[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 201 (Wednesday, October 17, 2001)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 52834-52837]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-26204]



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Part II





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Part 121



Flightcrew Compartment Access and Door Designs; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 201 / Wednesday, October 17, 2001 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 52834]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 121

[Docket No. FAA-2001-10770; SFAR 92-1]
RIN 2120-AH52


Flightcrew Compartment Access and Door Designs

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This action supersedes SFAR 92 which was published October 9, 
2001, by allowing certain air carriers to quickly modify the flightcrew 
compartment door to delay or deter unauthorized entry to the flightcrew 
compartment. This action temporarily authorizes variances from existing 
design standards for the doors and allows for approval for return to 
service of modified airplanes without prior approved data if the 
modification constitutes a major alteration. This action prohibits the 
possession of flightdeck compartment door keys by other than the 
flightcrew during flight. This action is being taken in the wake of the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against four U.S. commercial 
airplanes.

DATES: This action is effective October 17, 2001 and shall remain in 
effect until April 9, 2003.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kimberly Smith, Technical Programs 
Branch, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone: (202) 267-7242; e-mail address: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Availability of This Action

    You can get an electronic copy of this document from the Internet 
by taking the following steps:
    Go to the search function of the Department of Transportation's 
electronic Docket Management System (DMS) web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search).
    On the search page, type in the last four digits of the docket 
number shown at the beginning of this document. Click on ``search.''
    On the next page, which contains the docket summary information, 
click on the item you want to see.
    You can also get an electronic copy using the Internet through the 
FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the 
Government Printing Office's web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.
    You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make 
sure to identify the docket number or notice number of this rulemaking.

Small Entity Inquiries

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for 
information advice about compliance with statutes and regulations 
within the FAA's jurisdiction. Therefore, any small entity that has a 
question regarding this document may contact its local FAA official. 
Internet users can find additional information on SBREFA on the FAA's 
web page at http:www.faa.gov/avr/arm/sbrefa.htm and send electronic 
inquiries to the following Internet address: [email protected].

Background

    The September 11, 2001, hijacking events have demonstrated that 
some persons are willing to hijack airplanes and use them as weapons 
against the citizens of the United States. This is a safety and 
security threat that was not anticipated and, therefore, not considered 
in the design of transport airplanes. The recent hijackings make it 
clear that there is a critical need to improve the security of the 
flightcrew compartment. These improvements should deter terrorist 
activities and, if they are attempted, delay or deny access to the 
cockpit.

Flightcrew Compartment Door Designs

    Flightcrew compartment doors on transport category airplanes have 
been designed principally to ensure privacy, so pilots could focus 
their entire attention to their normal and emergency flight duties. The 
doors have not been designed to provide an impenetrable barrier between 
the cabin and the flightcrew compartment. Doors have not been required 
to meet any significant security threat, such as small arms fire or 
shrapnel, or the exercise of brute force to enter the flightcrew 
compartment.
    Besides affording an uninterrupted work environment for the 
flightcrew, flightcrew compartment doors often must meet other 
important safety standards. Should there be a sudden decompression of 
the airplane, separate compartments within the airplane, like the cabin 
and the crew compartment, must be designed so that the pressure 
differential that is created does not compromise the basic airplane 
structure. Certification standards require that airplane designs 
provide a method to compensate for decompression in a manner that 
avoids significant damage to the airplane. In many cases, flightcrew 
compartment doors provide the pressure compensation, by being vented or 
swinging open to equalize the pressure between the cabin and the 
flightcrew compartment.
    In addition, design standards require that the flightcrew have a 
path to exit the flightcrew compartment in an emergency, if the cockpit 
window exits are not usable. Flightcrew compartment doors have been 
designed to provide this escape path. But this escape feature may also 
enable easier unauthorized entry into the flightcrew compartment from 
the cabin.
    Operating regulations, in particular Sec. 121.379(b) in the case of 
a major alteration, require the work to be done in accordance with 
technical data approved by the Administrator. Operating regulations for 
airlines also require that each crewmember have a key readily available 
to open doors between passengers and an emergency exit. Some airlines 
issue flightcrew compartment door keys to all their crewmembers. This 
allows flight attendants to enter the flightcrew compartment and assist 
the flightcrew in an emergency, such as incapacitation of a flight 
crewmember. But it also offers an opportunity for an individual to 
overpower or coerce a flight attendant, take away the key, and enter 
the flightcrew compartment.

Rapid Response Team

    To evaluate what could be done to improve flightcrew compartment 
security, the Secretary of Transportation formed a Rapid Response Team 
for Aircraft Security. The Team included representatives of airplane 
designers, airline operators, airline pilots, and flight attendants. 
There was a clear consensus from this group, and agreement by the FAA, 
that immediate actions must be taken to strengthen the flightcrew 
compartment door. The short-term options, though, in one way or another 
could conflict with regulatory design requirements such as those 
discussed above.
    The Rapid Response Team addressed the design issues and found the 
relative safety risks to be small in view of the emergent security risk 
of unauthorized flightcrew compartment entry. The FAA agrees with this 
conclusion. The Rapid

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Response Team report also concluded, and the FAA agrees, that all 
existing design requirements should continue to be applied in the long 
term. Therefore, this SFAR allows a temporary period during which non-
compliance with design requirements will be allowed when improvements 
to flightcrew compartment security are made. This relief is limited to 
18 months, at which time the modified airplane must be brought back 
into full compliance with all design requirements. Airlines will submit 
reports within 180 days of the publication of the SFAR on how they will 
achieve this compliance.
    This SFAR will provide airlines with maximum flexibility to 
incorporate door modifications rapidly. In addition to waiving specific 
airworthiness regulations, the FAA is waiving procedural requirements 
applicable to major alterations (Sec. 121.379(b)). In addition to the 
information obtained from the Rapid Response Team, the FAA has received 
technical information from airline operators and manufacturers 
regarding what modifications are possible and how quickly they can be 
incorporated. The technical data reviewed by the FAA reflect good 
design practices, and the FAA is confident that installations can be 
made without unduly compromising safety.
    Given the urgency of the need to take action to reinforce the 
flightcrew compartment doors, the FAA finds that it is in the public 
interest to forgo the requirement that major alterations to accomplish 
this task have data previously approved by the Administrator. This 
portion of the SFAR is limited to 6 months. Major alterations performed 
after that date must be in accordance with approved data, and whatever 
the airline installs in the short term must ultimately be brought into 
full regulatory compliance for emergency egress and venting.
    The SFAR requires reports to the FAA at 90 days and 180 days after 
the publication date of the SFAR, so the modifications can be monitored 
and corrective action taken if necessary. Because of the risk posed by 
having other than flightcrew members onboard the aircraft as allowed in 
Sec. 121.583, FedEx on October 10, 2001, petitioned the FAA to take 
actions necessary to allow it to install additional door security 
measures in accordance with the provisions of SFAR 92 (66 FR 51546, 
October 9, 2001). The FAA has determined that the modifications 
requested by FedEx would apply to similarly situated cargo airplane 
operators and that the threat is similar to that of passenger 
airplanes.

The SFAR Provisions

    The revised SFAR allows all air carriers under part 121 to install 
flightcrew compartment door improvements and to prohibit possession of 
flightcrew compartment keys by persons other than flight crewmembers 
during flight. It is very broad, to allow maximum short-term 
flexibility in crafting enhanced door security measures. It allows the 
doors to be modified and airplanes to be operated with modified doors.
    The FAA has established an 18-month duration for the portions of 
the SFAR concerning airworthiness requirements. We expect this will 
give the industry sufficient time to design and install more permanent 
changes to door security and establish procedures for flightcrew 
compartment door access that meet regulatory requirements for egress 
and venting.
    The SFAR requires operators to submit a report to the FAA within 90 
days that details the specific modifications they have made to the 
flightcrew compartment door. This will allow the FAA to monitor what 
has been installed and take action if the installation creates an 
unacceptable safety risk. Further, to monitor progress toward the goal 
of full compliance, the SFAR requires a report within 180 days of the 
publication date of the SFAR that describes how the operator will meet 
regulatory compliance for egress and venting.
    We also expect that airframe manufacturers and modifiers will 
produce service information to assist operators in developing 
modifications to improve intrusion resistance to the flightcrew 
compartment. While service documents would not require separate 
approval under this SFAR, such modifications may also be installed in 
production airplanes. The modification authority granted by this SFAR 
also applies to manufacturers and other persons applying for 
airworthiness certificates to enable delivery of airplanes to the 
operators.
    In addition, we understand that some operators may rely on 
suppliers to produce parts to support these modifications to the 
flightcrew doors. Under normal circumstances, such parts producers 
would be subject to the requirement to obtain parts manufacturer 
approvals in accordance with 14 CFR 21.303. However, to facilitate 
reinforcement of these doors, the SFAR includes a provision overriding 
the requirement for parts production approval in support of these 
activities.
    Should any of the changes to the door constitute a major 
alteration, this SFAR temporarily relieves the operator of having to 
obtain prior approval of the data. This part of the SFAR terminates 180 
days after the publication date of the SFAR. As soon as the design data 
is submitted (no later than 90 days from the publication date of the 
SFAR), the FAA will work with the operators to identify a mutually 
acceptable process and time to get the data approved. In the meantime, 
the airworthiness certificates on airplanes that have been modified 
will remain valid. In making returns to service of airplanes modified 
under this SFAR, documents can reflect compliance with regulatory 
requirements by citing the SFAR.
    In addition to the above changes to harden the flightcrew 
compartment doors against intruders, the FAA also believes it is 
prudent to eliminate the ability of intruders to gain access by 
obtaining a flight attendant's key. For that reason, this SFAR 
temporarily changes the requirement in Sec. 121.313(g) by stating that 
only flight crewmembers, and not cabin crewmembers, will have flight 
crew compartment keys during flight. This should lessen the opportunity 
for gaining unauthorized access and reduce the likelihood of attacks on 
flight attendants to obtain the key. The limitations on keys do not 
apply to cargo operators because flight attendants are only required on 
passenger airplanes. Note that this change to 121.313(g) will expire 
with this SFAR. Further rulemaking will be necessary to address this 
subject after expiration.

Justification for Immediate Adoption

    Because the circumstances described herein warrant immediate action 
by the FAA, the Administrator finds that notice and public comment 
under 5 U.S.C. 553(b) are impracticable and contrary to the public 
interest. Further, the Administrator finds that good cause exists under 
5 U.S.C 553(d) for making this rule effective immediately upon 
publication. This action is necessary to prevent a possible imminent 
hazard to airplanes and to protect persons and property within the 
United States.

International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA 
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices 
that correspond to this SFAR.

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Paperwork Reduction Act

    This emergency final SFAR contains information collection 
activities subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 
3507(d)). In accordance with section 3507(j)(1)(B) of that statute, the 
FAA is requesting the Office of Management and Budget to grant an 
immediate emergency clearance on the paperwork package that it is 
submitting. As protection provided by the Paperwork Reduction Act, an 
agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to 
respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently 
valid OMB control number. Therefore, notification will be made to the 
public when a clearance is received. Following is a summary of the 
information collection activity.
    Title: Flightcrew Compartment Access and Door Designs.
    Summary/Need: The SFAR requires operators to submit a report to the 
FAA within 90 days that details the specific modifications. This will 
allow the FAA to monitor what has been installed and take action if the 
installation creates an unwarranted safety risk. Further, to monitor 
progress toward the goal of full compliance, the SFAR requires a report 
within 180 days of the SFAR that describes how the operator will come 
into full regulatory compliance.
    Respondents: The respondents are an estimated 135 airplane 
operators covered under 14 CFR part 121.
    Burden: The burden associated with this SFAR has not been 
determined prior to this publication, but will be submitted to OMB with 
the request for clearance.

Regulatory Analyses

    This rulemaking action is taken under an emergency situation within 
the meaning of Section 6(a)(3)(D) of Executive Order 12866, Regulatory 
Planning and Review. It also is considered an emergency regulation 
under Paragraph 11g of the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures. In addition, it is a significant 
rule within the meaning of the Executive Order and DOT's policies and 
procedures. No regulatory analysis or evaluation accompanies the rule. 
At this time, the FAA is not able to assess whether this rule will have 
a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities as 
defined in the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended. However, 
we will be conducting a regulatory analysis of the cost and benefits of 
this rulemaking, including any impact on small entities, at a later 
date.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this SFAR under the principles and criteria of 
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We have determined that this action 
will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the 
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government. Therefore, we have determined that this final rule does not 
have federalism implications.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), enacted as 
Public Law 104-4 on March 22, 1995, is intended, among other things, to 
curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal mandates on State, 
local, and tribal governments. Title II of the Act requires each 
Federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing the effects of 
any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule that may result 
in a $100 million or more expenditure (adjusted annually for inflation) 
in any one year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a 
``significant regulatory action.'' This SFAR does not contain such a 
mandate. Therefore, the requirements of Title II of the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply.

Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically 
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
environmental impact statement. In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, 
appendix 4, paragraph 4(j) this rulemaking action qualifies for a 
categorical exclusion.

Energy Impact

    The energy impact of this SFAR has been assessed in accordance with 
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) Public Law 94-163, as 
amended (42 U.S.C. 6362) and FAA Order 1053.1. It has been determined 
that this SFAR is not a major regulatory action under the provisions of 
the EPCA.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 121

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Charter flights, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Safety, Transportation.

The Amendment

    For the reasons set forth above, the Federal Aviation 
Administration amends 14 CFR part 121 as follows:

PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
OPERATIONS

    1. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 1153, 40113, 40119, 41706, 44101, 
44701-44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901, 
44903-44904, 44912, 46105.


SFAR No. 92  [Removed]

    2. Remove Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No. 92.


    3. Add Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No. 92-1 to read 
as follows:

SPECIAL FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATION NO. 92-1--FLIGHTCREW 
COMPARTMENT ACCESS AND DOOR DESIGNS

    1. Applicability. This Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 
applies to all operators that hold an air carrier certificate or 
operating certificate issued under 14 CFR part 119 and that conduct 
operations under part 121, except paragraph 4 of this SFAR does not 
apply to cargo operations. It applies to the operators specified in 
this SFAR that modify airplanes to improve the flightcrew compartment 
door installations to restrict the unwanted entry of persons into the 
flightcrew compartment. This SFAR also applies to production 
certificate holders and applicants for airworthiness certificates for 
airplanes to be operated by operators specified in this SFAR, and 
producers of parts to be used in such modifications.
    2. Regulatory Relief. Contrary provisions of part 21, and 
Secs. 121.153(a)(2) and 121.379(b), notwithstanding:
    (a) An operator may operate airplanes modified to improve the 
flightcrew compartment door installations to restrict the unauthorized 
entry of persons into the flightcrew compartment without regard to the 
applicable airworthiness requirements and may modify those airplanes 
for that purpose, using technical data not previously approved by the 
Administrator, subject to the following conditions:
    (i) Within 90 days after publication of this SFAR, submit to the 
Director, Aircraft Certification Service, a detailed description of the 
changes to the airplane that have been accomplished to enhance the 
intrusion resistance of the flightcrew compartment including 
identification of what major alterations have been done without 
previously approved data.
    (ii) Within 180 days after publication of this SFAR, submit to the 
Director,

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Aircraft Certification Service, a schedule for accomplishment of the 
changes necessary to restore compliance with all applicable 
airworthiness requirements, as well as a listing of the regulations not 
currently complied with. The schedule may not extend beyond the 
termination date of this SFAR.
    (iii) If, upon reviewing the data submitted in paragraph 2(a)(i) of 
this SFAR, the Administrator determines that a door modification 
presents an unacceptable safety risk, the FAA may issue an order 
requiring changes to such modifications.
    (b) An applicant for an airworthiness certificate may obtain such a 
certificate for modified airplanes to be operated by operators 
described in this SFAR.
    (c) A holder of a production certificate may submit for 
airworthiness certification or approval, modified airplanes to be 
operated by operators described in this SFAR.
    (d) A person may produce parts for installation on airplanes in 
connection with modifications described in this SFAR, without FAA parts 
manufacturer approval (PMA).
    3. Return to Service Documentation. Where operators have modified 
airplanes as authorized in this SFAR, the affected airplane must be 
returned to service with a note that it was done under the provisions 
of this SFAR.
    4. Provision for Flightdeck Door Compartment Key. Contrary to 
provisions of Sec. 121.313(g), the following provision applies: A key 
for each door that separates a passenger compartment from an emergency 
exit identified to passengers in the briefing required by 
Sec. 121.571(a)(1)(ii). The key required for access to the emergency 
exit must be readily available for each crewmember. No key to the 
flightcrew compartment shall be available to any crewmember during 
flight, except for flight crewmembers.
    5. Termination. With respect to the ability to approve airplanes 
for return to service without data previously approved by the 
Administrator in the case of major alterations, this SFAR terminates on 
April 15, 2002. All other provisions of this SFAR terminate on April 9, 
2003.

    Issued in Washington, DC on October 12, 2001.
Jane F. Garvey,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 01-26204 Filed 10-12-01; 5:05 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P