[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 202 (Thursday, October 18, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 52913-52916]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-26240]



[[Page 52913]]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. RM01-9-001]


Reporting of Natural Gas Sales to California Market

Issued October 11, 2001.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Order on rehearing.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is denying rehearing 
of the Commission's July 25, 2001 order, 66 FR 40245 (August 2, 2001), 
imposing certain reporting requirements on natural gas sellers and 
transporters serving the California market.

DATES: The reporting requirement covers activity for the six months 
from August 1, 2001, to January 31, 2002, and the first report is due 
October 1, 2001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jacob Silverman, Office of the General 
Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, N.E., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 208-2078.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:   

    Before Commissioners: Pat Wood III, Chairman; William L. Massey, 
Linda Breathitt, and Nora Mead Brownell.

Order on Rehearing

Issued October 11, 2001.
    On July 25, 2001, the Commission issued an order (July 25 order) 
imposing a reporting requirement on natural gas sellers and 
transporters serving the California market.\1\ The specific information 
to be collected was set forth in a series of questions included as an 
appendix to the order. The Commission concluded that it has the 
authority to request the information in order for the Commission to 
understand why the disparity in the price of natural gas between the 
price in California and the remainder of the country had occurred, and 
was continuing. The information is to be submitted monthly for the six-
month period covering August 1, 2001, through January 31, 2002, with 
the report due 30 days after the end of each month.\2\ Requests for 
rehearing or clarification were filed by a number of parties.
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    \1\ 96 FERC para. 61,119 (2001).
    \2\ On September 17, 2001, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) approved the information collection, and assigned it OMB No: 
1902-0187. The order stated that the Commission intended to seek an 
extension of the reporting requirement, upon approval by OMB, 
through September 30, 2002, to coincide with the end date of the 
Commission's mitigation plan regarding wholesale electricity prices 
in California and the West. See San Diego Gas & Electric Company, et 
al., 95 FERC para. 61,418 (2001), reh'g pending.
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    The Commission denies rehearing. The reporting requirement is in 
the public interest, since the information is necessary for the 
Commission to better understand how the California natural gas market 
operates so the Commission can determine whether there is anything else 
the Commission can do to protect California consumers. Without the 
information the Commission can not determine whether it has authority 
to meaningfully address the problem of disparate prices in the 
California natural gas market. Further, the information is necessary 
for the Commission to advise Congress as to whether it should change 
the existing regulatory framework under which the Commission now 
operates. The Commission also denies the requests for clarification.

Background

    On May 18, 2001, the Commission issued an order (the May 18 order) 
proposing to impose a reporting requirement on natural gas sellers and 
transporters serving the California market, and requested comments on 
the proposal.\3\ The order discussed the Commission's concern about a 
sharp increase in the price of natural gas sold in the California 
market, which exceeded the increase in other markets, including those 
markets supplied by the same producing areas.\4\ The May 18 order 
stated that the information should assist the Commission in carrying 
out its regulatory responsibilities in a number of ways. First, it 
would help the Commission determine what part of the problem, if any, 
is within the scope of its jurisdiction by enabling the Commission to 
determine what percentage of the volumes sold into the California 
market is domestically produced gas sold by marketers affiliated with 
pipelines \5\ and LDCs in sales for resales, which are the only sales 
of natural gas now being made that the Commission has jurisdiction to 
regulate. The information would also give the Commission an accurate 
picture of the overall average gas costs being incurred by all 
purchasers of natural gas moving into the California market. The 
Commission also stated that the information would enable it to 
determine the extent to which the cost of interstate transportation, 
which is subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, affects the price of 
gas at the California border.
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    \3\ 95 FERC para. 61,262 (2001).
    \4\ The May 18 order stated that the Commission's legal 
authority to take actions that would affect those prices is limited 
by the existing statutory framework, specifically the Natural Gas 
Policy Act of 1978, and the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 
1989. As a result, the only sales of natural gas that the Commission 
currently has jurisdiction to regulate are sales for resale of 
domestic gas by pipelines, LDCs, or their affiliates.
    \5\ For the most part, interstate pipelines no longer sell 
natural gas.
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    The specific information to be collected was set forth in a series 
of questions included as an appendix to the May 18 order. Twenty-nine 
responses were filed to the May 18 order. Some commenters who supported 
the proposal also sought to broaden the scope of information gathered. 
Other commenters raised a number of issues, such as the extent of the 
Commission's authority to collect the information, the period in which 
the information is to be collected, and the confidential treatment of 
certain information, particularly the data on individual transactions. 
In addition, some commenters urged clarification of a number of the 
questions.
    The July 25 order concluded that under NGA sections 14 \6\ and 16 
the Commission has the authority to request the information from 
entities that may not be natural gas companies subject to the 
Commission's NGA section 1 jurisdiction.\7\ In addition to the reasons 
discussed in the May 18 order, the Commission pointed out that the 
information being sought would be relevant in determining the effect of 
legislative proposals addressing the California energy situation in the 
current session of Congress.\8\
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    \6\ Section 14(a) provides:
    The Commission may investigate any facts, conditions, practices, 
or matters which it may find necessary or proper in order to 
determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate any 
provision of [the NGA] or any rule, regulation, or order hereunder, 
or to aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this act or in 
prescribing rules or regulations thereunder, or in obtaining 
information to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation 
to the Congress.
    \7\ Moreover, with respect to concerns over confidentiality, the 
order found that the specific information gas sellers are required 
to report concerning sales transactions is exempt from disclosure 
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In addition, in 
response to the comments received, certain of the proposed questions 
were modified.
    \8\ [See e.g. S. 764, and H.R. 1974 which would instruct the 
Commission to require natural gas sellers of bundled sales to the 
California market to disclose the commodity portion and the 
transportation portion of the sale price.
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    Moreover, the Commission stated that it was also concerned about 
the operation of the California natural gas market because gas-fired 
electric generators in California help to establish the market clearing 
price for electric generation pursuant to the bidding system used by 
the California Independent System Operator. On June 19, 2001, the 
Commission issued an

[[Page 52914]]

order establishing price mitigation for the California power 
markets.\9\ Under that mitigation plan, generators' price bids during 
reserve emergencies must reflect the marginal cost of obtaining natural 
gas used for generation in the California ISO's single price auctions. 
The ISO's clearing price will act as a maximum price for spot sales 
outside the ISO's single price auctions, which are bilateral sales in 
California and the rest of the WSCC. That number is derived using an 
average of the mid-point of the monthly bid-week prices at certain 
reported California natural gas market price points. Thus, the price 
for electric power would be dependent, to some extent, on the price of 
natural gas at certain California market points.
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    \9\ See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. et al., 95 FERC para. 
61,418 (2001) (San Diego), establishing a price mitigation plan for 
Western States Coordinating Council (WSSC) area, including 
California.
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    Under these circumstances, not only was the Commission's NGA 
section 14 and 16 authority applicable, but the Commission found that 
Section 311 of the Federal Power Act (FPA) \10\ also applies. That 
section authorizes the Commission, ``as a basis for recommending 
legislation,'' to request information ``regarding the generation * * * 
of electric energy, however produced * * * whether or not subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Commission * * *'' As a result the Commission 
has the authority to ``investigate nonjurisdictional sales of 
nonjurisdictional companies.'' \11\ The FPA section 311 authority 
includes authorization to secure information concerning ``the cost of 
generation.'' Since natural gas is used in many generating plants to 
produce the electricity, the cost of natural gas is obviously a crucial 
element in any investigation of the cost of generating electricity. 
Thus, in the current situation, FPA section 311 is another basis for 
the Commission's authority to issue the reporting requirement.
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    \10\ 16 U.S.C. Sec. 825j. That section provides, in part, that 
``the Commission is authorized and directed to conduct 
investigations regarding * * * electric energy, however produced, 
throughout the United States, * * * whether or not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission. * * *''
    \11\ Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 549 F.2d 31 at 34 (5th Cir. 
1975).
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    Requests for rehearing or clarification were filed by e prime, Inc, 
Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. (TEMI), and Enron North America and 
Enron Energy Services (Enron). The Public Utilities Commission of the 
State of California (CPUC), and Southern California Gas Company and San 
Diego Gas & Electric Company (collectively Sempra Utilities) filed 
requests for clarification.

Discussion

1. For the Purpose of the Reporting Requirement the Commission Has the 
Authority To Require Reports From Entities Not Subject to Its 
Jurisdiction
    The requests for rehearing objected to the requirement that non-
jurisdictional entities report information regarding non-jurisdictional 
transactions to the Commission. They contend that there is no basis to 
permit the Commission to collect data from entities that are not 
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act.
    TEMI also argues that even if the Commission declines to grant 
rehearing, it should exclude from the reporting requirement those 
entities whose gas sale volumes could not have a material effect on gas 
prices in the California market. It asserts that the order should be 
limited to entities whose volumes exceed 1 billion cubic feet per month 
of physical volumes in the California market. E prime, Inc. contends 
that since the Commission cannot require the information it seeks from 
those not subject to its jurisdiction, information from the limited 
universe of persons concerning the limited number of sales transactions 
over which the Commission does have jurisdiction, will not aid the 
Commission in its search for a solution to the California problem, so 
the rulemaking should be rescinded in its entirety.
    The July 25 order explained that NGA sections 14 and 16, and FPA 
section 311 provide the Commission's authority to require all entities 
selling gas in the California market, including non-jurisdictional 
entities, to file the report. The order explained that because of the 
disparity in the price between California and the rest of the country, 
the Commission needs the information to carry out its statutory 
responsibilities. Thus, contrary to e prime, which asserts that the 
Commission has not explained why it needs the information, the July 25 
order has an extensive discussion on this very point.\12\
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    \12\ 96 FERC at 61,464-66.
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    Without repeating the discussion in the July 25 order as to why the 
Commission needs the information, suffice it to say that without the 
information from non-jurisdictional parties, the Commission can not 
determine whether it has authority to meaningfully address the 
disparity in price of natural gas in the California market. Further, 
the information is necessary for the Commission to advise Congress as 
to whether it should change the existing regulatory framework under 
which the Commission now operates.
    There is no merit in e prime's contention that NGA section 14 
cannot be a basis for the Commission's order here because that section 
cannot expand the Commission's jurisdiction over persons or 
transactions excluded by Congress, citing Federal Power Commission v. 
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498. In that case, the 
Commission sought to enjoin the company, a regulated entity, from 
transferring property from which gas was being produced. The Court held 
that such action was outside the Commission's jurisdiction because it 
involved the ``production and gathering'' of gas, an activity 
specifically excluded from the Commission's jurisdiction under NGA 
section 1(b). However, the Court noted that in support of its position, 
the Commission relied on a number of sections of the NGA, one of which 
was Section 14(b). The Court stated:

    Section 14 (b) * * * comes closest to supporting the 
Commissions' argument, but that confers only power to obtain 
information (emphasis added).\13\
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    \13\ 337 U.S. at 505-06.

    That is exactly what is at issue here, the Commission's authority 
to obtain information relevant to carrying out its statutory 
responsibilities. Contrary to e prime's contention, the Commission's 
action is not a fishing expedition, but has been taken ``for the 
purpose of investigating a specific problem that is a matter of urgent 
concern both to it and the Congress.'' \14\
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    \14\ 96 FERC at 61,464.
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    Similarly, TEMI's argument that case law conflicts with the 
Commission's position is unconvincing.\15\ The cases TEMI cites found 
that the Commission has authority to require natural gas companies to 
submit information both as to jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional 
matters. It does not follow from that, as TEMI argues, that the 
Commission has no authority to require non-jurisdictional entities to 
submit information. In fact, in Superior Oil, cited by TEMI, at issue 
was the Commission's order requiring natural gas companies to file 
information concerning their exploration and development related 
expenditures, as well as those of their affiliates, including 
affiliates not themselves natural gas companies. Petitioners contended 
the Commission had exceeded its statutory power to the extent the order 
applied to affiliates not natural gas companies. The Court

[[Page 52915]]

upheld the Commission because the information as to affiliates was 
necessary to ensure that the Commission could determine the true cost 
of production of interstate sales of the regulated gas. Moreover, the 
Court stated that ``[O]ther sections of the Act,'' such as section 
14(a):
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    \15\ TEMI cites Continental Oil v. FPC, 519 F.2d 31, 34 (5th 
Cir. 1975); Union Oil v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976), and 
Superior Oil Co. v FERC, 563 F2d 191 (5th Cir. 1977).

while falling short of specifically empowering the FPC to gather 
from affiliates the information sought by Form 64, support the view 
that the [Commission's] investigatory powers are broad and are not 
limited by the constraints which Congress has placed on the 
regulatory and rate-setting jurisdiction of the 
[Commission](emphasis added).\16\
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    \16\ 563 F.2d at 198.

Here, the Commission relies upon NGA sections 14 and 16, and FPA 
section 311, for its authority to act here with respect to the specific 
problem being addressed.
    With regard to the Commission's authority under FPA section 311, 
the July 25 order explained that in light of the Commission's electric 
mitigation order; supra, n 2., it is essential that the Commission 
understands the operation of the natural gas market in California 
because the price of natural gas is an element in determining the cost 
of generating electricity. To argue, as does TEMI, that the price of 
natural gas is like ``any subject matter that could possibly affect the 
cost of electricity generation'' \17\ fails to recognize the crucial 
role natural gas plays in determining the price of electricity under 
the mitigators plan. Under the mitigation plan generators' price bids 
during reserve emergencies must reflect the marginal cost for each 
generator by using a proxy which is to be determined by ``averag[ing] 
the mid-point of the monthly bid-week prices * * * for three spot 
market prices reported for California.'' \18\
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    \17\ 95 FERC at 62,560-61.
    \18\ San Diego, 95 FERC at 62,560-61.
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    This clearly falls within the scope of FPA section 311 which 
authorizes ``investigations regarding the generation, transmission, 
distribution, and sale of electrical energy, however produced, 
throughout the United States * * * whether or not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission. * * * ``That section also expressly 
authorizes the Commission to secure information concerning ``the cost 
of generation.'' Moreover, to understand the operation of natural gas 
market in California, the Commission must have information from all 
participants in that market. Thus, the Commission will not limit the 
reporting requirement to only the larger participants in that market, 
as TEMI has requested.
2. Other Issues Raised in the Rehearing Requests Are Without Merit
    Enron takes a different position than the others seeking rehearing. 
It argues that:

the situation does not present an adequate legal basis for the 
imposition of the burden of formal reporting requirements on all 
parties; rather, the burden should only be imposed on parties and at 
such times as is reasonably necessary to investigate specific 
matters. The formalized and generally applicable reporting 
requirements adopted go far beyond that scope.\19\
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    \19\ Rehearing request at 2.

However, the experience in the past year supports the need for the 
information requested. The Commission is seeking information covering a 
limited time period. It is needed to address a specific problem in the 
California natural gas market to enable the Commission to determine 
whether it can take any meaningful action with respect to that problem, 
and, if not, whether Congress should consider changes in the regulatory 
framework.
    Enron contends that based upon its experience in responding to 
similar data requests, the Commission underestimated the burden of the 
reporting requirement set forth in the July 25 order, and seems to 
imply that this is a basis for not complying. The Commission can only 
make an average projection of that burden. The fact that Enron believes 
the burden will exceed that estimate provides no grounds for rescinding 
the reporting requirement.
    In addition, Enron argues that the reporting requirements were 
based on a business method that does not reflect how Enron manages its 
business. Specifically Enron asserts that the reporting requirement 
seeks daily pricing and volume information for gas transportation and 
purchase contracts ``associated with the sales contracts'' for gas 
physically delivered to California, and Enron does not have daily 
information about its sales, nor does it have purchase contracts that 
relate to specific sales contracts because its business is managed on 
an aggregated basis. It argues that to associate purchases to sales 
would be an ``arbitrary after the-fact-determination.'' Instead, Enron 
asks that the Commission should ``clarify that sellers of natural gas 
need to file information that they have that is responsive to the 
questions, but that they do not have to create data to respond to these 
questions when that data does not otherwise exist.'' \20\
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    \20\ Rehearing request at 5.
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    Question 2 to natural gas sellers requires them to provide, on a 
daily basis, certain information for each contract under which they 
sold gas that was physically delivered at points on the California 
border or in California. Question 3 requires sellers to identify 
separately the transportation and gas commodity components for each of 
the sales contracts identified in Question 2. Question 4 requires 
sellers to provide certain information on a daily basis ``for each of 
your gas purchase contracts associated with the sales contracts you 
identified in response to Question 2.''
    Enron reads Questions 3 and 4 as requiring gas sellers to match 
specific contracts under which it purchases transportation service and 
natural gas with particular gas sales contracts on a daily basis. Enron 
suggests that it cannot do this, primarily because its business is 
managed on an aggregated basis. It does not ```back-to-back' its sales 
with specific packages of gas or of transportation it purchases.'' \21\ 
Therefore, it asserts, any association of purchase and transportation 
contracts with particular sales contracts would be purely arbitrary. 
Enron also states any association of transportation and sales contracts 
with its sales contracts on a daily basis is complicated by the fact 
that it does not have daily information about most of its sales, since 
they are done on a monthly billing cycle basis.
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    \21\ Rehearing request at 4.
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    Questions 3 and 4 as adopted by the Commission do not require 
sellers to make arbitrary associations of the sellers' transportation 
and gas purchases with particular sales contracts. Rather, those 
questions can, and should, be answered in a manner consistent with the 
way the particular gas seller does business. For example, if a seller, 
such as Enron, operates its business on an aggregated basis without 
attributing purchases under any particular purchase contract to sales 
under any particular sales contract, then all the contracts under which 
it purchases gas each day during a particular month supply the gas sold 
under all its sales contracts during that month, whether in California 
or elsewhere. In effect, the purchases under each of the seller's gas 
purchase contracts must be considered to have been pro-rated among each 
of the seller's sales contracts, including both the California sales 
contracts identified in response to Question 2 and any other sales 
contracts that the seller might have. In such circumstances, the seller 
should report the information requested in Question 4 as to all its gas 
purchase contracts, since a pro-rated portion of the gas purchased 
under each gas purchase contract supplies the gas sold under each 
California sales

[[Page 52916]]

contract.\22\ In response to Question 4(d) concerning the daily volumes 
purchased, the seller would report a pro rata share of the volumes 
purchased under that contract equal to the pro rata share that the 
seller's California sales represent of its overall sales.\23\
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    \22\ Question 4 requires the following information concerning 
gas purchase contracts:
    a. The purchase contract's identification number;
    b. The pipeline upstream of the point of delivery; and the 
pipeline downstream of the point of delivery;
    c. The term of the purchase contract (beginning and ending 
dates);
    d. The daily volumes (on a MMBtu basis) purchased;
    e. The price paid;
    f. Whether the price is fixed or indexed (identify the index),
    g. Identify the entity from whom the responder purchased the 
gas; and,
    h. Identify the point where responder took title to the gas.
    \23\ If a seller does make gas purchases to supply particular 
gas sales contracts, then the only purchase contracts it need report 
in response to Question 4 are those purchase contracts which supply 
the gas sales contracts it identified in response to Question 2. The 
Commission has requested daily information, because market 
conditions change on a daily basis, and there can be significant 
changes in at least the spot price of gas from day to day.
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    To the extent that Enron is contending that it should only be 
required to report aggregated information concerning its gas purchase 
contracts, the Commission finds that limiting the reported information 
in such a manner would be unacceptable. First, the individual contract-
by-contract information is necessary to verify the aggregated data. 
Second, the information about the terms of each seller's gas purchase 
contracts is necessary for the Commission to understand how the 
California gas market works and thus what actions, if any, the 
Commission should take within its jurisdiction, or recommend that 
Congress take. For example, while spot prices of natural gas at the 
California border and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in producing basins 
have been very volatile, the Commission does not know to what extent 
sellers must pay spot prices for the gas they sell in California. The 
information required in response to Question 4 about the terms of the 
seller's gas purchase contracts and whether the price in those purchase 
contracts is fixed or indexed, will enable the Commission to determine 
this.
    Question 3 to gas sellers requires them to identify separately the 
transportation component and the gas commodity component of the price 
in their sales contracts identified in response to Question 2. The July 
25 order stated that if the sales contract only includes an overall 
price, then the seller shall report the transportation cost it incurred 
in moving the gas from the point where it purchased the gas to the 
point where it sold the gas, and how it determined that amount. If a 
seller operates its business on an aggregated basis, it still must 
maintain particular transportation contracts for the purpose of 
delivering gas to California. Therefore, to the extent its California 
sales contracts do not separately identify the transportation and gas 
commodity components of the sales price, then it should pro-rate the 
costs incurred under its transportation contracts used for delivering 
gas to California among the gas sales contracts identified in response 
to Question 2.
    Finally, Enron asserts that the filing deadline should be extended 
from 30 to 45 days after the end of each month. It argues that the 
current filing deadline creates additional problems because it ``tends 
to be the busiest time for the personnel in gas accounting who will 
have to prepare the reports.'' \24\
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    \24\ Rehearing request at 5.
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    We note that Enron was the only party seeking such an extension. 
Moreover, we fail to understand how the filing of the report thirty 
days after the month in which the activity occurred imposes too 
difficult a burden on gas accountants. The report due on October 1, 
2001, is for the activity that occurred during August. The information 
for that activity would be processed, and compiled in September, and 
the filing would be made by October 1. Accordingly, we deny that 
request.
    The Commission recognized, as e prime argues, that some of the 
information to be furnished might include highly confidential, 
sensitive marketing information. However, the order gave protection to 
such information, so that argument as a grounds for not furnishing the 
information is baseless.
3. Requests for Clarification
    CPUC requests that all the information furnished to the Commission 
should be given to CPUC as well.\25\ Although the CPUC has regulatory 
authority in California, we do not believe that that alone is a 
sufficient basis for granting its request. Certain of the information 
will not be entitled to confidential treatment, and will be available 
to all, including the CPUC. However, the July 25 order found that 
individual sales or purchase contracts, which include sensitive price 
data will be exempt from public disclosure. We will not make exceptions 
to this ruling because, by assurance of confidential treatment, parties 
will have no basis for not complying.
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    \25\ Sempra Energy Trading Corp. (SET) moved to respond to the 
CPUC's request, and that good cause exists to accept the answer 
since it had no opportunity to respond to CPUC's initial request. 
SET objects to the CPUC's request, and points out that the CPUC is a 
litigant in many ongoing Commission proceedings, so it should not 
have access to the confidential data furnished.
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    Moreover, the purpose in seeking the information is to enable the 
Commission to understand the operation of the market for gas sales into 
California, not to investigate the conduct of particular participants 
in that market. First, the information would help the Commission to 
determine what part of the problem, if any, is within the scope of its 
jurisdiction, and enable it to determine the extent to which the cost 
of interstate transportation, which is subject to the Commission's 
jurisdiction, affects the price of gas at the California border. In 
addition, the information being sought would be relevant in determining 
whether Congress should consider changes in the regulatory framework. 
None of these purposes would be aided by giving to the CPUC the 
confidential data concerning individual sales or purchase contracts.
    Sempra requests that the Commission clarify that the ``sellers and 
transporters of natural gas serving the California market'' required to 
provide data include LDCs and utilities upstream of California that are 
interconnected with or served by interstate pipelines ultimately 
serving the California markets. Sempra argues that it is impossible for 
the Commission to gain a comprehensive understanding of the pricing 
disparity between California and the rest of the nation unless, at a 
minimum, it obtains data on capacity utilization by entities upstream 
of California.
    The Commission denies the request. Not only is the request so broad 
and ambiguous that it is difficult to understand what it covers, but 
the Commission is satisfied that the questions in their present form 
will furnish the Commission with the necessary information.
    The Commission orders:
    (A) The requests for rehearing are denied.
    (B) The requests for clarification are denied.

    By the Commission.
David P. Boergers,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 01-26240 Filed 10-17-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P