[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 192 (Wednesday, October 3, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 50496-50499]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-24724]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

[Docket No. NHTSA 2000-7657, Notice 2]


General Motors North America; Denial of Application for Decision 
of Inconsequential Noncompliance

    General Motors North America (GM) has determined that in some 1998-
1999 model year GM and Isuzu light trucks, use of the hazard flasher 
switch may activate the retained accessory power (RAP) feature with no 
key in the ignition. This occurs, according to GM, because of ``sneak'' 
circuits created in the flasher switch. When the RAP is activated, 
power windows and sunroofs in the affected vehicles are operable. This 
condition fails to meet the requirements of S4 of FMVSS 118, ``Power-
operated window, partition, and roof panel systems.'' General Motors 
filed an appropriate report pursuant to 49 CFR Part 573, ``Defect and 
Noncompliance Reports'' and subsequently petitioned for a determination 
that this noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety 
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30118(d) and 30120(h).
    Notice of receipt of the petition was published in the Federal 
Register (65 FR 48280) on August 7, 2000, and opportunity was afforded 
for public comment until September 6, 2000.
    As many as 975,462 GM light trucks including Chevrolet and GMC 
pickups and sport utility vehicles, Oldsmobile and Cadillac sport 
utility vehicles, and Isuzu pickups are involved. According to GM's 
petition, the problem is due to manufacturing tolerances in the hazard 
flasher switch of those vehicles and does not affect all of the 
vehicles

[[Page 50497]]

equally. RAP activation is more difficult in some vehicles than in 
others. However, there is no way to identify which vehicles have 
problem flasher switches, so the entire vehicle population would be 
subject to recall.
    For the reasons discussed in this notice, we believe that the 
noncompliance is not inconsequential to motor vehicle safety when 
evaluated by the criteria used by the agency in the past in making such 
decisions. Therefore, the agency denies the GM petition.
    Note that NHTSA recently granted (66 FR 32871) a related but 
separate inconsequentiality petition from GM concerning noncomplying 
illumination of the center high-mounted stop lamp (CHMSL) caused by the 
same ``sneak'' circuit malfunction that caused the power window 
noncompliance that is the subject of this notice.

Background

    The noncompliance involves the ``Retained Accessory Power'' (RAP) 
feature of the subject GM vehicles. RAP allows certain electrical 
accessories such as the radio and power windows to be used for a 
limited time interval after removal of a vehicle's ignition key. The 
presence of the RAP feature complies with the requirements of FMVSS No. 
118 as long as RAP is active only during the time interval between 
turning off a vehicle's ignition with the ignition key and opening of 
either of the vehicle's front doors. This requirement, stated in S4(e) 
of FMVSS No. 118, permits manufacturers to equip vehicles with the RAP 
convenience feature while ensuring that a driver or other person will 
be present in the vehicle to supervise any children in the vehicle when 
the power windows are enabled by the RAP feature. Once RAP is 
activated, it remains active for no more than 20 minutes, and it is 
canceled immediately upon opening of one of the front doors of the 
vehicle.
    On the noncomplying GM vehicles, the RAP can be activated without 
the ignition key by forcefully depressing the hazard flasher switch 
located on the steering column. The hazard flasher switch in the 
affected vehicles is a pushbutton that operates as a push-on/push-off 
switch. When the hazard flasher pushbutton is fully depressed, it 
reaches a stop approximately 6 mm below the fully extended ``on'' 
position. It is not necessary for the switch to reach the stop in order 
to go from the ``on'' position to the ``off'' position, or vice-versa. 
The pushbutton is spring-loaded and will not stay in the fully 
depressed position unless pressure is maintained on it.
    Under certain conditions, unintended or so-called ``sneak'' 
circuits may be created in the switch if the pushbutton is depressed to 
its full extent of travel. The ``sneak'' circuits disappear when the 
switch is released. The presence of the ``sneak'' circuits causes 
activation of the RAP feature without the key in the ignition. The 
``sneak'' circuits materialize more easily if the brake pedal is 
pressed in conjunction with use of the hazard flasher switch. 
Activation of the RAP feature in these modes fails to comply with S4(e) 
of FMVSS No. 118.

GM's Petition

    GM's petition discussed in detail the nature of the circumstances 
under which RAP might be activated by use of the hazard flasher switch. 
An important GM rationale was that only some of the vehicles in the 
affected population had switches that were susceptible to RAP 
activation. The susceptibility depended on the force used to depress 
the switch pushbuttons. The necessary force for RAP activation varied 
from switch to switch because the root cause of the problem was 
manufacturing tolerances in the switches. The petition included data 
from a hands-on GM evaluation of 2,770 switches in which GM grouped the 
switches according to ease of RAP activation. In the evaluation, 
switches were operated repeatedly so as to intentionally activate RAP 
by forcefully pressing on the pushbutton, holding the pushbutton at the 
bottom limit of travel, and applying side force in all directions. 
Depending upon the amount of bottoming and side force applied before 
RAP was activated, GM categorized the switches as ``least difficult,'' 
``moderately difficult,'' ``hard,'' and ``impossible.'' The data 
indicated only about 1 percent of the switches would cause RAP 
activation under normal use, i.e., with moderate bottoming force on the 
pushbutton. In almost 92 percent of switches, RAP activation was rated 
``impossible.''
    GM later revised this data significantly. In the revised data, the 
sample size dropped from 2,770 to 530 (apparently, many of the switches 
in the initial group were switches that had already been modified in 
production in an attempt to fix the problem.) In the revised data, the 
portion of sample switches that were ``least difficult'' was about 24 
percent, and those categorized as ``impossible'' fell to about 57 
percent.
    According to GM, for RAP activation to occur unintentionally in the 
affected vehicles, two ``sneak'' circuits must be completed. Both 
circuits can be completed by depressing the hazard flasher button 
though, as discussed above, significant bottoming force on the button 
is often necessary and in some switches no amount of applied force 
caused RAP activation. However, one of the two ``sneak'' circuits is 
completed whenever the brake pedal is depressed enough to light the 
brake lamps. Thus, RAP activation is much easier when the brake pedal 
is depressed in conjunction with pressing on the hazard flasher switch. 
GM submitted data on ease of RAP activation with the brake pedal 
depressed for a sample of 234 hazard flasher switches from the affected 
vehicle population. This data indicated that RAP activation was ``least 
difficult'' in over half the switches in the sample, i.e., it could 
occur through normal use of the pushbutton with moderate bottoming 
force. Over 33 percent were ``moderately difficult'' and 14 percent 
were ``hard'' when the brake pedal was on. None of the switches in this 
sample were classified as ``impossible'' regarding RAP activation if 
the brake pedal was concurrently pressed.
    GM's main rationale for inconsequentiality was that, for any harm 
to come to occupants of the affected vehicles as a result of the 
noncompliance, a chain of unlikely events would have to occur. GM 
stated that the following specific events, each of which it describes 
as having a low probability of occurring, all would have to occur 
before an opportunity would exist for a person to be injured by a power 
operated window or sunroof:
     A young child or children within a certain age range (not 
infants, not older children) would have to be left unattended and 
unrestrained inside the vehicle. Restrained children would not have 
access to the hazard flasher switch located on the steering column. GM 
submitted the results of a survey that it commissioned to estimate the 
frequency with which children are left unattended in vehicles. In the 
survey, vehicles entering the parking areas of selected store and 
shopping complex locations in Virginia and California in June 2000 were 
monitored. Of a total of 730 vehicles observed, the survey found 25 
percent had children of any age as occupants and 1.5 percent had 
children left in them unattended. Most of the unattended children were 
older (approx. 10 years and over) and the average time unattended was 
about 7\1/2\ minutes.
     Unrestrained, unattended, young children would have to get 
access to and depress the hazard flasher switch to its limit of travel, 
and usually some force would be required for RAP activation to occur, 
or the child or children would have to press on the brake pedal while 
bottoming the switch. Even if these events occur, RAP probably would 
not

[[Page 50498]]

be activated since some switches are not prone or are less prone to 
``sneak'' circuits, as described previously. In this regard, GM 
conducted a human factors test to determine how likely children are to 
play with the hazard flasher switch, or the switch and brake pedal 
concurrently, when left alone in vehicles. GM describes the test as 
maximizing the possibility of switch usage by the children to determine 
not only the likelihood of RAP activation but also what would occur 
after any such activation. Four vehicles were used in the study and 
were all equipped with switches categorized as ``Least Difficult'' for 
RAP activation, and 138 young children were observed either 
individually or in pairs inside the vehicles for 20 minutes. At the 
conclusion of each 20 minute period, before removing the child or 
children from the vehicle, evaluators directed the children to activate 
the hazard flasher switch if they had not already. Pursuant to the GM 
test protocol, the children pressed on the switches a total of 554 
times (mostly by direction) resulting in one occurrence of RAP 
activation in the case of a pair of children, a nine-year-old boy and 
four-year-old girl. The RAP was de-activated in that instance by the 
four-year-old opening a door prior to any use of the power windows. In 
total, 96 observations of either one or two children in vehicles for no 
more than 20 minutes resulted in 25 occasions of hazard switch 
activation. In seven of these 25 instances, window switches were 
contacted after hazard switch use but, as mentioned window switches 
were not touched in the one instance where hazard switch use caused RAP 
activation.
     In the event unattended children activated the RAP 
feature, they would have to subsequently operate the power window or 
sunroof controls prior to RAP time-out or de-activation by a door being 
opened. Even then, power window use would be unlikely to actually lead 
to an injury. None of the affected vehicles has an ``express close'' 
feature so the windows only continue closing as long as the control is 
held.
    GM believes that, because each of these events has a very low 
frequency or probability of occurrence, the likelihood of all of them 
occurring is negligible.
    GM stated furthermore that it is not aware of any accidents, 
injuries, owner complaints, or field reports on the subject vehicles 
related to the noncompliance. GM commissioned an independent analysis 
of complaints in the NHTSA complaint database relating to power windows 
or sunroofs. That analysis found 30 complaints related in some way to 
entrapment out of 8,621 complaints involving power windows or sunroofs. 
Fourteen of those 30 involved an injury or near-injury to children. 
None of the 30 involved any of the subject GM vehicles.

Comments on the Petition

    One comment was submitted regarding the subject GM 
inconsequentiality petition. The Center for Auto Safety (CAS) urged the 
agency to deny the GM petition. CAS stated, ``FMVSS 118 seeks to 
minimize child injury risks from the inadvertent operation of power 
accessory devices.'' However, CAS appears to have misunderstood the 
nature of the noncompliance and overstated the risk involved. It 
stated, ``If this petition is granted, a child could depress the hazard 
warning switch to its limit while another child remains in the path of 
a closing window or panel. Similarly, a driver could activate the 
hazard lights and exit the vehicle to check on a problem and leave the 
child inside free to operate the power windows.'' Neither of these 
scenarios accurately reflects the actual risk. In the first scenario 
described by CAS, the RAP may be activated by the child pressing the 
hazard flasher switch, but this would not cause the power windows to 
move. It would merely enable the power window buttons. In the second 
scenario, in which the driver activates the hazard flashers and then 
exits the vehicle, the RAP would be canceled when the driver opened the 
door to get out, and so the windows would not be operable by a child 
left behind in the vehicle, as CAS suggested.
    CAS mentions the related problem of the potential for illumination 
of the CHMSL on the affected GM vehicles when the hazard flasher switch 
is used. CAS cites this as evidence that an effective remedy is 
required, not an exemption from remedy.

Petition Analysis

    The subject GM petition is being denied because FMVSS No. 118 is 
very specific regarding the conditions under which power windows may be 
operable. A requirement in the Standard, stated in S4(e), seeks to 
prevent conditions like the one that exists in the noncomplying GM 
vehicles. GM contends that there is only a very small likelihood of an 
injury resulting from this noncompliance, considering all the unlikely 
events that must first take place. The GM human factors trial in which 
children were observed as occupants of affected GM vehicles was 
supposed to demonstrate that RAP activation is exceedingly unlikely. In 
our view, it showed that the behavior of children is unpredictable, and 
the possibility of RAP activation is not negligible. Therefore, 
existing safeguards in FMVSS No. 118 should be adhered to.
    In determining inconsequentiality, the agency traditionally has 
considered whether a noncompliance is likely to increase the risk that 
occupants will experience the type of injury that the requirement is 
designed to protect against (Cosco, Inc., Denial of Application for 
Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 64 FR 29408 (June 1, 1999) 
(NHTSA-98-4033-2)). The main purpose of requiring power windows to be 
inoperative without the ignition key is to eliminate the possibility of 
unsupervised children operating them. The subject noncompliance makes 
RAP activation possible by means other than those allowed for in 
Standard No. 118, and it therefore increases the risk to occupants, 
particularly children, of an event that the standard is designed to 
protect against.
    In addition, NHTSA denied a somewhat similar 1996 Ford Motor 
Company petition (62 FR 51500) in part because the involved vehicles 
were minivans which are considered family vehicles in which the 
presence of children is more likely than in other types of vehicles. 
The same argument applies to many of the subject GM vehicle models. 
According to GM, 569,163 of the affected vehicles, or more than 58 
percent, are sport utility vehicles with passenger and cargo capacity 
that makes them suitable as family vehicles.
    We also note that the NHTSA grant of the related petition involving 
CHMSL illumination by the same ``sneak'' circuit mechanism which can 
cause RAP activation does not influence our decision. In the case of 
the CHMSL problem, the lamp could be inadvertently illuminated by use 
of the hazard flasher switch, but the illumination was only momentary. 
That is, it only occurred while the switch was being held in the 
bottomed-out position. Release of the switch always turned the lamp 
off. In contrast, RAP activation caused by the ``sneak'' circuit 
condition results in a timed interval of 20 minutes in which the power 
windows can be used. This condition can result even if only momentary 
bottoming of the switch occurs. Once activated, the RAP is set to an 
``on'' status and, unlike the CHMSL, releasing the hazard flasher 
pushbutton as occurs in normal use does not deactivate the RAP feature.
    For the reasons expressed above, it is hereby decided that GM has 
not met its burden of persuasion that the subject noncompliance is 
inconsequential to

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motor vehicle safety, and its petition is denied.

(Authority: 49 U.S.C. 301118, 301120; delegations of authority at 49 
CFR 1.50 and 501.8)

    Issued on: September 27, 2001.
Stephen R. Kratzke,
Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards.
[FR Doc. 01-24724 Filed 10-2-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P