[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 244 (Wednesday, December 19, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65516-65520]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-31218]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-255]


Nuclear Management Company, LLC; Palisades Plant Environmental 
Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering 
issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-20, held 
by Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC or the licensee), for operation 
of the Palisades Plant, located in Van Buren County, Michigan, and the 
NRC is issuing this environmental assessment and finding of no 
significant impact.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

    The proposed amendment would change the limiting conditions for 
operation (LCOs), surveillance requirements (SRs), and design features 
in the Technical Specifications (TSs) to provide more flexible fuel 
loading constraints for the Palisades fuel storage racks and 
accommodate future core designs. The changes affect TS Sections 3.7.15, 
``Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Boron Concentration,'' 3.7.16, ``Spent Fuel 
Assembly Storage,'' and 4.3, ``Design Features--Fuel Storage.'' Allowed 
uranium enrichments for storage would be increased. Enrichment limits 
for storage racks for unirradiated fuel (currently limited to fuel 
assemblies having a maximum average planar uranium-235 (U-235) 
enrichment of 4.20 weight percent) would be increased

[[Page 65517]]

to allow storage of 24 unirradiated fuel assemblies having a maximum 
planar average U-235 enrichment of 4.95 weight percent, subject to 
proposed loading pattern constraints (e.g., the center row being empty 
if stored fuel exceeds 4.05 percent U-235 enrichments). Similarly, the 
storage racks for unirradiated fuel could contain 36 unirradiated fuel 
assemblies having a maximum planar average U-235 enrichment of 4.05 
weight percent, subject to similar proposed loading pattern constraints 
not necessarily requiring the center row to be empty. Region I storage 
racks (currently limited to a maximum enrichment of 4.40 weight 
percent) would be changed to allow storage of unirradiated or 
irradiated fuel up to 4.95 weight percent enrichment on the basis of 
revised criticality analyses that assume no credit for soluble boron in 
the pool under normal conditions, but which take credit for 1350 ppm of 
soluble boron under accident conditions. Enrichment requirements for 
Region II fuel storage racks (currently limited to 3.27 weight percent) 
would be changed to allow storage of unirradiated fuel up to 1.14 
weight percent and irradiated fuel of equivalent reactivity up to 4.6 
weight percent initial enrichment on the basis of criticality analyses 
that take credit for 850 ppm of soluble boron in the pool under normal 
conditions and 1350 ppm of soluble boron under accident conditions. The 
TSs (e.g., proposed Table 3.7.16-1) for allowable enrichments for fuel 
storage in Region II of the SFP or the north tilt pit would continue to 
be based upon a combination of initial enrichment and burnup, but the 
proposed change would also add decay time to this combination. The 
existing limitations that Region I racks may contain only ``new or 
partially spent'' fuel assemblies, and that Region II spent fuel racks 
may contain only ``partially spent'' fuel assemblies, would be changed 
to ``new or irradiated fuel assemblies which meet the initial 
enrichment, burnup, and decay time requirements of [the proposed 
revision to] Table 3.7.16-1.'' The existing requirements that fuel 
assemblies in new or Region I fuel storage racks must contain ``216 
rods which are either UO2, 
Gd2O3UO2, or solid metal'' would be 
deleted. TS 3.7.15 would continue to require that the SFP boron 
concentration be equal to or greater than 1720 ppm whenever fuel is 
stored in the spent fuel pool, and be verified weekly. However, the 
optional Action Statement A.2.2 to immediately initiate action to 
perform a SFP verification when the concentration is not within limits 
would be deleted (as would a related portion of the applicability 
statement regarding verification). The licensee also included changes 
to the associated TS Bases.
    The proposed action is in accordance with the application dated 
March 2, 2001, as supplemented by letters dated March 29 and September 
14, 2001. Although the initial application for a license amendment was 
tendered by Consumers Energy Company (CEC), CEC has subsequently been 
succeeded by NMC as the licensed operator of Palisades. By letter dated 
May 17, 2001, NMC requested that the Commission continue to process and 
disposition licensing actions previously docketed and requested by CEC.

The Need for the Proposed Action

    The proposed action to change the fuel enrichment and burnup 
combinations acceptable for storage in Region II racks is needed to 
allow flexibility in fuel placement within the pool. This flexibility 
is needed because recent fuel assembly enrichments at Palisades have 
been above the current 3.27 weight percent enrichment limit for Region 
II racks specified in TS 4.3.1.2. Thus, currently, these assemblies can 
only be stored in Region I racks that have limited unused storage 
capacity. This proposed action is also needed to eliminate reliance 
upon programs (periodic ``blackness'' testing) designed to detect 
degradation and ensure the integrity of fixed Boroflex poison material 
in the Region II fuel racks for reactivity control. Since the 
licensee's criticality calculations for this proposed change do not 
credit the Boroflex material, periodic blackness testing can be 
discontinued.
    The proposed action to increase fuel storage enrichment limits 
allows the licensee the flexibility to pursue increased reload fuel 
enrichments needed to optimize fuel cycle costs.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

    The NRC has completed its evaluation of the potential radiological 
consequences for both normal and accident conditions associated with 
the proposed allowed storage of fuel with increased enrichment and SFP 
criticality calculations supporting the proposed changes. Radiological 
consequences are only indirectly affected by increasing fuel 
enrichment. The radiological consequences are primarily a function of 
operating power and burnup. By increasing fuel enrichment, the same 
power level can be produced for a longer period of time before 
refueling. Therefore, the proposed allowed storage of fuel with 
increased enrichment in the SFP would have no effect on authorized 
operating power levels, but would result in increasing the burnup 
levels that can be practically achieved. The proposed license amendment 
to change the TSs would not affect the allowed maximum burnup for 
Palisades. The licensee determines this limit using approved fuel 
assembly and core design methodology stated in the Palisades Final 
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), as periodically updated. The evaluation 
of the radiological consequences resulting from fuel handling accidents 
(and other accident and transient conditions) would not change since 
the maximum allowed fuel burnup remains unchanged. The licensee will 
continue to evaluate reload core designs on a cycle-by-cycle basis as 
part of its reload safety evaluation process to confirm that the cycle 
core design adheres to the limits that exist in the accident analyses 
and TSs and, thus, ensure that each reactor operating cycle will be 
acceptable.
A. TS Changes Associated with the Fuel Pool in General
    The applicability of TS LCO 3.7.15 would be changed from ``When 
fuel assemblies are stored in the SFP and a verification of the stored 
assemblies has not been performed'' to ``When fuel assemblies are 
stored in the Spent Fuel Pool.'' The NRC staff finds this to be a more 
restrictive change with no environmental impact.
    Required Action A.2.2 for LCO 3.7.15 would be deleted because 
verification alone would not restore the plant to analyzed conditions. 
Required Action A.2.1 would be renumbered as ``A.2.''
    The intent of the existing LCO 3.7.15 is to protect against 
criticality during a fuel handling accident or misloading event. The 
licensee's criticality analyses supporting the proposed action credit 
boron for normal storage as well as for accident scenarios. Therefore, 
the applicability of LCO 3.7.15 would be extended to all times when 
fuel assemblies are stored in the Palisades fuel pool and Action A.2.2 
would be eliminated.
    The change in applicability effectively increases the minimum SRs 
for spent fuel boron since samples now must be taken even if loading 
has been verified. Since administrative procedures at Palisades 
currently require these samples at least weekly, this change would have 
no effect upon plant operations and would not result in a change to 
individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure limits. 
Similarly, the changed surveillance

[[Page 65518]]

would not result in a change to radiological or nonradiological 
effluent releases during normal or accident scenarios.
B. TS Changes Associated with the Storage Racks for Unirradiated Fuel
    The enrichment allowed in TS 4.3.1.3.a would be changed from ``Fuel 
assemblies having a maximum average planar U235 enrichment 
of 4.20 weight percent'' to ``Twenty-four unirradiated fuel assemblies 
having a maximum planar average U-235 enrichment of 4.95 weight 
percent, and stored in accordance with the pattern shown in Figure 
4.3.-1; or Thirty-six unirradiated fuel assemblies having a maximum 
planar average U-235 enrichment of 4.05 weight percent, and stored in 
accordance with the pattern shown in Figure. 4.3.-1.'' Existing TS 
4.3.1.3.c would be deleted and existing TS 4.3.1.3d would be renumbered 
as 4.3.1.3c.
    Since the storage racks for new (unirradiated) fuel are not used to 
store irradiated fuel, radiological consequences associated with 
changes in storage limitations are largely limited by the prevention of 
inadvertent criticality. The licensee's criticality analyses supporting 
this license amendment request show that the keff based on a 
95-percent probability at a 95-percent confidence level (i.e., the 95/
95 keff) for the new fuel storage rack is less than 0.95 
assuming enrichment up to 4.05 weight percent U-235 when fully loaded 
with 36 unirradiated assemblies. The analyses also show the 95/95 
keff for the new fuel storage rack is less than 0.95 when 
loaded with only 24 unirradiated assemblies with enrichment up to 4.95 
weight percent U-235. The center row of the rack is left empty under 
this configuration. The licensee provided a graphical description of 
both loading patterns in Figure 3 of its engineering analysis, EA-SFP-
99-03 (Enclosure 2 to the March 2, 2001, supplemental letter), which 
shows \1/2\ of the new fuel storage rack--the loading pattern continues 
through the other half of the rack. The design-basis assembly is a 216-
pin Palisades assembly. The licensee found earlier assembly types with 
fewer than 216 pins and guide tubes to be bounded since their 
enrichment is less than or equal to 3.27 weight percent. The licensee 
also notes that all assemblies with fewer than 216 pins have been 
irradiated and, therefore, cannot be stored in the storage racks for 
new fuel. Any new designs other than those assumed in the licensee's 
calculation, including but not limited to different numbers of fueled 
pins, different pellet diameters, and different pellet densities, would 
first be evaluated by the licensee against the design-basis calculation 
and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, ``Changes, Tests and 
Experiments,'' before being stored in the racks. Therefore, the NRC 
staff finds that the proposed TS changes associated with the racks for 
storage of unirradiated fuel will not have a significant adverse 
radiological impact.
    Storage of higher enriched fresh fuel assemblies in the storage 
racks for unirradiated fuel, under specific loading patterns, has no 
effect on nonradiological effluent releases.
C. TS Changes Associated with Region I Fuel Pool Storage
    The enrichment allowed in TS 4.3.1.1.a for fuel assemblies in 
Region I fuel storage racks would be changed from ``having a maximum 
enrichment of 4.40 weight percent'' to ``having a maximum planar 
average U-235 enrichment of 4.95 weight percent.'' In TS 4.3.1.1.d, the 
existing requirement that the Region I fuel storage racks be designed 
and maintained with:

``New or partially spent fuel assemblies. Assemblies with enrichments 
above 3.27 weight percent U235 must contain 216 rods which 
are either UO2 , Gd2O3UO2, 
or solid metal.''

would be changed to

    ``New or irradiated fuel assemblies.''
    The licensee's criticality analyses supporting this license 
amendment request show that the 95/95 keff for the Region I 
fuel storage racks is less than 0.95 assuming the enrichment of an 
assembly is less than or equal to 4.95 weight percent U-235. The 
design-basis assembly is a 216-pin Palisades assembly. Earlier assembly 
types with less than 216 pins and guide tubes are bounded since their 
maximum enrichment is less than or equal to 3.27 weight percent. The 
licensee states that the calculation bounds all assemblies currently 
stored at Palisades and those the licensee foresees in the future. Any 
new designs other than those assumed in the licensee's calculation, 
including but not limited to different numbers of fueled pins, 
different pellet diameters, and different pellet densities, will first 
be evaluated by the licensee against the design-basis calculation 
before being stored in the racks. In addition, before being used in the 
Palisades core, any new fuel design is first evaluated as part of the 
licensee's reload safety evaluation to ensure the cycle core design 
adheres to the limits that exist in the accident analyses and TSs. The 
licensee performs such analyses using approved methodologies as defined 
in TS 5.6.5, ``Core Operating Limits Report (COLR),'' and in accordance 
with 10 CFR 50.59.
    In itself, increasing the enrichment level allowed for storage in 
the Region I fuel pool racks has no effect on possible radiological or 
nonradiological effluent releases. Since the licensee's criticality 
design calculations show that Keff remains below 0.95 in all 
normal storage and accident scenarios, there is no significant 
increased threat of radiation exposure due to accidental criticality in 
the fuel pool. If the licensee should decide to pursue reload 
enrichments higher than the current storage limit (i.e., greater than 
4.40 weight percent), the result would not adversely impact the 
environmental effects since radiological impacts are only indirectly 
affected by increasing fuel enrichment. The radiological impacts are 
primarily a function of operating power and burnup. The purpose of 
increased fuel enrichment is the ability to produce the same power 
level for a longer period of time before refueling. Therefore, the 
proposed allowed storage of fuel with increased enrichment in the SFP 
would have no effect on authorized operating power levels, but would 
result in increasing the burnup levels that can be practically 
achieved. Again, licensees evaluate the use of fuel (at any enrichment 
and burnup) on a cycle-by-cycle basis to ensure that parameters such as 
assembly discharge burnups are within limits specified in the FSAR.
    Therefore, the proposed TS changes associated with Region I fuel 
pool storage have no significant adverse radiological impact. These 
changes also have no adverse nonradiological impact.
D. TS Changes Associated with Region II Fuel Pool Storage
    The licensee proposes the following TS changes regarding the 
storage of fuel assemblies in Region II of the fuel pool:
    LCO 3.7.16 currently requires that ``The combination of initial 
enrichment and burnup of each fuel assembly stored in Region II shall 
be within the requirements of Table 3.7.16-1.'' This would be changed 
to require that ``The combination of initial enrichment, burnup, and 
decay time of each irradiated fuel assembly stored in Region II shall 
be within the requirements of Table 3.7.16-1.'' Thus, this change would 
add the decay time of each assembly as an additional requirement for 
storage in Region II. Similarly, the associated SR (SR 3.7.16.1) to 
``Verify by administrative means that the initial enrichment and burnup 
of each spent fuel assembly stored in Region II is in accordance with 
Table 3.7.16-1'' would be changed to

[[Page 65519]]

``Verify by administrative means that the combination of initial 
enrichment, burnup, and decay time of each irradiated fuel assembly 
stored in Region II is in accordance with Table 3.7.16-1.'' Existing TS 
Table 3.7.16-1 would be replaced by Table 4 from the licensee's 
engineering analysis, EA-SFP-99-03, which specifies Region II burnup 
requirements after various periods of decay. The existing requirement 
of TS 4.3.1.2.a that the Region II fuel storage racks are designed and 
shall be maintained with fuel assemblies ``having a maximum enrichment 
of 3.27 weight percent'' would be changed to ``having a maximum planar 
average U-235 enrichment of 4.60 weight percent.'' A new TS 4.3.1.2.b 
would be added to require that the Region II fuel storage racks be 
designed and maintained with ``Keff [less than] 1.0 if fully 
flooded with unborated water, which includes allowances for 
uncertainties as described in Section 9.11 of the FSAR.'' Existing TS 
4.3.1.2.b would be renumbered as 4.3.1.2.c and revised to require that 
Region II fuel storage racks be designed and maintained with 
Keff less than or equal to 0.95 ``if fully flooded with 
water borated to 850 ppm,'' rather than ``if fully flooded with 
unborated water.'' Existing TSs 4.3.1.2.c and 4.3.1.2.d would be 
renumbered 4.3.1.2.d and 4.3.1.2.e, respectively. TS 4.3.1.2.e (former 
4.3.1.2.d) would also be changed to require that Region II fuel storage 
racks be designed and maintained with ``[p]artially spent fuel 
assemblies which meet the initial enrichment and burnup requirements of 
Table 3.7.16-1,'' to ``[n]ew or irradiated fuel assemblies which meet 
the initial enrichment, burnup, and decay time requirements of Table 
3.7.16-1.'' A new figure based upon Figure 3 of the licensee's 
engineering analysis, EA-SFP-99-03, and showing storage rack loading 
patterns for new fuel would be added as TS Figure 4.3-1.
    The licensee's criticality analyses, which are the basis for this 
license amendment request, show that the 95/95 Keff for the 
Region II fuel storage racks is less than 0.95 assuming the enrichment 
of an assembly is less than or equal to 4.60 weight percent U-235 and 
assuming 850 ppm boron in the pool water. The analyses also ensure that 
Keff is less than 1.0 assuming no boron. The proposed 
revision to Table 3.7.16-1 contains the burnup, enrichment, and decay 
time combinations shown to be acceptable in the licensee's engineering 
analysis, EA-SFP-99-03.
    Boron is already present in the Palisades SFP. Likewise, the fuel 
stored in the pool is burned to levels dictated by core design 
constraints. Fuel assemblies experience radioactive decay while they 
are stored. These characteristics of the fuel would not be changed by 
the proposed amendment. Therefore, crediting the reactivity effects 
associated with boron, burnup, and decay in the design-basis 
criticality calculations has no effect upon possible radiological or 
nonradiological effluent releases. Since the criticality design 
calculations show that Keff remains below 0.95 in all normal 
storage and accident scenarios, there is no increased threat of 
radiation exposure due to accidental criticality in the fuel pool.
    In general, the proposed burnup and enrichment combinations that 
are acceptable for storage in the Region II racks require higher 
burnups for a given enrichment than those present in the current TS 
Table 3.7.16-1. This increase in allowed minimum burnup does not affect 
radiological consequences since the actual fuel burnup is dictated by 
core design constraints and may be significantly higher than that 
required for storage in Region II fuel storage racks (up to 58,900 MWD/
MTU assembly average for recent Palisades reload fuel, as discussed in 
FSAR Section 3.2.3, Nuclear Limits). In general, higher burnup has a 
limited effect on the short-lived isotope inventory in the fuel due to 
the development of an equilibrium condition between production and 
decay. Instead, extended burnups increase the fraction of the short-
lived isotopes that migrate into the fuel-clad gap region (see, for 
example, NUREG/CR-5009, ``Assessment of the Use of Extended Burnup Fuel 
in Light Water Power Reactors,'' prepared for the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission by Pacific Northwest). With increasing burnup, 
there is no decrease in fuel rod integrity or the probability of fuel 
failures during normal operations, as long as actual burnup does not 
exceed the vendor-approved values. However, with the increased short-
lived activity in the clad-gap region, increased burnup could result in 
increased activity being released into the reactor coolant under normal 
operation if fuel failures were to occur. Maximum fuel burnup limits 
are not being changed by this proposed amendment.
E. Conclusions
    On the basis of the above assessment, the NRC staff concludes that 
the proposed TS changes regarding the storage of new and irradiated 
fuel, including fuel with increased allowed enrichment (up to 4.95 
weight percent), will not have a significant adverse environmental 
effect.
    The proposed action will not significantly increase the probability 
or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of 
effluents that may be released off site, and there is no significant 
increase in occupational or public radiation exposure. Therefore, there 
are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with 
the proposed action.
    With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed 
action does not have a potential to affect any historic sites. It does 
not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other 
environmental impact. Therefore, there are no significant 
nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed 
action
    Accordingly, the NRC staff concludes that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives to the Proposed Action

    As an alternative to the proposed action, the NRC staff considered 
denial of the proposed action (i.e., the ``no-action'' alternative). 
Denial of the application would result in no change in current 
environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action 
and the alternative action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

    The action does not involve the use of any different resource than 
those previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for 
Palisades dated June 1972, as supplemented.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

    On December 12, 2001, the NRC staff consulted with the Michigan 
State official, Mary Ann Elzerman, regarding the environmental impact 
of the proposed action. The State official agreed with the NRC staff's 
proposed issuance of this Environmental Assessment and Finding of No 
Significant Impact.

Finding of No Significant Impact

    On the basis of the environmental assessment, the NRC concludes 
that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the NRC has determined 
not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed 
action.
    Further details with respect to the proposed action may be found in 
the licensee's application dated March 2, 2001, as supplemented by 
letters dated March 29 and September 14, 2001.

[[Page 65520]]

Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 
Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records 
will be accessible electronically from the ADAMS Public Library 
component on the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov (the Public 
Electronic Reading Room). Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or 
who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS 
should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-
4209, or 301-415-4737, or by e-mail at [email protected].

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of December, 2001.

Darl S. Hood,
Senior Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate III, Division of 
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 01-31218 Filed 12-18-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P