[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 242 (Monday, December 17, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 64994-64996]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-30968]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278]


Exelon Generation Company, LLC, PSEG Nuclear LLC, Peach Bottom 
Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3; Exemption

1.0  Background

    Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) and PSEG Nuclear LLC (the 
licensees) are the holders of Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-44 
and DPR-56, which authorize operation of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power 
Station, Units 2 and 3 (Peach Bottom or the facilities). The licenses 
provide, among other things, that the facilities are subject to all 
rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC or the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
    The facilities consist of two boiling water reactors located at the 
licensees' site in York County, Pennsylvania.

2.0  Request/Action

    Section III.F of Appendix R to Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR), part 50, requires that automatic fire detection 
systems (capable of operating with or without offsite power) be 
installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure 
fire hazard to safety-related or safe shutdown systems or components. 
By letter dated June 15, 2001, Exelon requested an exemption from 
Section III.F of Appendix R regarding the provisions for an automatic 
fire detection capability in room 222, a Unit 2 feedwater heater room 
in the turbine building, and room 429, the Unit 2 and Unit 3 turbine 
generator hall in the turbine building.

3.0  Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions are 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or 
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and 
(2) when special circumstances are present. Under 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are present when application of 
the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the 
underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the 
underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purpose of the rule is 
to reasonably assure the capability to achieve and maintain safe 
shutdown in the event of a fire.
    The NRC staff examined Exelon's rationale to support the exemption 
request and concluded that notwithstanding the absence of an automatic 
fire detection system in rooms 222 and 429, given the circumstances 
discussed below, the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, 
section III.F would still be met with respect to those rooms.

Room 222

    Room 222 is a feedwater heater room located in the Unit 2 turbine 
building on elevation 135. Exelon has determined that the only safe 
shutdown or safety-related systems or components located in this room 
susceptible to fire damage are circuits associated with offsite power. 
This room has not been provided with automatic fire detection in 
accordance with the provisions specified in section III.F of Appendix 
R. The fire hazards in this room consist solely of electrical cables 
located in three cable trays that are, or will be provided with metal 
covers. There are no transient combustibles stored in this area during 
plant operation. When hot work is performed in this room, a continuous 
fire watch is stationed in the room. The cables located in the trays 
are either qualified in accordance with the flame test provisions 
specified in Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
Standard 383, ``Standard for Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, 
Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,'' 
or qualified to a flame test equivalent to the one adopted by IEEE-383. 
There are no fire protection systems or features provided in this room. 
Due to the high radiation field present in this area during plant 
operation, this room is normally locked

[[Page 64995]]

with restricted personnel access. The cable associated with offsite 
power is routed in a cable tray which passes vertically through the 
room along the north wall. This cable tray (2BV080) is separated from 
the other cable trays (2BV070 & 2BV090) by a minimum horizontal 
distance of 24 inches. Exelon has determined that the failure of the 
cables in this room will not adversely impact the availability of 
offsite power to the 4kV safeguard switchgear required to achieve and 
maintain safe shutdown following a fire event. Exelon has determined 
that the only combustibles located in this room consist of a limited 
quantity of cables qualified in accordance with the criteria specified 
in IEEE 383 or a test equivalent to that specified in IEEE 383. Cables 
qualified in accordance with the provisions specified in IEEE-383 are 
less susceptible to self-ignition or ignition from an external source 
and have a lower flame spread than non-qualified cables. These 
qualified cables also remain operable at a higher temperature than non-
qualified cables. In the event of a fire involving the adjacent cable 
trays (2BV070 & 2BV090), the spatial separation of the trays (24 inches 
to 96 inches) and the metal covers provided on all the trays reduces 
the potential for damage to the cables located in tray 2BV080. The 
addition of fire detection in this room would provide little benefit 
for a self-ignited cable fire in tray 2BV080, as damage would likely 
occur prior to the response of the plant fire brigade. In the event 
that damage does occur, either due to a self-ignited cable fire in tray 
2BV080 or an exposure fire from the other trays due to hot work, Exelon 
has determined that an alternate offsite power supply to the 4kV 
safeguard switchgear is available and will remain free of fire damage. 
The transfer from the #343-SU offsite power located in room 222 to the 
#2-SU offsite power is automatic; therefore the transfer does not 
require any additional operator actions. Hot work performed in this 
area requires a continuous fire watch, in accordance with plant 
procedures, which can provide for rapid detection of a fire in this 
room and the prompt notification of the plant fire brigade. Based on 
the lack of significant fire hazards in this room (IEEE-383 qualified 
cables only), the separation of the cable trays in the room, the 
enclosure of the cables in the tray with metal covers, and the 
restricted access during plant operation, the NRC staff concludes that 
the lack of fire detection in room 222 does not present an undue risk 
to the public health and safety, fire detection specified by the rule 
is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of Section III.F of 
Appendix R, and that the NRC's principles of defense-in-depth are 
satisfied without the addition of fire detection capability.

Room 429

    Room 429 is located in the common area of the Peach Bottom turbine 
building, elevation 165, and Exelon has determined that the only safe 
shutdown and/or safety-related systems or components located in this 
room susceptible to fire damage are circuits associated with the #343-
SU offsite power to the 4kV safeguard switchgear, and reactor vessel 
pressure and level instrumentation. This room has not been provided 
with full area automatic fire detection in accordance with the 
provisions specified in Section III.F of Appendix R. The fire hazards 
in this area consist of turbine lube oil, hydrogen used for generator 
cooling, two maintenance office/shop structures, electrical cabinets 
and cable trays. The circuits associated with offsite power are located 
in three conduits routed along the west wall of room 429. Exelon has 
determined that the circuits in this room related to reactor vessel 
pressure and level instrumentation identified in a previous submittal 
dated December 31, 1998, as supplemented on January 14 and April 14, 
2000, are ``associated circuits'' as defined in Generic Letter 81-12, 
``Fire Protection Rule,'' dated February 20, 1981, and Exelon has 
committed to perform an analysis to ensure that the failure of these 
circuits (i.e. hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground) will not 
adversely impact the operation of the instrumentation required to 
achieve and maintain safe shutdown following a fire event. Exelon has 
committed to make a physical plant change if necessary to assure safe 
shutdown capability following the completion of the analysis. However, 
the instrumentation circuits are not within the scope of Section III.F 
of Appendix R and thus are not being assessed by the NRC staff in this 
exemption request. Fire protection systems and features in this room 
include sprinkler protection on the turbine bearings, smoke detection 
over each turbine bearing lift pump, hydrogen pressure monitoring, and 
sprinkler systems in the maintenance office and shops. The conduits 
containing the offsite power cables are located at least 30 feet 
horizontally from the significant fire hazards in this room. Exelon has 
determined that in the event that fire damages the conduits located in 
this room, a separate offsite power source is available to achieve and 
maintain safe shutdown. The conduits of interest in this area are 
adjacent to the entrance to the main control room and this is a high-
traffic area for plant personnel. Due to the personnel passing through, 
a fire would not go undetected for very long. The spatial separation of 
over 30 feet from the conduits to the significant fire hazards present 
in this room, the high ceilings and large volume above the turbine 
operating floor, the fire protection provided on the significant 
hazards present in this room (i.e. turbine bearings, lift pumps, 
offices/shops and hydrogen system), and the high-personnel traffic 
through the area provide reasonable assurance that a fire that has the 
potential to damage the conduits associated with offsite power located 
on the west wall will be detected by the existing fire protection 
systems, or plant personnel prior to damaging the offsite power cables. 
The existing fire suppression systems in conjunction with the plant 
fire brigade should be effective in controlling and extinguishing fires 
prior to damage occurring to the conduits located on the west wall of 
room 429. In the event that the existing fire suppression systems, or 
the plant fire brigade is not able to prevent damage to the conduits 
containing the cables related to offsite power, Exelon has determined 
that an alternate offsite power supply to the 4kV safeguard switchgear 
is available and will remain free of fire damage. The transfer from the 
#343-SU offsite power located in room 429, to the #2-SU offsite power 
is automatic; therefore the transfer does not require any additional 
operator actions. Therefore, based on the information provided by 
Exelon, the NRC staff concludes that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) 
additional fire detection in room 429 is not necessary to achieve the 
underlying purpose of section III.F of Appendix R, the NRC's principles 
of defense-in-depth are satisfied without the addition of full area 
fire detection capability, and the lack of full area fire detection in 
room 429 does not present an undue risk to the public health and 
safety.

4.0  Conclusion

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12, the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue 
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common 
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present in that 
application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is not 
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. Therefore, the

[[Page 64996]]

Commission hereby grants Exelon an exemption from the requirements of 
10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, section III.F, for rooms 222 and 429, for 
Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3, with the provision that metal covers are 
installed on all cable trays in room 222.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment (66 FR 50696).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of December 2001.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John A. Zwolinski,
Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 01-30968 Filed 12-14-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P