

(8) Document Production; (9) Date and Location of Next Meeting; (10) Closing.

Attendance is open to the interested public but limited to space availability. With the approval of the chairman, members of the public may present oral statements at the meeting. Persons wishing to present statements or obtain information should contact the RTCA Secretariat, 1140 Connecticut Avenue, NW., Suite 1020, Washington, DC 20036; (202) 833-9339 (phone); (202) 833-9434 (fax); or <http://www.rtca.org> (web site). Members of the public may present a written statement to the committee at any time.

Issued in Washington, DC, on March 1, 2001.

Janice L. Peters,

Designated Official.

[FR Doc. 01-6098 Filed 3-9-01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

[Policy Statement Number ACE-00-23.777-01]

Proposed Issuance of Policy Memorandum, Automatic Pilot (Control Wheel Steering) Applications for Part 23/CAR 3 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of policy statement; extension of the comment period.

SUMMARY: This document provides additional time for the public to comment on a proposal to adopt new policy for certification of normal, utility, acrobatic, and commuter category turbine powered airplanes with automatic pilot (autopilot) (control wheel steering) applications. Comments received on the original notice of policy statement (66 FR 4055, January 17, 2001) specify additional time to respond to the proposed action.

DATE: Comments sent must be received by May 11, 2001. This is extended from February 16, 2001.

ADDRESSES: Send all comments on this proposed policy statement to the individual identified under **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT**.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Sending comments: Bill Marshall, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Small Airplane Directorate, Regulations and Policy Branch, ACE-111, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone (816) 329-4116; fax (816) 329-4090; email: Bill.Marshall@faa.gov.

Asking technical questions: Jon Hannan, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, Regulations and Policy Branch, ACE-111, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone (816) 329-4127; fax (816) 329-4090; email: Jon.Hannan@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

How do I comment on the proposed policy? We invite your comments on this proposed policy statement, ACE-00-23.777-01. You may send whatever written data, views, or arguments you choose. We will consider all comments received by the closing date. We may change the proposals contained in this notice because of the comments received.

Please send comments using the following Internet address: Bill.Marshall@faa.gov. Comments sent using the Internet must contain "Comments to Policy Statement ACE-00-23.777-01" in the subject line. Writers should format in Microsoft Word 97 or ASCII any file attachments that are sent using the Internet.

Send comments using the following format:

- Organize comments issue-by-issue. For example, discuss a comment about the automatic pilot control panel and a comment about primary flight controls as two separate issues.

- For each issue, state what specific change you are requesting to the proposed policy memorandum.

- Include justification (for example, reasons or data) for each request. If sending your comments using the Internet will cause you extreme hardship, you may send comments using the U.S. Mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile machine. You should mark your comments, "Comments to Policy Statement ACE-00-23.777-01" and send two copies to the above address in the section **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sending comments.**"

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on March 6, 2001.

Michael Gallagher,

Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 01-6090 Filed 3-9-01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

Notice of Safety Advisory

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 01-01 addressing the structural integrity of cast steel draft sills, manufactured by American Steel Foundries, and installed in certain covered hopper cars. When in normal condition and used under normal train operations, these cast draft sills appear not to pose a safety hazard to railroad employees or the general public.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary Fairbanks, Mechanical Engineer, Motive Power & Equipment Division, Office of Safety Assurance & Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, SW., RRS-14, Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590 (Telephone 202-493-6322/Fax 202-493-6230).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Recently, FRA discovered that several Type C-114 covered hopper cars, manufactured by Trinity Industries, have experienced failures of their cast steel draft sills. A cast draft sill that apparently contained a pre-existing crack caused one train separation on main line track on the Montana Rail Link. Also, several of these cast draft sills failed in torsion as a result of a number of minor, low speed yard derailments. To date, all of the cars involved in such failures are owned and principally operated by The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF). At this time, there have been no reported failures of this type of cast draft sill on any other railroad; however, FRA and the industry are still in the process of investigating this matter. There have been no reported injuries or fatalities due to the failure of these draft sills.

On January 18, 2001 at Winston, Montana, approximately 20 miles east of Helena, Montana, a westbound BNSF loaded unit grain train, G-CVNKAL9-16, experienced a broken draft sill on the B-end of covered hopper BNSF 472398. The draft sill broke forward of the inboard draft lugs and separated from the car, allowing the draft gear, coupler, and a portion of the draft sill to fall to the rails. When the separation took place, the train's air brake train line pipe also separated, causing an emergency air brake application on the train. At this time, it appears as though there was an approximately 30-percent old break in the walls of the involved draft sill (a break that existed before the train separation occurred), with the remaining sill breaking with rapid brittle fracture at the time of the incident. The old crack appears to have started in the area of the side wall of the draft sill where an inspection port was cast in, and directly in front of, the rear draft lugs. No derailment occurred in this instance.