[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 242 (Monday, December 17, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65000-65005]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-30970]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328]


Tennessee Valley Authority; Notice of Consideration of Issuance 
of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. 
DRP-77 and DRP-79 issued to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the 
licensee) for operation of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Units 1 
and 2, located in Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee.
    The proposed amendments would change Technical Specifications (TSs) 
to allow SQN to provide incore irradiation services for the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE). This change would allow TVA to insert up to 
2256 tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) into the reactor 
cores to support DOE in maintaining its tritium inventory for national 
defense purposes. Each SQN core contains 193 fuel assemblies and each 
fuel assembly contains 264 fuel rods. In this amendment request, TVA 
proposes to insert up to 24 TPBARs in selected fuel assemblies 
(adjacent to but not in place of the 264 fuel rods). The TPBARS absorb 
neutrons and are similar to (and would replace) normal burnable neutron 
absorber rods that serve to shape neutron flux in the core. The TPBARs

[[Page 65001]]

contain no fissile material and will be installed in fuel assemblies 
where burnable absorber rods are normally placed in selected fuel 
assemblies. Therefore, the TPBARs would fill the same role as burnable 
absorber rods in the operation of the reactor. However, most of the 
neutron absorber (lithium) in the TPBARs still remains at the end of 
core life as compared to normal burnable neutron absorbers (boron or 
gadolinium). Therefore, the proposed license amendments involve (1) 
revising the measurement range for the source range neutron monitors 
specified in TS Table 3.3-9, (2) increasing the required boron 
concentration for both the cold leg accumulators (TS 3/4.5.1) and the 
refueling water storage tank (RWST) (TS 3/4.5.5), (3) deleting the 
boron concentration and spent fuel storage requirements and associated 
Bases for the cask pit pool in TS Section 3/4.7.14 and Section 5.6, (4) 
establishing a limit on the number of TPBARs that can be irradiated in 
TS Section 5.3.1, (5) providing storage requirements for spent fuel 
assemblies that contain TPBARs after irradiation in TS Section 5.6 and 
the Bases for TS Section 3/4.7.13, and (6) implementing a TPBAR 
consolidation activity. This submittal also provides proposed revisions 
to the associated TS Bases in Section 3/4.6.4 regarding combustible gas 
control. Changes (1) and (2) above are necessary because the uranium-
235 (U-235) enrichment of fuel assemblies containing TPBARs must be 
increased (to no more than 4.95 weight percent) to compensate for the 
higher neutron absorbing properties of the lithium-7 in the TPBARs. The 
NRC has previously approved maximum U-235 fuel enrichments of 4.95 
 0.05 weight percent for SQN Units 1 and 2. Five percent 
enrichment is the NRC's upper limit for reactor licensing. Therefore, 
enrichments resulting from the proposed amendments are bounded by the 
current SQN Operating License and licensing basis.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration in its application 
dated September 21, 2001, which is presented below:

    A. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.

1.TS Table 3.3-9--Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation--Revised 
Source Range Monitor Range

    The backup source range monitors are for indication of unit 
shutdown conditions only and do not perform any trip or mitigation 
functions. The monitors are not active components such that they 
could initiate a postulated accident and are not considered a 
contributor to accident generation. Therefore, the lowering of the 
indication range for this monitor will not increase the probability 
of an accident.
    Since the monitor has only an indication function, it does not 
serve to mitigate postulated accidents. While the indications from 
this monitor can help to identify changing core conditions and 
promote actions to prevent undesired conditions, this is not a 
mitigation function credited in the accident analysis and is 
considered a diverse capability of the plant instrumentation system. 
Therefore, the proposed change will not impact any credited accident 
mitigation functions, and by improving shutdown monitoring 
capability, will not [involve a significant] increase [in] the 
[probability or] consequences of an accident [previously evaluated].

2.TS 3/4.5.1--Cold Leg Injection Accumulators--Boron Concentration 
Increase

    The accumulator boron concentration does not affect any 
initiating event for accidents currently evaluated in the Updated 
Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The increased concentrations 
will not adversely affect the performance of any system or component 
which is placed in contact with the accumulator water. The integrity 
and operability of the stainless steel surfaces in the accumulator 
and affected nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) components/systems 
will be maintained. The decrease in solution pH is small and will 
not degrade the stainless steel. Also, the integrity of the Class 1E 
instrumentation and control equipment will be maintained since the 
lower sump pH, resulting from the increased boron concentrations, is 
still within the applicable equipment qualification limits. These 
limits are set to preclude the possibility of chloride[-]induced 
stress corrosion cracking and assure that there is no significant 
degradation of polymer materials. The design, material and 
construction standards of all components which are placed in contact 
with the accumulator water remain unaffected. Therefore, the 
possibility [probability] of an accident has not been increased.
    The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the 
UFSAR will not be increased. The change in the concentrations 
increase the amount of boron in the sump during a loss-of-coolant 
accident (LOCA). The increased boron in the sump is sufficient to 
maintain the core in a subcritical condition. Testing has indicated 
that TPBARs can experience cladding breach at Large Break LOCA 
(LBLOCA) conditions if the cladding temperature and internal 
pressure of the TPBARs reach limiting values. Consequently, the 
post-LOCA critical boron calculations account[ed] for the potential 
loss of a LiAlO2 [lithium aluminate] pencil, as well as partial 
leaching of lithium from the remaining pencils. Based on 
conservative assumptions, the calculations confirm that the tritium 
production core will remain subcritical following a LOCA. Also, a 
revised hot leg switchover time has been calculated and will be 
implemented in the plant emergency operating procedures (EOPs). 
Thus, there will be no added post-LOCA long-term cooling problems 
associated with boron precipitation in the core following a large 
break LOCA (LBLOCA).
    An evaluation of the non-LOCA events shows that the accumulators 
do not actuate. An increase in accumulator boron concentration would 
have no effect on either the steam line break (SLB) at hot zero 
power event, the feedwater line break event, or the spurious 
operation of safety injection (SI) system event (events in which an 
SI signal does occur). Therefore, there is no increase in 
consequences of the non-LOCA events associated with the proposed 
increase in accumulator boron concentration.
    The accumulators are not assumed to actuate in the steam 
generator tube rupture (SGTR) event analysis, and the SLB mass and 
energy (M&E) release evaluation relies on control rods for shutdown 
margin and assumes a minimum boron concentration. In addition, the 
increase in accumulator boron concentrations and subsequent slight 
decrease in containment sump and spray pH does not impact the LOCA 
dose evaluation since the analysis of record does not credit sump pH 
as an input or assumption regarding volatile iodine removal 
efficiencies. Therefore, the present analysis remains bounding. 
Also, the slight decrease in sump, core and spray fluid pH has been 
evaluated to not significantly impact the corrosion rate (and 
subsequent generation of hydrogen) of aluminum and zinc inside 
containment. Further, the decreased sump, core and spray fluid pH 
has been evaluated to not affect the amount of hydrogen generated 
from the post-LOCA radiolytic decomposition of the sump and core 
solution. The likelihood of containment failure due to hydrogen 
deflagration is therefore not impacted by pH changes.
    In view of the preceding, it is concluded that the proposed 
change in accumulator boron concentration will not increase the 
radiological [probability or] consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated in the UFSAR.

3. TS 3/4.5.5--Refueling Water Storage Tank--Boron Concentration 
Increase

    The RWST boron concentration does not affect any initiating 
event for accidents

[[Page 65002]]

currently evaluated in the UFSAR. The increased concentration will 
not adversely affect the performance of any system or component 
which is placed in contact with the RWST water. The integrity and 
operability of the stainless steel surfaces in the RWST and affected 
NSSS components/systems will be maintained. The decrease in solution 
pH is small and will not degrade the stainless steel. Also, the 
integrity of the Class 1E instrumentation and control equipment will 
be maintained since the lower sump pH, resulting from the increased 
boron concentrations, is still within the applicable equipment 
qualification limits. These limits are set to preclude the 
possibility of chloride induced stress corrosion cracking and assure 
that there is no significant degradation of polymer materials. The 
design, material and construction standards of all components which 
are placed in contact with the RWST water remain unaffected. 
Therefore, the probability of an accident has not changed.
    The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the 
UFSAR will not be increased. The change in the RWST boron 
concentration increases the amount of boron in the sump following a 
LOCA. The increased boron in the sump is sufficient to maintain the 
core in a subcritical condition. Testing has indicated that TPBARs 
can experience cladding breach at Large Break LOCA (LBLOCA) 
conditions if the cladding temperature and internal pressure of the 
TPBARs reach limiting values. Consequently, the post-LOCA critical 
boron calculations accounted for the potential loss of a LiAiO2 
pencil, as well as partial leaching of lithium from the remaining 
pencils. Based on conservative assumptions, the calculations confirm 
that the tritium production core will remain subcritical following a 
LOCA. Also, a revised hot leg switchover time has been calculated 
and will be implemented in the plant EOPs. Thus, there will be no 
added post-LOCA long-term cooling problems associated with boron 
precipitation in the core following a LOCA.
    An evaluation of the non-LOCA events indicates that an SI 
initiation occurs in the SLB at hot zero power event, the feedwater 
line break event, and the spurious operation of the SI system event. 
An increase in the RWST boron concentration would effectively reduce 
the return to power subsequent to a SLB. Boration is not credited in 
the feedwater line break analysis and the proposed boron increase is 
conservatively bounded by the boron inputs to the spurious SI system 
operation analysis. Therefore, there is no increase in consequences 
of the non-LOCA events associated with the proposed increase in RWST 
boron concentration.
    The SLB M&E release evaluation relies on control rods for 
shutdown margin and assumes a minimum boron concentration. For the 
SGTR, the boron concentration in the accumulators and the RWST are 
not modeled. In addition, the increase in RWST boron concentrations 
and subsequent slight decrease in containment sump and spray pH does 
not impact the LOCA dose evaluation. While higher pH helps maintain 
volatile iodine in solution and lower pH drives the equilibrium to 
favor volatile iodine in a gaseous state, the change in sump pH is 
not sufficient to result in any measurable change in post-LOCA 
releases.
    Furthermore, current radiological analyses do not take credit 
for volatile iodine removal efficiencies based on sump pH. 
Therefore, since the change in pH is minimal, and no credit is taken 
in release analysis, the present analysis remains bounding. Also, 
the slight decrease in sump, core and spray fluid pH has been 
evaluated to not significantly impact the corrosion rate (and 
subsequent generation of hydrogen) of aluminum and zinc inside 
containment and the present analysis remains bounding. Further, the 
decreased sump, core and spray fluid pH has been evaluated to not 
affect the amount of hydrogen generated from the radiolytic 
decomposition of the sump and core solution and therefore will not 
challenge containment integrity.
    In view of the preceding, it is concluded that the proposed 
change in RWST boron concentration will not increase the 
radiological [probability or] consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated in the UFSAR.

4. TS 3/4.7.14 and Bases--Cask Pit Pool Minimum Boron Concentration--
Deletion of Requirements

    This change removes the provisions that allow and support the 
storage of spent fuel in the cask pit pool. By eliminating this 
provision, the potential for criticality events associated with 
stored fuel in the cask pit pool is no longer credible. Not having 
boron concentration requirements for the cask pit for storage 
considerations is acceptable based on the removal of TS provisions 
that would allow such storage. The boron concentration requirement 
is not considered a contributor to accident generation and 
therefore, this deletion does not increase the potential 
[probability] for accident generation because spent fuel will not be 
stored in this location. Likewise, the consequences of an accident 
[previously evaluated] will not be [significantly] increased because 
the dose generation source, in the form of spent fuel stored in the 
cask pit, will not be allowed.

5. TS 5.3.1--Design Features/Reactor Core/Fuel Assemblies

    The insertion of TPBARs into the SQN reactor core does not 
adversely affect reactor neutronic or thermal-hydraulic performance; 
therefore, they do not significantly increase the probability of 
accidents or equipment malfunctions while in the reactor. The 
neutronic behavior of the TPBARS mimics that of standard burnable 
absorbers with only slight differences which are accommodated in the 
core design. The reload safety analysis performed for SQN Units 1 
and 2 prior to each refueling cycle will confirm that any minor 
effects of TPBARS on the reload core will be within fuel design 
limits.
    As described in the [Department of Energy's] tritium production 
core (TPC) topical [report, NDP-98-181, Revision 1], the TPBAR 
design is robust to all accident conditions except the large break 
LOCA (LBLOCA) where the rods are susceptible to failure. However, 
the failure of TPBARs has been determined to have an insignificant 
effect on the thermal hydraulic response of the core to this event, 
and analysis has shown that the core will remain subcritical 
following a LOCA.
    The impacts of TPBARs on the radiological consequences for all 
evaluated events are very small, and they remain within [well below] 
10 CFR 100 regulatory limits. The additional offsite doses due to 
tritium are small with respect to LOCA source terms and are well 
within regulatory limits.
    The TPBAR[s] could result in an increase in combustible gas 
released to the containment in a LBLOCA. This increase was found to 
be approximately 1495 scf which remains within the capability of the 
recombiners.
    Analysis has shown that TPBARs are not expected to fail during 
Condition I through IV events [as described in Chapter 15 of the 
UFSAR, Condition I being normal operation and operational 
transients, Condition II being faults of moderate frequency, 
Condition III being infrequent faults, and Condition IV being 
limiting faults] with the exception of a LBLOCA and a fuel handling 
accident. The radiological consequences of these events are [well] 
within 10 CFR 100 limits. Therefore, there is no significant 
increase in the [probability or] consequences of these previously 
evaluated accidents.

6. TS 5.6 and TS 3/4.7.13 Bases--Design Features/Fuel Storage and Spent 
Fuel Pool Minimum Boron Concentration--Revised Storage Requirements for 
Fuel Assemblies Containing TPBARs

    A specified amount of soluble boron is needed in the spent fuel 
pool to provide margin to criticality sufficient to mitigate the 
effects of the most serious spent fuel pool accident condition. 
Previous spent fuel pool criticality safety analyses (for Type A 
fuel) [spent fuel that has not hosted TPBARs] determined the 
required amount of soluble boron to be 700 parts per million (ppm). 
The new spent fuel pool criticality safety analysis accounting for 
storage of Type T fuel [spent fuel that has hosted TPBARS] confirmed 
that 700 ppm soluble boron still provides the required margin to 
criticality. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the 
consequences of previously evaluated accidents postulated for the 
spent fuel pool. Additionally, the administrative controls for 
loading the spent fuel pool are not changed and will continue to 
maintain acceptable storage configurations consistent with the 
analysis. Therefore, the proposed change will not [involve a 
significant] increase [in] the probability [or consequences] of an 
accident [previously evaluated].

7. TPBAR Consolidation Activity

    TPBAR consolidation and associated handling activities are 
designed to be consistent with the existing fuel handling and heavy 
load handling processes and equipment currently utilized at the 
facility, and are designed to preclude increased probability of an 
accident previously evaluated.
    Consequences of a fuel handling accident for fuel containing 
TPBARs is evaluated and does not result in exceeding [or even 
approaching]10 CFR Part 100 limits for off-site dose. All 
consolidation and heavy load handling activities are designed such 
that the current fuel handling accident scenario

[[Page 65003]]

remains bounding. Therefore the [probability or] consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated [will not be significantly increased] 
remains within acceptable limits.
    B. The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.

1. TS Table 3.3-9--Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation--Revised 
Source Range Monitor Range

    The backup source range monitors are for indication of unit 
shutdown conditions only and do not perform any trip or mitigation 
functions. The monitors are not active components such that they 
could initiate a postulated accident and are not considered a 
contributor to accident generation. Therefore, the lowering of the 
indication range for this monitor will not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident [from any accident previously 
evaluated].

2. TS 3/4.5.1--Cold Leg Injection Accumulators--Boron Concentration 
Increase

    The change to the accumulator concentration does not cause the 
initiation of any accident nor create any new credible limiting 
single failure. The change does not result in a condition where the 
design, material, and construction standards of the accumulators and 
other potentially affected NSSS components, that were applicable 
prior to the changes, are altered. The integrity and operability of 
the stainless steel surfaces in the accumulator and affected NSSS 
components/systems will be maintained. The decrease in solution pH 
is small and will not degrade the stainless steel. Also, the 
integrity of the Class 1E instrumentation and control equipment will 
be maintained during a LOCA since the lower sump pH, resulting from 
the increased boron concentrations, is still within the applicable 
equipment qualification limits. These limits are set to preclude the 
possibility of chloride[-]induced stress corrosion cracking and 
assure that there is no significant degradation of polymer 
materials.
    The changes in the concentrations increase the amount of boron 
in the sump following a LOCA. The increased boron in the sump is 
sufficient to maintain the core in a subcritical condition. Also, a 
revised hot leg switchover time has been calculated and will be 
implemented in the plant EOPs. Thus, there will be no boron 
precipitation in the core following a LOCA.
    All systems, structures, and components previously required for 
the mitigation of an event remain capable of fulfilling their 
intended design function. The proposed change has no adverse 
a[e]ffect on any safety-related system or component and does not 
challenge the performance or integrity of any safety[-]related 
system. Therefore, the proposed increase in accumulator boron 
concentration does not create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. TS 3/4.5.5--Refueling Water Storage Tank--Boron Concentration 
Increase

    The change to the RWST concentration does not cause the 
initiation of any accident nor create any new credible limiting 
single failure. The change does not result in a condition where the 
design, material, and construction standards of the RWST and other 
potentially affected NSSS components, that were applicable prior to 
the changes, are altered. The integrity and operability of the 
stainless steel surfaces in the RWST and affected NSSS components/
systems will be maintained. The decrease in solution pH is small and 
will not degrade the stainless steel. Also, the integrity of the 
Class 1E instrumentation and control equipment will be maintained 
during a LOCA since the lower sump pH, resulting from the increased 
boron concentrations, is still within the applicable equipment 
qualification limits. These limits are set to preclude the 
possibility of chloride[-]induced stress corrosion cracking and 
assure that there is no significant degradation of polymer 
materials.
    The changes in the concentrations increase the amount of boron 
in the sump following a LOCA. The increased boron in the sump is 
sufficient to maintain the core in a subcritical condition. Also, a 
revised hot leg switchover time has been calculated and will be 
implemented in the plant EOPs. Thus, there will be no boron 
precipitation in the core following a LOCA.
    All systems, structures, and components previously required for 
the mitigation of an event remain capable of fulfilling their 
intended design function. The proposed change has no adverse affect 
on any safety-related system or component and does not challenge the 
performance or integrity of any safety[-]related system. Therefore, 
the proposed increase in RWST boron concentration does not create 
the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any 
accident previously evaluated.

4. TS 3/4.7.14 and Bases--Cask Pit Pool Minimum Boron Concentration--
Deletion of Requirements

    This change removes the provisions that allow and support the 
storage of spent fuel in the cask pit pool. By eliminating this 
provision, the potential for criticality events associated with 
stored fuel in the cask pit pool is no longer credible. The boron 
concentration requirement for the cask pit pool is not considered a 
contributor to accident generation and therefore, this deletion does 
not increase the [possibility of] potential for [a new or different 
kind of] accident [from any accident previously evaluated] 
generation because spent fuel will not be stored in this location.

5. TS 5.3.1--Design Features/Reactor Core/Fuel Assemblies

    TPBARS have been designed to be compatible with existing fuel 
assemblies supplied by Framatome-ANP and its predecessor Framatome 
Cogema Fuels and with conventional Burnable Poison Rod Assembly 
(BPRA) handling tools, equipment, and procedures. Therefore, no new 
[or different kind of] accidents or equipment malfunctions are 
created by the handling of TPBARs. * * *
    TPBARs use materials with known and predictable performance 
characteristics and are compatible with pressurized water reactor 
coolant. The TPBAR design has specifically included material similar 
to those used in standard burnable absorber rods with the exception 
of internal assemblies used in the production and retention of 
tritium. As described in the TPC Topical Report, these materials are 
compatible with the reactor coolant system (RCS) and core design. 
Therefore, no new accidents or equipment malfunctions are created by 
the presence of the TPBARs in the RCS.
    Mechanical design criteria have been established to ensure that 
TPBARs will not fail during Condition I or II events. Analysis has 
shown that TPBARs, appropriately positioned in the core, operate 
within the established thermal-hydraulic criteria. Due to the 
expected high reliability of TPBAR components, the frequency of 
TPBAR cladding failures is very small, such that multiple adjacent 
TPBAR failures in limiting locations is not considered credible. In 
addition, analysis has shown that if a single TPBAR fails 
catastrophically in a high power location during normal operation 
and the lithium is leached out, the global reactivity increase is 
negligible and the local power peaking is small enough that DNBR 
[departure from nucleate boiling ratio] limits and fuel rod 
integrity are not challenged. Therefore, no new [or different kind 
of] accidents or equipment malfunctions are created by the presence 
of the TPBARs in the reactor.
    Analysis has shown that TPBARs will not fail during Condition 
III and IV events with the exception of a LBLOCA and a fuel handling 
accident. The radiological consequences of these events are within 
10 CFR 100 limits. Therefore, there is no significant increase in 
consequences of these previously evaluated accidents.
    TPBARs do not adversely affect reactor neutronic [or] thermal-
hydraulic performance, therefore they do not create the possibility 
of [new or different kinds of] accidents or equipment malfunctions 
of a different type [of accident] than previously evaluated while in 
the reactor.

6. TS 5.6 and TS 3/4.7.13 Bases--Design Features/Fuel Storage and Spent 
Fuel Pool Minimum Boron Concentration--Revised Storage Requirements for 
Fuel Assemblies Containing TPBARs

    The storage in the spent fuel pool of spent fuel that has 
contained TPBARs is not a fundamental change in the use of the spent 
fuel pool. Specific provisions have been made for burnup and cooling 
time requirements in allowable configurations to ensure safe 
storage. The same administrative program to control storage 
requirements in the spent fuel pool will be utilized to handle Type 
A and Type T spent fuel. Therefore, the possibility of a new or 
different [kind of] accident than [any accident] previously 
evaluated has not been created.

7. TPBAR Consolidation Activity

    The consolidation and handling systems are designed to preclude 
the possibility of a consolidating and/or handling event which could 
damage more than 24 TPBARs. Therefore, this proposed amendment does 
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from any [accident] previously evaluated.

[[Page 65004]]

    C. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

1. TS Table 3.3-9--Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation--Revised 
Source Range Monitor Range

    The backup source range monitors are for indication of unit 
shutdown conditions only and do not perform any trip or mitigation 
functions. The lowering of the monitor's range does allow improved 
indication of core conditions with the TPCs. While this monitor does 
not have any trip or accident mitigation functions, this change will 
improve the ability to assess the conditions of the unit such that 
necessary actions can be initiated to prevent undesired conditions. 
Therefore, the proposed change will not reduce [does not involve a 
significant reduction in] a margin of safety.

2. TS 3/4.5.1--Cold Leg Injection Accumulators--Boron Concentration 
Increase

    The change does not invalidate any of the non-LOCA safety 
analysis results or conclusions, and all of the non-LOCA safety 
analysis acceptance criteria continue to be met. The licensing basis 
small break LOCA (SBLOCA) analysis does not credit the accumulator 
boron and is not affected by the proposed change. Therefore, there 
is no reduction in the margin to the peak clad temperature (PCT) 
limit for the SBLOCA. There is no increase in the LBLOCA PCT; 
therefore, the ECCS acceptance criteria limit, dictated by 10 CFR 
50.46, is not exceeded with regard to the LBLOCA analysis. The 
increased boron concentration is sufficient to maintain 
subcriticality during the LBLOCA, and a post-LOCA long-term core 
cooling analysis demonstrated that the post-LOCA sump boron 
concentration is sufficient to prevent recriticality. The revised 
hot leg switchover time, which will be implemented in the EOPs, will 
prevent long-term cooling problems associated with boron 
precipitation in the reactor vessel and core. The licensing analyses 
for containment, equipment qualification, and environmental 
consequences remain bounding and applicable and the acceptance 
criteria of the related events continue to be met. The proposed 
increase in accumulator boron concentration, therefore, does not 
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

3. TS 314.5.5--Refueling Water Storage Tank--Boron Concentration 
Increase

    The change does not invalidate any of the non-LOCA safety 
analysis results or conclusions, and all of the non-LOCA safety 
analysis acceptance criteria continue to be met. The licensing basis 
SBLOCA analysis does not credit the RWST boron and is not affected 
by the proposed change. Therefore, there is no reduction in the 
margin to the PCT limit for the SBLOCA. There is no increase in the 
LBLOCA PCT; therefore, the ECCS acceptance criteria limit, dictated 
by 10 CFR 50.46, is not exceeded with regard to the LBLOCA analysis. 
The increased boron concentration is sufficient to prevent 
recriticality. The revised hot leg switchover time, which will be 
implemented in the EOPs, will prevent boron precipitation. The 
licensing analyses for containment, equipment qualification, and 
environmental consequences remain bounding and applicable and the 
acceptance criteria of the related events continue to be met. The 
proposed increase in RWST boron concentration, therefore, does not 
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

4. TS 3/4.7.14 and Bases--Cask Pit Pool Minimum Boron Concentration--
Deletion of Requirements

    This change removes the provisions that allow and support the 
storage of spent fuel in the cask pit pool. This change will not 
alter plant systems, operating methods, or plant setpoints that 
maintain the margin of safety. Boron concentration will continue to 
be properly maintained for the storage of spent fuel in the spent 
fuel pool as required by the analysis to control inadvertent 
criticality events. Therefore, this change will not reduce [does not 
involve a significant reduction in] the margin of safety.

5. TS 5.3.1--Design Features/Reactor Core/Fuel Assemblies

    TPBARs have been designed to be compatible with existing fuel 
assemblies. TPBARs do not adversely affect reactor neutronic or 
thermal-hydraulic performance. Analysis indicates that reactor core 
behavior and offsite doses remain relatively unchanged. For these 
reasons, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

6. TS 5.6 and TS 3/4.7.13 Bases--Design Features/Fuel Storage and Spent 
Fuel Pool Minimum Boron Concentration--Revised Storage Requirements for 
Fuel Assemblies Containing TPBARs

    Addition of fuel assemblies containing TPBARs to the spent fuel 
pool is consistent with the pool design function. Specific 
provisions have been made as a result of reanalysis of spent fuel 
pool criticality safety analysis to limit storage configurations and 
burnup or cooling time requirements to those that will provide for 
safe storage of fresh and spent fuel. Therefore, the proposed 
amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.

7. TPBAR Consolidation Activity

    The changes do not affect the safety-related performance of any 
plant operations, system, structures, or components. Therefore, 
there is no [it does not involve a] significant reduction in the 
margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the no significant hazards consideration 
analysis provided by TVA with respect to the three criteria listed in 
10 CFR 50.92(c). The staff's safety evaluation is in its early stages 
and will require several months to complete. However, in terms of 10 
CFR 50.92(c), the staff finds that the TVA application addresses all 
applicable accidents discussed in the UFSAR, including LOCAs, SGTRs, 
and fuel handling considerations. Insertion of the TPBARS for the 
purpose of producing tritium (which is sealed inside the TPBARs) 
requires a higher degree of fuel enrichment with uranium-235. Because 
the TPBARs neither contain fissile material nor replace normal reactor 
fuel, and because the TPBARs will not adversely affect reactor 
neutronic or thermal-hydraulic performance, their presence in the core 
should have no effect upon the probability or consequences of 
previously analyzed accidents, including fuel handling accidents. For 
the same reasons, the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident would not be expected to result from irradiation of the TPBARS 
in the SQN reactor cores. TVA's analysis of a possible reduction in 
safety margins addressed PCT limits resulting from an SBLOCA and the 
increased boron concentration to maintain subcriticality.
    Based on the NRC staff's review of the analysis provided by the 
licensee, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Documents may 
be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document 
Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first 
floor), Rockville, Maryland.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By January 16, 2002, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10

[[Page 65005]]

CFR part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 
2.714, which is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, 
located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), 
Rockville, Maryland, or electronically on the Internet at the NRC Web 
site http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/CFR/index.html. If there are problems in 
accessing the document, contact the Public Document Room Reference 
staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by E-mail to [email protected]. If 
a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by 
the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, 
designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety 
and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; 
and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike 
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the above date. A copy of the 
petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to 
General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, ET 11A, 400 West Summit 
Hill Drive, Knoxville, TN 37902, attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    Further details with respect to this action may be found in the 
application for amendment dated September 21, 2001, which is available 
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, located 
at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), 
Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from 
the Agencywide Documents Access and Management Systems (ADAMS) Public 
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html. Persons who do not have access to 
ADAMS, or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in 
ADAMS, should contact the NRC Public Document Room Reference staff by 
telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by E-mail to [email protected].

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of December 2001.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ronald W. Hernan,
Senior Project Manager, Section 2, Project Directorate II, Division of 
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 01-30970 Filed 12-14-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P