[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 165 (Friday, August 24, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 44653-44655]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-21436]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-410]


Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; Notice of Consideration of 
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a 
Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-69, issued to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC, the 
licensee), for operation of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 
No. 2 (NMP2), located in Scriba, New York.
    The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) 
Section 3.6.1.7, ``Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers,'' to 
allow an exception to the periodic functional testing requirements for 
two specific vacuum breakers (cycling the vacuum breakers open and 
closed). Specifically, the proposed change revises Surveillance 
Requirement 3.6.1.7.2 such that the functional testing requirement 
would not apply to vacuum breakers 2ISC*RV35A and 2ISC*RV35B for the 
remainder of Cycle 8 (the current operating cycle).
    The licensee found that limit switch(es) on vacuum breaker 
2ISC*RV35A began operating intermittently during the last functional 
test. The limit switches provide position indication to verify that 
vacuum breaker 2ISC*RV35A is closed. The limit switches also provide 
input to a permissive logic that allows opening vacuum breaker 
2ISC*RV35B when vacuum breaker 2ISC*RV35A is confirmed closed. An 
alternate pressure test method for verifying that vacuum breaker 
2ISC*RV35A is closed is available for use only if vacuum breaker 
2ISC*RV35B can be opened. Currently, both vacuum breakers 2ISC*RV35A 
and 2ISC*RV35B are verified closed. Future performance of functional 
tests on vacuum breaker 2ISC*RV35A could cause failure of the position 
indication, which is the normal method for verifying the vacuum breaker 
is closed. Furthermore, because the permissive logic inputs from vacuum 
breaker 2ISC*RV35A are not operating correctly, exercising vacuum 
breaker 2ISC*RV35B may not be possible in order to satisfy its 
functional testing requirement. Loss of the capability to exercise 
vacuum breaker 2ISC*RV35B would prohibit use of the alternate pressure 
testing method for verifying that vacuum breaker 2ISC*RV35A is closed.
    Thus, failure of the limit switch would require NMP2 to be placed 
in Mode 3 within 84 hours and Mode 4 within the following 24 hours due 
to a loss of position indication for verifying vacuum breaker 
2ISC*RV35A is closed and the inability to perform a pressure test. The 
degradation of the limit switches was observed during the last 
functional testing surveillance conducted on July 30, 2001. The limit 
switches are located in the drywell and cannot be accessed for repair 
or replacement during power operation due to the inerted environment. 
Per the TSs, the next functional test of the vacuum breakers must be 
performed by September 6, 2001 (31 days plus 25 percent).
    The licensee stated that the limit switches for the vacuum breakers 
are currently replaced every other refueling outage (RFO). The limit 
switches for vacuum breakers 2ISC*RV35A and 2ISC*RV35B were replaced 
during the last RFO7. The eight vacuum breakers had all passed their 
31-day functional tests since RFO7 with no evidence of impending 
failure until the last tests on July 30, 2001. Therefore, there was no 
prior indication that the limit switches would degrade.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under 
exigent circumstances, the NRC staff must determine that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:

    The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 2, in accordance with the 
proposed amendment, will not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    Proper functioning of the suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum 
breakers is required for accident mitigation. Failure of the vacuum 
breakers is not assumed as an accident initiator for any accident 
previously evaluated. Therefore, any potential failure of a vacuum 
breaker to perform when necessary will not affect the probability of 
an accident previously evaluated.
    During a LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident], the vacuum breakers 
are assumed to initially be closed to limit drywell-to-suppression 
chamber bypass leakage and must be capable of reclosing following a 
suppression pool swell event. The vacuum breakers open to prevent an 
excessive negative differential pressure across the suppression 
chamber-to-drywell boundary. The proposed change will not affect the 
capability of the vacuum breakers to perform their open and closed 
safety functions. Therefore, all four vacuum breaker pairs will 
remain operable and available to mitigate the consequences of a 
LOCA. Accordingly, the proposed amendment will not significantly 
increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 2, in accordance with the 
proposed amendment, will not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    The suppression chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers are used to 
mitigate the potential consequences of an accident. The proposed 
change does not affect the capability of the vacuum breakers to 
perform their open and closed safety functions. Thus, the initial 
conditions assumed in the accident analysis are not affected. Since 
the vacuum breakers have demonstrated high reliability, proper 
functioning of the four vacuum breaker pairs is assured in order to 
satisfy the current accident analysis. The proposed amendment does 
not involve a change to plant design and does not involve any new 
modes of operation or testing methods. Accordingly, the vacuum 
breakers will continue to perform their accident mitigation safety 
functions as previously evaluated. Therefore, operation with the 
proposed amendment will not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 2, in accordance with the 
proposed amendment, will not involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety.
    The deferral of functional testing for one vacuum breaker pair 
for the remainder of Cycle 8 is not risk significant, in that the 
increase in core damage frequency and large early release frequency 
were found to be less that 10\-8\/yr. The vacuum breakers are not 
modified by the proposed amendment. Reviews of vacuum breaker 
failure history show that the vacuum breakers have a high 
reliability to open or close when necessary. Thus, both vacuum 
breakers in each of the four vacuum breaker lines are expected to 
remain available to perform their accident mitigation safety 
functions. Furthermore, the 14-day surveillance that verifies the 
vacuum breakers are closed will continue to be performed to ensure a 
potential bypass leakage path is not present. Accordingly, all four 
vacuum breaker pairs are considered operable. The accident analysis 
assumptions for the closed safety functions of the vacuum

[[Page 44654]]

breakers are satisfied when at least one vacuum breaker in each of 
the four vacuum breaker lines are fully closed and capable of 
reclosing following a suppression pool swell event. The additional 
vacuum breaker in each line satisfies the single failure criterion. 
The open safety function of the vacuum breakers is satisfied when 
three of the four vacuum breaker pairs open during a design basis 
accident. The fourth vacuum breaker pair satisfies the single 
failure criterion. Since all of the vacuum breakers are considered 
operable and available to perform their open and closed safety 
functions, the proposed change will not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 14 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 14-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period, such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 14-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance. The Commission expects that the need to 
take this action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Documents may 
be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document 
Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first 
floor), Rockville, Maryland.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By September 24, 2001, the licensee may file a request for a 
hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject 
facility operating license and any person whose interest may be 
affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in 
the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition 
for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave 
to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules 
of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. 
Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714, which 
is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at One 
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland, or electronically on the Internet at the NRC Web site http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/CFR/index.html. If there are problems in accessing the 
document, contact the Public Document Room Reference staff at 1-800-
397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by email to [email protected]. If a request for a 
hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, 
the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by 
the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing 
Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the 
Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will 
issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If the amendment is issued before the expiration of the 30-day 
hearing period, the Commission will make a final determination on the 
issue of no significant hazards consideration. If a hearing is 
requested, the final determination will serve to decide when the 
hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.

[[Page 44655]]

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: 
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the 
Commission's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 
11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the above 
date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the 
General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and to Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston & Strawn, 1400 
L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-3502, attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated August 17, 2001, which is available for 
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at 
One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible electronically 
from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management Systems (ADAMS) 
Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC web site, 
http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html. If you do not have access to 
ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in 
ADAMS, contact the NRC Public Document Room Reference staff at 1-800-
397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by email to [email protected].

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of August 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Donna M. Skay,
Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate I, Division of 
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 01-21436 Filed 8-23-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P