[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 154 (Thursday, August 9, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 41909-41910]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-19973]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No(s). 50-498 and 50-499]


STP Nuclear Operating Company, et al., South Texas Project, Units 
1 and 2; Exemption

1.0  Background

    STP Nuclear Operating Company, et al. (STPNOC or the licensee) is 
the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80, which 
authorize operation of the South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP or 
the facilities). The licenses provide, among other things, that the 
licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) now or hereafter 
in effect.
    The facilities consist of two pressurized-water reactors located at 
the licensee's site in Matagorda County, Texas.

2.0  Request/Action

    Section 21.3 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations part 21 
(10 CFR 21.3), provides the definition of basic component as it relates 
to the reporting of defects and nonconformances. By letter dated July 
13, 1999, as supplemented, October 14 and 22, 1999, January 26, and 
August 31, 2000, and January 15, 18, 23, March 19, May 8 and 21, 2001, 
(hereinafter, the submittal) the licensee requested an exemption from 
the definition of basic component to exclude safety-related structures, 
systems, or components (SSCs) classified in accordance with its risk-
informed categorization process as low safety significant (LSS) or non-
risk significant (NRS) from the scope of the definition of basic 
component. STPNOC proposed that it would not apply procurement, 
dedication, and reporting requirements in 10 CFR part 21 to safety-
related LSS and NRS SSCs. STPNOC stated that 10 CFR Part 21 imposes 
procurement and dedication requirements and requires the reporting of 
defects and noncompliances involving basic components whose failure 
could cause a substantial safety hazard. Also, STPNOC stated that 
reporting of defects and noncompliance involving safety-related LSS and 
NRS SSCs is not necessary to meet the purpose of 10 CFR part 21 because 
failure of such SSCs would not result in a substantial safety hazard.

3.0  Discussion

    The Commission, pursuant to 10 CFR 21.7, may grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 as it determines are authorized by 
law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and 
security and are otherwise in the public interest.
    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has completed its 
evaluation of STPNOC's request for an exemption from the definition of 
basic component in 10 CFR 21.3. As it relates to nuclear power plants 
licensed pursuant to 10 CFR part 50, a basic component is defined as a 
SSC, or part thereof, that affects its safety function necessary to 
assure (1) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; (2) 
the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe 
shutdown condition; or (3) the capability to prevent or mitigate the 
consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite 
exposures comparable to those referred to in 10 CFR 50.34(a)(1) or 10 
CFR 100.11. Further, a basic component is defined as an item designed 
and manufactured under a quality assurance program complying with 10 
CFR part 50, Appendix B, or commercial-grade items which have 
successfully completed the dedication process. Finally, the definition 
of basic component includes the safety-related design, analysis, 
inspection, testing, fabrication, replacement of parts, or consulting 
services that are associated with the SSC hardware.
    In the discussion of the purpose in 10 CFR 21.1, the need to 
identify the failure of SSCs to satisfy requirements

[[Page 41910]]

(e.g., NRC regulations or Atomic Energy Act), or identify SSCs that 
contain defects, is related to conditions that could result in a 
substantial safety hazard. A substantial safety hazard is defined in 10 
CFR 21.3 as meaning a loss of safety function to the extent that there 
is a major reduction in the degree of protection provided to public 
health and safety.
    In the safety evaluation (SE), dated August 3, 2001, prepared in 
support of this exemption, the NRC describes its assessment of the 
attributes of the proposed treatment processes for LSS and NRS SSCs. 
The NRC determined that the proposed alternative treatment processes, 
if effectively implemented, will provide reasonable confidence that 
safety-related LSS and NRS SSCs remain capable of performing their 
safety functions under design-basis conditions. Also, as discussed in 
the SE, the NRC determined that the licensee's categorization process 
provides a reasonable method for determining that safety-related LSS 
and NRS SSCs have a small contribution to overall safety. Further, the 
sensitivity study conducted by the licensee demonstrates that for 
relatively large changes in availability of all of the safety-related 
LSS SSCs modeled in the probabilistic risk assessment, there is only a 
small change in the overall plant risk. Therefore, the NRC determined 
that it is acceptable to exclude LSS and NRS SSCs from the scope of the 
definition of basic component in 10 CFR 21.3 because the NRC concluded 
that defects in these components would not result in a substantial 
safety hazard and thus reporting of such defects is not necessary. On 
this basis, the NRC finds that the proposed exemption will not endanger 
life or property or the common defense and security.
    The NRC also finds the proposed exemption is otherwise in the 
public interest since it focuses NRC and licensee attention on the most 
safety and risk significant SSCs. Further, the NRC finds that the 
proposed exemption is authorized by law. Thus, the NRC finds that the 
proposed exemption satisfies the criteria given in 10 CFR 21.7 and 
should be granted.

4.0  Conclusion

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
21.7, the exemption is authorized by law and will not endanger life or 
property or the common defense and security and is otherwise in the 
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants, subject to 
the conditions described below, STPNOC the exemption from the 
definition of basic component in (1)(ii) of 10 CFR 21.3 for SSCs at STP 
categorized as LSS and NRS. As conditions of this exemption:

    1.The licensee described the categorization, treatment, and 
oversight (evaluation and assessment) processes in its submittal 
dated July 13, 1999, as supplemented October 14 and 22, 1999, 
January 26 and August 31, 2000, and January 15, 18, 23, March 19, 
May 8 and 21, 2001. The licensee has documented these processes in a 
proposed Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) submittal dated May 21, 
2001, found acceptable by the staff as the regulatory basis for 
granting this exemption (see the NRC's SE dated August 3, 2001). The 
licensee shall incorporate this proposed FSAR submittal into the STP 
FSAR and shall implement the categorization, treatment, and 
oversight processes consistent with the STP FSAR descriptions.
    2.The licensee shall implement a change control process that 
incorporates the following requirements:
    a. Changes to FSAR Section 13.7.2, ``Component Categorization 
Process,'' dated May 21, 2001, and found acceptable by the NRC as 
described in the NRC's SE dated August 3, 2001, may be made without 
prior NRC approval, unless the change would decrease the 
effectiveness of the process in identifying high safety significant 
and medium safety significant components.
    b. Changes to FSAR Section 13.7.3, ``Treatment of Component 
Categories,'' dated May 21, 2001, and found acceptable by the NRC as 
described in the NRC's SE dated August 3, 2001, may be made without 
prior NRC approval, unless the change would result in a reduction in 
the assurance of component functionality.
    c. Changes to FSAR Section 13.7.4, ``Continuing Evaluations and 
Assessments,'' dated May 21, 2001, and found acceptable by the NRC 
as described in the NRC's SE dated August 3, 2001, may be made 
without prior NRC approval, unless the change would result in a 
decrease in effectiveness of the evaluations and assessments.
    d. The licensee shall submit a report, as specified in 10 CFR 
50.4, of changes made without prior NRC approval pursuant to these 
provisions. The report shall identify each change and describe the 
basis for the conclusion that the change does not involve a decrease 
in effectiveness or assurance as described above. The report shall 
be submitted within 60 days of the date of the change.
    e. Changes to FSAR Sections 13.7.2, 13.7.3, and 13.7.4 that do 
not meet the criteria of a through c above shall be submitted to the 
NRC for prior review and approval.

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, an environmental assessment and finding 
of no significant impact has been prepared and published in the Federal 
Register (66 FR 32397). Accordingly, based upon the environmental 
assessment, the Commission has determined that the granting of this 
exemption will not have a significant effect on the quality of the 
human environment.
    This exemption is effective upon submittal of a FSAR update 
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.71(e) incorporating the FSAR Sections described 
in the conditions above.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of August, 2001.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John A. Zwolinski,
Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 01-19973 Filed 8-8-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P