[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 173 (Thursday, September 6, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 46656-46659]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-22412]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-346]


Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station; Notice of Consideration of 
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a 
Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-3 issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) for 
operation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS), Unit 1, 
located in Ottawa County, Ohio.
    The proposed amendment would change Technical Specification (TS) 
Sections 3/4.9.7, Refueling Operations--Crane Travel--Fuel Handling 
Building, and associated Bases; TS 3/4.9.11, Refueling Operations--
Storage Pool Water Level, and associated bases; TS 3/4.9.12, Refueling 
Operations--Storage Pool Ventilation; TS 3/4.9.13, Refueling 
Operations--Spent Fuel Assembly Storage, and associated Bases; and TS 
5.6 Design Features--Fuel Storage. The purpose of this license 
amendment application is to propose the necessary revisions to the 
DBNPS TS to reflect an increase in Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) storage 
capability, as a result of the SFP re-racking project, from the current 
capacity of 735 fuel assemblies to a new capacity of 1624 fuel 
assemblies. To provide additional temporary storage of fuel assemblies 
to support a complete re-racking of the SFP, this license amendment 
application also requests approval for up to 90 transfer pit storage 
locations. The transfer pit storage rack will be relocated into the SFP 
as part of the completion of this re-racking project. The resulting SFP 
fuel storage capacity will be sufficient to meet storage needs through 
the current expiration date of the DBNPS operating license, April 22, 
2017.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below. The Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) has reviewed the 
proposed changes and determined that a significant hazards 
consideration does not exist because operation of the DBNPS, Unit No. 
1, in accordance with these changes would:
    1a. Not involve a significant increase in the probability of an 
accident previously evaluated because the methods and procedures for 
handling fuel assemblies will remain unchanged, fuel handling equipment 
reliability will be unaffected, and provisions will remain in place to 
ensure that the likelihood of a heavy load drop will remain extremely 
small. The proposed changes involve an expanded SFP storage capacity 
resulting from the planned re-racking of the SFP, and the inclusion of 
provisions allowing for temporary storage of fuel assemblies in the 
transfer pit.
    For the installation activities involving the proposed expanded 
spent fuel storage capacity, heavy load lifts have been given careful 
consideration. In accordance with the proposed changes to Technical 
Specifications (TS) 3/4.9.7, ``Crane Travel--Fuel Handling Building,'' 
except when a specially designed impact cover is placed over fuel 
assemblies located in the cask pit, heavy loads are prohibited from 
travel

[[Page 46657]]

over stored fuel assemblies. The physical design of the impact cover, 
together with administrative controls established while the impact 
cover is being installed or removed, ensure that it can not fall into 
the cask pit in the unlikely event that it is dropped. As described 
below, except for the use of a temporary crane, the spent fuel cask 
crane will be used for the replacement of the existing storage racks in 
the spent fuel pool (SFP), placement of the temporary rack in the 
transfer pit, and eventual relocation of racks from the cask pit and 
transfer pit to the SFP. The spent fuel cask crane is comprised of a 
main hook rated for 140 tons, as well as an auxiliary hook rated for 20 
tons. As described in the DBNPS Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) 
Section 9.1.5, ``Control of Heavy Loads,'' the spent fuel cask crane, 
including its auxiliary hoist, is subject to compliance with the 
applicable guidelines of NUREG-0612, ``Control of Heavy Loads at 
Nuclear Power Plants.'' This will ensure that there will be no 
significant increase in the probability of a heavy load drop, and that 
the probability of a heavy load drop will remain extremely small. Due 
to the limited travel of the spent fuel cask crane, a temporary crane 
will be used, as necessary, to position existing racks for removal and 
for final positioning of the new racks. The crane will be designed to 
meet the intent of NUREG-0612 through a defense-in-depth approach. The 
temporary crane will only lift the racks several inches above the pool 
floor, will not be used to lift any heavy loads over fuel assemblies or 
safety-related equipment, and will not be used to move fuel assemblies. 
The methods and procedures for handling fuel assemblies during 
installation activities will not be significantly changed. Based on 
these considerations, there will be no significant increase in the 
probability of damage to stored fuel assemblies as a result of 
installation activities.
    For the activities involving the post-installation use of the 
proposed expanded spent fuel storage capacity, the following previously 
postulated accident scenarios have been considered: Misloaded or 
Mislocated Fuel Assembly; Seismic Event; and Fuel Handling Accident. In 
addition, the effects of a loss of spent fuel pool cooling or level 
have been evaluated. The probability of the inadvertent misloading or 
mislocation of a fuel assembly is primarily a function of fuel handling 
procedures. The probability of a fuel handling accident is primarily a 
function of fuel handling equipment reliability and fuel handling 
procedures. The methods and procedures for handling fuel assemblies 
during normal, post-installation use of the racks will not be 
significantly changed. In addition, following completion of 
installation activities, the activities performed in and around the 
spent fuel pool will not be significantly changed due to the use of the 
new spent fuel pool racks. The proposed TS changes have no bearing on 
the probability of a seismic event or the probability of a loss of 
spent fuel pool cooling or level. Based on these considerations, there 
will be no significant increase in the probability of an accident 
previously evaluated as a result of normal, post-installation use of 
the racks.
    1b. Not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated because evaluations for each postulated 
accident have shown that the consequences remain bounded by the 
consequences from the previously evaluated accidents.
    For the installation activities involving the proposed expanded 
spent fuel storage capacity, heavy load lifts have been given careful 
consideration. Heavy load lifts are subject to compliance with the 
applicable guidelines of NUREG-0612. These guidelines include use of 
defined safe load paths in accordance with approved procedures. This 
will ensure that there will be no significant increase in the 
consequences of a heavy load drop, in the unlikely event that one were 
to occur.
    For the activities involving the post-installation use of the 
proposed expanded spent fuel storage capacity, the following previously 
postulated accident scenarios have been considered: Misloaded or 
Mislocated Fuel Assembly; Seismic Event; and Fuel Handling Accident. In 
addition, the effects of a loss of spent fuel pool cooling or level 
have been evaluated. The criticality analyses for the new spent fuel 
pool storage racks require burnup/enrichment limitations similar to 
those currently in place for the existing racks. These burnup/
enrichment limitations are imposed by the proposed changes to TS 3/
4.9.13, Refueling Operations-Spent Fuel Assembly Storage. The 
criticality evaluation for the new racks shows that if an unirradiated 
fuel assembly of the highest permissible enrichment is placed in an 
unauthorized storage cell or mislocated outside a storage rack, 
keff will be maintained  0.95, taking credit for 
soluble boron in the spent fuel pool water. Therefore, there will be no 
adverse radiological consequences due to the proposed changes.
    The results of the seismic evaluation demonstrate that the racks 
will remain intact and that the structural capability of the pool and 
liner will not be exceeded. The Auxiliary Building structure will 
remain intact during a seismic event and will continue to adequately 
support and protect the fuel racks and pool water inventory, therefore, 
the rack geometry and cooling to the fuel will be maintained. Thus, 
there will be no adverse radiological consequences due to the proposed 
changes.
    The new racks do not change the height of the stored fuel relative 
to any load being handled, and the 72 hour decay time for the fuel 
assumed in the design basis accident is conservative. Based on this, 
the design basis fuel handling accident for the pool area remains 
unchanged.
    The mechanical accidents analyses evaluated the extent of rack 
deformation due to different scenarios. Based on the maximum calculated 
rack deformation, it was concluded that the criticality and thermal 
hydraulics limitations were not exceeded. Also, the mechanical accident 
analyses concluded that the pool liner will not be pierced, and there 
will be no catastrophic damage to the pool structure. Therefore, the 
analyzed mechanical accidents will not lead to radiological 
consequences beyond that already evaluated.
    The evaluation of a loss of spent fuel pool cooling shows that 
sufficient time will be available, before a significant reduction in 
water level, to restore cooling or to provide a source of makeup water. 
Therefore, the racks will remain submerged and fuel stored therein will 
remain sufficiently cooled, and there will be no adverse radiological 
consequences due to the proposed changes.
    The fuel handling area ventilation system will continue to ensure 
that in the event radioactive material is released from a damaged 
irradiated fuel assembly, it will be filtered through HEPA and charcoal 
iodine adsorber filters prior to discharge to the atmosphere. 
Therefore, the radiological consequences will continue to be mitigated 
as prior to the proposed changes.
    2. Not created the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated because the function 
and parameters of the components and the associated activities 
necessary to support safe storage of fuel assemblies in the new racks 
are similar to those presently in place. The methods and procedures for 
handling fuel assemblies would not be changed. Therefore, the list of

[[Page 46658]]

postulated accidents remains unchanged.
    Any event which would modify parameters important to safe fuel 
storage sufficiently to place them outside of the boundaries analyzed 
for normal conditions and/or outside of the boundaries previously 
considered for accidents would be considered a new or different 
accident. The fuel storage configuration and the existence of the 
coolant are the parameters that are important to safe fuel storage. The 
proposed changes do not alter the operating requirements of the plant 
or of the equipment credited in the mitigation of the design basis 
accidents, nor do they affect the important parameters required to 
ensure safe fuel storage. Therefore, the potential for a new or 
previously unanalyzed accident is not created.
    3. Not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety 
because for the proposed changes, appropriate evaluations have shown 
compliance with stipulated safety margins.
    The objective of spent fuel storage is to store the fuel assemblies 
in a subcritical and coolable configuration through all environmental 
and abnormal loadings, such as a seismic event or a fuel handling 
accident. The design of the new spent fuel racks meets all applicable 
requirements for safe fuel storage. The seismic and structural design 
of the racks preserves the proper margin of safety during normal and 
abnormal loads. The methodology used in the criticality analysis meets 
the applicable regulatory guidance. The thermal-hydraulic evaluation 
demonstrates that the pool will be maintained below the specified 
thermal limits under the conditions of the maximum heat load and during 
all credible malfunction scenarios and seismic events. Upon the 
unlikely event of a complete loss of spent fuel pool cooling, 
sufficient time will be available, before a significant reduction in 
water level, to restore cooling or to provide a source of makeup water. 
Therefore, the racks will remain submerged and fuel stored therein will 
remain sufficiently cooled. In addition, the results of the fuel 
handling accident evaluation show that the minimum subcriticality 
margin will be maintained, cooling will remain adequate, the spent fuel 
pool structure will not suffer catastrophic damage, and the 
radiological dose resulting from the release caused by a fuel handling 
accident will not be increased from that previously considered.
    Thus, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a 
significant reduction in the margin of safety.
    Conclusion:
    On the basis of the above, the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 
has determined that the License Amendment Request does not involve a 
significant hazards considerations. As this License Amendment Request 
concerns a proposed change to the Technical Specifications that must be 
reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, this License Amendment 
Request does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Documents may 
be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document 
Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first 
floor), Rockville, Maryland.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By October 9th, 2001, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at One 
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland, and accessible electronically through the ADAMS Public 
Electronic Reading Room link at the NRC Web site (http://www.nrc.gov). 
If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed 
by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing 
Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic 
Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or 
petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended

[[Page 46659]]

petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike 
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the above date. A copy of the 
petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Mary 
O'Reilly, FirstEnergy Corporation, 76 South Main Street, Akron, OH., 
attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    The Commission hereby provides notice that this is a proceeding on 
an application for a license amendment falling within the scope of 
section 134 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 42 U.S.C. 
10154. Under section 134 of the NWPA, the Commission, at the request of 
any party to the proceeding, must use hybrid hearing procedures with 
respect to ``any matter which the Commission determines to be in 
controversy among the parties.''
    The hybrid procedures in section 134 provide for oral argument on 
matters in controversy, preceded by discovery under the Commission's 
rules and the designation, following argument of only those factual 
issues that involve a genuine and substantial dispute, together with 
any remaining questions of law, to be resolved in an adjudicatory 
hearing. Actual adjudicatory hearings are to be held on only those 
issues found to meet the criteria of section 134 and set for hearing 
after oral argument.
    The Commission's rules implementing section 134 of the NWPA are 
found in 10 CFR part 2, subpart K, ``Hybrid Hearing Procedures for 
Expansion of Spent Fuel Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear Power 
Reactors'' (published at 50 FR 41662 dated October 15, 1985). Under 
those rules, any party to the proceeding may invoke the hybrid hearing 
procedures by filing with the presiding officer a written request for 
oral argument under 10 CFR 2.1109. To be timely, the request must be 
filed within ten (10) days of an order granting a request for hearing 
or petition to intervene. The presiding officer must grant a timely 
request for oral argument. The presiding officer may grant an untimely 
request for oral argument only upon a showing of good cause by the 
requesting party for the failure to file on time and after providing 
the other parties an opportunity to respond to the untimely request. If 
the presiding officer grants a request for oral argument, any hearing 
held on the application must be conducted in accordance with the hybrid 
hearing procedures. In essence, those procedures limit the time 
available for discovery and require that an oral argument be held to 
determine whether any contentions must be resolved in an adjudicatory 
hearing. If no party to the proceeding timely requests oral argument, 
and if all untimely requests for oral argument are denied, then the 
usual procedures in 10 CFR part 2, subpart G apply.
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated December 2, 2000, which is available 
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, located 
at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), 
Rockville, Maryland, and accessible electronically through the ADAMS 
Public Electronic Reading Room link at the NRC Web site (http://www.nrc.gov).

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of August, 2001.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 Anthony J. Mendiola,
Chief, Section 2, Project Directorate III, Division of Licensing 
Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 01-22412 Filed 9-5-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P