[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 144 (Thursday, July 26, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 39075-39080]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-18673]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration


Environmental Finding Document

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Environmental finding document: finding no significant impact; 
notice.

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SUMMARY: Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 12114, Environmental 
Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, the application of which is 
guided by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) prepared an Environmental 
Assessment (EA), evaluating a Sea Launch Limited Partnership (SLLP) 
proposal to evaluate the potential environmental effects of issuing a 
launch operator license (LOL) or launch-specific licenses to SLLP. THe 
LOL would allow SLLP to conduct up to eight commercial launches per 
year for five years without obtaining a separate license for each 
launch as long as there is not change in the launch parameters or in 
the anticipated environmental impacts. These launches would be 
equatorial and would use azimuths between 82.6 deg. and 97.4 deg., 
inclusive, originating from the SLLP Launch Platform (LP) at 0 deg. 
latitude and 154 deg. West (W) longitude, which is 425 kilometers (km) 
(266 miles (mi)) from Kiritimati (Christmas Island) in the

[[Page 39076]]

Kiribati Island Group in the Pacific Ocean. The EA also evaluated the 
proposed issuance of a launch-specific license for the launch of a 
Galaxy IIIC payload as well as other launch-specific licenses for 
launches within the proposed azimuth range and other specified launch 
parameters should the LOL not be issued or be delayed.
    After reviewing the EA which analyzed currently available data and 
information on existing conditions, potential project impacts, and 
measures to mitigate those impacts, the FAA Associate Administrator for 
Commercial Space Transportation (AST) finds that licensing the proposed 
launch activities including the LOL, Launch-specific license for the 
Galaxy IIIC and other launch-specific licenses within the proposed 
azimuth range, is not a major Federal action that would significantly 
affect the quality of the human environment outside the United States 
within the meaning of E.O. 12114. Therefore, the FAA has determined 
that the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is not 
required, and AST is issuing an Environmental Finding Document Finding 
No Significant Impact.
    The Environmental Assessment for a Launch Operator License (LOL) 
for Sea Launch Limited Partnership, dated May 15, 2001, incorporates by 
reference a prior EA prepared by the FAA dated and referred to as the 
February 11, 1999 EA. Both documents are incorporated by reference. THe 
LOL EA describes the purpose and need for the proposed project and 
describes the alternatives considered during the preparation of the 
document. The LOL EA also describes the environmental setting and 
analyzes the potential impacts to the applicable human environment as a 
consequence of the proposed project.
    Any person desiring a copy of the ``Final Environmental Assessment 
for a Launch Operator License for Sea Launch Limited Partnership'' 
should contact: Ms. Michon Washington, Federal Aviation Administration, 
Office of the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space 
Transportation, Suite 331/AST-100, 800 Independence Ave., SW., 
Washington, DC 20591; phone (202) 267-9305, or refer to the following 
Internet address: http://ast.faa.gov.

Action

    The proposed Federal action has three parts. First, the proposed 
Federal action is for the FAA to issue an LOL to SLLP authorizing SLLP 
to conduct launches from one launch site, within a range of launch 
parameters, of specific launch vehicles, transporting specified classes 
of payload. (See 14 CFR 415.3(b)). The proposed LOL would authorize 
SLLP to:
     Conduct up to eight launches per year over a five-year 
period, for a maximum of 40 launches;
     Use a launch site at 0 deg. latitude and 154 deg. W 
longitude;
     Launch along a range of azimuths from 82.6 deg. to 
97.4 deg., inclusi ve;
     Use a Zenit-3SL launch vehicle; and
     Transport specified classes of payloads.
    Any change to these LOL parameters would require additional 
environmental and safety analyses.
    Second, the proposed Federal action is for the FAA to issue a 
launch-specific license to SLLP for the launch of Galaxy IIIC. Third, 
the proposed Federal action includes issuance of other potential 
launch-specific licenses (not to exceed eight per year) as necessary 
should the proposed LOL not be issued or be delayed. The proposed 
Galaxy IIIC launch specific licenses, as well as the other launch-
specific licenses would authorize the SLLP to conduct specific 
launches:
     From a launch site at 0 deg. latitude and 154 deg.W 
longitude;
     On a launch azimuth within a range from 82.6 deg. to 
97.4 deg., inclusive;
     Using a Zenit-3SL launch vehicle; and
     Transporting specified classes of payloads.
    The launch site location, launch vehicles, and classes of payloads 
that would be authorized under the proposed launch-specific licenses 
would be identical to the launch site location, launch vehicles, and 
classes of payloads that would be authorized under the proposed LOL. In 
addition, the launch azimuths that would be authorized under the 
launch-specific licenses would fall within the launch azimuth range 
that would be authorized under the LOL. Finally, the number of launch-
specific licenses that would be issued per year would not exceed the 
number of the launches that would be authorized annually under the LOL 
(i.e., eight per year). The conduct that would be authorized under the 
proposed LOL and launch-specific licenses is identical, only the 
license application process would differ. Therefore, discussions and 
analyses of potential environmental impacts of the LOL and the launch-
specific licenses are addressed together. Throughout the document, when 
the proposed action is discussed, while emphasis is placed on the 
launch operator license, it should be understood that the launch-
specific licenses are included in the proposed action.
    To obtain a launch license (either launch-specific or a launch 
operator license), an applicant must obtain policy and safety approvals 
from the FAA. Requirements for obtaining these approvals are contained 
in 14 CFR 415 Subpart B (Policy Review and Approval), Subpart C (Safety 
Review and Approval for Launch From a Federal Launch Range, including 
the calculation of acceptable flight risk), and Subpart F (Safety 
Review and Approval for Launch From a Launch Site not Operated by a 
Federal Launch Range). Other requirements include payload determination 
(14 CFR 415 Subpart D), financial responsibility (14 CFR 415.83, 
Subpart E) and environmental review (14 CFR 415 Subpart G).
    The purpose of the proposed action as defined in 49 U.S.C. Subtitle 
IX--Commercial Space Transportation, ch. 701, Commercial Space Launch 
Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121 is to:
     Promote economic growth and entrepreneurial activity 
through use of the space environment for peaceful purposes;
     Encourage the U.S. private sector to provide launch 
vehicles, reentry vehicles, and associated services by simplifying and 
expediting the issuance of licenses;
     Provide FAA oversight and coordination of licensed 
launches and to protect the public health and safety, safety of 
property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the 
U.S.; and
     Facilitate the strengthening and expansion of the U.S. 
space transportation infrastructure.
    The need for the proposed action is to streamline the FAA's 
licensing process while still assuring public safety and proper 
environmental review. Such a streamlined process will promote the 
entrepreneurial activity of a licensed launch provider. The proposed 
LOL would cover multiple launches using the same infrastructure at the 
same launch location through a range of launch azimuths without the 
need to re-evaluate license applications for individual launches unless 
there are changes in the proposed action, environmental impacts or 
conditions of approval. The proposed LOL would allow SLLP to conduct up 
to eight launches per year for five years, for a maximum of 40 
launches. The proposed LOL would allow SLLP to launch on exact 
equatorial azimuths (e.g., 90 deg.), which are optimal for 
geosynchronous orbit (GSO) launches in terms of fuel efficiency, 
payload weight, and satellite life span.

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Alternatives Including No Action and the Alternatives Evaluation 
Process

    The FAA considered six alternatives in addition to the proposed 
action. These alternatives included issuing the proposed LOL with 
various changes in the launch parameters:
     Alternative with Up to 12 Launches Per Year. This 
alternative evaluates increasing the annual number of launches up to a 
maximum of 12 per year;
     Alternative with a Range of Azimuths Between 70 deg. and 
110 deg.. This alternative considers a wider range of azimuths, those 
from 70 deg. to 110 deg., inclusive, identified as feasible for GSO 
launches;
     Alternative with Avoidance of National Parks and National 
Reserves. This alternative would involve launching along a range of 
azimuths between 82.6 deg. and 97.4 deg. but would avoid specific 
azimuths within this range that would overfly any country's National 
Park or National Reserve;
     Alternative with Avoidance of the Oceanic Islands. This 
alternative would involve launching along a range of azimuths between 
82.6 deg. and 97.4 deg. but would avoid any azimuth that would overfly 
any of the Oceanic Islands; and
     Alternative with Avoidance of the Galapagos Islands. This 
alternative would involve launching along a range of azimuths between 
82.6 deg. and 97.4 deg. but would avoid any azimuths that overfly the 
Galapagos Islands Group; and
     No Action Alternative.
    The council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations require that 
the agency look at ``reasonable'' alternatives to a proposed action. 
With that standard in mind, the FAA did not evaluate in detail those 
alternatives that showed no possibility of meeting the purpose and need 
of the proposed action, as described previously. The following 
screening criteria were used to determine whether alternatives were 
reasonable to evaluate in detail in the EA:
     Promote economic growth and entrepreneurial activity 
through use of the space environment for peaceful purposes;
     Encourage U.S. private sector to provide launch vehicles, 
reentry vehicles, and associated services by simplifying and expediting 
the issuance of licenses;
     Provide FAA oversight and coordination of licensed 
launches and to protect the public health and safety, safety of 
property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the US; 
and
     Facilitate the strengthening and expansion of the U.S. 
space transportation infrastructure.
    Based on the evaluation of alternatives using the above screening 
criteria and the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), the following alternatives were evaluated in detail in the EA:
     Proposed Action,
     Alternative with Avoidance of the Oceanic Islands,
     Alternative with Avoidance of the Galapagos Islands, and
     No Action Alternative.

Environmental Impacts of Successful Flight

Geology, Oceanography, and Atmospheric Processes

    The launch will originate from a launch site at 0 deg. latitude and 
154 deg.W longitude. As the flight proceeds over open ocean, State I 
and the fairing will be deposited. The Stage I and fairing impact zones 
overlap slightly, and jointly form a rectangle of approximately 480 km 
(north to south) by 600 km (east to west) (300 by 375 mi). These impact 
zones are located in water 2,000 to 4,000 meters (m) (1.2 to 2.5 mi) 
deep. Later in the flight, Stage II will also be deposited in the open 
ocean. The Stage II impact zone is approximately 1,270 km (790 mi) by 
1,320 km (820 miles). The water depth in this area is approximately 
3,900 m (2.4 mi). The deposition of spent stages and the fairing in 
these areas would be inconsequential relative to natural geologic 
processes in the region.
    The open ocean environment within the proposed range of azimuths is 
largely uniform in terms of oceanic and atmospheric processes, with 
biological characteristics (e.g., plankton biomass) primarily varying 
with nutrient and mineral levels (Barber, et al., 1996). The spend 
stages and fairing pieces from any launch within the proposed range of 
azimuths would fall into undifferentiated deep, open waters of the 
tropical equatorial Pacific Ocean, far away from any Oceanic Islands or 
continental landmass.
    Given the expanse of the open ocean area within each impact zone, 
the environmental effect of stage and fairing deposition is minimal. 
For any individual launch, only 0.00003 percent, 0.000003 percent, and 
0.000001 percent of the impact zone area would be affected by the Stage 
I, fairing, and Stage II depositions, respectively.
    Residual propellants would be released as spent integrated launch 
vehicle (ILV) components fall into the ocean. Residual LOX would 
dissipate immediately upon release. Residual kerosene would be 
dispersed into a mist during descent, and all but the largest droplets 
would evaporate within a few minutes. The environment would recover 
from the effects of the residual propellants and return to its natural 
condition within a few days.

Biological Communities and Commercial Activities

    Potential effects of successful launches on biological communities 
and commercial activities are limited to the unlikely possibility that 
the spent stages and fairings could fall on a marine organism, ship, 
fishing vessel, or aircraft and noise effects associated with the 
launch.
    There is a remote possibility that spent stages or the fairing may 
fall on a marine organism, ship or fishing vessel, or aircraft. As a 
mitigation measure, SLLP gives advance notice for each launch to the 
FAA (Central Altitude Reservation Function), the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG; 14th District), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), 
and the U.S. Space Command (USSC). To coordinate air, marine, and space 
traffic, these organizations issue necessary information, including 
notices, through well-established channels. For vessels without 
receiving equipment (expected to be limited to those operating out of 
Kiribati ports), standard notices are delivered by fax to Kiribati 
government authorities and regional fishing fleet and tour operators 
for distribution and posting.

Noise

    Steady noise from pre- and post-launch operations (e.g., from ship 
engines) may reach approximately 70 dB. Research indicates that this 
level of noise would not have a detrimental affect on any animal that 
would linger in the area (Shulhof, 1994; Richardson, et al., 1997). 
Wind speeds of approximately 60 km/hr (37 mi/hr), which occur in the 
eastern portion of the Pacific Ocean, generate similar levels of noise 
(i.e., approximately 70 dB) on the open ocean (NIMA, 1998; Cato, 1994).
    No significant noise impacts would be expected from the launch 
because of the relatively short duration of launch noise and the 
unlikely presence of the higher trophic level organisms near the launch 
site. Noise from a single launch is estimated to be 150 dB at 378 m 
(1240 ft), with the equivalent sound intensity in the water at this 
distance being 75 dB. This reflects the fact that noise generated above 
the ocean is significantly attenuated by the air-water interface, which 
protects fish and

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marine mammals from most above-water noise impacts (Bowles, 1995).
    Data suggest that fish and marine mammals will move to avoid 
chronic high level noise and noise that may increase slowly in 
magnitude (Office of Naval Research, 2000; ENS, 2000). Fish and marine 
mammals, however, are not likely to be able to move quickly enough to 
avoid sudden acute high level noise. The velocity of sound in seawater 
is approximately 1,500 m/s (4,950 ft/s), or about 4.5 times faster than 
in air (Taley, 1990).
    A sonic boom would occur when the ILV reaches supersonic velocity 
during Stage I flight. A sonic boom is caused when an object moving 
faster than sound (i.e., 1,200 km/hr (750 mi/hr) at sea level) 
compresses the air in its path. The sound heard at the Earth's surface 
as a ``sonic boom'' is the sudden onset and release of pressure after 
the buildup by the shock wave or ``peak overpressure.'' The change in 
pressure caused by a sonic boom is only a few kilograms per square 
meter (pounds per square foot).
    The maximum pressures experienced from a sonic boom would be 
directly under the launch vehicle flight path, and is primarily a 
function of velocity and altitude. The sonic boom would occur over the 
open ocean far from any of the Oceanic Islands. The distance between 
the sonic boom footprint and the closest landmass (i.e., Kiritimati 
Island) is 420 km (260 mi). Below water effects of the sonic boom would 
be rapidly attenuated by the air-water interface (Bowles, 1995). Thus, 
it would not have any significant adverse effects on marine organisms 
that happen to be in the area other than a startle reaction. A startle 
reaction may cause an adverse effect in a threatened and endangered 
species; however, little information on the physiological impacts of 
the startle effect is available for marine organisms in the open ocean. 
No physical harm to animals or ships at sea level would occur because 
of the altitude of the launch vehicle and its vertical acceleration 
(USAF, 1996).

Environmental Impacts of Failed Missions

    The EP considered and analyzed potential impacts of a possible 
mission failure at the LP, during Stage I or Stage II flight, or during 
Upper Stage flight. In most cases, a failure would result from a 
detected deviation between the programmed flight path parameter (e.g., 
pitch, yaw, roll) and the actual flight parameters as monitored by ILV 
sensors. If flight deviations exceed established limits, the thrust 
termination system would terminate the flight. Failure of the onboard 
computer systems could also result in thrust termination and loss of 
the mission. SLLP has projected launch reliabilities of 0.982 for Stage 
I flight, 0.956 for Stage II flight, and 0.974 for Upper Stage flight 
(SLLP, 2001). For the purposes of conducting debris risk analyses the 
FAA specifies that for launch vehicles ``with fewer than 15 flights, a 
launch operator shall use an overall launch vehicle failure probability 
of 0.31.'' 14 CFR 417.227(b)(6)(i) For launch vehicles ``with at least 
15 flights, but fewer than 30 flights, a launch operator shall use an 
overall launch vehicle failure probability of 0.10 or the empirical 
failure probability, whichever is greater.'' 14 CFR 417.227(b)(6)(ii) 
For launch vehicles ``with 30 or more flights, a launch operator shall 
use the empirical failure probability determined from the actual flight 
history.'' 14 CFR 417.227(b)(6)(iii)

Possible Failure at the Launch Platform

    A possible failure at the LP would likely result in a cascading 
explosion of all ILV propellants. The explosions would scatter pieces 
of the ILV, and perhaps pieces of the LP, as far as three kilometers 
(two miles) away (the LP is designed to survive an explosion of the 
fully fueled launch vehicle). A smoke plume would rise and drift 
downwind some distance before dissipating. In the course of about one 
minute, the entire matter and energy of the ILV would be dispersed in 
the environment in a relatively concentrated area of the ocean. 
Environmental effects would include intense heat generated at the ocean 
surface; debris and noise released during the explosion; emissions 
released to the atmosphere; and the subsequent cleanup needed on the 
LP. Despite this intense, short-term, and localized disruption, there 
would be no discernible long-term impact to the environment. The fuels 
not consumed in the explosion would evaporate or become entrained in 
the water column and would eventually be degraded by microbial activity 
and oxidation (Doerffer, 1992; National Research Council, 1985; Rubin, 
1989; ITOPH, 2001; and EPA, 1999). The areas of plankton lost due to 
heat or toxic effect would be re-colonized as currents redistribute the 
surface waters (Grigg and Hey, 1992).

Launch Abort Scenarios

    There is also the potential for a launch abort at the LP (i.e., 
when a countdown is interrupted or no launch occurs, which is 
technically not a failure). In general, a launch would be aborted if 
equipment malfunctions or unresolved deviations of ILV parameters occur 
just before launch. Due to the inherent complexity of the ILV, a 
deviation in any number of factors could trigger an abort, and the 
extent to which propellants need to be safeguarded would vary based on 
the time prior to launch that the abort occurs. In all cases, however, 
the resulting contingency measures initiated by SLLP would follow 
established routines to stabilize the ILV on the LP. A worst-case 
abort, which would occur three seconds prior to launch, involves the 
largest quantities of propellant and the most detailed contingency 
measures. An abort scenario would involve draining small quantities of 
propellant into the flame bucket where it would evaporate due to wind 
effects. In addition, the pyrophoric fluid that initiates kerosene 
ignition would be burned according to SLLP's operating procedures. The 
ILV would be returned to a horizontal position in the LP hanger, and 
the propellant reservoirs from the State I engine would be drained into 
containers for later disposal at the Home Port as a hazardous waste.
    An ILV failure moments after the ILV leaves the deck of the LP 
could also be considered a worst-case scenario since the propellant 
quantities involved would still be near a maximum at the onset of 
flight, and the failure would occur over the ocean rather than on the 
LP. A possible failure at this stage of flight would put all unexpended 
propellants, other hazardous materials, and ILV hardware into the 
environment in a more concentrated area than would occur during a 
successful flight. The quantity of hazardous material and debris 
reaching the ocean surface would depend on when in the flight the 
failure occurred (i.e., the longer the flight before failure, the less 
propellant would be onboard the ILV and available to potentially reach 
the ocean surface).

Explosive Versus Thrust Termination Failures

    Potential explosive failures (marked by the sudden destruction of 
propellants and the ILV during flight) would result in the scattering 
of ILV parts and the immediate consumption by burning of most if not 
all of the hazardous materials incorporated by or contained in those 
parts. In contrast, possible thrust termination failures (i.e., one in 
which a deviation in flight triggers engine cutoff) would result in the 
ILV losing upward and forward momentum and falling toward Earth. In 
this case, an ILV early in Stage I flight would likely fall intact and 
rupture on the ocean surface, while later in Stage I flight and

[[Page 39079]]

during all of Stage II flight, the ILV would begin to tumble within 
seconds and break up due to stresses on the structure. Explosions may 
also occur during thrust termination if, as the ILV breaks up, 
flammable materials become exposed to hot engine parts and ignite. If 
an explosion does not occur, the extent to which ILV materials would 
reach the Earth's surface would depend on the altitude and speed of the 
ILV at the time of thrust termination.

Possible Failure Near the Launch Platform

    The worst-case scenario during initial ILV flight would be a thrust 
termination failure within 20 seconds of the ILV leaving the LP and the 
ILV falling intact and rupturing on the ocean surface. Regardless of 
when within the first 20 seconds the failure occurs, the ILV flight 
would continue until the twentieth second at which time the thrust 
termination system would automatically end the flight. This delayed 
termination has been automated to ensure that this type of failure does 
not damage the LP and to ensure that the ILV falls safely away from the 
ACS, which is positioned approximately five km (three mi) from the LP. 
At this point in flight, most of the propellant is unburned and 
virtually all of the ILV mass of propellants, other hazardous material, 
and components would be released into the environment in a concentrated 
area.
    A possible failure near the launch platform would be worse than 
either an explosive failure or a thrust termination failure in which 
the ILV explodes later in the flight. In the case of a failure 
involving an explosion, most of the ILV would be consumed, destroyed, 
and scattered in a series of cascading explosions, and the propellants 
and other flammable materials would be burned before reaching the ocean 
surface. A thrust termination or explosive failure later in the launch 
may have less environmental impact (depending on the impact location). 
During such a failure later in flight more of the debris and virtually 
all of the propellants would be incinerated or evaporated and not reach 
the ocean surface, while those debris or propellants that would reach 
the ocean surface would be more dispersed. In general, larger and more 
concentrated amounts of ILV material and debris released during a 
failure would have a proportionately greater impact and take more time 
to dissipate and break down in the environment.

Effects of a Possible Failure During Stage I or II Flight

    For the proposed action, the scenario of possible Stage I or II 
failure, and especially the worst-case scenario of possible thrust 
termination failure during the first 20 seconds of flight, would occur 
over the east-central Pacific Ocean, well away from the Oceanic Islands 
and South America. Even if a failure caused a deviation from the 
intended flight plan, the deviation prior to thrust termination would 
not be so great as to have any environmental effects significantly 
closer to the Oceanic Islands than the normal debris deposition areas 
of a successful flight. Therefore, the debris from the ILV would fall 
into the deep waters of the open ocean far from any Oceanic Islands. 
The debris, which includes metal and composite components that 
incorporate small amounts of rubber, plastics, and ceramics, is largely 
inert and would settle to the ocean bottom and become an inert part of 
the seafloor ecology (Chou, 1991).
    A possible failure during Stage I or II flight would result in the 
release of propellants and other hazardous materials. In addition to 
the main propellants, kerosene (or Boktan) and LOX, small quantities of 
the propellants MMH (or UDMH) and N2O4 would be 
released, as would even smaller amounts of explosive compounds and 
metals present in release mechanisms and batteries.
    There are three primary effects of a failure during Stage I or II 
flight:
     Release of emissions to the atmosphere;
     Release of propellants and other hazardous material to the 
ocean; and
     Unlikely possibility of Stage I or II debris falling on 
marine organisms, marine vessels, or aircraft.
    Possible failure during flight of the Upper Stage could conceivably 
occur at any point as the Upper Stage progressively transits over the 
open ocean, the Oceanic Islands, and the northern part of South 
America. Given the speed and altitude of the Upper Stage during this 
period, a failure during any point in Upper Stage flight would result 
in most of the material components and all of the propellants being 
heated in the atmosphere and vaporized or burned from frictional 
effects before reaching the Earth's surface. The actual amount of 
debris that survives depends on the time of failure during the flight 
(i.e., more debris would survive a failure that occurs earlier during 
the flight).
    As is the case for possible Stage I and II failures discussed 
above, a possible Upper Stage failure could occur as an explosion 
(where propellants in the Upper Stage suddenly combust) or a thrust 
termination (where acceleration ceases and the remaining ILV components 
begin to fall). In both types of failure scenarios, the hazardous 
materials associated with the Upper Stage, the satellite payload, and 
their connecting components would be rapidly consumed (in an explosion) 
or released and dispersed (as the ILV components tumble and break up in 
the fall to Earth).

Cumulative Impacts

    In general, all of the potential environmental impacts of the 
proposed action would occur on a regional scale. No larger global 
impacts are expected to occur, mainly because of the small amounts of 
debris, hazardous material, and atmospheric emissions produced by the 
ILV relative to other anthropogenic activities (e.g., power generation 
and the scale of natural processes in the Pacific Ocean).

Other Environmental Concerns

Environmental Justice and Social and Economic Considerations

    Although Executive Order 12114 requires consideration of Federal 
actions abroad with the potential for impacts to the environment, the 
Executive Order specifically defines environment as ``the natural and 
physical environment and excludes social, economic and other 
environments * * *.'' Therefore, potential impacts to environments 
other than the natural and physical are not analyzed in this document. 
Nevertheless, given the limited amount of time that the LP and the ACS 
will be present at the launch location, social and economic 
considerations are assumed to be negligible.

Exclusive Economic Zones

    Under successful flight conditions, any potential environmental 
impact from the stages and fairing would occur outside the Exclusive 
Economic Zones--defined as 200 nautical miles (370 km or 230 statute 
miles) of all countries bordering the affected environment. Only in the 
event of a mission failure during Upper Stage flight would be 
deposition of debris potentially occur within an EEZ. As with all 
missions failures, an intensive investigation as to the cause of the 
failure would be completed. A return to flight for the SLLP project 
would be re-instated only after corrective actions are undertaken to 
the satisfaction of the FAA and SLLP.

[[Page 39080]]

Other Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Avoidance of the Oceanic Islands

    Under this alternative, only azimuths between 82.6 deg. to 
83.28 deg., 84.50 deg. to 85.07 deg., 86.36 deg. to 88.80 deg. and 
92.89 deg. to 97.40 deg. would be used. The environmental impacts would 
be the same as for the proposed action except for the impacts to 
Oceanic Islands and the corresponding portions of South America which 
would not be overflown in this alternative action.
    Upper Stage and payload flight would progressively transit over 
open ocean waters and the northern part of South America. Upper Stage 
flight during a successful mission would have no effect on the ocean or 
land environments or the lower atmosphere because its operation occurs 
at very high altitudes. The impacts of failure during Upper Stage 
flight for this alternative would be the same as those for the proposed 
action with the exception that no Stage I or II impact would occur on 
or near the Oceanic Islands.

Avoidance of the Galapagos Islands

    Under this alternative, only azimuths between 83.60 deg. to 86.8 
0 deg. and 92.89 deg. to 97.40 deg. would be used. The environmental 
impacts would be the same as for the proposed action except for the 
impacts to the Galapagos Islands and the corresponding portions of 
South America which would not be overflown in this alternative action.
    Upper Stage and payload flight would progressively transit over 
open ocean waters, the Oceanic Islands (excluding the Galapagos 
Islands), and the northern part of South America. Upper Stage flight 
during a successful mission would have no effect on the ocean or land 
environments of the lower atmosphere because its operation occurs at 
very high altitudes. The impacts of failure during Upper Stage flight 
for this alternative would be the same as those for the proposed action 
with the exception that no impact would occur on or near the Galapagos 
Islands.

No Action

    Under the No Action alternative FAA would not issue an LOL or 
launch-specific license for Galaxy IIIC to SLLP. SLLP would continue to 
prepare and submit launch-specific applications for individual licenses 
to launch up to six satellites per year within the launch parameters 
addressed in the February 11, 1999 EA. Home Port operations would 
continue at their present level. If a customer requires a different 
launch azimuth, SLLP would prepare individual environmental analyses 
and documentation to support launch-specific applications and submit 
the documentation to the FAA for review.

Environmental Monitoring and Protection Plan

    The Environmental Monitoring and Protection Plan is an evolving 
document of mitigation measures, incorporating improvements identified 
by the FAA, SLLP, or suggested by the public. The plan consists of four 
elements:
     Visual observation for species of concern.
     Remote detection of atmospheric effects during launch.
     Collection of surface water samples to detect possible 
launch effects.
     Notification to mariners and air traffic.

Public Participation

    During the planning phase of the Sea Launch environmental review 
process, the FAA concluded that public participation was required. It 
was further decided that the Environmental Assessment document would be 
made available for public review for a 30-day period. Consequently a 
list of pertinent entities was compiled to ensure that wide 
distribution of the documents would be possible. The list included 
cognizant Federal and State agencies, scientific institutes, trade and 
environmental organizations and foreign embassies of countries in the 
area of the proposed action. The documents were also made available to 
any organization or member of the public who requested a copy and could 
also be found in the FAA/AST web site. The public review period 
commenced on May 17, 2001 via publication of a Notice in the Federal 
Register. Preceding this announcement, FAA mailed copies of the 
documents to all entities on the list. Additional copies were mailed 
via regular or next-day mail, as requested. The public review and 
comment period was scheduled from May 17, 2001 until June 18, 2001.
    During the public review period the U.S. Air Force and the 
Aerospace Corporation expressed interest in the project and submitted 
formal comments to the FAA. The South Pacific Regional Environmental 
Programme (SPREP) indicated the need for additional time for internal 
coordination and consultation. The FAA extended the closing date for 
comments for SPREP until June 30, 2001. However, no comments were 
received from SPREP.
    As part of the public participation program, FAA/AST personnel held 
face-to-face information exchanges with representatives of Ecuador in 
Washington, DC. In addition, SLLP personnel traveled to the Western 
Pacific and held similar meetings with representatives from SPREP.
    The Final Sea Launch LOL Environmental Assessment and Environmental 
Finding Document are public information available upon request pursuant 
to FAA procedures. Copies of the final Sea Launch LOL Environmental 
Assessment and finding document will be sent to persons on the list of 
pertinent entities.
    Notification of the Environmental Finding Document is provided to 
all interested parties through publication of this Notice in the 
Federal Register.

    Prepared by:

Michon Washington.
Dated: July 19, 2001.

    Recommended by:

Herbert Bachner.
Dated: July 19, 2001.

Finding

    After careful and thorough consideration of the SLLP LOL Final EA 
and the facts contained herein, the undersigned finds that the proposed 
Federal action is consistent with the purpose of national environmental 
policies and objectives as set forth in Executive Order 12114 the 
application of which is guided by the National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969 (NEPA) and that it will not significantly affect the quality of 
the human environment outside the United States within the meaning of 
Executive Order (E.O.) 12114, or otherwise include any condition 
requiring consultation. Therefore, the FAA has determined that an 
Environmental Impact Statement for the proposed action is not required 
(See E.O. 12114, Section 2-5).

    Issued in Washington, DC, on: July 19, 2001.
Patricia G. Smith,
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation.
[FR Doc. 01-18673 Filed 7-25-01; 8:45 am]
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