[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 107 (Monday, June 4, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30025-30026]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-13900]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-333]


Entergy Nuclear Fitzpatrick, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, 
Inc. James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Exemption

1.0 Background

    Entergy Nuclear FitzPatrick, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, 
Inc. are the holders of Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 which 
authorizes operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant 
(JAF). The license provides, among other things, that the facility is 
subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility consists of a boiling-water reactor located in Oswego 
County in New York.

2.0  Purpose

    By letter dated October 30, 2000, the Power Authority of the State 
of New York (PASNY), then the licensee for JAF, submitted a request for 
exemption from certain technical requirements of Section III.G of 
Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50, in accordance with the provisions of 10 
CFR 50.12. Specifically, PASNY requested an exemption from Section 
III.G.2.c in that it requires certain redundant trains of equipment 
located in the same fire area, where automatic fire detection and 
automatic fire suppression are provided, to be protected with a 1-hour 
rated fire barrier. On November 21, 2000, PASNY's interests in the 
license were transferred to Entergy Nuclear FitzPatrick, LLC, which is 
now authorized to possess and use FitzPatrick and to Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc., which is now authorized to possess, use and operate 
FitzPatrick. By letter dated January 26, 2001, Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. (the licensee) requested that the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) continue to review and act on all requests 
before the Commission which had been submitted by PASNY before the 
transfer. Accordingly, the NRC staff continued its review. By letter 
dated February 7, 2001, the licensee provided supplemental information.
    Section III.G.2.c of appendix R Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR), part 50 specifies that certain fire protection 
features are necessary in order to assure the ability to achieve and 
maintain hot shutdown conditions. The high-pressure coolant injection 
(HPCI) for reactor coolant makeup and Train B of residual heat removal 
(RHR) for suppression pool cooling are credited in the licensee's safe 
shutdown analysis for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions 
and Train B of alternate shutdown cooling (ASD) is credited for 
achieving cold shutdown for a fire in the west cable tunnel (CT-1). A 
power cable that supports HPCI, Train B RHR and ASD is routed through 
CT-1. CT-1 also houses the redundant required safe shutdown equipment.
    The power cable for HPCI, Train B RHR and ASD in CT-1 has been 
protected with a fire wrap material to meet Appendix R in order to 
separate these systems from the redundant systems located in CT-1. 
However, it was found that this fire wrap material did not meet the 
requirements of 1-hour fire protection. Thus, an exemption from the 
requirements of Section III.G.2.c of appendix R to 10 CFR part 50 was 
requested.

3.0  Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, when (1) the exemptions are 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or 
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and 
(2) when special circumstances are present.
    A power cable for HPCI, Train B RHR and ASD in CT-1 has been 
protected with a fire wrap material to meet appendix R in order to 
separate these systems from the redundant systems located in CT-1. The 
licensee intended that the fire barrier material be rated for 1 hour, 
but the licensee later identified that there was not sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that the barrier meets the acceptance criteria 
for a rated 1-hour fire barrier wrap. Based on fire barrier testing, 
the barrier exceeded test acceptance criteria at 30 minutes.
    The primary in-situ combustible loading in CT-1 is cable, which the 
licensee states would contribute to a slowly developing cable fire. The 
originally installed cables for JAF were specified and ordered before 
IEEE Std. 383-1974, which provides a flame spread rating indicating 
slow flame spreading, was issued. However, an analysis was performed by 
the licensee which evaluated the flame retardant capability of the 
installed cable and it was determined that the installed cable was 
similar to IEEE 383-1974 rated cable. The only other combustible 
materials identified in the area are limited quantities of fiberglass 
associated with a water tank, ladders and piping. The only ignition 
sources which have been identified are the cables.
    An automatic area-wide early warning smoke detection system is 
installed in CT-1. The system was designed and installed to National 
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards, NFPA-72D, 1979, 
Proprietary Signaling Systems and NFPA-72E, 1978, Automatic Detectors. 
In some cases the installed system does not meet the codes of record. 
These code deficiencies are related to lack of electrical supervision 
of circuits, lack of recording of alarms, lack of environmental 
qualification, over loading of fire detection signaling lines, some 
beam pockets lacking detectors, and power supplies not meeting NFPA 
standards. The licensee has determined that the code deviations do not 
adversely impact safety performance. The majority of the deficiencies 
would not degrade the performance of the fire detection system but may 
impact the system's availability. Site administrative procedures 
control compensatory measures for the detection system in CT-1 in the 
event that the detection system is unavailable. The code deficiency of 
lacking smoke detectors in

[[Page 30026]]

two of the beam pockets may impact the performance of the system. Based 
on the proximity of the unprotected beam pockets to the fire wrap, over 
80 feet away, the licensee concludes that the smoke detectors in the 
general area are adequate to provide detection of any credible fire 
which may potentially damage the fire wrap. Based on the information 
provided by the licensee, the staff concurs that the code deviations 
and lack of detectors in all beam pockets would not adversely impact 
the fire detection system's performance in the area of the fire wrap.
    An automatic area-wide wet pipe sprinkler system is installed in 
CT-1. The licensee states that the system meets the design requirements 
of NFPA-13, 1991, and is designed and installed as an Extra Hazard 
(Group 1) system. In addition, an in-tray automatic wet pipe water 
spray system is designed to suppress a tray based fire. The licensee 
states that the water spray system meets the design requirements of 
NFPA-15, 1990, Water Spray Systems. Water hose lines and fire 
extinguishers are available to the fire brigade inside the zone to 
support manual suppression. In addition, hose stations with additional 
lengths of hose are available outside of the area if needed.
    Transient combustible materials in the area are kept to a minimum 
based on the administrative limits for the area. Administrative limits 
may be exceeded only when an evaluation has been performed and a 
combustible control permit has been issued. All station hot work, 
including cutting and welding, is controlled by administrative 
procedures. Special requirements for the CT-1 are that fire protection 
personnel will approve hot work in this area and that fire protection 
personnel will inspect the area during the performance of hot work at 
least every 2 hours.
    The NRC staff examined the licensee's rationale to support the 
exemption request and believes that reasonable assurance that at least 
one means of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions will 
remain available during and after any postulated fire in the plant. 
Accordingly, the request for an exemption from the requirements of 10 
CFR part 50 appendix R, Section III.G.2.c with respect to fire area CT-
1 meets the special circumstances delineated in 10 CFR part 
50.12(a)(2)(ii), i.e., the application of the regulation in these 
particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying 
purpose of the rule. While the installed fire barrier in CT-1 has less 
than a 1-hour fire endurance rating, it will provide some resistance to 
fire. The area where the fire barrier is located has no ignition 
sources other than cables, has available manual suppression capability, 
and is equipped with automatic fire suppression and fire detection. 
Under these circumstances, there is an adequate level of fire safety 
such that there is reasonable assurance that at least one means of 
achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions will remain 
available during and after any postulated fire in the plant, and 
therefore, the underlying purpose of the rule is met.
    Based on the NRC staff review, and circumstances described above, 
the staff concludes that an exemption from the technical requirements 
of Section III.G.2.c of appendix R to 10 CFR part 50 to the extent that 
it requires the enclosure of cables of one redundant train of safe 
shutdown equipment in a 1-hour fire rated barrier, is appropriate for 
fire area CT-1. See the safety evaluation that supports these findings 
dated May 29, 2001.

4.0  Conclusion

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue 
risk to public health and safety, and is consistent with the common 
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present. 
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Entergy Nuclear FitzPatrick, 
LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. the requested exemption from 
the requirements of Section III.G.2.c of appendix R to 10 CFR part 50 
for the JAF.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment (66 FR27540).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day of May 2001.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Cynthia A. Carpenter,
Acting Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 01-13900 Filed 6-1-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P