[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 112 (Monday, June 11, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31342-31362]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-14637]



[[Page 31341]]

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Part IV





Federal Emergency Management Agency





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Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology; 
Alert and Notification; Notices

  Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 112 / Monday, June 11, 2001 / 
Notices  

[[Page 31342]]


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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY


Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation 
Methodology

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) proposes to 
revise the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual (REP-14) 
dated September 1991 by adopting the six Exercise Evaluation Areas 
described in this notice in place of the 33 REP-14 Objectives that are 
set out in Section D of REP-14. If the Exercise Evaluation Areas 
described in this notice are adopted, Radiological Emergency 
Preparedness exercises conducted pursuant to 44 CFR 350.9 will be 
evaluated against the criteria set out in this notice. The proposed 
frequency with which each of the proposed Exercise Evaluation Areas 
will be evaluated is also contained in this notice. Adoption of the 
proposed changes to REP-14 will render a companion manual entitled 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology 
(REP-15) dated September 1991 obsolete. If the proposed changes to REP-
14 are adopted, FEMA plans to rescind REP-15 and utilize a new form 
entitled ``Evaluation Module'' to document evaluations. We invite 
comments on the Exercise Evaluation Areas and the proposed frequency 
for exercising each area and the Evaluation Module form.

DATES: FEMA must receive comments on or before August 10, 2001.

ADDRESSES: You may submit your comments to the Rules Docket Clerk, 
Office of the General Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 
C Street, SW., room 840, Washington, DC 20472, or send them by e-mail 
to [email protected]. Please reference ``REP Exercise Evaluation Areas'' 
in the subject line of your e-mail or comment letter.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vanessa Quinn, Chief, Radiological 
Emergency Preparedness Branch, Chemical and Radiological Preparedness 
Division, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street SW., 
Washington, DC 20472; telephone: (202) 646-3664, or e-mail: 
[email protected], or Nathan S. Bergerbest, Office of the General 
Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20472, telephone: (202) 646-2685, or (e-mail) 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) proposes to revise the Radiological Emergency Preparedness 
Exercise Manual (REP-14) \1\ dated September 1991 by adopting the six 
Exercise Evaluation Areas described in this notice and deleting the 
thirty-three REP-14 Objectives that are set out in Section D of REP-14. 
If the Exercise Evaluation Areas described in this notice are adopted, 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness exercises conducted pursuant to 44 
CFR 350.9 will be evaluated against the criteria set out in this 
notice.\2\
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    \1\ FEMA is planning to consolidate REP-14 into a new reference 
book. The contents of REP-14, including any changes resulting from 
final action on the issues discussed in this notice, will be 
incorporated into this new reference book. At this time, we are 
proposing to revise not withdraw REP-14. We expect to formally 
withdraw REP-14 when the new reference book is available.
    \2\ Adoption of the proposed Evaluation Criteria will also 
render much of Sec. C.2 of REP-14 obsolete. Pages C.2-3 and C.2-4 of 
REP-14 speak to the frequency with which particular REP-14 
objectives will be exercised. FEMA proposes to adopt the Federal 
Exercise Evaluation Matrix, which appears later in this document as 
Table 2 in place of the exercise objective groupings which appear on 
Pages C.2-3 and C-2.4 of REP-14.
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    Adoption of the proposed changes to REP-14 will render a companion 
manual entitled Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation 
Methodology (REP-15) dated September 1991 obsolete. If the proposed 
changes to REP-14 are adopted, FEMA plans to rescind REP-15 and utilize 
a new form entitled ``Evaluation Module'' to document evaluation 
activities. The rescission will be effective on the same date upon 
which the changes to REP-14 are effective and the Evaluation Module 
form will be effective on the same date. We invite comments on the 
Exercise Evaluation Areas and the proposed frequency for exercising 
each area and the Evaluation Module form.

Background on Exercise Evaluation

    FEMA, through its Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP) 
conducts exercises to evaluate the ability of Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) to respond to an emergency involving a commercial 
nuclear power plant. These exercises are conducted in accordance with 
FEMA regulations, which appear in 44 CFR part 350.\3\ Although 
Sec. 350.9 is the portion of Part 350 that primarily speaks to 
exercises, it does not specifically address the standards under which 
exercises are to be conducted and performance is to be evaluated. These 
standards are addressed in 44 CFR 350.5(a) which states:
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    \3\ The preamble to 44 CFR part 350 is published at 48 FR 44332 
(September 28, 1983).

    Section 50.47 of [the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's] Emergency 
Planning Rule [10 CFR Parts 50 [Appendix E] and 70 as amended and 
the joint FEMA-Nuclear Regulatory Commission Criteria for 
Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Response Plants and 
Preparedness In Support of Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0654/FEMA 
REP-1, Rev 1 November, 1980) * * * are to be used in reviewing, 
evaluating and approving State and local radiological emergency 
plans and preparedness and in making any findings and determinations 
with respect to the adequacy of the plans and the capabilities of 
state and local government to implement them. Both the planning and 
preparedness standards and related criteria contained in NUREG-0654/
FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1 are to be used by FEMA and the [Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission] in reviewing and evaluating State and local 
government radiological emergency plans and preparedness.\4\
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    \4\ See also, 44 CFR 350.13(a) which states in relevant part 
``The basis upon which [FEMA] makes the determination for withdrawal 
of approval [of a State or local radiological emergency plan] is the 
same basis used in reviewing plans and exercises, i.e. the planning 
standards and related criteria in NUREG 0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1.''

    Planning Standard N of NUREG-0654/FEMA REP 1, Rev. 1 addresses the 
conduct of exercises. The Planning Standard states that ``Periodic 
exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of 
emergency response capabilities * * * and deficiencies identified as a 
result of exercises * * * are (will be) corrected.'' Evaluation 
criterion 1.a defines an exercise as ``an event that tests the 
integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements 
existing within emergency preparedness plans and organizations.''
    The Planning Standard N criteria contain several requirements for 
exercises. All exercises must simulate an emergency that results in 
offsite radiological emergency releases, which would require response 
by offsite authorities. Scenarios should be varied from year to year 
and conducted under various weather conditions; some exercises or 
drills should be unannounced.\5\ In other respects, the Planning 
Standard N criteria contemplate that exercises will be conducted as set 
forth in Nuclear Regulatory Commission and FEMA rules and in exercise 
evaluation guidance.\6\
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    \5\ See, Planning Standard N, evaluation criteria 1.a and 1.b
    \6\ See, Planning Standard N, evaluation criteria 1.a (rules) 
and 3 (exercise evaluation guidance).
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    In September 1991, FEMA published the current exercise evaluation 
guidance, which is REP-14. REP-14

[[Page 31343]]

established a series of 33 objectives (REP-14 Objectives) that 
interpret and apply the guidance contained in NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, 
Rev. 1. A companion document, REP-15 contained a series of forms and 
checklists keyed to the 33 REP-14 Objectives for use by exercise 
evaluators in documenting performance. FEMA circulated both documents 
for public comment.\7\
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    \7\ On March 27, 1991, FEMA noticed the availability for REP-14 
and REP-15 for public comment in the Federal Register [56 FR 12734]. 
It responded to public comments in a third publication, REP-18. See, 
57 FR 4880 (February 10, 1992) corrected by 57 FR 10956 (March 31, 
1992).
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    REP-14 also established the frequency with which each of the 
objectives would be demonstrated in exercises. The 33 REP-14 Objectives 
were divided into three groups. Thirteen objectives in the first group 
would need to be demonstrated in every exercise. Nine objectives in the 
second group should be demonstrated in every exercise by some but not 
all responding organizations as the scenario dictates, provided that 
all responding organizations must demonstrate the objective once every 
six years. Another eleven objectives must be demonstrated once every 
six years.\8\
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    \8\ See, REP-14, pages C-2.3 to C-2.4.
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Strategic Review Process

    In June 1996, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency initiated a strategic review of the REP Program. This review was 
announced in the Federal Register in June 1996 and suggestions for 
improvement in the REP Program were solicited from the public. The 
respondents raised 180 issues. Seventy comments specifically addressed 
the conduct of exercises. Many commenters suggested that FEMA make 
exercise evaluation criteria outcome-based and less prescriptive. These 
commenters, representing States, local governments, and industry, 
suggested that evaluations should stress successful completion of basic 
health and safety objectives, with the specifics of accomplishing this 
left up to the OROs.
    The comments were turned over to a Strategic Review Steering 
Committee for review.\9\ Due to the large number of comments received 
on the conduct of exercises, the Strategic Review Steering Committee 
commissioned a concept paper on exercise streamlining. The concept 
paper was released to the public \10\ and comments were received at 
stakeholder meetings in St. Louis, San Francisco and Washington DC in 
1997.\11\
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    \9\ The Strategic Review Steering Committee was composed of 
federal employees from FEMA headquarters, FEMA regional offices and 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
    \10\ The concept paper can be reviewed at http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/exercise.htm (viewed on May 22, 2001).
    \11\ The transcripts of the three public meetings can be 
reviewed at http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/trans.htm (viewed on May 22, 
2001).
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    The concept paper identified several key issues for further 
consideration.
     REP-14 and REP-15 should be revised to support a ``results 
oriented'' exercise evaluation process.
     REP exercises should concentrate on radiological issues.
     REP-14 and REP-15 could be streamlined by combining 
similar objectives and points of review without harming the evaluation 
process.
     REP-14 and REP-15 are out of date due to changes in 
federal regulations, guidance and terminology.
     The required demonstration frequency of objectives should 
be reevaluated. Some objectives should be demonstrated more frequently 
and others less frequently.\12\
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    \12\ FEMA is proposing to address each of these issues through 
the changes described in this notice. Other issues identified in the 
concept paper will not be addressed through this notice. The concept 
paper observed that some aspects of radiological emergency 
preparedness can be demonstrated separate and apart from the 
exercise. It suggested that FEMA should provide guidance on when 
``out of sequence'' demonstrations are permissible. FEMA has issued 
a policy statement on this issue which was made effective October 1, 
1999. The policy statement may be viewed at http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/fnlpl-3.htm (viewed May 30, 2001). The concept paper also 
observed that some aspects of radiological emergency preparedness 
are satisfactorily demonstrated by actual responses to disasters and 
emergencies or through other exercises in which OROs participate and 
credit should be given for demonstrated performance outside of a REP 
exercise. FEMA is still considering this issue. The concept paper 
suggested that FEMA should explore alternative approaches to 
evaluating emergency preparedness in addition to exercises. For 
example, it is suggested that maintenance and calibration of 
equipment that must be maintained under a radiological emergency 
response plan, can and should be verified separate and apart from an 
exercise. FEMA currently requires that OROs certify that various 
aspects of the radiological emergency response plans are functional 
through an ``Annual Letter of Certification.'' FEMA reserves the 
right to audit an ORO's representations in the Annual Letter of 
Certification. Some of the evaluation criteria contained in NUREG-
0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1 will not be exercised under the proposed 
Exercise Evaluation Areas described in this notice. This is because 
these criteria are most appropriately verified, in FEMA's judgment, 
through the Annual Letter of Certification and audits pursuant 
thereto. The concept paper recommended that FEMA expand its program 
of staff assistance visits to regularly provide feedback on 
emergency preparedness issues. FEMA is expanding this program.
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    On September 9, 1998, FEMA published the draft final 
recommendations of the Strategic Review Steering Committee for public 
comment. Recommendation 1.1 addressed the 33 REP-14 Objectives. The 
Strategic Review Steering Committee noted:

    Exercises are currently evaluated in an ``objective based 
format.'' * * * This system is very structured and leaves little 
latitude for satisfying the objective by alternate means. 
Stakeholders have identified the obvious similarities between 
objectives. Experience in exercise evaluations indicates that 
several objectives can easily be combined, and others deleted, 
without weakening the evaluation process. * * * [We recommend] the 
consolidation of current objectives into * * * six Evaluation Areas 
* * * These Evaluation Areas would be established to support a 
``results oriented'' evaluation process. Results oriented evaluation 
allows FEMA to focus on the outcome of actions taken by players in 
the implementation of their plans and procedures. This approach will 
give the exercise players more latitude to reach the desired 
results. Evaluators would then concentrate on the results of an 
exercise activity, not on the steps taken to arrive at a result. 
Within each Evaluation Area, objectives would be combined and 
duplicative Points of Review would be eliminated.'' \13\
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    \13\ 63 Fed. Reg. 48225 (September 9, 1998).
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    The Strategic Review Steering Committee recommended the 
consolidation of 29 of the 33 REP-14 Exercise Objective into six 
Exercise Evaluation Areas with sub-criteria. It also recommended the 
elimination of four of the REP-14 Objectives.\14\
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    \14\ These were REP-14 Objectives 23, 31, 32 and 33. FEMA is 
proposing to eliminate REP-14 Objectives 23 and 31 in their 
entirety. Objective 23 tested the ORO's ability to identify and 
utilize federal and voluntary agency resources. FEMA plans to take 
lead responsibility for identifying available federal resources. The 
decision on whether to use these resources belongs to the ORO. A 
determination of whether the ORO is effectively utilizing voluntary 
agency resources is more appropriately made in reviewing the ORO's 
plans. Objective 31 tested the ORO's ability to evacuate non-
essential personnel from the nuclear power plant site. We have 
concluded that the emergency preparedness benefit of evaluating this 
capability separate and apart from the capability to evacuate 
members of the general public is negligible. However, Objectives 32 
(demonstrate the capability to carry out emergency response 
functions in an unannounced exercise or drill) and 33 (demonstrate 
the capability to carry out emergency response functions during an 
off-hours drill or exercise) are not proposed for elimination. These 
REP-14 Objectives would be folded into Exercise Evaluation Area 
5.a.2, which provides for an unannounced drill of an incident 
requiring urgent response action by ORO's (also known as a ``fast 
breaker''). The drill may occur during off-hours.
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    Recommendation 1.2 addressed the frequency of demonstrations. 
The frequency for exercising each of the evaluation areas and sub 
criteria was set out in a table which accompanied Recommendation 
1.2.\15\
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    \15\ 63 Fed. Reg. 58226-58227 (September 9, 1998).
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    Respondents to FEMA's request for public comment generally 
favored Recommendations 1.1 and 1.2.\16\ On March

[[Page 31344]]

25, 1999, the strategic review recommendations, including 
Recommendations 1.1 and 1.2 were turned over to the REP Program by 
Kay C. Goss, CEM, Associate Director for Preparedness, Training and 
Exercises for further consideration. This notice addresses the 
proposed implementation of Recommendations 1.1 and 1.2.
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    \16\ A compilation of comments and the Strategic Review Steering 
Committee's response appears on the REP Internet site, http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/finalrecc10 99.doc (visited May 22, 2001).
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Implementation of Strategic Review Steering Committee Recommendation 
1.1

    FEMA proposes to implement Recommendation 1.1 through adoption 
of the Exercise Evaluation Areas described in this notice. Two 
drafts of the Exercise Evaluation Area have already been released 
for public comment on the REP website. The first draft was released 
in November 1999. These comments and responses from the drafting 
group have been placed on the REP website.\17\ A second draft was 
released in March 2000.\18\
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    \17\ http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/comments.doc (viewed May 22, 
2001).
    \18\ http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/recini.htm (viewed May 22, 
2001).
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    During the fall of 2000, FEMA conducted pilot tests of the six 
draft Exercise Evaluation Areas at four nuclear power plants in 
different FEMA regions. A Pilot Evaluation Team, comprised of REP 
Regional Assistance Committee Chairs and FEMA headquarters REP 
staff, observed and assessed the pilot exercises. The team was 
instructed to identify any evaluation areas that needed revision. It 
was also asked to consider whether the new evaluation methodology 
provided an equal if not more robust review of State and local 
emergency response plans and procedures than the objective 
``checklist approach.''
    The conclusions drawn by the Pilot Evaluation Team are 
consistent with the comments FEMA has received since the inception 
of the strategic review process. Based upon these comments and 
reports from the Pilot Evaluation Team, FEMA has concluded:
     The current REP-14 and REP-15 evaluation methodology 
resulted in predictable exercises, judged against checklists; 
exercises under the proposed criteria will be based on emergency 
response plans, not the checklists, and should facilitate better 
coordination, communication, decisionmaking and implementation.
     Utilization of the new methodology will facilitate the 
introduction of more challenging scenarios geared to the particular 
community being evaluated. It will reduce the artificiality of 
exercises and more closely replicate responses to real incidents.
     The proposed methodology, which focuses on results, 
will increase ORO enthusiasm for exercise participation and 
substantially reduce the perception that the evaluators are nit-
picking performance.
     The proposed methodology is more demanding on 
evaluators than the current checklists. It requires that they 
explain in narrative form what was observed and whether performance 
was adequate. This will result in more effective communication 
between evaluators and OROs about exercise issues and plan 
shortcomings. It will also provide the REP Program with better data 
from which to draw conclusions about emergency preparedness on a 
national level.
     Emergency preparedness can be significantly enhanced 
through better focused exercise evaluation criteria, coupled with 
FEMA's renewed emphasis on the Annual Letter of Certification and 
more frequent staff assistance visits.

Highlights of the Proposed Exercise Evaluation Areas

Evaluation Area 1--Emergency Operations Management

    Evaluation Area 1 has five sub-elements: (a) mobilization, (b) 
facilities, (c) direction and control, (d) communications equipment 
and (e) equipment and supplies to support operations.
    Criterion 1.a.1 requires that the OROs use effective procedures 
to alert, notify and mobilize emergency personnel and activate 
facilities in a timely manner. One of the more difficult issues to 
arise from the strategic review is how OROs demonstrate their 
twenty-four hour staffing capability in an exercise. The evaluation 
criteria associated with Planning Standard ``A'' of NUREG-0654/FEMA 
REP-1, Rev. 1 require that ``each principal organization shall be 
capable of continuous (twenty-four-hour) operations for a protracted 
period.'' \19\ These criteria also require that each State and local 
response organization be capable of twenty-four-hour emergency 
response.\20\
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    \19\ Planning Standard A, evaluation criterion A.4.
    \20\ Planning Standard A, evaluation criterion A.1.e
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    REP-14 Objective 30.1, which implements these criteria, 
presently requires all agencies responsible for providing twenty-
four-hour staffing demonstrate a shift change once every six years. 
The shift change is demonstrated by providing a ``one-for-one 
replacement . . . of key staff responsible for communications, 
direction and control of operations, alert and notification for the 
public and the media, radiological monitoring, protective response 
and medical and public health support.'' \21\
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    \21\ REP-14 page D.30-1
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    REP-14 Objective 30.2 requires that outgoing staff members 
should demonstrate their capability to brief their replacements on 
the current status of the simulated emergency. The purpose of this 
demonstration is to assure that the transition from the outgoing to 
incoming shift is accomplished without discontinuity in operations.
    The dissatisfaction within the REP community about Objective 30 
seems to stem from time constraints associated with the exercise. 
OROs will bring a second shift (often composed of volunteers who 
must take time away from other responsibilities) in for the 
exercise, only to discover that there is little time left in the 
exercise for the second shift to actually demonstrate their 
capabilities.
    FEMA is sympathetic to the dissatisfaction with the present 
approach. However, we are equally uneasy about simply eliminating 
the shift change requirement. NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1, 
requires that we verify that response organizations have sufficient 
trained people in the key positions to perform twenty-four-hour 
operations. Moreover, we are concerned that our present approach 
offers those on the second and the third shift little opportunity to 
train for a real emergency through exercise participation.
    Our proposed criterion 1.a.1 eliminates the requirement that 
OROs demonstrate a shift change once every six years. In order to 
assure that OROs have sufficient staffing to support twenty-four 
hour operations, we propose that the exercise evaluators inspect the 
procedures for twenty-four hour staffing at each facility and a 
staff roster to determine whether the response organization has 
identified the necessary personnel to carry out critical functions. 
These critical functions are the same functions named in REP-14 
Objective 30.1. The inspection would occur during each exercise.\22\ 
This approach is consistent with Planning Standard ``A'' of NUREG-
0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1. and its associated criteria. Neither 
requires the demonstration of a shift change.
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    \22\ Additional assurance that OROs have sufficient trained 
personnel to support twenty-four-hour response and operations is 
contained in the Annual Letter of Certification. FEMA may audit the 
ORO's representations in the Annual Letter of Certification.
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    However our consideration of the shift change issue leaves us 
mindful of the need to assure that key personnel on the off-hours 
shifts can perform as well as the primary responders. Without an 
opportunity to observe the performance of these personnel in an 
exercise, we are uncertain about whether the key personnel on the 
off-hours shifts can perform up to the standard that those who 
regularly exercise do. Moreover, we are concerned that our present 
exercise approach denies those in key positions on off-hours shifts 
an opportunity to train through meaningful exercise participation.
    For this reason, FEMA is inclined to require that OROs 
demonstrate their twenty-four hour response capability by 
alternating the personnel that participate in the biennial exercises 
from among the shifts.\23\ For example, the first biennial exercise 
of each six year cycle might involve personnel from the first 
twelve-hour shift. The second biennial exercise in the six year 
cycle would involve personnel from the second twelve-hour shift. The 
third biennial exercise in the six year cycle would involve 
personnel from the third shift (if the ORO uses three shifts in its 
plan) or the first shift (if the ORO uses two shifts in its plan) 
This would provide an opportunity for the key personnel on all 
shifts to have an opportunity to train by participating in an 
exercise as well as an opportunity for FEMA to evaluate the 
performance of all of the individuals who will play key roles in an 
actual response.
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    \23\ We define key positions in this proposal in the same way 
that they are defined in REP-14 Objective 30.1, i.e. communications, 
direction and control of operations, alert and notification of the 
public, accident assessment, information for the public and the 
media, radiological monitoring, protective response, and medical and 
public health support functions.

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[[Page 31345]]

    We recognize that a limited number of key personnel, such as a 
county Emergency Management Director, intend to remain involved in 
an actual emergency response on a twenty-four-hour basis until the 
incident is resolved. We are prepared to accommodate the 
participation of these individuals in every exercise, but expect 
that each will have their designated successor participate in the 
exercise. An exercise scenario might provide that a county Emergency 
Management Director is unable to perform his or her duties and an 
alternate must step in to take over the operation.
    FEMA believes it is crucial for all personnel expected to 
perform key roles in a radiological emergency response to exercise 
in their roles. However, we are not prepared to move forward with a 
definitive plan to achieve this objective without your comments. If 
you do not agree with the proposal described above, we would 
appreciate your identification of alternative means through which 
FEMA can assure that the key personnel who are expected to work the 
off-hours shifts are as well trained as those who work the shift 
that most often exercises. We are interested in your comments about 
whether FEMA needs to make any changes in the way it conducts 
exercises, i.e. commencing exercises on weekends, holidays or off-
hours, to facilitate participation from those who would serve on the 
off-hours shifts in the event of an actual emergency. We also seek 
your views on whether or not this proposal will result in a net 
benefit to emergency preparedness.
    Our review of the issues associated with the shift change also 
leads us to believe that the briefing required by Objective 30.2, 
which presently needs to be demonstrated only once every six years, 
should be demonstrated at every exercise in the future. This 
provision has been written into proposed criterion 1.a.1. We propose 
to give OROs the option of bringing in a second shift of key 
responders to receive the briefing or to provide the briefing to the 
evaluators.
    Criterion 1.b.1 requires that the ORO demonstrate that its 
facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. Under 
the proposed exercise methodology, facilities will only be evaluated 
if they are new or have substantial changes in structure or mission. 
It seems redundant to require the re-evaluation of a facility every 
two years if the facility has not changed. This change does not 
affect the current requirement that OROs certify in the Annual 
Letter of Certification that their facilities are available and 
adequate to meet emergency response needs. FEMA reserves the right 
to audit the representations made in the Annual Letter of 
Certification.
    Criterion 1.c.1 requires that key personnel with leadership 
roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the 
overall response for which they are responsible. This requirement is 
identical to that in Objective 3.1 \24\ of REP-14.
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    \24\ References to the REP-14 Objectives will appear in this 
form throughout this notice. REP-14 Objective 3.1 is Objective 3, 
Criterion 1.
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    Criterion 1.d requires that communications capabilities are 
managed in support of emergency operations with communication links 
established and maintained with appropriate locations. The proper 
functioning of communications equipment is essential to success in 
any exercise, just as it is essential to success in any response. 
FEMA expects that both the primary and backup communications 
systems, which are required by Planning Standard F, Evaluation 
Criteria F.1 of NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1 Rev. 1, will be fully 
functional at the commencement of an exercise. Under REP-14 the 
functionality of these systems were tested at each exercise. 
Consistent with the spirit of the proposed Exercise Evaluation 
Areas, FEMA will not verify that the primary and backup 
communications systems are operational as a stand-alone evaluation 
item. However, we will craft exercise scenarios which call for the 
use of the primary system and scenarios which assume the failure of 
the primary system and require the use of the backup system. The ORO 
will not know prior to the start of the exercise whether one or both 
systems will be tested as part of the scenario. While an ORO may not 
be penalized if a communications system fails, so long as the other 
is operational, FEMA will take note of all communications system 
failures. They will be reported to Director of the REP Program and 
to the appropriate FEMA Regional Director and Regional Assistance 
Committee Chair as a planning issue.\25\ The ORO is expected to 
correct any communication systems failure within 60 days of the 
conclusion of the exercise.
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    \25\ See, pages B.12 and B.21 of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program, 
Standard Exercise Report Format (October 1995).
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    Criterion 1.e requires that equipment, dosimetry, supplies of 
potassium iodide and other required supplies are sufficient to 
support emergency operations. The requirements are similar to those 
in REP-14 Objectives 2.1, 5.1, 8.2 and 14.2. FEMA may or may not 
verify that these items are available and in good repair as a stand-
alone item in every exercise. However, our exercise scenarios 
ordinarily require that the equipment and supplies be put to use. If 
equipment and supplies are unavailable or non-functional then the 
ORO may not be able to perform the emergency response activity at an 
acceptable level. Equipment and supplies that are not checked during 
an exercise will be checked during a staff assistance visit. 
Additional assurance that equipment and supplies are available in 
appropriate quantities and are properly maintained will be obtained 
in the Annual Letter of Certification. The representations contained 
in the Annual Letter of Certification are subject to audit.

Evaluation Area 2--Protective Action Decisionmaking

    Evaluation Area 2 assesses the ORO's ability to render decisions 
about what protective actions members of the public and emergency 
workers need to take in the wake of an incident. It has five sub-
elements: emergency worker exposure control, radiological assessment 
and protective action recommendations and decisions for the plume 
phase of the emergency,\26\ protective action decision 
considerations for the protection of special populations, 
radiological assessment and decisionmaking for the ingestion pathway 
exposure\27\ and radiological assessment and decisionmaking 
concerning relocation, re-entry and return.
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    \26\ The plume phase of the emergency focuses on preventing 
exposure of a population to radiation through direct contact with 
the plume.
    \27\ The ingestion pathway phase focuses on preventing exposure 
of a population to radiation through ingestion of foods that may 
have been exposed to radiation.
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    The criteria in Evaluation Area 2 are generally similar to those 
in REP-14. We believe that proposed criterion 2.e.1 improves upon 
REP-14 Objectives 28.1 and 28.3 by eliminating the cumbersome 
standard and optional approaches to re-entry and relocation 
decisionmaking in REP-14. Criterion 2.e.1 contains a single approach 
to evaluating decisions in these areas

Evaluation Area 3--Protective Action Implementation

    Evaluation Area 3 assesses the ORO's ability to implement 
protective actions, including evacuation. It contains six sub-
elements: implementation of emergency worker exposure control, 
implementation of potassium iodide decisions, implementation of 
protective actions for special populations, implementation of 
traffic and access control, implementation of ingestion pathway 
decisions and implementation of relocation, re-entry and return 
decisions.
    Criterion 3.a.1 requires that emergency workers demonstrate 
their ability to read dosimetry and understand the protective 
actions that they must take in response to specified levels. This 
requirement is similar to Objectives 5.1 and 5.2 in REP-14. Under 
the former evaluation methodology, emergency workers were subjected 
to the equivalent of a ``closed book examination'' on these matters. 
The proposed methodology makes it clear that emergency workers can 
refer to published procedures and confer with co-workers in 
responding to evaluator inquiries, just as they would, if necessary, 
in a real incident.
    Criterion 3.b.1 tests the capability to distribute potassium 
iodide and appropriately instruct recipients on its use, in 
accordance with the ORO's emergency response plan. Potassium iodide 
is a non-prescription thyroid-blocking agent, which has been found 
effective in preventing thyroid cancer in those exposed to radiation 
during a nuclear plant incident. Criterion 3.b.1 also requires OROs 
to demonstrate their ability to maintain records on the 
administration of potassium iodide. Criterion 3.b.1 does not require 
that potassium iodide actually be administered. It requires only 
that OROs be able to demonstrate the functionality of this aspect of 
the plan.
    Criterion 3.c.1 evaluates the protective action decisions that 
are implemented for special populations other than schools within 
areas subject to protective actions. OROs must demonstrate a 
capability to alert and notify special populations, transportation 
providers (including special resources for people with 
disabilities), and

[[Page 31346]]

establish reception facilities. The availability of resources to 
transport special populations out of the plume exposure pathway is 
key. For this reason, proposed criterion 3.c.1 requires that OROs 
actually contact at least \1/3\ of their transportation providers 
during each exercise to determine whether buses and drivers would be 
available if the exercise were an actual emergency.
    Criterion 3.c.2 evaluates the capability to implement protective 
action decisions for schools. The proposed criterion requires that 
OROs contact each public school system, licensed day care provider 
and participating private school which would be required to 
implement a protective action decision if the exercise scenario were 
an actual emergency. Simulation of these calls is not allowed.
    REP-14 Objective 16.2 presently requires that a single school 
bus be mobilized to drive an evacuation route as part of an 
exercise. FEMA does not believe that this demonstration achieves any 
significant emergency preparedness objective and is proposing to 
delete it. We do reserve the right to interview bus drivers to 
determine their familiarity with evacuation routes.
    Criterion 3.d.1 evaluates the capability to establish and 
maintain appropriate traffic control and access points. REP-14 
Objective 17.2 requires an actual deployment to test staffing 
capabilities. The proposed new criterion would not require an actual 
deployment. Capability could be established through an evaluative 
interview with appropriate public safety personnel. The decision to 
no longer require actual deployment stems from the recognition that 
public safety agencies regularly establish traffic and access 
control points in response to non-radiological incidents. The new 
criterion does not deprive FEMA of the ability to request a 
demonstration of actual deployment capability where appropriate. It 
simply establishes that actual deployment will not be required as a 
matter of course.
    Criterion 3.d.2 evaluates the capability to remove impediments 
to evacuation. REP-14 Objective 17.4 required that actual telephone 
calls be placed to resources which might assist in removing the 
impediments, e.g., tow truck contractors. However, REP-14 did not 
require that tow trucks actually respond and remove the impediments. 
While there is some value in determining whether OROs maintain an 
accurate list of telephone numbers, it is not necessary to mandate 
regular testing of the ability to telephone a tow operator. The tow 
operators that might be relied upon in a nuclear power plant 
incident are similar to those who might be called upon in a traffic 
accident. Emergency dispatchers can reasonably be presumed to know 
how to contact tow operators.
    Criterion 3.e.1 tests the availability and appropriate use of 
adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and 
agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway zone 
for implementation of protective actions. REP-14 Objective 27.1 
requires that various maps and information sources required by 
Planning Standard J of NUREG-0654/REP-1 Rev 1 be available. The 
proposed criterion does not change the requirement that these 
information sources be available. However, it does not require that 
an evaluator specifically check off that they are present. Ingestion 
pathway exercises will be evaluated based upon whether OROs 
effectively use the information that must be available in addressing 
the exercise scenario. If the information is not available, OROs may 
not be able to meet the new ``results oriented'' criterion.
    Criterion 3.e.2 evaluates measures, strategies and pre-printed 
instructional material for implementing protective action decisions 
for contaminated water, food products, milk and agricultural 
production. REP 14 Objective 11.4 requires that evaluators check off 
whether a distribution list is maintained and Objective 27.3 
contains specific instructions on how implementation of ingestion 
pathway decisions should be evaluated. Through its level of detail, 
REP-14 established a single correct way to implement ingestion 
pathway decisions, notwithstanding that alternative approaches would 
also adequately protect public health and safety. FEMA believes that 
it is appropriate to give OROs the flexibility to implement 
ingestion pathway decisions in a way that they deem prudent. OROs 
will be evaluated on the basis of whether their decisions adequately 
protect public health and safety.
    Criterion 3.f evaluates decisions regarding controlled re-entry 
of emergency workers and relocation and return. This criterion 
consolidates REP-14 Objectives 29.1, 29.2, 29.3 and 29.4.

Evaluation Area 4--Field Measurement and Analysis

    Evaluation Area 4 assesses the ability of OROs to conduct and 
analyze field radiation measurements. It has three sub-elements: 
plume phase field measurement and analysis, post plume phase field 
measurements and sampling, and laboratory operations. The evaluation 
criteria are similar to those that appear in REP-14. The proposed 
evaluation criterion encourages OROs to utilize resources offered by 
federal agencies, where appropriate.

Evaluation Area 5--Emergency Notification and Public Information

    Evaluation Area 5 looks at the ORO's ability to notify the 
public of an incident and to effectively communicate protective 
action recommendations. It contains two sub-elements: activation of 
the prompt alert and notification system and emergency information 
and instructions for the public and the media.
    Proposed criteria 5.a.1, 5.a.2 and 5.a.3 address activation of 
the prompt alert and notification system. We believe that the 
proposed criteria represent a significant improvement in exercise 
methodology over REP-14. Plume exposure exercises under the REP-14 
methodology have followed a familiar pattern--they all involved a 
scenario that incrementally escalates from a situation requiring no 
action by the public to a situation requiring urgent action by the 
public. The REP-14 methodology did not test the ability of ORO 
decisionmakers to reach a decision on activating the prompt alert 
and notification system in an atmosphere of uncertainty. The 
scenario left no discretion to the decisionmakers.
    Proposed criteria 5.a.1 and 5.a.2 remedy this artificiality by 
requiring that alert and notification decisionmaking be tested under 
two different scenarios--one in which urgent action is not 
immediately required and one in which it is. Proposed criterion 
5.a.1 addresses the situation in which urgent action by the public 
is not immediately required. Proposed criterion 5.a.2 addresses the 
situation in which urgent action by the public is immediately 
required due to quickly deteriorating conditions at the plant. This 
second scenario is known as the ``fast breaker.''
    Proposed criterion 5.a.1 requires that the alert and 
notification system be activated in a timely manner following 
notification to the ORO by the nuclear power plant of an incident 
that requires activation of the alert and notification system but 
does not immediately require urgent action by the public. Whether 
decisionmakers initiate the alert and notification system in a 
``timely manner'' will be judged in relation to the scenario. We 
will also evaluate the quality of the public notification.
    Proposed criterion 5.a.2 requires that activities associated 
with the alert and notification system in a ``fast breaker'' 
situation must be completed within fifteen minutes of the time that 
the ORO has received verified notification from the nuclear power 
plant of a situation that immediately requires urgent public action. 
The fifteen-minute requirement derives from Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission regulations which appear at 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix 
E.IV.D. Since fast breaking situations are by their nature 
unpredictable, FEMA proposes to evaluate the ``fast breaker'' 
response in an unannounced drill, separate and apart from regular 
exercises. OROs will be notified of the week in which the drill will 
occur, but not the specific day or time. The ``fast breaker'' drill 
can occur during off-hours. In formulating criteria 5.a.1 and 5.a.2, 
FEMA considered comments made at ``fast breaker workshops'' during 
the April 2000 National Radiological Emergency Preparedness 
Conference \28\ as well as comments submitted in the strategic 
review. We are especially interested in receiving written comments 
on proposed criteria 5.a.1 and 5.a.2 from those interested in ``fast 
breaker'' issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ The National Radiological Preparedness Conference is an 
annual meeting of individuals with an interest in radiological 
emergency preparedness. The conference is sponsored by an 
independent non-profit organization and is open to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed criteria 5.a.1 and 5.a.2 do not address what 
information must be contained in an initial instructional memorandum 
to the public. Under current FEMA guidance, \29\ an initial 
instructional message must contain five elements at a minimum. These 
five elements include a coded ``Emergency

[[Page 31347]]

Classification Level'' \30\ and a protective action recommendation. 
Concerns have been expressed in the strategic review process that 
disclosure of an Emergency Classification Level in an initial 
message does not provide the public with useful information. Serious 
questions have been raised about when a protective action 
recommendation must be made, particularly if evacuation routes need 
to be cleared and reception facilities need to be opened to support 
a safe and orderly evacuation. For these reasons, FEMA is requesting 
comments in a notice, which appears in the same edition of the 
Federal Register as this one about whether its current guidance 
should be changed. We hope to complete our review of this guidance 
contemporaneously with our decision on whether to implement the 
proposed Exercise Evaluation Areas so that any changes concerning 
the content of initial messages can be incorporated into criteria 
5.a.1 and 5.a.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ The current guidance entitled ``Radiological Emergency 
Preparedness (REP) Guidance To Support Implementation of the 
Emergency Alert System (EAS)'' dated February 2, 1999 can be viewed 
at http://www.fema.gov/pte/rep/easrep.htm (viewed May 31, 2001). The 
guidance is contained in Attachment ``B'' to the memorandum entitled 
``Background on the Emergency Alert System (EAS).''
    \30\ Emergency Classification Levels are a standard way through 
which nuclear power plants communicate the severity of incidents 
with onsite and offsite responders and regulatory agencies. See, 
Planning Standard D, NUREG-0654/REP-1, Rev. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed criterion 5.a.3 addresses notification of people living 
in very remote areas, also known as ``exception areas,'' who are not 
reached by alert sirens or tone alert radios. People who reside in 
exception areas are notified of an incident by mobile teams called 
``backup route alerting teams.'' Proposed criterion 5.a.3 is similar 
to the REP-14 criterion with respect to notification of people in 
``exception areas.''
    Proposed criterion 5.a.3 also addresses backup alerting and 
notification of the general public in the event of a failure in the 
primary alert and notification system. Criterion 5.a.3 requires that 
the completion of backup alerting and notification within 45 minutes 
of the decision by offsite emergency officials to notify the public 
of an emergency situation. REP-14 required completion of the 
notification within ``approximately'' 45 minutes after the decision. 
The proposed criterion more closely conforms to the requirement set 
forth in Appendix 3 to NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1.
    Proposed criterion 5.b.1 tests whether OROs provide accurate 
emergency information and instructions to the public and the news 
media in a timely fashion. While FEMA is considering whether 
technical information such as Emergency Classification Levels should 
be included in alert and notification system messages, it believes 
that this information should be made available to the news media 
with a plain Language explanation. The ORO should be prepared to 
explain the Emergency Classification Level and related technical 
information in plain Language during an exercise.

Evaluation Area 6: Support Operations/Facilities

    Evaluation Area 6 assesses the ability of OROs to account for, 
monitor and decontaminate evacuees, emergency workers, and emergency 
worker equipment, to provide temporary care of evacuees and to 
assure that capabilities exist for transporting and treating injured 
individuals who have been exposed to radiation. These competencies 
are tested in the four sub-elements associated with Evaluation Area 
6. The proposed Criteria are consistent with REP-14. While REP-14 
establishes a series of prescriptive procedures that must be 
followed by the ORO, the proposed criteria describe the result which 
must be obtained, without instructing the ORO on how to obtain it.

 Table 1.--Comparison of Proposed Evaluation Areas With NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1 Planning Criteria and REP
                                          14/15 Objectives and Criteria
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Evaluation area/Sub-element/
            Criterion                        NUREG 0654 Criteria             REP-14/15 Objective and Criterion
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1--Emergency Operations            ......................................  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 14, 30
 Management.
1.a--Mobilization
    1.a.1: OROs use effective      A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4..............  1.1, 1.2; 30
     proceduresto alert, notify,
     and mobilize emergency
     personnel and activate
     facilities in a timely
     manner.
1.b--Facilities
    1.b.1: Facilities are          H.3...................................  2.1
     sufficient to support the
     emergency response.
1.c--Direction and Control
    1.c.1: Key personnel with      A.1.d; A.2.a, b.......................  3.1
     leadership roles for the ORO
     provide direction and
     control to that part of the
     overall response effort for
     which they are responsible.
1.d--Communications Equipment
    1.d.1: At least two            F.1, 2................................  4.1
     communication systems are
     available and at least one
     operates properly, and
     communication links are
     established with appropriate
     locations. Communications
     capabilities are managed in
     support of emergency
     operations.
1.e--Equipment and Supplies to
 Support Operations
    1.e.1: Equipment, maps,        H.7; J.10.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a........  2.1; 5.1; 8.2; 14.2
     displays, dosimetry,
     potassium iodide (KI), and
     other supplies are
     sufficient to support
     emergency operations.
2--Protective Action Decision      ......................................  5, 7, 9, 14, 15, 16, 26, 28
 Making.
2.a--Emergency Worker Exposure
 Control
    2.a.1: OROs use a decision     J.10.e, f; K.4........................  5.1, 5.3; 14.1
     making process, considering
     relevant factors and
     appropriate coordination, to
     insure that an exposure
     control system, including
     the use of KI, is in place
     for emergency workers
     including provisions to
     authorize radiation exposure
     in excess of administrative
     limits or protective action
     guides.
2.b--Radiological Assessment and
 Protective Action
 Recommendations and Decisions
 for the Plume Phase of the
 Emergency
    2.b.1: Appropriate protective  I.8,10; Supp. 3.......................  7.1
     action recommendations are
     based on available
     information on plant
     conditions, field monitoring
     data, and licensee and ORO
     dose projections, as well as
     knowledge of on-site and off-
     site environmental
     conditions.
    2.b.2: A decision-making       J.9; J.10.f, m........................  9.1; 14.1
     process involving
     consideration of appropriate
     factors and necessary
     coordination is used to make
     protective action decisions
     (PADs) for the general
     public (including the
     recommendation for the use
     of KI, if ORO policy).
2.c--Protective Action Decisions
 for the Protection of Special
 Populations
    2.c.1: Protective action       J.9; J.10.............................  9.1; 15.1
     decisions are made, as
     appropriate, for special
     population groups.

[[Page 31348]]

 
2.d--Radiological Assessment and
 Decision-Making for the
 Ingestion Exposure Pathway
    2.d.1: Radiological            J.11..................................  26.1, 26.2
     consequences for the
     ingestion pathway are
     assessed and appropriate
     protective action decisions
     are made based on the ORO
     planning criteria.
2.e--Radiological Assessment and
 Decision-Making Concerning
 Relocation, Re-entry, and Return
    2.e.1: Timely relocation re-   M.1...................................  28.1, 28.2, 28.3, 28.4, 28.5
     entry, and return decisions
     are made and coordinated as
     appropriate, based on
     assessments of radiological
     conditions and criteria in
     the ORO's plan and/or
     procedures.
3. Protective Action               ......................................  5, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 27, 29
 Implementation.
3.a--Implementation of Emergency
 Worker Exposure Control
    3.a.1: The OROs issues         K.3.a, 3.b............................  5.1, 5.2
     appropriate dosimetry and
     procedures, and manage
     radiological exposure to
     emergency workers in
     accordance with the plan and
     procedures. Emergency
     workers periodically and at
     the end of each mission read
     their dosimeters and record
     the readings on the
     appropriate exposure record
     or chart.
3.b--Implementation of KI
 Decision
    3.b.1: KI and appropriate      J.10.e................................  14.1, 14.3
     instructions are made
     available should a decision
     to recommend use of KI be
     made. Appropriate record
     keeping of the
     administration of KI for
     emergency workers and
     institutionalized
     individuals (not the general
     public) is maintained.
3.c--Implementation of Protective
 Actions for Special Populations
    3.c.1: Protective action       J.10.c, d, g..........................  15.1, 15.2
     decisions are implemented
     for special population
     groups within areas subject
     to protective actions.
    3.c.2: ORO/School officials    J.10.c, d, g..........................  16.1, 16.2, 16.3
     decide upon and implement
     protective actions for
     schools.
3.d--Implementation of Traffic
 and Access Control
    3.d.1: Appropriate traffic     J.10.g, j.............................  17.1, 17.2, 17.3
     and access control is
     established. Accurate
     instructions are provided to
     traffic and access personnel.
    3.d.2: Impediments to          J.10.k................................  17.4
     evacuation are identified
     and resolved.
3.e--Implementation of Ingestion
 Pathway Decisions
    3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates    J.9,11................................  27.1
     the availability and
     appropriate use of adequate
     information regarding water,
     food supplies, milk and
     agricultural production
     within the ingestion
     exposure pathway emergency
     planning zone for
     implementation of protective
     actions.
    3.e.2: Appropriate measures,   E.; J.9,11............................  11.4; 27.2; 27.3
     strategies and pre-printed
     instructional material are
     developed for implementing
     protective action decisions
     for contaminated water, food
     products, milk, and
     agricultural production.
3.f--Implementation of
 Relocation, Re-entry, and Return
 Decisions
    3.f.1: Decisions regarding     M.1, 3................................  29.1, 29.2, 29.3, 29.4
     controlled re-entry of
     emergency workers and
     relocation and return of the
     public are coordinated with
     appropriate organizations
     and implemented.
4--Field Measurement and Analysis  ......................................  6, 8, 24, 25
4.a--Plume Phase Field
 Measurement and Analyses
    4.a.1: The field teams are     H.10, I.8, 9..........................  6.1; 8.1, 8.2
     equipped to perform field
     measurements of direct
     radiation exposure (cloud
     and ground shine) and to
     sample airborne radioiodine
     and particulates.
    4.a.2: Field teams are         I.8,11; J.10.a........................  6.3, 6.4
     managed to obtain sufficient
     information to help
     characterize the release and
     to control radiation
     exposure.
    4.a.3: Ambient radiation       I.9...................................  6.4, 6,5; 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6
     measurements are made and
     recorded at appropriate
     locations, and radioiodine
     and particulate samples are
     collected. Teams will move
     to an appropriate low
     background location to
     determine whether any
     significant (as specified in
     the plan and/or procedures)
     amount of radioactivity has
     been collected on the
     sampling media.
4.b--Post Plume Phase Field
 Measurements and Sampling
    4.b.1: The field teams         I.8; J.11.............................  24.1
     demonstrate the capability
     to make appropriate
     measurements and to collect
     appropriate samples (e.g.,
     food crops, milk, water,
     vegetation, and soil) to
     support adequate assessments
     and protective action
     decision-making.
4.c--Laboratory Operations
    4.c.1: The laboratory is       C.3; J.11.............................  25.1, 25.2
     capable of performing
     required radiological
     analyses to support
     protective action decisions.
    5--Emergency Notification and  ......................................  10, 11, 12, 13
     Public Information.
5.a--Activation of the Prompt
 Alert and Notification System

[[Page 31349]]

 
    5.a.1: Activities associated   10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E; E.5, 6....  10.1
     with primary alerting and
     notification of the public
     are completed in a timely
     manner following the initial
     decision by authorized
     offsite emergency officials
     to notify the public of an
     emergency situation. The
     initial instructional
     message to the public must
     include as a minimum: (1)
     identification of the State
     or local government
     organization and the
     official with the authority
     for providing the alert
     signal and instructional
     message; (2) identification
     of the commercial nuclear
     power plant and a statement
     than an emergency situation
     exists at the plant; (3)
     reference to REP-specific
     emergency information (e.g.,
     brochures and information in
     telephone books) for use by
     the general public during an
     emergency; and (4) a closing
     statement asking the
     affected and potentially
     affected population to stay
     tuned for additional
     information.
    5.a.2: Activities associated   10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E; E.5, 6....  10.1
     with primary alerting and
     notification of the public
     are completed within 15
     minutes of verified
     notification from the
     utility of an emergency
     situation requiring urgent
     action (fast-breaking
     situation). The initial
     instructional message to the
     public must include as a
     minimum: (1) identification
     of the State or local
     government organization and
     the official with the
     authority for providing the
     alert signal and
     instructional message; (2)
     identification of the
     commercial nuclear power
     plant and a statement than
     an emergency situation
     exists at the plant; (3)
     reference to REP-specific
     emergency information (e.g.,
     brochures and information in
     telephone books) for use by
     the general public during an
     emergency; and (4) a closing
     statement asking the
     affected and potentially
     affected population to say
     tuned for additional
     information. In addition,
     the ORO must demonstrate the
     capability to contact, in a
     timely manner, an authorized
     offsite decision maker
     relative to the nature and
     severity of the event, in
     accordance with plans and
     procedures.
    5.a.3: Activities associated   Appendix 3: B.2.c; E.6................  10.2, 10.3
     with FEMA approved exception
     areas (where applicable) are
     completed within 45 minutes
     of the initial decision by
     authorized offsite emergency
     officials to notify the
     public of an emergency
     situation. Backup alert and
     notification of the public
     is completed within 45
     minutes following the
     detection by the ORO of a
     failure of the primary alert
     and notification system.
5.b--Emergency Information and
 Instructions for the Public and
 the Media
    5.b.1: OROs provide accurate   E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.c..................  11.1, 11.2, 11.3; 12.1, 12.2; 13.1,
     emergency information and                                              13.2
     instructions to the public
     and the news media in a
     timely manner.
6--Support Operation/Facilities..  ......................................  18, 19, 20, 21, 22
6.a--Monitoring and
 Decontamination of Evacuees and
 Emergency Workers, and
 Registration of Evacuees
    6.a.1: The reception center/   J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a, b................  18.1, 18.2, 18.3, 18.4, 18.5; 22.1,
     emergency worker facility                                              22.2
     has appropriate space,
     adequate resources, and
     trained personnel to provide
     monitoring, decontamination,
     and registration of evacuees
     and/or emergency workers.
6.b--Monitoring and
 Decontamination of Emergency
 Worker Equipment
    6.b.1: The facility/ORO has    K.5.a, b..............................  22.1; 22.3
     adequate procedures and
     resources for the
     accomplishment of monitoring
     and decontamination of
     emergency worker equipment
     including vehicles.
6.c--Temporary Care of Evacuees
    6.c.1: Managers of congregate  J.10.h; J.12..........................  19.1, 19.2
     care facilities demonstrate
     that the centers have
     resources to provide
     services and accommodations
     consistent with American Red
     Cross planning guidelines.
     Managers demonstrate the
     procedures to assure that
     evacuees have been monitored
     for contamination and have
     been decontaminated as
     appropriate prior to
     entering congregate care
     facilities.
6.d--Transportation and Treatment
 of Contaminated Injured
 Individuals
    6.d.1: The facility/ORO has    F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1; L.4.........  20.1, 20.2, 20.3, 20.4, 20.5; 21.1,
     the appropriate space,                                                 21.2, 21.3, 21.4
     adequate resources, and
     trained personnel to provide
     transport, monitoring
     decontamination, and medical
     services to contaminated
     injured individuals.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Replacement of REP-15 With the Evaluation Module Form

    Adoption of the proposed Exercise Evaluation Areas will render 
REP-15 which contains checklists keyed to the 33 REP-14 Objectives 
obsolete. FEMA plans to utilize new forms called ``Evaluation 
Modules'' in place of the REP-15 checklists. The Evaluation Modules 
will be keyed to the Exercise Evaluation Areas. A sample Evaluation 
Module appears below.

BILLING CODE 6718-06-P

[[Page 31350]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN11JN01.057


[[Page 31351]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN11JN01.058

BILLING CODE 6718-06-C

Implementation of Strategic Review Steering Committee Recommendation 
1.2

    The REP-14 objectives are currently evaluated at the frequency 
described on Pages C-2.3 and C-2.4. Adoption of the proposed 
Exercise Evaluation Areas will render these pages obsolete. In Table 
2 proposes the minimum frequency with each of the Exercise 
Evaluation Areas would be exercised. FEMA is open to ORO proposals 
to voluntarily exercise certain criteria more frequently than the 
minimums listed below.

                                   Table 2.--Federal Evaluation Process Matrix
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Proposed evaluation area and sub-elements         Consolidates REP-14 objective          Minimum frequency
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Emergency Operations Management...........  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 14, 17, 30..........  .........................
    a. Mobilization..........................  ......................................  Every Exercise.
    b. Facilities............................  ......................................  Once if new.\1\
    c. Direction and Control.................  ......................................  Every Exercise.
    d. Communications Equipment..............  ......................................  Every Exercise.
    e. Equipment and Supplies to Support       ......................................  Every Exercise.
     Operations.
2. Protective Action Decisionmaking..........  5, 7, 9, 14, 15, 16, 26, 28...........  .........................
    a. Emergency Worker Exposure Control.....  ......................................  Every Exercise.
    b. Radiological Assessment & Protective    ......................................  Every Exercise.
     Action Recommendations & Decisions for
     the Plume Phase of theEmergency.
    c. Protective Action Decisions for the     ......................................  Every Exercise.
     Protection of Special Populations.
    d. Radiological Assessment &               ......................................  Once in 6 yrs.
     Decisionmaking for the Ingestion
     Exposure Pathway \2\.
    e. Radiological Assessment &               ......................................  Once in 6 yrs.
     Decisionmaking Concerning Relocation, Re-
     entry, and Return \2\.
3. Protective Action Implementation..........  5, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 27, 29.........  .........................
    a. Implementation of Emergency Worker      ......................................  Every Exercise.
     Exposure Control.
    b. Implementation of KI Decision.........  ......................................  Once in 6 yrs.
    c. Implementation of Protective Actions    ......................................  Once in 6 yrs.\3\
     for Special Populations.
    d. Implementation of Traffic and Access    ......................................  Every Exercise.
     Control \4\.
    e. Implementation of Ingestion Pathway     ......................................  Once in 6 yrs.
     Decisions.
    f. Implementation of Relocation, Re-       ......................................  Once in 6 yrs.
     entry, and Return Decisions.
4. Field Measurement and Analysis............  6, 8, 24, 25..........................  .........................
    a. Plume Phase Field Measurements &        ......................................  Every Exercise.
     Analysis.
    b. Post Plume Phase Field Measurements     ......................................  Once in 6 yrs.
     and Sampling.
    c. Laboratory Operations.................  ......................................  Once in 6 yrs.
5. Emergency Notification and Public           10, 11, 12, 13........................  .........................
 Information.
    a.1 Activation of the Prompt Alert and     ......................................  Every Exercise.
     Notification System.

[[Page 31352]]

 
    a.2 Activation of the Prompt Alert and     ......................................  Separate Drill once in 6
     Notification System (Fast Breaking).                                               yrs.
    a.3 Notification of exception areas and/   ......................................  Every Exercise--as
     or Back-up Alert and Notification System                                           needed.
     within 45 Minutes.
    b. Emergency Information & Instructions    ......................................  Every Exercise.
     for the Public and the Media.
6. Support Operations/Facilities.............  18, 19, 20, 21, 22....................  .........................
    a. Monitoring & Decontamination of         ......................................  Once in 6 yrs.\3\
     Evacuees and Emergency Workers &
     Registration of Evacuees.
    b. Monitoring & Decontamination of         ......................................  Once in 6 yrs.\3\
     Emergency Worker Equipment \3\.
    c. Temporary Care of Evacuees \5\........  ......................................  Once in 6 yrs.\5\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Will be evaluated if new or changed substantially.
\2\ The plume phase and the post-plume phase (ingestion, relocation, re-entry and return) can be demonstrated
  separately.
\3\ All facilities must be evaluated once during the six-year exercise cycle.
\4\ Physical deployment of resources is not necessary.
\5\ Facilities managed by the American Red Cross (ARC), under the ARC/FEMA Memorandum of Understanding, will be
  evaluated once when designated or when substantial changes occur; all other facilities not managed by the ARC
  must be evaluated once in the six-year exercise cycle.

Coordination With the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

    FEMA conducts and evaluates exercises in part under authority of 
a Memorandum of Understanding with the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. The text of the current Memorandum of Understanding is 
published in Appendix A to 44 CFR Part 353 (2000 edition). Section E 
of the Memorandum of Understanding provides that each agency will 
provide an opportunity for the other agency to review and comment on 
emergency planning and preparedness guidance (including 
interpretations of agreed joint guidance) prior to adoption as 
formal agency guidance. FEMA has transmitted a copy of this document 
to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and requested their comments no 
later than the date upon which the public comment period closes.

Evaluation Area 1--Emergency Operations Management

Sub-element 1.a--Mobilization

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and to activate and 
staff emergency facilities.
    Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, 
and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely 
manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)
    Extent of Play. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the 
capability to receive notification of an emergency situation from 
the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and 
mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner. At each 
facility, a roster and/or procedures indicating 24-hour staffing 
capability for key positions (those emergency personnel necessary to 
carry out critical functions), as indicated in the plan and/or 
procedures, should be provided to the evaluator. Although 
demonstration of a shift change is not required, each ORO shall 
demonstrate its ability to transition from an outgoing shift to an 
incoming shift without discontinuity in operations either by having 
personnel in key positions briefing the evaluators or their actual 
replacements on the current status of the simulated emergency. In 
addition, responsible OROs should demonstrate the activation of 
facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive 
to begin emergency operations. Activation of facilities should be 
completed in accordance with the plan and/or procedures. Pre-
positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance 
with the extent of play agreement, at those facilities located 
beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty 
location or residence. Further, pre-positioning of staff for out-of-
sequence demonstrations is appropriate in accordance with the extent 
of play agreement.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 1.b--Facilities

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have facilities to support the 
emergency response.
    Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the 
emergency response. (NUREG-0654, H)
    Extent of Play. Facilities will only be specifically evaluated 
for this criterion if they are new or have substantial changes in 
structure or mission. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the 
availability of facilities that support the accomplishment of 
emergency operations. Some of the areas to be considered are: 
adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, 
backup power and/or alternate facility (if required to support 
operations).
    Facilities must be set up based on the ORO's plans and 
procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, 
unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 1.c--Direction and Control

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to control 
their overall response to an emergency.
    Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO 
provide direction and control to that part of the overall response 
effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a, b)
    Extent of Play. Leadership personnel should demonstrate the 
ability to carry out essential functions of the response effort, for 
example: keeping the staff informed, coordinating with other 
appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and 
requests.
    All activities associated with direction and control must be 
performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as 
they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in 
the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 1.d--Communications Equipment

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should establish at least two 
reliable communication systems to ensure communications with key 
emergency personnel at locations such as the following: appropriate 
contiguous governments within the emergency planning zone (EPZ), 
Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its 
facilities, emergency operations centers (EOC), and field teams.
    Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are 
available, at least one operates properly, and communication links 
are established and maintained with appropriate locations. 
Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency 
operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1, 2)
    Extent of Play. Communications equipment and procedures for 
facilities and field units should be used as needed for the 
transmission and receipt of exercise

[[Page 31353]]

messages. All facilities and field teams should have the capability 
to access at least one communication system that is independent of 
the commercial telephone system and uses a separate power source. 
Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to manage the 
communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled 
without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency 
operations. OROs should ensure that a coordinated communication link 
for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exist. The specific 
communications capabilities of OROs should be commensurate with that 
specified in the response plan and/or procedures. Exercise scenarios 
could require the failure of a communications system and the use of 
an alternate system.
    All activities associated with the management of communications 
capabilities must be demonstrated based on the ORO's plans and 
procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, 
unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 1.e--Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have emergency equipment and 
supplies adequate to support the emergency response.
    Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium 
iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency 
operations. (NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a, b, e, j, k; j.11; K.3.a)
    Extent of Play. Equipment within the facility (facilities) 
should be sufficient and consistent with the role assigned to that 
facility in the ORO's plans and/or procedures in support of 
emergency operations. Use of maps and displays is encouraged.
    All instruments, including air sampling flow meters (field teams 
only), should be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked 
at least once each calendar quarter and after each use. They should 
be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations 
(or at least annually for the CDV-700 series or if there are no 
manufacturer's recommendations for a specific instrument). A label 
indicating such calibration should be on each instrument or 
verifiable by other means. Note: Field team equipment is evaluated 
under 4.a.1; radiological laboratory equipment under 4.c.1; 
reception center and emergency worker facilities' equipment is 
evaluated under 6.a.1; and ambulance and medical facilities' 
equipment is evaluated under 6.d.1.
    Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and 
permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers should be 
available for issuance to all categories of emergency workers that 
could be deployed from that facility. Appropriate direct-reading 
dosimeters should allow individual(s) to read the administrative 
reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's 
plans and procedures.
    Dosimeters should be inspected for electrical leakage at least 
annually and replaced, if necessary. CDV-138s, due to their 
documented history of electrical leakage problems, should be 
inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced if 
necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the 
exercise, through documentation submitted in the Annual Letter of 
Certification, and/or through a staff assistance visit.
    Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain 
inventories of KI sufficient for use by emergency workers, as 
indicated on rosters; institutionalized individuals, as indicated in 
capacity lists for facilities; and, where stipulated by the plan 
and/or procedures, members of the general public (including 
transients) within the plume pathway EPZ.
    Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage 
locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at storage 
location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted 
during the exercise, provided in the Annual Letter of Certification 
submission, and/or verified during a Staff Assistance Visit. 
Available supplies of KI should be within the expiration date 
indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, a 
letter from the drug manufacturer should be available that documents 
a formal extension of the KI expiration date. Another alternative is 
for the ORO to obtain approval from FEMA based on a certified 
independent laboratory testing to extend the shelf life.
    At locations where traffic and access control personnel are 
deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic 
cones and signs, etc.) should be available or their availability 
described.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Evaluation Area 2--Protective Action Decision-Making

Sub-Element 2.a--Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
an Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to 
assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency 
workers and have a decision chain in place as specified in the ORO's 
plans and procedures to authorize emergency worker exposure limits 
to be exceeded for specific missions.
    Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the 
recommended accumulated dose limits or exposure rates that emergency 
workers may be permitted to incur during an emergency. These limits 
include any pre-established administrative reporting limits (that 
take into consideration Total Effective Dose Equivalent or organ-
specific limits) identified in the ORO's plans and procedures.
    Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering 
relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an 
exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for 
emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation 
exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action 
guides. (NUREG-0654, K.4, J.10. e, f)
    Extent of Play. OROs authorized to send emergency workers into 
the plume exposure pathway EPZ should demonstrate the following 
capabilities on the basis of information in the emergency plan: (1) 
Determination of radiation exposure limits to be authorized for 
emergency workers; (2) appropriate decision making, based on 
projected doses and in accordance with emergency workers' exposure 
limits, as to whether or not to send emergency workers to areas 
within the plume exposure pathway EPZ; (3) establishment of 
procedures to allow emergency workers to voluntarily choose to enter 
the plume exposure pathway EPZ where radiation levels may expose 
individuals to higher than pre-authorized exposures for lifesaving 
missions, to protect valuable property, or to protect large 
populations; and (4) use of a KI decision-making process that 
involves close coordination between appropriate assessment and 
decision-making staff.
    Whenever emergency personnel are planning to undertake an 
operation, it is essential that the best estimate of the situation 
be known by the personnel directing the operation. All sources of 
information, including projected exposure rate patterns, should be 
considered and a best estimate made of the exposure likely to be 
received during a specific mission. The mission must be planned by 
taking into consideration the most likely situation as well as the 
most potentially hazardous situation. Items to be considered include 
alternative entry and exit routes, potential changes in 
meteorological conditions, areas or roads to be avoided, equipment 
and vehicle failure, and other relevant items.
    Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to make 
decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess 
of pre-authorized levels and to manage the number of emergency 
workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels.
    As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make 
decisions on the distribution and administration of KI, as a 
protective measure, based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or 
projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAGs for KI 
administration.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 2.b.--Radiological Assessment and Protective Action 
Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which indicates 
that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to 
independently project integrated dose from exposure rates or other 
information and compare the estimated dose savings with the 
protective action guides. OROs have the capability to choose, among 
a range of

[[Page 31354]]

protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency 
situation. OROs base these choices on PAGs from the ORO's plans and 
procedures or EPA 400-R-92-001 and other criteria, such as, plant 
conditions, licensee protective action recommendations, coordination 
of protective action decisions with other political jurisdictions 
(e.g., other affected OROs), availability of appropriate in-place 
shelter, weather conditions, evacuation time estimates, and 
situations that create higher than normal risk from evacuation.
    Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations 
are based on available information on plant conditions, field 
monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as 
knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-
0654, I.8, 10, 11 and Supplement 3)
    Extent of Play. During the initial stage of the emergency 
response, following notification of plant conditions that may 
warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO should demonstrate the 
capability to use appropriate means, described in the plan and/or 
procedures, to develop protective action recommendations (PAR) for 
decision-makers based on available information and recommendations 
from the licensee, and field monitoring data, if available.
    When release and meteorological data are provided by the 
licensee, the ORO also considers these data. The ORO should 
demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose 
projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on 
the data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs 
appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of projected 
dose should be demonstrated. Projected doses should be related to 
quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be compared. PARs 
should be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a prearranged 
format.
    Differences greater than a factor of 10 between projected doses 
by the licensee and the ORO should be discussed with the licensee 
with respect to the input data and assumptions used, the use of 
different models, or other possible reasons. Resolution of these 
differences should be incorporated into the PAR if timely and 
appropriate. The ORO should demonstrate the capability to use any 
additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and 
revise the associated PARs.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
    Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving 
consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is 
used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general 
public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO 
policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.m)
    Extent of Play. Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have 
the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADs. They should 
demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a timely manner 
appropriate to the situation, based on notification from the 
licensee, assessment of plant status and releases, and PARs from the 
utility and ORO staff.
    The dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based 
on the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or 
information on plant conditions. The decision-makers should 
demonstrate the capability to change protective actions as 
appropriate based on these projections.
    Where specified in the plan and/or procedures, responsible OROs 
should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the 
distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure. This 
decision should be based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or 
projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI 
administration. The KI decision-making process should involve close 
coordination with appropriate assessment and decision-making staff.
    If more than one ORO is involved in decision-making, OROs should 
communicate and coordinate PADs with affected OROs. OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to communicate the contents of decisions 
to the affected jurisdictions.
    All decision-making activities by ORO personnel must be 
performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as 
they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in 
the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 2.c--Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the 
Protection of Special Populations

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
determine protective action recommendations, including evacuation, 
sheltering and use of potassium iodide (KI), if applicable, for 
special population groups (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, 
correctional facilities, schools, licensed day care centers, 
mobility impaired individuals, and transportation dependent 
individuals). Focus is on those special population groups that are 
(or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from a 
nuclear power plant.
    Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as 
appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 
J.10.c, d, e, g)
    Extent of Play. Usually, it is appropriate to implement 
evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower 
end of the range of PAGs, except for situations where there is a 
high-risk environment or where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile 
or infirm) are involved. In these cases, examples of factors that 
should be considered are: weather conditions, shelter availability, 
Evacuation Time Estimates, availability of transportation assets, 
risk of evacuation vs. risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary 
school evacuations. In situations where an institutionalized 
population cannot be evacuated, the administration of KI should be 
considered by the OROs.
    All decision-making activities associated with protective 
actions, including consideration of available resources, for special 
population groups must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 2.d.--Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for 
the Ingestion Exposure Pathway

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the means to assess the 
radiological consequences for the ingestion exposure pathway, relate 
them to the appropriate PAGs, and make timely, appropriate 
protective action decisions to mitigate exposure from the ingestion 
pathway.
    During an accident at a nuclear power plant, a release of 
radioactive material may contaminate water supplies and agricultural 
products in the surrounding areas. Any such contamination would 
likely occur during the plume phase of the accident, and depending 
on the nature of the release could impact the ingestion pathway for 
weeks or years.
    Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion 
pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are 
made based on the ORO planning criteria. (NUREG-0654, I.8, 10; J.11)
    Extent of Play. It is expected that the Offsite Response 
Organizations (ORO) will take precautionary actions to protect food 
and water supplies, or to minimize exposure to potentially 
contaminated water and food, in accordance with their respective 
plans and procedures. Often such precautionary actions are initiated 
by the OROs based on criteria related to the facility's emergency 
classification levels (ECL). Such actions may include 
recommendations to place milk animals on stored feed and to use 
protected water supplies.
    The ORO should use its procedures (for example, development of a 
sampling plan) to assess the radiological consequences of a release 
on the food and water supplies. The ORO assessment should include 
the evaluation of the radiological analyses of representative 
samples of water, food, and other ingestible substances of local 
interest from potentially impacted areas, the characterization of 
the releases from the facility, and the extent of areas potentially 
impacted by the release. During this assessment, OROs should 
consider the use of agricultural and watershed data within the 50-
mile EPZ. The radiological impacts on the food and water should then 
be compared to the appropriate ingestion PAGs contained in the ORO's 
plan and/or procedures. (The plan and/or procedures may contain PAGs 
based on specific dose commitment criteria or based on criteria as 
recommended by current Food and Drug Administration guidance.) 
Timely and appropriate recommendations should be provided to the ORO 
decision-makers group for implementation decisions. As time permits, 
the ORO may also include a comparison of taking or not taking a 
given action on the resultant ingestion pathway dose commitments.
    The ORO should demonstrate timely decisions to minimize 
radiological impacts

[[Page 31355]]

from the ingestion pathway, based on the given assessments and other 
information available. Any such decisions should be communicated and 
to the extent practical, coordinated with neighboring and local 
OROs.
    OROs should use Federal resources, as identified in the Federal 
Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources 
(e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation 
of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal 
and other resources participating.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 2.e.--Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making 
Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return

Intent

    The sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to make 
decisions on relocation, re-entry, and return of the general public. 
These decisions are essential for the protection of the public from 
the direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials 
from a severe accident at a nuclear power plant.
    Criterion 2.e.1: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return 
decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on 
assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's 
plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654, A.1.b; I.10; M)
    Extent of Play.
     Relocation: OROs should demonstrate the capability to 
estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and to compare these 
estimates with PAGs, apply decision criteria for relocation of those 
individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated but 
where projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs, and control 
access to evacuated and restricted areas. Decisions are made for 
relocating members of the evacuated public who lived in areas that 
now have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs. 
Determination of areas to be restricted should be based on factors 
such as the mix of radionuclides in deposited materials, calculated 
exposure rates vs. the PAGs, and field samples of vegetation and 
soil analyses.
     Re-entry: Decisions should be made regarding the 
location of control points and policies regarding access and 
exposure control for emergency workers and members of the general 
public who need to temporarily enter the evacuated area to perform 
specific tasks or missions.
    Examples of control procedures are: the assignment of, or 
checking for, direct-reading and non direct-reading dosimeters for 
emergency workers; questions regarding the individual's objectives 
and locations expected to be visited and associated time frames; 
availability of maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; advice 
on areas to avoid; and procedures for exit including: monitoring of 
individuals, vehicles, and equipment; decision criteria regarding 
decontamination; and proper disposition of emergency worker 
dosimeters and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure 
records.
    Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop a 
strategy for authorized re-entry of individuals into the restricted 
zone, based on established decision criteria. OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to modify those policies for security 
purposes (e.g., police patrols), for maintenance of essential 
services (e.g., fire protection and utilities), and for other 
critical functions. They should demonstrate the capability to use 
decision making criteria in allowing access to the restricted zone 
by the public for various reasons, such as to maintain property 
(e.g., to care for farm animals or secure machinery for storage), or 
to retrieve important possessions. Coordinated policies for access 
and exposure control should be developed among all agencies with 
roles to perform in the restricted zone. OROs should demonstrate the 
capability to establish policies for provision of dosimetry to all 
individuals allowed to re-enter the restricted zone. The extent that 
OROs need to develop policies on re-entry will be determined by 
scenario events.
     Return: Decisions are to be based on environmental data 
and political boundaries or physical/geological features, which 
allow identification of the boundaries of areas to which members of 
the general public may return. Return is permitted to the boundary 
of the restricted area that is based on the relocation PAG. Other 
factors that the ORO should consider are, for example: conditions 
that permit the cancellation of the emergency classification level 
and the relaxation of associated restrictive measures; basing return 
recommendations (i.e., permitting populations that were previously 
evacuated to reoccupy their homes and businesses on an unrestricted 
basis) on measurements of radiation from ground deposition; and the 
capability to identify services and facilities that require 
restoration within a few days and to identify the procedures and 
resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and 
facilities are: medical and social services, utilities, roads, 
schools, and intermediate term housing for relocated persons.

Evaluation Area 3--Protective Action Implementation

Sub-Element 3.a--Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure 
Control

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and 
processing of direct-reading dosimeters and permanent record 
dosimeters; provide for direct-reading dosimeters to be read at 
appropriate frequencies by emergency workers; maintain a radiation 
dose record for each emergency worker; and provide for establishing 
a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to 
incur radiation exposures in excess of protective action guides, 
always applying the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) 
principle as appropriate.
    Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and 
procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in 
accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers 
periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters 
and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. 
(NUREG-0654, K.3)
    Extent of Play. OROs should demonstrate the capability to 
provide appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, 
dosimetry chargers, and instructions on the use of dosimetry to 
emergency workers. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-
reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows individual(s) 
to read the administrative reporting limits (that are pre-
established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation 
of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure limits (for 
those emergency workers involved in life saving activities) 
contained in the OROs plans and procedures.
    Each emergency worker should have the basic knowledge of 
radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plan and/or 
procedures. Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and 
to manage radiological exposure control should be demonstrated.
    During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers should 
demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative 
exposure limits and turn-back values are reached. The emergency 
worker should report accumulated exposures during the exercise as 
indicated in the plans and procedures. OROs should demonstrate the 
actions described in the plan and/or procedures by determining 
whether to replace the worker, to authorize the worker to incur 
additional exposures or to take other actions. If scenario events do 
not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional 
exposure, evaluators should interview at least two emergency 
workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in the 
event authorization is needed and at what exposure levels. Emergency 
workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures 
and/or co-workers) in providing responses.
    Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have 
a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team 
members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire 
mission and adequate control of exposure can be effected for all 
members of the team by one dosimeter worn by the team leader. 
Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, e.g., 
at reception centers, counting laboratories, emergency operations 
centers, and communications centers, may have individual direct-
reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters 
strategically placed in the work area. It should be noted that, even 
in these situations, each team member must still have their own 
permanent record dosimeter. Individuals without specific 
radiological response missions, such as farmers for animal care, 
essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public 
who must re-enter an evacuated area following or during the plume 
passage, should be limited to the lowest radiological

[[Page 31356]]

exposure commensurate with completing their missions.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 3.b--Implementation of KI Decision

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
provide radioprotective drugs for emergency workers, 
institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plan and/or 
procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may 
not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it 
is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI to 
emergency workers and institutionalized individuals, the provision 
of KI to the general public is an ORO option and is reflected in 
ORO's plans and procedures. Provisions should include the 
availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of the 
distribution of radioprotective drugs.
    Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available 
should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record 
keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and 
institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is 
maintained. (NUREG-0654, E. 7, J. 10. e, f)
    Extent of Play. Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should 
demonstrate the capability to make KI available to emergency 
workers, institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in 
the ORO plan and/or procedures, to members of the general public. 
OROs should demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of 
KI consistent with decisions made. Organizations should have the 
capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers and 
institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including 
documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to 
ingest KI. The ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO 
health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual 
ingestion of KI is not necessary. OROs should demonstrate the 
capability to formulate and disseminate appropriate instructions on 
the use of KI for those advised to take it. If a recommendation is 
made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information 
should be provided to the public by the means of notification 
specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures.
    Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of 
procedures for the use of KI whether or not the scenario drives the 
use of KI. This can be accomplished by an interview with the 
evaluator.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 3.c--Implementation of Protective Actions for Special 
Populations

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
implement protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or 
sheltering, for all special populations. Focus is on those special 
populations that are (or potentially will be) affected by a 
radiological release from a nuclear power plant.
    Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for 
special populations other than schools within areas subject to 
protective actions. (NUREG-0654, E.7; J.9, 10.c, d, e, g)
    Extent of Play. Applicable OROs should demonstrate the 
capability to alert and notify (e.g., provide protective action 
recommendations and emergency information and instructions) special 
populations (hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, 
mobility impaired individuals, transportation dependent, etc.). OROs 
should demonstrate the capability to provide for the needs of 
special populations in accordance with the ORO's plans and 
procedures.
    Contact with special populations and reception facilities may be 
actual or simulated, as agreed to in the Extent of Play. At least 
\1/3\ of transportation providers (including special resources for 
disabled individuals) must be actually contacted during each 
exercise. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged.
    All implementing activities associated with protective actions 
for special populations must be based on the ORO's plans and 
procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, 
unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
    Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement 
protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g)
    Extent of Play. Applicable OROs should demonstrate the 
capability to alert and notify all public schools, licensed day care 
centers, and participating private schools within the emergency 
planning zone of emergency conditions that are expected to or may 
necessitate protective actions for students.
    In accordance with plans and/or procedures, OROs and/or 
officials of participating public and private schools and licensed 
day care centers should demonstrate the capability to make and 
implement prompt decisions on protective actions for students. 
Officials should demonstrate that the decision making process for 
protective actions considers (e.g., either accepts automatically or 
gives heavy weight to) protective action recommendations made by ORO 
personnel, the ECL at which these recommendations are received, 
preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, and the 
location of students at the time (e.g., whether the students are 
still at home, en route to the school, or at the school).
    Implementation of protective actions should be completed subject 
to the following provisions: At least one school in each affected 
school system or district, as appropriate, needs to demonstrate the 
implementation of protective actions. The implementation of 
canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering should be 
simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be 
followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all 
activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to 
reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may 
actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview 
process. If accomplished through an interview process, appropriate 
school personnel including decision making officials (e.g., 
superintendent/principal, transportation director/bus dispatcher), 
and at least one bus driver should be available to demonstrate 
knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. 
Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, 
if required by the plan and/or procedures, should be verified.
    Officials of the participating school(s) or school system(s) 
should demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely 
information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general 
public, and the media on the status of protective actions for 
schools.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
specified above or indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 3.d.--Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to 
implement protective action plans, including relocation and 
restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This sub-element 
focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and 
access control points and removal of impediments to the flow of 
evacuation traffic.
    Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is 
established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and 
access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j, k)
    Extent of Play. OROs should demonstrate the capability to 
select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control 
points, consistent with protective action decisions (for example, 
evacuating,sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs 
should demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic 
and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in 
protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation 
patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.
    Traffic and access control staff should demonstrate accurate 
knowledge of their roles and responsibilities. This capability may 
be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview in accordance 
with the extent of play agreement.
    In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control 
access by certain types of traffic (rail, water, and air traffic), 
they should demonstrate the capability to contact the State or 
Federal agencies with authority to control access.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they

[[Page 31357]]

would be in an actual emergency, unless specified above or indicated 
in the extent of play agreement.
    Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and 
resolved. (NUREG-0654, J.10.k)
    Extent of Play. OROs should demonstrate the capability, as 
required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions 
concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources 
to deal with impediments, such as wreckers, need not be 
demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, should be 
logged.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
specified above or indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 3.e--Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
implement protective actions, based on criteria recommended by 
current Food and Drug Administration guidance, for the ingestion 
pathway zone (IPZ), the area within an approximate 50-mile radius of 
the nuclear power plant. This sub-element focuses on those actions 
required for implementation of protective actions.
    Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and 
appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food 
supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion 
exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of 
protective actions. NUREG-0654, J.9, 11)
    Extent of Play. Applicable OROs should demonstrate the 
capability to secure and utilize current information on the 
locations of dairy farms, meat and poultry producers, fisheries, 
fruit growers, vegetable growers, grain producers, food processing 
plants, and water supply intake points to implement protective 
actions within the ingestion pathway EPZ. OROs should use Federal 
resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (e.g., 
compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this 
criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and 
other resources participating in the exercise.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
    Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-
printed instructional material are developed for implementing 
protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, 
milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654, E.5, 7; J.9, 11)
    Extent of Play. Development of measures and strategies for 
implementation of IPZ protective actions should be demonstrated 
during exercise play by formulation of protective action information 
for the general public and food producers and processors. This 
includes the capability for the rapid reproduction and distribution 
of appropriate pre-printed information and instructions to pre-
determined individuals and businesses. OROs should demonstrate the 
capability to control, restrict or prevent distribution of 
contaminated food by commercial sectors. Exercise play should 
include demonstration of communications and coordination between 
organizations to implement protective actions. However, actual field 
play of implementation activities may be simulated. For example, 
communications and coordination with agencies responsible for 
enforcing food controls within the IPZ should be demonstrated, but 
actual communications with food producers and processors may be 
simulated.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-element 3.f--Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return 
Decisions

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the 
capability to implement plans, procedures, and decisions for 
relocation, re-entry, and return. Implementation of these decisions 
is essential for the protection of the public from the direct long-
term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe 
accident at a commercial nuclear power plant.
    Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of 
emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are 
coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-
0654, M.1, 3)
    Extent of Play.
     Relocation: OROs should demonstrate the capability to 
coordinate and implement decisions concerning relocation of 
individuals, not previously evacuated, to an area where radiological 
contamination will not expose the general public to doses that 
exceed the relocation PAGs. OROs should also demonstrate the 
capability to provide for short-term or long-term relocation of 
evacuees who lived in areas that have residual radiation levels 
above the PAGs.
    Areas of consideration should include the capability to 
communicate with OROs regarding timing of actions, notification of 
the population of the procedures for relocation, and the 
notification of, and advice for, evacuated individuals who will be 
converted to relocation status in situations where they will not be 
able to return to their homes due to high levels of contamination. 
OROs should also demonstrate the capability to communicate 
instructions to the public regarding relocation decisions.
     Re-entry: OROs should demonstrate the capability to 
control re-entry and exit of individuals who need to temporarily re-
enter the restricted area, to protect them from unnecessary 
radiation exposure and for exit of vehicles and other equipment to 
control the spread of contamination outside the restricted area. 
Monitoring and decontamination facilities will be established as 
appropriate.
    Examples of control procedure subjects are: (1) The assignment 
of, or checking for, direct-reading and non-direct-reading 
dosimeters for emergency workers; (2) questions regarding the 
individuals' objectives and locations expected to be visited and 
associated timeframes; (3) maps and plots of radiation exposure 
rates; (4) advice on areas to avoid; and procedures for exit, 
including monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment, 
decision criteria regarding contamination, proper disposition of 
emergency worker dosimeters, and maintenance of emergency worker 
radiation exposure records.
     Return: OROs should demonstrate the capability to 
implement policies concerning return of members of the public to 
areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to identify and prioritize services and 
facilities that require restoration within a few days, and to 
identify the procedures and resources for their restoration. 
Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social 
services, utilities, roads, schools, and intermediate term housing 
for relocated persons.
    Communications among OROs for relocation, re-entry, and return 
may be simulated; however all simulated or actual contacts should be 
documented. These discussions may be accomplished in a group 
setting.
    OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, 
and other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if 
available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration 
the level of Federal and other resources participating in the 
exercise.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Evaluation Area 4--Field Measurement And Analysis

Sub-Element 4.a--Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
deploy field teams with the equipment, methods, and expertise 
necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and 
particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In 
addition, NUREG-0654 indicates that OROs should have the capability 
to use field teams within the plume emergency planning zone to 
measure airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and to 
measure radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In 
the event of an accident at a nuclear power plant, the possible 
release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby 
population and environment. Although accident assessment methods are 
available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these 
methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an accident, it 
is important to collect field radiological data in order to help 
characterize any radiological release. This does not imply that 
plume exposure projections should be made from

[[Page 31358]]

the field data. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential to 
such field measurement efforts.
    Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field 
measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) 
and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, 
H.10; I.7, 8, 9, 11)
    Extent of Play. Field teams should be equipped with all 
instrumentation and supplies necessary to accomplish their mission. 
This should include instruments capable of measuring gamma exposure 
rates and detecting the presence of beta radiation. These 
instruments should be capable of measuring a range of activity and 
exposure consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the 
ORO's plans and procedures, including radiological protection/
exposure control of team members and detection of activity on the 
air sample collection media. An appropriate radioactive check source 
should be used to verify proper operational response for each low 
range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1 R/hr) and for 
high range instruments when available. If a source is not available 
for a high range instrument, a procedure should exist to 
operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only 
a high range instrument can make useful readings. All activities 
must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as 
they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in 
the extent of play agreement.
    Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient 
information to help characterize the release and to control 
radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; I.8, 11; J.10.a)
    Extent of Play. Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) 
should demonstrate the capability to brief teams on predicted plume 
location and direction, travel speed, and exposure control 
procedures before deployment.
    Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release 
and to support the adequacy of implemented protective actions or to 
be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams should be 
directed to take measurements in such locations, at such times to 
provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and 
impacts.
    If the responsibility to obtain peak measurements in the plume 
has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with 
concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these 
measurements to be repeated by State and local monitoring teams. The 
sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all 
field teams (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential. Coordination 
concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form, 
to a radiological laboratory should be demonstrated. OROs should use 
Federal resources as identified in the Federal Radiological 
Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources (e.g., 
compacts, utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion 
will take into consideration the level of Federal and other 
resources participating in the exercise.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
    Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and 
recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate 
samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low 
background location to determine whether any significant (as 
specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has 
been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, I.7, 8, 9, 11)
    Extent of Play. Field teams should demonstrate the capability to 
report measurements and field data pertaining to the measurement of 
airborne radioiodine and particulates and ambient radiation to the 
field team coordinator, dose assessment, or other appropriate 
authority. If samples have radioactivity significantly above 
background, the appropriate authority should consider the need for 
expedited laboratory analyses of these samples. Offsite Response 
Organizations (ORO) should share data in a timely manner with all 
appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination control, 
instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form 
for transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance with the ORO 
plan and/or procedures. OROs should use Federal resources as 
identified in the FRERP, and other resources (e.g., compacts, 
utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take 
into consideration the level of Federal and other resources 
participating in the exercise.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 4.b--Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
OROs should have the capability to assess the actual or potential 
magnitude and locations of radiological hazards in the ingestion 
pathway zone (IPZ) and for relocation, re-entry and return measures. 
This sub-element focuses on the collection of environmental samples 
for laboratory analyses that are essential for decisions on 
protection of the public from contaminated food and water and direct 
radiation from deposited materials.
    Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to 
make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples 
(e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support 
adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-
0654, H.12; I.8; J.10.a, 11)
    Extent of Play. The Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) field 
teams should demonstrate the capability to take measurements and 
samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an 
adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support re-
entry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are 
available, the use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement 
is appropriate. All methodology, including contamination control, 
instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form 
for transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance with the ORO 
plan and/or procedures.
    Ingestion pathway samples should be secured from agricultural 
products and water. Samples in support of relocation and return 
should be secured from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces in areas 
that received radioactive ground deposition. OROs should use Federal 
resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (e.g., 
compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation 
of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal 
and other resources participating in the exercise.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 4.c--Laboratory Operations

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in air, liquid, and 
environmental samples to support protective action decision-making.
    Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing 
required radiological analyses to support protective action 
decisions. (NUREG-0654, C.3; I.8, 9; J.11)
    Extent of Play. The laboratory staff should demonstrate the 
capability to follow appropriate procedures for receiving samples, 
including logging of information, preventing contamination of the 
laboratory, preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored 
samples, preventing cross contamination of samples, preserving 
samples that may spoil (e.g., milk), and keeping track of sample 
identity. In addition, the laboratory staff should demonstrate the 
capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.
    The laboratory should be appropriately equipped to provide 
analyses of media, as requested, on a timely basis, of sufficient 
quality and sensitivity to support assessments and decisions as 
anticipated by the ORO's plans and procedures. The laboratory 
(laboratories) instrument calibrations should be traceable to 
standards provided by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze typical radionuclides 
released in a reactor incident should be as described in the plans 
and procedures. New or revised methods may be used to analyze 
atypical radionuclide releases (e.g., transuranics or as a result of 
a terrorist event) or if warranted by circumstances of the event. 
Analysis may require resources beyond those of the ORO.
    The laboratory staff should be qualified in radioanalytical 
techniques and contamination control procedures.
    OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, 
and other resources

[[Page 31359]]

(e.g., compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. 
Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level 
of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.
    All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Evaluation Area 5--Emergency Notification and Public Information

Sub-Element 5.a--Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification 
System

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume pathway 
EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in this sub-element are derived 
from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations (10 CFR 
Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D.), and FEMA-REP-10, ``Guide for the 
Evaluation of Alert and Notification systems for Nuclear Power 
Plants.''
    Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and 
notification of the public are completed in a timely manner 
following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency 
officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The 
initial instructional message to the public must include as a 
minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR 
Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D and NUREG-0654, E. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7)
    Extent of Play. Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) 
should demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert 
signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated 
areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile 
plume pathway EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and 
notification system, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or 
procedures, completion of system activation should be accomplished 
in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time 
requirements) for primary alerting/notification. The initial message 
should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.
    For exercise purposes, timely is defined as ``the responsible 
ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the 
appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and 
without undue delay.'' If message dissemination is to be identified 
as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) 
will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not 
considered timely.
    Procedures to broadcast the message should be fully demonstrated 
as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of 
transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test messages is not 
required. The alert signal activation may be simulated. However, the 
procedures should be demonstrated up to the point of actual 
activation. The capability of the primary notification system to 
broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis should be 
verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the 
primary notification system.
    All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's 
plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual 
emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the 
extent of play agreement.
    Criterion 5.a.2: After the State and local governmental agency 
(agencies) point of contact is notified by the licensee of the 
situation requiring urgent action, activities associated with 
primary alerting and notification of the public in the event of an 
emergency situation requiring urgent action (a fast-breaking 
situation) are completed in one of the two following ways:
    (1) The State and local governmental agency (agencies) point of 
contact has 15 minutes from verified notification by the licensee in 
which to complete primary alerting and notification of the public. 
In addition, the initial point of contact must demonstrate the 
capability to contact, in a timely manner, an authorized offsite 
decision-maker relative to the nature and severity of the event, in 
accordance with plans and procedures.
    (2) The State and local governmental agency (agencies) point of 
contact promptly (in a timely manner) notifies State and local 
official(s) of the situation requiring urgent action, who then have 
15 minutes in which to complete primary alerting and notification of 
the public.
    The initial instructional message to the public must include the 
elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, 
Appendix E.IV.D and NUREG-0654, E. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7)
    Extent of Play. The ORO's capability to meet this criterion must 
be evaluated at least once every six years during a fast breaker 
drill. The ORO's established fast-breaking incident procedures will 
be evaluated. When the ORO's point of contact is notified by the 
licensee of an emergency situation requiring urgent action, the 
applicable ORO should demonstrate the capability to sequentially 
provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message 
to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 
10-mile plume pathway EPZ in one of the following two ways:
    (1) The State and local governmental agency (agencies) point of 
contact demonstrates the capability to sequentially provide an alert 
signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated 
areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile 
plume pathway EPZ within 15 minutes of verified notification from 
the utility that a situation exists requiring urgent action. The 
initial instructional message should include the elements required 
by current FEMA REP guidance. The ``clock'' will start when the 
transmission of an initial notification of a General Emergency and a 
protective action recommendation from the utility is completed and 
verified. Within 15 minutes, actual contact of the primary 
notification system facility (facilities) and dissemination of the 
initial message to the public should be demonstrated; this is when 
the ``clock'' will stop.
    Broadcast of the message may be simulated; however, once again, 
all activities leading to that point should be demonstrated. In 
addition, the ORO(s) should demonstrate the capability to contact, 
in a timely manner, an authorized offsite decision-maker relative to 
the nature and severity of the event, in accordance with plans and 
procedures. This contact may occur either prior to, or immediately 
subsequent to, activation of the primary alerting and notification 
system. Although it must be accomplished in a timely manner, contact 
of the decision-maker does not have to be completed within the 15-
minute timeframe discussed above. The drill will be terminated when 
the alert signal activation (simulated) is initiated, the broadcast 
(simulated) is initiated by the primary notification system facility 
(facilities), and an authorized offsite decision-maker has been 
contacted.
    (2) The State and local governmental agency (agencies) point of 
contact demonstrates the capability to promptly (in a timely manner) 
notify State and local official(s) of the situation requiring urgent 
action, who then must sequentially provide an alert signal followed 
by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent 
resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ 
within 15 minutes of notification by the point of contact. The 
initial instructional message should include the elements required 
by current FEMA REP guidance. The ``clock'' will start when the 
transmission of an initial notification of a situation requiring 
urgent action is received by the State and local governmental 
official(s). Within 15 minutes, actual contact of the primary 
notification system facility (facilities) and dissemination of the 
initial message to the public should be demonstrated; this is when 
the ``clock'' will stop. Broadcast of the message may be simulated; 
however, once again, all activities leading to that point should be 
demonstrated. The drill will be terminated when the alert signal 
activation (simulated) is initiated and the broadcast (simulated) is 
initiated by the primary notification system facility (facilities).
    The drill will be scheduled to be conducted ``Unannounced'' 
within a one-week window. The evaluators and controllers for each 
jurisdiction will be briefed in detail concerning the extent of play 
and timing of the drill. Evaluators and controllers will be 
stationed at each location where actions will be initiated, where 
alert signals are controlled, and at the applicable primary 
notification system facility (facilities). The actual activation of 
the alert signal may be simulated; however, all activities leading 
up to activation should be demonstrated and should be completed 
within the 15-minute time frame. It should be noted that 
coordination among OROs is normally desirable; however, in the event 
of a fast breaker situation this coordination is not necessary prior 
to activation of the primary alert and notification sequence.
    All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's 
plans and procedures

[[Page 31360]]

and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as 
noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.
    Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved 
exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes 
following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency 
officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup 
alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes 
following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert 
and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)
    Extent of Play. Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) with FEMA-
approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and 
Notification System Design Report) 5-10 miles from the nuclear power 
plant should demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary 
alerting and notification of the exception area(s) within 45 minutes 
following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency 
officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The 45-
minute clock will begin when the OROs make the decision to activate 
the alert and notification system for the first time for a specific 
emergency situation. The initial message should, at a minimum, 
include: a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and where 
to obtain additional information.
    For exception area alerting, at least one route needs to be 
demonstrated and evaluated. The selected routes should vary from 
exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be 
demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and 
notification activities along the route should be simulated (that 
is, the message that would actually be used is read for the 
evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent 
of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be 
conducted at some agreed upon location.
    Backup alert and notification of the public should be completed 
within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of 
the primary alert and notification system. Backup route alerting 
needs only be demonstrated and evaluated, in accordance with the 
ORO's plan and/or procedures and the extent of play agreement, if 
the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the 
primary system(s), or if any portion of the primary system(s) 
actually fails to function. If demonstrated, only one route needs to 
be selected and demonstrated. All alert and notification activities 
along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would 
actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually 
broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent of play. Actual testing of 
the Public Address system will be conducted at some agreed upon 
location.
    All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's 
plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual 
emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the 
extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 5.b--Emergency Information and Instructions for the 
Public and the Media

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
disseminate to the public appropriate emergency information and 
instructions including any recommended protective actions. In 
addition, NUREG-0654 provides that OROs should ensure the capability 
exists for providing information to the media. This includes the 
availability of a physical location for use by the media during an 
emergency. NUREG-0654 also provides that a system be available for 
dealing with rumors.
    Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and 
instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. 
(NUREG-0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, b, c)
    Extent of Play. Subsequent emergency information and 
instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a 
timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements). 
For exercise purposes, timely is defined as ``the responsible ORO 
personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the 
appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and 
without undue delay.'' If message dissemination is to be identified 
as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) 
will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not 
considered timely.
    The Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should ensure that 
emergency information and instructions are consistent with 
protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The 
emergency information should contain all necessary and applicable 
instructions to assist the public in carrying out protective action 
decisions provided to them (e.g., evacuation instructions, 
evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when 
evacuating, information concerning pets, shelter-in-place 
instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools 
and special populations, rumor control telephone number, etc.). The 
ORO should also be prepared to disclose and explain the emergency 
classification level (ECL) of the incident. As a minimum, this must 
be included in media briefings and/or press releases. OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and 
understandable to the public, including tribes, within both the 
plume and ingestion pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the 
capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe 
protective action areas.
    The emergency information should be all-inclusive by including 
previously identified protective action areas that are still valid 
as well as new areas. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to 
ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is 
rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs 
should demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency 
information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance 
with the plan and/or procedures.
    OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop emergency 
information in a non-English language when required by the plan and/
or procedures.
    If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs should 
demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of 
ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and 
businesses in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures.
    OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide timely, 
accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for 
subsequent dissemination to the public. This would include 
demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent 
media briefings and distribute press releases as the situation 
warrants. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to respond 
appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information 
presented in media briefings and press releases should be consistent 
with protective action decisions and other emergency information 
provided to the public. Copies of pertinent emergency information 
(e.g., EAS messages and press releases) and media information kits 
should be available for dissemination to the media.
    OROs should demonstrate that an effective system is in place for 
dealing with rumors. Rumor control staff should demonstrate the 
capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or 
refer them to an appropriate information source. Information from 
the rumor control staff, including information that corrects false 
or inaccurate information when trends are noted, should be included, 
as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, 
media briefings, and/or press releases.
    All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's 
plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual 
emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play 
agreement.

Evaluation Area 6--Support Operation/Facilities

Sub-Element 6.a--Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and 
Emergency Workers, and Registration of Evacuees

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to 
implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees 
and emergency workers, while minimizing contamination of the 
facility, and registration of evacuees at reception centers.
    Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility 
has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to 
provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees 
and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b)
    Extent of Play. Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and 
registration facilities for evacuees/ emergency workers should be 
set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or 
as indicated in the

[[Page 31361]]

extent of play agreement. This would include adequate space for 
evacuees' vehicles. Expected demonstration should include 1/3 of the 
monitoring teams/portal monitors required to monitor 20% of the 
population allocated to the facility within 12 hours. Prior to using 
monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the 
process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.
    Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees 
should demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain a monitoring 
productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the emergency planning 
zone (EPZ) population planning base within about 12 hours. This 
monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that 
can be monitored per hour by the total complement of monitors using 
an appropriate monitoring procedure. A minimum of six individuals 
per monitoring station should be monitored, using equipment and 
procedures specified in the plan and/or procedures, to allow 
demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration 
capabilities. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated 
evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators in 
order to determine whether the twelve-hour requirement can be met. 
Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the twelve-
hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures should 
be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers.
    Decontamination of evacuees/emergency workers may be simulated 
and conducted by interview. The availability of provisions for 
separately showering should be demonstrated or explained. The staff 
should demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of 
contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs and 
appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate 
clean from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions should also 
exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals, 
provide changes of clothing for individuals whose clothing is 
contaminated, and store contaminated clothing and personal 
belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or 
facilities. In addition, for any individual found to be 
contaminated, procedures should be discussed concerning the handling 
of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings.
    Monitoring personnel should explain the use of action levels for 
determining the need for decontamination. They should also explain 
the procedures for referring evacuees who cannot be adequately 
decontaminated for assessment and follow up in accordance with the 
ORO's plans and procedures. Contamination of the individual will be 
determined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level 
radiation source.
    The capability to register individuals upon completion of the 
monitoring and decontamination activities should be demonstrated. 
The registration activities demonstrated should include the 
establishment of a registration record for each individual, 
consisting of the individual's name, address, results of monitoring, 
and time of decontamination, if any, or as otherwise designated in 
the plan. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all 
acceptable means for registration.
    All activities associated with this criterion must be based on 
the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an 
actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play 
agreement.

Sub-Element 6.b--Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker 
Equipment

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to 
implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency 
worker equipment, including vehicles.
    Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and 
resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination 
of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, 
K.5.b)
    Extent of Play. The monitoring staff should demonstrate the 
capability to monitor equipment, including vehicles, for 
contamination in accordance with the Offsite Response Organizations 
(ORO) plans and procedures. Specific attention should be given to 
equipment, including vehicles, that was in contact with individuals 
found to be contaminated. The monitoring staff should demonstrate 
the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of 
equipment including vehicles based on guidance levels and procedures 
stated in the plan and/or procedures.
    The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be 
set up as it would be in an actual emergency with all route 
markings, instrumentation, record keeping and contamination control 
measures in place. Monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for 
a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor 
the entire surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor 
areas such as air intake systems, air filters, radiator grills, 
bumpers, wheel wells and tires of vehicles, and door handles, as a 
minimum, should be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that 
were in contact with individuals found to be contaminated should 
also be checked.
    Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and 
equipment that cannot be decontaminated, may be simulated and 
conducted by interview.
    All activities associated with this criterion must be based on 
the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an 
actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the 
extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 6.c--Temporary Care of Evacuees

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) demonstrate the capability to 
establish relocation centers in host areas. Congregate care is 
normally provided in support of OROs by the American Red Cross (ARC) 
under existing letters of agreement.
    Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities 
demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and 
accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning 
guidelines. (Found in MASS CARE--Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031) 
Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have 
been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as 
appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-
0654, J.10.h, J.12)
    Extent of Play. Under this criterion, demonstration of 
congregate care centers may be conducted out of sequence with the 
exercise scenario. The evaluator should conduct a walk-through of 
the center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the 
services and accommodations are consistent with ARC 3031. In this 
simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations as they would 
be in an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be 
demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and 
providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the 
substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this 
objective, exercise demonstration expectations should be clearly 
specified in extent-of-play agreements.
    Congregate care staff should also demonstrate the capability to 
ensure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination, have 
been decontaminated as appropriate, and have been registered before 
entering the facility. This capability may be determined through an 
interview process.
    If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that 
would be difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots, blankets, 
sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically 
available at the facility (facilities). However, availability of 
such items should be verified by providing the evaluator a list of 
sources with locations and estimates of quantities.
    All activities associated with this criterion must be based on 
the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an 
actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the 
extent of play agreement.

Sub-Element 6.d--Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated 
Injured Individuals

Intent

    This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that 
Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to 
transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities 
with the capability to provide medical services.
    Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, 
adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, 
monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated 
injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)
    Extent of Play. Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination 
control

[[Page 31362]]

efforts will not delay urgent medical care for the victim.
    Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the 
capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical 
facilities. An ambulance should be used for the response to the 
victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an 
extended time, any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) may be 
utilized to transport the victim to the medical facility. Normal 
communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving 
medical facility should be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is 
used for transport to the medical facility, this communication must 
occur prior to releasing the ambulance from the drill. This 
communication would include reporting radiation monitoring results, 
if available. Additionally, the ambulance crew should demonstrate, 
by interview, knowledge of where the ambulance and crew would be 
monitored and decontaminated, if required, or whom to contact for 
such information.
    Monitoring of the victim may be performed prior to transport, 
done enroute, or deferred to the medical facility. Prior to using a 
monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the 
process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All 
monitoring activities should be completed as they would be in an 
actual emergency. Appropriate contamination control measures should 
be demonstrated prior to and during transport and at the receiving 
medical facility.
    The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to 
activate and set up a radiological emergency area for treatment. 
Equipment and supplies should be available for the treatment of 
contaminated injured individuals.
    The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to make 
decisions on the need for decontamination of the individual, to 
follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and to maintain 
records of all survey measurements and samples taken. All procedures 
for the collection and analysis of samples and the decontamination 
of the individual should be demonstrated or described to the 
evaluator.
    All activities associated with this criterion must be based on 
the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an 
actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play 
agreement.

    Dated: June 5, 2001.
Archibald C. Reid III,
Acting Executive Associate Director, Preparedness, Training & Exercises 
Directorate.
[FR Doc. 01-14637 Filed 6-8-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6718-06-P