decided to use the U.S. Census Bureau's 
definitions because they were the best available data on population 
adjacent to hazardous liquid pipelines. In contrast, because gas 
pipeline safety requirements are structured according to class location 
(i.e., population density), gas pipeline operators already maintain 
current data on the location of people in areas adjacent to their 
pipelines. We are confident this data is accurate. Thus, it seemed 
logical to structure a definition that would use the data pipeline 
companies already collect and maintain.
    Nonetheless, even though the we structured the gas pipeline high 
consequence areas differently from the hazardous liquid high 
consequence areas, the inclusion of both Class 3 and 4 locations in the 
proposed definition is consistent with the census-defined areas 
encompassing population density of approximately 1000 people per square 
mile. In Class 3 locations, the lower limit on occupied buildings in a 
sliding mile is 46 (i.e., an area one mile long and 1320 (2  x  660) 
feet wide), which is equivalent to a population density of 460 people 
per square mile assuming 2.5 people per building. Other populated areas 
included in the hazardous liquid definition are picked up in the 
proposed definition by the lower population density value used in the 
Class 3 location definition and by including isolated buildings near a 
pipeline that house people with limited mobility.
    RSPA's proposed definition of high consequence areas for gas 
transmission pipelines extends to areas beyond current class locations, 
or in other words, beyond areas where operators are currently required 
to have data. Our analysis of data on the area affected by a pipeline 
accident, demonstrated the need for special consideration of buildings 
located more than 300 feet from the pipeline that house people with 
limited mobility. It also demonstrated a need for consideration of 
areas near gas pipelines of diameter greater than 30 inches and 
operating at pressures in excess of 1000 psig. Therefore, we are 
including in the proposed definition, areas out to 660 feet from a 
pipeline (1000 feet from a pipeline with a diameter greater than 30 
inches and operating at a pressure greater than 1000 psig) where there 
are buildings housing people with limited mobility and areas where 
people congregate. Although operators are not currently required to 
maintain data on these areas, operators are required to patrol their 
pipeline right-of-way. Based on these requirements, we believe 
operators should have knowledge of where people congregate near their 
pipeline. Additionally, this information should be available from local 
public safety officials.
    Our basis for extending the area to 1000 feet is based on the C-FER 
model, previously discussed in this document. (Their report is in 
Docket #7666). The C-FER Model demonstrated that large diameter pipe 
(greater than 30 inches) operated at pressures greater than 1000 psig 
has the potential to impact an area greater than 660 feet from the 
pipeline. The C-FER analysis was based on a simplified model of a gas 
pipeline rupture. The model included simplified mathematical treatment 
of several phenomena important to characterizing the extent of damage 
following a pipeline rupture (for example, critical heat flux, the time 
of ignition of the escaping gas, the height of the burning jet, the 
pipe decompression rate). The model also included estimates of several 
important parameters associated with the phenomena. Due to the 
simplifications in the model and the need to select values for the key 
parameters, the model was validated by comparing its predictions with 
the results of actual incidents for which the burn radius (area around 
the rupture which experienced damage) associated with a pipeline 
rupture and ignition could be measured. The C-FER report shows these 
comparisons between model predictions and observed burn areas. The 
comparisons appear to validate the predictive ability of the model.

High Consequence Areas

    We considered the comments and information received in response to 
the hypotheses presented in the Information Notice. We developed a 
proposed definition of high consequence areas for gas transmission 
pipelines based on the hypotheses and comments, as well as our 
extensive analysis of technical information from diverse sources. Our 
primary concern is with protecting populated areas from a gas release. 
Therefore, we are proposing to include the following class location 
areas, which are already defined in part 192. We concluded that these 
areas will encompass about 85% of populated areas, which is comparable 
to the percentage of populated areas picked by the hazardous liquid 
definition using the Census Bureau's definitions. These are the areas 
where gas transmission pipeline operators maintain data on population 
and buildings near their pipelines.
     Class 3 areas. Class 3 areas are defined in the pipeline 
safety regulations as a class location unit with 46 or more buildings 
intended for

[[Page 1114]]

human occupancy. A class location unit is an area that extends 220 
yards on either side of the centerline of any continuous one-mile 
length of pipeline. A class 3 area is also an area where the pipeline 
lies within 100 yards of either a building or a small, well-defined 
outside area, such as a playground, recreation area, outdoor theater, 
or other place of public assembly, which is occupied by 20 or more 
persons on at least 5 days a week for 10 weeks in any 12-month period. 
Neither the days nor the weeks need be consecutive.
     Class 4 areas. Class 4 areas are any class location unit 
which include buildings with four or more stories.
    We are proposing to extend the definition of areas of high 
consequence beyond the class location areas. We analyzed the C-FER 
model against RSPA accident data and concluded that a release from most 
pipelines would not affect an area greater than 660 feet. However, we 
also want to ensure that areas where there are facilities with people 
who may not be able to evacuate an area quickly are better protected 
from the likelihood of a pipeline release. Therefore, we propose to 
define these areas as follows:

    An area where a pipeline lies within 660 feet of a hospital, 
school, day-care facility, retirement facility, prison or other 
facility having persons who are confined, are of impaired mobility, 
or would be difficult to evacuate.

    With the use of a commercial database, we are collecting data on 
the locations of these facilities to help identify these areas.
    Our research further demonstrates that a rupture or release from a 
larger-sized pipeline would likely affect an area beyond 660 feet, 
i.e., those pipelines that are more than 30 inches in diameter and 
operate at pressures greater than 1000 psig. Therefore, we are defining 
a larger high consequence area for areas where there are larger high 
pressure pipelines. We propose to define these areas as follows:

    An area where a pipeline lies within 1000 feet from a hospital, 
school, day-care facility, retirement facility, prison or other 
facility having persons who are confined, are of impaired mobility 
or would be difficult to evacuate, where the pipeline is greater 
than 30 inches in diameter and operates at an maximum allowable 
operating pressure (MAOP) of 1000 psig or greater.

    As with the previously described areas, we are using a commercial 
database to help identify these areas.
    In light of recent accident history, particularly, the explosion 
near Carlsbad, New Mexico, RSPA recognizes that the class location 
definitions may not cover all areas where a pipeline may pose a risk to 
the public. There are areas where people may not live, but they gather 
regularly for recreational or other purposes. We propose to define 
these areas as follows:

    An area where a pipeline lies within 660 feet (or within 1000 
feet where the pipeline is greater than 30 inches in diameter and 
operates at a MAOP of 1000 psig or more) where 20 or more persons 
congregate at least 50 days in any 12-month period. (The days need 
not be consecutive.) Examples of such areas include, but are not 
limited to, beaches, recreational facilities, camping grounds, and 
museums.

    The 20-person number is used in the current definition of a class 3 
location. We believe it is representational of the number of people 
that typically frequent a recreational area. This component of the 
proposed high consequence area definition should pick up most 
recreational areas or other areas where the public gathers on a regular 
basis. We have explicitly included camping areas to ensure that areas 
like those where the people were camping near the pipeline in Carlsbad 
will receive additional protection. Also, based on the C-FER model 
calculations, we propose to increase the area of the impacted zone from 
the current 300 feet to 660 feet (or 1000 feet for larger diameter 
pipelines).
    As we previously mentioned, gas transmission operators are not 
currently required to maintain data on areas where people congregate 
near their pipelines. However, because operators are required to patrol 
their pipeline rights-of-way, they should have knowledge about these 
areas. This information should also be available from local public 
safety officials.
    These proposed areas go beyond those specified in current 
regulations in the following ways:
    1. A current Class 3 location includes buildings or areas where 
people congregate located within 300 feet of the pipeline. The proposed 
definition extends these areas from the pipeline out to 660 feet for 
most pipelines and out to 1000 feet for larger pipelines (those greater 
than 30 inches in diameter and operating at pressures greater than 1000 
psig).
    2. Current Class location regulations consider people located 
within 660 feet of a pipeline. The proposed definition includes an 
impact zone of 1000 feet from the pipeline for pipelines greater than 
30 inches in diameter operating at pressures greater than 1000 psig.
    3. Current Class location regulations include no explicit provision 
for facilities housing people with limited mobility. The proposed 
definition includes these facilities.
    4. The proposed definition more explicitly references areas where 
people congregate near a pipeline, particularly, camping grounds.
    We received no comment encouraging the inclusion of environmental 
areas as high consequence areas. In the proposed definition, we did not 
include sensitive environmental areas due to the highly localized 
impact of a gas pipeline rupture and explosion. Since a release from a 
gas pipeline accident is airborne, it is unlikely any major damage will 
occur to a threatened or endangered species. We received a similar 
response to our question on whether to include high traffic areas. We 
did not include such areas in the proposed definition because special 
attention is already given to these areas in the design and maintenance 
of pipelines near road crossings. Furthermore, the number of drivers 
that could be affected by a gas transmission pipeline accident is 
limited due to the highly localized effect of a gas release.

Regulatory Analyses and Notices

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures.
    DOT considers this action to be a non-significant regulatory action 
under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735; October 
4,1993). Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not 
reviewed this rulemaking document. This proposed rule is also not 
significant under DOT's regulatory policies and procedures (44 FR 
11034: February 26, 1979).
    This proposed rule has no cost impact on the pipeline industry or 
the public, as it is only a definition. A regulatory evaluation is 
available in the Docket. The High Consequence Areas definition will be 
used in the forthcoming rulemaking on ``Pipeline Safety: Pipeline 
Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Gas Transmission 
Operators).'' When we issue that proposed rule, we will then fully 
evaluate all the associated costs and benefits.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) RSPA 
must consider whether a rulemaking would have a significant impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. This proposed rulemaking will not 
impose additional requirements on pipeline operators, including small 
entities that operate regulated pipelines. As this action only involves 
a definition, there are no cost implications, and thus, we determined 
it had no impact on small entities. Costs

[[Page 1115]]

are likely to result once we issue requirements for actions that use 
this definition at a later date. RSPA will soon propose integrity 
management requirements for gas transmission pipelines in high 
consequence areas; at that time will examine the costs and benefits of 
that rulemaking. Based on this information demonstrating that this 
rulemaking will not have an economic impact, I certify that this 
proposed rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This notice of proposed rulemaking contains no information 
collection subject to review by OMB under the Paperwork Reduction Act 
of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507 (d)). Therefore, RSPA concludes the proposed 
rule contains no paperwork burden and is not subject to OMB review 
under the paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
    This proposed rule is simply a definition of high consequence 
areas. The definition will be used in the forthcoming rulemaking on 
``Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence 
Areas (Gas Transmission Operators)''. RSPA will prepare a paperwork 
burden analysis for that proposed rule.

Executive Order 13084

    This proposed rule was analyzed in accordance with the principles 
and criteria contained in Executive Order 13084 (``Consultation and 
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments''). Because this proposed 
rule does not significantly or uniquely affect the communities of the 
Indian tribal governments and does not impose substantial direct 
compliance costs, the funding and consultation requirements of 
Executive Order 13084 do not apply.

Executive Order 13132

    This proposed rule was analyzed in accordance with the principles 
and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132 (``Federalism''). This 
proposed rule does not propose any regulation that:
    (1) Has substantial direct effects on the States, the relationship 
between the national government and the States, or the distribution of 
power and responsibilities among the various levels of government;
    (2) Imposes substantial direct compliance costs on States and local 
governments; or
    (3) Preempts state law.
    Therefore, the consultation and funding requirements of Executive 
Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; August 10, 1999) do not apply. Nevertheless, 
in public meetings on November 18-19, 1999, and February 12-14, 2001, 
RSPA invited the National Association of Pipeline Safety 
Representatives (NAPSR), which includes State pipeline safety 
regulators, to participate in a general discussion on pipeline 
integrity. Since then RSPA held conference calls with NAPSR to receive 
their input before proposing a definition of high consequence areas.

Unfunded Mandates

    This proposed rule does not impose unfunded mandates under the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does not result in costs of 
$100 million or more to either State, local, or tribal governments, in 
the aggregate, or to the private sector, and is the least burdensome 
alternative that achieves the objective of the rule.

National Environmental Policy Act

    We analyzed the proposed rule for purposes of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and preliminarily 
determined the action would not significantly affect the quality of the 
human environment. The Environmental Assessment of this proposal is 
available for review in the docket.
    The Environmental Assessment (EA) considered the impacts of the 
proposed definition, in conjunction with future requirements of an 
integrity management rule. The EA found that the proposed definition by 
itself, did not by itself have any impact on the environment. When 
integrity management program requirements are issued which will 
incorporate the definition, there should be positive environmental 
benefits for the areas receiving additional protection.
    However, because the environmental consequences from a gas release 
are limited, any impact is expected to be minimal. Therefore, the 
proposed definition of high consequence areas for gas pipeline 
integrity management will not have a significant environmental impact.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 192

    High consequence areas, Integrity assurance, Pipeline safety, and 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

    In consideration of the foregoing, RSPA proposes to amend part 192 
of title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 192--[AMENDED]

    1. The authority citation for part 192 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 60102, 60104, and 60108; and 49 CFR 1.53.

    2. A New Sec. 192.761 would be added under a new heading of ``High 
Consequence Areas'' in subpart M to read as follows:

Subpart M--Maintenance

* * * * *

High Consequence Areas


Sec. 192.761  Definitions.

    The following definitions apply to this section and Sec. 192.763:
    High consequence area means any of the following areas:
    (a) A Class 3 area as defined in Secs. 192.5(b)(3) and 192.5(c);
    (b) A Class 4 area as defined in Secs. 192.5(b)(4) and 192.5(c);
    (c) An area where a pipeline lies within 660 feet of a hospital, 
school, day-care facility, retirement facility, prison or other 
facility having persons who are confined, are of impaired mobility or 
would be difficult to evacuate;
    (d) An area where a pipeline lies within 1000 feet from a hospital, 
school, day-care facility, retirement facility, prison or other 
facility having persons who are confined, are of impaired mobility or 
would be difficult to evacuate, if the pipeline is greater than 30 
inches in diameter and operates at a maximum allowable operating 
pressure (MAOP) greater than 1000 psig; or
    (e) An area where a pipeline lies within 660 feet (or within 1000 
feet where the pipeline is greater than 30 inches in diameter and 
operates at a MAOP greater than 1000 psig) where 20 or more persons 
congregate at least 50 days in any 12-month period. (The days need not 
be consecutive.) Examples of such areas include, but are not limited 
to, beaches, recreational facilities, camping grounds, and museums.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on January 3, 2002.
Stacey L. Gerard,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 02-543 Filed 1-8-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P