[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 17 (Thursday, January 25, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 7815-7818]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-2304]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[DOCKET NO. 50-341]


Detroit Edison Company; Fermi 2 Environmental Assessment and 
Finding of no Significant Impact

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering 
issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 
issued to Detroit Edison Company (the licensee), for operation of Fermi 
2, located in Monroe County, Michigan.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

    The proposed action would revise the Fermi 2 Technical 
Specifications (TSs) by changing (1) the design features description of 
the fuel storage equipment and configuration to allow an increase in 
the spent fuel pool (SFP) storage capacity and (2) the description of 
the high-density spent fuel racks program to clarify that the 
surveillance program is applicable only to racks containing Boraflex as 
a neutron absorber.
    Currently, the SFP for Fermi 2 has 14 freestanding high-density 
(Boraflex) fuel racks, four General Electric (GE) low-density racks, 
and a rack for defective fuel, for a total storage capacity of 2414 
fuel assemblies. As part of a proposed modification, the licensee plans 
to increase Fermi 2's spent fuel storage capacity by 2194 spaces in a 
three-phase operation. In phase one, four additional high-density racks 
will be added to open spaces in the SFP. In phase two, the GE racks, 
the rack for defective fuel, and one high-density rack would be 
replaced with five new high-density racks. In phase three, the 
remaining 13 existing racks would be replaced with 14 new high-density 
racks. At the completion of phase three, the entire available floor 
space of the pool would be occupied with fuel storage racks providing 
for a total storage capacity of 4608 assemblies. Two platforms will be 
installed above the new high-density fuel storage racks to accommodate 
storage of miscellaneous activated components.
    The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's 
application for

[[Page 7816]]

amendment dated November 19, 1999, as supplemented on May 31, August 2, 
October 19, and November 21, 2000.

The Need for the Proposed Action

    The proposed action is needed to maintain full core offload 
capability by expanding the spent fuel storage capacity. The licensee 
estimates that it will lose the ability to fully offload the reactor 
fuel by June 2001. The expanded storage capacity would extend full core 
offload capability to the year 2015. The current Fermi 2 operating 
license authorizes plant operations through March 20, 2025.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

Radioactive Wastes
    The existing contaminated fuel storage racks will be the main 
source of radioactive waste for the proposed modification. The racks 
will be washed prior to being removed from the pool to remove as much 
contamination as possible. The racks will then be shipped, using a 
special Department of Transportation approved container, to a volume 
reduction facility for processing and subsequent disposal at an 
authorized burial site.
    In order to maintain the SFP water as clean as possible, underwater 
vacuuming of the SFP will be used to remove radioactive crud, sediment, 
and other debris generated in the rack replacement. Filters from use of 
this underwater vacuum system will also be a source of solid radwaste.
    The impact of the expanded fuel storage capacity on the production 
and release of radioactive waste during normal operations is not 
expected to be significant. The level of radioactive contamination in 
the pool water impacts the amount of solid waste produced by pool 
purification system resins, as well as the liquid effluents originating 
from SFP water. Radioactive gases that evolve from the surface of the 
pool also contribute to the plant's gaseous effluents. However, the 
levels of gaseous and particulate radioactivity in the pool water are 
dominated by the most recent reactor core offload to the SFP, not the 
older cooled fuel stored in the pool. Therefore, the storage of 
additional aged spent fuel assemblies resulting from this proposed 
design change will have a minimal contribution to the levels of 
radioactivity in the pool water.
    On the basis of its review of the Fermi 2 license amendment 
request, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed increase in spent 
fuel storage capacity (1) is not expected to result in an increase in 
the amount of gaseous tritium released from the SFP; (2) will result in 
a negligible increase in the amount of radioactive liquid released to 
the environment; and, (3) will not result in a significant increase in 
the volume of solid radioactive waste. Finally, small amounts of 
additional waste resin may be generated by the SFP's clean-up systems 
on a one-time basis. Shipping containers for these resins, the old 
racks, and debris generated by reracking will conform to 10 CFR part 
71, ``Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material,'' and the 
requirements of States through which shipments may pass. Therefore, the 
NRC staff finds that, with regard to radioactive waste, the proposed 
increase in spent fuel storage capacity at Fermi 2 is acceptable.
Radiological Impact Assessment
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's plan for the replacement 
of the existing SFP storage racks at Fermi 2 with respect to 
occupational radiation exposure. As stated above, the licensee plans to 
replace the existing fuel storage racks in the SFP with 23 new high-
density racks. A number of facilities have performed similar operations 
in the past. On the basis of the lessons learned from these operations, 
the licensee estimates that the proposed fuel rack installation can be 
performed within a radiological dose estimate of approximately 12 
person-rem. This estimate includes the rad-waste processing of the 
existing contaminated racks, as well as the projected dose to divers, 
in the event they are used, consistent with the licensee's contingency 
plan.
    All of the operations involved in the fuel rack installations will 
utilize detailed procedures prepared with full consideration of as low 
as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles. Workers performing the SFP 
re-racking operation will be given pre-job briefings to ensure that 
they are aware of their job responsibilities and precautions associated 
with the job. The licensee will monitor and control work, personnel 
traffic, and equipment movement in the SFP area to minimize 
contamination and to assure that exposures are maintained ALARA. 
Personnel will wear protective clothing and respiratory protective 
equipment, if necessary. Alarming dosimeters will be used as needed to 
confirm exposure and dose rates, while thermal luminescent dosimeters 
(TLDs) will be used to officially document the dose received. 
Additional personnel monitoring equipment (such as extremity TLDs or 
multiple TLDs) will be issued for appropriate tasks.
    As indicated previously, the licensee intends to complete the 
three-phase fuel rack replacement without the use of divers in the 
pool. Removal of existing racks and installation of the new racks are 
expected to be completed remotely from the surface of the pool. 
However, if diving is necessary, the licensee has developed a 
contingency plan that includes diving procedures that are consistent 
with Regulatory Guide 8.38, Appendix A, in terms of diver restraint, 
radiological monitoring, physical monitoring, and standard SFP diving 
operations.
    Prior to any diving operations, the radioactive sources in the pool 
will be configured to maximize the distance and shielding of the 
divers. Three dimensional radiation surveys will be performed with 
appropriate equipment. In addition, the divers will be equipped with 
monitors to survey the work area during each dive. The licensee will 
utilize underwater TV cameras to maintain visual contact with the 
divers during all diving operations. The divers will also be physically 
restrained by a dive tender with a tether contained in the dive 
umbilical. The SFP water will be continuously filtered through the SFP 
purification system in order to maintain water clarity. In addition, 
the licensee will vacuum the SFP floor prior to initiation of the 
diving operation and will vacuum the pool additional times during the 
diving operation, if it should become necessary, to maintain diver 
doses ALARA. Each diver will be equipped with whole body and extremity 
dosimetry (including alarming dosimetry) with remote, above surface, 
readouts that will be continuously monitored by radiation protection 
personnel.
    All items removed from the pool, as well as divers, if used, will 
be monitored for radiation and contamination. This monitoring will be 
performed in isolated ``bull pens'' that separate the potentially 
contaminated areas from the rest of the refueling floor. The bull pens 
will minimize the possible spread of contamination, including ``hot 
particles'' (or discrete radioactive particles (DRPs)). Based on the 
Fermi 2 operating history and fuel integrity experience, the licensee 
does not anticipate any significant radiological challenges from DRPs.
    The licensee assessed the radiological exposure impact of the 
proposed SFP design change on areas of the plant during normal 
operations. Revised shielding calculations indicate that the dose rates 
through the east and west walls of the pool would have only a modest 
increase (to 0.6 mrem/hr compared to the previous maximum of

[[Page 7817]]

0.5 mrem/hr). The maximum dose rates in the equipment storage room, 
adjacent to the north wall of the pool, increased to 400 mrem/hr. These 
calculations are based on the conservative assumption that all 
assemblies in the storage array have cooled for only 60 hours. The 
actual operational dose rates in this area will depend upon the age of 
the fuel stored in the north end of the pool. In addition, this area is 
not a normally occupied room and can be controlled as a high radiation 
area consistent with the requirement in 10 CFR part 20. The licensee 
has provided marked up radiation zoning maps from the Fermi 2 Updated 
Safety Analysis Report to reflect these design changes.
    On the basis of the NRC staff review of the Fermi 2 license 
amendment, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed increase in spent 
fuel storage capacity at Fermi 2 can be performed in a manner that will 
ensure that doses to the workers will be maintained ALARA. The NRC 
staff finds that the projected dose for the project of 12 person-rem is 
in the range of doses for similar modifications at other plants and is, 
therefore, acceptable.
Accident Considerations
    The proposed modification increases the spent fuel storage 
capacity, but it does not change the method for handling spent fuel 
assemblies.
    The proposed expansion of the SFP will not affect any of the 
assumptions or inputs used in evaluating the dose consequences of a 
fuel handling accident and, therefore, will not result in an increase 
in the doses from a postulated fuel handling accident.
Environmental Impact Conclusions
    The proposed action will not significantly increase the probability 
or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of 
any effluents that may be released off-site, and there is no 
significant increase in occupational or public exposure. Therefore, 
there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated 
with the proposed action.
    With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed 
action does not involve any historic sites. It does not affect 
nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impacts. 
Therefore, there are no significant nonradiological environmental 
impacts associated with the proposed action.
    Accordingly, the NRC concludes that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed

Shipping Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility
    Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility 
is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity. 
However, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) high-level radioactive 
waste repository is not expected to begin receiving spent fuel until 
approximately 2010, at the earliest. To date, no interim Federal 
storage facility has yet to be approved in advance of a decision on a 
permanent repository. Therefore, shipping the spent fuel to the DOE 
repository is not considered an alternative to increasing the onsite 
fuel storage capacity at this time.
Shipping Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility
    Reprocessing of spent fuel from Fermi 2 is not within the 
reasonable range of alternatives since there are no operating 
commercial reprocessing facilities in the United States. Therefore, 
spent fuel would have to be shipped to an overseas facility for 
reprocessing. However, this approach has never been used and it would 
require approval by the Department of State as well as other entities. 
Additionally, the cost of spent fuel reprocessing is not offset by the 
salvage value of the residual uranium; reprocessing represents an added 
cost.
Shipping the Fuel Offsite to Another Utility or Private Fuel Storage 
Facility
    The shipment of fuel to another utility or transferring fuel to 
another of the licensee's facilities would provide short-term relief at 
Fermi 2. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Subtitle B, Section 
131(a)(1), however, clearly places the responsibility for the interim 
storage of spent fuel with each owner or operator of a nuclear plant. 
The SFPs at the other reactor sites were designed with capacity to 
accommodate spent fuel from those particular sites. Therefore, 
transferring spent fuel from Fermi 2 to other sites would create 
storage capacity problems at those locations. The shipment of spent 
fuel to another site is not an acceptable alternative because of 
increased fuel handling risks and additional occupational radiation 
exposure, as well as the fact that no additional storage capacity would 
be created.
    The shipment of fuel to a private fuel storage facility is an 
alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity. 
However, a private fuel storage facility is not licensed at this time. 
Therefore, shipping the spent fuel to a private fuel storage facility 
is not considered an alternative to increased onsite fuel storage 
capacity at this time.
Alternatives Creating Additional Storage Capacity
    Alternative technologies that would create additional storage 
capacity include rod consolidation, dry cask storage, modular vault dry 
storage, and constructing a new pool. Rod consolidation involves 
disassembling the spent fuel assemblies and storing the fuel rods from 
two or more assemblies into a stainless steel canister that can be 
stored in the spent fuel racks. Industry experience with rod 
consolidation is currently limited, primarily due to concerns for 
potential gap activity release due to rod breakage, the potential for 
increased fuel cladding corrosion due to some of the protective oxide 
layer being scraped off, and because the prolonged consolidation 
activity could interfere with ongoing plant operations. Dry cask 
storage is a method of transferring spent fuel, after storage in the 
pool for several years, to high capacity casks with passive heat 
dissipation features. After loading, the casks are stored outdoors on a 
seismically qualified concrete pad. Concerns for dry cask storage 
include the need for special security provisions and high cost. Vault 
storage consists of storing spent fuel in shielded stainless steel 
cylinders in a horizontal configuration in a reinforced concrete vault. 
The concrete vault provides missile and earthquake protection and 
radiation shielding. Concerns for vault dry storage include security, 
land consumption, eventual decommissioning of the new vault, the 
potential for fuel or clad rupture due to high temperatures, and high 
cost. The alternative of constructing and licensing new spent fuel 
pools is not practical for Fermi 2 because such an effort would require 
about 10 years to complete and would be an expensive alternative.
    The alternative technologies that could create additional storage 
capacity involve additional fuel handling with an attendant opportunity 
for a fuel handling accident, involve higher cumulative dose to workers 
affecting the fuel transfers, require additional security measures that 
are significantly more expensive, and would not result in a significant 
improvement in environmental impacts compared to the proposed reracking 
modifications.
Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation
    Generally, improved usage of the fuel and/or operation at a reduced 
power level would be an alternative that would decrease the amount of 
fuel being stored in the SFPs and, thus, increase the

[[Page 7818]]

amount of time before the maximum storage capacities of the SFPs are 
reached. With extended burnup of fuel assemblies, the fuel cycle would 
be extended and fewer off-loads would be necessary. This is not an 
alternative for resolving the loss of full core off-load capability 
that will occur as a result of Fermi 2 receiving new fuel for Cycle 9 
in June 2001. In addition, operating the plant at a reduced power level 
would not make effective use of available resources and would cause 
unnecessary economic hardship on the licensee and its customers. 
Therefore, reducing the amount of spent fuel generated by increasing 
burnup further or reducing power is not considered a practical 
alternative.
The No-Action Alternative
    The NRC staff, also, considered denial of the proposed action 
(i.e., the ``no-action'' alternative). Denying the application would 
result in no significant change in current environmental impacts. The 
environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative 
actions are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

    This action does not involve the use of any resources not 
previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for Fermi 2.

Agencies and Persons Contacted

    In accordance with its stated policy, on December 11, 2000, the NRC 
staff consulted with the Michigan State official, M. Eldsman of the 
Michigan Public Service Commission, regarding the environmental impact 
of the proposed action. The state official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

    On the basis of the environmental assessment, the NRC concludes 
that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the NRC has determined 
not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed 
action.
    For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
licensee's letter dated November 19, 1999, as supplemented by letters 
dated May 31, August 2, October 19, and November 21, 2000, which are 
available for public inspection at the NRC's Public Document Room, 
located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), 
Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible 
electronically from the ADAMS Public Library component on the NRC Web 
site, http://www.nrc.gov (the Electronic Reading Room).

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of January, 2001.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Claudia M. Craig,
Section Chief, Section 1, Project Directorate III, Division of 
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 01-2304 Filed 1-24-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P