[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 67 (Friday, April 6, 2001)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 18208-18210]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-8443]



[[Page 18208]]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. 99-5682]
RIN 2127-AG48


Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Seat Belt Assemblies

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Denial of petitions for reconsideration.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice announces the denial of petitions for 
reconsideration of the agency's final rule deleting the provision in 
Standard No. 209, Seat belt assemblies, requiring that the lap belt 
portion of a safety belt system ``shall be designed to remain on the 
pelvis under all conditions.''

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For non-legal issues: Mr. John Lee, 
Office of Crashworthiness Standards, NPS-11, National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590, 
telephone (202) 366-2264, facsimile (202) 366-4329, electronic mail 
[email protected].
    For legal issues: Mr. Otto G. Matheke, III, NCC-20, Rulemaking 
Division, Office of Chief Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590, 
telephone (202) 366-2992, facsimile (202) 366-3820, electronic mail 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 209, Seat belt 
assemblies, specifies requirements for seat belt assemblies, including 
the pelvic restraint (i.e., lap belt) and the upper torso restraint 
(i.e., shoulder belt). Other requirements address the release 
mechanism, attachment hardware, adjustment, webbing, strap, marking and 
other informational instructions. NHTSA adopted Standard No. 209 in 
1967 as one of the initial Federal motor vehicle safety standards (32 
FR 2408, February 3, 1967).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Standard No. 209 was adopted from a Department of Commerce 
standard (32 FR 2408, February 3, 1967), which was adopted from a 
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) standard. (29 FR 16973, 
December 11, 1964).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    From the time the Standard was issued until the issuance of the 
final rule deleting the provision, S4.1(b) contained the following 
requirement:

    A seat belt assembly shall provide pelvic restraint whether or 
not upper torso restraint is provided, and the pelvic restraint 
shall be designed to remain on the pelvis under all conditions, 
including collision or roll-over of the motor vehicle. Pelvic 
restraint of a Type 2 seat belt assembly that can be used without 
upper torso restraint shall comply with requirement for Type 1 seat 
belt assembly in S4.1 to S4.4.

    Although the brief preamble of the notice establishing the standard 
and paragraph S4.1(b) in 1967 did not discuss the purpose of that 
paragraph, NHTSA subsequently indicated that it regarded the purpose of 
S4.1(b) to be the reduction of the likelihood of restrained occupants 
sliding forward and under a fastened safety belt during a crash 
(referred to as submarining). It is important that the lap belt remains 
on the pelvis so that the crash forces transferred by a lap belt are 
imposed on the strong, bony pelvis, instead of the more vulnerable 
abdominal region.
    In a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) published on July 7, 1997 
(62 FR 36251),\2\ NHTSA proposed to delete S4.1(b). NHTSA tentatively 
concluded that S4.1(b) was unclear and should either be clarified or 
deleted. The agency explained that it was unclear how it would 
objectively determine that a lap belt complied with the Standard and 
was in fact ``designed'' to remain on the pelvis. NHTSA raised the 
issue of whether a lap belt's failure to remain on the pelvis during a 
crash could be sufficient to establish that the belt was not 
``designed'' to remain on the pelvis under all conditions. In addition, 
NHTSA noted that the meaning of the words, ``remain on the pelvis,'' 
was unclear. The agency also stated its belief that Standard No. 208, 
other provisions in Standard No. 209, and Standard No. 210 contained 
more specific requirements that collectively have the effect of 
requiring effective pelvic restraint and thereby reducing the 
likelihood of occupants submarining during a crash. NHTSA tentatively 
concluded that the requirement appeared to be unnecessary and 
unenforceable and was an appropriate candidate for deletion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ The NPRM was issued in response to a May 24, 1996 petition 
for rulemaking from the Association of International Automobile 
Manufacturers, Inc. (AIAM). AIAM petitioned NHTSA to delete S4.1(b) 
of Standard No. 209. AIAM stated that the phrase ``designed to 
remain on the pelvis under all conditions'' was redundant of other, 
more specific and more stringent requirements in Standard No. 208, 
Occupant Crash Protection, Standard No. 209, and Standard No. 210, 
Seat Belt Assembly Anchorages, which already provide specific 
requirements that affect pelvic restraint.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA received nine comments in response to the NPRM. General 
Motors Corporation (GM), Mercedes Benz, the Automotive Occupant 
Restraint Council (AORC), the Association of International Automobile 
Manufacturers (AIAM), Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler), Ford Motor 
Company (Ford), and Volkswagen of America, Inc. (VW) all favored the 
agency's proposal to delete S4.1(b) from Standard No. 209. Advocates 
for Highway Safety (Advocates) and the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) opposed it.
    In a final rule published in the Federal Register on May 19, 1999 
(64 FR 27203, DOT docket #99-5682-1), NHTSA deleted S4.1(b) from 
Standard No. 209. As the agency explained at that time, NHTSA concluded 
that S4.1(b) is unnecessary because subsequently adopted provisions in 
Standard No. 208 and Standard No. 210, and other provisions in Standard 
No. 209, contained more specific requirements that collectively 
achieved the same objective for a broad category of vehicle occupants. 
These provisions regulating belt angle, adjustment, fit, and the amount 
of slack in the belt were viewed by NHTSA as adequately addressing the 
likelihood of occupant submarining. In particular, the agency 
determined that Standards No. 208 and 209 address seat belt fit and 
adjustment by requiring seat belts to fit a wide range of vehicle 
occupants, thereby assuring that belts are likely to be correctly 
located on an occupant. Further, NHTSA also observed that it amended 
S4.3.1 of Standard No. 210 in 1990 to increase the minimum lap belt 
angle from 20 degrees to 30 degrees. (55 FR 17970, April 30, 1990), 
thereby reducing the potential for occupant submarining. The agency 
also noted that the potential for occupant submarining is also affected 
by the amount of slack in a lap belt and that S4.3(j) of Standard No. 
209, promulgated after S4.1(b), lowered the risk of occupant 
submarining by controlling the amount of slack that may be introduced 
into the belt.
    The agency also concluded that S4.1(b) was essentially 
unenforceable. The agency did not have a test procedure for evaluating 
compliance with S4.1(b), and did not believe that a repeatable, 
practicable test could be devised to determine compliance with the 
provision. NHTSA determined that no single test could be devised to 
determine if a belt was designed to stay on the pelvis under all 
conditions.

II. Petitions for Reconsideration

    The agency received one petition for reconsideration and two 
comments regarding the May 19,1999 final rule. Syson-Hille & Associates 
(Syson), a consulting group, filed its petition on June 22, 1999. Ms. 
Kimberly Abood

[[Page 18209]]

submitted comments opposing the final rule on July 7, 1999 and Mr. Chad 
Cloud filed similar comments on November 8, 1999.\3\ All were concerned 
that the deletion of S4.1(b) would increase submarining injuries. In 
addition, Syson believed that the deletion of S4.1(b) would also have 
an impact on the performance of belt latches in rollovers, as the 
requirement that a belt remain over the pelvis implicitly demands that 
a belt remain fastened at all times.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ The comments filed by Mr. Cloud and Ms. Abood did not meet 
the formal requirements for petitions for reconsideration and were 
filed after the deadline for such petitions had passed. Nonetheless, 
the agency is treating these comments as if they were proper 
petitions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Syson disagreed with NHTSA's determination that other provisions in 
Standards No. 208, No. 209 and No. 210 would provide adequate assurance 
that submarining would not occur in a crash. Syson argued that the 
parameters affected by the foregoing provisions (i.e., lap belt angles, 
shoulder belt anchorages and junction to centerline distance) addressed 
only three of 20 conditions that Syson considers to be important in 
submarining. Syson further claimed that the current agency standards 
applicable to lap belt angles, shoulder belt anchorage locations, and 
junction to centerline distance addressed these factors in the most 
general sense without adequate assurances of performance. Syson urged 
that NHTSA make a submarining test specification part of the FMVSS No. 
208 crash test procedures and cautioned the agency, stating that the 
elimination of S4.1(b) imposes a safety cost and offers no benefits. 
Syson also stated its belief that the elimination of S4.1(b) increased 
risks to occupants in all collisions, not just frontal impacts. In 
Syson's view, S4.1(b)'s command that the belt be designed to remain on 
the pelvis under all conditions required that the belt remain on an 
occupant's pelvis in any and all impacts and events. Because of this, 
Syson believes that S4.1(b) not only served to ensure that belts remain 
properly located, but also required that belts always remain fastened 
as an unfastened belt will not remain on the pelvis. In particular, 
Syson alleged that certain buckle designs are likely to unlatch in side 
impacts or rollovers.
    Ms. Kimberly Abood submitted comments indicating her concern about 
the deletion of S4.1(b) from Standard No. 209. In Ms. Abood's view, the 
original requirement that the lap belt be designed to remain on the 
pelvis was inserted in the Standard for good reason and should not be 
deleted for the convenience of the auto industry. Ms. Abood related how 
she had been in a minor crash, but had sustained extremely severe 
injuries when she submarined under her lap belt. Ms. Abood stated her 
belief that automakers will not test for submarining if S4.1(b) is 
eliminated and the same manufacturers will be able to cut costs without 
being held accountable for their designs.
    Mr. Chad Cloud submitted comments similar to those submitted by Ms. 
Abood. Mr. Cloud indicated that his son suffered severe spinal injuries 
and resulting paralysis after submarining under a rear seat lap belt in 
a 1988 Plymouth Horizon involved in a crash. Mr. Cloud argued that his 
son's injuries were caused by the fact that the 1988 Horizon did not 
comply with S4.1(b) of Standard No. 209. Because of this experience, 
Mr. Cloud urged NHTSA not to modify the Standard.

III. Response To Petitions for Reconsideration

    In response to the petitions for reconsideration the agency has 
reviewed its decision to delete S4.1(b) from Standard No. 209. For the 
reasons stated below, the agency is affirming its earlier decision.
    Standard No. 209 was among the initial set of safety standards 
issued by the agency. The section at issue here, S4.1(b), dates from 
the original issuance of Standard No. 209 in 1967. The agency notes 
that both automobile safety and NHTSA's own safety standards have 
evolved considerably since that time. As the agency noted in the 
preamble accompanying the final rule deleting S4.1(b), upgrades to a 
number of standards that have occurred since the adoption of Standard 
No. 209 now provide adequate, if not superior, safety benefits beyond 
those that may have been realized through the adoption of S4.1(b).
    The agency also notes that, for a number of reasons, compliance 
with S4.1(b) could neither be measured nor enforced. S4.1(b) contained 
the general command that a seat belt ``shall be designed to remain on 
the pelvis under all conditions * * *.'' The particular language of 
S4.1(b), which would have required examination of whether a 
configuration was ``designed to'' achieve a result rather than 
measuring actual performance, made the development of a practical 
compliance test unlikely. Assessing the performance of a device under 
``all conditions,'' is not practicable.
    Elimination of the subjective requirement that a belt must have a 
specific design goal and the requirement that it meet this goal under 
all conditions would reduce the requirement to a general command that 
the belt remain on the pelvis. Unless limited to some type of crash, 
this command would be the equivalent of ``under all conditions.'' As 
the risk of submarining is greatest in a frontal impact, the logical 
choice would be to specify that the belt remain on the pelvis in a 
frontal crash. However, as the agency noted when it issued the final 
rule, NHTSA has concluded that existing provisions in other standards, 
particularly Standard No. 210, Standard No. 209 and Standard No. 208, 
adequately protect against this risk.
    The agency concedes that, in theory, S4.1(b) could have been 
modified to include a practicable test procedure applicable to some 
crash conditions. However, as noted above and in the preamble to the 
May 19, 1999 final rule, NHTSA believes that any safety need that might 
have been addressed by such a test has been met by other provisions in 
existing safety standards. In particular, the agency notes that the 
minimum lap belt angle requirements now found in Standard No. 210, 
reduce the risk of submarining.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ NHTSA test data have shown that the occurrence of 
submarining is diminished as lap belt angles increase (``Rear Seat 
Submarining Investigation,'' DOT HS 807-347, May 1988).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Chad Cloud and Ms. Kimberly Abood both urged NHTSA to 
reconsider its decision to delete S4.1(b) on the basis that the 
provision operated to prevent manufacturers from employing belt systems 
which might allow occupants to ``submarine'' under a lap belt in a 
crash and suffer abdominal injuries as a result of the lap belt moving 
off the pelvis and onto the abdomen. As Ms. Abood and Mr. Cloud pointed 
out, a lap belt may inflict serious or fatal injuries if such 
submarining occurs. NHTSA is aware of this risk, and has concluded that 
deletion of S4.1(b) does not increase it.
    Submarining occurs when an occupant moves forward and underneath a 
lap belt in a frontal crash. A number of measures instituted by the 
agency since the adoption of S4.1(b) require manufacturers to use seat 
belts minimize the risk of submarining in frontal crashes. For example, 
Standard No. 208 was modified in 1985 through the issuance of a final 
rule requiring improvements in seat belt comfort and fit (50 FR 46056, 
November 6, 1985). Later amendments to that standard required dynamic 
testing of seat belts in passenger cars (51 FR 9800, March 21, 1986) 
and in light trucks (52 FR 44898, November 23, 1987). In November 1989, 
the risk of injuries from submarining was significantly reduced by the

[[Page 18210]]

issuance of a requirement that lap and shoulder belts be provided at 
all front facing outboard seating positions in passenger cars, light 
trucks and multipurpose vehicles (54 FR 46257, November 2, 1989). An 
amendment to Standard No. 210 increasing the minimum lap belt angle was 
issued by NHTSA in April 1990 (55 FR 17970, April 30, 1990).
    Neither Mr. Cloud or Ms. Abood submitted any data with their 
comments other than to provide an account of the seat-belt related 
injuries suffered by themselves or a family member in individual 
crashes. In both instances, the injuries appear to have occurred in 
older vehicles designed and built before the effective dates of the 
amendments discussed above. NHTSA believes that, in both cases, the 
presence of shoulder belts in addition to lap belts, the modifications 
to the minimum lap belt angle, and the other changes to Standard No. 
208 might very well have been sufficient to prevent or reduce the 
severity of the injuries described in the comments.
    As is the case with Mr. Cloud and Ms. Abood, Syson did not submit 
any data supporting its contention that the agency should reconsider 
its decision to delete S4.1(b). Syson's principal argument is that the 
amendments to Standards No. 208 and 210 that were cited by the agency 
as providing, in the aggregate, superior protection than that offered 
by S4.1(b), were too general and do not sufficiently address 
submarining. Syson further stated that it had identified 20 variables 
that it viewed as affecting submarining and that, at best, the measures 
adopted by NHTSA subsequent to the promulgation of S4.1.(b) addressed 
only three of those variables.
    NHTSA does not agree. The amendments cited by the agency, 
particularly those relating to lap belt angles and requiring shoulder 
belts, reduce the risks of submarining to a far greater extent than the 
requirements of S4.1(b). Furthermore, an examination of the 20 factors 
submitted by Syson indicates that these factors are either addressed by 
existing standards, are variables that could not reasonably be 
controlled by regulation, or are variables particular to a specific 
user or crash. At least four of the factors noted by Syson (belt 
angles, belt elongation, anchorage location and retractor locking) are 
subject to existing regulations. Others, such as vehicle pitch, vehicle 
deceleration pulse, seat back position, the occupant's seated position, 
friction between occupant and belt, friction between occupant and seat, 
and the occupant's clothing are variables unique to an individual 
crash.
    Syson also urged the agency to adopt additional tests and modify 
the Hybrid III dummy to address submarining. Again, in light of the 
amendments to Standards No. 208 and 210, NHTSA does not believe these 
steps are necessary. Lastly, Syson argues that S4.1(b)'s requirement 
that the belt remain on the pelvis provides an additional safeguard 
against seat belt buckle failure and unlatching. The agency notes that 
Standard No. 209 already contains a number of requirements that require 
that seat belt latches perform as they should. In regard to Syson's 
claim that certain buckle designs may release in side impacts and 
rollovers, the agency notes that its Office of Defects Investigation 
(ODI) completed an extensive investigation involving the alleged 
problem of inadvertent unlatching of the buckle of certain designs of 
safety belts. (The investigation is documented in a 1992 Vehicle 
Research and Test Center test report titled, ``Tests Regarding Alleged 
Inertial Unlatching of Safety Belt Buckles.'' This document may be 
obtained from NHTSA's Technical Information Services office.)

IV. Conclusion

    For the reasons provided above, the petitions are denied.

    Issued on: March 30, 2001.
Stephen R. Kratzke,
Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards.
[FR Doc. 01-8443 Filed 4-5-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P