[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 242 (Monday, December 17, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 64994-64996]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-30968]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278]
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, PSEG Nuclear LLC, Peach Bottom
Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3; Exemption
1.0 Background
Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) and PSEG Nuclear LLC (the
licensees) are the holders of Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-44
and DPR-56, which authorize operation of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power
Station, Units 2 and 3 (Peach Bottom or the facilities). The licenses
provide, among other things, that the facilities are subject to all
rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC or the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
The facilities consist of two boiling water reactors located at the
licensees' site in York County, Pennsylvania.
2.0 Request/Action
Section III.F of Appendix R to Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), part 50, requires that automatic fire detection
systems (capable of operating with or without offsite power) be
installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure
fire hazard to safety-related or safe shutdown systems or components.
By letter dated June 15, 2001, Exelon requested an exemption from
Section III.F of Appendix R regarding the provisions for an automatic
fire detection capability in room 222, a Unit 2 feedwater heater room
in the turbine building, and room 429, the Unit 2 and Unit 3 turbine
generator hall in the turbine building.
3.0 Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions are
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and
(2) when special circumstances are present. Under 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are present when application of
the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the
underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purpose of the rule is
to reasonably assure the capability to achieve and maintain safe
shutdown in the event of a fire.
The NRC staff examined Exelon's rationale to support the exemption
request and concluded that notwithstanding the absence of an automatic
fire detection system in rooms 222 and 429, given the circumstances
discussed below, the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R,
section III.F would still be met with respect to those rooms.
Room 222
Room 222 is a feedwater heater room located in the Unit 2 turbine
building on elevation 135. Exelon has determined that the only safe
shutdown or safety-related systems or components located in this room
susceptible to fire damage are circuits associated with offsite power.
This room has not been provided with automatic fire detection in
accordance with the provisions specified in section III.F of Appendix
R. The fire hazards in this room consist solely of electrical cables
located in three cable trays that are, or will be provided with metal
covers. There are no transient combustibles stored in this area during
plant operation. When hot work is performed in this room, a continuous
fire watch is stationed in the room. The cables located in the trays
are either qualified in accordance with the flame test provisions
specified in Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Standard 383, ``Standard for Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables,
Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,''
or qualified to a flame test equivalent to the one adopted by IEEE-383.
There are no fire protection systems or features provided in this room.
Due to the high radiation field present in this area during plant
operation, this room is normally locked
[[Page 64995]]
with restricted personnel access. The cable associated with offsite
power is routed in a cable tray which passes vertically through the
room along the north wall. This cable tray (2BV080) is separated from
the other cable trays (2BV070 & 2BV090) by a minimum horizontal
distance of 24 inches. Exelon has determined that the failure of the
cables in this room will not adversely impact the availability of
offsite power to the 4kV safeguard switchgear required to achieve and
maintain safe shutdown following a fire event. Exelon has determined
that the only combustibles located in this room consist of a limited
quantity of cables qualified in accordance with the criteria specified
in IEEE 383 or a test equivalent to that specified in IEEE 383. Cables
qualified in accordance with the provisions specified in IEEE-383 are
less susceptible to self-ignition or ignition from an external source
and have a lower flame spread than non-qualified cables. These
qualified cables also remain operable at a higher temperature than non-
qualified cables. In the event of a fire involving the adjacent cable
trays (2BV070 & 2BV090), the spatial separation of the trays (24 inches
to 96 inches) and the metal covers provided on all the trays reduces
the potential for damage to the cables located in tray 2BV080. The
addition of fire detection in this room would provide little benefit
for a self-ignited cable fire in tray 2BV080, as damage would likely
occur prior to the response of the plant fire brigade. In the event
that damage does occur, either due to a self-ignited cable fire in tray
2BV080 or an exposure fire from the other trays due to hot work, Exelon
has determined that an alternate offsite power supply to the 4kV
safeguard switchgear is available and will remain free of fire damage.
The transfer from the #343-SU offsite power located in room 222 to the
#2-SU offsite power is automatic; therefore the transfer does not
require any additional operator actions. Hot work performed in this
area requires a continuous fire watch, in accordance with plant
procedures, which can provide for rapid detection of a fire in this
room and the prompt notification of the plant fire brigade. Based on
the lack of significant fire hazards in this room (IEEE-383 qualified
cables only), the separation of the cable trays in the room, the
enclosure of the cables in the tray with metal covers, and the
restricted access during plant operation, the NRC staff concludes that
the lack of fire detection in room 222 does not present an undue risk
to the public health and safety, fire detection specified by the rule
is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of Section III.F of
Appendix R, and that the NRC's principles of defense-in-depth are
satisfied without the addition of fire detection capability.
Room 429
Room 429 is located in the common area of the Peach Bottom turbine
building, elevation 165, and Exelon has determined that the only safe
shutdown and/or safety-related systems or components located in this
room susceptible to fire damage are circuits associated with the #343-
SU offsite power to the 4kV safeguard switchgear, and reactor vessel
pressure and level instrumentation. This room has not been provided
with full area automatic fire detection in accordance with the
provisions specified in Section III.F of Appendix R. The fire hazards
in this area consist of turbine lube oil, hydrogen used for generator
cooling, two maintenance office/shop structures, electrical cabinets
and cable trays. The circuits associated with offsite power are located
in three conduits routed along the west wall of room 429. Exelon has
determined that the circuits in this room related to reactor vessel
pressure and level instrumentation identified in a previous submittal
dated December 31, 1998, as supplemented on January 14 and April 14,
2000, are ``associated circuits'' as defined in Generic Letter 81-12,
``Fire Protection Rule,'' dated February 20, 1981, and Exelon has
committed to perform an analysis to ensure that the failure of these
circuits (i.e. hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground) will not
adversely impact the operation of the instrumentation required to
achieve and maintain safe shutdown following a fire event. Exelon has
committed to make a physical plant change if necessary to assure safe
shutdown capability following the completion of the analysis. However,
the instrumentation circuits are not within the scope of Section III.F
of Appendix R and thus are not being assessed by the NRC staff in this
exemption request. Fire protection systems and features in this room
include sprinkler protection on the turbine bearings, smoke detection
over each turbine bearing lift pump, hydrogen pressure monitoring, and
sprinkler systems in the maintenance office and shops. The conduits
containing the offsite power cables are located at least 30 feet
horizontally from the significant fire hazards in this room. Exelon has
determined that in the event that fire damages the conduits located in
this room, a separate offsite power source is available to achieve and
maintain safe shutdown. The conduits of interest in this area are
adjacent to the entrance to the main control room and this is a high-
traffic area for plant personnel. Due to the personnel passing through,
a fire would not go undetected for very long. The spatial separation of
over 30 feet from the conduits to the significant fire hazards present
in this room, the high ceilings and large volume above the turbine
operating floor, the fire protection provided on the significant
hazards present in this room (i.e. turbine bearings, lift pumps,
offices/shops and hydrogen system), and the high-personnel traffic
through the area provide reasonable assurance that a fire that has the
potential to damage the conduits associated with offsite power located
on the west wall will be detected by the existing fire protection
systems, or plant personnel prior to damaging the offsite power cables.
The existing fire suppression systems in conjunction with the plant
fire brigade should be effective in controlling and extinguishing fires
prior to damage occurring to the conduits located on the west wall of
room 429. In the event that the existing fire suppression systems, or
the plant fire brigade is not able to prevent damage to the conduits
containing the cables related to offsite power, Exelon has determined
that an alternate offsite power supply to the 4kV safeguard switchgear
is available and will remain free of fire damage. The transfer from the
#343-SU offsite power located in room 429, to the #2-SU offsite power
is automatic; therefore the transfer does not require any additional
operator actions. Therefore, based on the information provided by
Exelon, the NRC staff concludes that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii)
additional fire detection in room 429 is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of section III.F of Appendix R, the NRC's principles
of defense-in-depth are satisfied without the addition of full area
fire detection capability, and the lack of full area fire detection in
room 429 does not present an undue risk to the public health and
safety.
4.0 Conclusion
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12, the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present in that
application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is not
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. Therefore, the
[[Page 64996]]
Commission hereby grants Exelon an exemption from the requirements of
10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, section III.F, for rooms 222 and 429, for
Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3, with the provision that metal covers are
installed on all cable trays in room 222.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment (66 FR 50696).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of December 2001.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John A. Zwolinski,
Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 01-30968 Filed 12-14-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P