[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 44 (Tuesday, March 6, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13531-13535]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-5395]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Report No. AUC-36-A (Auction No. 39); DA 01-477]


Auction of Licenses for the VHF Public Coast and Location and 
Monitoring Services Spectrum Scheduled for June 6, 2001

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This document announces the auction of 16 VHF public coast 
licenses and 241 multilateration Location and Monitoring Services 
Spectrum scheduled for June 6, 2001. The notice seeks comments on 
reserve prices or minimum opening bids and other procedural issues 
regarding Auction No. 39.

DATES: Comments are due on or before March 9, 2001, and reply comments 
are due on or before March 16, 2001.

ADDRESSES: An original and four copies of all pleadings must be filed 
with the Commission's Secretary, Magalie Roman Salas, Office of the 
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 445 Twelfth Street, SW., 
TW-A325, Washington, DC 20554, in accordance with Sec. 1.51(c) of the 
Commission's rules.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth Burnley, Auctions Attorney, or 
Lyle Ishida, Auctions Analyst, at (202) 418-0660; or Linda Sanderson, 
Project Manager, at (717) 338-2888.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of a public notice 
released February 23, 2001 that announces the auction of 16 VHF public 
coast licenses and 241 multilateration Location and Monitoring Service 
(``LMS'') licenses (``Auction No. 39'') to commence on June 6, 2001. 
This auction will include the licenses that remained unsold in Auctions 
No. 20 and No. 21, which closed on December 14, 1998 and March 5, 1999, 
respectively. Auction No. 39 will include the following:
     VHF Public Coast. Specifically, sixteen licenses will be 
available in

[[Page 13532]]

geographic areas known as VHF Public Coast Areas (VPCs). There are two 
categories of VPCs: maritime VPCs and inland VPCs. All of the VHF 
Public Coast licenses to be offered in Auction No. 39 are inland VPC 
licenses. Inland VPCs are identical to the Commerce Department's 
Economic Areas, no part of which is within 100 miles of a major 
waterway. Each VPC license has seven 25 kHz channel pairs, adding up to 
350 kHz.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Inland VPCs              Channel Pairs (total kHz available)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inland Border VPCs:, VPCs 10,       24, 26, 27, 28, 85, 86, 87 (350 kHz)
 11..........................
Inland Non-Border VPCs:......       24, 26, 27, 28, 85, 86, 87 (350 kHz)
VPCs 12-15, 23, 26, 38 VPCs         24, 26, 27, 28, 84, 86, 87 (350 kHz)
 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 40..
------------------------------------------------------------------------

     LMS. Three blocks of spectrum are allocated for LMS 
systems:
    Block A: 904.000-909.750 MHz and 927.750-928.000 MHz;
    Block B: 919.750-921.750 MHz and 927.500-927.750 MHz;
    Block C: 921.750-927.250 MHz and 927.250-927.500 MHz.
    A geographic licensing area is comprised of each of these spectrum 
blocks. LMS spectrum is licensed in 176 Economic Areas (EAs). In 
Auction No. 39, 241 LMS licenses will be available: 117 licenses will 
be auctioned in Block A, 61 licenses will be auctioned in Block B, and 
63 licenses will be auctioned in Block C.
    A list of licenses available for this auction is included in 
Attachment A of the Public Notice. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
requires the Commission to ``ensure that, in the scheduling of any 
competitive bidding under this subsection, an adequate period is 
allowed . . . before issuance of bidding rules, to permit notice and 
comment on proposed auction procedures. . . .'' Consistent with the 
provisions of the Balanced Budget Act and to ensure that potential 
bidders have adequate time to familiarize themselves with the specific 
rules that will govern the day-to-day conduct of an auction, the 
Commission directed the Bureau, under its existing delegated authority, 
to seek comment on a variety of auction-specific procedures prior to 
the start of each auction. We therefore seek comment on the following 
issues relating to Auction No. 39.

I. Auction Structure

A. Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction Design

    1. We propose to award the licenses in a single, simultaneous 
multiple-round auction. As described further, this methodology offers 
every license for bid at the same time in successive bidding rounds. We 
seek comment on this proposal.

B. Upfront Payments and Initial Maximum Eligibility

    2. The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine 
an appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned taking 
into account such factors as the population in each geographic license 
area, and the value of similar spectrum. As described further, the 
upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by each bidder to 
establish eligibility to bid on licenses. Upfront payments related to 
the specific spectrum subject to auction protect against frivolous or 
insincere bidding and provide the Commission with a source of funds 
from which to collect payments owed at the close of the auction. With 
these guidelines in mind, we propose for Auction No. 39, to calculate 
upfront payments on a license-by-license basis using the following 
formulas:
 VHF Public Coast
    Inland VPC Licenses: $.075 * MHz * Pops (the result rounded to the 
nearest hundred for results less than $10,000) with a minimum upfront 
payment of $2,500 per license.
 LMS
    Block A: $0.0004 * MHz * Pops (the result rounded to the nearest 
hundred for results less than $10,000) with a minimum upfront payment 
of $1,000 per license.
    Block B: $0.0005 * MHz * Pops (the result rounded to the nearest 
hundred for results less than $10,000) with a minimum upfront payment 
of $1,000 per license.
    Block C: $0.0005 * MHz * Pops (the results rounded to the nearest 
hundred for results less than $10,000 and to the nearest thousand for 
results greater than $10,000) with a minimum upfront payment of $1,000 
per license.
    3. A complete list of all licenses, including the related license 
area population and upfront payment, are listed as Attachment A of the 
Public Notice. We seek comment on this proposal.
    4. We further propose that the amount of the upfront payment 
submitted by a bidder will determine the initial maximum eligibility 
(as measured in bidding units) for each bidder. Upfront payments will 
not be attributed to specific licenses, but instead will be translated 
into bidding units to define a bidder's initial maximum eligibility, 
which cannot be increased during the auction. The maximum eligibility 
will determine the licenses on which a bidder may bid in each round of 
the auction. Thus, in calculating its upfront payment amount, an 
applicant must determine the maximum number of bidding units it may 
wish to bid on (or hold high bids on) in any single round, and submit 
an upfront payment covering that number of bidding units. We seek 
comment on this proposal.

C. Activity Rules

    5. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable 
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to either place a 
valid bid and/or be the standing high bidder during each round of the 
auction rather than waiting until the end to participate. A bidder that 
does not satisfy the activity rule will either use an activity rule 
waiver, if any remain, or lose bidding eligibility in the auction.
    6. We propose to divide the auction into two stages: Stage One and 
Stage Two--each characterized by an increased activity requirement. The 
auction will start in Stage One. We propose that the auction will 
generally advance to the next stage when the auction activity level, as 
measured by the percentage of bidding units receiving new high bids, is 
approximately thirty percent or below for three consecutive rounds of 
bidding. However, we further propose that the Bureau retain the 
discretion to change stages unilaterally by announcement during the 
auction. In exercising this discretion, the Bureau will consider a 
variety of measures of bidder activity, including, but not limited to, 
the auction activity level, the percentage of licenses (as measured in 
bidding units) on which there are new bids, the number of new bids, and 
the percentage increase in revenue. We seek comment on these proposals.
    7. For Auction No. 39, we propose the following activity 
requirements:
    Stage One: In each round of Stage One, a bidder desiring to 
maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on licenses 
encompassing at least

[[Page 13533]]

80 percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the 
requisite activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder's 
bidding eligibility in the next round of bidding (unless an activity 
rule waiver is used). During Stage One, reduced eligibility for the 
next round will be calculated by multiplying the current round activity 
by five-fourths (5/4).
    Stage Two: In each round of Stage Two, a bidder desiring to 
maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 98 percent 
of its current bidding eligibility. In this final stage, reduced 
eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the 
current round activity by fifty-fortyninths (50/49). We seek comment on 
these proposals. If commenters believe that these activity rules should 
be changed, they should explain their reasoning and comment on the 
desirability of an alternative approach. Commenters are advised to 
support their claims with analyses and suggested alternative activity 
rules.

D. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility

    8. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current 
bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round 
being below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies 
to an entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity 
waivers are principally a mechanism for auction participants to avoid 
the loss of auction eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances 
prevent them from placing a bid in a particular round.
    9. The FCC auction system assumes that bidders with insufficient 
activity would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if available) 
rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will 
automatically apply a waiver (known as an ``automatic waiver'') at the 
end of any bidding period where a bidder's activity level is below the 
minimum required unless: (i) there are no activity rule waivers 
available; or (ii) the bidder overrides the automatic application of a 
waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the minimum 
requirements.
    10. A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its 
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the 
bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism 
during the bidding period by using the reduce eligibility function in 
the bidding software. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is 
permanently reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the 
activity rules as described. Once eligibility has been reduced, a 
bidder will not be permitted to regain its lost bidding eligibility.
    11. A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means 
to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a 
proactive waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding 
software) during a bidding period in which no bids are submitted, the 
auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility will be 
preserved. An automatic waiver invoked in a round in which there are no 
new valid bids will not keep the auction open.
    12. We propose that each bidder in Auction No. 39 be provided with 
five activity rule waivers that may be used at the bidder's discretion 
during the course of the auction as set forth. We seek comment on this 
proposal.

E. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation

    13. For Auction No. 39, we propose that, by public notice or by 
announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend, or 
cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical 
obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding 
activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason 
that affects the fair and competitive conduct of competitive bidding. 
In such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume 
the auction starting from the beginning of the current round, resume 
the auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the auction in 
its entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or 
suspend the auction. We emphasize that exercise of this authority is 
solely within the discretion of the Bureau, and its use is not intended 
to be a substitute for situations in which bidders may wish to apply 
their activity rule waivers. We seek comment on this proposal.

II. Bidding Procedures

A. Round Structure

    14. The Commission will use its Automated Auction System to conduct 
the electronic simultaneous multiple round auction format for Auction 
No. 39. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public 
notice to be released at least one week before the start of the 
auction, and will be included in the registration mailings. The auction 
format will consist of sequential bidding rounds; each followed by the 
release of round results. Details regarding the location and format of 
round results will be included in the same public notice.
    15.The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in 
order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the 
bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding 
strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for 
the bidding rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds per day, 
depending upon the bidding activity level and other factors. We seek 
comment on this proposal.

B. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid

    16. The Balanced Budget Act calls upon the Commission to prescribe 
methods by which a reasonable reserve price will be required or a 
minimum opening bid established when FCC licenses are subject to 
auction (i.e., because the Commission has accepted mutually exclusive 
applications for those licenses), unless the Commission determines that 
a reserve price or minimum bid is not in the public interest. 
Consistent with this mandate, the Commission has directed the Bureau to 
seek comment on the use of a minimum opening bid and/or reserve price 
prior to the start of each auction.
    17. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below, 
which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can 
be either published or unpublished. A minimum-opening bid, on the other 
hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction 
below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate 
the competitive bidding process. Also, in a minimum opening bid 
scenario, the auctioneer generally has the discretion to lower the 
amount later in the auction. It is also possible for the minimum 
opening bid and the reserve price to be the same amount.
    18. In light of the Balanced Budget Act, the Bureau proposes to 
establish minimum opening bids for Auction No. 39. The Bureau believes 
a minimum opening bid, which has been utilized in other auctions, is an 
effective bidding tool. A minimum opening bid, rather than a reserve 
price, will help to regulate the pace of the auction and provides 
flexibility.
    19. Specifically, for Auction No. 39, the Commission proposes the 
following formulae for calculating minimum opening bids on a license-
by-license basis:
 VHF Public Coast
    Inland VPC Licenses: $.011 * MHz * Pops (the result rounded to the 
nearest hundred for results less than $10,000) with a minimum of no 
less than $2,500 per license.

[[Page 13534]]

 LMS
    Block A: $0.0004 * MHz * Pops (the result rounded to the nearest 
hundred for results less than $10,000) with a minimum of no less than 
$1,000 per license.
    Block B: $0.0005 * MHz * Pops (the result rounded to the nearest 
hundred for results less than $10,000) with a minimum of no less than 
$1,000 per license.
    Block C: $0.0005 * MHz * Pops (the result rounded to the nearest 
hundred for results less than $10,000 and to the nearest thousand for 
results greater than $10,000) with a minimum of no less than $1,000 per 
license.
    20. The specific minimum opening bid for each license available in 
Auction No. 39 is set forth in Attachment A of the Public Notice. 
Comment is sought on this proposal. If commenters believe that these 
minimum opening bids will result in substantial numbers of unsold 
licenses, or are not reasonable amounts, or should instead operate as 
reserve prices, they should explain why this is so, and comment on the 
desirability of an alternative approach. Commenters are advised to 
support their claims with valuation analyses and suggested reserve 
prices or minimum opening bid levels or formulas. In establishing the 
minimum opening bids, we particularly seek comment on such factors as, 
among other things, the amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels of 
incumbency, the availability of technology to provide service, the size 
of the geographic service areas, issues of interference with other 
spectrum bands and any other relevant factors that could reasonably 
have an impact on valuation of the VHF public coast station and the LMS 
spectrum. Alternatively, comment is sought on whether, consistent with 
the Balanced Budget Act, the public interest would be served by having 
no minimum opening bid or reserve price.

C. Minimum Accepted Bids and Bid Increments

    21. Once there is a standing high bid on a license, a bid increment 
will be applied to that license to establish a minimum acceptable bid 
for the following round. For Auction No. 39, we propose to use a 
smoothing methodology to calculate bid increments, as we have done in 
several other auctions. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the 
minimum bid increment if it determines that circumstances so dictate. 
The Bureau will do so by announcement in the Automated Auction System. 
We seek comment on these proposals.
    22. The exponential smoothing formula calculates the bid increment 
for each license based on a weighted average of the activity received 
on each license in all previous rounds. This methodology will tailor 
the bid increment for each license based on activity, rather than 
setting a global increment for all licenses. For every license that 
receives a bid, the bid increment for the next round for that license 
will be established using the exponential smoothing formula.
    23. The calculation of the percentage bid increment for each 
license in a given round is made at the end of the previous round. The 
computation is based on an activity index, which is calculated as the 
weighted average of the activity in that round and the activity index 
from the prior round. The activity index at the start of the auction 
(round 0) will be set at 0. The current activity index is equal to a 
weighting factor times the number of new bids received on the license 
in the most recent bidding round plus one minus the weighting factor 
times the activity index from the prior round. The activity index is 
then used to calculate a percentage increment by multiplying a minimum 
percentage increment by one plus the activity index with that result 
being subject to a maximum percentage increment. The Commission will 
initially set the weighting factor at 0.5, the minimum percentage 
increment at 0.1 (10%), and the maximum percentage increment at 0.2 
(20%).

Equations

Ai = (C * Bi) + ( (1-C) * Ai-1)
Ii+1 = smaller of ( (1 + Ai) * N) and M

where,

Ai = activity index for the current round (round i)
C = activity weight factor
Bi = number of bids in the current round (round i)
Ai-1 = activity index from previous round (round i-1), 
A0 is 0
Ii+1 = percentage bid increment for the next round (round 
i+1)
N = minimum percentage increment or bid increment floor
M = maximum percentage increment or bid increment ceiling

    Under the exponential smoothing methodology, once a bid has been 
received on a license, the minimum acceptable bid for that license in 
the following round will be the new high bid plus the dollar amount 
associated with the percentage increment (variable Ii+1 from 
above times the high bid). This result will be rounded to the nearest 
thousand if it is over ten thousand or to the nearest hundred if it is 
under ten thousand.

Examples

License 1

C=0.5, N = 0.1, M = 0.2

Round 1 (2 new bids, high bid = $1,000,000)

    i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 2 using 
exponential smoothing:

A1 = (0.5 * 2) + (0.5 * 0) = 1
I2 = The smaller of ( (1 + 1) * 0.1) = 0.2 or 0.2 (the 
maximum percentage increment)

    ii. Minimum bid increment for round 2 using the percentage 
increment (I2 from above)

0.2 * $1,000,000 = $200,000

    iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 2 = $1,200,000

Round 2 (3 new bids, high bid = $2,000,000)

    i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 3 using 
exponential smoothing:

A2 = (0.5 * 3) + (0.5 * 1) = 2
I3 = The smaller of ( (1 + 2) * 0.1) = 0.3 or 0.2 (the 
maximum percentage increment)

    ii. Minimum bid increment for round 3 using the percentage 
increment (I3 from above)

0.2 * $2,000,000 = $400,000

    iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 3 = $2,400,000

Round 3 (1 new bid, high bid = $2,400,000)

    i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 4 using 
exponential smoothing:

A3 = (0.5 * 1) + (0.5 * 2) = 1.5
I4 = The smaller of ( (1 + 1.5) * 0.1) = 0.25 or 0.2 (the 
maximum percentage increment)

    ii. Minimum bid increment for round 4 using the percentage 
increment (I4 from above)

0.2 * $2,400,000 = $480,000

    iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 4 = $2,880,000

D. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal

    24. For Auction No. 39, we propose the following bid removal and 
bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding period, a 
bidder has the option of removing any bid placed in that round. By 
using the remove bid function in the bidding software, a bidder may 
effectively ``unsubmit'' any bid placed within that round. A bidder 
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to a withdrawal 
payment. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. We 
seek comment on this bid removal procedure.
    25. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. 
However, in the next round, a bidder may withdraw standing high bids 
from previous rounds using the withdraw bid function. A high bidder 
that withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round is subject 
to the bid withdrawal payment provisions. We seek comment

[[Page 13535]]

on these bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures.
    26. In the Part 1 Third Report and Order, 63 FR 2315 (January 15, 
1998), the Commission explained that allowing bid withdrawals 
facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses and the pursuit of 
efficient backup strategies as information becomes available during the 
course of an auction. The Commission noted, however, that, in some 
instances, bidders may seek to withdraw bids for improper reasons. The 
Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in managing the auction, to limit 
the number of withdrawals to prevent any bidding abuses. The Commission 
stated that the Bureau should assertively exercise its discretion, 
consider limiting the number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw 
bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market if the 
Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal 
procedures.
    27. Applying this reasoning, we propose to limit each bidder in 
Auction No. 39 to withdraw standing high bids in no more than two 
rounds during the course of the auction. To permit a bidder to withdraw 
bids in more than two rounds would likely encourage insincere bidding 
or the use of withdrawals for anti-competitive strategic purposes. The 
two rounds in which withdrawals are utilized will be at the bidder's 
discretion; withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the 
Commission's rules. There is no limit on the number of standing high 
bids that may be withdrawn in either of the rounds in which withdrawals 
are utilized. Withdrawals will remain subject to the bid withdrawal 
payment provisions specified in the Commission's rules. We seek comment 
on this proposal.

C. Stopping Rule

    28. For Auction No. 39, the Bureau proposes to employ a 
simultaneous stopping rule approach. The Bureau has discretion ``to 
establish stopping rules before or during multiple round auctions in 
order to terminate the auction within a reasonable time.'' A 
simultaneous stopping rule means that all licenses remain open until 
the first round in which no new acceptable bids, proactive waivers, or 
withdrawals are received. After the first such round, bidding closes 
simultaneously on all licenses. Thus, unless circumstances dictate 
otherwise, bidding would remain open on all licenses until bidding 
stops on every license.
    29. The Bureau seeks comment on a modified version of the 
simultaneous stopping rule. The modified stopping rule would close the 
auction for all licenses after the first round in which no bidder 
submits a proactive waiver, a withdrawal, or a new bid on any license 
on which it is not the standing high bidder. Thus, absent any other 
bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for which it 
is the standing high bidder would not keep the auction open under this 
modified stopping rule. The Bureau further seeks comment on whether 
this modified stopping rule should be used unilaterally or only in 
stage two of the auction.
    30. The Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to keep an auction 
open even if no new acceptable bids or proactive waivers are submitted 
and no previous high bids are withdrawn. In this event, the effect will 
be the same as if a bidder had submitted a proactive waiver. The 
activity rule, therefore, will apply as usual, and a bidder with 
insufficient activity will either lose bidding eligibility or use a 
remaining activity rule waiver.
    31. Finally, we propose that the Bureau reserve the right to 
declare that the auction will end after a specified number of 
additional rounds (``special stopping rule''). If the Bureau invokes 
this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the final round(s) 
only for licenses on which the high bid increased in at least one of 
the preceding specified number of rounds. The Bureau proposes to 
exercise this option only in certain circumstances, such as, for 
example, where the auction is proceeding very slowly, there is minimal 
overall bidding activity, or it appears likely that the auction will 
not close within a reasonable period of time. Before exercising this 
option, the Bureau is likely to attempt to increase the pace of the 
auction by, for example, moving the auction into the next stage (where 
bidders would be required to maintain a higher level of bidding 
activity), increasing the number of bidding rounds per day, and/or 
increasing the amount of the minimum bid increments for the limited 
number of licenses where there is still a high level of bidding 
activity. We seek comment on these proposals.

III. Conclusion

    32. Comments are due on or before March 9, 2001, and reply comments 
are due on or before March 16, 2001. An original and four copies of all 
pleadings must be filed with the Commission's Secretary, Magalie Roman 
Salas, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 445 
Twelfth Street, SW., TW-A325, Washington, DC 20554, in accordance with 
Sec. 1.51(c) of the Commission's rules.
    See 47 CFR 1.51(c). In addition, one copy of each pleading must be 
delivered to each of the following locations: (a) the Commission's 
duplicating contractor, International Transcription Service, Inc. 
(ITS), 1231 20th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036; (b) Office of Media 
Relations, Public Reference Center, 445 Twelfth Street, SW., Suite CY-
A257, Washington, DC 20554; (c) Rana Shuler, Auctions and Industry 
Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 445 Twelfth 
Street, SW., Suite 4-A628, Washington, DC 20554. Comments and reply 
comments will be available for public inspection during regular 
business hours in the FCC Public Reference Room, Room CY-A257, 445 12th 
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20554.

Federal Communications Commission.
Margaret Wiener,
Chief, Auctions & Industry Analysis Division, WTB.
[FR Doc. 01-5395 Filed 3-5-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P