[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 141 (Monday, July 23, 2001)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 38195-38198]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-17597]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2001-NM-103-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-10 and -30 
Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness 
directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model 
DC-9-10 and -30 series airplanes. This proposal would require an 
inspection of the power feeder cable for evidence of chafing, and 
repair of any chafed power feeder cable. This proposal also would 
require replacement of the wiring support clip (standoff) of the power 
feeder cable with a new, improved wiring support clip. This action is 
necessary to prevent chafing and arcing of the power feeder cable and 
adjacent airplane structure and system components, and consequent 
smoke/fire in an engine nacelle. This action is intended to address the 
identified unsafe condition.

DATES: Comments must be received by September 6, 2001.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, 
Attention: Rules Docket No. 2001-NM-103-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., 
Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this 
location between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays. Comments may be submitted

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via fax to (425) 227-1232. Comments may also be sent via the Internet 
using the following address: [email protected]. Comments sent 
via fax or the Internet must contain ``Docket No. 2001-NM-103-AD'' in 
the subject line and need not be submitted in triplicate. Comments sent 
via the Internet as attached electronic files must be formatted in 
Microsoft Word 97 for Windows or ASCII text.
    The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be 
obtained from Boeing Commercial Aircraft Group, Long Beach Division, 
3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data 
and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024). This information may 
be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind 
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft 
Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elvin Wheeler, Aerospace Engineer, 
Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft 
Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 
90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5344; fax (562) 627-5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the 
proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as 
they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number 
and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All 
communications received on or before the closing date for comments, 
specified above, will be considered before taking action on the 
proposed rule. The proposals contained in this action may be changed in 
light of the comments received.
    Submit comments using the following format:
     Organize comments issue-by-issue. For example, discuss a 
request to change the compliance time and a request to change the 
service bulletin reference as two separate issues.
     For each issue, state what specific change to the proposed 
AD is being requested.
     Include justification (e.g., reasons or data) for each 
request.
    Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, 
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All 
comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing 
date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested 
persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with 
the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.
    Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments 
submitted in response to this action must submit a self-addressed, 
stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ``Comments 
to Docket Number 2001-NM-103-AD.'' The postcard will be date stamped 
and returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

    Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request 
to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-114, Attention: Rules 
Docket No. 2001-NM-103-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 
98055-4056.

Background

    In July 1996, a Boeing Model 747 series airplane was involved in an 
accident. As part of re-examining all aspects of the service experience 
of the airplane involved in the accident, the FAA participated in 
design review and testing to determine possible sources of ignition in 
center fuel tanks. As part of the review, we examined fuel system 
wiring with regard to the possible effects that wire degradation may 
have on arc propagation.
    In 1997 in a parallel preceding, at the recommendation of the White 
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, the FAA expanded its 
Aging Transport Program to include non-structural systems and assembled 
a team for evaluating these systems. This team performed visual 
inspections of certain transport category airplanes for which 20 years 
or more had passed since date of manufacture. In addition, the team 
gathered information from interviews with FAA Principal Maintenance 
Inspectors and meetings with representatives of airplane manufacturers. 
This evaluation revealed that the length of time in service is not the 
only cause of wire degradation; inadequate maintenance, contamination, 
improper repair, and mechanical damage are all contributing factors. 
From the compilation of this comprehensive information, we developed 
the Aging Transport Non-Structural Systems Plan to increase airplane 
safety by increasing knowledge of how non-structural systems degrade 
and how causes of degradation can be reduced.
    In 1998, an accident occurred off the coast of Nova Scotia 
involving a McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplane. 
Investigation indicates that a fire broke out in the cockpit and first 
class overhead area. Although the ignition source of the fire has not 
been determined, the FAA, in conjunction with Boeing and operators of 
Model MD-11, DC-8, DC-9, DC-10, and DC-9-80 series airplanes, is 
reviewing all aspects of the service history of those airplanes to 
identify potential unsafe conditions associated with wire degradation 
due to various contributing factors (e.g., inadequate maintenance, 
contamination, improper repair, and mechanical damage) and to take 
appropriate corrective actions. We have issued a series of 
airworthiness directives (AD) that address unsafe conditions identified 
during that process. This process is continuing and we may consider 
additional rulemaking actions as further results of the review become 
available. The cause of the Nova Scotia MD-11 accident has not yet been 
determined.
    In 1999, the FAA Administrator established a formal advisory 
committee to facilitate the implementation of the Aging Transport Non-
Structural Systems Plan. This committee, the Aging Transport Systems 
Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ATSRAC), is made up of representatives 
of airplane manufacturers, operators, user groups, aerospace and 
industry associations, and government agencies. As part of its mandate, 
ATSRAC will recommend rulemaking to increase transport category 
airplane safety in cases where solutions to safety problems connected 
to aging systems have been found and must be applied. Detailed analyses 
of certain transport category airplanes that have been removed from 
service, studies of service bulletins pertaining to certain wiring 
systems, and reviews of previously issued ADs requiring repetitive 
inspections of certain wiring systems, have resulted in valuable 
information on the cause and prevention of wire degradation due to 
various contributing factors (e.g., inadequate maintenance, 
contamination, improper repair, and mechanical damage).
    In summary, as a result of the investigations described above, the 
FAA has determined that corrective action may be necessary to minimize 
the potential hazards associated with wire degradation and related 
causal factors (e.g., inadequate maintenance, contamination, improper 
repair, and mechanical damage).

Identification of Unsafe Condition

    The FAA has received a report of chafing and arcing of the 
electrical power feeder cable on adjacent airplane

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structure and system components on a McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-30 
series airplane. The chafing and arcing was the result of a failed 
wiring support clip (standoff), which allowed the power feeder cable to 
come in contact with a hydraulic line ``B'' nut. This condition, if not 
corrected, could result in chafing and arcing of the power feeder cable 
and adjacent airplane structure and system components, and consequent 
smoke/fire in an engine nacelle.

Other Related Rulemaking

    This proposed AD is one of a series of actions identified as part 
of the ATSRAC program initiative to maintain continued operational 
safety of aging non-structural systems in transport category airplanes. 
The program is continuing and the FAA may consider additional 
rulemaking actions as further results of the review become available.

Explanation of Relevant Service Information

    The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 
DC9-24A160, Revision 02, dated March 14, 2001, which describes 
procedures for a general visual inspection of the power feeder cable 
for evidence of chafing, and repair of any chafed power feeder cable. 
The service bulletin also describes procedures for replacement of the 
wiring support clip (standoff) of the power feeder cable with a new, 
improved wiring support clip. Accomplishment of the actions specified 
in the service bulletin is intended to adequately address the 
identified unsafe condition.

Explanation of Requirements of Proposed Rule

    Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to 
exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the 
proposed AD would require accomplishment of the actions specified in 
the service bulletin described previously.

Cost Impact

    There are approximately 162 Model DC-9-10 and -30 series airplanes 
of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 
107 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD, 
that it would take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish 
the proposed actions, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work 
hour. Required parts would cost approximately $102 or $204 per airplane 
depending on the airplane configuration. Based on these figures, the 
cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be 
$17,334, or $28,248, or $162 or $264 per airplane depending on the 
airplane configuration.
    The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions 
that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements 
of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions 
in the future if this proposed AD were not adopted. The cost impact 
figures discussed in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time 
necessary to perform the specific actions actually required by the AD. 
These figures typically do not include incidental costs, such as the 
time required to gain access and close up, planning time, or time 
necessitated by other administrative actions.

Regulatory Impact

    The regulations proposed herein would not have a substantial direct 
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national 
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it 
is determined that this proposal would not have federalism implications 
under Executive Order 13132.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed 
regulation (1) is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under 
Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); 
and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, 
positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under 
the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft 
regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the 
Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules 
Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend 
part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as 
follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec. 39.13  [Amended]

    2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new 
airworthiness directive:

McDonnell Douglas: Docket 2001-NM-103-AD.

    Applicability: Model DC-9-10 and -30 series airplanes, as listed 
in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC9-24A160, Revision 02, dated 
March 14, 2001; certificated in any category.

    Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the 
preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been 
modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the 
requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, 
altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of 
this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an 
alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (b) of 
this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of 
the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition 
addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been 
eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to 
address it.

    Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished 
previously.
    To prevent chafing and arcing of the power feeder cable and 
adjacent airplane structure and system components, and consequent 
smoke/fire in an engine nacelle, accomplish the following:

Inspection; Repair, If Necessary; and Replacement

    (a) Within 12 months after the effective date of this AD, do the 
actions specified in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD per 
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC9-24A160, Revision 02, dated March 
14, 2001.
    (1) Do a general visual inspection of the power feeder cable for 
evidence of chafing, and repair any chafed power feeder cable.

    Note 2: For the purposes of this AD, a general visual inspection 
is defined as ``A visual examination of an interior or exterior 
area, installation, or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure, 
or irregularity. This level of inspection is made under normally 
available lighting conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting, 
flashlight, or drop-light, and may require removal or opening of 
access panels or doors. Stands, ladders, or platforms may be 
required to gain proximity to the area being checked.''

    (2) Replace the wiring support clip (standoff) of the power 
feeder cable with a new, improved wiring support clip.

    Note 3: Inspection, repair, and replacement per McDonnell 
Douglas Service Bulletin DC9-24-160, dated January 4, 1996, or 
Revision 01, dated March 7, 1996, before the effective date of this 
AD is considered acceptable for compliance with the requirements of 
this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the 
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be 
used if approved by the Manager, Los

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Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA. Operators shall 
submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal 
Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the 
Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

    Note 4: Information concerning the existence of approved 
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be 
obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

Special Flight Permit

    (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 
Secs. 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the 
requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 9, 2001.
Vi L. Lipski,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 01-17597 Filed 7-20-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-U