[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 115 (Thursday, June 14, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 32400-32407]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-14978]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation on 
Technical Specification Improvement To Modify Requirements Regarding 
Missed Surveillances Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement 
Process

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Request for comment.

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SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model safety evaluation (SE) 
relating to the modification of requirements regarding missed 
surveillances imposed on licensees through technical specifications. 
The NRC staff has also prepared a model no significant hazards 
consideration (NSHC) determination relating to this matter. The purpose 
of these models is to permit the NRC to efficiently process amendments 
that propose to modify requirements for missed surveillances. Licensees 
of nuclear power reactors to which the models apply could request 
amendments confirming the applicability of the SE and NSHC 
determination to their reactors. The NRC staff is requesting comments 
on the model SE and model NSHC determination prior to announcing their 
availability for referencing in license amendment applications.

DATES: The comment period expires July 16, 2001. Comments received 
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received 
on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or via U.S. 
mail.
    Submit written comments to: Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, 
Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, Mail 
Stop: T-6 D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays.
    Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC's Public 
Document Room, 11555 Rockville Pike (Room O-1F21), Rockville, MD.
    Comments may be submitted by electronic mail to [email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Dennig, Mail Stop: O-12H4, 
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone 301-415-1161.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item 
Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specification 
Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The 
consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP) is intended to 
improve the efficiency of NRC licensing processes. This is accomplished 
by processing proposed changes to the standard technical specifications 
(STS) in a manner that supports subsequent license amendment 
applications. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to 
comment on proposed changes to the STS following a preliminary 
assessment by the NRC staff and finding that the change will likely be 
offered for adoption by licensees. This notice is soliciting comment on 
a proposed change to the STS that modifies requirements regarding 
missed surveillances. The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate any 
comments received for a proposed change to the STS and to either 
reconsider the change or to proceed with announcing the

[[Page 32401]]

availability of the change for proposed adoption by licensees. Those 
licensees opting to apply for the subject change to technical 
specifications are responsible for reviewing the staff's evaluation, 
referencing the applicable technical justifications, and providing any 
necessary plant-specific information. Each amendment application made 
in response to the notice of availability would be processed and 
noticed in accordance with applicable rules and NRC procedures.
    This notice involves the modification of requirements regarding 
missed surveillances in technical specifications. This proposed change 
was proposed for incorporation into the standard technical 
specifications by all Owners Groups participants in the Technical 
Specification Task Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF-358. TSTF-358 
can be viewed on the NRC's web page at 
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/sts/sts.htm.

Applicability

    This proposed change to modify technical specification requirements 
for missed surveillances is applicable to all licensees who currently 
have or who will adopt, in conjunction with the proposed change, 
technical specification requirements for a Bases control program 
consistent with the Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program 
described in Section 5.5 of the applicable vendor's STS.
    To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications, 
the staff requests each licensee applying for the changes addressed by 
TSTF-358 using the CLIIP to include Bases for the proposed technical 
specification consistent with the Bases proposed in TSTF-358. In 
addition, for those licensees that have not adopted requirements for a 
Bases control program by converting to the improved STS or by other 
means, the staff requests that you include the requirements for a Bases 
control program consistent with the STS in your request for the 
proposed change. The need for a Bases control program stems from the 
need for adequate regulatory control of some key elements of the 
proposal that are contained in the proposed Bases for SR 3.0.3. The 
staff is requesting that the Bases be included with the proposed 
license amendments because, in this case, the changes to the technical 
specifications and changes to the associated Bases form an integrated 
change to a plant's licensing bases. To ensure that the overall change, 
including the Bases, includes the appropriate regulatory controls, the 
staff plans to condition the issuance of each license amendment on 
incorporation of the changes into the Bases document and on requiring 
the licensee to control the changes in accordance with the Bases 
Control Program. The CLIIP does not prevent licensees from requesting 
an alternative approach or proposing the changes without the requested 
Bases and Bases control program. Variations from the approach 
recommended in this notice may, however, require additional review by 
the NRC staff and may increase the time and resources needed for the 
review.

Public Notices

    This notice requests comments from interested members of the public 
within 30 days of the date of publication in the Federal Register. 
Following the staff's evaluation of comments received as a result of 
this notice, the staff may reconsider the proposed change or may 
proceed with announcing the availability of the change in a subsequent 
notice (perhaps with some changes to the safety evaluation or proposed 
no significant hazards consideration determination as a result of 
public comments). If the staff announces the availability of the 
change, licensees wishing to adopt the change will submit an 
application in accordance with applicable rules and other regulatory 
requirements. The staff will in turn issue for each application a 
notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to facility operating 
license(s), a proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination, and an opportunity for a hearing. A notice of issuance 
of an amendment to operating license(s) will also be issued to announce 
the modification of requirements for missed surveillances for each 
plant that applies for and receives the requested change.

Proposed Safety Evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Consolidated Line Item Improvement
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Change TSTF-358
Change to Surveillance Requirement 3.0.3 Regarding Missed Surveillances

1.0  Introduction

    In a letter dated November 17, 1999, the Nuclear Energy Institute 
(NEI) Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) proposed several 
changes to the standard technical specifications (STS) (NUREGs 1430-
1434) on behalf of the industry. One of the proposed changes, 
identified as TSTF-358, was a change to STS surveillance requirement 
(SR) 3.0.3 regarding missed SRs. The proposed change would modify SR 
3.0.3 to allow a delay period for a missed SR of 24 hours or up to the 
surveillance frequency, whichever is longer.
    On February 14, 2000, the staff requested that the NEI TSTF modify 
TSTF-358 to address several questions and comments that the staff had 
during their initial review of the proposed change. On September 15, 
2000, the NEI TSTF submitted Revision 5 to TSTF-358 for review. 
(Revisions 2-4 were only reviewed by the industry and were never 
submitted for NRC review.) This proposal is one of the industry's 
initiatives under the Risk-Informed Technical Specifications program.
    The industry proposed changes, in TSTF-358, to the Technical 
Specifications (TS) SR 3.0.3 and the SR 3.0.3 Bases have been modified 
slightly by the NRC staff. The modifications are: (1) The TS SR 3.0.3 
proposal has been changed, by the addition of a phrase to the proposed 
new sentence, to make it clear that not only must a risk evaluation be 
performed but also that the risk impact must be managed; and, (2) the 
SR 3.0.3 Bases proposal is changed to properly invoke the program to 
assess and manage risk required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), and to avoid the 
misperception that 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires monitoring at times 
other than before maintenance activities.
    The following shows the TSTF-358 TS SR 3.0.3 and SR 3.0.3 Bases 
with the NRC staff additions and deletions incorporated: (1) The 
revised TS SR 3.0.3 reads, ``A risk evaluation shall be performed for 
any surveillance delayed greater than 24 hours, and the risk shall be 
managed;'' and (2) the revised SR 3.0.3 Bases that provides the link to 
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) reads, ``This risk impact should be managed through 
the program in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and its 
implementation guidance, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.182, `Assessing and 
Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants.'

2.0  Background

    The regulations contained in 10 CFR 50.36, ``Technical 
Specifications,'' require that technical specifications include 
surveillance requirements. Surveillance requirements are requirements 
relating to test, calibration, or inspection to ensure that the 
necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that 
facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting 
conditions for operation will be met. Technical specifications (TS) 
require surveillance tests to be performed periodically (e.g., weekly 
or monthly). The periodic test

[[Page 32402]]

interval defined in the technical specifications is called the 
surveillance frequency or surveillance interval. The majority of 
surveillance tests included in the technical specifications are 
designed to ensure that standby safety systems will be operable when 
they are needed to mitigate an accident. By testing these components, 
failures that may have occurred since the previous test can be detected 
and corrected.
    STS SR 3.0.1 states that SRs shall be met during the MODES or other 
specified conditions in the applicability for individual limiting 
conditions for operation (LCOs) and that failure to perform a 
surveillance within the specified frequency shall be failure to meet 
the LCO, except as provided in SR 3.0.3.
    The current STS SR 3.0.3 requires that, if it is found that a 
surveillance test was not performed within its specified frequency, the 
associated LCO be declared not met (e.g., equipment be declared 
inoperable) unless the missed surveillance test is completed 
successfully within 24 hours or within the limit of the specified 
frequency, whichever is less, from the time it was discovered that the 
test was not performed. The requirements in STS SR 3.0.3 are based on 
NRC Generic Letter 87-09, ``Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of the Standard 
Technical Specifications (STS) of the Applicability of Limiting 
Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements.''
    Generic Letter 87-09 was published to address three specific issues 
with the application of technical specifications. One of those issues 
was missed surveillances. The Generic Letter states, ``The second 
problem involves unnecessary shutdowns caused by Specification 4.0.3 
when surveillance intervals are inadvertently exceeded. The solution is 
to clarify the applicability of the Action Requirements, to specify a 
specific acceptable time limit for completing a missed surveillance in 
certain circumstances, and to clarify when a missed surveillance 
constitutes a violation of the Operability Requirements of an LCO. It 
is overly conservative to assume that systems or components are 
inoperable when a surveillance has not been performed because the vast 
majority of surveillances do in fact demonstrate that systems or 
components are OPERABLE. When a surveillance is missed, it is primarily 
a question of operability that has not been verified by the performance 
of a Surveillance Requirement. Because the allowable outage time limits 
of some Action Requirements do not provide an appropriate time for 
performing a missed surveillance before Shutdown Requirements apply, 
the technical specifications should include a time limit that allows a 
delay of required actions to permit the performance of the missed 
surveillance based on consideration of plant conditions, adequate 
planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the 
surveillance, and, of course, the safety significance of the delay in 
completing the surveillance. [emphasis added] The staff has concluded 
that 24 hours is an acceptable time limit for completing a missed 
surveillance when the allowable outage times of the Action Requirements 
are less than this limit, or when time is needed to obtain a temporary 
waiver\1\ of the Surveillance Requirement.''
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    \1\ The terminology ``temporary waiver'' was subsequently 
revised to refer to the practice as ``enforcement discretion.''
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    The proposed change would extend the delay time for declaring the 
LCO not met and entering the required actions by allowing more time to 
perform the missed surveillance test. This will be achieved by 
modifying [SR 3.0.3] to allow a delay period from 24 hours up to the 
surveillance frequency, whichever is greater, to perform a missed 
surveillance prior to having to declare the LCO not met. The change 
will add a sentence to [SR 3.0.3] that states, ``A risk evaluation 
shall be performed for any surveillance delayed greater than 24 hours, 
and the risk impact shall be managed.''
    The objective of the proposed change is to minimize the impact on 
plant risk resulting from the performance of a missed surveillance test 
by allowing flexibility in considering the plant conditions and other 
plant activities without compromising plant safety. In addition, 
implementation of the proposed change would reduce the need for the 
licensee to apply for regulatory relief to delay the performance of 
missed surveillances.
    The basis for establishing the changes to requirements for missed 
surveillances in Generic Letter 87-09 continues to apply to the current 
proposed change to [SR 3.0.3]. As evidenced by the discussion in 
Generic Letter 87-09, the intent of the change proposed in the Generic 
Letter was to reduce the impact on plant risk resulting from the 
performance of a missed surveillance test by allowing some flexibility 
in the performance of missed tests. The delay time of 24 hours was 
selected using engineering judgement in the absence of suitable tools 
to determine a delay period on a case-by-case basis. In addition, the 
staff recognized in Generic Letter 87-09 that even a 24-hour delay 
period would not be sufficient in some cases and licensees would need 
to seek regulatory relief in those cases.
    The recent revision to the Maintenance Rule to establish the 
requirement in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) to assess and manage the increase in 
risk that may result from maintenance activities provides a framework 
to allow a more risk-informed approach to addressing missed 
surveillances. This approach is consistent with the Commission's policy 
to increase the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) technology 
in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-
art in PRA methods and data and continues to support the objectives 
outlined by the staff in Generic Letter 87-09.

2.1  Background Determination

    The staff believes that the proposed change to [SR 3.0.3] is 
appropriate because: (1) The number of missed surveillance tests is a 
very small fraction of the total number of such tests performed at a 
nuclear plant each year; (2) the change applies to unintentionally 
missed surveillance tests and is not intended to be used as an 
operational convenience to extend surveillance frequencies (as stated 
in the proposed [SR 3.0.3] Bases); and (3) missed surveillances will be 
placed in the licensee's corrective action program.
    The staff has determined that the proposed change is applicable to 
all licensees. In Generic Letter 87-09, the staff concluded that the 
proposed modifications would result in improved technical 
specifications for all plants and no limitations were put on the 
applicability of the proposed changes. Because the basis for this 
proposed change is largely the same as for the change proposed in 
Generic Letter 87-09, the staff believes the same broad applicability 
is appropriate. In addition, every licensee is required to comply with 
the Maintenance Rule and, therefore, will have implemented programs to 
comply with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) to assess and manage risk associated 
with maintenance and other operational activities.

3.0  Evaluation

    The proposed change modifies [SR 3.0.3] to allow a delay period 
from 24 hours up to the surveillance frequency, whichever is greater, 
to perform a missed surveillance prior to having to declare the LCO not 
met. The change will add a sentence to [SR 3.0.3]. that states, ``A 
risk evaluation shall be performed for any surveillance delayed

[[Page 32403]]

greater than 24 hours, and the risk impact shall be managed.''
    The proposed change will not allow equipment known to be inoperable 
to be considered operable until the missed surveillance is performed. 
If it is known that the missed surveillance could not be met, [SR 
3.0.1] would require that the LCO be declared not met and the 
appropriate condition(s) entered. In addition, the Bases for [SR 3.0.3] 
state that the use of the delay period established by [SR 3.0.3] is a 
flexibility which is not intended to be used as an operational 
convenience to extend surveillance intervals, but only for the 
performance of missed surveillances.
    The modification will also include changes to the Bases for [SR 
3.0.3] that provide details on how to implement the new requirements. 
The Bases changes provide guidance for surveillance frequencies that 
are not based on time intervals but are based on specified unit 
conditions, operating situations, or requirements of regulations. In 
addition, the Bases changes state that the licensee is expected to 
perform any missed surveillance test at the first reasonable 
opportunity, taking into account appropriate considerations, such as 
the impact on plant risk and accident analysis assumptions, 
consideration of unit conditions, planning, availability of personnel, 
and the time required to perform the surveillance. The Bases also state 
that the risk impact should be managed through the program in place to 
implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and its implementation guidance, NRC 
Regulatory Guide 1.182, ``Assessing and Managing Risks Before 
Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants,'' and that the missed 
surveillance should be treated as an emergent condition as discussed in 
Regulatory Guide 1.182. In addition, the Bases state that the degree of 
depth and rigor of the evaluation should be commensurate with the 
importance of the component and that missed surveillances for important 
components should be analyzed quantitatively. The Bases also state 
that, if the results of the risk evaluation determine that the risk 
increase is significant, the evaluation should be used to determine the 
safest course of action. Finally, the Bases state that all missed 
surveillances will be placed in the licensee's Corrective Action 
Program.
    [Optional Section for applications for changes to technical 
specifications that do not include a Bases Control Program:
    The licensee has included in its application the addition of a 
Bases control program to the administrative section of the technical 
specifications. Prior the issuance of the STS (NUREGS 1430-1434), the 
control of technical specification Bases was not clearly defined by 
either technical specifications or NRC regulations. The administrative 
requirements for a Bases control program were added to the STS to 
define a methodology for evaluating changes to and providing updates of 
the technical specification Bases. The addition of the technical 
specification Bases Control Program for plants that have not adopted 
the STS will provide the same benefits in terms of defining a 
methodology for the maintenance of the technical specification Bases. 
The licensee has proposed administrative controls that are consistent 
with the STS requirements and therefore satisfy the condition that was 
included in the Federal Register Notice for the use of CLIIP for this 
technical specifications change. The staff finds the addition of the 
technical specifications Bases Control Program acceptable.]
    Key elements provided by the licensee to justify the proposed 
technical specification change are listed below. These elements were 
built into the process to ensure that every time a surveillance is 
missed the risk will be properly assessed and managed. In addition, 
such elements facilitate regulatory oversight.
     A risk evaluation shall be performed for any surveillance 
test delayed longer than 24 hours and the risk impact shall be managed.
     Although the proposed change to [SR 3.0.3] allows an 
increase of the delay time, the missed surveillance test should be 
performed at the ``first reasonable opportunity.''
     The ``first reasonable opportunity'' will be determined by 
taking into consideration the risk impact from delaying the 
surveillance test (including risk from changing plant configurations or 
shutting the plant down to perform the surveillance, whenever 
applicable) as well as the impact on any analysis assumptions, in 
addition to unit conditions, planning, availability of personnel, and 
the time required to perform the surveillance.
     A missed surveillance will be treated as an emergent 
condition in the same fashion as other unplanned maintenance 
activities. The risk impact of the condition will be managed through 
the program in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and its 
implementation guidance, Regulatory Guide 1.182 .
     A missed surveillance will be placed in the licensee's 
corrective action program, thus providing the staff with a means to 
verify that the number of missed surveillances continues to be very 
low.
     The NRC's operating reactor oversight process will provide 
the framework for inspectors and other staff to review missed 
surveillances and assess the licensee's actions and performance.
    The staff finds that a process containing these key elements is 
appropriate in this case for the following reasons:
     10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires licensees to implement 
programs to assess and manage increases in risk that may result from 
planned maintenance activities. This program is suitable to assess and 
manage the risk impact of missed surveillances because missed 
surveillances can be treated as emergent conditions and their risk 
impact will be assessed and managed in an integrated fashion with 
concurrent maintenance activities.
     Inspection procedures are in place which will allow NRC 
staff to oversee the implementation of Maintenance Rule requirements, 
including the adequacy of risk assessments performed by licensees for 
maintenance configurations.
     The number of missed surveillance tests is a very small 
fraction of the total number of such tests performed at a nuclear plant 
each year. The proposed change is not intended to be used as an 
operational convenience to extend surveillance frequencies.
     This process is similar to other improvements that have 
been made to the technical specifications that allow the use of a 
controlled decision making process by licensees when the process has 
some high-level regulatory oversight. Two examples of this are the 
adoption of the Core Operating Limits Report and the Pressure/
Temperature Limits Report. In each of these cases, the staff approved 
the methodology behind the calculation of certain technical 
specification parameter limits and then allowed the specific limits to 
be removed from technical specifications and controlled by the licensee 
using the approved methodology. Similarly, for this proposed change, 
the staff has already approved guidance that outlines a process for 
complying with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and, therefore, can allow the 
licensee to use that guidance to determine the most prudent course of 
action in the case of a missed surveillance.
    The guidance outlining an acceptable process for licensees to 
assess and manage increases in risk that may result from planned 
maintenance activities is found in Regulatory Guide 1.182. Regulatory 
Guide 1.182 endorses a

[[Page 32404]]

revised Section 11 to NUMARC 93-01 ``Industry Guideline for Monitoring 
the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,'' Revision 2, 
updated by the Nuclear Energy Institute.
    Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, dated February 22, 2000, provides 
guidance for assessing and managing risk impact resulting from 
performance of maintenance activities, including guidance for 
establishing action thresholds based on qualitative and quantitative 
considerations as well as risk management actions. The objective of 
risk management is to control the temporary and aggregate risk 
increases from maintenance activities such that the plant's average 
baseline risk is maintained within a minimal range. This is 
accomplished by using the results of the risk assessment to plan and 
schedule maintenance such that the risk increases are limited, and to 
take additional actions beyond routine work controls to address 
situations where the temporary risk increase is above a certain 
threshold.
    In order to gain additional insights into the proposed change, the 
staff referred to the regulatory guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 
1.174 entitled ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in 
Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing 
Basis, and in Regulatory Guide 1.177, ``An Approach for Plant-Specific, 
Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications,'' although 
these Regulatory Guides do not specifically address the type of change 
in this proposal. Regulatory Guide 1.177 provides the staff's 
recommendations for utilizing risk information to evaluate changes to 
nuclear power plant technical specifications by assessing the impact of 
such proposed changes on the risk associated with plant operation. The 
approach documented in Regulatory Guide 1.177 was taken into 
consideration by the staff in evaluating the risk information provided 
in support of the proposed changes in [SR 3.0.3] to increase the time 
allowed to perform a missed surveillance.
    One portion of the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.177 includes the 
assessment of the risk impact of the proposed change for comparison to 
acceptance guidelines consistent with the Commission's Safety Goal 
Policy Statement, as documented in Regulatory Guide 1.174. In addition, 
the approach outlined in the guidance aims at ensuring that the plant 
risk does not increase unacceptably at any time during the 
implementation of the proposed change (i.e., during the extended 
surveillance interval).
    Another portion of the guidance addresses the need for identifying 
risk significant configurations resulting from maintenance or other 
operational activities and taking appropriate compensatory measures to 
avoid such configurations. This type of evaluation is directly 
addressed by the requirement to perform a risk assessment for missed 
surveillances delayed longer than 24 hours.
    The staff believes that insights from the guidance provided in 
Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177 can be used to show how the proposed 
change is expected to result in, at most, an increase in risk which is 
small and consistent with the Commission's Safety Goal Policy 
Statement. The staff believes that in the majority of the cases of 
missed surveillances, implementation of the proposed change will result 
in a risk benefit due to the proposed requirement for the licensee to 
evaluate the risk impact for missed surveillances that would require a 
delay of longer than 24 hours.

3.1  Risk Impact of the Proposed Change

    The staff made a qualitative assessment of the risk impact of the 
proposed change for comparison with the intent of the acceptance 
guidelines documented in Regulatory Guide 1.174, consistent with the 
Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement. Such risk impact is measured 
by the average (yearly) risk change. In addition, the staff took into 
consideration guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.177 aimed at ensuring that 
the plant risk does not increase unacceptably at any time during the 
implementation of the proposed change (i.e., during an extended 
surveillance interval in this case). The staff's qualitative assessment 
is summarized below.
Average Risk Impact
    The probability that a standby active component, such as a pump or 
a circuit breaker, will fail when demanded during an accident is based 
on the assumption that the component fails due to ``standby'' stresses 
(i.e., stresses which are present while the component is in standby, 
such as corrosion, dirt, lack of lubrication). This probability, also 
called the component's average ``unavailability,'' is used in 
probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) and is most frequently calculated 
by the following equation.

        q = \1/2\ *  * T         (1)

where:
    q = the component's average unavailability,
     = the component's failure rate (assumed constant) while 
in standby, and
    T = the interval at which the component is tested for operability.
    The average unavailability of a structure, system, or component 
(SSC), calculated by using the above equation, reflects the potential 
vulnerability of the component to ``standby'' stresses. Such 
vulnerability increases with time between operability checks (tests) 
assuming corrective action is taken to restore failed components 
identified by the test. Thus, the risk impact of a missed surveillance 
is reflected by the increased unavailability of the related SSCs due to 
the increase of the interval between surveillance tests. If the missed 
surveillance affects two or more components, some ``standby'' stresses 
may impact multiple components. In such a case, the missed surveillance 
would also increase the average common cause failure (CCF) 
unavailability of two or more components and this should be addressed 
in the risk assessment (CCF unavailabilities are calculated by 
adjusting the single component failure unavailability using standard 
PRA techniques, such as the beta factor or the Multiple Greek Letter 
method).
    The thresholds of the aggregate risk impacts are based on the 
permanent change guidelines discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.174. The 
licensee will be expected to manage the risk from the proposed 
technical specification change in conjunction with the risk from other 
concurrent plant activities to ensure that any risk increase, in terms 
of CDF and LERF, will be small and consistent with the Commission's 
Safety Goal Policy Statement.
    Risk insights from existing PRAs and the low frequency of missed 
surveillances indicate that the proposed technical specification change 
is highly unlikely to lead to a significant increase in the average 
(yearly) risk, in terms of CDF or LERF. Significant risk increases can 
occur only under the following conditions:
     The number of missed surveillances is allowed to increase 
significantly;
     High risk configurations are allowed (e.g., by allowing 
certain combinations of multiple missed surveillances and/or outages); 
and
     Poor risk management of plant operational activities is 
allowed.
    Any of these conditions would be in violation of the intent of the 
proposed [SR 3.0.3] and could trigger a review by NRC of the licensee's 
actions and performance. The implementation guidance found in the 
proposed [SR 3.0.3] Bases is intended to ensure that

[[Page 32405]]

such conditions would not occur. Licensees are already required to 
manage risk associated with online maintenance activities. Furthermore, 
the addition of missed surveillances (rather rare plant conditions) to 
the maintenance activities is not expected to increase risk. On the 
contrary, insights from existing risk assessments indicate that there 
are plant conditions during which it is preferable and safer not to 
have to complete missed surveillance tests for some SSCs. Therefore, 
the proposed technical specification change will allow the licensee to 
make informed decisions and take appropriate actions to control risk.
Temporary Risk Impact
    In addition to changes in the mean values of CDF and LERF, the 
incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) and the 
incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP) are 
proposed by Regulatory Guide 1.177 as appropriate measures of the 
increase in probability of core damage and large early release, 
respectively, during the period of implementation of a proposed 
technical specification change (i.e., during the extended surveillance 
period in the case of a missed surveillance). Regulatory Guide 1.182 
provides guidance for controlling temporary risk increases resulting 
from maintenance activities. Such guidance, which is consistent with 
guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.177, establishes action 
thresholds based on qualitative and quantitative considerations as well 
as risk management actions. The staff expects that the licensee will 
implement this guidance for assessing temporary risk increases from 
missed surveillances concurrently with maintenance and other 
operational activities.
    Instantaneous and temporary risk increases from a missed 
surveillance are assessed by considering the time-dependent 
unavailability, most often calculated by the following equation.

            q(t) =  * t

where:
    q(t) = the component's unavailability at time t
     = the component's failure rate (assumed constant) while 
in standby, and
    t = time from end of surveillance frequency of a missed 
surveillance test.

    If the missed surveillance affects two or more components, some 
``standby'' stresses may impact multiple components. In such a case, 
the missed surveillance would increase also the time-dependent CCF 
unavailability of two or more components and this should be addressed 
in the risk assessment.
    Significant temporary risk increases following a missed 
surveillance can occur only under the following conditions:
     High risk configurations are allowed (e.g., by allowing 
certain combinations of multiple missed surveillances and/or outages), 
and
     Poor risk management of plant operation activities is 
allowed.
    Any of these conditions would be in violation of the intent of the 
proposed [SR 3.0.3] and could trigger an NRC review of the licensee's 
actions and performance. The requirements associated with the proposed 
change are intended to ensure that such conditions would not occur. 
Thus, the proposed technical specification change is not expected to 
lead to significant temporary risk increases. Following the discovery 
of an unintentionally missed surveillance, the licensee will have to 
assess temporary risk increases, qualitatively or quantitatively 
depending on the importance of the component affected by the missed 
surveillance, if the surveillance cannot be performed within 24 hours 
from the time it has been discovered.

3.2  Risk-Informed Configuration Risk Management

    Regulatory Guide 1.177 addressed the need for identifying risk 
significant configurations resulting from maintenance or other 
operational activities and taking appropriate compensatory measures to 
avoid such configurations. The objective of such guidance for this 
review is to ensure that plant safety will be maintained and monitored 
during the period of an extended surveillance testing interval 
(associated with an unintentionally missed surveillance). The licensee 
proposes to use the program in place to implement the Maintenance Rule 
to identify ``high-risk'' configurations resulting from missed 
surveillance tests in conjunction with outages associated with 
maintenance activities. It is worth noting that the guidance provided 
in Regulatory Guide 1.177 with regard to the Configuration Risk 
Management Program was used as the basis for developing the guidance 
contained in Regulatory Guide 1.182 for the 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) 
provisions of the Maintenance Rule. This provides additional assurance 
that the proposed process for evaluating the risk impact of missed 
surveillances is consistent with guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 
1.177.

3.3  Quality of PRA

    Once a missed surveillance is discovered and the licensee 
determines that the surveillance cannot be performed within 24 hours, 
the licensee will have to use a risk assessment to determine the most 
prudent course of action. The risk assessment can be done qualitatively 
or quantitatively depending on the importance of the component affected 
by the missed surveillance (missed surveillances for risk important 
components should be analyzed quantitatively). Such a risk assessment 
will be consistent with the program to implement the Maintenance Rule 
guidance to assess and account for both aggregate and temporary risk 
increases associated with ``emergent'' plant conditions as well as 
before undertaking online maintenance or other operational activities.
    All licensees must have the capability to assess and manage 
increases in risk from maintenance activities as required by the 
Maintenance Rule. Risk assessments performed pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.65(a)(4) may use qualitative, quantitative or blended methods. The 
degree of depth and rigor of the evaluation should be commensurate with 
the complexity of the proposed configuration to be assessed. Section 11 
of NUMARC 93-01 provides guidance for using qualitative, quantitative 
or blended methods to assess risk. Current inspection programs allow 
the NRC staff to oversee licensee implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) 
requirements, including the adequacy of pre-maintenance risk 
assessments performed by licensees.
    For the reasons listed below, the staff finds that the same 
``quality'' of PRA or PRA insights used to perform risk assessments 
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55 (a)(4) is also appropriate when assessing the 
impact of missed surveillances.
     The number of ``emergent'' conditions resulting from 
missed surveillances is very small (in both absolute terms and in 
comparison to the frequency of ``emergent'' conditions resulting from 
equipment failures). The licensee is expected to implement the proposed 
change to [SR 3.0.3] in a manner that ensures that this statement 
remains valid.
     A missed surveillance is equivalent to a one-time 
surveillance frequency extension. Therefore, the risk exposure is 
limited to the duration of the surveillance frequency extension. Risk 
increases are small compared to similar increases associated with 
equipment failures. The average (conditional) risk increase, given a 
missed surveillance, may be comparable to the risk increase

[[Page 32406]]

from equipment failures. However, due to the rarity of missed 
surveillances, the average (yearly) risk increase from missed 
surveillances is expected to be small compared to the risk increase 
from equipment failures.
     PRA insights indicate that the risk impact from missed 
surveillances is significant only for a relatively small set of standby 
equipment. This equipment, such as auxiliary feedwater, high pressure 
injection pumps, and emergency diesel generators, is located outside 
containment and generally can be easily tested in a short time, if 
necessary.
     NRC inspection programs allow NRC staff to oversee the 
implementation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) requirements, including the 
adequacy of pre-maintenance risk assessments performed by licensees.

3.4  Summary

    The staff review finds that the process proposed by the licensee 
for addressing missed surveillance requirements meets Commission 
guidance for allowing technical specification changes. Key elements of 
the proposed change are listed below.
     A risk evaluation shall be performed for any surveillance 
delayed longer than 24 hours, and the risk impact shall be managed.
     The missed surveillance test should be performed at ``the 
first reasonable opportunity.''
     The ``first reasonable opportunity'' will be determined by 
taking into consideration the risk impact from delaying the 
surveillance test as well as the impact on any analysis assumptions, in 
addition to unit conditions, planning, availability of personnel, and 
the time required to perform the surveillance.
     A missed surveillance will be treated as an ``emergent'' 
condition in the same fashion as other unplanned maintenance 
activities. The risk impact of the condition will be managed through 
the program in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and its 
implementation guidance (NRC Regulatory Guide 1.182). Rescheduling of 
missed surveillances pursuant to Regulatory Guide 1.182 will ensure the 
necessary provisions for managing the risk impact of performing the 
surveillance in conjunction with other ongoing plant configuration 
changes.
     The NRC's operating reactor oversight process will provide 
the framework for inspectors and other staff to review missed 
surveillances and assess the licensee's actions and performance. 
Inspection procedures are in place which will allow NRC staff to 
oversee the implementation of Maintenance Rule requirements, including 
the adequacy of pre-maintenance risk assessments performed by 
licensees.
     A missed surveillance will be placed in the licensee's 
corrective action program, thus providing the staff with a means to 
verify that the number of missed surveillances continues to be very 
low.
     The number of missed surveillance tests is a very small 
fraction of the total number of such tests performed at a nuclear plant 
each year. The proposed change is not intended to be used as an 
operational convenience to extend surveillance frequencies.
     This process is similar to other improvements that have 
been made to the technical specifications that allow the use of a 
controlled decision making process by licensees when the process has 
some high-level regulatory oversight. Two examples of this are the 
adoption of the Core Operating Limits Report and the Pressure/
Temperature Limits Report. In each of these cases, the staff approved 
the methodology behind the calculation of certain technical 
specification parameter limits and then allowed the specific limits to 
be removed from technical specifications and controlled by the licensee 
using the approved methodology. Similarly, for this proposed change, 
the staff has already approved guidance that outlines a process for 
complying with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and, therefore, can allow the 
licensee to use that guidance to determine the most prudent course of 
action in the case of a missed surveillance.
    For these reasons, the staff finds that the proposed technical 
specification change, to be implemented in accordance with the above 
listed key elements, is acceptable.

4.0  State Consultation

    In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [ ] State 
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The 
State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following comments--with 
subsequent disposition by the staff].

5.0  Environmental Consideration

    The amendment changes a requirement with respect to a surveillance 
requirement. [For those adding a Bases Control Program: The amendment 
also changes recordkeeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or 
requirements.] The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve 
no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the 
types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is 
no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational 
radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed 
finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards 
consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding 
(FR). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for 
categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) [and c(10)]. 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or 
environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the 
issuance of the amendments.

6.0 Conclusion

    The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed 
above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and 
safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the 
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance 
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 
amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or 
to the health and safety of the public.

Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

    Description of Amendment Request: A change is proposed to technical 
specifications to allow a longer period of time to perform a missed 
surveillance. The time is extended from the current limit of up to 24 
hours or up to the limit of the specified frequency, whichever is less; 
to up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the specified frequency, 
whichever is greater.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change relaxes the time allowed to perform a missed 
surveillance. The time between surveillances is not an initiator of any 
accident previously evaluated. Consequently, the probability of an 
accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The 
equipment being tested is still required to be operable and capable of 
performing the accident mitigation functions assumed in the accident 
analysis. As a result, the consequences of any accident previously 
evaluated are not

[[Page 32407]]

significantly affected. Any reduction in confidence that a standby 
system might fail to perform its safety function due to a missed 
surveillance is small and would not, in the absence of other unrelated 
failures, lead to an increase in consequences beyond those estimated by 
existing analyses. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage 
the risk introduced by the missed surveillance will further minimize 
possible concerns. Therefore, this change does not involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated

    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a 
change in the methods governing normal plant operation. A missed 
surveillance will not, in and of itself, introduce new failure modes or 
effects and any increased chance that a standby system might fail to 
perform its safety function due to a missed surveillance would not, in 
the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an accident beyond 
those previously evaluated. The addition of a requirement to assess and 
manage the risk introduced by the missed surveillance will further 
minimize possible concerns. Thus, this change does not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety

    The extended time allowed to perform a missed surveillance does not 
result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety. As supported 
by the historical data, the likely outcome of any surveillance is 
verification that the LCO is met. Failure to perform a surveillance 
within the prescribed frequency does not cause equipment to become 
inoperable. The only effect of the additional time allowed to perform a 
missed surveillance on the margin of safety is the extension of the 
time until inoperable equipment is discovered to be inoperable by the 
missed surveillance. However, given the rare occurrence of inoperable 
equipment, and the rare occurrence of a missed surveillance, a missed 
surveillance on inoperable equipment would be very unlikely. This must 
be balanced against the real risk of manipulating the plant equipment 
or condition to perform the missed surveillance. In addition, parallel 
trains and alternate equipment are typically available to perform the 
safety function of the equipment not tested. Thus, there is confidence 
that the equipment can perform its assumed safety function.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in 
a margin of safety.
    Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous 
discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not 
involve a significant hazards consideration.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day of June 2001.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Robert L. Dennig,
Acting Chief, Technical Specification Branch, Division of Regulatory 
Improvement Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 01-14978 Filed 6-13-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P