[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 225 (Wednesday, November 21, 2001)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 58650-58653]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-29280]



[[Page 58649]]

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Part V





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Part 121



Flightcrew Compartment Access and Door Designs; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 225 / Wednesday, November 21, 2001 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 58650]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 121

[Docket No. FAA-2001-10770; SFAR 92-2]
RIN 2120-AH54


Flightcrew Compartment Access and Door Designs

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This action supersedes SFAR 92-1, which was published October 
17, 2001, allowing air carriers to quickly modify the flightcrew 
compartment door to delay or deter unauthorized entry to the flightcrew 
compartment. This action temporarily authorizes variances from existing 
design standards for the doors and allows for approval for return to 
service of modified airplanes without prior approved data if the 
modification constitutes a major alteration. This action prohibits the 
possession of flightdeck compartment door keys by other than the 
flightcrew during flight, unless the flightdeck door has an internal 
flightdeck locking device installed, operative, and in use. This action 
also clarifies the 90 day and 180 day time frames in earlier versions 
of this SFAR with specific dates. This action is being taken in the 
wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against four U.S. 
commercial airplanes.

DATES: This action is effective November 21, 2001 and shall remain in 
effect until April 9, 2003.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kimberly Smith, Technical Programs 
Branch, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone: (202) 267-7242; e-mail address: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Availability of This Action

    You can get an electronic copy of this document from the Internet 
by taking the following steps:
    Go to the search function of the Department of Transportation's 
electronic Docket Management System (DMS) web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search).
    On the search page, type in the last four digits to the docket 
number shown at the beginning of this document. Click on ``search.''
    On the next page, which contains the docket summary information, 
click on the item you want to see.
    You can also get an electronic copy using the Internet through the 
FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the 
Government Printing Office's web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su 
docs/aces/aces140.html.
    You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make 
sure to identify the docket number or notice number of this rulemaking.

Small Entity Inquiries

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for 
information advice about compliance with statutes and regulations 
within the FAA's jurisdiction. Therefore, any small entity that has a 
question regarding this document may contact its local FAA official. 
Internet users can find additional information on SBREFA on the FAA's 
web page at http:www.faa.gov/avr/arm/sbrefa.htm and send electronic 
inquiries to the following Internet address: [email protected].

Background

    The September 11, 2001, hijacking events have demonstrated that 
some persons are willing to hijack airplanes and use them as weapons 
against the citizens of the United States. This is a safety and 
security threat that was not anticipated and, therefore, not considered 
in the design of transport airplanes. The recent hijackings make it 
clear that there is a critical need to improve the security of the 
flightcrew compartment. These improvements should deter terrorist 
activities and, if they are attempted, delay or deny access to the 
cockpit.

Flightcrew Compartment Door Designs

    Flightcrew compartment doors on transport category airplanes have 
been designed principally to ensure privacy, so pilots could focus 
their entire attention to their normal and emergency flight duties. The 
doors have not been designed to provide an impenetrable barrier between 
the cabin and the flightcrew compartment. Doors have not been required 
to meet any significant security threat, such as small arms fire or 
shrapnel, or the exercise of brute force to enter the flightcrew 
compartment.
    Beside affording an uninterrupted work environment for the 
flightcrew, flightcrew compartment doors often must meet other 
important safety standards. Should there be a sudden decompression of 
the airplane, separate compartments within the airplane, like the cabin 
and the crew compartment, must be designed so that a the pressure 
differential that is created does not compromise the basic airplane 
structure. Certification standards require that airplane designs 
provide a method to compensate for decompression in a manner that 
avoids significant damage to the airplane. In many cases, flightcrew 
compartment doors provide the pressure compensation, by being vented or 
swinging open to equalize the pressure between the cabin and the 
flightcrew compartment.
    In addition, design standards require that the flightcrew have a 
path to exit the flightcrew compartment in an emergency, if the cockpit 
window exists are not usable. Flightcrew compartment doors have been 
designed to provide this escape path. But this escape feature may also 
enable easier unauthorized entry into the flightcrew compartment from 
the cabin.
    Operating regulations, in particular Sec. 121.379(b) in the case of 
a major alteration, require the work to be done in accordance with 
technical data approved by the Administrator. Operating regulations for 
airlines also require that each crewmember have a key readily available 
to open doors between passengers and an emergency exit. Some airlines 
issue flightcrew compartment door keys to all their crewmembers. This 
allows flight attendants to enter the flightcrew compartment and assist 
the flightcrew in an emergency, such as incapacitation of a flight 
crewmember. But it also offers an opportunity for an individual to 
overpower or coerce a flight attendant, take away the key, and enter 
the flightcrew compartment.

Rapid Response Team

    To evaluate what could be done to improve flightcrew compartment 
security, the Secretary of transportation formed a Rapid Response Team 
for Aircraft Security. The Team included representatives of airplane 
designers, airline operators, airlines pilots, and flight attendants. 
There was a clear consensus from this group, and agreement by the FAA, 
that immediate actions must be taken to strength the flightcrew 
compartment door. The short-team options, though, in one way or another 
could conflict with regulatory design requirements such as those 
discussed above.
    The Rapid Response Team addressed the design issues and found the 
relative safety risks to be small in view of he

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emergent security risk of unauthorized flightcrew compartment entry. 
The FAA agrees with this conclusion. The Rapid Response Team report 
also concluded, and the FAA agrees, that all existing design 
requirements should continue to be applied in the long term. Therefore, 
this SFAR allows a temporary period during which non-compliance with 
design requirements will be allowed when improvements to flightcrew 
compartment security are made. This relief is limited to 18 months, at 
which time the modified airplane must be brought back into full 
compliance with all design requirements. Airlines will submit reports 
within 180 days of the publication of the SFAR on how they will achieve 
this compliance.
    This SFAR will provide airlines with maximum flexibility to 
incorporate door modifications rapidly. In addition to waiving specific 
airworthiness regulations, the FAA is waiving procedural requirements 
applicable to major alterations Sec. 121.379(b)). In addition to the 
information obtained from the Rapid Response Team, the FAA has received 
technical information from airline operators and manufactures regarding 
what modifications are possible and how quickly they can be 
incorporated. The technical data reviewed by the FAA reflect good 
design practices, and the FAA is confident that installations can be 
made without unduly compromising safety.
    Given the urgency of the need to take action to reinforce the 
flightcrew compartment doors, the FAA finds that it is in the public 
interest to forego the requirement that major alterations to accomplish 
this task have data previously approved by the Administrator. This 
portion of the SFAR is limited to 6 months. Major alterations performed 
after that date must be in accordance with approved data, and whatever 
the airline installs in the short term must ultimately be brought into 
full regulatory compliance for emergency egress and venting.
    The SFAR requires reports to the FAA so the modifications can be 
monitored and corrective action taken it necessary. Because of the risk 
posed by having other than flightcrew members onboard the aircraft as 
allowed in Sec. 121.583, FedEx on October 10, 2001, petitioned the FAA 
to take actions necessary to allow it to install additional door 
security measures in accordance with the provisions of SFAR 92 (66 FR 
51546, October 9, 2001). The FAA has determined that the modifications 
requested by FedEx would apply to similarly situated cargo airplane 
operators and that the threat is similar to that of passenger 
airplanes.

The SFAR Provisions

    The revised SFAR allows all air carriers under part 121 to install 
flightcrew compartment door improvements and to prohibit possession of 
flightcrew compartment keys by persons other than flight crewmembers 
during flight. It is very broad, to allow maximum short-term 
flexibility in crafting enhanced door security measures. It allows the 
doors to be modified and airplanes to be operate with modified doors.
    The FAA has established an 18-month duration for the portions of 
the SFAR concerning airworthiness requirements. We expect this will 
give the industry sufficient time to design and install more permanent 
changes to door security and establish procedures for flightcrew 
compartment door access that met regulator requirements for egress and 
venting.
    The SFAR requires operators to submit a report to the FAA by 
January 15, 2002 that details the specific modifications they have made 
to the flightcrew compartment door. This will allow the FAA to monitor 
what has been installed and take action if the installation creates an 
unacceptable safety risk. Further, to monitor progress toward the goal 
of full compliance, the SFAR requires a report by April 22, 2002 that 
describes how the operator will meet regularly compliance for egress 
and venting.
    We also expect that airframe manufacturers and modifiers will 
produce service information to assist operators in developing 
modifications to improve intrusion resistance to the flightcew 
compartment. While service documents would not require separate 
approval under this SFAR, such modifications may also be installed in 
production airplanes. The modification authority granted by this SFAR 
also applies to manufacturers and other persons applying for 
airworthiness certificates to enable delivery of airplanes to the 
operators.
    In addition, we understand that some operators may rely on 
suppliers to produce parts to support these modifications to the 
flightcrew doors. Under normal circumstances, such parts producers 
would be subject to the requirement to obtain parts manufacturer 
approvals in accordance with 14 CFR 21.303. However, to facilitate 
reinforcement of these doors, the SFAR includes a provision overriding 
the requirement for parts production approval in support of these 
activities.
    Should any of the changes to the door constitute a major 
alteration, this SFAR temporarily relieves the operator of having to 
obtain prior approval of the data. This part of the SFAR terminates on 
April 22, 2002. As soon as the design data is submitted (no later than 
January 15, 2002), the FAA will work with the operators to identify a 
mutually acceptable process and time to get the data approved. In the 
meantime, the airworthiness certificates on airplanes that have been 
modified will remain valid. In making returns to service of airplanes 
modified under this SFAR, documents can reflect compliance with 
regularly requirements by citing the SFAR.
    In addition to the above changes to harden the flightcrew 
compartment doors against intruders, the FAA also believes it is 
prudent to eliminate the ability of intruders to gain access by 
obtaining a flight attendant's key. For that reason, this SFAR 
temporarily changes the requirement in Sec. 121.313(g) by stating that 
only flight crewmembers, and not cabin crewmembers, will have flight 
crew compartments key during flight. This should lessen the opportunity 
for gaining unauthorized access and reduced the likelihood of attacks 
on cabin crewmembers to obtain keys on airplanes where the flightdeck 
door does not have an internal locking device.
    Since initial issuance of this SFAR, internal locking devices that 
render the key useless for flightdeck access have been installed on 
many air carrier airplanes. Since the keys have multiple uses in the 
airplane beyond the flightdeck door, prohibiting possession of the 
flightdeck door keys by non-flight crewmembers on these airplanes is 
only an inconvenience to the crew and not a deterrent to terrorist 
activity. Allowing non-flight crewmembers access to the keys is 
acceptable when the internal locking device is in use on the airplane. 
``In use'' contemplates that the device is locked from the inside by 
the flightdeck crew. If a flightdeck crewmember must exist the 
flightdeck for some reason, either the remaining flightdeck crewmember, 
or a cabin crewmember that enters the flightdeck, will immediately lock 
the internal device behind the exiting flightdeck crewmember. This 
provision may also reduce the opportunity for coercion, since the 
flight attendant can safely hand over the key.
    As a result, this change to the SFAR adds a phrase to the end of 
Sec. 121.313(a)(ii) to allow possession of the key under certain 
circumstances. The limitations on keys do not apply to cargo operators 
because flight attendants are only required on passenger airplanes. 
Note that this change to

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121.313(g) will expire with this SFAR. Further rulemaking will be 
necessary to address this subject after expiration.
    This change also replaces the 90 day and 180 day reporting and 
termination time frames with specific dates, January 15, 2002, and 
April 22, 2002 respectively. Since this SFAR has been republished more 
than once, insertion of specific dates will eliminate confusion in 
calculating these dates.

Justification for Immediate Adoption

    Because the circumstances described herein warrant immediate action 
by the FAA, the Administrator finds that notice and public comment 
under 5 U.S.C. 553(b) are impracticable and contrary to the public 
interest. Further, the Administrator finds that good cause exists under 
5 U.S.C. 553(d) for making this rule effective immediately upon 
publication. This action is necessary to prevent a possible imminent 
hazard to airplanes and to protect persons and property within the 
United States.

International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA 
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices 
that correspond to this SFAR.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This emergency final SFAR contains information collection 
activities subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 USC 
Sec. 3507(d)). In accordance with section 3507(j)(1)(B) of that 
statute, the FAA is requesting the Office of Management and Budget to 
grant an immediate emergency clearance on the paperwork package that it 
is submitting. As protection provided by the Paperwork Reduction Act, 
an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to 
respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently 
valid OMB control number. Therefore, notification will be made to the 
public when a clearance is received. Following is a summary of the 
information collection activity.
    Title: Flightcrew Compartment Access and Door Designs.
    Summary/Need: The SFAR requires operators to submit a report to the 
FAA by January 15, 2002 that details the specific modifications. This 
will allow the FAA to monitor what has been installed and taken action 
if the installation creates an unwarranted safety risk. Further, to 
monitor progress toward the goal of full compliance, the SFAR requires 
a report by April 22, 2002 that describes how the operator will come 
into full regulatory compliance.
    Respondents: The respondents are an estimated 135 airplane 
operators covered under 14 CFR part 121.
    Burden: The burden associated with this SFAR has not been 
determined prior to this publication, but will be submitted to OMB with 
the request for clearance.

Regulatory Analyses

    This rulemaking action is taken under an emergency situation within 
the meaning of Section 6(a)(3)(D) of Executive Order 12866, Regulatory 
Planning and Review. It also is considered an emergency regulation 
under Paragraph 11g of the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures. In addition, it is a significant 
rule within the meaning of the Executive Order and DOT's policies and 
procedures. No regulatory analysis or evaluation accompanies the rule. 
At this time, the FAA is not able to assess whether this rule will have 
a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities as 
defined in the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended. However, 
we will be conducting a regulatory analysis of the cost and benefits of 
this rulemaking, including any impact on small entities, at a later 
date.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this SFAR under the principles and criteria of 
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We have determined that this action 
will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the 
relationship between the national Government and the State, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government. Therefore, we have determined that this final rule does not 
have federalism implications.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), enacted as Pub. 
L. 104-4 on March 22, 1995, is intended, among other things, to curb 
the practice of imposing unfunded Federal mandates on State, local, and 
tribal governments. Title II of the Act requires each Federal agency to 
prepare a written statement assessing the effects of any Federal 
mandate in a proposed or final agency rule that may result in a $100 
million or more expenditure (adjusted annually for inflation) in any 
one year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or 
by the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a ``significant 
regulatory action.'' This SFAR does not contain such a mandate. 
Therefore, the requirements of Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act of 1995 do not apply.

Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically 
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
environmental impact statement. In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, 
appendix 4, paragraph 4(j) this rulemaking action qualifies for a 
categorical exclusion.

Energy Impact

    The energy impact of this SFAR has been assessed in accordance with 
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) Pub. L. 94-163, as 
amended (42 U.S.C. 6362) and FAA Order 1053.1. It has been determined 
that this SFAR is not a major regulatory action under the provisions of 
the EPCA.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 121

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Charter flights, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Safety, Transportation.

The Amendment

    For the reasons set forth above, the Federal Aviation 
Administration amends 14 CFR part 121 as follows:

PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
OPERATIONS

    1. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 1153, 40113, 40119, 41706, 44101, 
44701-44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901, 
44903-44904, 44912, 46105.


SFAR 92-1  [Removed]

    2. Remove Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 92-1 [SFAR].


SFAR 92-2  [Added]

    3. Add Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 92-2 to read as 
follows:

Special Federal Aviation Regulations No. 92-2--Flightcrew Compartment 
Access and Door Designs

    1. Applicability. This Special Federal Aviation Regulation 
(SFAR) applies to all operators that hold an air carrier certificate 
or operating certificate issued under part 119 and that conduct 
operations under part 121, except paragraph 4 of this SFAR does not 
apply to cargo operations. It applies to the operators specified in 
this SFAR that modify airplanes to improve the flightcrew

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compartment door installations to restrict the unwanted entry of 
persons into the flightcrew compartment. This SFAR also applies to 
production certificate holders and applicants for airworthiness 
certificates for airplanes to be operated by operators specified in 
this SFAR, and producers of parts to be used in such modifications.
    2. Regulatory Relief. Contrary provisions of part 21, and 
Secs. 121.153(a)(2) and 121.379(b), notwithstanding:
    (a) An operator may operate airplanes modified to improve the 
flightcrew compartment door installations to restrict the 
unauthorized entry of persons into the flightcrew compartment 
without regard to the applicable airworthiness requirements and may 
modify those airplanes for that purpose, using technical data not 
previously approved by the Administrator, subject to the following 
conditions:
    (i) Not later than January 15, 2002, submit to the Director, 
Aircraft Certification Service, a detailed description of the 
changes to the airplane that have been accomplished to enhance the 
intrusion resistance of the flightcrew compartment including 
identification of what major alterations have been done without 
previously approved data.
    (ii) Not later than April 22, 2002, submit to the Director, 
Aircraft Certification Service, a schedule for accomplishment of the 
changes necessary to restore compliance with all applicable 
airworthiness requirements, as well as a listing of the regulations 
not currently complied with. The schedule may not extend beyond the 
termination date of this SFAR.
    (iii) If, upon reviewing the data submitted in paragraph 2(a)(i) 
of this SFAR, the Administrator determines that a door modification 
presents an unacceptable safety risk, the FAA may issue an order 
requiring changes to such modifications.
    (b) An applicant for an airworthiness certificate may obtain 
such a certificate for modified airplanes to be operated by 
operators described in this SFAR.
    (c) A holder of a production certificate may submit for 
airworthiness certification or approval, modified airplanes to be 
operated by operators described in this SFAR.
    (d) A person may produce parts for installation on airplanes in 
connection with modifications described in this SFAR, without FAA 
parts manufacturer approval (PMA).
    3. Return to Service Documentation. Where operators have 
modified airplanes as authorized in this SFAR, the affected airplane 
must be returned to service with a note that it was done under the 
provisions of this SFAR.
    4. Provision for Flightdeck Door Compartment Key. Contrary to 
provisions of Sec. 121.313(g), the following provision applies: A 
key for each door that separates a passenger compartment from an 
emergency exit identified to passengers in the briefing required by 
Sec. 121.571(a)(1)(ii). The key required for access to the emergency 
exit must be readily available for each crewmember. No key to the 
flight crewmembers, unless an internal flightdeck locking device 
such as a deadbolt or bar is installed, operative, and in use.
    5. Termination. With respect to the ability to approve airplanes 
for return to service without data previously approved by the 
Administrator in the case of major alterations, this SFAR terminates 
on April 22, 2002. All other provisions of this SFAR terminate on 
April 9, 2003.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on November 19, 2001.
Jane F. Garvey,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 01-29280 Filed 11-19-01; 3:43 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M