[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 57 (Friday, March 23, 2001)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 16121-16125]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-7200]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 33

[Docket No. RM98-4-001; Order No. 642-A]


Revised Filing Requirements Under Part 33 of the Commission's 
Regulations

Issued March 15, 2001.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: final rule; order on rehearing.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is 
issuing an order addressing requests for rehearing of Order No. 642, a 
final rule updating the filing requirements applications filed under 
the Commission's regulations. (65 FR 70984 (Nov. 28, 2000).) Order No. 
642 was designed to implement the Commission's Policy Statement 
concerning mergers under the Federal Power Act. The final rule codified 
the Commission's screening approach to mergers that may raise 
horizontal competitive concerns, provided specific filing requirements 
consistent with Appendix A of the Commission's Merger Policy Statement, 
established guidelines for vertical competitive analysis, and 
identified filing requirements for mergers that potentially raise 
vertical market power concerns. The order on rehearing addresses issues 
relating to the Merger Policy Statement, the abbreviated filing 
requirements, adequacy of data requirements, consideration of retail 
competitive effects, generic conditions for mergers, a temporary 
moratorium on mergers and other miscellaneous issues.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Diana Moss, Office of Markets, Tariffs 
and Rates, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 208-0087.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

    Before Commissioners: Curt Hebert, Jr., Chairman; William L. 
Massey, and Linda Breathitt.

Order No. 642-A; Order on Rehearing

I. Introduction

    The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is issuing an 
order addressing requests for rehearing of Order No. 642, a final rule 
updating the filing requirements applications filed under Part 33 of 
the Commission's regulations, including public utility mergers.\1\ The 
rehearing order denies rehearing but provides clarification on these 
issues.
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    \1\ 65 FR 70984 (Nov. 28, 2000); III FERC Stats. & Regs. para. 
31,111 (Nov. 15, 2000), codified at, 18 CFR Part 33.
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II. Background

    Pursuant to section 203 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), Commission 
authorization is required for public utility acquisitions or 
dispositions of jurisdictional facilities, including public utility 
mergers and consolidations.\2\ Since 1996, the Commission has approved 
such transactions if they are consistent with the public interest under 
guidelines established in the Merger Policy Statement.\3\ The Policy 
Statement sets out three factors the Commission will generally consider 
when analyzing a merger proposal: effect on competition, effect on 
rates, and effect on regulation.
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    \2\ 16 U.S.C. 824(b).
    \3\ Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Merger Policy Under the 
Federal Power Act: Policy Statement, Order No. 592, 61 FR 68595 
(Dec. 30, 1996), III FERC Stats. & Regs. para. 31,044 (Dec. 18, 
1996), reconsideration denied, Order No. 592-A, 62 FR 33341 (1997), 
79 FERC para. 61,321 (1997) (Policy Statement).
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    Order No. 642 revised the filing requirements in Part 33 of the 
Commission's regulations to enable

[[Page 16122]]

applicants and intervenors to address more effectively and predictably 
the types of issues that have arisen in applications filed since the 
issuance of the Policy Statement, as well as issues that we anticipate 
may arise as the energy industry continues to make the transition to 
more competitive markets. Order No. 642 was also designed to implement 
the Policy Statement and provide detailed guidance to applicants for 
preparing applications under section 203 of the FPA. The revised filing 
requirements are designed to assist the Commission in determining 
whether applications are consistent with the public interest, and to 
provide more certainty and expedite the Commission's handling of such 
applications.
    Among other things, Order No. 642 codifies the Commission's 
screening approach to mergers that may raise horizontal competitive 
concerns, provided specific filing requirements consistent with 
Appendix A of the Commission's Merger Policy Statement, established 
guidelines for vertical competitive analysis, and set forth filing 
requirements for mergers that potentially raise vertical market power 
concerns. Order No. 642 also streamlined and eliminated outdated and 
unnecessary Part 33 filing requirements, and reduced the information 
burden for dispositions of jurisdictional facilities that raise no 
competitive concerns.
    Requests for rehearing were filed by the National Rural Electric 
Cooperative Association (NRECA) and jointly by the American Public 
Power Association and the Transmission Access Policy Study Group (APPA/
TAPS). As discussed below, the Commission denies rehearing, but 
clarifies certain aspects of the filing requirements in Order No. 642.

III. Discussion

A. Reversal of the Policy Statement

Rehearing Requests
    NRECA and APPA/TAPS are concerned that Order No. 642 relies too 
heavily on the Appendix A competitive screen analysis and improperly 
shifts the burden of proof regarding a disposition's competitive 
effects from applicants to intervenors. This, they argue, reverses the 
Policy Statement without adequate explanation. Specifically, 
Petitioners are concerned about Order No. 642's declaration that:

    If the screen is violated, the Commission will take a closer 
look at whether the merger would harm competition. If not, and no 
intervenors make a convincing case that the merger has 
anticompetitive effects despite passing the screen, the horizontal 
analysis stops there.

    APPA/TAPS contend that, if the foregoing is read literally, the 
Commission will treat passing the screen as creating a ``nearly 
irrebuttable'' presumption that intervenors may overcome only by ``a 
convincing case that the merger has anti-competitive effects.'' This, 
they argue, flips the statutory burden of proof from applicants to 
intervenors by requiring intervenors to make a ``convincing case'' of 
competitive problems, a standard that was not proposed in the Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR). APPA/TAPS point to the standard in the 
Policy Statement, which stated:

    [S]uch claims must be substantial and specific. In other words, 
they should focus on errors or other factual challenges to the data 
or assumptions used in the analysis, or whether the analysis has 
overlooked certain effects of the merger.\4\
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    \4\ Order No. 592 at 30,119.

    While APPA/TAPS understand the ``substantial and specific'' 
standard articulated in the Policy Statement to be consistent with the 
assignment of the burden of proof under the FPA, they assert that the 
``convincing case'' terminology used in Order No. 642 suggests 
application of an unlawfully heavier burden.
    Therefore, Petitioners argue that the Commission should clarify 
that the applicant bears the ultimate burden of proof to demonstrate 
that the transaction is consistent with the public interest. In 
addition, APPA/TAPS state that it is not clear whether, if applicants 
take advantage of the safe harbors outlined in Order No. 642, 
intervenors may be left with the impossible task of ``making a 
convincing case'' based on other factors, in less than the 60 day 
period for comments, without the benefit of the information required in 
an Appendix A analysis.
    Moreover, NRECA points out that the statement ``the horizontal 
analysis stops there'' is ambiguous. This deviates from the Policy 
Statement, Petitioners state, and abandons the Commission's statutory 
duty to be pro-active regarding mergers. They note that the Policy 
Statement made clear that the screen was just one factor to be 
considered in setting a case for hearing and described the screen as a 
tool, allowing mergers of concern to be identified based on facts not 
fully reflected in or completely outside the screen. APPA/TAPS 
reiterate that the Policy Statement instructed intervenors to provide 
specific concerns, not generalized claims, consistent with the 
``substantial and specific'' standard.
    APPA/TAPS also cite past instances where the Commission looked 
beyond the screen, such as the hearing order for the merger between 
American Electric Power Company and Central and South West 
Corporation.\5\ Thus, Petitioners contend that the Commission must 
clarify that it will look beyond the screen at other market power 
concerns which may arise. NRECA also requests that the Commission 
clarify that, even absent an intervenor making a clear and convincing 
case, the Commission has the authority and the duty to inquire further 
into a merger's competitive effects.
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    \5\ American Electric Power Company, et al., 85 FERC para. 
61,201 (1998), reh'g 87 FERC para. 61,274 (1999), appeal pending sub 
nom., Wabash Valley Power Assn. v. FERC, Docket 00-1297 (D.C. Cir. 
2000).
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Commission Response
    The Commission believes that Order No. 642 does not reverse the 
PolicyStatement. Rather, Order No. 642 implements the Policy Statement 
and sets forth filing requirements that are consistent with the Policy 
Statement.\6\ APPA/TAPS' concern that under Order No. 642, passing the 
screen creates an irrebuttable presumption which can be overcome only 
with ``a convincing case'' that the merger has anti-competitive effects 
is misplaced. The term ``convincing case'' is consistent with the 
Policy Statement, to which APPA/TAPS themselves cite:
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    \6\ Order No. 642 at 31,872 and 31,874.

[there] also may be disputes over the data used by applicants or 
over the way applicants have conducted the screen analysis. However, 
these claims must be substantial and specific.\7\
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    \7\ Order No. 592 at 30,119.

As envisioned in Order No. 642, unsubstantiated, unspecific claims made 
by any party to the proceeding do not constitute a convincing case.
    Given the foregoing, we also disagree with NRECA's claim that the 
phrase ``the horizontal analysis stops there'' is ambiguous. To the 
contrary, it makes clear that the Commission will be satisfied that 
there is no need for further investigation on this issue if the 
criteria for passing the screen are met. As stated in Order No. 642, 
these criteria include: (1) Intervenors do not make a convincing case 
(i.e., they do not raise substantial and specific claims) that the 
merger has anticompetitive effects \8\ and (2) the evidence as to the 
lack of effect on competition is convincing and verifiable.\9\ In 
crafting Order No. 642 to

[[Page 16123]]

be consistent with the Policy Statement, the Commission was cognizant 
of the value of the screen as ``* * * a standard, generally 
conservative check to allow the Commission, applicants and intervenors 
to quickly identify mergers that are unlikely to present competitive 
problems.'' \10\ However, to ensure that mergers with potential 
competitive problems will be appropriately identified and analyzed, the 
Commission was also careful to state in Order No. 642 that ``[the] 
horizontal screen is not meant to be a definitive test of the likely 
competitive effects of a proposed merger.'' \11\
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    \8\ Order No. 642 at 31,897.
    \9\ Id. at 31,878.
    \10\ Id. at 31,879.
    \11\ Id.
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    Therefore, we do not agree with Petitioners that Order No. 642 
reverses the Policy Statement and we deny their request for rehearing 
on this issue.

B. Abbreviated Filing Requirements

Rehearing Request
    APPA/TAPS argue that the abbreviated filing requirements specified 
in Order No. 642 are inappropriate because: (1) They are erroneously 
based on whether applicants are actual or potential competitors in each 
other's geographic markets; (2) they create strong incentives to craft 
potentially anti-competitive combinations that can be portrayed to 
qualify for abbreviated filing requirements; and (3) the procedures 
allow less than 60 days for interventions, giving intervenors (whom the 
Commission relies on as a critical source of information) less time and 
information to accomplish the task of making a ``convincing case'' that 
a corporate disposition has anti-competitive effects. APPA/TAPS urge 
the Commission to impose the same (non-abbreviated) filing requirements 
on all applicants under section 203 and, absent that, to require a 
competitive analysis if the applicants would own or control 5,000 MWs 
or more of generation. Petitioners also urge the Commission not to 
shorten the 60-day intervention period. At a minimum, APPA/TAPS suggest 
the Commission automatically grant extensions to a 60-day notice period 
if any intervenor requests additional time to prepare its case.
Commission Response
    As stated in Order No. 642, the abbreviated filing requirements 
apply when it is relatively easy to determine that a disposition will 
not harm competition.\12\ In cases where this determination is not 
obvious, as also explained in Order No. 642, the Commission would be 
unlikely to consider merger applications for review under the 
abbreviated filing requirements, but would make such decisions after 
examining the specifics of each case.\13\ Given the foregoing, 
Petitioners' proposals regarding the 60-day notice period are 
unnecessary, and defeat the purpose of the abbreviated filing 
requirements. In addition, APPA/TAPS have not demonstrated why non-
abbreviated filing requirements should be required of all applicants 
that own or control 5,000 MW or more of generation.
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    \12\ Id. at 31,901.
    \13\ Id. at 31,902.
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    APPA/TAPS' concern that the Commission will overlook market power 
issues in abbreviated filings if applicants do not have a pre-merger 
presence in each other's geographic markets is based on a misreading of 
Order No. 642. As explained in Order No. 642, to be eligible for an 
abbreviated filing, applicants must demonstrate that the merging 
entities do not currently operate in the same geographic markets, or if 
they do, that the extent of such overlapping operation is de 
minimis.\14\ Relevant geographic markets include, but are not limited 
to, Applicants' own geographic markets. In the case of a horizontal 
merger, the overlapping relevant markets in question would be 
downstream electricity markets and in a vertical merger case, they 
would be upstream input and downstream electricity markets.\15\ As 
such, the abbreviated filing requirements do not overlook either 
horizontal or vertical market power issues. We therefore deny 
Petitioners' request for rehearing on this issue.
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    \14\ Id.
    \15\ Id. at 31,901 and 31,907.
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C. Confidentiality of ``Market Strategy'' Information

Rehearing Requests
    Petitioners object to the presumption of confidentiality for 
applicant's ``market strategy'' information unless intervenors can show 
that denying disclosure would violate intervenors' due process rights. 
NRECA believes that this provision creates an incentive to shield large 
classes of information by labeling it ``market strategies.'' APPA/TAPS 
point out that there is a constitutional dimension to the burden placed 
upon requests for secrecy, and there is also long-established 
Commission precedent placing an exacting standard on those seeking to 
justify confidential treatment. NRECA also points out that the 
Commission's existing discovery rules provide procedures for invoking 
privilege to limit discovery of specific information. APPA/TAPS argue 
that due process and the Commission's ex parte rules require disclosure 
in all cases to intervenors willing to abide by reasonable protective 
orders and that denying intervenor access to that information even 
under a protective order directly conflicts with the Commission's ex 
parte rules.
    Petitioners suggest that the Commission clarify that merger 
applicants are subject to a heavy burden to demonstrate that 
confidential treatment is required and that to the extent information 
is treated as confidential, it will be made available to intervenors 
willing to execute protective agreements. Absent this, NRECA argues 
that the Commission should clarify that the confidentiality provision 
applies only to ``market strategy'' information voluntarily submitted 
by applicants in response to intervenor concerns about perceived 
potential competition but not to data or information labeled by 
applicants as ``market strategies'' but submitted for other reasons or 
obtained through discovery.
Commission Response
    As we explained in Order No. 642, the Commission's treatment of 
confidential information in merger applications will be consistent with 
the Commission's long-standing rules governing the protection of any 
documents filed at the Commission for which the confidentiality 
privilege is claimed.\16\ Under these regulations, applicants may claim 
confidentiality for certain information included in their merger 
applications at the time the application is filed, and parties to the 
proceeding may seek access to that information pursuant to Sec. 388.107 
of the Commission's regulations.\17\ At that time, we will review the 
documents to determine whether the information falls within the 
exemption from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) for ``trade secrets and commercial or financial information 
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.''\18\ We 
therefore deny Petitioners' request for rehearing on this issue.
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    \16\ 18 CFR 388.112.
    \17\ 18 CFR 388.107.
    \18\ 18 CFR 388.107(d).
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D. Inadequacy of Data Requirements

Rehearing Requests
    APPA/TAPS allege that Order No. 642 fails to address their concern 
that the data collected for merger analysis may be inadequate. In their 
comments on the NOPR, APPA/TAPS explained the need

[[Page 16124]]

for data and information obtained through a ``second request'' issued 
by the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission. APPA/TAPS 
argue that despite the Commission's claim that it can request 
additional data, the Commission has not demonstrated that it has the 
time or resources to do so. Therefore, APPA/TAPS argue that ``second 
request''-type data should be submitted automatically with the merger 
filing and be made available to intervenors when they execute the 
appropriate confidentiality agreements. Alternatively, APPA/TAPS 
suggest that the Commission should permit intervenors to obtain limited 
discovery during the initial intervention period.
Commission Response
    We disagree with Petitioners that Order No. 642 does not addresses 
their concern that data collected for merger analysis may be 
inadequate. To the contrary, Order No. 642 sets forth data and 
information requirements sufficient to ensure comprehensive review of 
applications under section 203. Moreover, as we stated several times in 
Order No. 642, the Commission retains the right to request additional 
information that we deem necessary to evaluate the economic and 
regulatory impacts brought about by a prospective corporate 
disposition.\19\ Contrary to Petitioners' assertions, the Commission 
has requested additional information in a number of instances and 
intervenors have benefitted from that information.\20\ Thus, we believe 
that expanding the data requirements to cover all contingencies is 
unnecessary. We will therefore deny Petitioners' request for rehearing 
on this issue.
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    \19\ See, e.g., Order No. 642 at 31,881 (on deficient filings), 
31,902 (on abbreviated filing requirements) and 31,918 (on retail 
access).
    \20\ See id. at 31,881, n. 26.
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E. Consideration of Retail Competitive Effects

Rehearing Requests
    Petitioners argue that Order No. 642 fails to adequately consider 
the effect of mergers by limiting the Commission's review of retail 
markets to only those situations where ``a state lacks authority in 
these kinds of circumstances and asks us to do so.'' APPA/TAPS argue 
that the Commission is responsible for considering the impact of its 
actions and ensuring that those actions further the public interest, 
which includes an analysis of retail markets. NRECA argues that state 
merger evaluation standards are not necessarily related to those 
required under the FPA, and that the Commission should not substitute 
state determinations (or lack thereof) for its own determination.
Commission Response
    We stated in Order No. 642 that we will look at retail competitive 
impacts only when a state lacks authority and asks us to do so.\21\ The 
petitions for rehearing offer no reasoned basis for changing our 
policy. Accordingly, we will deny Petitioners' request for rehearing on 
this issue.
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    \21\ Id. at 31,918 and 31,919. In reviewing Order No. 642, we 
found a typographical error. The second to last sentence in the 
paragraph before Section C at 31,919 should read: ``We take this 
opportunity to clarify that we will consider retail market issues 
when circumstances warrant.''
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F. Generic Conditions for Mergers

Rehearing Requests
    Petitioners claim that Order No. 642 should impose certain generic 
conditions on mergers. APPA/TAPS claim that all mergers should be 
generically conditioned on: (1) The requirement (as APPA/TAPS 
originally proposed in their comments on the NOPR) that applicants take 
service to meet their retail load under their Open Access Transmission 
Tariffs and ``treat their own dispatch comparably with service to 
others;'' (2) participation in a properly structured Regional 
Transmission Organization (RTO) prior to the consummation of the 
merger; and (3) continued or expanded reserve sharing, or equivalent 
mechanisms. NRECA also argues that if merger applicants voluntarily 
commit to join an RTO, the Commission's regulations should include 
provisions to enforce that commitment. APPA/TAPS also argues that Order 
No. 642 should provide for other conditions--such as financial 
disincentives--to address the improper use of merger-related market 
power.
Commission Response
    Order No. 642 does not specifically address APPA/TAPS' proposal 
that mergers be generically conditioned on applicants taking service to 
meet their retail load under their Open Access Transmission Tariff 
(OATT). However, we did explain in Order No. 642 that while there are 
numerous mitigation measures that may be effective, the adequacy of 
specific mitigation proposals must still be evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis.\22\ Petitioners have not supported the need for generic 
mitigation measures such as participation in an RTO, expanded reserve 
sharing requirements or the use of financial disincentives, and we deny 
rehearing on this issue.
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    \22\ Id. at 31,900.
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    With regard to the RTO issue raised by NRECA, we note that when 
voluntary commitments to join Commission-approved RTOs are recognized 
in our approval of mergers, we expect applicants to honor such 
commitments.

G. Temporary Moratorium on Mergers

Rehearing Requests
    Petitioners claim that Order No. 642 fails to adequately explain 
why the Commission rejected a moratorium on large utility mergers. They 
cite recent events in electricity markets around the country, including 
California, as support for just such a moratorium. Absent a moratorium, 
APPA/TAPS contend that mergers should be approved only if merger-
related benefits are shown to be sufficient to offset harm to actual or 
potential competition.
Commission Response
    We will deny Petitioners' request for rehearing on this issue. As 
we explained in Order No. 642, regulatory safeguards are in place to 
prevent such adverse competitive effects, regardless of the size of a 
merger.\23\ Moreover, in implementing the Policy Statement, Order No. 
642 states that we will determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a 
merger will adversely affect competition. We disagree with Petitioners' 
proposals that applicants should be required to demonstrate that 
merger-related benefits offset competitive harm. Such a specific 
requirement would conflict with the flexibility embedded in Order No. 
642 and the Policy Statement, which provide that merger applicants 
failing the competitive analysis screen should propose mitigation or go 
on to evaluate the following four factors: (1) The potential adverse 
competitive effects of the merger; (2) whether entry by competitors can 
deter anticompetitive behavior or counteract adverse competitive 
effects; (3) the effects of efficiencies that could not be realized 
absent the merger; and (4) whether one or both of the merging firms is 
failing and, absent the merger, the failing firm's assets would exit 
the market.\24\ This is consistent with our finding that a transaction 
taken as a whole must be consistent with the public interest.\25\
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    \23\ Order No. 642 at 31,919.
    \24\ Id. at 31,898.
    \25\ See, e.g., Northeast Utilities Service Co. v. FERC, 993 
F.2d 937 (1st Cir. 1993).

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[[Page 16125]]

H. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification Analysis

Rehearing Requests
    NRECA argues that, contrary to the Commission's assertion that the 
rule will not have a ``significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities,'' there are an increasing number of rural 
electric cooperatives, some of them modest in size, that have become 
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction as they have paid off their 
debt from the Rural Utilities Service. NRECA argues that Order No. 642 
will affect ``small'' public utilities if those entities choose to 
merge to better deal with the increasing market power of larger public 
utilities. NRECA requests that the Commission either perform the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act analysis, or provide for waivers of the 
reporting requirements for small public utilities.
Commission Response
    The Commission has evaluated the various types of mergers and other 
section 203 transactions subject to these revised filing requirements. 
The number of cooperatives subject to Commission jurisdiction as public 
utilities, and therefore affected by these requirements, is small. In 
addition, Order No. 642 does not increase the number of small entities 
that are subject to the Commission's jurisdiction under section 203. In 
fact, the final rule reduces the regulatory burdens and reporting 
requirements on most entities, both large and small, by streamlining 
and eliminating outdated and unnecessary filing requirements.
    The Commission therefore certifies that Order No. 642 will not have 
a significant economic impact on small entities.

I. Miscellaneous Issues

Rehearing Requests
    APPA/TAPS argue that Order No. 642 fails to reflect components of a 
detailed competitive analysis that are not adequately captured by 
market concentration statistics. They point to the failure of market 
concentration analysis to reveal the constraints which they believe are 
now apparent in California, including: transmission constraints and 
their manipulation; incentives not to build transmission; insufficient 
generation; and gas supply, water, and emission constraints. NRECA 
requests that the Commission modify Sec. 33.3(c) of the Commission's 
regulations to require horizontal merger applicants to analyze firm 
requirements power as a relevant product.
Commission Response
    Petitioners' concern that the Commission will rely exclusively on 
the horizontal screen analysis in evaluating the effect of a merger on 
competition is misplaced. For example, we stated in Order No. 642 that:

    [T]he horizontal screen is not meant to be a definitive test of 
the likely competitive effects of a proposed merger. Instead, it is 
intended to provide a standard, generally conservative check to 
allow the Commission, applicants and intervenors to quickly identify 
mergers that are unlikely to present competitive problems.\26\
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    \26\ Order No. 642 at 31,879.
    \27\ Id. at 31,882, 31,897.
    \28\ Id. at 31,881.
    \29\ Id. at 31,883.

This is consistent with the Policy Statement.
    We also note in Order No. 642 the limitations on the use of 
concentration statistics.\27\ In addition, Order No. 642 points out 
that we have sought additional information from merger applicants when 
circumstances warranted and that the intervention process itself allows 
other market participants to raise concerns.\28\ Together, these 
factors indicate that the Commission will not rely exclusively on 
market concentration statistics in evaluating the competitive effects 
of mergers.
    Finally, we disagree with NRECA's position that firm requirements 
power should be considered as a separate relevant product. In Order No. 
642, we explain that it is important to define relevant products from 
the perspective of the consumer, i.e., including in a product group 
those products considered by the consumer to be good substitutes.\29\ 
NRECA has not demonstrated how firm requirements power meets this 
standard. We therefore deny Petitioners' request for rehearing on these 
issues.
    The Commission orders:
    For the reasons discussed above, the Commission denies rehearing of 
Order No. 642.

    By the Commission.
David P. Boergers,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 01-7200 Filed 3-22-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P