[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 31 (Wednesday, February 14, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 10340-10345]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-3733]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Notice of Safety Advisory 2001-01

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2001-1 which establishes 
recommended minimal guidelines for the operation of remote control 
locomotives.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Conklin, Operating Practices 
Division, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 1120 Vermont 
Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-493-6318) or Mark 
Tessler, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-493-6061)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Background

    Remote control locomotives (RCL) have been in use for a number of 
years. The term ``remotely controlled locomotives'' or ``remote control 
locomotives'' refers to a locomotive which, through use of a radio 
transmitter and receiver system, can be operated by a person not 
physically located at the controls within the confines of the 
locomotive cab. (As used in this document, the term ``remote control 
locomotive'' does not refer to use of distributive power, in which a 
locomotive or group of locomotives entrained or at the rear of a train 
is

[[Page 10341]]

remotely controlled from the lead locomotive of a train).
    FRA's first priority in assessing RCL operations is to ensure that 
these operations pose no threat to railroad workers or the general 
public. Because this technology is not widely used in railroad 
operations, FRA has limited data on which to base an objective safety 
analysis and must therefore proceed prudently. It is clear that the 
potential for serious injury exists, as it does in all aspects of 
railroad operations. RCL operations have been in existence in this 
country for many years; however, this technology has largely been 
confined to in-plant rail operations. As these operations expand, some 
of the traditional ways of conducting rail movements will be 
significantly modified. Under such circumstances, safety risk factors 
may change. It is FRA's task to ensure that this transition takes place 
safely. Throughout its history, FRA has tried to encourage and embrace 
technological advances in the rail industry.
    In 1994, FRA proposed to conduct a national test program of RCL 
operations. FRA held a hearing on February 23, 1995 (FRA Docket No. 94-
6), to gather testimony on the proposed RCL operating conditions. See 
59 FR 59826 (November 18, 1994). Several manufacturers, labor 
organizations, railroads, and their associations participated in the 
hearing. The testimony provided by these organizations revealed a broad 
spectrum of opinion concerning the merits of the proposed program, the 
substance of the program requirements, the resultant risks to railroad 
employees, and the safety of the technology.
    Interest in, and use of RCLs by the railroad industry has 
intensified since publication of the Notice of Test Program and the 
1995 public hearing. FRA believed that RCL technology has progressed 
beyond the ``test'' period and proposed one final meeting to obtain the 
most recent information and comments on this technology. On July 19, 
2000, FRA held a technical conference to allow all interested parties 
the opportunity to state their concerns and opinions on RCL operations. 
The conference examined all safety aspects of RCL operations, including 
(1) Design standards, (2) employee training, (3) operating practices 
and procedures, (4) test and inspection procedures, and (5) security 
and accident/incident reporting procedures.
    The following is a brief discussion of the material and comments 
presented at that conference. Several commentors expressed concerns in 
the following areas: RCL operations in bad weather conditions, 
ergonomic issues in the design of the remote control transmitter (RCT), 
electromagnetic field (EMF) emissions from RCTs, insufficient clearance 
when wearing the RCTs in tight spaces, roadway worker protection 
issues, mental and physical stress associated with RCL operation, and 
lack of accurate exposure metrics for calculating accident rates.
    Conversely, several commenters stated that RCL operations have 
enhanced safety performance. Some of the suggested enhancements 
included better visual contact with the leading end of rail movements, 
the elimination of communication error between the locomotive engineer 
and ground crew, and the reduction of yard accidents and injuries. 
Several commentors submitted data that indicate accidents and incidents 
dropped dramatically as RCL operations increased. Although FRA commends 
these commentors for their efforts in gathering such data, FRA notes 
that the data used were obtained without equal exposure metrics to 
allow valid comparisons between remote control and manual operations 
(i.e., comparisons were not equalized for the number of labor hours and 
number of employees). Normalizing safety data is necessary to clarify 
our understanding of the potential safety risks.
    Consequently, FRA is taking steps to incorporate RCL operations 
into the accident/incident reporting procedures required by 49 CFR part 
225. See 65 FR 79915, December 20, 2000. FRA is proposing to modify the 
instructions for Forms F 6180.54, 6180.55a, and 6180.57 in its Guide to 
Preparing Accident/Incident Reports. Two of the three form 
modifications will request that the ``Special Study Block'' (SSB) of 
each form be used to capture (with coded letters) information 
pertaining to accidents/incidents which involve RCL operations. The 
third form will capture the required data with an annotation in the 
narrative portion of the form.
    In addition, FRA recommends that railroads maintain appropriate 
exposure measures, including total number of labor hours and total 
number of employees by location for both RCL operations and manual 
locomotive operations. Together these measures will allow FRA to 
accurately measure accident and incident rates of both types of 
operations and make valid comparisons between RCL operations and manual 
operations. Thus, the railroads will be able to closely monitor the 
safety performance of RCL operations as they progress. FRA will then 
use these data when considering any future policies on these 
operations.
    FRA notes that many of the ergonomic design concerns experienced by 
remote control operators (RCOs) have been addressed in the current 
generation of RCTs. FRA commends the rail industry and RCL system 
manufacturers for their diligence in addressing the design concerns of 
RCOs. As this new technology expands, the continued input of the men 
and women who operate RCLs will be necessary to ensure that ergonomic 
issues and operating concerns are properly identified and fully 
addressed, consistent with the needs of both RCOs and the rail 
industry. Furthermore, we must be cognizant that gender specific issues 
may arise with respect to ergonomic challenges and solutions. FRA will, 
therefore, recommend that railroads give special consideration to the 
unique human/machine interface problems that may arise during the 
proliferation of this technology, particularly regarding female 
operators.
    FRA has reviewed the furnished data concerning fatalities that have 
occurred during RCL operations on plant railroads. The data indicate 
that none of these fatalities occurred as a direct result of RCL system 
failure. All involved the same scenarios described in similar 
fatalities that have occurred during manual switching operations. There 
was no way to determine if these workers were distracted due to their 
added responsibility of conducting RCL operations. However, FRA will 
attempt to reduce possible risk by recommending that RCOs (1) Should 
not ride on rail cars, (2) should not mount or dismount from moving 
locomotives during RCL operations, and (3) should remain well clear of 
affected tracks when in front of a locomotive movement. FRA also 
believes that additional training should be provided to traditional 
locomotive engineers who will be required to operate RCLs and who have 
never worked on the ground during switching operations. These 
individuals lack the valuable experience gained from working around 
moving equipment and are less likely to recognize dangerous situations.
    FRA believes that bad weather conditions, roadway worker protection 
procedures, RCT clearance problems, and mental and physical stress 
issues are operational problems that can and do occur during any 
railroad operation and are best addressed through proper training and 
through a credible communication system. There should be a direct line 
of communication between labor and management to quickly address RCL 
operating problems and training needs. Therefore, FRA recommends that a 
formal

[[Page 10342]]

communication procedure should be developed to ensure that RCL 
operational concerns are handled expeditiously.
    In response to concerns expressed by a number of parties, FRA had 
previously asked DOT's Volpe Center to test the electromagnetic 
radiation (EMR) emissions from an RCL system, simulating realistic rail 
yard operating conditions (since multiple reflections of radiofrequency 
radiation from metallic surfaces, like railcars, can enhance the 
primary beam and cause hotspots). An independent test contractor then 
tested EMR levels according to FCC standards and found that under 
normal use and where the manufacturer's operating instructions were 
followed, EMR emissions and workers' exposure levels were in full 
compliance with applicable human exposure safety standards regarding 
radio frequency radiation.
    FRA found no data that would indicate that electromagnetic field 
(EMF) and EMR emissions from RCTs exceed the accepted human exposure 
safety standards in the United States. FRA and the DOT Volpe Center 
technical experts will, however, continue to monitor the latest studies 
on potential health effects from long term low level environmental and 
work EMF and EMR exposures, as well as up-to-date applicable 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards posted 
on the web at http://www.osha-slc.gov/SLTC/radiofrequencyradiation. 
Standards and practices addressing EMF and EMR emissions can also be 
found in: FCC, 1997 Evaluating Compliance with FCC Guidelines for Human 
Exposure to Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields,'' FCC Office of 
Engineering Technology (OET), Ed. 97.01, FCC Bulletin 65, August 1997 
and Supplement C, December 1997. Both items are posted on the web at 
http://www./fcc./gov/oet/rfsafety; IEEE, C95.1a-1988, ``IEEE Standard 
for Safety Levels with Respect to Human Exposure to Radio Frequency 
Electromagnetic Fields, 3 KHz to 300 GHz,'' Edition 16 and Supplement 
a, April 1999, to be ordered from IEEE Customer Service at 1-800-678-
IEEE; and the ``American Conference of Governmental Industrial 
Hygienists (ACGIH),'' TLVs and BEIs-Threshold Limit Values for Chemical 
Substances and Physical Agents,'' pp. 150-155 (See http://www.ecgih.org). FRA intends to ensure that the margin of safety is 
maintained in this area and will take appropriate action if it becomes 
apparent that accepted safety margins are not maintained or if credible 
data on potential worker safety or health hazards from such exposures 
become available.
    A review of the accident/incident reports submitted during the 
technical conference disclosed communication failures, speed surges, 
braking force problems, and emergency stops during RCL operations. 
However, most of the reports were dated between 1996 and 1997 and 
pertained primarily to one rail yard and to a specific group of RCLs in 
that yard. FRA believes that current generation of RCTs have addressed 
many of the reported problems with RCL systems. It has been FRA's 
experience that, as this type of technology is introduced into railroad 
operations, unforeseen problems in hardware and software design do 
develop. As a consequence, FRA suggests that railroads have procedures 
in place to immediately identify and address such problems to reduce 
the risk of accident and/or injury. In addition, the FRA suggests that 
railroads have scientifically valid data gathering procedures to 
accurately monitor accident rates in RCL operations compared with 
manual locomotive operations.
    FRA has also reviewed data from the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) and Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) 
regarding any accidents investigated involving RCL operations. The 
records indicate that there has been considerable concern by OSHA 
regarding protection of rail movements. The records cite incidents of 
inplant rail movements that were not properly protected in the 
direction of travel, i.e., RCOs were not in position to observe the 
track ahead of the movement. MSHA also reported an accident that was 
caused in part by ``the inability of the remote operator to see the 
locomotive.'' These concerns are not new to the rail industry, which 
has long adopted operating rules that require switching movements to be 
made at a speed that will enable the movement to stop within half the 
range of vision short of a train, an engine, a railroad car, people or 
equipment fouling the track, obstructions, a stop signal, or a derail 
or switch lined improperly (restricted speed). Simply put, no movement 
should begin unless the track ahead of that movement is known to be 
clear. This would require RCOs to view the track ahead of the movement 
each time a movement is made. Because FRA believes RCL operations will 
be primarily conducted within heavily congested areas, i.e., railroad 
yards, and because FRA wishes to ensure that these operations are 
conducted in the safest possible manner, FRA recommends that all RCL 
movements be conducted at restricted speed, unless specifically 
exempted by railroad special instructions. However, these special 
instructions should ensure that a comparable means of protection is 
afforded these movements. FRA notes that many railroads have limited 
exemptions from the provisions of restricted speed. FRA plans to 
closely monitor how railroad operating rules are modified to 
accommodate RCL operations. Safety must not be compromised by these 
modifications. FRA also plans to monitor the accident/incident rates in 
areas where RCL operations exist to ensure that safety is maintained.
    FRA notes that traditional railroad industry restricted speed rules 
or their equivalents were not developed to protect trespassers or 
railroad workers who are not authorized to be on the track. Therefore, 
in the interest of safety, FRA will recommend that the public and 
railroad workers in the area should be notified by clearly visible 
warning signs, or by other equally effective means, that RCL operations 
exist and train movements are being conducted without anyone in the 
locomotive.
    FRA is also concerned about RCO safety when operations are 
conducted in isolated areas. There is no assurance that emergency aid 
can be adequately provided in a timely manner in the event of an 
emergency situation. Therefore, FRA recommends that the railroad or RCT 
should provide some automatic means of communication that will notify 
the railroad in the event the RCO becomes incapacitated, i.e., ``a 
worker alarm''. This automatic communication feature should also be 
capable of determining the non-responsive RCO's location to ensure that 
emergency help can respond effectively.
    Part 240 of title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires 
that all individuals who operate a locomotive are to be qualified and 
certified in accord with the requirements of that regulations. 
Therefore, anyone who operates a locomotive, regardless of the means 
used, must be properly trained and certified. The introduction of 
remote control operations is a significant departure from traditional 
on-board locomotive operations. If a railroad elects to conduct RCL 
operations, its locomotive engineer certification program would have to 
be modified to outline the training that will be required for this type 
of operation. This would constitute a material modification of the 
program requiring that the program be submitted to FRA for approval 
according to 49 CFR 240.103(e).

[[Page 10343]]

    Because information currently available to FRA does not lead to the 
conclusion that RCL operations should be prohibited on safety grounds, 
FRA has elected to proceed cautiously. The range of views and safety 
concerns expressed underscores the need to proceed with the 
implementation of this new technology in a safe and consistent manner. 
The Safety Advisory announced today is a refinement of proposed 
standards contained in the original Test Program.

Safety Advisory 2001-01

Recommendation: Operation of Remote Control Locomotives

    The following design criteria and operating procedures are 
recommendations only. Compliance is voluntary. However, railroads are 
strongly encouraged to regard these suggested criterion as a minimum 
from which to tailor their own RCL operations. It should be noted that 
all of the design features recommended are available with the current 
generation of remote control technology. In certain circumstances, due 
to the design of their equipment, or differences in operating 
practices, a railroad may not be able to obtain complete consistency 
with these recommendations. In those situations railroads are 
encouraged to develop alternative designs or practices which offer at 
least equivalent or greater levels of safety. FRA emphasizes that 
although compliance with this Safety Advisory is voluntary, nothing in 
this Safety Advisory is meant to relieve a railroad from compliance 
with all existing railroad safety regulations. Therefore, when 
procedures required by regulation are cited in this Safety Advisory, 
compliance is mandatory.

A. Safety Design and Operational Requirements

    1. Each RCT should, at a minimum, have the following features:
    a. directional control;
    b. graduated throttle or speed control;
    c. graduated locomotive independent brake application and release;
    d. train brake application and release control;
    e. audible warning device control (horn);
    f. audible bell control, if equipped;
    g. sand control (unless automatic);
    h. headlight control;
    i. emergency air brake application switch;
    j. generator field switch or equivalent to eliminate tractive 
effort to the locomotive; and
    k. audio or visual indication of wheel slip/slide.
    2. Although an RCT can have the capability to control, at different 
times, different locomotives equipped with remote-control receivers, it 
should be designed to be capable of controlling only one RCR equipped 
locomotive at a time. (A locomotive may consist of one or more engines 
operated from a single control).
    3. An RCT having the capability to control more than one RCL should 
have a means to lock in one RCR ``assignment address'' to prevent 
simultaneous control over more than one locomotive.
    4. Each locomotive equipped with an RCR should respond only to the 
RCTs assigned to that receiver.
    5. The RCT should be designed to require at least two separate 
actions by the RCO before RCL movement can begin (in order to prevent 
accidental movement).
    6. When an RCT's signal to the RCL is interrupted for a set period, 
not to exceed five seconds, the remote-control system should cause:
    a. full service application of the locomotive and train brakes; and
    b. elimination of locomotive tractive effort.
    7. If an RCT is equipped with an ``on'' and ``off'' switch, the 
switch, when moved from ``on'' to ``off'' position, should result in:
    a. application of the locomotive and train brakes; and
    b. elimination of locomotive tractive effort.
    8. Each RCL should have a distinct and unambiguous audible or 
visual warning device that indicates to nearby personnel that the 
locomotive is under active remote control and subject to movement.
    9. Each RCT should be equipped with an operator alertness device 
requiring manual resetting or its equivalent. It should incorporate a 
timing sequence not to exceed 60 seconds. Failure to reset the switch 
within the timing sequence should result in:
    a. application of the locomotive and train brakes; and
    b. elimination of locomotive tractive effort.
    10. Each RCT should have a tilt feature that, when tilted to a 
predetermined angle, should result in:
    a. an emergency application of the locomotive and train brakes; and
    b. elimination of locomotive tractive effort.

    Note: If RCL operations are being conducted in an isolated area, 
the railroad should establish timely emergency response procedures 
in the event the RCO is incapacitated. One method that would serve 
to meet this recommendation would be to equip the RCT with 
capability of transmitting an emergency signal. The signal should 
also be capable of identifying the RCO's location.

    11. If the RCT is equipped with a ``tilt bypass'' system enabling 
the tilt protection feature to be temporarily disabled, the bypass 
feature should deactivate after 15 seconds, unless reactivated by the 
RCO.
    12. The RCL should be equipped with a device that causes an 
application of the locomotive and train brakes and elimination of 
locomotive tractive effort whenever the RCL's main reservoir air 
pressure falls below 90 psi or when a locomotive protection alarm is 
activated while the locomotive is in remote operation. The device 
should need to be manually reset on board the RCL.
    13. When the air valves and the electrical selector switch on the 
RCR are moved from manual to remote or from remote to manual modes, an 
emergency application of the locomotive and train brakes should be 
initiated to prevent unauthorized use of the system.
    14. Railroads which acquire and utilize RCL equipment should comply 
with current human safety exposure standards for radio frequency 
radiation in their workplace. FRA further recommends that manufacturers 
should certify their equipment for compliance with current EMR exposure 
safety standards.
    15. Consideration should be given to the design of the RCT to 
provide for a human-machine interface (HMI) that incorporates basic 
human factors principles for the design and operation of displays, 
controls, supporting software functions, and other components. FRA 
recommends that railroads work closely with RCOs when addressing RCT 
design and comfort issues. The overriding goal of the design should be 
to minimize the potential for design-induced error by ensuring that the 
RCT is suitable for operators, including female operators, and their 
tasks and environment. RCT systems that have been designed with human-
centered design principles in mind--system products that keep human 
operators as the central, active component of the system--are more 
likely to result in improved safety. This includes the ergonomic design 
of the RCT. See FRA's 1998 report entitled ``Human Factors Guidelines 
for Locomotive Cabs'' (FRA/ORD-98/03 or DOT-VNTSC-FRA-98-8). Special 
consideration should be given to the effect of the RCT on the 
musculoskeletal system of the RCOs as well as on RCT harness comfort to 
avoid distraction from safety-related duties. Additional consideration 
should also be given to the ``breakaway'' safety feature of the RCT 
harness. The harness should be

[[Page 10344]]

designed to easily break free of the RCO in the event the harness 
becomes entangled on equipment.

B. Training

    Each person operating an RCL must be certified and qualified in 
accordance with 49 CFR Part 240 if conventional operation of a 
locomotive under the same circumstances would require certification 
under that regulation. Training must be provided to all RCOs subject to 
the requirements of 49 CFR Part 240. Additionally, training should be 
afforded those RCOs not subject to the requirements of Part 240 and 
those locomotive engineers who have little or no on-ground experience 
in switching operations if they are expected to conduct RCL operations. 
All affected railroad employees should be trained on RCL operating 
rules and procedures.
    Under Part 240, railroad engineer certification programs must 
include procedures to keep certified engineers current on methods of 
safe train handling, operating rules, condition of equipment, and 
personal safety and to provide initial training for new engineers on 
those subjects. Sec. 240.123. The programs must also include skill 
testing in the most demanding type of service the person will perform. 
Sec. 240.127. Appendix B of Part 240 requires that railroad engineer 
certification programs address how the railroad responds to changes 
such as the ``introduction of new technology'' and ``significant 
changes in operations.'' In FRA's view, it is likely that the 
introduction of remote controlled locomotives on railroads would 
typically necessitate a material change to each railroad's engineer 
certification program. Material modifications must be submitted to FRA 
for its review under 49 CFR 240.103(e).

C. Operating Practices

    1. The railroad should establish written standard operating 
procedures tailored to its RCL operations. At a minimum these 
procedures should include:
    a. Upon going off duty, each RCO should place the RCL in manual 
operation and properly secure it, unless control of the RCL is directly 
given to a relieving RCO.
    b. When operating an RCL, the RCO should not:
    i. ride on a freight car under any circumstances;
    ii. mount or dismount moving equipment;
    iii. operate any other type of machinery; or
    iv. stand or walk within the gage of the track or foul the track on 
which the movement is occurring while physically located in front of 
the movement.
    c. RCOs should ensure that the track is clear and properly aligned 
ahead of the remotely controlled movement while it is underway. 
Therefore, RCL operations should be operated at restricted speed not to 
exceed 20 mph, i.e., at a speed that will enable stopping the movement 
within half the range of vision assuring that all movements are 
protected.
    d. The RCO should operate only one RCL at a time.
    e. Prior to performing any function as prescribed in 49 CFR 
218.22(c)(5), the RCO should apply three point protection, i.e., fully 
apply the locomotive and train brakes, center the reverser, and place 
the generator field switch to the off position (eliminate locomotive 
tractive effort capability).
    f. Passenger trains should not be operated by use of a remote-
control device.
    2. The railroad must include RCL operating rules and procedures in 
its program required under 49 CFR part 217.
    3. The railroad should establish formal communication procedures to 
enable the appropriate railroad officials to receive and respond to 
information pertaining to RCL system failures or safety problems.
    4. The FRA recommends that the railroad keep a record of the total 
number of labor hours and the total number of employees by location for 
both RCL and manual switching operations to ensure that accidents and 
incidents are accurately measured, and that valid comparisons between 
the two types of operations can then be made.
    5. The FRA recommends that the railroad develop and implement a 
program specifically designed for RCOs that addresses the risks 
associated with switching operations and train movements on adjacent 
tracks. This program should incorporate the findings and 
recommendations of the Switching Operations Fatality Analysis Working 
Group.

D. Security

    1. The railroad should have instructions for the proper storing and 
handling of RCTs when not in use or in the operator's possession.
    2. The operation control handles located in the RCL cab should be 
removed or pinned in place to prevent accidental or intentional 
movement while the RCL is being operated in remote.
    3. The railroad should have strict procedures in place to ensure 
that only the intended RCTs are assigned to the appropriate RCL.

E. Inspections and Tests

    1. The RCL system must be included as part of the calendar day 
inspection required by 49 CFR 229.21, since this equipment becomes an 
appurtenance to the locomotive.
    2. Each time an RCT is used for the first time on each shift, a 
test of the air brakes and the RCT's safety features (tilt switch and 
alerter device) should be conducted. The test would not be required if 
the RCT were being directly transferred from one RCO to another with no 
change in remote status.
    3. The RCL system (both the RCT and RCR), should be designed to 
perform a self-diagnostic test of the electronic components of the 
system. The system should be designed to immediately ``fail safe'' 
(full service application of the locomotive and train brakes and the 
elimination of locomotive tractive effort) in the event a failure is 
detected.
    4. The RCL system components that interface with the mechanical 
devices of the locomotive, e.g., air pressure monitoring devices, 
pressure switches, speed sensors, etc., should be inspected and 
calibrated as often as necessary, but not less than the locomotive's 
periodic (92-day) inspection. It is recommended that records of such 
inspections and calibrations be kept.

F. Notification of RCL Use and Protection of Workers

    1. Each RCL should have a tag placed on the control stand throttle 
indicating the locomotive is being used in a remote control mode. The 
tag should be removed when the locomotive is placed back in manual 
mode.
    2. In areas where RCL operations are being conducted, warning signs 
should be posted indicating that there is no operator in the control 
compartment of the locomotive. These warning signs should be highly 
visible and posted at conspicuous locations so as to maximize their 
exposure to those most likely to encounter RCL operations.
    3. Whenever worker protection is required according to 49 CFR part 
218, the locomotive should be placed into manual mode and be properly 
secured. The appropriate blue signal protection should then be 
provided.

G. Accident-Incident Reporting Procedures

    1. All accident and/or incidents described in 49 CFR part 225 must 
be reported to FRA using the appropriate ``remote control'' reporting 
codes.
    2. Railroads are also reminded that they are required to comply 
with the

[[Page 10345]]

provisions of 49 CFR part 229.17--Accident reports.

    Dated: Issued in Washington D.C., February 1, 2001.
Edward R. English,
Director, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance.
[FR Doc. 01-3733 Filed 2-13-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P