[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 48 (Monday, March 12, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 14432-14433]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-6182]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Notice of Safety Advisory

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 01-01 addressing the structural 
integrity of cast steel draft sills, manufactured by American Steel 
Foundries, and installed in certain covered hopper cars. When in normal 
condition and used under normal train operations, these cast draft 
sills appear not to pose a safety hazard to railroad employees or the 
general public.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary Fairbanks, Mechanical Engineer, 
Motive Power & Equipment Division, Office of Safety Assurance & 
Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, SW., RRS-14, Mail Stop 25, 
Washington, DC 20590 (Telephone 202-493-6322/Fax 202-493-6230).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Recently, FRA discovered that several Type 
C-114 covered hopper cars, manufactured by Trinity Industries, have 
experienced failures of their cast steel draft sills. A cast draft sill 
that apparently contained a pre-existing crack caused one train 
separation on main line track on the Montana Rail Link. Also, several 
of these cast draft sills failed in torsion as a result of a number of 
minor, low speed yard derailments. To date, all of the cars involved in 
such failures are owned and principally operated by The Burlington 
Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF). At this time, there have 
been no reported failures of this type of cast draft sill on any other 
railroad; however, FRA and the industry are still in the process of 
investigating this matter. There have been no reported injuries or 
fatalities due to the failure of these draft sills.
    On January 18, 2001 at Winston, Montana, approximately 20 miles 
east of Helena, Montana, a westbound BNSF loaded unit grain train, G-
CVNKAL9-16, experienced a broken draft sill on the B-end of covered 
hopper BNSF 472398. The draft sill broke forward of the inboard draft 
lugs and separated from the car, allowing the draft gear, coupler, and 
a portion of the draft sill to fall to the rails. When the separation 
took place, the train's air brake train line pipe also separated, 
causing an emergency air brake application on the train. At this time, 
it appears as though there was an approximately 30-percent old break in 
the walls of the involved draft sill (a break that existed before the 
train separation occurred), with the remaining sill breaking with rapid 
brittle fracture at the time of the incident. The old crack appears to 
have started in the area of the side wall of the draft sill where an 
inspection port was cast in, and directly in front of, the rear draft 
lugs. No derailment occurred in this instance.

[[Page 14433]]

    On January 30, 2001, at the West Havre yard in Havre, Montana, the 
same series of Type C-114 covered hoppers were involved in the 
derailment of BNSF train GSPLTAC 9-26. A total of 19 cars derailed as 
the train was leaving the yard, traveling approximately 8 miles per 
hour. Five (5) of the cars overturned onto their sides and experienced 
failures of the cast steel draft sills. Furthermore, an attempt was 
made to re-rail one of the derailed loaded cars using a mobile crane 
with a sling passing under the draft sill. The car had no damage other 
than having one pair of wheels derailed. The draft sill on the car was 
inspected prior to lifting the car, and it was found to be free of any 
cracks or damage from the derailment. While the car was being lifted 
with the sling, the draft sill failed catastrophically, which caused 
the car to fall to the ground. The draft sill fractured on both sides 
just outboard of the rear draft lugs, but remained attached by a 
severely bent section on the top portion of the sill. No injuries or 
fatalities resulted from this incident, nor were the broken draft sills 
the cause of the derailment.
    On January 31, 2001, BNSF transferred two of the broken draft sills 
involved in the above incident to its testing facility at Topeka, 
Kansas for a metallurgical analysis. The draft sills were then 
forwarded to the manufacturer for further inspection. The initial 
report from BNSF and the manufacturer stated that the material used in 
the draft sills met the Association of American Railroads' (AAR) 
requirement for a Grade ``B'' steel casting. A subsequent design review 
between BNSF, the car builder, and the draft sill manufacturer found 
the design acceptable, and at this time did not recommend any 
subsequent changes. However, fatigue and impact testing of the 
fractured draft sills is still being conducted by both BNSF and the 
manufacturer. The AAR is also investigating nationwide if any of the 
cast draft sills of this same design have been installed on car owners 
equipment other than BNSF.
    The cars currently in question are Type C-114 covered hopper cars, 
with a capacity of 5,161 cubic-feet, series BNSF 471500 through 477012 
and series BNSF 450000 through 450649, a total of 5,999 cars. The cars 
were built by Trinity Industries from 1998 through 2000, and the draft 
sills were manufactured by American Steel Foundries (ASF). Examples of 
the casting nomenclature on the draft sills that have failed are: ASF 
6/98 3952 A-2 and ASF 6/99 3952 B-2. BNSF has initiated a systemwide 
inspection of the draft sills on these two car series, looking 
especially for cracks in the area of the inspection ports ahead of the 
rear draft lugs. BNSF is inspecting both sides and both ends of each of 
these cars. The inspection instructions issued by the BNSF to their 
inspectors regarding these cars, loaded or empty, provides for the 
following:

Initial Terminal, 1000-Mile, Terminating Inspection Points, and All 
Repair Tracks

    1. Inspect cars paying particular attention to the cast draft sill. 
Inspect for cracks propagating from the bottom flange or the side 
inspection holes of the cast draft sill, see attached photographs.
    2. Determine if car is defective per 49 CFR Sec. 215.121(b)(2), if 
crack is 6" or less and car is safe to move to destination, if loaded 
forward for unloading. If empty ``BH'' car home for repair.
    3. If crack is greater than 6" and car is safe to move, then car 
must be ``BH'' home and moved under 49 CFR Sec. 215.9.
    4. Report defect code ``DS'' when bad ordering these cars.
    5. Place a white dot, using spray paint, on both sides of the draft 
sill on both ends of the car once inspection is completed.
    A cast draft sill is considered a component of a car's center sill 
structure. FRA's Freight Car Safety Standards prescribe that a car may 
not be placed or remain in service if the car center sill is broken; 
cracked more than 6 inches; or permanently bent or buckled more than 
2\1/2\ inches in any six foot length. Car inspections required by FRA 
safety regulations will normally detect this type of defect.

Action Recommended by FRA

    When in normal condition and used in normal train operations, these 
cast draft sills appear not to pose a safety hazard to railroad 
employees or the general public. However, if any of the cars listed 
above is involved in a derailment, regardless of how minor, it should 
be considered to be a significant safety risk to all personnel and the 
following steps taken:
     Exercise caution if the car is positioned such that it 
applies a torsional load to the draft sill;
     Avoid lifting the car by the draft sill with a crane to 
re-rail; or
     If the car's draft sill has a crack of 6 inches or more, 
request home shop disposition, complying with 49 CFR 215.9.
    For additional information concerning car series BNSF 471500 
through BNSF 477012 and BNSF 450000 through BNSF 450649, and to obtain 
a copy of System Mechanical Alert BNSF MA-01/01, FRA recommends that 
the railroad contact Mr. Rick Stauffer, System Mechanical Department, 
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company, P.O. Box 961056, Fort 
Worth, TX 76131-2830, telephone (817) 352-1465.
    FRA may modify Safety Advisory 01-01, issue additional safety 
advisories, or take other appropriate action to ensure the highest 
level of safety on the Nation's railroads.

    Issued in Washington, DC on March 8, 2001.
George Gavalla,
Associate Administrator for Safety.
[FR Doc. 01-6182 Filed 3-9-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P