[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 14 (Monday, January 22, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6715-6718]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-1806]



[[Page 6715]]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-43839; File No. SR-CBOE-00-61]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule 
Change by the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. To Change the 
Capitalization Transfer Fee Applicable to Designated Primary Market-
Makers

January 12, 2001.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that 
on November 22, 2000, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. 
(``CBOE'' or ``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (``Commission'' or ``SEC'') the proposed rule change as 
described in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared 
by the CBOE. On December 4, 2000, the Exchange submitted Amendment No. 
1 to the proposed rule change.\3\ On December 13, 2000, the Exchange 
submitted Amendment No. 2 to the proposed rule change.\4\ On January 
10, 2001, the Exchange submitted Amendment No. 3 to the proposed rule 
change.\5\ The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments 
on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ In Amendment No. 1, the CBOE re-designated the filing as a 
submission pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 
78s(b)(2), rather than Section 19(b)(3)(A) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 
78s(b)(3)(A). See letter from Steve Youhn, Attorney, CBOE, to 
Deborah Flynn, Senior Special Counsel, Division of Market Regulation 
(``Division''), SEC, dated December 1, 2000 (``Amendment No. 1'').
    \4\ In Amendment No. 2, the CBOE confirmed that its recusal 
standards would apply to the procedures of the Modified Trading 
System (``MTS'') Committee described herein, and clarified certain 
portions of the text and description of the proposed rule change. 
See letter from Steve Youhn, Attorney, CBOE, to Deborah Flynn, 
Senior Special Counsel, Division, SEC dated December 8, 2000 
(``Amendment No. 2'').
    \5\ In Amendment No. 3, the CBOE amended the text of the 
proposed rule change to specify the formula for determining the 
amount of any fee imposed, and made further clarifications to the 
text and description of the proposed rule change. See letter from 
Steve Youhn, Attorney, CBOE, to Deborah Flynn, Senior Special 
Counsel, Division, SEC, dated December 28, 2000 (``Amendment No. 
3'').
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of 
Substance of the Proposed Rule Change

    The CBOE proposed to amend its rules regarding application of the 
fee for changes in ownership of Designated Primary Market Makers 
(``DPMs''). Below is the complete text of the proposed rule change. 
Proposed new text is in italics. Proposed deletions are in [brackets].
* * * * *

Chapter VIII--Market-Makers, Trading Crowds and Designated Primary 
Market-Makers

* * * * *

Transfer of DPM Appointments

    Rule 8.89. (a)-(e) No change.
    (f) The approval or failure to approve a proposed transfer of a DPM 
appointment, and the application of the transfer fee under 
Interpretation .02 of this Rule to a transfer, are [is] subject to 
direct review by the Board of Directors upon receipt by the Secretary 
of the Exchange, within ten (10) days of the time the Board is notified 
of the decision [of the MTS Committee is announced], of (i) a written 
request for such review made by a person aggrieved by the decision, 
specifying why the aggrieved person believes the decision of the 
Committee should be reversed or modified [(in the case of a failure to 
approve an application as submitted)] or (ii) a request for review made 
by at least five Directors of the Exchange (in any case). For purposes 
of this Rule, a person must be aggrieved as described in Chapter XIX of 
the Exchange's rules.
    * * * Interpretations and Policies:
    .01  No change.
    .02 [Any DPM that is allocated, after June 29, 1999, one or more 
option classes traded on the Exchange prior to that date shall be 
subject to a transfer fee in the event of a change in the 
capitalization of the DPM during the five year period following the 
allocation of the first such option class to the DPM. For purposes of 
this transfer fee, a change in the capitalization of a DPM shall be 
deemed to include any sale, transfer, or assignment of any ownership 
interest in the DPM or any change in the DPM's capital structure, 
voting authority, or distribution of profits or losses. This transfer 
fee shall be equal to the larger of (i) (the applicable percentage set 
forth below)  x  (the actual dollar value of the change in 
capitalization of the DPM as determined by the Exchange)  x  (the 
percentage of the DPM's Market-Maker trading volume in its capacity as 
a DPM in the previous 12 months attributable to option classes 
allocated to the DPM after June 29, 1999 that were traded on the 
Exchange prior to that date) and (ii) (the applicable percentage set 
forth below)  x  (the current level of overall DPM profitability per 
contract as determined by the Exchange based on DPM financial 
reporting)  x  (the DPM's Market-Maker trading volume in the previous 
12 months in option classes allocated to the DPM after June 29, 1999 
that were traded on the Exchange prior to that date)  x  (2)  x  (the 
percentage change in the DPM's capitalization as determined by the 
Exchange). The applicable percentage to be used in the formulas above 
to determine the transfer fee to be assessed to a DPM shall be 50% in 
the first year of the five year period during which the DPM is subject 
to this transfer fee, 40% in the second year, 30% in the third year, 
20% in the fourth year, and 10% in the fifth year.]
    (a) Certain transfers of interest in DPM appointments that occur 
after October 20, 2000 shall be subject to a DPM transfer fee. The 
intent of the Rule is to apply a transfer fee in those instances where 
one or more principals in the DPM exit or significantly reduce their 
participation in the DPM operation. The intent of the Rule is not to 
assess the transfer fee to any transaction that enables a DPM to add 
new capital, to replace a capital partner, to merge with an existing 
DPM (where all pre-existing partners continue their participation in 
the new DPM), or that makes small changes in the ownership or profit 
sharing arrangement of the DPM. The MTS Committee shall determine, 
based on the intent of this Rule, whether the transfer fee is 
applicable to specific transactions.
    (c) Factors to be considered in determining whether a transfer of 
an interest in a DPM appointment is subject to the transfer fee under 
this Interpretation .02 may include, but are not limited to, any one or 
more of the following:
    i. Is new capital being contributed to the DPM by the new 
principal(s)?*
    ii. Are the original principals maintaining their level of capital 
contributions to the DPM* or withdrawing capital?** If the original 
principals are retaining a profit allocation but are not maintaining 
their level of capital contributions to the DPM, have the original 
principals incurred financial losses with respect to their investment 
in the DPM?
    iii. How is the profit allocation structure changing?
    iv. What are the profit percentages allocated to the original 
principals in relation to the profit percentages allocated to the new 
principals? Are the profit percentages allocated to the new principals 
greater than the profit percentages allocated to the original 
principals?** If yes, does the difference reflect a difference in 
capital contributed?*
    v. What are the profit percentages allocated to the principals who 
are active in the management of the DPM in relation to the profit 
percentages

[[Page 6716]]

allocated to those principals that are primarily investors in the DPM? 
Are the profit percentages allocated to principals who are active in 
management greater than the profit percentages allocated to principals 
who are primarily investors?* Has the profit allocation split between 
these two categories of principals changed significantly?**
    vi. Is the purpose of a change in profit percentages to compensate 
a DPM employee?*
    vii. What is the level of consideration that is being received by 
the original principals?
    viii. Has management of the DPM changed significantly?**
    ix. Will the original principals who were active in the management 
of the DPM continue in that role?*
    An asterisk (*) next to a factor indicates that a positive response 
to the question posed would be a factor in favor of not imposing the 
transfer fee. A double asterisk (**) next to a factor indicates that a 
positive response to the question posed would be a factor in favor of 
imposing the transfer fee.
    (c) The amount of the transfer fee applicable to a specific 
transaction shall be equal to (the total value of the consideration, as 
determined by the MTS Committee, to be paid to the original DPM 
principals prior to June 30, 2004)  x  (the percentage of the DPM's 
Market-Maker trading volume in its capacity as a DPM in the previous 12 
months attributable to option classes allocated to the DPM after June 
29, 1999 that were traded on the Exchange prior to that date)  x  (the 
applicable percentage set forth below.) The fee rate percentage to be 
applied above is: 40% during the time period until June 29, 2001; 30% 
during the time period from June 30, 2001 to June 29, 2002; 20% during 
the time period from June 30, 2002 to June 29, 2003; and 10% during the 
time period from June 30, 2003 to June 29, 2004. The transfer fee 
expires on June 30, 2004. If the transfer of interest occurs over a 
period of years, the fee rate percentage applied will be consistent 
with the year in which the transfer occurs. As an example, if the 
transfer of a DPM is to occur equally over three years commencing in 
November 2000, then the fee rate percentage applied would be 40% for 
the first portion of the transfer, 30% for the second portion of the 
transfer, and 20% for the last portion of the transfer.
* * * * *

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the CBOE included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and 
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
Item IV below. The CBOE has prepared summaries, set forth in sections 
A, B, and C below, of the most significant parts of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    In 1999, CBOE instituted a floor-wide DPM system and awarded the 
appointment of options classes to DPMs at no cost in exchange for a 
long-term commitment to the Exchange and a fee on subsequent changes of 
ownership (``transfer fee''). Currently, the transfer fee, contained in 
Interpretation and Policy .02 to CBOE Rule 8.89, is imposed on DPMs 
that undergo changes in their capitalizations during a determined five-
year period.\6\
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    \6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 43186 (August 21, 
2000), 65 FR 51880 (August 25, 2000) (Approval of File No. SR-CBOE-
99-37) (approving current transfer fee scheme). The transfer fee 
generally is equivalent to an applicable percentage of the larger 
of: (i) (the applicable percentage set forth below)  x  (the actual 
dollar value of the change in capitalization of the DPM as 
determined by the Exchange)  x  (the percentage of the DPM's market 
maker trading volume in its capacity as a DPM in the previous 12 
months attributable to option classes allocated to the DPM after 
June 29, 1999 that there traded on the Exchange prior to that date) 
and (ii) (the applicable percentage set forth below)  x  (the 
current level of overall DPM profitability per contract as 
determined by the Exchange based on DPM financial reporting)  x  
(the DPM's market maker trading volume in the previous 12 months in 
option classes allocated to the DPM after June 29, 1999 that were 
traded on the Exchange prior to that date)  x  (2)  x  (the 
percentage change in the DPM's capitalization as determined by the 
Exchange). The applicable percentage to be used in the formulas 
above to determine the transfer fee to be assessed to a DPM shall be 
50% in the first year of the five year period during which the DPM 
is subject to this transfer fee, 40% in the second year, 30% in the 
third year, 20% in the fourth year, and 10 percent in the fifth 
year.
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    As originally proposed, the Exchange detailed three primary 
purposes for the transfer fee. First, it was designed to provide those 
who own DPMs with a significant incentive to capitalize sufficiently 
the DPM. Second, because the Exchange believes that the allocation of 
existing options classes to DPMs bestows upon them a valuable right for 
which they paid no consideration, the Exchange believed it would be 
inequitable for those DPMs to sell those rights shortly thereafter by 
transferring all or a portion of their interest in the DPM organization 
to other parties. Thus, the transfer fee was established to discourage 
these types of transactions, or if they were to occur, to require a 
significant portion of the value of the transaction to be paid to the 
Exchange. Finally, the transfer fee was intended to assure that DPMs 
maintained a long-term commitment to the Exchange.
    The Exchange believes that the DPM transfer fee, as structured, is 
not accomplishing these primary objectives and that it may be, in fact, 
having an unintended effect on the ability of CBOE to attract and 
retain well-capitalized DPMs. Specifically, the Exchange notes that the 
potential application of the transfer fee may be suppressing a number 
of proposed transactions that could strengthen the financial resources 
of DPMs.\7\ As originally proposed, the Exchange stated that it would 
consider changes to the DPM transfer fee if subsequent experience 
indicated that such changes were necessary and appropriate.\8\ In this 
respect, the Exchange notes that the Exchange's MTS Committee, the 
Lessors Advisory Committee, and the Floor Directors Committee have 
evaluated the DPM transfer fee and determined to modify the transfer 
fee so that it accomplishes its original primary objectives.
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    \7\ In this respect, the Exchange notes that the other options 
exchanges allow specialist assignments to be sold or transferred 
without the imposition of a fee, leaving CBOE at a competitive 
disadvantage. For example, on competing exchanges, specialists may 
take on new partners willing to make capital contributions, they may 
become part of larger market making organizations, or they may merge 
with other specialist units to combine their resources. All of these 
actions, which would trigger application of CBOE's DPM transfer fee, 
occur on other exchanges without those competing specialist units 
paying any transfer fee.
    \8\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 41872 (September 13, 
1999), 64 FR 51158 (September 21, 1999) (Notice of Filing of SR-
CBOE-99-37).
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    The proposed changes are intended to permit a DPM to add new 
capital, to make small changes in ownership or profit sharing, to 
replace a capital partner, or to merge with other DPMs (where all pre-
existing partners continue their participation in the new DPM), all 
without triggering the transfer fee. Consistent with the intent of the 
rule, a transfer fee would continue to be assessed in cases where one 
or more principals of a DPM exit[s] or significantly reduce[s] their 
participation in the DPM operation.
    To accomplish these changes, the Exchange proposes to amend 
Interpretation .02 to CBOE Rule 8.89 to modify the instances in which 
the fee

[[Page 6717]]

would be assessed. Specifically, the Interpretation would be modified 
to allow the MTS Committee to analyze each proposed transaction to 
determine whether the transfer fee should be applied. Factors to be 
considered in making such a determination may include, but would not be 
limited to, one or more of the following:
    i. Is new capital being contributed to the DPM by the new 
principal(s)?*
    ii. Are the original principals maintaining their level of capital 
contributions to the DPM* or withdrawing capital**? If the original 
principals are retaining a profit allocation but are not maintaining 
their level of capital contributions to the DPM, have the original 
principals incurred financial losses with respect to their investment 
in the DPM?
    iii. How is the profit allocation structure changing?
    iv. What are the profit percentages allocated to the original 
principals in relation to the profit percentages allocated to the new 
principals? Are the profit percentages allocated to the new principals 
greater than the profit percentages allocated to the original 
principals?** If yes, does the difference reflect a difference in 
capital contributed?*
    v. What are the profit percentages allocated to the principals who 
are active in the management of the DPM in relation to the profit 
percentages allocated to those principals that are primarily investors 
in the DPM? Are the profit percentages allocated to principals who are 
active in management greater than the profit percentages allocated to 
principals who are primarily investors?* Has the profit allocation 
split between these two categories of principals changed 
significantly?**
    vi. Is the purpose of a change in profit percentages to compensate 
a DPM employee?*
    vii. What is the level of consideration that is being received by 
the original principals?
    viii. Has management of the DPM changed significantly?**
    ix. Will the original principals who were active in the management 
of the DPM continue in that role?*
    An asterisk (*) next to a factor listed above indicates that a 
positive response to the question posed would be a factor in favor of 
not imposing the transfer fee. A double asterisk (**) next to a factor 
indicates that a positive response to the question posed would be a 
factor in favor of imposing the transfer fee.
    If after its review the MTS Committee determines that the proposed 
transaction should be subject to the transfer fee, the MTS Committee 
shall impose the fee. The Exchange proposes to replace the existing 
formulas for determining the amount of the transfer fee with a new 
formula contained in Interpretation .02(c) to Rule 8.89. The amount of 
the transfer fee applicable to a specific transaction would be equal 
to: (the total value of the consideration, as determined by the MTS 
Committee, to be paid to the original DPM principals prior to June 30, 
2004) x (the percentage of the DPM's Market-Maker trading volume in its 
capacity as a DPM in the previous 12 months attributable to option 
classes allocated to the DPM after June 29, 1999 that were traded on 
the Exchange prior to that date) x (the applicable percentage set forth 
below.) The fee rate percentage to be applied above is: 40% during the 
time period until June 29, 2001; 30% during the time period from June 
30, 2001 to June 29, 2002; 20% during the time period from June 30, 
2002 to June 29, 2003; and 10% during the time period from June 30, 
2003 to June 29, 2004.\9\ The transfer fee would expire on June 30, 
2004.
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    \9\ If the transfer of ownership occurs over a period of years, 
the fee rate percentage applied will be consistent with the year in 
which the transfer occurs. As an example, if the transfer of a DPM 
is to occur equally over three years commencing in November 2000, 
then the fee rate percentage applied would be 40% for the first 
portion of the transfer, 30% for the second portion of the transfer, 
and 20% for the last portion of the transfer.
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    The Exchange also proposes to amend section (f) to Rule 8.89 to 
create a review process relating to the application of the transfer 
fee. Accordingly, this provision allows a person aggrieved by the 
decision to appeal the MTS Committee's decision to assess the transfer 
fee, as well as its determination as to the amount of the fee, to the 
Board of Directors of the Exchange. Additionally, the proposed rule 
would allow the Board of Directors to call MTS Committee decisions 
relating to the assessment of the fee for review on the Board's own 
motion upon the request of five or more directors.
    Finally, CBOE proposes to make the effective date of this proposal 
retroactive to October 20, 2000. If this proposal is not granted 
retroactive status, the current transfer fee structure will have been 
applicable to only one transaction. By making the effective date 
October 20, 2000, the Exchange proposes to avoid assessing a fee to a 
transaction that, had it occurred one month later, would not have been 
subject to the fee. Thus, the Exchange does not believe that the 
interests of fairness are served by assessing a fee to a transaction 
that occurred during this interim period, a period in which the 
Exchange already had begun discussions to amend the transfer fee 
structure.
    The Exchange believes that the proposed changes advance the primary 
objectives of the DPM transfer fee, as identified above. First, the 
Exchange believes that the proposed changes will facilitate a DPM's 
ability to maintain sufficient capital to operate as a DPM by allowing 
it to enter into transactions that enhance its financial operating 
structure without automatically subjecting it to the DPM transfer fee. 
As the amount of the business transacted on the Exchange continues to 
grow, so will a DPM's capital needs. The proposed changes recognizes 
this and allow DPMs to respond accordingly without being subject to the 
transfer fee.
    Second, that Exchange believes that the proposed changes also 
continue to ensure that a DPM maintains its long-term commitment to the 
Exchange. The Exchange believes that by enhancing its capital 
structure, a DPM is making a long-term commitment to the Exchange that 
it intends to operate in that capacity for an extended period. For this 
reason, the Exchange believes it would be counter-productive to assess 
a fee on those types of transactions.
    Third, the Exchange believes the proposed amendments should prevent 
the ``quick sale'' of a DPM interest for a profit. The Exchange 
believes that the proposal advances this objective because it allows 
DPMs to enhance their capital structures without paying a transfer fee, 
provided that one or more principals do not exit or significantly 
reduce their participation in the DPM operation. If, however, the 
original principals do exit the business or significantly reduce their 
participation, they will be assessed a fee consistent with the intent 
of the rule. Accordingly, the proposal should continue to result in the 
levying of a transfer fee when a DPM tries to profit from the ``quick 
sale'' of its interest.
    Finally, the Exchange notes that the full membership has had an 
opportunity to review the proposed changes. In this regard, on November 
1, 2000, the Chairmen of the Floor Directors, MTS Appointments, and 
Lessors Advisory Committees distributed to the membership an 
Information Circular that discussed the changes and requested comment. 
To date, the Exchange has received no written comments in opposition to 
the amendment of the rule.\10\ The

[[Page 6718]]

Committees have discussed this issue in great detail and believe that 
the proposed changes will be beneficial to the operation of the 
Exchange.\11\
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    \10\ The Exchange notes that the Chairman of the Floor Directors 
Committee received one comment via telephone regarding the proposed 
amendment. This commenter supported abolishing the transfer fee 
altogether. The Exchange also received a copy of a letter sent to 
the Commission by another commenter. This commenter opposed the 
filing of the proposed rule change under Section 19(b)(3)(A) of the 
Act, 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A), which would have rendered it effective 
on filing. The commenter believed that the proposed rule change 
should be subject to public comment and review pursuant to Section 
19(b)(2) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2). See letter from Lawrence 
J. Blum to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, dated November 24, 
2000. The filing was subsequently re-filed under Section 19(b)(2) of 
the Act, 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2). See Amendment No. 1, supra note 3.
    \11\ The Exchange believes the proposed changes will address the 
potential shortcomings of the current DPM transfer fee. However, the 
Exchange will continue to evaluate the fee and make changes to it in 
the future if such changes are deemed necessary. Any such changes 
would be submitted to the Commission pursuant to Section 19(b) of 
the Act (15 U.S.C. 78s(b)).
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2. Basis
    For these reasons, the Exchange believes the proposed rule change 
is consistent with Section 6(b) of the Act,\12\ in general, and further 
the objectives of Section 6(b)(5) \13\ in particular, because it is 
designed to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to remove 
impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market, and 
to protect investors and the public interest.
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    \12\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \13\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
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B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    The CBOE does not believe that the proposed rule change will impose 
any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance 
of the purposes of the Act.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    On November 1, 2000, the Chairmen of the Floor Directors, MTS 
Appointments, and Lessors Committees distributed to the membership an 
Information Circular that discussed the prescribed changes and 
requested comment. To date, the Exchange has received no written 
comments in opposition to the amendment of the rule. The Exchange notes 
that the Chairman of the Floor Directors Committee received, via 
telephone, the views of one commenter who supported abolishing the 
transfer fee altogether.\14\ The Exchange believes the proposed 
amendments will enable it to achieve the original intent of the 
transfer fee, thereby negating the need to abolish the fee altogether. 
The Exchange also received a copy of a letter sent to the Commission 
from another commenter. This commenter opposed allowing the proposed 
changes to become effective on filing, and urged that they be subject 
to public comment and review.\15\ In Amendment No. 1 to the proposed 
rule change, the Exchange re-designated the filing as a submission 
pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act.\16\
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    \14\ See supra note 10.
    \15\ See supra note 10.
    \16\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
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III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing 
for Commission Action

    Within 35 days of the date of publication of this notice in the 
Federal Register or within such longer period (i) as the Commission may 
designate up to 90 days of such date if it finds such longer period to 
be appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to 
which the self-regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:
    (A) By order approve such proposed rule change, or
    (B) Institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule 
change should be disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposal is 
consistent with the Act. Persons making written submissions should file 
six copies thereof with the Secretary, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Washington, DC 20549-0609. Copies of 
the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with 
respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the Commission, 
and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change 
between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be 
withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 
552, will be available for inspection and copying in the Commission's 
Public Reference Room. Copies of such filing will also be available for 
inspection and copying at the principal office of the CBOE. All 
submissions should refer to File No. SR-CBOE-00-61 and should be 
submitted by February 12, 2001.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Market Regulation, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\17\
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    \17\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 01-1806 Filed 1-19-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8010-01-M