[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 212 (Thursday, November 1, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 55166-55171]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-27437]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Interim Management of Nuclear Materials

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Amended record of decision.

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SUMMARY: On December 12, 1995, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 
issued a Record of Decision (ROD) and Notice of Preferred Alternatives, 
60 FR 65300 (December 19, 1995), for the final environmental impact 
statement, Interim Management of Nuclear Materials (IMNM EIS) (DOE/EIS-
0220, October 20, 1995), at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South 
Carolina. As part of its decision, DOE decided to construct a new 
facility, the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF), to 
prepare, package, and store plutonium oxide and metal in accordance 
with DOE's plutonium storage standard, recently revised as 
Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials 
(DOE-STD-3013). The APSF also was intended to provide space for 
consolidated storage of plutonium and some special actinide materials 
at the SRS. Additionally, DOE decided that it would process 
approximately 14,000 liters (3,800 gallons) of americium and curium 
solution into a glass matrix (vitrify) within small stainless steel 
canisters (the ``Vitrification (F-Canyon)'' alternative). Modifications 
to the F-Canyon, where the americium/curium solution is stored, would 
be required to establish the vitrification stabilization capability. 
The canisters of vitrified americium/curium would have been stored in 
the F-Canyon building until DOE decided on its use or disposition.
    For several reasons, including project cost growth concerns, DOE 
issued an amended ROD (66 FR 7888, January 26, 2001) which canceled the 
APSF project and decided to install the plutonium storage standard 
stabilization and packaging capability within Building 235-F, an 
existing plutonium storage and processing facility in the F-Area at the 
SRS. DOE also decided to use existing SRS vault storage space, 
including space in Building 235-F, to store plutonium (and other 
nuclear material inventories) pending disposition.
    Now, after further review of project costs, schedules, and program 
requirements, DOE has canceled the Building 235-F Plutonium Packaging 
and Stabilization project and the F-Canyon Americium/Curium 
Vitrification project. To establish the capability to package plutonium 
in accordance with the plutonium storage standard (DOE-STD-3013), DOE 
will modify existing furnaces, or install new ones, and install an 
outer can welding capability within the FB-Line facility, located in 
Building 221-F. To stabilize the F-Canyon americium/curium solution, 
DOE will implement the Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the 
Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) alternative analyzed in the 
IMNM EIS. This alternative includes the transfer of the solution to the 
SRS high-level waste (HLW) system, vitrification of the HLW solution in 
the DWPF, and storage of the resultant canisters in the DWPF Glass 
Waste Storage Building pending disposition in a geologic repository.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the interim 
management of nuclear materials at the SRS, to receive a copy of the 
final IMNM EIS, or a copy of the IMNM ROD(s), contact: Andrew R. 
Grainger, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Compliance Officer, 
U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office, Building 
730B, Room 2418, Aiken, South Carolina 29802, (800) 881-7292, Internet: 
[email protected]
    For further information on the DOE NEPA process, contact:
    Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance 
(EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., 
Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at (800) 472-
2756.
    Additionally, DOE NEPA information, including the IMNM Final EIS, 
can be found on the DOE NEPA Web site at: www.eh.doe.gov/nepa/.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Background

NEPA Review and Decisions

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a final environmental 
impact statement, Interim Management of Nuclear Materials (IMNM EIS) 
(DOE/EIS-0220, October 20, 1995), in accordance with the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Council on Environmental Quality

[[Page 55167]]

NEPA implementing regulations, and DOE implementing procedures. The 
IMNM EIS assessed the potential environmental impacts of actions 
necessary to safely manage nuclear materials at the SRS, Aiken, South 
Carolina, until decisions on their future use or ultimate disposition 
are made and implemented. The IMNM EIS grouped the nuclear materials at 
the SRS into three categories: Stable, Programmatic, and Candidates for 
Stabilization. Some of the ``Programmatic'' and all of the ``Candidates 
for Stabilization'' materials could have presented environmental, 
safety and health vulnerabilities in their then-current storage 
condition. For materials that could present environmental, safety, or 
health vulnerabilities within the next 10 years of the NEPA analysis, 
the IMNM EIS evaluated stabilization alternatives to meet the new 
plutonium storage standard to ensure safe storage (for up to 50 years). 
For non-plutonium materials, alternatives were evaluated that provided 
similar safe storage.
Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging for Long-Term Storage
    The capability to meet the Department's plutonium storage standard, 
DOE-STD-3013, did not exist at the SRS or any other DOE site at the 
time of the preparation of the IMNM EIS. Subsequently, DOE has been 
working to establish this capability at its non-pit \1\ surplus 
plutonium sites. Facilities at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology 
Site (RFETS, near Golden, Colorado), Hanford (Richland, Washington), 
and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore, California) 
have been established and are now operating, packaging plutonium to the 
requirements of the storage standard. Stabilizing and packaging 
plutonium to the storage standard are generally the last steps in 
completing the stabilization process. The IMNM EIS considered two 
options to provide the long-term storage stabilization and packaging 
capability at the SRS: (1) The construction of a new facility (i.e., 
APSF), and (2) the modification of existing plutonium processing and 
storage facilities--Building 235-F and FB-Line, both in F-Area.
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    \1\ A ``pit'' is a nuclear weapon component.
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    On December 12, 1995, DOE issued a Record of Decision (ROD) and 
Notice of Preferred Alternatives [published December 19, 1995 (60 FR 
65300)], on the interim management of several categories of nuclear 
materials at the SRS. As part of its decision, DOE decided to construct 
a new facility, the APSF, to enable plutonium oxides to be stabilized, 
and plutonium oxide and metal to be repackaged in accordance with DOE's 
plutonium storage standard (DOE-STD-3013). The APSF also was intended 
to provide space for consolidated storage of plutonium and certain 
special actinide materials at the SRS.
    In December 1996, DOE issued the Storage and Disposition of 
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement (Storage and Disposition PEIS, DOE/EIS-0229). The 
Storage and Disposition PEIS, among other things, assessed the 
potential environmental impacts of alternative approaches and locations 
for storing weapons-usable fissile materials (plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium). DOE decided in the Storage and Disposition ROD 
[published January 21, 1997 (62 FR 3014)], to expand the storage 
capacity of the prospective APSF at the SRS (from 2,000 storage 
positions to 5,000 storage positions) to accommodate the storage of 
surplus non-pit plutonium to be received from RFETS, pending 
disposition.\2\ DOE also indicated in the Storage and Disposition ROD 
that DOE would pursue a strategy for surplus plutonium disposition that 
allows for immobilization of surplus weapons plutonium in glass or 
ceramic forms, and irradiation of surplus plutonium as mixed oxide 
(MOX) \3\ fuel in existing commercial nuclear power reactors. The 
immobilized plutonium would be stored in the DWPF Glass Waste Storage 
Building at the SRS and the spent MOX fuel would be stored at the 
commercial nuclear power reactor site, pending disposal in a geologic 
repository.
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    \2\ Non-pit weapons-usable plutonium would only move from the 
RFETS provided that: (1) The plutonium had been stabilized to meet 
the then-plutonium storage standard, DOE-STD-3013-96; (2) the 
construction of the APSE at the SRS had been completed; and, (3) the 
SRS had been selected as the immobilization disposition site for 
surplus weapons-usable plutonium.
    \3\ A physical blend of uranium oxide and plutonium oxide.
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    Subsequently, in order to support the early closure of RFETS, DOE 
published an amended Storage and Disposition ROD August 13, 1998 (63 FR 
43386), to allow the RFETS surplus non-pit plutonium to be sent to the 
SRS before completion of the APSF. Based upon the amended Storage and 
Disposition ROD, DOE undertook the K-Area Materials Storage (KAMS) 
project to modify existing space within Building 105-K to store surplus 
plutonium in shipping containers as received from RFETS, pending 
disposition.
    On January 12, 2001, DOE issued an Amended IMNM ROD [published 
January 26, 2001 (66 FR 7888)], deciding to cancel the APSF project and 
instead establish a stabilization and packaging capability by modifying 
space within Building 235-F to prepare and package surplus plutonium 
for storage in accordance with DOE's plutonium storage standard, DOE-
STD-3013. Additionally, DOE indicated it would use existing facilities 
(Building 221-F's FB-Line, Building 235-F, and KAMS) for plutonium 
storage, pending disposition.
Americium/Curium Solution Stabilization
    In the ROD issued December 12, 1995, DOE selected the 
``Vitrification (F-Canyon)'' alternative evaluated in the IMNM EIS to 
stabilize the existing americium/curium solution being stored in F-
Canyon. DOE would have processed the americium/curium solution to a 
glass (``vitrify'') contained within small stainless steel canisters 
(14 inches tall, 2 inches in diameter). DOE would have modified an 
existing portion of F-Canyon (previously called the Multi-Purpose 
Processing Facility) to install the necessary vitrification equipment. 
The canisters would have been stored within the F-Canyon (Building 221-
F) at the SRS until DOE made programmatic decision on the use of the 
americium and curium isotopes.
Other NEPA Reviews and Decisions
    In addition to the December 12, 1995, and the January 12, 2001, 
RODs that relied upon the analyses of the IMNM EIS, DOE issued four 
supplemental RODs to make additional decisions and/or modify previous 
decisions concerning the management of nuclear materials at the SRS: 
(1) DOE published a supplemental ROD February 21, 1996 (61 FR 6633), 
identifying management actions for two categories of SRS nuclear 
materials: (a) DOE would stabilize the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels by 
processing them in the SRS canyon facilities and blending down the 
resulting highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium, and (b) DOE 
would stabilize the ``other aluminum-clad targets'' by dissolving them 
in the SRS canyon facilities and transferring the resulting nuclear 
material solution to the HLW tanks for future vitrification in the 
DWPF; (2) DOE published a supplemental ROD September 13, 1996 (61 FR 
48474), identifying management actions for two more categories of SRS 
nuclear materials: (a) DOE would dissolve, chemically separate, and 
process in F-Canyon obsolete neptunium-production targets and

[[Page 55168]]

existing neptunium solution (stored in H-Canyon) to a glass form using 
a vitrification capability to be established in F-Canyon; and, (b) DOE 
would process existing H-Canyon plutonium-239 solutions to a glass form 
using a vitrification capability to be established in F-Canyon; (3) DOE 
published a supplemental ROD April 11, 1997 (62 FR 17790), identifying 
some additional spent nuclear fuel from the Taiwan Research Reactor 
that should be recategorized from Stable to Candidate for Stabilization 
and that this material would be processed through the SRS canyon 
facilities; and, (4) DOE published an amended ROD November 14, 1997 (62 
FR 61099), modifying the decision to vitrify the H-Canyon plutonium-239 
and neptunium to ``Processing to Oxide'' using H-Canyon facilities. 
These supplemental or amended decisions did not alter DOE's decisions 
related to the construction of the APSF or the vitrification of the 
americium/curium solution in F-Canyon.
    In November 1999, DOE issued the Surplus Plutonium Disposition 
Final Environmental Impact Statement (SPD EIS) (DOE/EIS-0283), which 
analyzed alternatives for the siting, construction, and operation of 
three surplus plutonium disposition facilities. These three facilities 
would accomplish pit disassembly and conversion, plutonium conversion 
and immobilization, and MOX fuel fabrication. DOE published the Surplus 
Plutonium Disposition ROD on January 11, 2000 (65 FR 1608), which 
selected the SRS for all three of the new surplus plutonium disposition 
facilities.

Plutonium Stabilization and Storage Evaluations

    As indicated in the January 12, 2001, Amended ROD (66 FR 7888), DOE 
determined after a review of plutonium storage and stabilization 
options, documented in Evaluation of Savannah River Plutonium Storage 
and Stabilization Options (July 2000), that cost savings of $180 
million or more could be achieved by modifying space within Building 
235-F in lieu of constructing the APSF.
    As a result of program priorities and further review of an FB-Line 
low-cost option, DOE has canceled the Building 235-F Packaging and 
Stabilization Project. DOE has completed the conceptual design for an 
FB-Line project that would stabilize and package SRS plutonium in full 
compliance with the requirements of DOE-STD-3013; project costs are 
estimated to be $13.5 million to $29 million. This is substantially 
less than the Building 235-F project conceptual design estimate range 
of $160 million to $250 million. SRS plutonium stabilization and 
packaging activities using the FB-Line are estimated to begin earlier 
than Building 235-F, and complete stabilization and packaging 
activities within the same time-frame as Building 235-F (2006-2008), if 
not sooner. SRS plutonium, to include that stored in FB-Line, will be 
stored in Building 235-F and KAMS at the SRS after packaging to the 
plutonium storage standard.

Americium and Curium Vitrification Project Difficulties and Changes

    The Department's February 28, 1995, Implementation Plan for DNFSB 
Recommendation 94-1 indicated that the americium/curium solution could 
be stabilized by September 1998 should the Vitrification (F-Canyon) 
alternative analyzed within the IMNM EIS be the selected stabilization 
alternative (with the corresponding ROD expected to be issued by July 
1995). After more than five years of work on the americium/curium 
solution stabilization project, the time-table has been extended and 
the costs have increased for a variety of technical and programmatic 
reasons. Most recently, a project re-baseline request, submitted to DOE 
by the site contractor on March 19, 2001, identified a $68 million 
increase in estimated project costs, bringing total estimated project 
costs to $197 million. A subsequent request submitted April 6, 2001, 
identified an additional increase of up to $26 million to meet proposed 
geologic disposal waste criteria and would delay stabilization 
completion one year, to December 2006. These proposed changes would 
increase project costs by up to 73 percent.
    One of the factors in DOE's selection process for stabilizing the 
americium and curium solution had been to preserve these rare isotopes, 
which are not likely to be produced again in any substantial quantity, 
for potential DOE or other research, medical, or industrial use. The 
Vitrification (F-Canyon) process would stabilize the americium and 
curium isotopes into a safe, long-term storable, but retrievable form.
    Uncertainties and projections for project cost growth were becoming 
evident in mid-2000. In light of these rising costs and uncertainties 
in solution stabilization schedules, DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy, 
Science and Technology and Office of Science conducted an evaluation of 
the need for the americium and curium isotopes. No firm need for these 
special isotopes was identified, leading DOE to conclude that the 
material was excess to requirements and that maintaining the material 
indefinitely was unwarranted.
    Based upon these events and determinations, DOE authorized the re-
assessment of a waste disposal alternative for the americium/curium 
solution. Results from this re-assessment indicate: (1) The americium/
curium solution can be transferred to the HLW system \4\ in a single 
continuous transfer; (2) very little dilution is expected to be 
required, resulting in approximately ten additional DWPF canisters; (3) 
the transferred solution could be processed through DWPF in 2004-2007, 
substantially earlier than the previous expectation of 2020, or later; 
and (4) preliminary cost estimates indicate a savings of up to $116 
million over continuing to pursue vitrification in F-Canyon. 
Subsequently, DOE has determined that there is no programmatic need for 
the americium and curium solution and that it can be dispositioned to 
the SRS HLW system, precluding any future recovery. DOE has, therefore, 
canceled the Americium/Curium Vitrification Project.
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    \4\ The SRS HLW system consists of a variety of facilities for 
the management, treatment, and vitrification of approximately 38 
million gallons of HLW. The various facilities include the F- and H-
Area tank farms (22 and 29 HLW tanks, respectively, with two tanks 
operationally closed), waste evaporators, DWPF, Saltstone, Extended 
Sludge Processing, Glass Waste Storage Building, piping and transfer 
systems.
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Interim Management of Nuclear Materials EIS

Alternatives

    The IMNM EIS analyzed several alternatives, including the No Action 
alternative (Continued Storage), for the interim management of eleven 
(11) types of nuclear materials at the SRS. All of the alternatives, 
except the No Action, would support DOE's objective of removing nuclear 
materials from vulnerable conditions and from vulnerable facilities in 
preparation for deactivation, decontamination, and decommissioning. The 
IMNM RODs include decisions to undertake stabilization and processing 
actions for ten (10) SRS nuclear material types categorized as 
``Candidates for Stabilization'' and ``Programmatic.'' (DOE decided to 
continue existing actions for the ``Stable'' nuclear material types/
category.) Seven of these nuclear materials types--(1) plutonium and 
uranium stored in vaults, (2) Mark-31 targets, (3) aluminum-clad Taiwan 
Research Reactor fuel and Experimental Breeder Reactor-II slugs, (4) 
plutonium-239 solutions, (5) plutonium-242 solutions, (6) neptunium-237 
solutions, and, (7) americium/curium solution--require, or could 
require, a new capability to stabilize and package the

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material to DOE's storage standard, or comparable criteria, to complete 
stabilization for safe interim management and long-term storage.
    The plutonium-242, neptunium-237, and americium/curium were 
categorized as programmatic materials in the IMNM EIS, but were 
analyzed for completeness of the potential impacts from stabilization 
and packaging for long-term storage. DOE has since stabilized the 
plutonium-242 to oxide and transferred it to the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory for programmatic use. The neptunium-237 has yet to be 
stabilized. However, DOE decided in a January 19, 2001, ROD for the 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Accomplishing Expanded 
Civilian Nuclear Energy Research and Development and Isotope Production 
Missions in the United States, Including the Role of the Fast Flux Test 
Facility [published January 26, 2001 (66 FR 7877)], that the neptunium-
237 is required to reestablish the domestic production of plutonium-
238. Once stabilized to oxide, the neptunium-237 will be shipped to the 
Radiochemical Engineering Development Center at the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory (Oak Ridge, Tennessee) where it will be stored until 
fabrication into targets for irradiation, and plutonium-238 production, 
in the Advanced Test Reactor (near Idaho Falls, Idaho) and the High 
Flux Isotope Reactor (Oak Ridge, Tennessee). [Note: On April 25, 2001, 
the Secretary of Energy suspended for 90 days the decision to 
permanently deactivate the Fast Flux Test Facility as indicated in the 
above subject ROD. This suspension did not alter DOE's decision 
regarding the need for the SRS neptunium-237.] As discussed in this 
Amended ROD, the americium/curium continues to require stabilization.
Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging for Long-Term Storage
    The IMNM EIS considered two options [see IMNM EIS, Chapter 2. 
Alternatives, and Appendix C, pp. C-41 to C-46] for stabilizing, 
packaging, and storing plutonium to DOE's storage standard--(1) the 
construction of the new APSF, and (2) the modification of existing 
facilities, FB-Line and Building 235-F. The storage standard is 
designed to help ensure the safe storage of the materials for long 
periods (e.g., up to 50 years). Each option was designed to provide the 
capability to heat plutonium oxide materials to drive off residual and 
absorbed moisture; package stabilized material (oxides and metal) in at 
least two corrosion-resistant containers (a container within a 
container) without the use of plastics, hydrogenous compounds, or 
organic material; weld-seal the outer container in an inert atmosphere 
to ensure weld joint and container material integrity; and store the 
stabilized material in sealed containers.
    For modifications to the FB-Line in the F-Canyon building (Building 
221-F) at the SRS, DOE had re-considered its previous decisions 
associated with the F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions Final Environmental 
Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0219, December 1994). On February 1, 1995, 
DOE issued a ROD (60 FR 9824, February 22, 1995) to add to the FB-Line 
a capability to package plutonium metal within a single, inert gas-
filled, welded container, without the need for plastic and other 
organic materials. During preparation of the IMNM EIS and its initial 
ROD, DOE concluded that adding the full stabilization and packaging 
mission to the FB-Line facility would delay completion of the FB-Line's 
nuclear materials stabilization activities and the planned shutdown of 
the FB-Line facility.
    Since 1995, certain SRS nuclear material stabilization activities 
have been completed and plans for stabilizing other remaining materials 
have been altered. For plutonium-bearing residues, DOE stabilization 
decisions included dissolving the residues in nitric acid, purifying 
the solution, precipitating the solution back into a powder, and then 
either converting the powder to metal (if processed in FB-Line) or 
drying the powder (plutonium oxide, if processed in HB-Line) and 
canning. The FB-Line dissolver system, of 1960's vintage, has been 
shutdown since the mid-1980's and was not designed to today's safety 
standards. HB-Line is a newer facility (construction completed in the 
1980's), and its dissolver system had been used satisfactorily in the 
mid- to late-1990's for the plutonium-238 program.
    Now, based upon estimates for restart, plans to curtail materials 
separation and purification activities in F-Canyon, and the comparably 
better capabilities of the HB-Line dissolvers, DOE is no longer 
pursuing the restart of the FB-Line dissolver system. As documented in 
the ``Department of Energy Plan for the Transfer of All Long-Term 
Chemical Separation Activities at the Savannah River Site from the F-
Canyon Facility to the H-Canyon Facility Commencing in Fiscal Year 
2002,'' and provided to the Congress on April 10, 2001, DOE expects to 
complete nuclear material stabilization activities that would use the 
F-Canyon's separation and purification capabilities in fiscal year 
2002. Material characterization and packaging, as well as material 
storage, activities will continue in FB-Line supporting the dissolution 
of plutonium-bearing residues in HB-Line, the packaging and preparation 
of other residues for disposition to waste, and the characterization 
and staging of other plutonium-bearing materials for heat treatment and 
packaging to the long-term plutonium storage standard. The FB-Line 
material characterization and packaging activity is scheduled to 
continue through 2005. Establishing the DOE-STD-3013 stabilization and 
packaging capability within FB-Line can complement the facility's 
ongoing missions by reducing nuclear material handling and 
transportation requirements.
Americium/Curium Solution Stabilization
    To manage the approximately 14,000 liters (3,800 gallons) of 
americium/curium solution stored within a single tank (Tank 17.1) in F-
Canyon, DOE evaluated four alternatives in the IMNM EIS: (1) 
Vitrification (F-Canyon), the selected alternative in the December 12, 
1995, ROD; (2) Processing to Oxide; (3) Processing and Storage for 
Vitrification in the DWPF; and, (4) Continuing Storage (i.e., ``No 
Action'').
    Under the Vitrification (F-Canyon) alternative, DOE would modify 
existing space in the F-Canyon, providing equipment to vitrify the 
americium/curium radioactive solution into a glass matrix. After 
completing the modifications, DOE would vitrify the existing solution 
of americium and curium isotopes. DOE identified Vitrification (F-
Canyon) as the preferred alternative for stabilizing the americium/
curium solution in the IMNM EIS.
    For the Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the DWPF 
alternative, DOE would perform research and development work to 
determine the chemical adjustments necessary for the americium/curium 
solution in the F-Canyon in order to transfer it to the HLW tanks in F- 
or H-Area. The research and development work would evaluate the effects 
on the systems and facilities used to store and treat the liquid HLW. 
Upon completion of the studies, the americium/curium solution would be 
chemically adjusted and transferred to the HLW tank(s) via underground 
pipelines. When transferred to the HLW tank(s), the solution would be 
mixed with the existing volume of HLW stored in the tank(s). The bulk 
of the radioactivity in the HLW tank(s) solution would eventually be 
vitrified in borosilicate glass in the DWPF. The glass would be 
contained within stainless steel canisters that would be stored in the

[[Page 55170]]

Glass Waste Storage Building, adjacent to the DWPF, pending disposal in 
a geologic repository.

Potential Environmental Impacts

    The IMNM EIS analyzed potential impacts of alternatives for 
managing all SRS nuclear materials, those materials that were expected 
to present a environment, safety, or health vulnerabilities as well as 
those determined to be stable. Summaries of potential impacts from the 
alternatives are presented in the IMNM EIS, Table 2-2 through Table 2-
12 (pp. 2-48 through 2-58).
    The IMNM EIS indicated that there would be minimal environmental 
impacts from the implementation of any alternative (including the APSF, 
Building 235-F, or FB-Line options for plutonium stabilization and 
storage activities, and the americium/curium stabilization alternatives 
involving F-Canyon or DWPF processing) in the areas of geologic, 
ecological, cultural, aesthetic and scenic resources, noise, and land 
use. Impacts in these areas would be limited because facility 
modifications or construction of new facilities would occur within 
existing buildings or industrialized portions of the SRS. The existing 
SRS workforce would support any construction projects and other 
activities required to implement any of the alternatives, and thus 
negligible socioeconomic impacts would be expected from implementing 
any of the alternatives.
    Emissions of hazardous air pollutants and releases of hazardous 
liquid effluents from any of the alternatives would be very small and 
well within applicable standards and existing regulatory permits \5\ 
for the SRS facilities. DOE expects minimal impacts from any of these 
releases. Similarly, for any of the IMNM EIS alternatives, potential 
transuranic waste, mixed hazardous waste, and low-level solid waste 
generated would be handled by existing waste management (treatment, 
storage, and disposal) facilities at the SRS.
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    \5\ The IMNM EIS inidcates many of the constituent releases 
would be expected to be several orders of magnitude below the permit 
or regulatory limits.
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Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging for Long-term Storage
    DOE has reviewed the IMNM EIS and determined that there are no 
substantial changes in the proposed modification of FB-Line nor are 
there any significant new circumstances or information relevant to 
environmental impacts that would result from modifying FB-Line. The 
analysis of potential environmental impacts and the description of the 
FB-Line option in the IMNM EIS have not changed since the Final EIS was 
issued.
    While the IMNM EIS indicated that potential adverse impacts to the 
environment, public, or workers would be small for the packaging and 
storage alternatives, there would be minor differences between the APSF 
``new construction'' option and the Building 235-F or FB-Line 
modification options. The modification to FB-Line would involve work in 
an existing and radiologically contaminated facility, thereby 
potentially leading to a small increase over the APSF option in 
radiological waste generation and construction worker exposure. Through 
the use of site administrative control limits, however, no worker would 
be expected to receive a radiological dose beyond that allowed for 
radiological workers from normal operations, or from facility 
modification work. Likewise, the existing waste management facilities 
are capable of handling the additional radiological waste that would 
result from the FB-Line modification.
Americium/Curium Solution Stabilization
    While the IMNM EIS indicates that potential environmental impacts 
from any of the nuclear material management alternatives are small, 
those management alternatives requiring the processing of nuclear 
material through the large chemical separations facilities (the canyons 
and B-Lines), such as the vitrification of the americium/curium 
solution in the F-Canyon, would have greater environmental impacts 
during the time that dissolving, processing or conversion activities 
are underway than when these facilities are storing nuclear materials. 
After materials have been stabilized, impacts of normal facility 
operations related to management of those materials would decline, and 
potential impacts of accidents associated with those materials would be 
reduced, with certain kinds of accidents eliminated (e.g., americium/
curium solution leaking or being improperly transferred from its 
existing storage tank). The americium/curium solution presents the 
greatest radiological source term (approximately 230,000 curies) within 
any of the nuclear material processing and storage facilities. Based 
upon an average HLW tank radioactivity content of 8.5 million curies, 
the transfer of the americium/curium solution to a single HLW tank 
would increase the HLW tank's radioactivity level by 0.23 million 
curies, or less than two and one-half percent.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging for Long-term Storage

    The IMNM EIS indicated that potential adverse impacts to the 
environment, public, or workers would be small for the APSF, Building 
235-F, or FB-Line options. While small increases in radiological waste 
and worker radiological exposure could be expected from the Building 
235-F and FB-Line modification options over the APSF option, all 
options would involve relatively small impacts, and thus neither could 
be deemed environmentally preferable over the other.

Americium/Curium Solution Stabilization

    Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the DWPF is the 
environmentally preferable alternative for stabilizing the americium/
curium solution (as well as for americium/curium containing metal 
targets and slugs). This alternative is estimated to result in the 
lowest radiological doses to the offsite public and the SRS workers; 
have the lowest level of hazardous pollutant emissions to the air with 
comparable levels of liquid effluent emissions; and result in the least 
amount of high-level, transuranic and mixed waste with comparable 
amounts of low level waste.

Decision

    After further review of the Building 235-F Stabilization and 
Storage Project and the Americium/Curium Vitrification Project (using a 
capability to be installed within F-Canyon's Multi-Purpose Processing 
Facility), DOE is amending its previous decisions issued in December 
1995 and January 2001. The alternative approaches being implemented are 
estimated to have substantially reduced costs, which allows DOE to 
reduce capital expenditure requirements to levels more consistent with 
current and projected budget resources. Likewise, these alternatives 
offer the potential to complete certain nuclear materials stabilization 
activities sooner, reducing further the already low risks to workers, 
the public, and the environment.

Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging for Long-term Storage

    DOE is amending its January 2001 ROD to provide a SRS capability 
for the stabilization and packaging of plutonium to the storage 
standard (DOE-STD-3013). Instead of modifying existing space within 
Building 235-F, DOE will modify existing space within

[[Page 55171]]

the FB-Line facility, located within and atop the F-Canyon (Building 
221-F). This decision will allow DOE to stabilize and package plutonium 
to the storage standard within the same time-frame, if not sooner, as 
would a modified Building 235-F. DOE will continue to use existing 
vault space in Building 235-F and Building 105-K (KAMS) for interim 
storage pending disposition, and existing vault space in FB-Line for 
interim storage during stabilization actions.

Americium/Curium Solution Stabilization

    DOE is amending its December 1995 ROD for stabilizing americium and 
curium solution at the SRS. Instead of implementing the ``Vitrification 
(F-Canyon)'' alternative DOE will implement the ``Processing and 
Storage for Vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility'' 
alternative analyzed in the IMNM EIS. For this alternative, DOE will 
transfer the solution, after chemical adjustments as necessary, to the 
HLW storage and treatment system. The americium and curium isotopes 
will be vitrified to a glass form with SRS HLW in the DWPF. DWPF 
canisters are being stored on-site in the Glass Waste Storage Building 
pending transfer to a geologic repository for permanent disposal. DOE 
estimates approximately ten additional DWPF canisters [approximately 
6000 DWPF canisters are forecast to be produced at the SRS] will result 
from adding the americium/curium solution to the HLW inventory.

    Issued at Washington, DC, October 19, 2001.
Jessie Hill Roberson,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.
[FR Doc. 01-27437 Filed 10-31-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P