NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–277 and 50–278]

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon), Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3; Notice of Receipt of Application for Renewal of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–44 and DPR–56 for an Additional 20-Year Period

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has received an application from Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) dated July 2, 2001, filed pursuant to Section 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR Part 54 for renewal of Operating License Nos. DPR–44 and DPR–56, which authorize the applicant to operate Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3. Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station is a two-unit boiling water reactor located in York County and Lancaster County in southeastern Pennsylvania. The operating licenses for Peach Bottom, Units 2 and 3, expire on August 8, 2013, and July 2, 2014, respectively. The acceptability of the tendered application for docketing and other matters, including an opportunity to request a hearing will be the subject of subsequent **Federal Register** notices.

Copies of the application are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, or electronically from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). The ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html. In addition, the application is available on the NRC web page at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/REACTOR/LR/index.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737 or by email to pdr@nrc.gov.

The license renewal application for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station is also available to local residents at the Harford County Public Library, in Whiteford, Maryland, and the Collinsville Community Library, in Brogue, Pennsylvania.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, the 19th day of July 2001.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Christopher I. Grimes,

Chief, License Renewal and Standardization Branch, Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–315 AND 50–316]

Indiana Michigan Power Co.; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating Licenses No. DPR–58 and DPR–74, issued to Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M, the licensee), for operation of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, located in Bridgman, Michigan.

The proposed amendments would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1.1, Table 3.3–1, Action 2a, to increase the amount of time allowed to place an inoperable power range neutron flux channel in the tripped condition from one hour to six hours.

In its application, I&M explained why it could not have foreseen the need for these amendments. The proposed TS change is being requested on an exigent basis because I&M recently discovered that the surveillance test procedure for the quarterly power range neutron flux channel calibration, required by TS 4.3.1.1.1, Table 4.3–1, was not being performed in accordance with TS 3.3.1.1, Table 3.3–1, Action 2a. I&M has determined this to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). I&M states that the problem exists with the quarterly power range neutron flux channel calibration surveillance, defined by TS 1.9. The manner in which the testing is performed requires the detector to be disconnected from the instrumentation. This makes the channel inoperable. Since the channel calibration takes longer than one hour to perform, the channel is placed in the tripped condition. To complete the test, the channel must be taken out of the tripped condition prior to reconnecting the detector input. The channel remains inoperable because it is disconnected; thus, Action 2a can not be met. I&M performed a review of the surveillance test procedure and concluded that the test cannot be performed in a manner that is consistent with meeting the current one-hour completion requirement of Action 2a. In order to restore compliance with the TS, the one-hour completion requirement should be increased to a time that would allow completion of the required testing. The next surveillance is due August 12, 2001, which includes the 25 percent extension allowed by TS 4.0.2. I&M could not have avoided the exigency due to the short duration between when the problem was discovered and the date when the next surveillance is due.

The staff has determined that the licensee used its best efforts to make a timely application for the proposed changes and that exigent circumstances do exist and were not the result of any intentional delay on the part of the licensee.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under exigent circumstances, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff must determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The change involves an increase in the amount of time allowed prior to placing an inoperable reactor protection channel in a tripped condition. By placing a channel in a tripped condition when the channel is inoperable, it places the reactor protection system from two-out-of-four reactor trip logic to one-out-of-three reactor trip logic. This places the reactor closer to a tripped condition if a spurious signal should occur on one of the other channels. By not placing the reactor closer to an inadvertent reactor trip, the probability of a reactor trip is not significantly increased. One channel being inoperable is not a precursor to any accident and thus does not significantly increase the probability of occurrence of any accident