[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 154 (Thursday, August 9, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 41901-41903]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-19968]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No(s). 50-498 and 50-499]


STP Nuclear Operating Company, et al., South Texas Project, Units 
1 and 2; Exemption

1.0 Background

    STP Nuclear Operating Company, et al. (STPNOC or the licensee) is 
the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80, which 
authorize operation of the South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP or 
the facilities). The licenses provide, among other things, that the 
licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) now or hereafter 
in effect.
    The facilities consist of two pressurized-water reactors located at 
the licensee's site in Matagorda County, Texas.

2.0 Request/Action

    Under Sec. 50.65(b) of Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, 
part 50, (10 CFR 50.65(b)) criteria were established that defined the 
scope of components to be subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 
(the Maintenance Rule). As defined under 10 CFR 50.65(b), the scope of 
the Maintenance Rule includes ``(1) Safety-related structures, systems 
and components that are relied upon to

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remain functional during and following design-basis events to ensure 
the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability 
to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, 
or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents 
that could result in potential offsite exposure comparable to the 
guidelines in Sec. 50.34(a)(1), Sec. 50.67(b)(2), or Sec. 100.11 of 
this chapter, as applicable;'' (2) nonsafety-related structures, 
systems, or components (i) ``[t]hat are relied upon to mitigate 
accidents or transients or are used in plant emergency operating 
procedures (EOPs)[,]'' or (ii) ``[w]hose failure could prevent safety-
related structures, systems, and components from fulfilling their 
safety-related function[,]'' or (iii) ``[w]hose failure could cause a 
reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system.''
    By letter dated July 13, 1999, as supplemented October 14 and 22, 
1999, January 26 and August 31, 2000, and January 15, 18, 23, March 19, 
May 8, and May 21, 2001, (hereinafter, the submittal), STPNOC requested 
an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(b) to exclude 
structures, systems, and components (SSCs) categorized as low safety 
significant (LSS) and non-risk significant (NRS) from the scope of the 
Maintenance Rule, with the exception that the requirements of 10 CFR 
50.65(a)(4) would continue to apply.

3.0 Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, when (1) The exemptions are 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or 
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and 
(2) when special circumstances are present. Under 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2)(vi), special circumstances are present whenever there is 
any other material circumstances not considered when the regulation was 
adopted for which it would be in the public interest to grant an 
exemption. If 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(vi) is relied on exclusively for 
satisfying the special circumstances provision of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2), 
the exemption may not be granted until the Executive Director for 
Operations has consulted with the Commission.
    The NRC has completed its evaluation of STPNOC's request for an 
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(b). The NRC's 
evaluation is provided in a safety evaluation (SE), dated August 3, 
2001, prepared in support of this exemption. The NRC evaluated the 
consequence of excluding LSS and NRS SSCs from scope of the Maintenance 
Rule. Information provided by the licensee in the submittal 
sufficiently describes a risk-informed categorization process that can 
identify a class of SSCs (LSS and NRS) that have little or no safety 
significance. The overall STPNOC process provides for adequate 
oversight to validate and recognize changes in safety significance and 
degradation in LSS and NRS SSCs.
    The staff has reviewed STPNOC's integrated SSC categorization 
process. The categorization process was found to use both a 
probabilistic and a deterministic based methodology that appropriately 
addressed the issues of defense-in-depth, safety margins, and aggregate 
risk impacts. The staff finds the proposed categorization process to be 
acceptable to categorize the risk significance of both functions and 
SSCs for use in reducing the scope of SSCs subject to special 
treatment. The categorization process provides an acceptable method for 
defining those SSCs for which exemptions from the special treatment 
requirements can be granted. In support of its finding on the 
licensee's categorization process, the staff also found that the 
alternative treatment practices provide the licensee with a framework 
that, if effectively implemented, will provide reasonable confidence 
that safety-related LSS and NRS SSCs remain capable of performing their 
safety functions under design-basis conditions. Based on these 
findings, the staff determined that LSS and NRS SSCs could be excluded 
from the scope of 10 CFR 50.65, with the exception that the 
requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) would continue to apply, without 
undue risk to public health and safety.
    The staff also found that granting of this exemption is in the 
public interest in that it enhances the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the NRC's oversight of the licensee's activities at STP by focusing its 
resources on those SSCs that are most significant to maintaining public 
health and safety. Likewise, the licensee's resources and attention can 
be focused on those SSCs that have the highest contribution to plant 
risk. Further, the licensee's categorization process provides a method 
for establishing a licensing basis for STP that is consistent with the 
risk-informed approach in the NRC's reactor oversight process. This 
enhances the regulatory framework under which STPNOC operates its 
facility and by which the NRC oversees the licensee's activities.
    As discussed further in the August 3, 2001, SE prepared in support 
of this exemption, the NRC has concluded that the special circumstances 
of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(vi) are satisfied in that the licensee has 
presented a material circumstance (the categorization process) that was 
not considered when the regulations were adopted and that provides an 
acceptable method for refining the scope of SSCs to include under the 
regulations. Furthermore, it is in the public interest to grant such 
exemptions. Finally, as required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(vi), the 
Executive Director for Operations has consulted with the Commission in 
the application of this special circumstance during the Commission 
meeting held on July 20, 2001.

4.0  Conclusion

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or 
property or common defense and security, and is, otherwise, in the 
public interest. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, 
the Commission hereby grants, subject to the conditions described 
below, STPNOC the exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(b) 
for SSCs at STP categorized as LSS and NRS to the extent that this rule 
defines the scope of SSCs subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 
50.65(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3). The requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) 
continue to apply to the scope of all SSCs defined under 10 CFR 
50.65(b). As conditions of this exemption:

    1. The licensee described the categorization, treatment, and 
oversight (evaluation and assessment) processes in its submittal 
dated July 13, 1999, as supplemented October 14 and 22, 1999, 
January 26 and August 31, 2000, and January 15, 18, 23, March 19, 
May 8 and 21, 2001. The licensee has documented these processes in a 
proposed Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) submittal dated May 21, 
2001, found acceptable by the staff as the regulatory basis for 
granting this exemption (see the NRC's SE dated August 3, 2001). The 
licensee shall incorporate this proposed FSAR submittal into the STP 
FSAR and shall implement the categorization, treatment, and 
oversight processes consistent with the STP FSAR descriptions.
    2. The licensee shall implement a change control process that 
incorporates the following requirements:
    a. Changes to FSAR Section 13.7.2, ``Component Categorization 
Process,'' dated May 21, 2001, and found acceptable by the NRC as 
described in the NRC's SE dated August 3, 2001, may be made without 
prior NRC approval, unless the change would decrease the 
effectiveness of the process in identifying high safety significant 
and medium safety significant components.
    b. Changes to FSAR Section 13.7.3, ``Treatment of Component 
Categories,'' dated

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May 21, 2001, and found acceptable by the NRC as described in the 
NRC's SE dated August 3, 2001, may be made without prior NRC 
approval, unless the change would result in a reduction in the 
assurance of component functionality.
    c. Changes to FSAR Section 13.7.4, ``Continuing Evaluations and 
Assessments,'' dated May 21, 2001, and found acceptable by the NRC 
as described in the NRC's SE dated August 3, 2001, may be made 
without prior NRC approval, unless the change would result in a 
decrease in effectiveness of the evaluations and assessments.
    d. The licensee shall submit a report, as specified in 10 CFR 
50.4, of changes made without prior NRC approval pursuant to these 
provisions. The report shall identify each change and describe the 
basis for the conclusion that the change does not involve a decrease 
in effectiveness or assurance as described above. The report shall 
be submitted within 60 days of the date of the change.
    e. Changes to FSAR Sections 13.7.2, 13.7.3, and 13.7.4 that do 
not meet the criteria of a through c above shall be submitted to the 
NRC for prior review and approval.

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, an environmental assessment and finding 
of no significant impact has been prepared and published in the Federal 
Register (66 FR 32397). Accordingly, based upon the environmental 
assessment, the Commission has determined that the granting of this 
exemption will not have a significant effect on the quality of the 
human environment.
    This exemption is effective upon submittal of a FSAR update 
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.71(e) incorporating the FSAR Sections described 
in the conditions above.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of August, 2001.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John A. Zwolinski,
Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 01-19968 Filed 8-8-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P