[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 11 (Wednesday, January 17, 2001)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 4104-4217]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-606]



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Part III





Department of Transportation





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Federal Railroad Administration



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49 CFR Parts 229, 231, and 232



Brake System Safety Standards for Freight and Other Non-Passenger 
Trains and Equipment; End-of-Train Devices; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 66 , No. 11 / Wednesday, January 17, 2001 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 4104]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 229, 231, and 232

[FRA Docket No. PB-9; Notice No. 17]
RIN 2130-AB16


Brake System Safety Standards for Freight and Other Non-Passenger 
Trains and Equipment; End-of-Train Devices

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOT.

ACTION: Final Rule.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing revisions to the regulations governing the 
power braking systems and equipment used in freight and other non-
passenger railroad train operations. The revisions are designed to 
achieve safety by better adapting the regulations to the needs of 
contemporary railroad operations and facilitating the use of advanced 
technologies. These revisions are being issued in order to comply with 
Federal legislation, to respond to petitions for rulemaking, and to 
address areas of concern derived from experience in the application of 
existing standards governing these operations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: April 1, 2001. The incorporation by reference of 
certain publications listed in the rule is approved by the Director of 
the Federal Register as of April 1, 2001.

ADDRESSES: Any petition for reconsideration should reference FRA Docket 
No. PB-9, Notice 17, and be submitted in triplicate to FRA Docket 
Clerk, Office of Chief Counsel, RCC-10, 1120 Vermont Avenue, Mail Stop 
10, Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: Leon Smith, Deputy Regional 
Administrator--Region 3, FRA Office of Safety, RRS-14, 1120 Vermont 
Avenue, Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 404-562-3800), or 
Thomas Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel, RCC-10, 
1120 Vermont Avenue, Stop 10, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-
6053).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    In 1992, Congress amended the Federal rail safety laws by adding 
certain statutory mandates related to power brake safety. See 49 U.S.C. 
20141. These amendments specifically address the revision of the power 
brake regulations by adding a new subsection which states:

    (r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.--(1) The Secretary shall conduct a 
review of the Department of Transportation's rules with respect to 
railroad power brakes, and not later than December 31, 1993, shall 
revise such rules based on such safety data as may be presented 
during that review.
    (2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Secretary shall, where 
applicable, prescribe standards regarding dynamic brake equipment. * 
* *

Pub. L. 102-365, section 7; codified at 49 U.S.C. 20141, superseding 
45 U.S.C. 431(r).

    In response to the statutory mandate, the various recommendations 
and petitions for rulemaking, and due to its own determination that the 
power brake regulations were in need of revision, FRA published an 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on December 31, 1992 (57 
FR 62546), and conducted a series of public workshops in early 1993. 
The ANPRM provided background information and presented questions on 
various subjects including the following: the use and design of end-of-
train (EOT) telemetry devices; the air flow method of train brake 
testing; the additional testing of train air brakes during extremely 
cold weather; the training of employees to perform train brake tests 
and inspections; computer-assisted braking systems; the operation of 
dynamic brakes on locomotives; and other miscellaneous subjects 
relating to conventional brake systems as well as information regarding 
high speed passenger train brakes. The questions presented in the ANPRM 
on the various topics were intended as fact-finding tools and were 
meant to elicit the views of those persons outside FRA charged with 
ensuring compliance with the power brake regulations on a day-to-day 
basis.
    Based on the comments and information received, FRA published a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (1994 NPRM) regarding revisions to the 
power brake regulation. See 59 FR 47676 (September 16, 1994). In the 
1994 NPRM, FRA proposed a comprehensive revision of the power brake 
regulations which attempted to preserve the useful elements of the 
current regulatory system in the framework of an entirely new document. 
FRA attempted to delineate the requirements for conventional freight 
braking systems from the more diverse systems for various categories of 
passenger service. In developing the NPRM, FRA engaged in a systems 
approach to the power brake regulations. FRA considered all aspects of 
a railroad operation and the effects that the entire operation had on 
the train and locomotive power braking systems. Therefore, the proposed 
requirements not only addressed specific brake equipment and inspection 
requirements, but also attempted to encompass other aspects of a 
railroad's operation which directly affect the quality and performance 
of the braking system, such as personnel qualifications; maintenance 
requirements; written procedures governing operation, maintenance, and 
inspection; record keeping requirements; and the development and 
integration of new technologies.
    Following publication of the 1994 NPRM in the Federal Register, FRA 
held a series of public hearings in 1994 to allow interested parties 
the opportunity to comment on specific issues addressed in the NPRM. 
Public hearings were held in Chicago, Illinois on November 1-2; in 
Newark, New Jersey on November 4; in Sacramento, California on November 
9; and in Washington, DC on December 13-14, 1994. These hearings were 
attended by numerous railroads, organizations representing railroads, 
labor organizations, rail shippers, and State governmental agencies. 
Due to the strong objections raised by a large number of commenters at 
these public hearings, FRA announced by notice published on January 17, 
1995 that it would defer action on the NPRM and permit the submission 
of additional comments prior to making a determination as to how it 
would proceed in this matter. See 60 FR 3375. Although the comment 
period officially closed April 1, 1995, FRA continued to receive 
comments on the NPRM as well as other suggested alternatives well into 
October 1995.
    Furthermore, beginning in mid-1995, FRA internally committed to the 
process of establishing the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC). 
The determination to develop the RSAC was based on FRA's belief that 
the continued use of ad hoc collaborative procedures for appropriate 
rulemakings was not the most effective means of accomplishing its goal 
of a more consensual regulatory program. FRA believed that the 
establishment of an advisory committee to address railroad safety 
issues would provide the best opportunity for creating a consensual 
regulatory program to benefit the Administrator in the conduct of her 
statutory responsibilities. FRA envisioned that the RSAC would allow 
representatives from management, labor, FRA, and other interested 
parties to cooperatively address safety problems by identifying the 
best solutions based on agreed-upon facts, and, where regulation 
appears necessary, by identifying regulatory options to implement these 
solutions. The process of establishing the RSAC was not complete until 
March 1, 1996, and on March 11, 1996, FRA published a notice

[[Page 4105]]

in the Federal Register that the Committee had been established. See 61 
FR 9740.
    In the interim, based on these considerations and after review of 
all the comments submitted, FRA published a notice in the Federal 
Register on February 21, 1996, stating that, in order to limit the 
number of issues to be examined and developed in any one proceeding, 
FRA would proceed with the revision of the power brake regulations via 
three separate processes. See 61 FR 6611. In light of the testimony and 
comments received on the 1994 NPRM, emphasizing the differences between 
passenger and freight operations and the brake equipment utilized by 
the two, FRA decided to separate passenger equipment power brake 
standards from freight equipment power brake standards. As passenger 
equipment power brake standards are a logical subset of passenger 
equipment safety standards, it was determined that the passenger 
equipment safety standards working group would assist FRA in developing 
a second NPRM covering passenger equipment power brake standards. See 
49 U.S.C. 20133(c). In addition, in the interest of public safety and 
due to statutory as well as internal commitments, FRA determined that 
it would separate the issues related to two-way EOTs from both the 
passenger and freight issues, address them in a public regulatory 
conference, and issue a final rule on the subject as soon as 
practicable. A final rule on two-way EOTs was issued on December 27, 
1996. See 62 FR 278 (January 2, 1997). Furthermore, it was announced 
that a second NPRM covering freight equipment power brake standards 
would be developed with the assistance of RSAC. At the Committee's 
inaugural meeting on April 1-2, 1996, the RSAC officially accepted the 
task of assisting FRA in development of revisions to the regulations 
governing power brake systems for freight equipment. See 61 FR 29164.
    Members of RSAC nominated individuals to be members of the Freight 
Power Brake Working Group (Working Group) tasked with making 
recommendations regarding revision of the power regulations applicable 
to freight operations. The Working Group was comprised of thirty-one 
voting members as well as a number of alternates and technical support 
personnel. The following organizations were represented by a voting 
member and/or an alternate on the Working Group:

Association of American Railroads (AAR)
The American Short Line Railroad Association (ASLRA)
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE)
The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF)
Canadian National Railroads (CN)
Canadian Pacific Rail Systems (CP)
Consolidated Rail Corporation (CR)
CSX Transportation, Incorporated (CSX)
Illinois Central Railroad Company (IC)
International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers (IAMAW)
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)(Advisor)
National Association of Regulatory Commissioners (NARUC)
California Public Utilities Commission (CAPUC)
Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS)
Railway Progress Institute (RPI)
Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA)
Southern Pacific Lines (SP)
Transportation Communications International Union/Brotherhood of 
Railway Carmen (TCU/BRC)
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU)
Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP)
United Transportation Union (UTU)

    The Working Group held seven multi-day sessions in which all 
members of the working group were invited. These sessions were held on 
the following dates:
    May 15-17, 1996 in Washington D.C.;
    June 11-13, 1996 in Chicago, Illinois;
    July 31, 1996 in Chicago, Illinois;
    August 21-23, 1996 in Annapolis, Maryland;
    September 26-27, 1996 in Washington D.C.;
    October 29-30, 1996 in Washington D.C.; and
    December 4, 1996 in St. Louis, Missouri.
    General minutes of each of these meetings are contained in FRA 
Docket PB-9 and are available for public inspection during the times 
and at the location noted previously. In addition to these meetings, 
there were numerous meetings conducted by smaller task force groups 
designated by the Working Group to further develop various issues. All 
of these smaller task forces were made up of various members of the 
Working Group or their representatives, with each task force being 
represented by management, labor, FRA, and other interested parties. 
The Working Group designated smaller task forces to address the 
following issues: Dry air; dynamic brakes; periodic maintenance and 
testing; electronically controlled locomotive brakes; and inspection 
and testing requirements. These task forces were assigned the job of 
developing the issues related to the broad topics, presenting reports 
to the larger Working Group, and if possible making recommendations to 
the Working Group for addressing the issues.
    Although the Working Group discussed, debated, and attempted to 
reach consensus on various issues related to freight power brakes, 
consensus could not be reached. However, the working group in 
conjunction with the various task forces developed a wealth of 
information on various issues and further clarified the parties' 
positions regarding how the issues could or should be addressed in any 
regulation. The major cluster of issues, upon which resolution of many 
of the other issues rested, were the requirements related to the 
inspection and testing of brake equipment. The inspection and testing 
task force met on numerous occasions and gathered and reviewed data, 
and the labor and rail management representatives to the task force 
drafted various proposals and options related to the inspection and 
testing of freight brake equipment. The Working Group discussed the 
proposals and investigated many of the costs and benefits related to 
the various proposals as well as the safety implications; however, the 
Working Group could not reach any type of consensus position. 
Consequently, FRA declared that an impasse had been reached and 
announced, at the December 4, 1996 meeting of the Working Group, that 
FRA would proceed unilaterally with the drafting of the NPRM.
    Subsequent to December 4, 1996, several members of the Working 
Group, including representatives from both rail management and labor, 
continued informal discussions of some of the issues related to the 
inspection and testing of freight equipment. These representatives 
informed FRA that a consensus proposal might be possible, provided that 
the Working Group were permitted to continue deliberations. 
Consequently, FRA agreed to reconvene the Working Group, and in April 
1997 three additional meetings were conducted on the following dates:
    April 2-3 in Kansas City, Missouri;
    April 10-11 in Phoenix, Arizona; and
    April 23 in Jacksonville, Florida.
    Representatives of both rail management and rail labor presented 
the Working Group with inspection and testing proposals for 
consideration and review both before and during this period. Although 
the proposals were discussed and deliberated, the Working Group was 
once again unsuccessful in

[[Page 4106]]

reaching consensus on any of the freight power brake inspection and 
testing issues. Consequently, by letter dated May 29, 1997, FRA 
informed the members of the Working Group that FRA would be withdrawing 
the freight power brake task from the Working Group at the next full 
RSAC meeting on June 24, 1997. FRA provided this notice to avoid any 
misunderstanding regarding the process by which the proposed rule would 
be drafted. FRA also informed the members of the Working Group that it 
would not invest further time in attempting to reach consensus unless 
all other members of the Working Group jointly indicated that they have 
reached consensus on a proposal and wanted to discuss it with FRA. FRA 
noted that if that were to occur prior to June 24, 1997, it would 
reconsider withdrawing the task from RSAC. As no consensus proposal was 
presented to FRA prior to June 24, 1997, FRA withdrew the task from the 
Working Group and informed the members of RSAC that FRA would proceed 
independently in the drafting of a freight power brake NPRM.
    FRA carefully considered the information, data, and proposals 
developed by the Freight Power Brake Working Group as well as all the 
oral and written comments offered by various parties regarding the 1994 
NPRM on power brakes when developing a revised power brake NPRM. On 
September 9, 1998, an NPRM (1998 NPRM) was published in the Federal 
Register proposing brake system safety standards for freight trains and 
equipment. See 63 FR 48294 (September 9, 1998).
    As evidenced by the preceding discussion, FRA spent years 
developing the 1998 proposed power brake regulations. During that time, 
FRA instituted rulemakings to address passenger and commuter operations 
and equipment and two-way end-of-train devices, and developed a channel 
of communication to address tourist and excursion operational concerns. 
Consequently, the 1998 proposal focused solely on freight and other 
non-passenger operations. FRA did not, for the most part, attempt to 
include provisions related to the inspection and maintenance of 
locomotive braking systems or to the performance of other mechanical 
inspections that are currently addressed by other parts of the 
regulations. FRA believed that although those requirements are 
interrelated to the inspection, testing, and maintenance of freight 
power brakes, they are adequately addressed in other regulations and 
would only add to the complexity of the proposal, causing confusion and 
misunderstanding by members of the regulated community.
    When developing the 1998 NPRM, FRA determined that the proposal 
would closely track the existing requirements related to the 
inspection, testing, and maintenance of the braking systems used in 
freight operations. Although FRA recognized that the current regulatory 
scheme tended to create incentives to ``overlook'' defects or fail to 
conduct vigorous inspections, FRA also believed that the current 
regulatory scheme is an effective and proven method of ensuring safety 
and that many of the ``negative incentives'' could be greatly reduced 
by strict and aggressive enforcement coupled with moderate revisions to 
address specific concerns raised by interested parties. Furthermore, 
representatives of both rail labor and rail management indicated that 
if a consensus proposal could not be developed then FRA should proceed 
on its own with developing a proposal which tracks the current 
requirements, and that FRA should strictly enforce those requirements.
    The 1998 NPRM proposed a moderate, although comprehensive, revision 
of the existing requirements related to the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance of brake equipment used in freight operations. The proposal 
attempted to balance the concerns of rail labor and management and 
increase the effectiveness of the regulation. In the 1998 NPRM, FRA 
attempted to reorganize, update, and clarify the existing regulations 
related to freight power brakes and eliminate potential loopholes 
created by the existing regulatory language. Furthermore, completely 
new requirements were proposed to address the qualifications of those 
individuals conducting brake inspections and tests. FRA also proposed 
requirements related to the movement of freight equipment with 
defective or inoperative brakes which were consistent with existing 
statutory requirements and other federal regulations addressing the 
movement of defective freight equipment. The 1998 NPRM also attempted 
to codify existing maintenance requirements related to the brake system 
and its components and prevent unilateral changes to those provisions 
by the very party to which they apply. Moreover, the proposal also 
contained specific requirements related to dynamic brakes and 
requirements aimed at increasing the quality of air introduced into 
brake systems by yard air sources.
    In addition to the above, the 1998 proposal also contained various 
incentives to the railroads to encourage the performance of quality 
brake inspections, particularly at locations where trains originate. 
These included incentives to use qualified mechanical forces to conduct 
brake system tests at major terminals where long-distance trains 
originate in order to move these trains greater distances between brake 
inspections than existing regulations permitted. Consequently, the 1998 
proposal retained the basic inspection intervals and requirements 
contained in the existing regulations and preserved the useful elements 
of the existing system, but also proposed additions, clarifications, 
and modifications that FRA believed would increase the safety, 
effectiveness, and enforceability of the regulations.
    Following publication of the 1998 NPRM, FRA held two public 
hearings and a public technical conference to allow interested parties 
the opportunity to comment on specific issues addressed in the NPRM. 
The public hearings were held in Kansas City, Missouri on October 26 
and in Washington, DC on November 13, 1998. The public technical 
conference was conducted in Walnut Creek, California on November 23 and 
24, 1998. The hearings and technical conference were attended by 
numerous railroads, organizations representing railroads, labor 
organizations, rail shippers, and State governmental agencies. During 
the hearings and technical conference a vast amount of oral information 
was presented, and a considerable number of issues were raised and 
discussed in detail.
    Subsequent to conducting these public hearings and technical 
conference, FRA issued a notice extending the comment period on the 
NPRM from January 15, 1999 to March 1, 1999. See 64 FR 3273. This 
extension was provided based on the requests of several interested 
parties for more time in which to develop their responses. At the 
public hearings and technical conference conducted in relation to the 
NPRM and in written comments submitted subsequent to the public 
hearings and technical conference, concerns were raised regarding the 
data discussed by FRA in the NPRM. The comments raised concerns 
regarding FRA's collection of data related to FRA's inspection activity 
and the number of conditions not in compliance with Federal regulations 
found during that inspection activity. The comments and correspondence 
received alleged that there were substantial problems with FRA's 
database, that there had been substantial overreporting of the number 
of units inspected, and that there had been a systematic deflation of 
power brake defect ratios.

[[Page 4107]]

    As the allegations and concerns raised were general in nature, FRA 
believed it prudent and necessary to allow interested parties to fully 
explain and discuss their concerns. Therefore, FRA conducted a public 
meeting on May 27, 1999 to permit the exchange of information and 
concerns regarding FRA's database and the information developed from 
that database. See 64 FR 23816 (May 4, 1999). The purpose of the 
meeting was to allow FRA to provide information regarding its internal 
review of the data and address some of the concerns raised as well as 
to allow interested parties to further develop and articulate the 
issues and concerns they had with regard to the data gathered and 
presented by FRA in the NPRM.
    FRA has carefully considered all the information, data, and 
proposals submitted in relation to FRA Docket PB-9 when developing this 
final rule. This includes: the information, data and proposals 
developed by the RSAC Freight Power Brake Working Group; all oral and 
written comments submitted in relation to the 1994 NPRM on power 
brakes; and all oral and written comments submitted regarding the 1998 
NPRM on freight power brakes. In addition to the preceding information, 
FRA's knowledge and experience with enforcing the existing power brake 
regulations were also relied upon when developing this final rule.

II. Overview of Comments and General FRA Conclusions

    The following discussions are grouped by major themes and issues 
addressed in the 1998 NPRM and the oral and written comments submitted 
in relation to that document. In each of the major issue areas, FRA has 
attempted to outline the significant portions of the proposal, discuss 
the comments received on the proposal and any alternative approach 
recommended, and provide a general idea of how FRA has decided to 
address the issues or approaches.

A. Accident/Incident History and Defective Equipment

    The 1998 NPRM contained a detailed discussion regarding the 
accident/incident data which FRA considered when developing the 
proposal. In that discussion, FRA noted that it considers a variety of 
factors in attempting to determine the relative condition of the 
industry as it relates to the safety of train power brake systems. Two 
of the factors considered when making this assessment are the number of 
recent brake-related incidents and the amount of defective brake 
equipment recently discovered operating over the railroad system, both 
of which provide some indication as to the potential or likelihood of 
future brake-related incidents. Due to concerns raised in both written 
comments and at the public meeting conducted on May 27, 1999, regarding 
the accident/incident data and power brake defect ratio data discussed 
above, FRA believes it is necessary to further explain how these data 
were used in developing this final rule.
1. Accident/Incident Data
    In order to determine the potential quantifiable safety benefits to 
be derived from the provisions proposed in the NPRM and either retained 
or modified in this final rule, FRA conducted a review of all 
accidents/incidents reported to FRA to determine which incidents/
accidents could potentially have been prevented had the provisions of 
the rule been in place. For purposes of the NPRM, FRA identified a 
brake-related incident as being an incident reported to FRA as being 
caused by one of the following: brake rigging down or dragging; air 
hose uncoupled or burst; broken brake pipe or connections; other brake 
components damaged, worn, broken or disconnected; brake valve 
malfunction (undesired emergency); brake valve malfunction (stuck 
brake); hand brake broken or defective; hand brake linkage and/or 
connections broken or defective. For purposes of the NPRM, FRA did not 
consider brake pipe obstruction-related incidents because FRA believed 
they had been fully considered at the time that FRA promulgated the 
final rule relating to the use of two-way end-of-train devices.
    In written comments and at the public meeting held in conjunction 
with the NPRM, several labor representatives raised concerns regarding 
FRA's reliance on accident/incident information which is essentially 
reported to FRA by the railroads. These representatives contend that 
railroads have an economic incentive to report accidents/incidents as 
being due to human factors rather than to mechanical problems or 
deficiencies. Thus, they contend that the potential safety benefits 
identified by FRA in the NPRM are inaccurate and underestimated because 
the data used to determine those benefits are developed by the 
railroads. FRA tends to agree with the concerns raised by these 
commenters and raised this concern in its discussion of the accident/
incident data in the NPRM.
    In the NPRM, FRA acknowledged that the presented brake-related 
incidents most likely did not accurately reflect the total number of 
incidents that were potentially linked, in some part, to brake-related 
causes and did not provide a complete picture of the costs associated 
with the identified incidents. See 63 FR 48297. FRA recognized that the 
information on most incidents is provided by the railroads which 
generally identify the direct cause of an incident but may not 
sufficiently identify all of the contributory causes in a manner to 
permit FRA to conclude that the brake system played a part in the 
incident. Thus, FRA acknowledged that there may be numerous incidents 
which occurred in the industry which were at least partially due to 
brake-related problems, but which were ultimately more closely linked 
to human error or other mechanical problems and thus, were reported to 
FRA under different cause codes. However, as it is extremely difficult 
to identify those accidents/incidents that may have been in some part 
related to a brake problem, FRA elected to include only those accidents 
specifically identified as brake-related in its quantified safety 
benefits and included other potential incidents as qualitative safety 
benefits in the NPRM. FRA also recognized that the damage costs 
provided to FRA by the railroads for the incidents identified in the 
NPRM failed to consider all of the costs associated with an accident 
such as: loss of lading; wreck clearance; track delay; environmental 
clean-up; removal of damaged equipment; evacuations; or the impact on 
local traffic patterns. See 63 FR 48297. Thus, for purposes of the 
NPRM, the property damages reported by the railroads were multiplied by 
a factor of 1.5625 in an effort to capture these non-reported damages. 
See 63 FR 48297.
    In calculating the potential quantifiable safety benefits to be 
derived from this final rule, FRA has slightly expanded the criteria 
for determining the accidents/incidents which are addressed by this 
final rule. Thus, for purposes of this final rule the quantified safety 
benefits include a percentage of certain types of accidents reported as 
being due to human error or other than a brake-related mechanical 
problem. The quantified safety benefits for this final rule also 
include a percentage of those incidents which are considered brake pipe 
obstruction-related. Although these accidents were considered in 
relation to the two-way EOT final rule, FRA believes that this final 
rule will prevent an additional percentage of those incidents that were 
not captured by the two-way EOT final rule.
    Table 1 below contains a compilation of the relevant incidents that 
FRA

[[Page 4108]]

considers to be preventable that have been reported to FRA from 1994 
through 1998. The incidents included in this table contain incidents 
reported to FRA as being caused by one of the following: Brake rigging 
down or dragging; air hose uncoupled or burst; broken brake pipe or 
connections; other brake components damaged, worn, broken or 
disconnected; brake valve malfunction (undesired emergency); brake 
valve malfunction (stuck brake); hand brake broken or defective; hand 
brake linkage and/or connections broken or defective. Table 1 also 
contains incidents reported as being related to brake pipe obstructions 
and certain brake-related human factor incidents which include: runaway 
cuts of cars; train handling; and improper use of brakes. FRA believes 
that various provisions of this final rule have the potential of 
preventing a certain percentage of the incidents reported as being due 
to these causes. However, in developing the cost/benefit analysis for 
this final rule, FRA used a very conservative effectiveness rate of .2 
for incidents with these reported causes. The Regulatory Impact 
Analysis prepared in connection with this final rule provides a 
detailed discussion of how certain human factor and brake pipe 
obstruction incidents were utilized when evaluating this rule.
    It should be noted that the damage costs noted in Table 1 for the 
identified incidents are based on the damage to railroad property or 
equipment. Thus, the damages presented fail to consider the costs 
associated with the injuries and fatalities involved. These costs are 
calculated in detail in the Regulatory Impact Analysis prepared in 
connection with this final rule. The costs presented in Table 1 also do 
not consider such things as: loss of lading; wreck clearance; track 
delay; environmental clean-up; removal of damaged equipment; 
evacuations; or the impact on local traffic patterns. Consequently, the 
railroad property damages have been multiplied by a factor of 1.5625 in 
an effort to capture some of these non-reported damages.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ AAR surveyed its members and reported that, on average, 
these other costs constitute an additional 56.25 percent of the 
reported damages.

                                        Table 1.--Brake-Related Incidents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Number of
                      Year                           accidents       Injuries       Fatalities      Damages \*\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994............................................              99              24               1     $11,414,346
1995............................................             121              65               0       9,431,582
1996............................................             112              44               3      20,637,986
1997............................................              98               8               0       9,651,569
1998............................................             121               3               0      10,791,626
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
      Total.....................................             551             140               4     61,927,107
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ Increased by 56.25% to reflect unreported damages.

2. Use of Power Brake Defect Data
    A second factor that is considered by FRA, to some extent, in 
determining the relative condition of the industry in regard to the 
safety of power brake equipment is the percentage of equipment found 
with defective brakes during FRA inspections and special projects. As 
noted in the preceding discussions, the method for calculating and 
determining the percentage of equipment with defective brakes was a 
contentious subject within the RSAC Power Brake Working Group prior to 
the issuance of the NPRM and at the public hearings and meetings 
conducted subsequent to the issuance of the NPRM. In the NPRM, FRA 
provided a lengthy discussion regarding the data it had available 
regarding power brake defect ratios and the limitations regarding the 
use of such data. See 63 FR 48298. In that discussion, FRA explained 
that data on brake defects is collected by FRA inspectors as they do 
rail equipment inspections and during special projects conducted under 
the Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP). The NPRM made clear 
that the data collected during these activities is not suitable for use 
in any statistical analysis of brake defects.
    In order to perform a statistically valid analysis, either all cars 
and locomotives must be inspected (prohibitively expensive), or a 
statistically valid sample must be collected. For the sample to be 
valid for the purpose of statistical analysis, the sample must be 
randomly selected so that it will represent the same characteristics as 
the universe of data. Random samples have several unique 
characteristics. They are unbiased, meaning that each unit has the same 
chance of being selected. Random samples are independent, or the 
selection of one unit has no influence on the selection of other units. 
Most statistical methods depend on independence and lack of bias. 
Without a randomized sample design there can be no dependable 
statistical analysis, and no way to measure sampling error, no matter 
how the data is modified. Random sampling ``statistically guarantees'' 
the accuracy of the results.
    The sampling method used for regular FRA inspections is not random. 
It is more of a combination between a judgement sample and an 
opportunity sample. The opportunity sample basically just takes the 
first sample population that comes along, while the judgement sample is 
based on ``expert'' opinion. The sampling method used for SACP 
inspections is also a judgement sample, where FRA is focusing its 
inspections on a specific safety concern. This method is extremely 
prone to bias, as FRA is typically investigating known problem areas. 
Furthermore, some SACP inspections are joint inspections with labor. 
Consequently, it is unknown whether the final reports reflect only FRA 
defects, as many of the joint inspections had both AAR and FRA defects 
recorded.
    Neither the regular FRA inspections nor the SACP inspections were 
designed for random data collection. Although both are very useful to 
FRA, they were not designed for this purpose and the data should be 
used carefully. FRA believes that data collected during routine 
inspections are the most likely data to accurately reflect the 
condition of the fleet. However, both FRA inspection data and SACP data 
lack any measuring device, a defect is a defect and no distinction is 
made between a critical defect versus a minor defect. Furthermore, the 
estimated correlation coefficients between defects and

[[Page 4109]]

accidents were not found to be statistically significant. This does not 
mean that defects cannot lead to collisions or derailments as the lack 
of correlation could easily be a result of non-random sampling. 
Therefore, the data collected both during routine FRA inspections and 
under SACP cannot be used as a proxy for data collected by means of a 
random sample for the purpose of statistical analysis. The sample is 
not random, so no dependable statistical analysis may be performed. 
Consequently, FRA did not and will not use the data regarding power 
brake defects for the purpose of conducting any type of statistical 
analysis.
    In the NPRM, FRA provided brake defect ratio's for the years 1993 
through 1997 based upon the data contained in its database. See 63 FR 
48298, Table 2. The average brake defect ratio for this five year 
period was 3.84 percent. The NPRM also noted that the available SACP 
data (which focuses on known problem areas) indicated brake defect 
ratios as high as 35 percent at some locations. FRA stated that the 
SACP data in all likelihood indicates that there are localized areas of 
concern and that some railroads have particular yards or operations 
with persistent problems. The NPRM attempted to make clear that FRA 
believes that brake defects are in all likelihood higher than that 
indicated by FRA's database and that the reality of power brake defects 
lies somewhere between the 3.84 percent represented in FRA's database 
and the 35 percent found at certain locations. FRA noted that actual 
power brake defect ratios are probably closer to the percentage 
reflected in FRA's database because FRA examines almost \1/2\ million 
freight cars and locomotives annually. Thus, contrary to the assertions 
of certain commenters, FRA did not assert or contend that the power 
brake defect ratios represented by its database were an accurate or 
precise reflection as to the relative condition of the industry. In 
fact, as evidenced by the preceding discussion, FRA attempted to point 
out the limited usefulness of the data contained in its database. 
Furthermore, review of the defect data submitted by the BRC at the 
technical conference in Walnut Creek, California, as discussed below, 
appears to support FRA's conclusions regarding power brake defect 
ratios.
    The NPRM made clear that the power brake defect ratios indicated in 
FRA's database were specifically relied on only to calculate the cost 
of the requirement to conduct retests on cars found with brakes that 
are not applied during the performance of the various required brake 
tests. Power brake defect ratios were not specifically relied on when 
developing any provision contained in the NPRM or in this final rule. 
Although power brake defect ratios were considered, they were not used 
as the basis for any of the provisions proposed in the NPRM or 
contained in this final rule. They were generally used to aid FRA in 
identifying problem areas, which in turn helped FRA identify brake 
issues and practices that needed to be addressed. For example, the 
existence of high power brake defect ratios at a particular location or 
on a particular railroad likely indicate the existence of certain 
practices or procedures that create or contribute to the high defect 
levels. As is evident from the discussions of the various requirements 
contained in both the NPRM and in this final rule, FRA considered a 
massive amount of information when developing this rule. These included 
accident/incident data; information and data provided in relation to 
the 1994 NPRM, the RSAC Power Brake Working Group, and the 1998 NPRM as 
well as FRA's experience in the enforcement of existing regulations and 
the expertise and knowledge of FRA's field inspectors.
    Although the data regarding defect ratios contained in FRA's 
database has limited usefulness in the context of developing a 
regulation, the data is very useful to FRA in other ways. The data is 
useful in measuring a railroad's general compliance level and aids in 
identifying problem areas or locations. This information aids FRA in 
allocating its inspections forces and permits FRA to focus its 
enforcement on locations or issues which are in the greatest need of 
such scrutiny. By focusing its enforcement in this manner FRA is able 
to make the best use of its limited resources.
3. Discussion of Concerns Regarding FRA's Collection of Power Brake 
Defect Data
    Although the NPRM and the preceding discussion detail the 
limitations of using the data collected by FRA regarding power brake 
defects when developing a regulation, FRA believes that a more detailed 
discussion of FRA's collection of power brake defect data is needed in 
order to address the issues raised by various commenters subsequent to 
the issuance of the NPRM. As noted above, FRA conducted a public 
meeting on May 27, 1999 in order to address general concerns raised by 
various parties regarding the accuracy of the brake defect data 
presented in the NPRM and to provide interested parties the opportunity 
to develop the issues they generally raised in oral and written 
comments regarding that data. At this public meeting, representatives 
of several labor organizations raised issues regarding the accuracy and 
use of the power brake defect data complied by FRA. These commenters 
generally allege that the method by which FRA collects defect data 
results in the underreporting of defects which in turn results in a 
systematic deflation of power brake defect ratios.
    Specific issues raised at this public meeting and in subsequent 
written comments include: the overreporting of units inspected during 
FRA inspections; the calculation and deflation of the power brake 
defect ratio; the inspection procedures used by FRA that tend to 
exclude certain categories of power brake defects; potential 
discrepancies in the input data relative to the activity codes from FRA 
field inspection reports to FRA's database; the performance of power 
brake inspections by FRA inspectors on cars that are not properly 
charged or connected to a source of compressed air; FRA's reliance on 
the railroads for the total number of cars inspected; and the wide 
variance between FRA inspectors and FRA regions in the number of units 
inspected, the number of defects reported, and the resulting defect 
ratios.
    In order to understand some of the issues raised, it is necessary 
to understand how inspection data developed by an FRA inspector are 
entered into FRA's database. FRA Motive Power & Equipment (MP&E) 
inspectors conduct inspections of railroad freight equipment pursuant 
to various parts of the Federal regulations contained in chapter 49 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations. Principally, these include inspections 
under the following: Part 215--Freight Car Safety Standards; part 229--
Locomotive Safety Standards; part 231--Safety Appliance Standards; and 
part 232--Power Brakes and Drawbars. When performing an inspection 
under each of these parts, an FRA inspector will fill out the 
appropriate inspection form which indicates the number of units 
inspected under each part as well as the number of defective conditions 
found on those units. In the context of performing power brake 
inspections under part 232, an inspection of a car means a unit count 
of one. When this type of inspection is conducted, inspectors inspect 
various brake-related car components such as: Foundation brake rigging, 
air hoses, angle cocks, brake shoes, and, where possible, piston 
travel. When an inspector performs an inspection of a brake test 
required under part 232, the unit count for such a test

[[Page 4110]]

is the train consist, block of cars, or car being tested. For example, 
when an inspector observes the performance of an initial terminal brake 
test, the entire train would constitute one unit count.
    Certain labor representatives raised various issues regarding FRA's 
calculation of power brake defect ratios. Several of these concerns 
involve the potential overreporting of the number of units inspected 
which then results in the deflation of power brake defect ratios. One 
concern addressed the practice of counting a single car or locomotive 
as a unit count under each of the MP&E regulations that it is inspected 
under. For example, a freight car could be considered a unit count 
under part 215, part 231, and part 232 if an FRA inspector were to 
inspect that freight car under each of those provisions. Thus, one 
freight car could be represented as three unit counts. It is claimed 
that this practice inflates the number of units inspected and thus, 
deflates defect ratios. This concern would be valid if FRA were to 
attempt to express a defect ratio for combined parts of the CFR. For 
example, if FRA were to attempt to express an MP&E defect ratio (a 
combination of parts 215, 229, 231, and 232) then the method by which 
FRA collects data would result in an inflation of the number of units 
inspected and the resulting defect ratio would be skewed. For purposes 
of analysis, FRA's database is constructed so that defect ratios are 
expressed only in terms of each separate part of the CFR. Therefore, 
the power brake defect ratios discussed in the NPRM were calculated 
based solely on the units inspected by FRA under the provisions 
contained in part 232.
    A second concern involves the potential of duplicate inspection 
reports being submitted by different FRA inspectors when engaged in 
team inspections. Certain labor representatives allege that FRA 
inspectors are significantly inflating the number of power brake units 
being inspected by submitting duplicate reports for the same inspection 
activity when groups of FRA inspectors perform inspections at the same 
location. In an effort to investigate this concern, FRA designed a 
computer program to search for potentially duplicate inspection reports 
submitted during the years of 1995 through 1998. Table 2 displays the 
figures regarding power brake inspections conducted by FRA for the 
years of 1995 through 1998 that is contained in FRA's database.

                     Table 2.--Power Brake Inspections and Defect Ratios: 1995 Through 1998*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                  All railroads     Class I RRs
               Calendar year                   Power brake       Power brake       power brake      power brake
                                                  units        defective units    defect ratios    defect ratios
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995......................................           611,824            24,387            .03986           .0369
1996......................................           646,140            28,795            .04456           .0419
1997......................................           582,685            26,004            .04463           .045
1998......................................           585,663            26,286            .04488       N/A
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Note: Class I Railroads Power Brake Defect Ratios column information comes from the Regulatory Impact Analysis
  (RIA) for the 1998 NPRM on freight power brakes. No defect ratio was used in the report for calendar year 1998
  because the RIA was finalized in August of 1998.

    In order to identify potential duplicate reports the computer 
program identified inspection reports in which two or more FRA 
inspectors were in the same county, on the same day, on the same 
railroad, and in which at least one unit-count code matched. Table 3 
displays the results of this search, showing the number of potential 
duplicate reports that were submitted from 1995 through 1998 and 
showing the potential number of over reported units.

                     Table 3.--Potential Duplicate Power Brake Inspections 1995 Through 1998
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Inspection
                                                              reports with                          Potential
                       Calendar year                          more than one         Units        duplicate units
                                                              matching unit                      (half of units)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995......................................................                39             1,965               983
1996......................................................               154            12,646             6,323
1997......................................................               342            19,482             9,741
1998......................................................               182             8,692             4,346
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 4 and Table 5 display the impact of the potential duplicate 
reports on the calculation of power brake defect ratios. FRA believes 
that the data contained in Tables 4 and Table 5 establish that the 
impact of potential duplicate reports on the defect ratios presented in 
the NPRM is insignificant when considered in the context of nationwide 
data.

                              Table 4.--Revised Power Brake Data Considering Potential Duplicate Reports 1995 Through 1998
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                          Defect ratios
                                                                   Power brake        Potential        Units minus                       after adjusting
                         Calendar year                                units        duplicate units      potential      Defective units    for potential
                                                                                                     duplicate units                     duplicate units
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995..........................................................           611,824               983           610,841            24,387            .03992
1996..........................................................           646,140             6,323           639,817            28,795            .04501
1997..........................................................           582,685             9,741           572,944            26,004            .04539
1998..........................................................           585,663             4,346           581,317            26,286            .04522
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 4111]]


         Table 5.--Affect of Potential Duplicate Reports on Power Brake Defect Ratios 1995 Through 1998
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Defect ratios
                       Calendar year                             before         Defect ratios      Difference
                                                               adjustment     after adjustment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995......................................................            .03986            .03992            .00006
1996......................................................            .04456            .04501            .00045
1997......................................................            .04463            .04539            .00076
1998......................................................            .04488            .04522            .00034
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It should be noted that the numbers presented in Tables 3 through 
Table 5 overstate the actual impact of potential duplicate inspection 
reports. For the year 1998, FRA conducted an in-depth analysis of the 
potential duplicate reports found by the computer program. The computer 
program identified 393 potential duplicate inspection reports for the 
year 1998. However, included in this grouping were unique inbound 
inspection reports, outbound inspection reports and split inspection 
reports. In addition, there were inspection reports from inspectors who 
worked in the same county, but at different locations. Each of these 
reports was removed from the 393 potentially duplicate inspection 
reports identified by the computer program based on a report-by-report 
analysis of each of the reports by FRA MP&E specialists. This analysis 
left 182 potential duplicate reports for 1998, which were used to 
calculate the figures presented in Tables 3 through 5 for 1998. 
Although these tables note 182 potential duplicate inspection reports 
involving 8,692 units (4,346 duplicates), a further analysis of the 
reports by FRA found that only 54 of the inspection reports were 
actually found to be duplicative. These 54 duplicate inspection reports 
involved the over-reporting of just 3,073 units rather than the 4,346 
units identified in Table 4. As an in-depth analysis was not performed 
on the potential duplicate inspection reports identified by the 
computer program for the years of 1995 through 1997, the figures 
provided for those years in all likelihood greatly overstate the actual 
number of duplicate claims submitted in each of those years. Thus, the 
actual impact of duplicate inspection reports is even less than the 
small percentages indicated in Table 5 above.
    Although the impact of duplicate inspection reports is 
insignificant, FRA believes that a brief discussion of how these 
duplicate inspection reports happened is necessary in order to assure 
interested parties that such occurrences are rare and that FRA has 
taken steps to avoid these inaccuracies. In 1994, FRA had four 
inspection forms for the Agency's five inspection disciplines. The 
Operating Practices and Hazardous Materials disciplines shared the same 
form. FRA also had a Quality Improvement Plan (QIP) daily activity 
report form to help the Agency track resource allocations, including 
the amount of time required to perform certain inspections. When ``team 
inspections'' occurred, one inspector completed the inspection report 
for the entire team. However, each inspector on the team was also 
required to complete a separate QIP report to receive credit for the 
inspection. On January 1, 1995, a newly developed single inspection 
form (FRA 6180.96) for all disciplines became operational. Furthermore, 
in May of 1995, FRA discontinued the collection of QIP-time data based 
on FRA's conclusion that it had adequate information from previous QIP 
reports regarding the time it takes to conduct various inspections. In 
addition, the new inspection form incorporated many of the previous QIP 
codes. In August 1995, FRA converted to a data collection system using 
personal computers.
    After conducting the analysis discussed above, it was determined 
that 26 FRA MP&E inspectors inadvertently prepared all of the involved 
duplicate inspection reports. Furthermore, FRA was not aware that the 
new computer system did not filter out duplicate inspection reports. 
After becoming aware of these problems based on reports from its field 
personnel, FRA specifically addressed the issue of inspection reporting 
at FRA's multi-regional conference conducted in 1998. At this 
conference, FRA's Office of Safety management provided specific 
guidance on preparing reports that would eliminate potential duplicate 
reporting. During this same period, FRA also changed its computer 
software to give inspectors credit for inspections while at the same 
time preventing potential duplicate reporting. Furthermore, on March 5, 
1999, FRA re-issued reporting procedures designed to prevent duplicate 
inspection reports when team inspections are conducted. These 
procedures were issued to all Federal and State inspection personnel 
and to all FRA Regional Administrators and Deputy Regional 
Administrators.
    Subsequent to the public meeting conducted in May of 1999, FRA made 
two modifications to the summary data produced by its database in order 
to clarify the meaning of the data and to avoid misunderstanding by 
outside parties. The first modification relates to safety appliance 
inspections conducted under 49 CFR part 231. The summary data 
previously contained the heading ``SA & PB (cars and locomotives).'' 
This heading may have caused some confusion because the heading 
suggests that it applies to both safety appliance and power brake 
inspections when in reality the data captured under this heading only 
concerns safety appliance inspections under part 231. This heading has 
been modified to read ``SA (cars and locomotives)'' to more accurately 
reflect the information contained under this heading. FRA has also 
modified the summary data by eliminating the calculation of an MP&E 
defect ratio. As discussed above, FRA believes that the calculation of 
a composite MP&E defect ratio is inappropriate based on the way FRA 
collects the information contained in its database and would result in 
a deflation of MP&E defect ratios. Therefore, defect ratios will only 
be presented for each separate MP&E CFR part.
    In response to the issue raised regarding FRA's practice of 
conducting brake inspections under part 232 while cars are not 
connected to a source of compressed air or not completely charged with 
air, FRA has developed a separate reporting code for brake inspections 
conducted in this manner. This reporting code will become effective in 
mid-2000 and will indicate when brake inspections are conducted on cars 
or trains that are not charged with compressed air. Although FRA agrees 
that the most thorough brake inspection is performed when a car or 
train is charged, a large majority of the brake components on a car can 
be inspected for abnormalities without the actual application of the 
air brakes. For example, cut-out air brakes, brake connection pins 
missing, brake rigging down or dragging, brake shoes worn to the extent 
that the backing plate comes in contact with the tread of the wheel,

[[Page 4112]]

angle cocks missing or broken, retainer valves broken or missing, and 
air brake piping bent or broken can all be discovered regardless of 
whether a car or train is charged with air. When FRA inspectors conduct 
train air brake tests, they inspect all of the components noted above 
as well as the operation of the train air brakes while under the 
required air pressures. FRA has conducted inspections of brake 
equipment in this manner for decades and will continue to conduct brake 
inspections under part 232 on equipment that is both on and off a 
source of compressed air. FRA believes that the addition of a code to 
identify those inspections conducted while equipment is not connected 
to a source of compressed air will provide a more accurate assessment 
of defective brake system components.
    Two other issues raised by various individuals at the May 27, 1999, 
public meeting concerned FRA's reliance on railroads to determine the 
number of cars inspected and the wide disparity between FRA inspectors 
and regions with regard to the number of units inspected and defects 
reported. FRA acknowledges that FRA inspectors frequently rely on 
information provided by the railroad regarding car counts when 
initially conducting an inspection, which is sometimes higher than the 
actual number of cars being inspected. However, in most instances FRA 
inspectors request a copy of the consist prior to finalizing their 
inspection reports to ensure a proper unit count. FRA has issued 
guidance to its inspectors to ensure that the unit counts on all 
inspections are accurate.
    Although FRA acknowledges that the number of brake inspections 
conducted varies somewhat from inspector to inspector and from region 
to region, FRA contends that these variances are the result of 
competing priorities and varying workloads within each region. FRA 
makes every effort to standardize its inspection activities by 
providing substantial training to each of its inspectors. This training 
is comprised of both classroom and on-the-job training. Classroom 
training conducted at least once a year at the Regional or Multi-
Regional conferences, and through training provided by General 
Electric, General Motors-EMD, and Westinghouse Air Brake Company. Many 
regions also conduct discipline specific conferences with training on 
new regulations and issues provided by various subject matter experts. 
On-the-job training is provided through Regional Specialists and 
journeyman inspectors. These individuals will work one-on-one with the 
inspectors on the various types of inspections that the inspector is 
required to conduct. FRA also frequently issues enforcement guidance to 
its inspectors in the form of technical bulletins in order to ensure 
consistent enforcement of the regulations.

4. Review of Defect Data Submitted by the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen 
(BRC)

    After issuance of the 1998 NPRM, FRA conducted a technical 
conference in Walnut Creek, California, on November 23 and 24, 1998. At 
this technical conference individuals representing the BRC submitted a 
vast amount of data collected either by its members at various 
locations or through joint labor and FRA inspection activities 
conducted at various locations. The data provided by BRC 
representatives addressed defective equipment found in various trains 
at seven different locations across the country during various time 
periods from October of 1997 to November of 1998. The BRC submitted 
this data in order to establish that the power brake defect ratios 
developed based on the information contained in FRA's database were 
inaccurate.
    FRA conducted an in-depth review of the data submitted by BRC 
representatives. Although the BRC attempted to summarize the data for 
many of the locations addressed, FRA's review of the data discovered 
that the BRC's summaries counted defects that were not power brake 
defects, failed to summarize all the data for all the trains covered by 
the supporting documentation, and double counted some brake defects 
when calculating the number of defective cars. It should also be noted 
that approximately 80-90 percent of the defective conditions noted on 
the supporting documentation merely listed the defective condition as 
being ``brake shoes.'' This notation does not make clear whether the 
defective brake shoe was defective under the federal regulations or 
defective under AAR industry standards. However, in order to assess the 
data in a manner that is most favorable to the party submitting the 
data, FRA assumed that all defects noted as ``brake shoes'' were 
defective under Federal requirements. In conducting its analysis of the 
data submitted, FRA only considered power brake defects, whereas, BRC's 
summary data appear to consider other mechanical and safety appliance 
defects which are not the subject of this proceeding.
    Table 6 contains a summary of FRA's in-depth analysis of the data 
submitted. FRA's analysis determined that the data submitted by the BRC 
establish a power brake defect ratio of approximately 4.96 percent, 
which is less than 1 percent higher than the power brake defect ratios 
developed based on the information contained in FRA's database for the 
years of 1996 and 1997, discussed in the 1998 NPRM. See 63 FR 48298. 
The analysis of the data submitted by the BRC indicates that some 
locations and some trains have power brake defect ratios in excess of 
11 and 12 percent, which is consistent with the findings made and 
reported by FRA during various SACP inspections as noted in the 
preceding discussion and in the 1998 NPRM.

                             Table 6.--Analysis of Defect Data Submitted by the BRC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                   Power brake
                Location                    Total trains       Total cars      Cars with power    defect ratio
                                              inspected         inspected       brake defect        (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Platte, Nebraska..................             1,625           150,926             8,136              5.39
Hinkle Yard, Oregon.....................               151            13,455               425              3.15
Oak Island-Newark, New Jersey...........                13               618                72             11.65
Kansas City, Missouri...................               180            11,917               159              1.33
Clovis, Alliance, Temple Yards--Texas...                16             1,419                41              2.88
Sparks Yard--Sacramento, California.....                 8               781                30              3.84
Various Locations, Mississippi..........                 4               296                37              12.5
                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------
      Totals............................             1,997           179,412             8,900              4.96
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 4113]]

B. Inspection and Testing Requirements

    As noted in the preceding discussions and in the 1998 NPRM, the 
issues related to the inspection and testing of the brake equipment on 
freight trains are some of the most complex and sensitive issues with 
which FRA deals on a daily basis. Consequently, the requirements 
related to the inspection and testing of freight power brakes must be 
viewed as the foundation on which the rest of the requirement contained 
in this final rule are based.
1. Brake Inspections--General
    In the 1998 NPRM, FRA fully discussed the information and proposals 
submitted in response to the 1994 NPRM, as well as the proposals 
developed as part of the RSAC process. See 63 FR 48298-304 (September 
9, 1998). Based on its review of that information and those proposals 
and based upon its experience in the enforcement of the current power 
brake regulations, FRA provided a detailed discussion as to why those 
alternatives were not viable models upon which a revision of the 
freight power brake requirements could be based. See 63 FR 48301-304. 
Rather than reiterate those discussions, FRA refers interested parties 
to the discussions contained in the 1998 NPRM noted above. In 
developing the inspection requirements contained in the NPRM, FRA 
determined that the proposed requirements should closely track the 
existing inspection requirements and intervals as they have proven 
themselves effective in ensuring the safety of railroad operations. FRA 
believed that moderate modifications to the existing requirements were 
necessary to ensure clarity, eliminate potential loopholes, incorporate 
current best practices of the industry, and enhance enforcement while 
providing some flexibility to the railroads to utilize new technologies 
and recognize contemporary railroad operations.
    The current regulations are primarily designed around the following 
four different types of brake system inspections: Initial terminal; 
1,000-mile; intermediate terminal; and brake pipe continuity check. See 
49 CFR 232.12 and 232.13. These brake system inspections differ in 
complexity and detail based on the location of the train or on some 
event that affects the composition of the train. Each of the inspection 
provisions details specific actions that are to be performed and 
identifies the items that are to be observed by the person performing 
the inspection.
    The initial terminal inspection described in Sec. 232.12(c)-(j) is 
intended to be a comprehensive inspection of the brake equipment and is 
primarily required to be performed at the location where a train is 
originally assembled. This inspection requires the performance of a 
leakage test and an in-depth inspection of the brake equipment to 
ensure that it is properly secure and does not bind or foul. Piston 
travel must be checked during these inspections and must be adjusted to 
a specified length if found not to be within a certain range of 
movement. The brakes must also be inspected to ensure that they apply 
and release in response to a specified brake pipe reduction and 
increase. FRA recently issued enforcement guidance to its field 
inspectors clarifying that both sides of a car must be observed 
sometime during the inspection process in order to verify the condition 
of the brake equipment as required when performing an initial terminal 
inspection.
    The current regulations require an intermediate brake inspection at 
points not more than 1,000 miles apart. These inspections are far more 
limited than the currently required initial terminal inspections in 
that the railroad is required only to determine that brake pipe leakage 
is not excessive, the brakes apply on each car, and the brake rigging 
is secure and does not bind or foul. See 49 CFR 232.12(b). In the 1982 
revisions to the power brake rules, FRA extended the distance between 
these inspections from 500 miles to 1,000 miles.
    The existing regulations also mandate the performance of an 
intermediate terminal brake inspection on all cars added to a train 
after it leaves its initial terminal, en route to its destination, 
unless they have been previously given an initial terminal inspection. 
This inspection requires the performance of a leakage test and 
verification that the brakes on each car added to the train and the 
rear car of the train apply and release. See 49 CFR 232.13(d). 
Railroads are permitted to use a gauge or device at the rear of the 
train to verify changes in brake pipe pressure in lieu of performing an 
application and release on the rear car. The current regulations also 
require that if cars that are given an intermediate terminal brake 
inspection and have not previously been provided an initial terminal 
inspection and are then added to a train, then the added cars must be 
given an initial terminal inspection at the next location where 
facilities are available for performing such an inspection.
    The current regulations also require the performance of a brake 
pipe continuity test whenever minor changes to a train consist occur. 
This inspection requires that a brake pipe reduction be made and 
verification that the brakes on the rear car apply and release. 
Railroads are permitted to use a gauge or device at the rear of the 
train to verify changes in brake pipe pressure in lieu of visually 
verifying the rear car application and release. This inspection is to 
be performed when a locomotive or caboose is changed, when one or more 
consecutive cars are removed from the train, and when previously tested 
cars are added to a train.
    In the 1998 NPRM, FRA noted that in its opinion railroads have not 
conducted the excellent initial terminal inspections that were 
contemplated in 1982, when FRA extended the 500-mile inspection 
interval to 1,000 miles. FRA also contended that many initial terminal 
brake inspections are being performed by individuals who are not 
sufficiently qualified or trained to perform the task. FRA recognized 
that since 1982 new technology and improved equipment have been 
developed that allow trains to operate for longer distances with fewer 
defects. However, the key to achieving this improved capability is to 
ensure the proper operation and condition of the equipment at the 
location where the train is initially assembled.
    Although FRA agreed that many of the initial terminal inspections 
conducted by train crews are not of the quality anticipated in 1982 
when the inspection interval was increased from 500 miles to 1,000 
miles, FRA also conceded that properly trained and qualified train crew 
personnel can perform certain brake inspections and have been 
performing such inspections for many years. FRA stated that it did not 
believe that a reversion to a 500-mile inspection interval restriction 
on trains inspected by train crews, as sought by some commenters, would 
adequately address the concerns regarding the safety of those trains 
and would impose an economic burden on the railroads that could not be 
justified. In FRA's view, two of the major factors in ensuring the 
quality of brake inspections are the proper training of the persons 
performing the inspections and adequate enforcement of the 
requirements. Therefore, FRA proposed that the current 1,000-mile 
inspection interval be retained but that general training requirements 
for persons conducting brake inspections be established. The proposed 
training requirements included general provisions requiring both 
classroom and ``hands-on'' training, general testing requirements, and 
annual refresher training provisions. FRA also proposed that various 
training records be

[[Page 4114]]

maintained by the railroads in order for FRA to determine the basis for 
a railroad's determination that a particular person is qualified to 
perform a brake inspection, test, or repair. FRA believed that the 
proposed general training and recordkeeping requirements would provide 
some assurances that qualified people were conducting brake system 
inspections and tests. (See discussion below titled ``Training and 
Qualification of Personnel.'')
    In addition to proposing general training requirements, FRA also 
noted its intent to enhance and increase its enforcement activities 
with regard to the performance of the brake inspections and tests 
eventually finalized in this rule, particularly those performed by 
train crews. FRA made clear that it would make a concerted effort to 
focus on the qualifications of train crew members and would strictly 
scrutinize the method and length of time spent by these individuals in 
the performance of the required inspections. FRA also committed to 
focus its inspection activities to ensure that train crews are provided 
the proper equipment necessary to perform many of the required 
inspections.
    In addition to focusing its enforcement and to aid in that 
initiative, FRA proposed various clarifications, modernizations, and 
modifications of the current inspection requirements in order to close 
what are perceived to be existing loopholes and to incorporate what FRA 
believed to be the best practices existing in the industry while 
updating the requirements to recognize existing technology. FRA 
believed, and many representatives of rail labor and management agreed, 
that the current inspection requirements are very good for the most 
part and are sufficient to ensure a high level of safety, but that they 
need to be strictly enforced, clarified, and updated to recognize 
existing and new technology. Therefore, as noted above, FRA did not 
propose an extensive revision of the basic brake inspection intervals 
or requirements. Rather, FRA proposed a moderate revision of the 
requirements, with the intent of tightening, expanding, or clarifying 
those inspection or testing requirements that have created enforcement 
problems or inconsistencies in the past. FRA recognized some of the 
technological improvements made in the industry such as the use of two-
way EOTs during the brake tests and use of the air flow method of 
qualifying train air brake systems. FRA also recognized that some 
trains are capable of moving extended distances between inspections 
provided that comprehensive inspections are performed at the locations 
where the trains are originated. (See discussion below titled 
``Extended Haul Trains.'')
    In order to clarify the requirements regarding where and when 
various brake inspections and tests were to be performed, FRA proposed 
modification of the terminology related to the power brake inspection 
and testing requirements contained in the current regulations, which is 
generally based on the locations where the inspections and tests must 
be performed (e.g., ``initial terminal'' and ``intermediate 
terminal''). Instead, FRA proposed various ``classes'' of inspections 
based on the duties and type of inspection required, such as: Class I; 
Class IA; and Class II. This is similar to the approach taken by FRA in 
the 1994 NPRM and in the final rule on passenger equipment safety 
standards. See 64 FR 25682-83. FRA believed that this type of 
classification system would avoid some of the confusion that currently 
arises regarding when and where a certain brake inspection must be 
performed.
    Currently, the brake system inspection and testing requirements are 
interspersed within Secs. 232.12 and 232.13 and are not clearly 
delineated. Therefore, FRA proposed a reorganization of the major types 
of brake inspections into separate and distinct sections in order to 
provide the regulated community with a better understanding as to when 
and where each inspection or test would be required. Although FRA 
proposed a change in the terminology used to describe the various power 
brake inspections and tests, the requirements of these inspections and 
tests mirrored the current requirements and were not intended to change 
or modify any of the voluminous case law that had been developed over 
the years regarding the inspections. Consequently, FRA proposed four 
different types of brake inspections that were to be performed by 
freight railroads some time during the operation of the equipment. FRA 
proposed the terms ``Class I,'' ``Class IA,'' ``Class II,'' and ``Class 
III'' to identify the four major types of brake inspections required by 
this proposal.
    The proposed Class I brake test, currently known as the ``initial 
terminal'' test, generally contained the requirements currently 
contained in Sec. 232.12(a) and (c)-(j). See 63 FR 48362-63. The 
requirements were reorganized to clearly delineate when and how the 
inspection was to be performed based on current interpretations and 
comments received since the 1994 NPRM. The requirements were also 
modified to require written notification that the test was performed 
and that the notification was to be retained in the train until it 
reached its destination. The proposed revisions also acknowledged the 
use of the air flow method for qualifying train brake systems and 
permitted the use of end-of-train devices in the performance of the 
test. The proposal also provided some latitude to trains received in 
interchange that had a pre-tested car or solid block of cars added at 
the interchange point or that were to be moved less than 20 miles after 
being received in interchange by permitting these types of trains to 
continue without the performance of a comprehensive Class I brake test.
    The proposed Class IA brake test clarified the requirements for 
performing 1,000-mile brake inspections currently contained in 
Sec. 232.12(b). See 63 FR 48363. The proposal made clear that the most 
restrictive car or block of cars in the train would determine when the 
inspection was to be performed on the entire train. FRA also proposed 
that railroads designate the locations where these inspections would be 
conducted and did not permit a change in those designations without 30-
day notice to FRA or the occurrence of an emergency situation. The 
proposed Class II and Class III brake tests essentially clarified the 
intermediate terminal inspection requirements currently contained in 
Sec. 232.13(c) and (d) regarding the performance of brake system 
inspections when cars were added to the train en route or when the 
train consist was slightly altered en route. See 63 FR 48364.
    In addition to the modifications and clarifications proposed with 
regard to the four major types of brake system inspections, FRA's 
proposal also retained, with clarification and elaboration, the basic 
inspection requirements related to transfer trains currently contained 
at Sec. 232.13(e) as well as the requirements for performing brake 
system inspections using yard air sources currently contained at 
Sec. 232.12(i). See 63 FR 48365. The proposal also retained the 
requirements related to the inspection and testing of locomotives when 
used in double heading and helper service currently contained at 
Sec. 232.15 and proposed additional inspection requirements of 
locomotives when used in helper service or in distributed power 
operations to ensure the proper functioning of the brakes on these 
locomotives as these types of inspections are not adequately addressed 
in the existing regulation. See 63 FR 48365. Furthermore, the proposal 
recognized that trains, if properly inspected, could safely travel 
greater

[[Page 4115]]

than 1,000 miles between brake inspections. (See discussion below 
titled ``Extended Haul Trains.'')
    FRA received numerous comments in response to the 1998 NPRM from 
representatives of rail labor and rail management, various private car 
owners, the NTSB, manufacturers of rail equipment, and one state public 
utility commission relating to these proposed provisions. These 
individuals and representatives submitted comments addressing the 
qualifications of individuals conducting the proposed inspections, the 
methods by which the proposed inspections are to be conducted, the 
frequency with which the proposed inspections should be required, and 
various other specific aspects of the language used in the proposed 
inspection requirements.
    Several labor representatives objected to the proposed change in 
the names of the specific required inspections. These commenters 
believe that the proposed new terminology of Class I, Class IA, Class 
II, and Class III would result in a number of problems including 
confusion among those individuals responsible for performing the 
inspections as the existing terminology has been used for decades, 
imposition of additional training costs on the railroads as workers 
will need to be reeducated, and the risk of upsetting years of case law 
dealing with the various inspections.
    Certain labor representatives also objected to the language used in 
connection to the proposed inspections that would permit a qualified 
person to perform many of the required inspections. Various labor 
organizations and their representatives reiterated their concerns that 
such an approach would continue to allow untrained and unqualified 
train crew personnel to perform the required inspections. These 
commenters continued to assert that FRA should mandate that carmen, or 
persons similarly trained and experienced, perform all of the required 
brake inspections except for the cursory train line continuity 
inspections covered by the proposed Class III brake test. It is their 
belief that only carmen possess the necessary training, skill, and 
experience to properly perform the other brake inspections contained in 
the proposal. These commenters contend that FRA is ignoring the 
commitment made by rail management in 1982, when the regulations were 
revised to permit trains to travel up to 1,000 miles between brake 
inspections, to conduct high quality inspections at a train's initial 
terminal. They contend that the 1982 revisions were intended to require 
that these brake inspections be performed only by carmen. Several labor 
representatives also contend that since the railroads have failed to 
live up to the commitment made in 1982, to conduct high quality initial 
terminal inspections, that FRA should reconsider its proposals to 
permit trains to travel 1,000 miles or more between brake inspections. 
These commenters recommended that FRA reduce the inspection interval to 
500 miles.
    Conversely, representatives of rail management and private car 
owners suggest that FRA failed to adequately consider the industry's 
safety record in proposing the inspection requirements. Several of 
these commenters recommended that FRA reconsider performance standards 
similar to those provided by the AAR in response to the 1994 NPRM. See 
63 FR 48300. These individuals assert that based upon the industry's 
excellent safety record there is no need for the command and control 
type of regulations proposed in the 1998 NPRM. Several railroad 
representatives also commented that the proposed training requirements 
for designating an individual as a qualified person are onerous and not 
justified in light of the industry's safety record. They contend that 
the industry's safety record is evidence of the sufficiency of the 
training currently provided to its inspection forces. (See discussion 
below regarding the ``Training and Qualification of Personnel.'')
    Many railroad and private car owner representatives also contend 
that there is no justification for continuance of the 1,000-mile 
inspection requirement. They contend that if a car is properly 
inspected at its point of origin it can be safely moved to destination 
and that very few cars are found defective at 1000-mile inspections. As 
support for these contentions, they cite to various studies, which 
included: a 1994 study conducted by the Illinois Institute of 
Technology Research Institute, which concluded that brake shoes could 
last up to 4,000 miles; a 1993 study conducted by BNSF at Havre, 
Montana, which found that less than \1/3\ of 1 percent of the cars 
inspected at 1,000 miles had any kind of brake defect; and data 
submitted in 1985 by the AAR related to cars operating 3,000 miles 
between brake inspections. These commenters also rely on the fact that 
Canada eliminated its intermediate brake inspection requirement in 
1994. Consequently, these commenters contend that the 1,000-mile 
inspection serves no useful purpose from a safety standpoint, creates 
unnecessary delays, and should be eliminated.
    Commenters representing certain labor organizations also 
recommended that FRA establish step-by-step procedures for conducting 
the proposed inspections which specifically include a requirement that 
both sides of a train be given a walking inspection during both the set 
and the release of the brakes. These commenters contend that the 
language proposed in the 1998 NPRM regarding the inspection of both 
sides of a train is unclear and creates uncertainty as to how a proper 
inspection is to be conducted. They further recommend that roll-by 
inspections of the brake release not be permitted and that a walking 
inspection of the release be required. They also object to the proposed 
requirement permitting the use of an end-of-train device in lieu of a 
visual inspection of the pressure at the rear car in the train or in 
lieu of a set and release on such car as such a practice does not 
ensure actual application and release of that rear car.
    Representatives of railroads and private car owners also believe 
that FRA should clarify the method by which certain inspections are to 
be performed. However, these commenters seek to clarify that both sides 
of the equipment do not have to be inspected during either the 
application or release of the brakes when conducting a Class I brake 
test and that both sides of the equipment do not have to be inspected 
when conducting Class IA brake tests. They contend that there is no 
reason to observe both sides of the equipment during either the set or 
release as long as the brake rigging and equipment is inspected to 
ensure it is in proper condition prior to or at the same time that the 
application or release of the brakes is conducted. If the brakes are 
applied or released on one side of the equipment then, due to the 
design of the equipment, the brakes on the other side of the equipment 
will be similarly applied or released in virtually every instance. 
Therefore, it is contended that there is no justification to require 
observation of the set and release from each side of the equipment. 
These commenters also contend that FRA needs to clarify that both sides 
of the equipment do not need to be observed during the performance of a 
Class IA inspection. They assert that such a requirement would be 
contrary to the current 1,000-mile inspection requirements and would 
increase the burden on railroads when conducting this inspection.
    The CAPUC submitted comments on the proposed inspection 
requirements recommending that each side of the car be inspected during 
both the application and release of the brakes. This commenter also 
recommend that FRA

[[Page 4116]]

require the proposed Class I brake tests to be performed by individuals 
designated as ``qualified mechanical inspectors'' pursuant to the 
proposal. The CAPUC believes that only these individuals possess 
sufficient knowledge and ability to adequately perform the inspection. 
The NTSB also submitted comments on the proposed inspection 
requirements suggesting that FRA modify the requirements regarding the 
pressure at which trains are tested to require that trains be tested at 
the pressure at which they will be operated. The NTSB believes that 
such a requirement would preclude attempts to qualify trains that have 
excessive leakage by testing them at a pressure that is lower than the 
train's operating pressure and thus, lower the amount of leakage that 
exists on the train.
    Some labor commenters again objected to FRA's inclusion of the air 
flow method as an alternative to the leakage test when qualifying a 
train's brake system. They contend that the air flow method disguises 
serious leaks and allows greater leakage in a train's brake system than 
the currently required leakage test. The AAR and other railroad 
representatives endorsed the allowance of the air flow method as an 
alternative to the leakage test for qualifying a train's brake system. 
They believe that the air flow method is superior to the leakage test 
and is an appropriate alternative for all trains, regardless of length, 
provided the 15 psi brake pipe gradient is maintained.
    Certain labor representatives expressed concern over the proposed 
provision permitting yard air tests to be conducted at a pressure that 
is lower than the operating pressure of the train. These commenters 
suggested that such a practice could permit trains to depart with 
excess leakage since the required leakage test would be performed at 
the lower pressure and thus, mask the potential leakage of the train. 
The AAR and some of its member railroads also expressed concern 
regarding the proposed requirements related to the performance of brake 
tests using yard air. These commenters objected to the requirement that 
brake tests performed with yard air be performed at 80 psi. They 
recommended that such test be permitted to be performed at 60 psi as 
currently required because the proposal permits yard and transfer 
trains to operate at such pressure and that to test at higher pressure 
creates the potential for overcharge conditions. They also argue the 
practical difficulties of an 80 psi requirement in that many older yard 
plants and rental compressors are not capable of supplying 80 psi of 
air pressure. These commenters further contend that FRA should permit 
yard air to be connected to other than the front of the consist 
provided that procedures are taken to prevent overcharge conditions. 
The commenters also provided recommended language to clarify the 
calibration requirements for devices and gauges used to conduct yard 
air brake tests.
    Several labor representatives also commented on the proposed 
written notification requirement related to the performance of Class I 
brake tests. These commenters supported the written notification 
requirement and recommended that the information remain with the train 
if the motive power is changed. One labor organization also recommended 
that the proposed requirements related to the designation of 1,000-mile 
inspections are insufficient. This commenter recommended that the 
designation be filed with FRA and that the designations specifically 
identify the trains that will be inspected at each location. 
Representatives of rail management objected to the proposed requirement 
that locomotive engineers be notified in writing by a person performing 
the test as to the successful completion of a Class I brake test. These 
commenters did not object to notifying the locomotive engineer of the 
results of the test but believe that the notification could be provided 
orally or electronically by a person with knowledge of the test as long 
as the locomotive engineer made a record of the notification and 
necessary information. These commenters also sought clarification of 
the proposed requirements regarding the designation of locations where 
1,000-mile inspections would be conducted. These commenters did not 
object to the designation requirement provided that it is not required 
on a train by train basis. They contend that to require that specific 
trains have 1,000-mile inspections performed at specific locations 
would create substantial burdens and would eliminate flexibility needed 
to operate trains in a timely and efficient manner.
    The AAR and other railroad commenters also raised concern over the 
requirement that trains in captive service be required to receive a 
Class I brake test every 3,000 miles. They recommended that a train of 
this type that travels in excess of 3,000 miles between cycles be 
permitted to complete its cycle prior to receiving a Class I brake 
test. They contend that to require a Class I brake test on these types 
of cycle trains on a 3,000 mile basis will require the reallocation of 
manpower and equipment to locations not currently equipped to perform 
such inspections.
    Several railroad representatives also objected to the definition of 
``solid block of cars'' contained in the proposal. This definition is 
important because FRA proposed that if more than a solid block of cars 
is removed from or added or a train, the entire train would have to 
receive a Class I brake test. As the proposed definition limits a 
``solid block of cars'' to a group of cars that are removed from only 
one other train and that remain coupled together, these commenters 
contend that the definition is much more restrictive than the current 
interpretation of the language and would significantly increase the 
need to perform Class I brake tests. These commenters contend that the 
current interpretation of the language permits a ``solid block of 
cars'' to be made up of cars from several different trains provided the 
block of cars is added to a train as one unit without triggering the 
requirement to perform a new initial terminal brake test on the entire 
train. These commenters also noted that a literal reading of the 
proposed provisions for when a Class I brake test would be required 
does not allow a railroad to remove defective equipment without 
triggering a Class I brake test on the entire train. They contend that 
this authority needs to be recognized and is currently permitted.
    FRA Conclusions. After consideration of the comments submitted and 
based upon its experience in the enforcement of the current power brake 
regulations, FRA continues to believe that the general approach to 
brake inspections contained in the 1998 NPRM represents the most 
effective method of ensuring the continued safety and proper operation 
of brake systems currently used in the railroad industry without 
creating an unnecessary burden to the railroads. Therefore, the final 
rule is a moderate revision of the current inspection requirements, 
similar to that proposed, with certain minor changes made to address 
the comments and recommendations submitted on the NPRM.
    The final rule adopts the proposed classifications identifying the 
various types of brake inspections based on the duties and tasks that 
are required to be performed. These include: Class I; Class IA; Class 
II; and Class III brake tests. Contrary to the contentions of some 
commenters, FRA does not believe that this classification of the brake 
inspections in any way impacts previous case law regarding the various 
inspections. Although the final rule changes the terminology used to 
describe the various brake inspections,

[[Page 4117]]

the underlying inspection requirements have remained generally 
consistent with the existing requirements, and the final rule is not 
intended to change or modify any of the voluminous case law that has 
developed over the years regarding the inspections. Furthermore, the 
final rule retains the monikers that have traditionally been attached 
to the various inspections so as to limit any confusion that may exist. 
For example, the section containing the requirements for conducting 
Class I brake tests is entitled, ``Class I brake test-initial terminal 
inspection.'' FRA believes that the classifications proposed in the 
NPRM and retained in this final rule clearly delineate what is required 
at each inspection, better clarify when each inspection is to be 
performed, and avoid the potential confusion caused by the terminology 
used in the present regulations.
    As discussed in detail in the 1998 NPRM, FRA continues to believe 
that the performance standard recommended by the AAR in response to the 
1994 NPRM and suggested again by some commenters does not provide a 
viable method for establishing the frequency of brake inspections. See 
63 FR 48301-02. The performance standard proposed by the AAR is based 
upon the number of mechanically-caused accidents per million train 
miles. Therefore, the standard is based upon the rate of occurrence of 
accidents--accident history--rather than on a factor that could measure 
a railroad's performance prior to an accident occurring. The suggested 
performance standard would also be very difficult to calculate on a 
railroad-by-railroad basis, and the standard itself is a very 
subjective factor as many accidents are due to a variety of causes only 
a part of which may be a mechanical or brake-related cause. Thus, the 
determination of what constitutes a mechanically-caused accident would 
be difficult if not impossible to make in some circumstances and would 
be a determination made by the railroad; thus, opening the potential 
for data manipulation. FRA also notes that the AAR's performance 
standard contains certain provisions that are contrary to existing 
statutory requirements regarding the movement of defective equipment.
    The final rule retains the requirement to perform 1,000-mile brake 
inspections as proposed with a few minor revisions discussed below and 
in the section-by-section analysis of that section. Although FRA agrees 
that many of the initial terminal brake inspections currently conducted 
by train crews and other personnel are not of the quality anticipated 
in 1982, when the inspection interval was increased from 500 miles to 
1,000 miles, FRA continues to believe that properly trained and 
qualified train crew personnel can perform most of the inspections 
required by this final rule and have been performing such inspections 
for many years. Furthermore, FRA continues to believe that a reversion 
to a 500-mile inspection interval on trains inspected by train crews, 
as suggested by some commenters, does not address the concerns 
regarding the safety of these trains and would impose an economic 
burden on the railroads that cannot be justified. Rather than simply 
increasing the frequency at which inspections are performed, FRA 
believes that the proper approach is to enhance the quality of the 
inspections being performed in order to further improve safety. FRA 
believes that the training and designation requirements contained in 
this final rule will increase the quality of the brake inspections 
being performed by ensuring that those individuals responsible for 
conducting the inspections are provided adequate and continuing 
training to properly perform the task. The final rule contains general 
training provisions which include: classroom and experiential ``hands-
on'' training; general testing requirements; and periodic refresher 
training. The final rule also mandates that training records be 
maintained by the railroads in order for FRA to ascertain the basis for 
a railroad's determination that a particular person is considered 
qualified to perform the inspection or test he or she is assigned. FRA 
believes these training requirements will provide the necessary 
assurances that the people conducting the required inspections and 
tests are qualified.
    FRA recognizes that since 1982 new technologies and improved 
equipment have been developed that allow trains to operate longer 
distances with fewer defects. The data submitted by AAR, noted above, 
appears to support this assertion, and FRA does not dispute the 
potential capability of certain equipment to travel distances in excess 
of 1,000 miles without becoming defective. However, the capability of 
the equipment to travel extended distances is contingent on the 
condition of the equipment when it begins operation and on the nature 
of the operation in which it is to be engaged. FRA believes that in 
order for brake equipment to travel extended distances between brake 
inspections, the condition and planned operation of the equipment must 
be thoroughly assessed at the beginning of a train's journey through 
high quality inspections. As noted above, FRA believes that railroads 
are not conducting high quality initial terminal inspections at many 
locations because the railroads are utilizing employees who are not 
sufficiently qualified or trained to perform the inspections. 
Therefore, FRA believes that the 1,000-mile brake inspection interval 
continues to be necessary and important to ensure the safe operation of 
trains inspected by qualified personnel pursuant to this final rule. 
Furthermore, no trains operated in the United States are currently 
permitted to travel greater than 1,000 miles between brake inspections. 
Consequently, FRA is not willing to permit trains to travel in excess 
of 1,000 miles between brake inspections, except in the limited, 
controlled situations where data on the equipment can be gathered. (See 
discussion below titled ``Extended Haul Trains.'') FRA notes that 
Canada eliminated intermediate inspections in 1994. However, Canada has 
different inspection requirements than those contained in this final 
rule and vastly different operating conditions and environments than 
those prevalent on most American railroads, operating conditions and 
environments that are more conducive to the inspection regimen imposed 
by that country.
    The final rule also generally retains the proposed provisions 
detailing the items that must be inspected during the various 
inspections and the minimum procedures for performing the inspections. 
Contrary to the assertions of some commenters, FRA believes that the 
proposed methods of inspection sufficiently detailed how the various 
inspections were to be performed while providing flexibility for 
railroads to conduct the inspections in a manner most conducive to 
their operations. The methods of inspection proposed in the 1998 NPRM 
incorporated current practices and technical guidance previously issued 
by FRA. To require that all inspections be performed by walking the 
train would impose a huge financial and operational burden on the 
railroads and would ignore the various different methods by which 
inspections are currently performed and have been performed for years. 
FRA does not intend to mandate specific methods for how the various 
inspections are to be performed. FRA believes that each railroad is in 
the best position to determine the method of inspection that best suits 
its operations at different locations. FRA has never mandated specific 
step-by-step procedures for conducting brake inspections but

[[Page 4118]]

merely requires that, whichever method is used, it must ensure that all 
of the components required to be inspected will be so inspected.
    The proposed rule made clear that when performing a Class I brake 
test of a train the inspector must take positions on each side of each 
car in the train sometime during the inspection process. This provision 
is retained in the final rule. This is intended to mean that at a 
minimum both sides of the equipment must be inspected. The provision 
does not require that both sides be observed during the application or 
during the release of the brakes. However, at a minimum at least one 
side of the car must be inspected while the brakes on the car are 
applied or if the brakes do not apply, while an effort is made to apply 
the brakes on the car. FRA continues to believe that if the various 
brake components are inspected to ensure they are properly secure and 
in proper condition then, due to the design of the equipment, if an 
application or release is observed from one side it can be assumed that 
in virtually every case there is an application or release of the brake 
occurring on the other side of the equipment. The final rule also 
retains the proposed requirement that the piston travel on each piece 
of the equipment must be inspected while the brakes are applied. 
Furthermore, the final rule retains the provision that permits a roll-
by inspection of the release of the brake but prohibits the roll-by 
inspection from being considered an inspection of that side of the 
equipment.
    FRA also finds the comments of AAR and other railroad 
representatives contending that both sides of the equipment should not 
be required to be inspected at Class IA brake tests to be lacking. The 
Class IA brake test basically incorporates the current 1,000-mile brake 
inspection, which FRA believes requires an inspection of both sides of 
the equipment during the inspection process. The current 1,000-mile 
inspection requires that brake rigging be inspected to ensure it is 
properly secure and does not bind or foul and that the brakes apply on 
each car in the train. See 49 CFR 232.12(b). In order to make these 
inspections properly, FRA believes that both sides of the equipment 
must be observed sometime during the inspection process and, to FRA's 
knowledge, railroads currently conduct these inspections in this 
manner. Thus, the NPRM and the final rule merely clarify what is 
required to be performed under the current regulations to properly 
perform a 1,000-mile inspection. Therefore, contrary to the contentions 
of certain commenters, retention of this current requirement does not 
impose any additional burden on the railroads.
    The final rule retains the provisions granting railroads the 
ability to utilize the air flow method (AFM) to qualify a train's brake 
system in lieu of the traditional leakage test. FRA believes that if a 
train contains a locomotive equipped with 26L freight locomotive brake 
equipment and the train is equipped with an EOT device, that train 
should be allowed to be qualified using the AFM. The AFM of qualifying 
train air brake systems has been allowed in Canada as an alternative to 
the leakage test since 1984. In addition, several railroads in the 
United States have been using the AFM since 1989 when FRA granted the 
AAR's petition for a waiver of compliance to permit the AFM as an 
alternative to the leakage test. FRA recognizes the concerns of several 
labor organization commenters opposing the adoption of the AFM; 
however, FRA believes these commenters' apprehension is based on their 
unfamiliarity with the method. As FRA pointed out in the ANPRM, the 
1994 NPRM, and the 1998 NPRM, the AFM is a much more comprehensive test 
than the leakage test. See 57 FR 62551, 59 FR 47682-47683, 63 FR 48305-
06. The AFM tests the entire brake system just as it is used, with the 
pressure-maintaining feature cut in. FRA believes the AFM is an 
effective and reliable alternative method of qualifying train brakes. 
In the 1998 NPRM, FRA expressed some concern regarding the use of the 
AFM on short trains. However, based on consideration of the comments 
received and FRA's experiences in observing the use of the AFM, FRA 
agrees that the AFM should be permitted as an alternative on any train 
provided the 15 psi gradient is maintained on the train.
    The final rule changes some of the provisions related to the 
conduct of brake tests utilizing yard air sources that were proposed in 
the NPRM. Rather than requiring yard air tests to be performed at 80 
psi as was proposed, the final rule reduces the required pressure to 60 
psi at the end of the consist as is currently required. FRA recognizes 
that many yard air sources and rental compressors are not capable of 
producing 80 psi of air pressure. However, to address the concerns 
raised regarding the inadequacy of conducting a leakage or air flow 
test at this lower pressure, the final rule includes provisions to 
require those tests to be conducted at the operating pressure of the 
train. Thus, if the yard air is not capable of producing the pressure 
that the final rule requires, then the leakage or air flow test is to 
be conducted when the locomotives are attached. The final rule also 
permits the yard air test device to be connected at other than the end 
of the consist nearest the controlling locomotive, provided that the 
railroad adopts and complies with written procedures to ensure that 
overcharge conditions do not occur. Many yards across the country 
currently conduct the test in this manner, and FRA believes it is 
necessary to acknowledge the viability of these operations.
    The final rule also modifies the notification requirement related 
to Class I brake tests from that proposed in the NPRM. In the NPRM, FRA 
proposed that the engineer be informed in writing of the successful 
completion of the Class I brake test. The intent of this requirement 
was to ensure that the locomotive engineer was adequately informed of 
the results of the inspection; however, FRA recognizes that a 
requirement to provide the information in writing ignores technological 
advances and operational efficiencies. Consequently, the final rule 
will permit the notification in whatever format the railroad deems 
appropriate; provided that the notification contains the proper 
information and a record of the notification and the requisite 
information is maintained in the cab of the controlling locomotive. FRA 
believes these changes are consistent with the intent and purpose of 
the proposed requirement for written notification and ensure necessary 
information is relayed to the operator of the train.
    FRA also realizes that the proposed requirement for designating 
locations where Class IA inspections will be performed was somewhat 
unclear and may have caused confusion. The intent of the requirement 
was to ensure that FRA was informed of those locations where a railroad 
intends to perform Class IA brake inspections and that FRA had the 
information with which to hold the railroad responsible for conducting 
the inspections at those locations. FRA was not intending to require 
that a railroad separately identify a specific Class IA inspection 
location for each train it operates. Consequently, the final rule makes 
clear that the designation required is for locations where such 
inspections will be performed and permits deviance from those locations 
only in emergency situations.
    The final rule retains the proposed requirement that unit or cycle 
trains receive a Class I brake test every 3,000 miles. FRA has added a 
definition of ``unit train'' and ``cycle train'' to the final rule in 
order to clarify the applicability of the requirement.

[[Page 4119]]

Historically, these trains operate for extended periods of time with 
only a series of brake inspections similar to Class IA brake 
inspections. FRA believes that the proposed 3,000-mile limitation is 
appropriate as it represents the approximate distance that a train 
would cover when traveling from coast to coast. In addition the 3,000 
mile requirement is consistent with the interval for performing Class 
IA brake tests and would equate to every third inspection being a Class 
I brake test rather than a Class IA brake test. Furthermore, AAR does 
not seek a moderate extension of a couple hundred miles so a few trains 
could complete their cycle, but seeks to extend the distance to more 
than 4,500 miles in many instances. FRA is not willing to modify the 
proposed requirement to that extent and believes that the 3,000-mile 
interval for these types of trains provides sufficient flexibility to 
the railroads to perform periodic Class I brake tests on these trains 
in a cost-efficient manner.
    The definition of ``solid block of cars'' has been modified from 
that proposed in the NPRM. Although FRA believes the definition it 
proposed is consistent with current interpretations and enforcement of 
the requirement, FRA agrees with some of the commenters that the 
definition may have been too narrow and does not directly address FRA's 
primary concern, the block of cars itself. FRA's primary concern is the 
condition of the block of cars being added to the train especially when 
the block of cars is made up of cars from more than one train. Thus, 
the final rule will permit a solid block of cars to be added to a train 
without triggering a requirement to perform a Class I brake test on the 
entire train. However, depending on the make-up of that block of cars, 
certain inspections will have to be performed on that block of cars at 
the location where it is added to the train.
    FRA believes that limits have to be placed on the addition of 
blocks of cars being added to a train in order to ensure that cars are 
being inspected in a timely manner and in accordance with the intent of 
the regulations. Some commenters suggest that a block of cars should be 
permitted to be added to a train with no inspection other than a 
continuity test regardless of the number of different trains the cars 
making up the block came from provided all the cars received a Class I 
brake test at their point of origin. Other commenters suggest that any 
number of blocks of cars should be permitted to be added to a train at 
a single location. FRA believes that to accept either of these 
positions would be tantamount to eliminating initial terminal and 
intermediate inspections and would drastically reduce the safety of 
freight trains being operated across the country. In FRA's view, both 
of the positions noted above are merely means to circumvent inspections 
and are akin to a practice known as ``block swapping'' in the 
mechanical inspection context, a practice that FRA does not permit. In 
FRA's opinion, the ability to add multiple blocks of cars to a train at 
one location or add a single block of cars to a train that is composed 
of cars from numerous different trains without inspecting the cars in 
those blocks, would essentially allow railroads to assemble new trains 
without performing any direct inspection of any of the cars in the 
train. Furthermore, if cars are permitted to be moved in and out of 
trains at will, the ability to track when and where Class IA brake 
tests are to be performed on trains will be impossible.
    Based on a review of the comments submitted, two other minor 
modifications to the proposed inspection requirements have been made in 
this final rule. The final rule contains an additional caveat that will 
permit the removal of defective equipment at locations where other cars 
are added or removed without triggering the requirement to perform a 
Class I brake test on the entire train. FRA currently permits this 
practice, and it is consistent with the requirements aimed at having 
defective equipment repaired as quickly as possible. The final rule 
also modifies the language used in the proposed provisions related to 
the air pressure at which the brake tests are to be conducted based on 
a comment submitted by the NTSB. The NTSB noted that the language used 
by FRA in the NPRM to describe the air pressure settings for conducting 
the required brake tests would permit some road trains to be tested at 
a lower pressure than that at which the train would be operated. The 
NTSB contends that although most road freight trains operate at 90 psi, 
some road freight trains are operated at 100 psi and the proposal would 
permit them to be tested at 90 psi. FRA agrees with NTSB's suggestion 
that a trains brake system should be tested at the pressure at which 
the train will operate and has modified the language of the final rule 
accordingly.
2. Extended Haul Trains
    In developing the provisions regarding extended haul trains 
proposed in the 1998 NPRM, FRA relied on several basic beliefs 
developed from the information and comments submitted and upon its 
experience in enforcing the current regulations. FRA believed that if a 
train was properly and thoroughly inspected, with as many defective 
conditions being eliminated as possible, then the train would be 
capable of traveling much more than 1,000 miles between brake 
inspections. By this, FRA contended that not only must the brake system 
be in quality condition but that the mechanical components of the 
equipment must be in equally prime condition. FRA believed that as the 
distance a train is allowed to travel increases, the mechanical 
condition of the equipment is a key factor in ensuring the proper and 
safe operation of the train brake system throughout the entire trip. 
FRA also stated that the best place to ensure the proper conduct of 
these inspections and to ensure that the train's brake system and 
mechanical components are in the best condition possible is at a 
train's point of origin (initial terminal).
    In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed a set of requirements that had to be 
met by a railroad in order to move a train up to 1,500 miles without 
performing additional brake inspections. The requirements included such 
features as low defect ratios, maintenance programs, and the 
performance of quality brake and mechanical inspections at a train's 
point of origin. See 59 FR 47735. In the 1998 NPRM, FRA agreed with 
several commenters that some of the 1994 proposed requirements were 
overly burdensome and were partially predicated on potentially 
subjective standards. However, FRA continued to believe that many of 
the inspection requirements and movement restrictions proposed in 1994 
were valid conditions that should be met in order to operate trains for 
extended distances between brake inspections. These included: the 
performance of a quality, in-depth brake inspection by a highly 
qualified inspector; the performance of a quality mechanical inspection 
by a person qualified under 49 CFR 215.11; and a restriction on the 
number of set-outs and pick-ups occurring en route. FRA also believed 
that these extended haul trains had to be closely monitored to ensure 
that both the brake system and mechanical components remain safely 
intact throughout the train's journey.
    In the 1998 NPRM, FRA proposed that certain designated trains be 
permitted to move up to 1,500 miles between brake and mechanical 
inspections provided the railroad met various inspection and monitoring 
requirements. See 63 FR 48343, 48364-65. As no trains were currently 
permitted to travel in excess of 1,000 miles between inspections, FRA 
was not willing to propose more than

[[Page 4120]]

1,500 miles between such inspections until appropriate data is 
developed that establish that equipment moved under the proposed 
criteria remains in proper condition throughout the train's trip. FRA 
believed that the proposed provision requiring the performance of an 
inbound inspection at destination or at 1,500 miles and the requirement 
that carriers maintain records of all defective conditions discovered 
on these trains would create the bases for developing such data.
    In order to ensure the accuracy of the data as well as ensure the 
proper and safe operation of these extended haul trains, FRA also 
proposed that the trains have 100 percent operative brakes and contain 
no cars with mechanical defects at their initial terminal point and at 
the time of departure from the 1,500-mile point, if moving an 
additional 1,500 miles from that location between brake inspections. 
FRA further proposed that these trains not conduct any pick-ups or set-
outs en route, except for the removal of defective equipment, in order 
to minimize the disruptions made to the integrity of the train's brake 
system and reduce mechanical damage that might occur during switching 
operations. In addition, as there was no reliable tracking system 
currently available to FRA to ensure that cars added to the train en 
route have been inspected in accordance with the proposed requirements, 
FRA believed that the number of cars added to these trains had to be 
limited.
    As noted earlier in the discussion, FRA believed that in order for 
a train to be permitted to travel 1,500 miles between inspections, the 
train must receive inspections that ensure the optimum condition of 
both the brake system and the mechanical components at the location 
where the train originates. In order to ensure that quality inspections 
were performed, FRA proposed that they be performed by highly qualified 
and experienced inspectors. As FRA intended that the proposed Class I 
brake test performed on these trains at their initial terminal be as 
in-depth and comprehensive as possible, FRA believed that the 
inspections should be performed by individuals possessing the knowledge 
not only to identify and detect a defective condition in all of the 
brake equipment required to be inspected, but also to possess the basic 
knowledge to recognize the interrelational workings of the equipment 
and the ability to trouble-shoot and repair the equipment. Therefore, 
FRA proposed the term ``qualified mechanical inspector'' to identify 
and describe those individuals it believed would possess the necessary 
knowledge and experience to perform the proposed Class I brake tests on 
these extended haul trains.
    In the 1998 NPRM, a ``qualified mechanical inspector'' was defined 
as a person with training or instruction in the troubleshooting, 
inspection, testing, maintenance, or repair of the specific train brake 
systems the person is assigned responsibility and whose primary 
responsibilities include work generally consistent with those 
functions. (See Sec. 232.5 of the section-by-section analysis for a 
more detailed discussion of ``qualified mechanical inspector.'') FRA 
also proposed that these same highly qualified inspectors be the type 
of individuals performing the proposed inbound inspection on these 
extended haul trains in order to ensure that all defective conditions 
are identified at the train's destination or 1,500-mile location. 
Similarly, FRA proposed that all of the mechanical inspections required 
to be performed on these trains be conducted by inspectors designated 
pursuant to 49 CFR 215.11 in order to ensure that all mechanical 
components are in proper condition prior to the train's departure.
    The AAR and various private car owners submitted a number of 
comments objecting to the proposed requirements regarding extended haul 
trains contained in the 1998 NPRM. These commenters believe that the 
1,500-mile limitation on the movement of these trains between brake 
inspections is insufficient considering the restrictions placed on the 
trains. They recommend that these trains be permitted to operate to its 
destination or at a minimum be permitted 2,000 miles between brake 
inspections. They contend that the 1,500-mile limitation results in 
little or no benefit to the railroads because in order to take 
advantage of the flexibility provided, railroads would have to 
establish new facilities and add more manpower at 1,500-mile points to 
conduct the more stringent inspections required at those locations. 
They contend that a limitation at the 2,000-mile point would be 
logically consistent with existing inspection requirements, based on 
1,000-mile increments, and would allow a greater number of trains to 
utilize the provisions because railroads could use existing facilities 
and manpower. They recommend that FRA reconsider the estimates provided 
regarding the benefits derived from the extended haul train provisions, 
claiming that the benefits estimated in the NPRM's Regulatory Impact 
Analysis are overstated. Several private car owners also suggested that 
even if FRA were not to extend the proposed distance for the entire 
industry, it should allow certain private car owners greater distances 
due to their superior safety record and maintenance practices.
    Many of these same commenters also object to the proposed 
requirement that extended haul trains not be permitted to make any 
pick-ups or set-outs en route. These commenters contend that this 
restriction severely limits the actual flexibility of the proposal. 
They assert that the prohibition on pick-ups and set-outs would 
eliminate nearly one-half of the trains that could potentially be 
operated under the proposed provisions. Several commenters also 
objected to the proposed notification requirements for extended haul 
trains. These commenters state that the proposed provision requiring 
advance notification to FRA of the trains to be operated under the 
extended haul provision would seriously limit the number of trains 
utilizing the provisions as many trains are unscheduled with unknown 
train symbols and would be excluded. They recommend that the 
notification requirements be reduced in some manner to allow 
unscheduled trains to be identified as extended haul trains. One 
commenter also objects to the proposed requirement that extended haul 
trains not depart their initial terminals with any part 215 defects 
entrained. This commenter asserts that there was no rationale for this 
restriction and that it merely creates an additional burden for 
railroads.
    Several rail labor representatives also object to the proposed 
provisions permitting trains to be operated as extended haul trains; 
however, these commenters oppose allowing any train to operate more 
than 1,000 miles between brake inspections. These commenters contend 
that when the distance between intermediate brake inspections was 
increased in 1982, the railroads made a commitment to conduct quality 
initial terminal brake inspections in exchange for the increased 
mileage, but that has not occurred and FRA should not provide the 
railroads with an increase in mileage when the previous agreement has 
not been honored. They contend that the proposed extension would merely 
allow defective equipment to be moved further distances without repair. 
They further contend that the proposed increase in distance between 
brake tests is not justified from a safety standpoint and, thus, 
violates 49 U.S.C. 20302(d)(2), which permits a change in the existing 
power brake regulations ``only for the purpose of achieving safety.'' 
These commenters oppose any extension in the distance between brake 
inspections unless stringent

[[Page 4121]]

requirements are placed on the trains, one such requirement being that 
carmen or similarly trained individuals perform all the inspections and 
tests required to be performed on the trains. They also contend that 
the proposed standard for revoking a railroad's ability to designate 
extended haul trains is too high.
    FRA Conclusions. FRA continues to believe that if a train is 
properly and thoroughly inspected, with as many defective conditions 
being eliminated as possible, then the train is capable of traveling 
much greater than 1,000 miles between brake inspections. Therefore, the 
final rule retains the provisions permitting railroads to designate 
trains as extended haul trains and allowing such trains to be operated 
up to 1,500 miles between brake inspections. Although FRA recognizes 
that retention of the 1,500-mile limitation may limit the utility of 
the provision on some railroads, FRA is not willing to increase the 
proposed mileage restriction at this time. Currently, no train is 
permitted to travel more than 1,000 miles without receiving an 
intermediate brake inspection. Therefore, FRA does not believe it would 
be prudent to immediately double or triple the currently allowed 
distance without evaluating the safety and operational effects of an 
incremental increase in the distance. Consequently, until sufficient 
information and data are collected on trains operating under the 
provisions proposed in the NPRM and retained in this final rule, FRA is 
not willing to permit trains to travel the distances suggested by some 
commenters without additional brake inspections. FRA continues to 
believe that the requirement for performing inbound inspections and the 
requirement to maintain records of all defective conditions discovered 
on these trains provides the basis for developing the information and 
data necessary to determine the viability of allowing greater distances 
between brake inspections.
    After consideration of the comments submitted, FRA agrees that the 
benefits estimated in the NPRM in association with the extended haul 
provisions may have been overstated. FRA realizes that the retention of 
the 1,500-mile limitation may eliminate certain trains from being 
operated pursuant to the extended haul provisions and reduce the 
benefits estimated at the NPRM stage of the proceeding. (See detailed 
discussion in the Regulatory Impact Analysis portion of the preamble 
below.) However, in order to increase the viability of the extended 
haul provisions, the final rule provides some flexibility for 
designating extended haul trains and allows for the limited pick-up and 
set-out of equipment.
    Several commenters noted that the proposed provisions regarding the 
advance designation of extended haul trains would prohibit certain 
unscheduled trains from being operated as extended haul trains. In an 
effort to provide some flexibility in this area, the final rule has 
been modified to allow railroads to designate certain locations as 
locations where extended haul trains will be initiated and requires 
railroads to describe those trains that will be so operated rather than 
requiring specific identification of every train. FRA believes this 
modification will allow railroads to capture some of their unscheduled 
trains by identifying the trains by the locations where they are 
initiated.
    The final rule will also permit extended haul trains to set out 
cars at one location or to pick up cars, or both, at the same or 
another location. This modification will provide railroads the 
flexibility to set-out a block of cars at one location and pick up a 
block of cars at another location. FRA believes that this limited 
ability provides the railroads with some flexibility to move equipment 
efficiently while minimizing the disruptions made to the train's brake 
system and ensuring that cars added to such trains can be adequately 
tracked and inspected. The final rule makes clear that any cars added 
to extended haul trains must be inspected in the same manner as the 
cars at the train's initial terminal. The final rule also makes clear 
that any car removed from the train must be inspected in the same 
manner as a car at the train's point of destination or 1,500-mile 
location.
    Certain commenters have portrayed the provisions related to 
extended haul trains as merely being an extension of the current 
intermediate inspection distances. FRA objects to such a 
characterization. In FRA's view, the extended haul provisions contained 
in the NPRM and retained in this final rule constitute a completely new 
inspection regimen. The provisions related to the operation of extended 
haul trains contain stringent inspection requirements, both brake and 
mechanical, by highly qualified inspectors and establish stringent 
requirements whenever cars are added to or removed from such trains. 
The extended haul train requirements also contain a means to assess the 
safety of such operations by requiring that records be maintained of 
the defective conditions that develop on these trains while en route. 
Consequently, FRA believes that the requirements related to extended 
haul trains not only ensure the safe operation of the trains operated 
under them, but actually increase the safety of such operations over 
that which is provided in the current regulations.
3. Charging of Air Brake System
    Present regulations for air brake testing basically require that 
cars that have previously been tested in accordance with the 
regulations either ``be kept charged until road motive power is 
attached'' or be retested. See 49 CFR 232.12(i). The current 
regulations also require the performance of an initial terminal brake 
test ``where the train consist is changed other than by adding or 
removing a solid block of cars, and the train brake system remains 
charged. * * *'' See 49 CFR 232.12(a)(ii). Based on longstanding 
administrative interpretation and practice, FRA currently presumes that 
a brake system is no longer adequately charged if disconnected from the 
charging device (supply of pressurized air) for more than two hours 
before coupling or recoupling of locomotives; otherwise, retesting is 
required.
    In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed to permit trains to be removed from 
a continuous source of compressed air for up to four hours without 
requiring the re-performance of a comprehensive brake inspection. FRA 
received very few comments that directly addressed the safety 
implications of this proposal; thus, FRA proposed the four-hour time 
limitation in the 1998 NPRM. In the 1998 NPRM, FRA agreed that its 
longstanding administrative interpretation, that requires the retesting 
of cars disconnected from a charging device for longer than two hours, 
was established prior to the development of new equipment that has 
greatly reduced leakage problems, such as welded brake piping and 
fittings and ferrule-clamped air hoses. However, contrary to several 
railroads' assertions, FRA did not believe that cars should be allowed 
to be off air for extended periods of time without being retested. FRA 
believed that the longer cars sit without air attached, the greater the 
chances were that the integrity of the brake system would be 
compromised. Consequently, based on today's equipment, operating 
practices, and overriding safety concerns, FRA proposed that cars 
should not be disconnected from a continuous supply of pressurized air 
for longer than four hours without being retested. FRA also proposed 
that the source of compressed air must be sufficient to maintain the 
integrity of the brake system. Consequently, FRA proposed that the 
source of compressed

[[Page 4122]]

air be maintained at a minimum level of 60 psi.
    The AAR and several other parties commented that there is no reason 
to assume that once a train is charged and tested and then left 
standing without being provided with a source of compressed air that 
the brake system would become defective. These commenters assert that 
leaving equipment connected to a source of compressed air does nothing 
to ensure proper performance of the brake system, does not prevent 
vandalism, and does not prevent leakage due to adverse weather 
conditions. These parties suggest that leakage on standing trains has 
been greatly reduced through the use of welded brake piping and 
fittings and ferrule-clamped air hoses. These commenters believe that 
FRA's current interpretation of allowing trains to sit without air for 
only two hours is from an era when this new equipment was not used. 
They also contend that FRA's current interpretation and the proposed 
four-hour limitation costs the industry money, fuel, and time and 
creates pollution because trains must either be reinspected or left 
with a locomotive attached and idling in order to avoid performing a 
full Class I brake test. They further contend that the proposed four-
hour rule exposes employees to various safety hazards due to the 
employees being required to perform inspections at locations that are 
not designed or equipped for such activity.
    The AAR recommends that the proposed four-hour limitation be 
eliminated for the reasons noted above. They also noted that the 
Canadian rules do not contain an off-air requirement and that in Canada 
if cars are off air for any length of time, only a set-and-release 
continuity test is required. As an alternative to eliminating the off-
air requirement completely, the AAR suggests that FRA adopt 
requirements which would allow cars to be removed from a source of 
compressed air for up to 48 hours without a car-by-car reinspection. 
They recommend that cars only be required to receive a continuity test 
when they have been off a source of compressed air for more than fours 
hours but less than 48 hours and that no retesting occur if equipment 
is off air for less than four hours.
    Representatives of rail labor objected to the proposed increase in 
the amount of time that equipment could be removed from a source of 
compressed air. These commenters believe that the existing two-hour 
limitation is reasonable. Most of these commenters expressed concern 
for the integrity of the brake system if a consist were left standing 
for longer than two hours. These concerns were aimed at the effect that 
climate might have on the equipment and the increased possibility of 
vandalism to the equipment if consists or equipment were left off air 
for longer periods.
    FRA Conclusions. The final rule retains the proposed requirement 
that equipment removed from a source of compressed air for longer than 
four hours be reinspected. FRA believes that this requirement is 
necessary to ensure not only the integrity of the brake system on 
equipment but to ensure that inspections are performed on equipment in 
a timely and predictable manner. FRA tends to agree that the amount of 
time equipment is left off a source of compressed air is not directly 
related to the operation of the brake system on that equipment. 
However, FRA does believe that in certain circumstances the length of 
time that equipment is removed from a source of compressed air can 
impact the integrity and operation of the brake system on a vehicle or 
train. Particularly in cold weather situations where freeze-ups in 
train brake systems can occur or in areas where the potential for 
vandalism is high due to the location where equipment is left standing. 
Moreover, FRA believes that the four-hour limitation is consistent with 
the intent of the existing regulations and is intended to ensure that 
equipment is regularly inspected.
    The commenters objecting to the four-hour limitation proposed in 
the NPRM and retained in this final rule have ignored the intent and 
purpose of the existing two-hour allowance permitted by longstanding 
administrative interpretation. As discussed above, the existing power 
brake regulations, adopted by Congress in 1958, are based on the 
premise that if a train or equipment does not remain charged the 
equipment is to be retested. There is no provision in the existing 
regulations for allowing equipment to be removed from a source of 
compressed air for any length of time, such allowance was granted only 
through administrative interpretation. The original intent of the 
currently existing two-hour interpretation, which permits equipment to 
remain off-air for up to two-hours without being retested, was to allow 
trains to pick up or remove cars from their consists while en route 
without requiring a retest of the entire train. The two-hour limit was 
based on the amount of time it would take a train to make a switching 
move while en route. Thus, the current application of the two-hour rule 
to any and all equipment left off a source of compressed air is 
somewhat counter to the original intent of the interpretation when it 
was provided.
    Although FRA recognizes that it has acquiesced and endorsed the 
expansion of the two-hour rule to all equipment, FRA believes that the 
underlying intent of the existing regulations must be recognized and 
maintained. The doubling of the existing two-hour interpretation to 
four hours is based on the fact that the average time needed for many 
trains to perform the switching they conduct while en route has 
increased. Thus, FRA's intent when proposing an expansion of the two-
hour rule was not to alter the basic tenet that equipment should be 
retested when it is removed from a source of compressed air for any 
lengthy period of time. FRA believes that the four-hour allowance 
provided by this final rule gives the railroads flexibility to perform 
switching operations while trains are en route and provides flexibility 
to efficiently move cars from one train to another when necessary, yet 
retains the concept that equipment be retested when left disconnected 
from a source of compressed air for longer periods of time.
    FRA further believes that a limitation on the amount of time that 
equipment may be off air is necessary for ensuring that equipment is 
inspected in a timely and predictable manner. If no time limit were 
imposed or if 48 hours were permitted, as suggested by some commenters, 
equipment could lawfully sit for days at various locations while en 
route to its destination and be switched in and out of numerous trains 
without ever being reinspected. Such an approach would drastically 
reduce the number of times that the brake systems on such equipment 
would ever be given a visual inspection from what is currently required 
and, in FRA's view, would seriously degrade the safety of the trains 
operating with such equipment in its consist. Furthermore, if equipment 
were allowed to be off-air for an excessive amount of time, it would be 
virtually impossible for FRA to ensure that equipment is being properly 
retested as it would be extremely difficult for FRA to determine how 
long a particular piece of equipment was disconnected from a source of 
compressed air. In order to make such a determination, FRA would have 
to maintain observation of the equipment for days at a time. 
Consequently, the final rule retains the proposed four-hour limit on 
the amount of time equipment can be disconnected from a source of 
compressed air as it maintains current levels of safety and provides an 
enforceable and verifiable time limit that FRA believes provides the 
railroads

[[Page 4123]]

some additional benefit over what is currently required both in terms 
of operational efficiency and cost savings.
4. Retesting of Brakes
    In the 1998 NPRM, FRA attempted to clarify language contained in 
the current regulation which requires that the brakes ``apply.'' See 49 
CFR 232.12(b), 232.12(d), 232.13(d), and 232.13(e). The current 
language has been misinterpreted by some to mean that if the piston 
applies in response to a command from a controlling locomotive or yard 
test device, and releases before the release signal is given, the brake 
system on that car is in compliance with the regulation because the 
brake simply applied. The intent of the regulation has always been that 
the brakes apply and remain applied until the release signal is 
initiated from the controlling locomotive or yard test device. 
Therefore, clarifying language was added to the proposed inspection 
requirements to eliminate all doubt as to what is required. In the 1998 
NPRM, FRA made clear that the brakes on a car must remain applied until 
the appropriate release signal is given. The proposal required that 
cars with brakes that fail to remain applied either be removed from the 
train or repaired in the train and retested, and the proposal provided 
specific requirements for performing a retest on such equipment.
    FRA recognized that some defective train air brake conditions found 
when performing a train air brake test, which may cause insufficient 
application of the brakes on a piece of equipment, are of such a nature 
that they can be quickly repaired in the train. For example, a brake 
connection pin might be missing, a slack adjuster might be 
disconnected, or some other minor part of the brake system might be 
defective. FRA realized that to mandate that equipment with these types 
of obvious defective conditions be removed from the train would 
potentially impose a tremendous burden on the railroads. Therefore, FRA 
sought to provide some relief to railroads by permitting cars with 
obvious brake defects to be repaired and retested while remaining in 
the train. However, FRA also believed that some consistency and 
guidance had to be provided regarding the performance of a retest on a 
car's brake system. Consequently, FRA proposed that the retesting of a 
car had to be conducted from the controlling locomotive or head end of 
the consist if a car is repaired in a train. Furthermore, FRA proposed 
that if a retest is conducted the brakes on the retested car must 
remain applied for a minimum of five (5) minutes. The proposed five-
minute requirement was based on the leakage parameters established for 
locomotives contained at Sec. 229.59(c).
    The AAR and several other commenters object to the parameters 
contained in the proposed retesting provisions. Specifically, these 
commenters object to three of the requirements contained in the 
proposed retest provision, these include: the requirement that only 
cars with an obvious defect be retested, the requirement that the 
brakes remain applied for five minutes, and the requirement that the 
retest be conducted from the controlling locomotive or the head of the 
consist. These commenters contend that there is no reason to limit the 
retest provision to cars with readily identifiable defects. They claim 
that there are a number of conditions which might cause a car's brakes 
not to apply that are not readily identifiable thus, the retest may 
identify the problem and allow it to be repaired, or the reason for a 
no-set is unknown but the brakes operate properly upon being retested.
    These commenters also believe that the proposed requirement to have 
the brakes remain applied for five minutes is impractical and 
unnecessary. They assert that it is only necessary to have the brakes 
remain applied for the period of time it takes an inspector to perform 
an inspection of the brakes and that it is impractical to require an 
employee to watch each retested car for five minutes. They also contend 
that FRA's reliance on the five-minute requirement related to the 
testing of locomotive brake cylinder leakage contained in Sec. 229.59 
is misplaced. They assert that there is no parallel between determining 
the brake cylinder leakage on a locomotive and the testing of the 
brakes on a freight car. One commenter suggests that a one-minute 
application is a sufficient period to ensure the proper operation of a 
car's brakes.
    These commenters also object to the proposed requirement that the 
retest be conducted from the controlling locomotive or the head end of 
the consist. They contend that there is no safety hazard in performing 
the test with a test device positioned at one end of the car being 
retested. They assert that such a procedure would replicate the natural 
gradient of the train and, thus, avoid the possibility of overcharging 
the brake system, and would better facilitate retesting.
    Representatives of rail labor generally supported the proposed 
retest provisions. These commenters did assert that any retest should 
be conducted from the head end of the consist or from the controlling 
locomotive. They claim that to perform the test from other than that 
location would provide no assurance that the brakes would apply in 
response to a brake pipe reduction from the controlling locomotive.
    FRA Conclusions. FRA agrees that the proposed provisions regarding 
the retesting of cars may have been overly restrictive and is modifying 
the final rule based on FRA's review of the comments and 
recommendations submitted. The final rule has been modified to permit 
the retesting of any car the brakes of which were found not to be 
applied during a required inspection. FRA agrees that there are several 
circumstances that could occur where the reason for the failure of the 
brakes to apply is not readily apparent. FRA believes that permitting a 
retest on any car found not applying will not adversely affect safety 
since the car will be required to pass the retest in order to remain in 
the train or be handled for necessary repair.
    The final rule also modifies the proposed provision that requires a 
retested car's brakes to remain applied for five minutes. FRA agrees 
that its reliance on the five-minute requirement applicable to the 
testing of locomotive brake cylinder leakage is not appropriate. 
However, rather than insert a subjective requirement for how long the 
brakes should remain applied, as suggested by some commenters, FRA 
believes that a definite time period should be established to ensure 
consistency in the performance of these retests. Thus, the final rule 
requires that the brakes on a retested car remain applied for at least 
three minutes. FRA believes that three minutes is consistent with the 
amount of time that it would take an individual to conduct a complete 
inspection of the retested car's brakes. The three minutes is based on 
the generally accepted period of one and one-half minutes it would take 
to perform a walking inspection on each side of an average size freight 
car. Requiring the brakes to remain applied for a period of at least 
three minutes also provides FRA with sufficient assurances that the 
brakes are operating properly and will remain applied for the duration 
of any brake application required during the train's journey.
    The final rule also modifies the proposed requirement that the 
retest be conducted from the controlling locomotive or the head of the 
consist by permitting the retest to be conducted with a suitable test 
device positioned at one end of the car or cars being retested. FRA 
agrees that there is little or no safety rationale for requiring the 
retest to be performed from the controlling locomotive or head of the 
consist. Some

[[Page 4124]]

commenters argue that if the retest is not conducted from the 
controlling locomotive, then there are no assurances that the brakes 
will apply in response to a brake reduction from the controlling 
locomotive. FRA finds that this argument ignores the various methods by 
which cars may be tested and assembled when air brake tests are 
conducted using yard air sources. FRA currently allows and this final 
rule continues to allow cars to be tested with yard test plants and 
allows such cars to be added to trains without requiring that each car 
be inspected to ensure it operates in response to the controlling 
locomotive.
    One potential safety hazard with allowing cars to be retested with 
a device at the car is the potential for injury to the employees 
responsible for separating the train line between the charged cars. The 
train line between the car being retested and the car it is coupled to 
would have to be separated to perform the retest with a device. In many 
cases this train line will be under pressure at the time of the 
separation and could cause injury to the person separating the train 
line if caution is not used. The final rule recognizes this potential 
safety concern and requires that the compressed air in a car to be 
retested must be depleted prior to separating the air hoses and 
conducting the retest.

C. Movement of Equipment With Defective Brakes

    The current regulations do not contain requirements pertaining to 
the movement of equipment with defective power brakes. The movement of 
equipment with these types of defects is currently controlled by a 
specific statutory provision originally enacted in 1910, and later 
amended which states:

    (a) GENERAL.--A vehicle that is equipped in compliance with this 
chapter whose equipment becomes defective or insecure nevertheless 
may be moved when necessary to make repairs, without a penalty being 
imposed under section 21302 of this title, from the place at which 
the defect or insecurity was first discovered to the nearest 
available place at which the repairs can be made--
    (1) On the railroad line on which the defect or insecurity was 
discovered; or
    (2) At the option of a connecting railroad carrier, on the 
railroad line of the connecting carrier, if not farther than the 
place of repair described in clause (1) of this subsection.

49 U.S.C. 20303(a) (emphasis added).

    Although there is no limit contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 as to the 
number of cars with defective equipment that may be hauled in a train, 
FRA has a longstanding interpretation which requires that, at a 
minimum, 85 percent of the cars in a train have operative brakes. FRA 
bases this interpretation on another statutory requirement which 
permits a railroad to use a train only if ``at least 50 percent of the 
vehicles in the train are equipped with power or train brakes and the 
engineer is using the power or train brakes on those vehicles and on 
all other vehicles equipped with them that are associated with those 
vehicles in a train.'' 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally enacted 
in 1903, section 20302 also granted the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) the authority to increase this percentage, and in 1910 the ICC 
issued an order increasing the minimum percentage to 85 percent. See 49 
CFR 232.1, which codified the ICC order.
    As virtually all freight cars are presently equipped with power 
brakes and are operated on an associated train line, the statutory 
requirement is in essence a requirement that 100 percent of the cars in 
a train have operative power brakes, unless being hauled for repairs 
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Consequently, FRA currently requires that 
equipment with defective or inoperative air brakes makeup no more than 
15 percent of the train and that if it is necessary to move the 
equipment from where the railroad first discovered it to be defective, 
the defective equipment be moved no farther than the nearest place on 
the railroad's line where the necessary repairs can be made or, at the 
option of the receiving carrier, to a location that is no farther than 
the location where the repairs could have been performed on the 
delivering line.
    In addition to the general requirements relating to the movement of 
equipment with defective safety appliances, FRA currently requires 100-
percent operative brakes on a train departing its initial terminal. The 
requirement for 100 percent at the initial terminal has been a standard 
by which the railroad industry has operated for decades and one which 
FRA and its predecessor agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
have endorsed since the adoption of the power brake regulations. The 
requirement is founded on Congress' mandate that the ICC incorporate 
into the federal rail safety regulations the AAR's rules, standards, 
and instructions as of April 11, 1958, regarding the installation, 
inspection, maintenance, and repair of train brakes. In 1958, Congress 
amended a provision of the Safety Appliance Acts, then codified at 45 
U.S.C. 9, by incorporating the inspection requirements of the AAR into 
the statute and permitting their change only for the purpose of 
achieving safety.\3\ Based on a review of the legislative history 
surrounding that amendment, FRA believes it is clear that Congress 
interpreted the AAR standards as requiring 100 percent operative brakes 
on all trains prior to departure from an initial terminal. As the 
current regulations regarding the performance of an initial terminal 
inspection contained at 49 CFR 232.12(c)-(j) were basically an adoption 
of the AAR inspection and testing standards as they existed in 1958, 
FRA believes that the current regulations are intended and do require 
100 percent operative brakes at initial terminals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ In 1994, Congress revised, recodified, and enacted without 
substantive change, the federal railroad safety laws. 
Simultaneously, the then existing general and permanent federal 
railroad safety laws were repealed. 45 U.S.C. 9 of the Safety 
Appliance Acts is currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 20301 and 20302. 
The reference to the AAR rules, standards, and instructions was 
removed during the recodification as executed. See Pub. L. 103-272 
(July 5, 1994) and H.R. Rep. No. 103-180, at 94 (1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In developing the 1998 NPRM, FRA considered the various proposals 
discussed in the RSAC Working Group and the numerous comments provided 
subsequent to the issuance of the 1994 NPRM. A discussion of those 
comments and proposals was provided in the 1998 NPRM and will not be 
reiterated here. See 63 FR 48308-310. It is clear from that discussion 
that many of the proposals received by FRA since the issuance of the 
1994 NPRM were in direct conflict with various statutory requirements 
related to the movement of equipment with defective brakes. As the RSAC 
Working Group was unable to reach a consensus on the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance requirements for freight train brake systems, 
FRA was not willing or able to propose provisions regarding the 
movement of equipment with defective brakes that would be contrary to 
existing statutory mandates. The 1998 NPRM contained proposals 
regarding the tagging of defective equipment, the placement of 
defective equipment in a train, and a method for consistently 
calculating the percentage of operative brakes on a train. Therefore, 
in addition to being consistent with the statutory requirements, the 
proposed requirements ensured the safe and proper movement of defective 
equipment and clarified the duties imposed on a railroad when moving 
such equipment.
    FRA proposed that all cars or locomotives found with defective or 
inoperative brake equipment be tagged as bad ordered with a designation 
of the location where the necessary repairs

[[Page 4125]]

would be effectuated. FRA attempted to expressly clarify the 
requirement that equipment with defective brakes not depart from, or be 
moved beyond, a location where the necessary repairs to the equipment 
could be performed. The 1998 proposal made clear that if a car or 
locomotive is found with defective brakes during any of the proposed 
brake inspections or while the piece of equipment is en route and the 
location where the defective equipment is discovered is a place where 
repairs of the type needed can be performed, then that car or 
locomotive may not be moved from that location until the necessary 
repairs are effectuated. However, if repairs to the defective condition 
cannot be performed at the location where the defect is discovered, or 
should have been discovered, the proposal made clear that the railroad 
is permitted to move the equipment with the defective condition only to 
the nearest location where the necessary repairs can be performed.
    The preamble to the 1998 NPRM contained a lengthy discussion 
regarding FRA's views as to what constitutes the nearest location where 
the necessary repairs can be performed. See 63 FR 48309. In that 
discussion, FRA noted that its previous proposals regarding the use of 
mobile repair trucks and when locations serviced by those trucks would 
be considered locations where necessary repairs could be effectuated 
did not sufficiently address the issue and might lead to undesired 
consequences. Rather than attempt to develop a standard applicable to 
all situations, which FRA did not believe could be accomplished at the 
time, FRA intended to approach the issue of what constitutes the 
nearest location where necessary repairs could be made based on a case-
by-case analysis of each situation. FRA noted that in making these 
determinations both the railroad as well as FRA's inspectors must 
conduct a multi-factor analysis based on the facts of each case. In the 
preamble, FRA provided a broad discussion, based on existing case law, 
setting out general guidelines and factors that should be considered 
when determining whether a particular location is a location where 
necessary repairs can be made or whether a location is the nearest 
location where the necessary repairs can be effectuated. See 63 FR 
48309.
    FRA also proposed continuation of the requirement to have 100 
percent operative brakes on a train at its point of origin (initial 
terminal). FRA noted that this has been a requirement in the railroad 
industry for decades and that it was not only wise from a safety 
standpoint, as it ensures the proper operation of a train's brake 
system at least once during its life, but it also sets the proper tone 
for what FRA expects to be accomplished at these locations. 
Furthermore, requiring 100 percent operative brakes on a trains at its 
inception provides the railroads with a margin for failure of some 
brakes while the train is in transit (up to 15 percent) and tends to 
ensure that defective equipment is being repaired in a timely fashion. 
In addition, FRA stated that the 100-percent requirement is consistent 
not only with Congress' understanding of the AAR inspection standards 
that were adopted in 1958, but also with the intent of FRA, rail 
management, and rail labor as to what was to occur at initial terminals 
when the inspection interval was increased from 500 miles to 1,000 
miles in 1982. At that time, carrier representatives committed to the 
performance of quality initial terminal inspections in exchange for an 
extension in the inspection interval, for which FRA intended to hold 
them accountable. Moreover, FRA believed that retention of the 100-
percent requirement is consistent with the statutory requirements 
regarding the movement of defective equipment because a majority of the 
locations where trains are initiated have the capability of conducting 
virtually any brake system repair, and thus, under 49 U.S.C. 20303(a) 
the defective equipment may not be moved from those locations anyway.
    In the preamble to the 1998 NPRM, FRA recognized that the 100-
percent requirement at points of origin tends to be somewhat burdensome 
for some railroads at certain locations. See 63 FR 48309-10. However, 
FRA noted that the number of locations where the requirement is quite 
burdensome appears to be fairly low as FRA had made clear that 
railroads are free to petition for a waiver of this requirement, but as 
of the issuance of the NPRM no railroad had filed such a petition. 
Although FRA recognized that the requirement creates somewhat illogical 
scenarios at some locations, FRA was not willing to propose provisions 
permitting trains to depart locations with less than 100 percent 
operative brakes without fully considering the safety hazards or 
potential abuses which may accompany such an approach. Therefore, FRA 
sought comment from interested parties regarding the potential for 
permitting very limited flexibility in moving defective equipment from 
outlying initial terminals which lack the capability of effectuating 
brake system repairs. FRA also discussed various alternative 
approaches, with attendant restrictions, which might provide some 
flexibility at these outlying locations and sought comment on those 
approaches as well. See 63 FR 48310.
    The AAR and several other railroad representative submitted a 
number of comments on the proposed requirements regarding the movement 
of defective equipment. The majority of the comments received from 
these parties addressed the proposed requirements regarding 100 percent 
operative brakes at a train's initial terminal, the identification of 
locations where brake repairs should be required, and the tagging of 
defective equipment.
    These commenters recommend that FRA permit trains to operate from 
any location with a minimum percentage of its brakes inoperative. At a 
minimum, they recommend that this flexibility be provided at locations 
where repairs can not be performed. They suggest adoption of a 95-
percent minimum operative brake requirement from such locations. They 
contend that the 100-percent requirement at initial terminals is 
outdated and does not take into consideration the numerous 
technological improvements made to brake systems over the last several 
decades. They also contend that it makes no sense to require 100-
percent operative brakes on trains originating at a location yet allow 
a train originating at another location to pick-up defective equipment 
at the same location and haul it to the same place that it could have 
been hauled by the originating train. They further contend that the 
100-percent requirement results in the unnecessary switching of cars 
and exposes employees to greater safety risks than if the equipment 
were permitted to depart in originating trains. Several commenters note 
that Canada has permitted trains to operate to destination with 95 
percent operative brakes since June of 1994 and has experienced no 
compromise in safety. The AAR commented that railroads could live with 
a 95-percent operative brake requirement out of initial terminals 
provided that there were no mileage restrictions placed on the movement 
of such defective equipment as discussed in the NPRM. See 63 FR 48310. 
The ASLRA sought clarification as to the applicability of the 100-
percent requirement to transfer trains. They contend that the language 
used in the NPRM suggests that all transfer trains must have 100-
percent operative brakes from their initial terminal which is not what 
is required under the current regulations and would have a huge impact 
on small railroads.
    A number of railroad representatives also provided comments and

[[Page 4126]]

recommendations on how FRA addressed the issue of what constitutes a 
location where brake repairs are required to be performed. These 
commenters recommend that FRA clarify what constitutes the nearest 
location where repairs can be made. These parties do not believe that 
this determination should be left to the discretion of individual FRA 
inspectors. They claim that such an approach creates inconsistent 
enforcement from one region to another and makes it very difficult for 
railroads to comply as FRA is continually second guessing their good 
faith determinations.
    The AAR and other commenters contend that Congress intended that 
only fixed repair facilities be considered locations where brake system 
repairs must be conducted and that such facilities provide safer 
working conditions than those encountered when using a mobile repair 
truck. They further contend that it is not in the public interest to 
require repair trucks to make repairs at every location where they can 
be moved. The AAR and several railroads recommend that FRA permit 
railroads to designate repair locations to FRA and permit modification 
of those designations each quarter.
    The AAR and its member railroads also objected to some to the 
proposed tagging requirements associated with the movement of equipment 
with defective brakes. They objected to the requirement that any 
automated tracking system be approved by FRA prior to its 
implementation. These commenters suggested that such review and 
approval process would be very time consuming and that FRA would not 
easily grant the use of such systems. They also objected to the 
proposed requirement that the tag or card be retained for 90 days, 
contending that the requirement was merely to aid in FRA's enforcement 
and served no other purpose.
    The AAR also recommended that FRA modify the proposed requirement 
regarding the placement of equipment with defective brakes. The AAR 
contends that FRA should permit the use of multi-unit articulated 
equipment provided that it has no more than two consecutive control 
valves cut out or inoperative rather than the proposed limitation 
prohibiting the use of such equipment with consecutive inoperative or 
cut-out control valves. They contend this is the current practice of 
many railroads in the United States and is currently allowed on trains 
operated in Canada.
    A number of rail labor representatives also provided comments on 
the proposed provisions regarding the movement of equipment with 
defective brakes. These commenters as well as the CAPUC support the 
requirement that trains have 100-percent operative brakes at their 
initial terminals. They believe that any flexibility granted to 
railroads in this regard would reduce the incentive to conduct quality 
inspections and would result in railroads eliminating even more 
personnel at other outlying locations. These commenters also suggest 
that any inability of railroads to conduct repairs at outlying 
locations is due to their own actions in eliminating repair equipment 
and personnel from these locations. They also contend that properly 
equipped mobile repair trucks have the capability of conducting any 
repair that would be required at virtually any of the outlying 
locations operated by a railroad.
    Several labor representatives also object to granting the railroads 
the ability to designate locations where brake system repairs will be 
conducted. They contend that this is merely an attempt by the railroads 
to eliminate existing locations where repairs can be conducted. They 
further object to the AAR's contention that only fixed repair 
facilities should be considered in determining where brake system 
repairs must be conducted. They claim that such an approach would lead 
to the closure of even more fixed repair shops so that railroads could 
further circumvent the requirement to make timely repairs at the 
nearest location. They assert that allowing railroads to designate 
locations where repairs will be made would violate 49 U.S.C. 20303(a) 
which requires repairs to be conducted at the nearest location where 
the necessary repairs can be made.
    Parties representing rail labor generally support the proposed 
tagging requirements for moving defective equipment but noted their 
objection to the use of an automated tracking system. These commenters 
believe that an automated tracking system reduces the awareness of 
ground inspection forces as to the presence of defective equipment and 
would not ensure proper handling of such equipment. The required tag 
provides carmen and yard crews with the ability to visually identify 
defective equipment and take appropriate action. Furthermore, it is 
contended that automated tracking systems lack ready accessibility and 
do not provide sufficient accountability or security to prevent 
potential abuse by the railroads. Many of these commenters also 
recommend that the tags be retained for a period of at least one year 
rather than the proposed 90 days and that they be made available to FRA 
immediately rather than within the proposed 15 days. Allowing railroads 
15 days to produce the document would merely frustrate FRA enforcement 
activity due to information delay.
    Several labor commenters as well as the CAPUC also recommend that 
FRA modify the proposed requirements regarding the person responsible 
for making the determinations regarding the movement of defective brake 
equipment. They suggest that the rule require the person to be a carman 
or at a minimum a person meeting the proposed definition of a qualified 
mechanical inspector. They contend that only these individuals have the 
experience and knowledge to adequately assess the impact that a 
defective piece of equipment might have on a train's operation.
    Several labor representatives also raised concerns regarding the 
proposed method for calculating the percentage of operative brakes. 
These commenters along with the NTSB recommend that the proposed method 
for calculating the percentage of operative brakes, based on the number 
of cut-out control valves, be modified because a control valve can be 
cut in but the brakes which it controls can be inoperative. Thus, the 
proposed method does not provide an accurate count of the number of 
defective brakes. Some labor representatives suggest that the 
computation be based on car count as it provides a much more simple, 
reliable, and enforceable method than the proposed control-valve 
method. Certain labor representatives also object to the proposed list 
of conditions that would not be considered an inoperative brake for 
purposes of calculating the percentage of operative brakes. They 
contend that cars containing any of the listed conditions should be 
considered to have inoperative brakes.
    FRA Conclusions. The final rule generally retains the requirements 
regarding the movement of defective equipment proposed in the 1998 NPRM 
with minor modification in response to the comments submitted. The 
final rule modifies the language used in the proposed general 
provisions to accurately reflect the language contained in the existing 
statutory provisions pertaining to the movement of equipment with 
defective brakes. The final rule replaces the term ``repair location'' 
with the phrase ``location where necessary repairs can be performed.'' 
FRA agrees that the proposed language could have been interpreted as 
being somewhat contrary to the language used in the existing statute, 
which was not FRA's intent.

[[Page 4127]]

    The final rule also clarifies that the person required to make the 
determinations regarding the safe movement of defective equipment is to 
be a ``qualified person'' as defined in the final rule. The intent of 
FRA when issuing the NPRM was to require the determinations to be made 
by these individuals. FRA believes that the training requirements 
contained in the final rule for designating a person qualified to 
perform a specific task will ensure that the individual possesses the 
appropriate knowledge and skills to perform the assigned task. The 
determinations that are required to be made in the final rule are 
currently made by individuals which FRA believes will be trained and 
designated under the final rule as qualified persons.
    The final rule also modifies the proposed method for calculating 
the percentage of operative brakes. The final rule retains the general 
method of calculating the percentage based on a control-valve basis. 
FRA believes that basing the calculation on control valves provides a 
much more accurate measurement than using a car basis because many 
types of freight equipment in use today can have the brakes cut out on 
a per-truck basis, and FRA expects this trend to continue as the 
technology is applied to new equipment. Thus, the method retained in 
this final rule more accurately reflects the true braking ability of a 
train as a whole and recognizes existing technology. However, FRA 
agrees with the comments of the NTSB and certain labor representatives 
that the method proposed in the NPRM did not take into consideration 
the possibility of a control valve being cut in when the brakes it 
controls are inoperative. Consequently, the final rule clarifies that a 
control valve will not be considered cut in if the brakes controlled by 
that valve are inoperative.
    The final rule also retains the proposed list of conditions that 
are not to be considered inoperative power brakes for purposes of 
calculating the percentage of operative brakes. Contrary to the 
assertions of some commenters, the conditions listed do not render the 
brakes inoperative nor are the listed conditions ones that are outside 
the scope of the movement-for-repair provisions. Furthermore, many of 
the listed conditions are of such a nature that if found, they would 
constitute a violation under other provisions contained in the final 
rule and separate penalties are provided.
    The final rule also modifies the proposed requirement regarding the 
placement of multi-unit articulated equipment with inoperative brakes. 
The final rule requires that such equipment shall not be placed in a 
train if it has more than two consecutive individual control valves cut 
out or if the brakes controlled by the valve are inoperative. FRA 
recognizes that the proposed requirement prohibiting the placement of 
such equipment with consecutive control valves cut out is more 
restrictive than current practice on many railroads. When proposing the 
requirement in the NPRM, FRA believed that the current practice on most 
railroads was to prohibit the placement of such equipment if it had 
consecutive control valves cut-out. Based on the comments received, it 
appears that the standard practice on most railroads prohibits 
placement of this equipment only if more than two consecutive control 
valves are cut-out. As it was FRA's intent to incorporate the current 
practices of railroads with regard to the placement of this equipment, 
the final rule has been modified accordingly.
    The final rule retains FRA's position on the use of automated 
tracking systems in lieu of the required tagging of defective 
equipment. As an adequate automated system for tracking defective 
equipment does not currently exist on most railroads, FRA is not 
willing to permit the implementation of such a system without its 
approval. Furthermore, FRA does not believe it is prudent, from a 
safety perspective, to allow implementation of a tracking system for 
which FRA would not have a prior opportunity to assess to ensure the 
system's accessibility, security, and accuracy. Moreover, FRA agrees 
that the physical tagging of defective equipment provides a railroad's 
ground and operational forces the ability to visually locate and 
identify defective equipment at the time they see it rather than 
referring to an electronic database for such information. It should be 
noted that FRA is not intending to discourage the development of a 
viable automated tracking system, but believes that FRA must be 
provided the ability to review and approve any such system prior to its 
implementation. In fact, the final rule contains some new language 
regarding FRA's oversight of any automated tracking system that is 
approved by FRA to ensure the agency's ability to monitor such systems 
and potentially prohibit the use of the system if it is found 
deficient.
    The final rule also retains the proposed requirement that a record 
or copy of each tag removed from a defective piece of equipment be 
retained for 90 days and made available to FRA within 15 days of 
request. FRA does not believe that the proposed time frames need to be 
expanded as suggested by some commenters. The provisions are identical 
to those contained in part 215 regarding freight car defects, and they 
have proven to be sufficient to meet the needs of FRA. FRA admits that 
the record keeping requirements are intended to aid FRA in its 
enforcement of the regulations. However, as the agency is able to 
inspect and oversee only a small portion of the railroad operations 
taking place across the country at any one time, the need for railroads 
to maintain records is essential for FRA carry out its mission of 
ensuring that all railroads are operating in the safest possible manner 
and comply with those regulatory provisions designed to ensure that 
safety.
    After consideration of the comments provided, FRA believes it is 
essential to further clarify to the regulated community its position 
for determining whether a location is a place where brake repairs can 
be made. FRA does not agree that railroads should be permitted to 
unilaterally determine the locations FRA will consider capable of 
making brake system repairs. History shows that many railroads and FRA 
have widely different views on what should be considered a location 
where brake repairs can and should be effectuated. Furthermore, it is 
apparent to FRA that some railroads attempt to minimize or circumvent 
the requirements for conducting repairs for convenience or efficiency. 
However, FRA also recognizes that the emergence of mobile repair trucks 
creates an ability to perform repairs that did not exist when Congress 
enacted the statutory requirements related to the movement of defective 
equipment. FRA acknowledges that every location where a mobile repair 
truck is capable of making repairs should not be considered a location 
where repairs must be conducted. However, FRA also disagrees with the 
contentions of some commenters that Congress intended for only fixed 
repair facilities to be considered when determining locations where 
brake repairs are to be performed and that mobile repair trucks should 
not be considered. FRA is aware of numerous locations where mobile 
repair trucks are being used in lieu of a fixed facility or where a 
fixed facility was eliminated and the same repairs, that were being 
performed by the fixed facility, are now being performed at the same 
location by a fully equipped repair truck. Thus, FRA believes that 
locations where repair trucks are used in the same manner as a fixed 
facility should be considered when determining where the necessary 
repairs can be made.
    As noted in the NPRM, the determination as to what constitutes the

[[Page 4128]]

nearest location where necessary repairs can be performed is an issue 
that FRA has grappled with for decades. FRA continues to believe that 
the determination must be made on a case-by-case basis after conducting 
a multi-factor analysis. However, in an effort to better detail the 
items that will be considered by FRA in making a determination, the 
final rule contains general guidelines that FRA will consider when 
determining whether a location is one where at least some brake system 
repairs must be made. FRA would expect railroads to consider the 
guidance contained in the final rule when making their decisions on 
where equipment containing brake defects will be repaired. The guidance 
contained in the final rule is based upon the voluminous case law that 
establishes the guiding principles for determining whether a location 
constitutes the nearest location where the necessary repairs can be 
made, previous enforcement actions taken, and guidance provided by FRA 
regarding identification of repair locations. The final rule guidance 
incorporates the principles contained in the following discussion 
previously set out in the NPRM.
    In determining whether a particular location is a location where 
necessary repairs can be made or whether a location is the nearest 
repair location, the accessibility of the location and the ability to 
safely make the repairs at that location are the two overriding factors 
that must be considered in any analysis. These two factors have a 
multitude of sub-factors which must be considered, such as: the type of 
repair required; the safety of employees responsible for conducting the 
repairs; the safety of employees responsible for getting the equipment 
to or from a particular location; the switching operations necessary to 
effectuate the move; the railroad's recent history and current practice 
of making repairs (brake and non-brake) at a particular location; and 
relevant weather conditions. Although the distance to a repair location 
is a key factor, distance alone is not the determining factor 
concerning whether a particular location is the nearest location for 
purposes of effectuating repairs and must be considered in conjunction 
with the factors noted above. Existing case law states that neither the 
congestion of work at a particular location or convenience to the 
railroad are to be considered when conducting this analysis.
    Although FRA does not believe that railroads should be permitted to 
unilaterally designate locations where brake system repair will be 
conducted, FRA does believe that safety could be served and disputes 
avoided if a railroad in cooperation with its employees could develop a 
plan, subject to FRA's approval, which designates locations where brake 
system repairs will be effectuated. FRA believes such a plan would have 
to be consistent with the guidelines discussed above and contained in 
this final rule and that such plans would have to be approved by FRA 
prior to being implemented. Such a plan could serve safety well by 
making clear to all where repairs are to be made and by assuring in 
advance that the criteria set forth in the final rule are appropriately 
applied. Consequently, the final rule permits railroads and 
representatives of their employees to submit a joint proposal 
containing a plan which designates locations where brake system repairs 
will be conducted. The final rule makes clear that such proposals would 
have to be approved by FRA prior to being implemented.
    The final rule also retains the proposed and current requirement 
that a train have 100-percent operative brakes when departing from a 
location where an initial terminal brake test is required to be 
performed on the train. This has been a requirement in the railroad 
industry for decades, and FRA is not willing to provide an exception on 
an industry-wide basis at this time. Contrary to the assertions made by 
some commenters, FRA believes there is adequate justification for 
retaining the 100-percent requirement. In the NPRM and in the preceding 
discussion, FRA provided a number of reasons why it believes there is a 
need for the 100-percent requirement and will not reiterate them here. 
See 63 FR 48309. Some commenters suggested that FRA should permit any 
and all trains that have 95-percent operative brakes to operate from 
their points of origin to destination and that Canada currently allows 
such operation. FRA believes that such an approach would be completely 
contrary to, and would violate, the existing statutory mandate 
regarding the movement of equipment with defective brakes. The existing 
statutory provisions regarding the movement of equipment require that 
such equipment be repaired at the nearest location where the necessary 
repairs can be performed. See 49 U.S.C. 20303(a). Consequently, trains 
that originate at or that operate through locations where the necessary 
brake repairs can be effectuated clearly are required by the statute to 
have 100-percent operative brakes prior to departing those locations 
and may not haul a car with inoperative brakes under the statutory 
hauling-for-repair provision.
    Although FRA recognizes that the 100-percent requirement may be 
somewhat burdensome for some railroads at certain locations, FRA 
believes that the number of locations involved is relatively low and 
should be handled on a case-by-case basis through the existing waiver 
process. FRA agrees that many railroads have created their own problems 
by eliminating repair facilities and personnel at many of the outlying 
locations where the railroads now claim they lack the ability to make 
appropriate repairs. Furthermore, FRA believes that the best method of 
assessing the safety implications of permitting a location to operate 
trains with less than 100-percent operative brakes is for the railroad 
to provide information on how the railroad will handle the defective 
equipment based on the specific needs and operating characteristics of 
the railroad involved.
    In the NPRM, FRA provided various approaches under which it would 
potentially consider allowing a railroad to operate a train from their 
initial terminal with less than 100-percent operative brakes. See 63 FR 
48310. The methods suggested by FRA were rejected as being overly 
burdensome by several commenters noted in the preceding discussion. 
Therefore, FRA believes the burden falls on each railroad seeking 
relief from the 100-percent requirement at certain outlying locations 
to provide FRA with an operating plan that will ensure the safe 
operation of such trains and provide for the timely and certain repair 
of any defective equipment moved from those locations. Consequently, 
FRA believes that there are a few existing locations that may be 
candidates for receiving a waiver from the 100-percent requirement, and 
FRA is willing to consider waivers for such locations, however; the 
railroads applying for such waivers must be able to establish a true 
need for the exemption and must be willing to provide alternative 
operating procedures that ensure the safety of the trains being 
operated from those locations.
    The final rule also clarifies that the 100-percent operative brake 
requirement is not intended to apply to transfer trains that originate 
at location where the necessary brake repairs cannot be effectuated. 
FRA agrees that the 100-percent requirement does not currently apply to 
such trains, and it was not FRA's intention when issuing the NPRM to 
extend its application to such trains. However, it should be noted that 
if a transfer train originates at a location where repairs to the 
equipment

[[Page 4129]]

containing defective brakes can be effectuated, then the train would be 
required to have 100-percent operative brakes prior to departing that 
location.

D. Dynamic Brakes

    The issue of dynamic brakes, and the extent to which FRA should 
impose regulatory requirements governing their use, if at all, is one 
which has prompted lengthy and animated debate among all affected 
parties since the issuance of the ANPRM in December 1992. Coincident 
with the drafting of the ANPRM, the Rail Safety Enforcement and Review 
Act amended section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 
(recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20141), and mandated, in part, that FRA, 
``where applicable, prescribe regulations that establish standards on 
dynamic braking equipment.'' This specific mandate is derived largely 
from two NTSB recommendations to FRA concerning dynamic brakes 
following the Southern Pacific Transportation Company (SP) accident at 
San Bernardino, California on May 25, 1989.
    In this accident, excessive tonnage and excessive speed cresting a 
2.2-percent grade, complicated by the fact that the train crew had been 
provided erroneous information regarding available and operative 
dynamic brakes, led to a train that was out of control and was 
ultimately unable to stop before derailing. While the NTSB determined 
the primary cause of the accident to be the excessive weight of the 
train as compared to that reported to the train crew, a secondary cause 
was determined to be the fact that the engineer had far less operable 
dynamic braking available for use than expected. The combination of 
these two conditions likely led to flawed decision making by the train 
crew in developing train handling strategies for negotiating the grade 
safely. In its final report, the Safety Board issued the following 
recommendations to the FRA regarding dynamic brakes:
    1. Study, in conjunction with the AAR, the feasibility of 
developing a positive method to indicate to the operating engineer in 
the cab of the controlling locomotive unit the condition of the dynamic 
brakes on all units in the train.
    2. Revise regulations to require that if a locomotive unit is 
equipped with dynamic brakes that the dynamic brakes function. NTSB 
Recommendation R-90-24 (1990).
    To reiterate the general explanation of the principles of dynamic 
braking, as provided in the ANPRM (57 FR 62546), the 1994 NPRM (59 FR 
47676), and the 1998 NPRM (63 FR 48311), dynamic brakes were developed 
as a ``free'' by-product of the diesel-electric drive train. By 
engaging the dynamic brake, the normally powered traction motors on 
each axle are changed to generators, and the power generated is 
dissipated through resistance grids. The effect is similar to that of 
shifting an automobile to a lower gear when descending a steep grade. 
The additional hardware needed to outfit a locomotive with dynamic 
brakes includes the grids and the controls and switches.
    The primary selling point of dynamic brakes has been the ability to 
reduce freight car brake shoe wear. The dynamic brake is also useful in 
controlling train slack in lieu of using the locomotive independent 
brake. Furthermore, use of the dynamic brake in controlling train speed 
in lieu of power braking, where the train brake is applied with the 
locomotive under power, is a major factor in fuel savings. Due to these 
benefits, railroads currently emphasize and encourage the use of 
dynamic brakes as evidenced through examination of numerous carriers' 
operating rules which dictate the use of dynamic braking as the 
preferred method of slowing or controlling a train, or both, especially 
in heavy-grade territory. Historically, dynamic brakes have been 
applied to locomotives at the individual railroad's option, primarily 
based on economic considerations. It is important to note that, at 
present, the vast majority of new locomotives procured by the railroads 
are equipped with dynamic brakes.
    A wealth of information was gathered regarding the operation, 
testing, and maintenance of dynamic brakes prior to the issuance of the 
1998 NPRM. In the 1998 NPRM, FRA provided an in-depth discussion of the 
various proposals and comments related to the operation and maintenance 
of dynamic brakes as well as potential technologies for providing 
information to the locomotive engineer regarding the operational status 
of the dynamic brakes in a train consist. See 63 FR 48310-313. After 
consideration of all the information submitted and developed, FRA 
proposed a set of standards for dynamic brakes that it believed were 
consistent with the statutory mandate, took into consideration NTSB 
recommendations, promoted progressive improvements in dynamic brake 
information systems through the phased introduction of technology, 
while avoiding excessive regulation that might discourage the use of 
dynamic brakes.
    In the 1998 NPRM, FRA noted that RSAC Working Group and task force 
deliberations provided no rationale to warrant a reconsideration of 
FRA's stated position that dynamic brakes do not offer the technical 
capability to serve as a primary train braking system since: (i) They 
provide braking force only on powered locomotive axles and are 
incapable of controlling in-train forces in the same manner as the 
automatic braking system; (ii) they are effective only within a narrow 
speed range and have no capability to actually stop a train; (iii) they 
can fail without prior warning; and (iv) their failure mode is 
characterized by loss of braking force (as opposed to the automatic 
brake, which, properly employed, initiates an emergency brake 
application upon loss of system integrity and therefore is failsafe). 
Similarly, however, FRA asserted that the RSAC Working Group and task 
force deliberations reinforced FRA's belief that dynamic brakes have 
become, de facto, a second-order safety system where employed. Although 
from the point of view of logical priorities, dynamic brakes ``back 
up'' the automatic train brake system, in sequence of operational 
procedures the priority is reversed. Stated differently, either the 
proper functioning of these systems, or the provision of reliable 
information concerning degraded functioning of these systems, should 
prevent locomotive engineers from operating trains in a manner that 
might make recovery through use of the automatic brake impossible.
    In considering all of the information available, FRA concluded that 
it was imperative for the locomotive engineer to be informed in writing 
as to the operational status of the dynamic brakes on all locomotives 
in the consist at the initial terminal or point of origin for a train 
or at other locations where a locomotive engineer first takes charge of 
a train. Therefore, FRA proposed that locomotive engineers be provided 
this information at these locations. This proposed provision directly 
addressed the foremost concern articulated by the NTSB following the 
San Bernardino accident. FRA also proposed provisions requiring visible 
identification of locomotive units with inoperative dynamic brakes. FRA 
also agreed that when locomotives are equipped with dynamic brakes, 
they should be in proper operating condition and be maintained on a 
regular basis. Therefore, FRA proposed that defective dynamic brakes be 
repaired within 30 days of being found defective or at the locomotive's 
next periodic inspection. FRA recognized that these maintenance 
requirements might be overly burdensome in some instances for railroads 
(primarily short lines) that do not utilize dynamic brakes in their

[[Page 4130]]

respective operations, but yet own and operate locomotives equipped 
with dynamic brakes. Consequently, FRA proposed provisions for 
deactivating a locomotive's dynamic brakes without physically removing 
the components.
    In addition to the information and maintenance requirements, FRA 
also proposed the development of operating rules and training programs 
to ensure the proper and safe use of dynamic brakes. For example, FRA 
proposed that railroads operating trains with brake systems that 
include dynamic brakes, develop and implement written operating rules 
governing safe train handling procedures for using these dynamic brakes 
under all operating conditions that are tailored to the specific 
equipment and territory of the railroad. The NPRM also proposed that 
the railroads provide training to their locomotive engineers on the 
prescribed operating rules, that at a minimum includes classroom, 
hands-on, and annual refresher training. More importantly, FRA also 
proposed a requirement that a railroad's operating rules be based on 
the ability of friction brakes alone to safely stop the train under all 
operating conditions. FRA believed that the establishment of these 
comprehensive operating rules and training plans was the most effective 
means by which to minimize the possibility of future incidents caused 
by excessive reliance on dynamic brakes by a train crew.
    In the ANPRM (57 FR 62555), the 1994 NPRM (59 FR 47687), and the 
1998 NPRM (63 FR 48314), FRA requested comments from the industry on 
possible methods of providing information regarding the status of 
dynamic brakes to the engineer in the cab of the controlling 
locomotive. The 1998 NPRM also contained a detailed discussion of 
various technologies available for providing information on the status 
of the dynamic brakes to the locomotive engineer. See 63 FR 48312-13. 
Although FRA recognized that the technology for dynamic brake displays 
with the ability to provide the type of information sought by FRA in 
the 1994 NPRM was not readily available at the time the 1998 NPRM was 
issued, several commenters suggested that the technology was under 
development. Consequently, FRA was not ready or willing to require the 
use of such indicators at that time. However, FRA noted that the 
benefit of such an indicator would be to alert engineers that they have 
diminished or excessive dynamic braking capabilities, thus permitting 
the engineers to control the braking of their trains in the safest 
possible manner. FRA indicated that it would continue to monitor the 
development of the technology and consider its application to 
locomotives used in the industry.
    The AAR and its members, the NTSB, the CAPUC, and several 
representatives of rail labor provided numerous comments on the 
provisions related to dynamic brakes proposed in the 1998 NPRM. The AAR 
contends that the proposed requirement to provide written notification 
of the operational status of the dynamic brakes is overly burdensome. 
They recommend that the information be permitted to be transmitted in 
any manner, provided a record of the notification is maintained in the 
cab of the controlling locomotive. They also suggest that the 
notification only be required on an exception basis, when the dynamic 
brakes are inoperative. Conversely, representatives of rail labor 
contend that no locomotive with inoperative dynamic brakes should be 
permitted to be dispatched from a location with mechanical facilities 
capable of making the repairs. They further contend that if the 
locomotive's dynamic brakes cannot be repaired at the train's point of 
origin it should be allowed to be operated only as a trailing unit. 
These commenters support the requirement that the locomotive engineer 
be informed in writing as to the operational status of the dynamic 
brakes on all units in the consist and recommend that the lead 
locomotive of the consist be tagged to notify the engineer of the 
presence of a defective unit.
    The AAR also objects to the proposed requirement that defective 
dynamic brakes be repaired within 30 days of being found defective. It 
claims that due to the reliability of dynamic brake systems they should 
be permitted to operate until the next periodic inspection. AAR asserts 
that a shorter repair cycle will reduce motive power availability and 
may result in shortages of motive power on some railroads. AAR also 
requests clarification of the term ``ineffective'' dynamic brake. The 
organization recommends that the term be eliminated, that the term 
``inoperative'' dynamic brake be retained, and that a dynamic brake be 
considered ``inoperative'' when it is no longer capable of providing 
its designed retarding force on the train, similar to the proposed 
definition of ``effective'' brake.
    Representatives of rail labor contend that locomotives with 
defective dynamic brakes should be required to be repaired within 15 
days of being discovered. They contend that this is a more than 
sufficient time period for railroads to arrange for alternative power 
and get the locomotive to a location where it can be repaired. These 
commenters also recommend that a record of the repairs made to a 
locomotives dynamic brakes be retained for a period of one year rather 
than the 92 days proposed in the NPRM. These commenters also recommend 
that provisions be added to ensure that all dynamic brakes operate as 
intended and that the equipment not be altered or cut back in any 
manner.
    The AAR also seeks clarification of the proposed training 
requirements contending that they should not be included in this rule 
unless FRA is willing to specify the knowledge, skills, and ability 
criteria needed pursuant to part 240. They also contend that the 
proposed requirement regarding the development of operating rules is 
unclear and should be eliminated if not clarified. The BLE asserted 
that the problem is not in the training of engineers on the use of 
dynamic brakes but in the prohibition on the use of the automatic brake 
in normal train operation, not just when the dynamic brakes fail. They 
assert that locomotive engineers should be permitted to use the 
automatic brake to control the train on a periodic basis to become 
familiar with its operation.
    The AAR also objects to the requirement to stencil locomotives 
operating with deactivated dynamic brakes. The AAR asserts that 
defacing such locomotives is unnecessary and that a less intrusive 
means of identification should be used. The organization recommends 
that a locomotive with a deactivated dynamic brake should be treated no 
differently than a locomotive with an inoperative dynamic brake, in 
that the locomotive engineer should be notified of its presence. The 
AAR also recommends that railroads be permitted to use existing tags to 
identify locomotives with inoperative dynamic brakes.
    The AAR and several locomotive manufacturers provided comments on 
the availability and use of dynamic brake indicators. These commenters 
make clear that there is currently no easy method of providing the 
available dynamic brake retarding force to the locomotive engineer. 
They also contend that the technology does not exist to show dynamic 
brake performance on distributed power units and that they should, 
therefore, be excluded from any indicator requirements. These 
commenters indicated that technology is not available to have most 
existing locomotives retrofitted with an indicator of some sort. They 
also assert that it is impossible to develop a device that will tell an 
engineer whether the dynamic

[[Page 4131]]

brakes will operate prior to the engineer actually applying the brakes 
due to the unknown risk of failure. The AAR also recommends that if FRA 
adopts an indicator requirement then the proposed requirements related 
to the notification of the locomotive engineer of dynamic brake status 
and for repairing inoperative dynamic brakes should not be adopted 
since real-time information will be available to the locomotive 
engineer.
    Numerous labor representatives, the NTSB, and the CAPUC contend 
that the technology does exist, at least for new locomotives, to 
provide locomotive engineers with real-time indicators of the operating 
status of the dynamic brakes on trailing units. These commenters 
believe that the information these indicators provide to an engineer is 
extremely important and would allow engineers to control and operate 
their trains in the safest manner possible. All of these commenters 
appear to support a requirement to require these indicators in new 
locomotives, and some recommend some sort of retrofit requirement for 
existing equipment.
    Several parties responded to FRA's request regarding technical 
reasons for prohibiting a locomotive with inoperative dynamic brakes 
from functioning as the lead or controlling locomotive in a locomotive 
consist. The AAR responded that it found no technical reason to 
prohibit such use, provided the locomotive has the ability to control 
the dynamic brakes on trailing locomotives. The AAR contends that 
railroads currently operate in this manner and will use a non-equipped 
locomotive when the other locomotives in the consist are cabless. 
Several labor representatives asserted that a locomotive with 
inoperative dynamic brakes should not be permitted to operate as the 
controlling locomotive regardless of whether it can operate the dynamic 
brakes on trailing units. These commenters contend that the engineer is 
better able to feel the dynamic brakes operate if the controlling unit 
has operative dynamic brakes and that the engineer will at least know 
whether that unit has operable dynamic brakes. The CAPUC cites similar 
human factor reasons for contending that a locomotive with inoperative 
dynamic brakes should not be used as a controlling unit. Several labor 
representatives also contended that if a defective locomotive were in 
the controlling position, then the speed of the train should be limited 
to 30 mph and the train should not be permitted to operate over grades 
of one percent or greater until a locomotive with operative dynamic 
brakes is placed in the lead position.
    The NTSB and the CAPUC recommend that FRA include a ``mile-per-
hour-overspeed-stop'' rule into the final rule to ensure that the speed 
of a train does not exceed its braking capacity. Such a rule would 
require a train that exceeds an established speed limit by a specified 
amount to be placed in emergency. The NTSB recommends that the 
overspeed limit be 5 mph or less over the designated speed limit. The 
CAPUC claims that California uses a 5 mph rule but that the limit may 
vary for different operations and should be established through 
validated simulations that include brake fade and field tests and must 
be related to a safe base speed. Both commenters contend that although 
the overspeed rule is simple, it accomplishes a critical safety 
function and reduces the chances of a runaway occurring as it removes 
any discretion from the operator. The CAPUC also recommends that 
railroads be required to validate their operating rules to ensure that 
friction brakes alone are sufficient to stop a train on all grades 
operated by the railroad. The CAPUC recommends that this be 
accomplished through validated simulations and field test that take 
into account brake heat-fade.
    FRA Conclusions. The intent of the proposed requirement to notify 
the locomotive engineer in writing as to the operational status of the 
dynamic brakes on the locomotives in a train's consist was to ensure 
that the engineer had timely information on the condition of the 
locomotives so he could operate the train in the safest possible manner 
based upon that information. Thus, the manner in which the information 
is provided to the engineer is not a major concern to FRA, provided the 
information is accurate and up-to-date. Therefore, the final rule will 
allow railroads to provide locomotive engineers with the required 
information by any means they deem appropriate. However, the final rule 
will require that a written or electronic record of the information 
provided be maintained in the cab of the controlling locomotive. This 
will ensure that on-coming engineers will have the information provided 
to the previous operator of the train. The final rule also clarifies 
that the information is to be provided to the locomotive engineer at 
the train's initial terminal and at other locations where an engineer 
``first begins operation'' of the train rather than where the engineer 
``takes charge of the train.'' This clarification is in response to 
certain labor commenters to prevent possible misinterpretation or abuse 
of the requirement.
    The final rule retains the proposed requirement to repair 
locomotives with inoperative dynamic brakes within 30 days of being 
found inoperative or at the locomotive's next periodic inspection, 
whichever occurs first. Due to the industry's reliance on these braking 
systems, as noted in the discussion above, FRA continues to believe 
they should be repaired as soon as possible after being found 
inoperative. FRA believes that a period of 30 days provides the 
railroads with sufficient time to get a locomotive to a location where 
the dynamic brakes can be repaired and allows for the reallocation of 
motive power when necessary so as to cause minimal disruption to a 
railroad's operation. FRA is not willing decrease the time period 
allowed to make repairs, as recommended by some commenters, because 
such a reduction could jeopardize a railroad's access to available 
motive power and could cause delay in the movement of freight which may 
create safety hazards themselves.
    The final rule also eliminates the use of the term ``ineffective'' 
dynamic brakes and uses the term ``inoperative'' dynamic brake to 
include any dynamic brake that no longer provides its designed 
retarding force on the train, for whatever reason. FRA agrees that the 
use of only this term clarifies the applicability of the requirements 
related to dynamic brakes and prevents potential misunderstandings. The 
final rule also retains the proposed requirements related to the 
tagging of a locomotive found with inoperative dynamic brakes. Contrary 
to the comments of some parties, FRA does not believe that the tagging 
provisions require the development of new tags. The rule would allow 
the use of any type of tag, provided it is placed in a conspicuous 
location and contains the required information. The final rule also 
eliminates the requirement to stencil the outside of a locomotive 
declared to have deactivated dynamic brakes. FRA agrees that defacing 
the exterior of the locomotive is unnecessary and would do little to 
inform the locomotive engineer of the presence of the locomotive. FRA 
believes that the requirements to notify the locomotive engineer of the 
operational status of the locomotives and to have the cab of the 
locomotive clearly marked that the locomotive's dynamic brakes are 
deactivated provide sufficient notice to the locomotive engineer as to 
the status of that locomotive.
    The final rule contains a requirement that an electronic or written 
record of repairs made to a locomotive's dynamic brakes be maintained 
and retained for a period of 92 days. Although this

[[Page 4132]]

requirement was not proposed in the NPRM, FRA believes these records 
fall within the scope of the notice and are necessary to ensure that 
necessary repairs are conducted on a locomotive's dynamic brakes in a 
timely fashion. FRA also believes that such a record will provide a 
railroad with information regarding the operation of the dynamic brakes 
and will potentially permit railroads to identify a repeated problem 
with a locomotive's dynamic brakes to prevent future reoccurrences and, 
thus, increase the utilization of a locomotive's dynamic brakes.
    The final rule also contains specific requirements related to the 
use of a locomotive with inoperative or deactivated dynamic brakes as a 
controlling locomotive. These requirements are based on FRA's review of 
the comments submitted in response to FRA's request regarding the 
positioning of such a locomotive made in the NPRM. See 63 FR 48314. FRA 
tends to agree that there are no technical reasons why a locomotive 
with inoperative dynamic brakes cannot function as the controlling 
locomotive provided it can control the dynamic brakes on trailing units 
in the locomotive consist. However, FRA also agrees that a locomotive 
engineer loses the physical sensation of the operation of the dynamic 
brakes when the unit where the engineer is riding loses dynamic brake 
capability, which, if present, provides the engineer with at least some 
assurance that the dynamic brakes on some of the units in the consist 
are operating. Thus, in addition to requiring that locomotives with 
inoperative or deactivated dynamic brakes have the capability of 
controlling the dynamic brakes on trailing units when operating as the 
controlling locomotive, the final rule also requires that such 
locomotives also have the capability of displaying to the locomotive 
engineer the deceleration rate of the train or the total train dynamic 
brake retarding force. This requirement will ensure that locomotive 
engineers have at least some information as to the operation of the 
dynamic brakes in the locomotive consist they are controlling. FRA 
intends that the information required by this provision be provided 
either by a device known as an ``accelerometer'' or a similar device or 
by a dynamic brake indicator capable of providing total train dynamic 
brake retarding force to the locomotive engineer.
    The final rule also contains provisions requiring new and rebuilt 
locomotives to be equipped with some sort of dynamic brake indicator. 
Although FRA agrees that the technology does not currently exist to 
equip existing locomotives with dynamic brake indicators economically, 
FRA does believe that the technology exists or is sufficiently 
developed to provide new locomotives with the ability to test the 
electrical integrity of the dynamic brakes at rest and to display the 
total train dynamic brake retarding force at various speed increments 
in the cab of the controlling locomotive. FRA recognizes that the 
industry will require a little time to incorporate the existing 
technology into new locomotives. Therefore, the requirements related to 
dynamic brake indicators will only apply to locomotives ordered one and 
one-half years after the issuance of this final rule and to locomotives 
placed in service for the first time three years after the effective 
date of the final rule. FRA also recognizes that not all locomotives 
being rebuilt are designed, or have the capability of being redesigned, 
to have the capability to display the total train dynamic brake 
retarding force in the cab of the controlling locomotive. Thus, the 
final rule allows rebuilt locomotives to be designed to display the 
train deceleration rate (i.e., equipped with an accelerometer or 
similar device as discussed above) in lieu of being equipped with the 
dynamic brake indicator required on new locomotives. FRA believes that 
the information provided by these indicators is extremely useful to an 
engineer and will provide locomotive engineers with ready access to 
real-time information on the operation of the dynamic brakes in a 
locomotive consist and permit engineers to control and operate trains 
in the safest manner possible.
    FRA also acknowledges that the information provided by dynamic 
brake indicators would eliminate the need to provide the locomotive 
engineers with information regarding the operational status of the 
dynamic brakes when the engineer first begins operation of a train. As 
the indicators would provide real-time information to the engineer on 
the operation of the dynamic brakes brake in the train consist, the 
information received by the engine when beginning operation would be 
unnecessary. Therefore, the final rule alleviates the need to inform 
locomotive engineers of the status of the dynamic brakes when all of 
the locomotives in the lead consist are equipped with dynamic brake 
indicators required for new locomotives. FRA believes that this 
allowance makes sense from a practical perspective but also provides 
some incentive for railroads to equip existing equipment with such 
indicators when the technology for doing so becomes economically 
feasible. It should be noted that there is no requirement that the 
dynamic brake status of distributed power units be provided in order to 
eliminate the need to provide dynamic brake information to the 
engineer. FRA agrees that the technology for transmitting that 
information to the engineer is not currently available in a cost 
effective and reliable manner.
    The final rule retains the proposed provisions requiring railroads 
to develop and implement written operating rules governing the use of 
dynamic brakes and to incorporate training on those operating rules 
into the locomotive engineer certification program pursuant to 49 CFR 
part 240. Contrary to the assertions of some commenters, FRA does not 
believe these requirements are unclear. FRA intends for each railroad 
to develop appropriate operating rules regarding train handling 
procedures when utilizing dynamic brakes that cover the equipment and 
territory operated by the railroad. Many railroads already have these 
procedures in place and already provide training to their employees 
that adequately cover the requirements. FRA continues to believe that 
training on proper train handling procedures is essential to ensuring 
that locomotive engineers can properly handle their trains with or 
without dynamic brakes and in the event that these brake systems fail 
while the train is being operated. FRA also disagrees that the agency 
should specify the knowledge, skill, and ability criteria that a 
railroad must incorporate in its training program. FRA believes that 
each railroad is in the best position to determine what these criteria 
should be, given the railroad's equipment, physical characteristics and 
operating rules, and what training is necessary to provide that 
knowledge, skill, and ability to its employees.
    The final rule also requires that the operating rules developed by 
railroads include a ``miles-per-hour-overspeed-stop'' requirement that 
requires a train to be immediately stopped if it exceeds the maximum 
authorized speed by more than 5 mph when descending a grade of one 
percent or greater. FRA agrees with both the NTSB and the CAPUC that 
this requirement accomplishes a critical safety function and reduces 
the potential for a runaway train as it establishes a clear rule for 
stopping a train and removes any discretion from the operator to 
continue operation of a train. FRA believes that the five-mph 
limitation is a good base limitation that should be reduced if so 
indicated by validated research and should be increased only with FRA 
approval. Moreover, the operating rules of most

[[Page 4133]]

Class I railroads already include a five-mph-overspeed-stop provision; 
thus, FRA's inclusion of the requirement in this final rule should 
impose little or no burden on the operations of most railroads.

E. Training and Qualifications of Personnel

    Currently, the regulations contain no specific training 
requirements or standards for personnel who conduct brake system 
inspections. The regulations merely require that a ``qualified person'' 
perform certain inspections or tasks. See 49 CFR 232.12(a). 
Furthermore, the current regulations do not require that a railroad 
maintain any type of records or information regarding the training or 
instruction it provides to its employees to ensure that they are 
capable of performing the brake inspections or tests for which they are 
assigned responsibility. In several cases, FRA has found that a 
railroad's list of ``qualified persons'' is merely a roster of all of 
its operating and mechanical forces.
    In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed a series of broad qualification 
standards addressing various types of personnel engaged in the 
inspection, testing, and maintenance of brake equipment. See 59 FR 
47731-47732. These broad qualifications were separated into distinct 
subgroups that identified various types of personnel based on the type 
of work those individuals would be required to perform under the 
proposal. These included supervisors, train crew members, mechanical 
inspectors, and electronic inspectors. Although not proposed in the 
rule text of the 1994 NPRM, the preamble contained various guidelines 
regarding specific hours of classroom and ``hands-on'' training as well 
as guidelines regard the level of experience each of these types of 
employees would be required to possess or be provided. See 59 FR 47702-
47703. The proposal also contained various requirements regarding the 
development and retention of records and information used by a railroad 
in determining the qualifications of such employees. See 59 FR 47732.
    In the 1998 NPRM, FRA acknowledged that many railroads continue to 
improve the training they provide to individuals charged with 
performing brake system inspections, tests, and maintenance; however, 
FRA also acknowledged that it continued to believe that this training 
could be greatly improved and enhanced. The agency noted that although 
there had been a decline in the number of train incidents, derailments, 
fatalities, and injuries over the previous ten years, FRA believed that 
the number of these incidents could be further reduced if maintenance, 
inspections, and tests of the brake system were performed by 
individuals who have received proper training specifically targeting 
the activities for which the individual is assigned responsibility. FRA 
believed that one of the major factors in ensuring the quality of brake 
inspections and the proper operation of that equipment is the adequate 
training of those persons responsible for inspecting and maintaining 
that equipment.
    In the 1998 NPRM, FRA proposed broad performance-based training and 
qualification requirements that would permit a railroad to develop 
programs specifically tailored to the type of equipment it operates and 
the employees designated by the railroad to perform the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance duties required in this proposal. FRA agreed 
that there is no reason for an individual who solely performs pre-
departure air brake tests and inspections to be as highly trained as a 
carman since a carman performs many other duties which involve the 
maintenance and repair of equipment in addition to brake inspections. 
Therefore, FRA proposed training and qualification requirements which 
permit a railroad to tailor its training programs to ensure the 
capability of its employees to perform the tasks to which they are 
assigned. FRA also made clear that the proposed training and 
qualification requirements applied not only to railroad personnel but 
also to the personnel of railroad contractors and personnel in plants 
that build cars and locomotives that are responsible for brake system 
inspections, maintenance, or tests covered by this part.
    Contrary to the 1994 NPRM, FRA did not issue specific guidelines on 
experience, classroom training, or ``hands-on'' training. FRA agreed 
that many of the guidelines contained in the preamble to that proposal 
were overly restrictive and might have impeded the implementation of 
certain training protocols capable of achieving similar results with 
less emphasis on solely the time spent in the training process. 
Furthermore, the 1994 proposed guidelines failed to consider the 
potentially narrow scope of training that might be required for some 
employees, particularly some train crew personnel, that perform very 
limited inspection functions on very limited types of equipment. 
Consequently, although the training and qualification requirements 
proposed in the 1998 NPRM continued to require that any training 
provided include classroom and ``hands-on'' training as well as verbal 
or written examinations and ``hands-on'' proficiency, they did not 
mandate a specific number of hours that the training must encompass as 
FRA realized that the time period should vary depending on the employee 
or employees involved. The 1998 proposal also contained provisions for 
conducting periodic refresher training and supervisor oversight of an 
employee's performance once training is provided.
    FRA believed that the recordkeeping and notification requirements 
contained in the 1998 proposal were the cornerstone of the training and 
qualification provisions. As FRA was not proposing specific training 
curricula or specific experience thresholds, FRA believed that the 
recordkeeping provisions were vital to ensuring that proper training 
was being provided to railroad personnel. FRA intended the record 
keeping requirements to provide the means by which FRA would judge the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of a railroad's training and 
qualification program. The proposed recordkeeping provisions also 
provided FRA with the ability to independently assess whether the 
training provided to a specific individual adequately addresses the 
tasks that the individual is deemed capable of performing. Finally the 
proposed training mandates seemed most likely to prevent railroads from 
using insufficiently trained individuals to perform the necessary 
inspections, tests, and maintenance required by the proposal.
    In the 1998 NPRM, FRA proposed to require that railroads maintain 
specific personnel qualification records for all personnel (including 
their contractors' personnel) responsible for the inspection, testing, 
and maintenance of train brake systems. FRA proposed that the records 
contain detailed information regarding the training provided as well as 
detailed information on the types of equipment the individual is 
qualified to inspect, test, or maintain and the duties the individual 
is qualified to perform. As an additional means of ensuring that only 
properly qualified individuals are performing only those tasks for 
which they are qualified, FRA proposed that railroads be required to 
promptly notify personnel of changes in their qualification status and 
specifically identify the date that the employee's qualification ends 
unless refresher training is provided.
    FRA recognized that some railroads would be forced to place a 
greater emphasis on training and qualifications than they had in the 
past, and as a result would incur additional costs. However, FRA 
believed that the proposed rule

[[Page 4134]]

allowed railroads the flexibility to provide only the training that an 
employee needs in order to perform a specific job. The 1998 proposed 
rule did not require an employee who performs only brake inspections 
while the train is en route (i.e., Class II brake tests) to receive the 
intensive training needed for an employee who performs Class I brake 
tests or one who is charged with the maintenance or repair of the 
equipment. The training might be tailored to the specific needs of the 
railroad. Across the industry as a whole, the 1998 proposal would not 
have required extensive changes in the way most railroads currently 
operate, but it would have required some railroads to invest more time 
in the training of their personnel.
    FRA recognized that the costs of the proposed training requirements 
were fairly substantial; however, FRA believed that most Class I 
railroads had already invested in training, routinely scheduled 
training for their employees, and offered training to other interested 
parties. On the other hand, FRA noted that most railroads did not 
engage in the ``hands-on'' training and testing contained in the 
proposal nor did most railroads maintain the records required in the 
proposal. FRA noted that many Class I railroads have participated in 
initiatives under the Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP) 
with FRA and labor and that many of the proposed training requirements 
would already be met by those railroads that have completed the 
training required under the SACP.
    In the 1998 NPRM, FRA recognized that the proposed training 
requirements would likely cause some impact to smaller railroads but 
believed that the impact of the requirements on these smaller 
operations would be somewhat reduced due to the training already 
provided by the railroads and due to the nature of the operations 
themselves. FRA noted that many smaller railroads, particularly Class 
II railroads, send their employees to other railroads for training, 
participate in ASLRA and FRA training, and have some form of on-the job 
training. Furthermore, Class III railroad employees are not likely to 
require extensive training on different types of brake equipment since 
most of the equipment used by Class III railroads have only one type of 
brake valve. Furthermore, the employees of these small railroads would 
likely not be required to receive any training in the areas of EPIC 
brakes, dynamic brakes, two-way EOT devices, or on some of the brake 
tests and maintenance mandated in the proposal due to the limited 
distances traveled by these trains, the low tonnages hauled, and 
because many of the maintenance functions are contracted out to larger 
railroads.
    The AAR and its members, the ASLRA, and various private car owners 
submitted numerous comments regarding the proposed training 
requirements. Generally, these commenters believe that the significant 
costs being imposed by the proposed training requirements are not 
justified based on the industry's safety record over the last two 
decades. They contend that the industry's safety record is evidence 
that the current training provided by the railroads is sufficient. At a 
minimum, these commenters recommend that railroads be provided three 
years to implement any training requirements imposed. Such an approach 
would be consistent with the proposed three-year refresher training 
requirements and would prevent manpower shortages and ease the 
financial impact.
    Several railroad representatives recommend that railroads not be 
responsible for the training of the contract personnel they employ as 
was proposed. They contend that railroads do not maintain records of 
the training or experience of these individuals and that the contractor 
should bear the burden of training its own employees. These commenters 
admit that railroads would work with contractors to help them train 
their employees but that the contractor should be held responsible for 
providing the necessary training. They assert that the contractor is in 
the best position to determine the training needs of its employees and 
that the proposed approach potentially intrudes and alters the 
employment relationship of contractors and railroads.
    Representatives of various railroads also object to some of the 
administrative burdens imposed by the proposed training requirements. 
They contend that the requirement to identify all tasks related to the 
inspection, testing, and maintenance of brake systems and develop 
procedures for performing each task, is overly burdensome and 
unnecessary. They also object to the proposed requirement that the 
railroad's Chief Mechanical or Chief Operating Officer sign a statement 
for each employee attesting that the employee meets the minimum 
requirements. They contend that the requirement would inhibit the use 
of electronic records and that there is no benefit obtained by 
requiring such a signature. These commenters further object to the 
requirement that railroads implement formal internal audit programs, 
contending that these programs would waste scarce resources and that 
the effectiveness of a training program can be assessed through 
efficiency tests, supervisory spot checks, and other less burdensome 
methods.
    The AAR also objects to the potential requirement that all existing 
employees be completely retrained. The AAR recommends that existing 
employees not be required to receive any new training because it is 
unnecessary and there has been no showing that current training is 
inadequate. They also suggest that there is no need for refresher 
training of these employees unless a new brake system is introduced. At 
a minimum, they recommend that the ``hands-on'' refresher training be 
eliminated as virtually every railroad conducts periodic efficiency 
testing or audits of its employees to ensure ``hands-on'' proficiency 
of personnel. They also contend that refresher training should only be 
required for those employees that repeatedly demonstrate a failure to 
properly perform their required duties.
    Several railroad representatives also object to the proposed 
requirement that employees receive training and testing on each task 
they will be required to perform and that they be trained and tested on 
each type of equipment operated by the railroad. These commenters 
contend that these proposed requirements would be cost-prohibitive and 
time-consuming. They claim that it is impossible for a railroad to have 
every type of vehicle it operates available to train all of its 
employees. They recommend that the training be limited to the different 
brake systems operated by the railroad and that the training be 
required to impart the necessary skills and abilities to perform the 
required tasks.
    The AAR and the ASLRA also object to the proposed record keeping 
provisions, claiming they are overly detailed and unnecessary. These 
commenters recommend that the record keeping burdens be reduced and 
that FRA should only require a list of qualified employees, the 
training courses completed by an employee, and the date that training 
was completed. They contend that each railroad is in the best position 
to determine the level of detail that their records should contain and 
that the level of detail proposed by FRA will have a significant cost 
burden on railroads.
    Representatives of rail labor reiterate that the need for any 
training provisions could be greatly reduced if FRA would simply 
require many of the proposed inspections and tests to be conducted by 
qualified carmen. At a minimum, these commenters contend that any 
training provisions must include a requirement

[[Page 4135]]

for FRA approval. They assert that any training program developed by a 
railroad should be approved by FRA. Several labor representatives also 
contend that the proposed training requirements fail to adequately 
address supervisors charged with oversight and training instructors. 
They believe that specific qualifications of both supervisors and 
instructors should be included in any final rule developed. They 
further contend that the proposed requirements do not include a dispute 
resolution procedure which they believe is necessary to avoid potential 
abuses by railroads when designating qualified employees. Certain labor 
representatives recommend that the proposed language regarding the 
training on new equipment needs to be clarified to ensure that the 
training is provided before the new equipment is placed in service.
    FRA Conclusions. FRA recognizes that there has been a significant 
decline in the number of brake-related derailments and other train 
accidents and incidents, and resulting property damage, fatalities, and 
injuries over the last ten years; however, FRA continues to believe 
these numbers can be even further reduced if the inspections and tests 
of brake systems are performed by individuals who have received 
training that specifically targets the activities which the individual 
is assigned responsibility to perform. FRA's experience in enforcing 
the existing power brake regulations supports the conclusion that the 
better trained a person is on how to perform a brake inspection the 
better that person can perform the inspection when required to do so. 
Many FRA field inspectors have discovered equipment with brake 
conditions having the potential of causing a derailment or accident 
that are not identified by railroad personnel because those persons 
responsible for finding the conditions are not sufficiently trained or 
equipped to conduct the inspections they are required to perform. FRA's 
field forces consistently find that the most comprehensive brake 
inspections are performed by those individuals who have received 
detailed training specifically related to the inspection being 
performed and who conduct such inspections on a consistent basis. Based 
on this experience, FRA believes that the training required in this 
final rule will enhance the quality of brake inspections, which will 
increase the discovery of brake conditions that have the potential of 
causing a derailment or other accident. Because an increased number of 
brake conditions having the potential of causing a derailment or other 
accident will be discovered prior to being used in a train, FRA expects 
that the training required by this rule will reduce the number of 
incidents caused by brake-related problems.
    Furthermore, as discussed in the 1998 NPRM, railroads continue to 
consolidate mechanical work to fewer and fewer locations on their 
systems. This trend places an increasing premium on the ability of 
mechanical and operating forces to conduct meaningful inspections and 
tests of the power brake system. Increases in train speeds and 
increased pressure on operating personnel due to growing traffic 
density will continue to make it critical for operating and mechanical 
forces to discharge their duties with respect to the power brake system 
both diligently and effectively even under the most optimistic of 
scenarios. Technological change presents an additional reason for 
placing a strong emphasis on the training and qualifications of 
inspection personnel. Both operating and mechanical personnel are 
confronted with an increasing variety of power brake arrangements and 
features. Consequently, these trends and changes make the training 
required in this final rule a necessity in order to ensure and enhance 
the quality of brake inspections.
    In addition to the safety benefits, both quantified and non-
quantified, there are certain operational benefits derived from the 
training required by this final rule. This final rule allows an 
increase in the distance some trains may travel between brake 
inspections. These increases are premised on the condition that all of 
the inspection functions performed on these trains are conducted by 
highly trained and qualified personnel. The latitude provided to these 
trains will result in fewer inspections per miles traveled and will 
reduce the number of opportunities that exist for a serious defect to 
be found before it could result in a train incident. It is imperative, 
therefore, that each inspection performed on these trains be of 
uniformly high quality. FRA believes that the training required by this 
final rule is a key factor for ensuring such high quality inspections. 
FRA also believes that certain non-quantifiable operational benefits 
will be derived from the training required by this final rule, 
particularly in the areas of equipment utilization, reduced train 
delays, and repair costs.
    FRA agrees that railroads have made significant improvements in the 
quality of training provided to their employees but believes that this 
training can be further improved. Furthermore, FRA believes that a 
number of railroads participating in the SACP process have already 
developed, or are in the process of developing, comprehensive training 
programs that meet many of the requirements proposed in the NPRM. 
Therefore, the final rule retains the basic structure and concepts that 
were proposed in the NPRM regarding the training of individuals 
responsible for conducting the inspections and tests required by the 
final rule. The proposed training requirements have been slightly 
revised in this final rule in order to clarify FRA's intent, to 
recognize existing training, and to reduce any unnecessary burden that 
may have been inadvertently created by the proposed requirements.
    The final rule modifies the proposed provision that required a 
railroad to provide training to the personnel of a contractor to the 
railroad whom the railroad uses to perform the various tasks required 
by the rule. The final rule makes clear that the contractor is 
responsible for providing appropriate training to its employees. FRA 
agrees that railroads should not bear the burden of training the 
employees of a contractor. However, FRA notes that this change does not 
relieve the railroad from potential civil penalties for, e.g., failure 
to perform a proper Class I brake test, if the employees of a 
contractor were found not to be qualified to perform the task for which 
they are assigned responsibility. As a contractor's employees are 
acting as an agent for the railroad when performing a task required by 
this regulation, both the railroad and the contractor would remain 
liable for potential civil penalties if the employees used to perform a 
particular task were not trained and qualified in accordance with the 
training requirements contained in this final rule.
    The final rule retains the proposed requirement that railroads and 
contractors identify the tasks related to the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance of the brake system required to be performed by the 
railroad or contractor and identify the skills and knowledge necessary 
to perform each task. FRA believes that it is essential to developing a 
comprehensive training program for a railroad or contractor to go 
through the process of identifying the tasks they will be required to 
perform and determining the skills and knowledge that must be provided 
to perform those tasks. FRA believes that most railroads have already 
engaged in this activity and would merely need to revise existing data 
with changes made to existing requirements by this final rule. The 
final rule eliminates the requirement to

[[Page 4136]]

develop written procedures for performing each task identified. 
Although FRA believes that each railroad or contractor should and will 
develop such procedures, FRA does not believe it is necessary to 
require their development as FRA believes they will either be developed 
in the required training curricula or are sufficiently detailed in the 
regulation itself.
    The final rule also clarifies that the required training is 
intended to provide employees with the skills and knowledge necessary 
to perform the tasks required by this final rule. FRA does not believe 
it is necessary to train an employee on every different type of 
equipment that a railroad operates or on each and every task an 
employee will be required to perform. FRA's intent when issuing the 
NPRM was to ensure that the training received by an employee provided 
that individual with the knowledge and skills needed to perform the 
tasks he or she was assigned on the various types of equipment the 
railroad operated. Therefore, the final rule clarifies this intent by 
specifically stating that the training curriculum, the examinations, 
and the ``hands-on'' capability should address the skills and knowledge 
needed to perform the various required tasks rather than focusing 
strictly on the tasks themselves or on the specific types of equipment 
operated by the railroad. The final rule also clarifies that the 
training that an employee is required to receive need only address the 
specific skills and knowledge related to the tasks that the person will 
be required to perform under this part. Thus, a railroad or contractor 
may tailor its training programs to the needs of each of its employees 
based on the tasks that each of its employee will be required to 
perform. FRA tends to agree with several commenters that there is no 
reason for an individual who performs strictly brake inspections and 
tests to be as highly trained as a carman since carmen perform many 
other duties related to the maintenance and repair of equipment in 
addition to brake inspections.
    The final rule also clarifies that previous training and testing 
received by an employee may be considered by the railroad. FRA did not 
intend to require the complete retraining of every employee performing 
a task required in this final rule. When proposing the training 
requirements, FRA intended for railroads to incorporate existing 
training regimens and curricula into the proposed training programs. 
Therefore, in order to clarify this intent, the final rule contains a 
specific provision which permits railroads to consider previous 
training and testing received by an employee when determining whether 
an employee is qualified to perform a particular task. However, the 
final rule also makes clear that any previous training or testing 
considered by a railroad or contractor must be documented as required 
in the final rule. Thus, previous training or testing which has not 
been properly documented cannot be considered. The final rule also 
makes clear that employees must be trained on the specific regulatory 
requirements contained in this final rule related to the tasks that the 
employee will be required to perform. Therefore, all employees 
performing tasks covered by this part will require at least some 
training which covers the specific requirements detailed in this final 
rule.
    The final rule retains the proposed requirement regarding the 
performance of periodic refresher training and testing. The final rule 
retains the requirement that refresher training be provided at least 
once every three years and that it include both classroom and 
experiential ``hands-on'' training and testing. FRA continues to 
believe that periodic refresher training is essential to ensuring the 
continued ability of an employee to perform a particular task. FRA does 
not intend for such training to be as lengthy or as formal as the 
initial training originally provided, but believes that the training 
should reemphasize key elements of various tasks and focus on items or 
tasks that have been identified as being problematic or of poor quality 
by the railroad, contractor, or its employees through the periodic 
assessment of the training program. The final rule also makes clear 
that a railroad or contractor may use efficiency testing to meet the 
hands-on portion of the required refresher training provided such 
testing is properly documented. FRA agrees that such testing provides 
the necessary assurances that the individual continues to have the 
knowledge and skills necessary to perform the task for which the 
employee is being tested.
    The final rule also modifies the proposed requirement that 
railroads develop an internal audit process to evaluate the 
effectiveness of their training. Although FRA agrees that a formal 
audit process may not be necessary, FRA continues to believe that 
railroads and contractors should periodically assess the effectiveness 
of their training programs. However, rather than require a formal 
internal audit, FRA believes that periodic assessments may be conducted 
through a number of different means and each railroad or contractor may 
have a need to conduct the assessment in a different manner. The final 
rule requires that a railroad or contractor develop a plan to 
periodically assess its training program and, as suggested by some 
commenters, permits the use of efficiency tests or periodic review of 
employee performance as methods for conducting such review. FRA agrees 
that many railroads, due to their small size, are capable of assessing 
the quality of the training their employees receive by conducting 
periodic supervisory spot checks or efficiency tests of their 
employees' performance.
    The final rule also retains the record keeping requirements 
proposed in the NPRM with slight modification for consistency with the 
changes noted above regarding the application of the skills and 
knowledge necessary to perform a particular task. FRA continues to 
believe that the record keeping and designation requirements contained 
in this final rule are the cornerstone of the training requirements. 
Contrary to the views of some commenters, FRA believes that something 
more than mere lists of qualified employees is needed. Because the rule 
allows each railroad and contractor the flexibility to develop a 
training program that best fits its operation and does not impose 
specific curriculum or experience requirements, FRA continues to 
believe it is vital for railroads and contractors to maintain detailed 
records on the training they do provide. Such documentation will allow 
FRA to judge the effectiveness of the training provided and will 
provide FRA with the ability to independently assess whether the 
training provided to a specific individual adequately addresses the 
skills and knowledge required to perform the tasks that the person is 
deemed qualified to perform. Moreover, requiring these records will 
prevent railroads and contractors from circumventing the training 
requirements and prevent them from attempting to utilize insufficiently 
trained personnel to perform the inspections and tests required by this 
rule.
    The final rule makes clear that the required records may be 
maintained either electronically or in writing. Many railroads 
currently maintain their training records in an electronic format, and 
FRA sees no reason not to permit such a practice if as the information 
can be provided to FRA in a timely manner upon request. The proposed 
provision requiring the railroad's chief mechanical or chief operating 
officer to sign a statement regarding each employee's qualifications 
has been modified in the final rule to merely require identification of 
the person or persons

[[Page 4137]]

making the determination that the employee has completed the necessary 
training. This modification will permit the information to be 
maintained electronically and will still provide the accountability 
which FRA intended by the provision in the NPRM. FRA believes it is 
absolutely essential that those individuals making the determinations 
regarding an employee's qualification be identified in order to ensure 
the integrity of the training programs developed and prevent potential 
abuses by a railroad or contractor.
    FRA also objects to the portrayal by some commenters that the 
records required to be maintained are overly burdensome. Virtually all 
of the items required to be recorded are currently maintained by most 
railroads in some fashion or another. Contrary to the concerns raised 
by some commenters, the rule does not require that the contents of each 
training program be maintained in each employee's file. Railroads are 
free to develop whatever type of cross-referencing system they desire, 
provided the contents of the training program are maintained in some 
fashion and can be readily retrieved. Furthermore, railroads currently 
maintain lists of individuals they deem to be qualified persons and 
inform those individuals as to their status to perform particular 
tasks. FRA believes this is a good practice and is necessary to ensure 
that individual employees do not attempt to perform, or are not asked 
to perform, tasks for which they have not been trained.
    The final rule contains two provisions that were not specifically 
included in the NPRM but which were intended by FRA to be covered by 
the established training programs. The final rule requires that new 
brake systems be added to training programs prior to their introduction 
into revenue service. FRA believes this requirement is only logical and 
makes sense. FRA believes that prior to the introduction of any new 
brake system the employees responsible for inspecting and maintaining 
the equipment need to be specifically trained on the systems in order 
to adequately perform their required tasks. The final rule also 
requires railroads that operate trains under conditions that require 
their employees to set retaining valves to develop training programs 
which specifically address the use of retainers and provide such 
training to those employees responsible for using or setting retainers. 
This provision has been added in response to an NTSB recommendation 
which FRA supports. See NTSB Recommendation R-98-7.
    FRA has not included provisions requiring FRA approval of the 
training programs developed by railroads or contractors as suggested by 
some commenters. FRA does not have the resources to implement such an 
approval process and does not believe such approval is necessary, given 
the records that will be required to be maintained. Furthermore, FRA 
believes that such a process would slow the implementation of training 
programs and, thus, slow the implementation of this final rule. An 
approval process would also seriously impede the ability of a railroad 
or contractor to make necessary and timely changes to its training 
program, which is necessary to ensure its currency. The final rule also 
does not contain a dispute-resolution provision regarding such 
programs. FRA believes that such matters are within the province of 
employee-employer relationships and are better addressed by established 
processes. The final rule also does not specifically address the 
training that must be provided to supervisors. Although some commenters 
recommended specific requirements, FRA believes that supervisors are 
sufficiently covered by the final rule requirements. FRA believes that 
in order for a supervisor to properly exercise oversight of an 
employee's work, the supervisor must be qualified to perform the tasks 
for which they have oversight responsibilities.
    FRA realizes that many railroads will need time to bring their 
existing training programs up to the level required by this final rule. 
FRA also recognizes that the cost of the proposed training requirements 
is somewhat substantial and may prevent railroads from completing the 
necessary training in a short period of time. Moreover, FRA recognizes 
that railroads need time to provide the necessary training to their 
employees without causing manpower shortages in their operations. 
Therefore, the final rule allows railroads three years in which to 
develop and complete the required training. This period is consistent 
with the time requested by the AAR and other railroad commenters. It is 
also consistent with the requirement to provide refresher training at 
least every three years and will allow a railroad to have one-third of 
its inspection forces receive the necessary refresher training each 
year after the initial training is complete.

F. Air Source Requirements

    In the 1998 NPRM, FRA again proposed a ban on the use of anti-
freeze chemicals in train air brake systems, reiterating the position 
stated in the 1994 NPRM, in order to prevent untimely damage and wear 
to brake system components. See 59 FR 47728. At that time, FRA had not 
received any adverse comments on this issue in response to the 1994 
NPRM, in which a similar requirement was proposed. Furthermore, 
statements and discussions provided at various RSAC Working Group 
meetings appeared to establish that both rail labor and rail management 
representatives believed that such a provision would be acceptable.
    Based on information gathered throughout the RSAC process, previous 
comments by industry parties, and agency experience, FRA firmly 
believes that the presence of moisture in the train air brake system 
poses potential safety, operational, and maintenance issues that 
require attention in this rulemaking. After completion of detailed, 
instrumented testing on both locomotives and yard test plants performed 
as part of the task force activities, FRA determined that locomotives 
rarely contribute to moisture in the trainline. Consequently, FRA did 
not propose that air dryers be installed on new locomotives, as was 
proposed in the 1994 NPRM (59 FR 47729). A detailed discussion of the 
testing conducted by the RSAC Working Group members and recommendations 
regarding air dryers appears in the preamble of the 1998 NPRM. See 63 
FR 48317-19.
    In contrast, the results of the same testing clearly indicated to 
FRA that yard air plants often provide unacceptably high levels of 
moisture while charging the train air brake system due to the age of 
the system, improper design, inadequate maintenance, or a combination 
thereof. Working Group task force efforts also estimated that upwards 
of 80 percent of train air brake systems are charged using yard/ground 
air plants. However, FRA did not believe that simply requiring yard air 
sources to be equipped with air dryers would solve or address the 
problem. In order for air dryers to be effective on yard air sources, 
the air dryers must be properly placed to sufficiently condition the 
air source. FRA determined that many yard air sources are configured 
such that a single air compressor services several branch lines used to 
charge train air brake systems; therefore, multiple air dryers would be 
required to eliminate the introduction of moisture into the brake 
system. Consequently, FRA determined that requiring yard air sources to 
be equipped with air dryers would impose a significant and unnecessary 
cost burden on the railroads.

[[Page 4138]]

    Based on its determination that air dryers would not provide a cost 
effective or suitable solution, FRA considered other viable 
alternatives. In the 1998 NPRM, FRA proposed that each railroad develop 
and implement a system by which it would monitor all yard air sources 
to ensure that the air sources operate as intended and do not introduce 
contaminates into the brake system. FRA believed that the proposed 
monitoring program provided a method by which the industry might 
maximize the benefits to be realized through air dryer technology, 
which all parties acknowledge has been proven to reduce the level of 
moisture introduced into the trainline, at a cost that was commensurate 
with the potential benefits. The proposed monitoring program required 
railroads to take remedial action with respect to any yard air sources 
that were found not operating as intended, and established a retention 
requirement for records of the deficient units to facilitate the 
tracking and resolution of continuing problem areas. FRA also proposed 
that yard air reservoirs either be equipped with an operative automatic 
drain system or be manually drained at least once each day that the 
devices were used or when moisture was detected in the system. FRA 
believed that these proposed provisions, in concert with assurances 
that condensation is blown from the pipe or hose from which compressed 
air is taken prior to connecting the yard air line or motive power to 
the train, as currently prescribed in Sec. 232.11(d), would 
significantly minimize the possibility of moisture being introduced 
into the train air brake system.
    In the 1998 NPRM, FRA noted the recent issuance of a final rule 
mandating the incorporation of two-way end-of-train telemetry devices 
(two-way EOTs) on a variety of freight trains, specifically those 
operating at speeds of 30 mph or greater or in heavy grade territories. 
See 62 FR 278. Two-way EOTs provide locomotive engineers with the 
capability of initiating an emergency brake application that commences 
at the rear of the train in the event of a blockage or separation in 
the train's brake pipe that would prevent the pneumatic transmission of 
the emergency brake application throughout the entire train. FRA noted 
that the issuance of a final rule mandating the use of these devices 
was significant particularly in the context of air source requirements 
and air dryers. In the unlikely event that the proposed requirements 
regarding air sources fail to sufficiently eliminate moisture from the 
trainline, and a restriction or obstruction in the form of ice forms as 
the result of the freezing of this moisture during cold weather 
operations, the two-way EOT device becomes a first order safety device 
and will initiate an emergency application of the brakes from the rear 
of train. Therefore, many of the concerns associated with moisture in 
the trainline freezing in cold weather operations have been alleviated 
through the incorporation of this technology in most freight 
operations, thus reducing the need or desire to specifically require 
air dryers on air sources.
    The AAR and its member railroads submitted various comments related 
to the proposed air source requirements. Although various railroads had 
previously indicated support for a requirement banning the use of 
alcohol in train brake system and stated that their railroad no longer 
used alcohol in its operation, they now object to the proposed 
requirement prohibiting the use of the such chemicals. These commenters 
now assert that there are instances in the industry where alcohol is 
used to unfreeze frozen trainlines. They contend that railroads should 
be permitted to continue this practice in order to move trains in 
certain circumstances and that the need to use alcohol would be rare 
but necessary. The AAR contends that the use of the term ``chemical'' 
is inappropriate, and, unless there is an alternative, the requirement 
should be deleted. They contend that frozen trainlines are a reality 
and railroads must be provided some method to deal with such 
occurrences other than waiting for warm weather which could take 
months.
    These commenters also discussed the proposed requirements related 
the development and implementation of monitoring plans for yard air 
sources. The AAR contends that the railroads would need at least five 
years to comply with the proposed requirements and would incur costs of 
$41 million. These commenters object to the requirement for remedial 
action when a yard air source is found to have the ``potential'' of 
introducing contaminants into the equipment it services. They contend 
that such remedial action should be required only if the yard air 
source actually introduces such contaminants. These commenters also 
object to the requirement for a detailed assessment of the remedial 
actions taken as unnecessary and believe that the recordkeeping 
requirements merely increase a railroad's administrative burden and are 
merely included as enforcement traps.
    Several representatives of rail labor and the NTSB support the 
proposed prohibition on the use of alcohol and object to any allowance 
of its use. Some labor representatives suggested that, if FRA were to 
allow the use of alcohol, then it needed to reinstate the requirements 
to perform periodic clean, oil, test, and stencilling (COT&S). These 
commenters recommend that the prohibition be extended to any device 
providing air to a train's brake system. The BRC again asserts that FRA 
should require that locomotives and air sources be equipped with air 
dryers, contending that they are the only way to ensure that moisture 
is not introduced into a train's brake system. Labor representatives 
also object to the proposed yard air monitoring plan requirements, 
contending that the proposed requirements fail to specify the frequency 
with which yard air sources are to be inspected. They recommend that 
such inspections should be more frequent at locations in cold climates. 
They also suggest that the monitoring plans should be subject to FRA 
approval prior to implementation.
    FRA Conclusions. The final rule retains the basic requirements 
regarding yard air sources and cold weather operations that were 
proposed in the 1998 NPRM. The final rule generally retains the 
proposed requirement prohibiting the use of chemicals in a train air 
brake system. However, FRA agrees that the proposed prohibition of all 
chemicals may have been somewhat overbroad and contrary to FRA's actual 
intent. In proposing the prohibition, FRA intended to eliminate the use 
of chemicals, such as alcohol, which are known to degrade the rubber of 
a train's brake system. FRA agrees that there are chemicals that are 
currently available or that are in the process of being developed that 
do not cause the problems associated with the use of alcohol. In fact, 
FRA believes there are products currently available that do not degrade 
a brake system's rubber components like alcohol does. FRA believes that 
several railroads are currently testing or using these chemical 
alternatives. Consequently, the final rule slightly modifies the 
prohibition on the use of chemicals by imposing the prohibition on 
chemicals that are known to degrade or harm brake system components, 
such as alcohol.
    The final rule also modifies some of the requirements related to 
the proposed yard air source monitoring plans. FRA agrees that the 
proposed requirements did not establish a frequency with which 
inspections of yard air sources should be conducted. In proposing the 
requirement, FRA hoped that various commenters would recommend 
frequencies for conducting these

[[Page 4139]]

inspections. This did not occur. FRA agrees that a set frequency needs 
to be established that will ensure that yard air sources are inspected 
in a timely manner during various climatic conditions. Therefore, the 
final rule requires the that yard air sources be inspected at least 
twice each calendar year and that two of the inspections be no less 
than five months apart. FRA intends for this requirement to result in 
yard air sources being inspected each year during two different 
seasonal periods.
    The final rule also clarifies that remedial action under the 
monitoring plans is required only on those yard air sources that are 
not operating as intended or that are found introducing contaminants 
into brake systems. Thus, the final rule removes the word ``potential'' 
as FRA agrees that the proposed language was unclear and may have been 
over-inclusive. The final rule also eliminates the requirement for 
railroads to conduct a detailed assessment of the remedial actions 
taken. FRA agrees that this requirement is unnecessary because 
railroads will be conducting regular inspections of the yard air 
sources on which they have conducted repairs or taken other remedial 
action and will be able to determine if the repairs were effective 
through those inspections. The final rule retains the other proposed 
record keeping requirements related to yard air monitoring plans but 
clarifies that the records may be maintained either electronically or 
in writing. FRA continues to believe that these records are necessary 
to ensure that railroads are properly conducting the required 
inspections and are taking timely and appropriate remedial action when 
a problem air source is detected.
    The final rule does not contain provisions requiring FRA approval 
of the yard air source monitoring plans prior to their implementation 
as suggested by some commenters. FRA does not have the manpower or 
resources to review and approve the plan of each railroad and does not 
believe such approval is necessary given the specific requirements 
contained in the final rule and the records that are required to be 
maintained. The final rule also does not contain requirements regarding 
the use of air dryers on either locomotives or yard air sources. For 
the reasons noted in the discussion above and in the NPRM, FRA believes 
that requiring the use of air dryers on either locomotives or yard air 
sources would impose a significant cost burden on railroads and would 
not necessarily address the problem sought to be resolved. See 63 FR 
48317-19. It should be noted that FRA advocates the use of air dryers 
when possible and agrees that they have proven effective in reducing 
the level of moisture introduced into the brake system; however, FRA 
believes that the railroad is in the best position to determine where 
these devices will provide the greatest benefit based on the railroad's 
operation.
    FRA is somewhat skeptical of the AAR's contentions regarding both 
the time and the cost necessary to implement the required yard air 
source monitoring plans. FRA sees no reason why a railroad would need 
five years to implement a plan to inspect each of its yard air sources 
twice a year. These devices are used on a fairly regular, if not daily, 
basis and should not be that difficult to inspect. Therefore, FRA 
believes that railroads should easily be able to implement these 
monitoring plans within the three years allowed under the applicable 
date provided in this final rule.

G. Maintenance Requirements

    Based on comments received in response to the 1994 NPRM, 
deliberations of the RSAC Working Group and task force, and field 
experience, FRA proposed a comprehensive set of maintenance 
requirements which were intended to be a codification of current best 
practices occurring within the industry. The preamble to the 1998 NPRM 
contains a detailed discussion of the issues raised, discussed, and 
considered prior to the issuance of the NPRM. See 63 FR 48320-22.
    After consideration of all the information and comments submitted 
prior to the issuance of the 1998 NPRM, FRA remained confident that the 
``new'' repair track test and single car test, which have been used 
industry-wide since January of 1992, are a much better and more 
comprehensive method of detecting and eliminating defective brake 
equipment and components than the old, time-based COT&S requirements. 
FRA continued to believe that performance of the repair track and 
single car test significantly reduces the number of defective 
components and dramatically increases the reliability of brake 
equipment. Accordingly, FRA proposed the incorporation of AAR 
Interchange Rule 3 and Chart A into the 1998 NPRM, thus codifying the 
repair track air test requirements per Chart A, such that a railroad 
would be required to perform a repair track brake test on freight cars 
in any of the following six circumstances: (i) When a freight car is 
removed from a train due to an air brake related defect; (ii) when a 
freight car has its brakes cut out when removed from a train or when 
placed on a shop or repair track; (iii) when a freight car is on a 
repair or shop track for any reason and has not received a repair track 
brake test within the previous 12 month period; (iv) when a freight car 
is found with missing or incomplete repair track brake test 
information; (v) when the brake reservoir(s), the control valve 
mounting gasket, and the pipe bracket stud are removed, repaired, or 
replaced; or (vi) when a freight car is found with a wheel with a 
built-up tread, a slid flat, or a thermal crack. FRA also proposed that 
each freight car receive a repair track air test no less frequently 
than every 5 years, and not less than 8 years from the date the car was 
built or rebuilt. Similarly, it was proposed that the single car test 
requirements of Chart A be codified, such that a railroad would perform 
a single car test on a freight car when the service portion, the 
emergency portion, or the pipe bracket or a combination of such 
components is removed, repaired, or replaced.
    In the 1998 NPRM, FRA recognized that circumstances arise where the 
proposed repair track brake tests or single car tests could not always 
be performed at the point where repairs can be made that necessitate 
performance of the test. To address these circumstances, FRA proposed 
that a car would be allowed to be moved to the next forward location 
where the test could be performed after the necessary repairs were 
conducted. FRA attempted to make clear that the inability to perform a 
repair track brake test or a single car test did not constitute an 
inability to effectuate the necessary repairs. At the same time, 
however, FRA recognized rail labor's contention that some carriers 
often attempt to circumvent the requirements for single car and repair 
track testing through the elimination of repair tracks, by moving cars 
to ``expediter'' tracks for repair, or simply by making the repairs in 
the field. As a means to curtail these practices, FRA decided to impose 
extensive tagging requirements on freight cars that, due to the nature 
of the defective condition(s) detected, require a repair track brake 
test or single car test but that are moved from the location where 
repairs are performed prior to receiving the required test. As an 
alternative to the tagging requirements, FRA proposed that railroads be 
permitted to utilize an automated tracking system to monitor these cars 
and ensure they receive the requisite tests provided the automated 
system has been approved by FRA. FRA also proposed to require 
stencilling of cars with the location and date of the last

[[Page 4140]]

repair track or single car test. Alternatively, FRA proposed that 
railroads could utilize an electronic record keeping system to 
accomplish this stencilling requirement, provided the system has been 
approved by FRA. FRA believed that the proposed tagging and stencilling 
requirements were necessary to ensure the timely performance of the 
tests. Without such information, there would be virtually no way for 
FRA to verify a railroad's compliance with the proposed repair track 
and single car test requirements.
    FRA also proposed various requirements related to the testing of 
the devices used to perform the single car tests. Similar to the 1994 
NPRM, the 1998 NPRM again proposed that single car testing devices be 
tested at least once a day and receive routine maintenance at least 
every 92 days. FRA also proposed that the mechanical and electronic 
test devices be regularly calibrated.
    In the 1998 NPRM, FRA determined that any changes to the AAR 
standards incorporated into regulation should be reviewed and approved 
by all affected parties, including FRA and rail labor. Consequently, 
FRA proposed a special approval process, whereby the AAR would be 
required to submit any proposed changes to the FRA. FRA would review 
the proposed change to determine whether the change is ``safety-
critical.'' Such proposed changes include, but are not limited to the 
following: (i) Any changes to Chart A, (ii) changes to established 
maintenance intervals, and (iii) changes to UMLER reporting 
requirements. If the proposed change was deemed by FRA to be ``non 
safety-critical,'' FRA would permit the change to be implemented 
immediately. If the proposed change was deemed ``safety-critical,'' FRA 
would be required to publish a Federal Register notice, conduct a 
public hearing if necessary, and act based on the information developed 
and submitted in regard to these proceedings.
    FRA proposed the special approval process in response to comments 
from several railroads and manufacturers that FRA needed to devise some 
sort of quick approval process in order to permit the industry to make 
modifications to existing standards or equipment based on the 
development of new technology. Thus, FRA attempted to propose an 
approval process it believed would speed the process for taking 
advantage of new technologies over that which is currently available 
under the waiver process. However, in order to provide an opportunity 
for all interested parties to provide input for use by FRA in its 
decision-making process as required by the Administrative Procedure 
Act, FRA determined that any special approval provision must, at a 
minimum, provide proper notice to the public of any significant change 
or action being considered by the agency with regard to existing 
regulations.
    The AAR, its members, and various private car owners and brake 
manufacturers submitted numerous comments regarding the maintenance 
requirements proposed in the NPRM. The commenters object to the 
proposed incorporation of AAR's Rule 3, Chart A, and the incorporation 
of specific AAR standards for performing single car and repair track 
air brake tests. They contend that such incorporation would inhibit the 
ability of the industry to develop and implement new rules and 
procedures that would improve safety and hinder the ability of the 
industry to implement changes that improve brake performance. They 
contend that the current reference to AAR rules is sufficient and that 
oversight by FRA is not necessary. The AAR notes that there have been 
over 25 changes to the AAR maintenance requirements and test procedures 
over the last ten years and that many of these may not have been 
accomplished under the provisions proposed in the NPRM. The AAR also 
notes that the single car and repair track standards cited in the NPRM 
were changed in July of 1998 and were being revised again in 1999. 
These commenters recommend that any provisions requiring FRA approval 
of AAR standards should be eliminated. Alternatively, they recommend 
that AAR be permitted to implement changes subject to FRA revocation 
based on a finding that the change does not promote safety.
    In addition to their general objections to any incorporation of AAR 
maintenance standards, these commenters provide several recommendations 
in the event that FRA should decide to retain the proposed 
requirements. They recommend that FRA eliminate the requirement to 
stencil equipment with the date of the last single car or repair track 
air brake test and allow the industry to use the UMLER tracking system 
to record and monitor such information. They believe that the industry 
should be permitted to implement an automated or electronic tracking 
system without prior FRA approval. They contend that the industry has 
been using the UMLER system to track this information for years and it 
has proven effective. They contend that the automated system currently 
used is no less secure or capable of manipulation than a manual 
stenciling requirement. They contend that there has been no evidence of 
falsification on the part of railroads using the UMLER system and that 
it should be permitted without FRA approval.
    Several railroad representatives also object to the proposed 
requirement for performing a repair track air brake test whenever a car 
is removed from a train for a brake-related defect. They contend that 
the way the provision is proposed it would require repair track air 
brake tests whenever minor brake defects occur that have no relation to 
the actual operation of the brakes. They recommend that the requirement 
be tied to cars removed from trains for inoperative brakes as this is 
the intent of AAR's Rule 3, Chart A. These commenters also object to 
the proposed requirement to perform a set and release of the brakes and 
to check piston travel when a car is on a shop or repair track. They 
contend that AAR no longer requires this to be performed and assert 
that the brake tests required in the proposal are sufficient to 
determine piston travel and proper operation of the brakes. These 
commenters also contend that there is no need to retain the bad order 
tags required for moving equipment for testing because a record of the 
repair is maintained for a year pursuant to AAR rules. They also 
recommend that FRA should not require brake repairs at locations where 
single car or repair track tests cannot be performed. They contend that 
the test is necessary to determine the sufficiency of the repair. They 
believe that the inability to conduct these test should be considered 
an inability to conduct brake repairs.
    The AAR and certain manufacturers of brake equipment also raise 
concerns over the proposed requirements related to the testing and 
calibration of devices used to perform single car and repair track air 
tests. These commenters generally object to the inclusion of these 
requirements in the proposal as they have always been part of AAR 
standard S-486 and feel they do not belong in federal regulations. 
These parties also contend that the proposed requirements regarding the 
testing and calibration of single car test devices are more restrictive 
than are currently required. The current existing industry requirements 
for testing single car test devices are based on the date on which the 
device is placed in service. Thus, the time for conducting the 92-day 
test does not begin to run until the device is placed in service. They 
contend that the ``in service'' date allows railroads flexibility in 
having spare devices when

[[Page 4141]]

a primary device is being serviced as such a device is generally sent 
to a special location for calibration and cleaning. At a minimum, they 
recommend that the rule permit testing and calibration of single car 
test devices based on the in-service date of the device rather than a 
strict 92-day requirement.
    Representatives of rail labor support the incorporation of AAR 
standards and contend that AAR should not be allowed unilateral 
discretion to change the incorporated standards. These commenters 
assert that railroads do not currently follow existing AAR standards 
and will not do so unless they are made part of a federal regulation. 
These commenters recommend that FRA develop specific, detailed 
maintenance requirements rather than reference AAR standards. They 
further contend that all maintenance should be required to be performed 
by a carman or at least by a QMI as defined in the NPRM. These 
commenters object to any type of automated tracking system as it is 
susceptible to abuse and manipulation by railroads.
    Certain labor representatives provided specific comments on the 
proposed requirements related to conducting single car and repair track 
air brake tests. They recommend that FRA identify locations where 
single car and repair track air brake tests can be performed to prevent 
manipulation and circumvention of the requirements by railroads. These 
commenters contend that only a carman or a QMI should be permitted to 
perform a single car or repair track air brake test. They also contend 
that, since periodic COT&S has been eliminated, the need to conduct 
frequent repair track and single car tests is much greater in order to 
ensure the proper operation of the brake equipment. They assert that 
the intervals for conducting these tests need to be increased over 
those proposed and recommend that each car receive a repair track air 
brake every year and a single car test every four years.
    FRA Conclusions. Although the final rule retains many of the 
proposed maintenance requirements, several modifications have been made 
in this final rule in response to comments received and based upon the 
current best practices occurring within the industry. FRA agrees that 
the proposed incorporation of AAR Rule 3, Chart A, is unnecessary as it 
would remove the determination of when certain maintenance is performed 
from the discretion of the railroads, and would make it difficult for 
railroads to change the requirements related to the performance of that 
maintenance. FRA believes that a railroad is in the best position to 
determine when and where it will perform various maintenance on its 
equipment and should not have its hands tied in this area by overly 
prescriptive federal requirements. Furthermore, FRA's primary intent 
when proposing incorporation of AAR Rule 3, Chart A, was to codify the 
existing requirements for performing single car and repair track air 
brake tests and eliminate the right of the industry to unilaterally 
change the frequency and method of performing these tests. As the final 
rule retains the requirements for when and how these tests are to be 
completed and retains certain inspections that are to be performed when 
equipment is on a shop or repair track, FRA believes that it is 
unnecessary to incorporate every maintenance procedure covered in AAR's 
Rule 3, Chart A. Consequently, the final rule does not incorporate 
AAR's Rule 3, Chart A, and continues to allow railroads some 
flexibility in determining appropriate maintenance practices.
    Contrary to the assertions of some commenters, FRA continues to 
believe that certain maintenance procedures are critical to ensuring 
the safe and proper operation of the brake equipment on the nation's 
fleet of freight cars. FRA does not believe that the determination of 
what maintenance should be performed should be left solely to the 
discretion of the railroads operating the equipment in all 
circumstances. As periodic COT&S maintenance has been eliminated and 
replaced with the performance of single car and repair track tests, 
which FRA agrees is a better and more comprehensive method of detecting 
defective brake equipment and components, FRA believes that specific 
and determinable limits must be placed on the manner and frequency in 
which these tests are performed. Therefore, the final rule retains the 
proposed requirements regarding the performance of single car and 
repair track tests.
    FRA recognizes that the procedures for performing single car and 
repair track tests proposed in the NPRM have been modified by the AAR 
since the issuance of the proposal. As it is FRA's intent to 
incorporate the most recent version of the single car and repair track 
air brake test procedures, the final rule incorporates the test 
procedures that were issued by the AAR in April of 1999. FRA recognizes 
that the industry may find it necessary to modify the test procedures 
from time to time in order to address new equipment or utilize new 
technology. Thus, the final rule permits railroads to seek approval of 
alternative procedures through the special approval process contained 
in the final rule. The special approval process is intended to speed 
FRA's consideration of a party's request to utilize an alternative 
procedure from the one identified in the rule itself. FRA believes that 
it is essential for FRA to approve any change made in the procedures 
for conducting these safety-critical tests in order to prevent 
unilateral changes and to ensure consistency in the method in which the 
tests are performed.
    It should be noted that the incorporated procedures for performing 
single car and repair track air brake tests are the minimum 
requirements for performing such tests. The special approval process is 
required to be used only if the incorporated procedures are to be 
changed in some manner. For instance, if the industry were to elect to 
add a new test protocol to the incorporated procedures, there would be 
no need to seek approval of such an addition as long as the procedures 
contained in the incorporated standard are still maintained. This final 
rule is not intended to prevent railroads from voluntarily adopting 
additional or more stringent maintenance standards provided they are 
consistent with the standards incorporated.
    The final rule also modifies one of the proposed conditions for 
when a repair track air brake test would be required to be performed. 
FRA agrees that the proposed requirement to perform a repair track air 
brake test on any car removed from a train for a brake-related defect 
is overly restrictive and inconsistent with the requirements of AAR's 
Rule 3, Chart A. FRA agrees that the proposed requirement would require 
the performance of the test when minor brake system repairs are 
conducted, which is not the intent of the AAR's rule. Therefore, the 
final rule modifies the proposed condition to require the performance 
of a repair track test on cars that have inoperative or cut-out air 
brakes when removed from a train.
    The final rule also modifies the proposed requirements regarding 
the use of an automated tracking system in lieu of stenciling equipment 
with the date and location of the last single car or repair track test 
received. Since 1992, the industry has utilized the AAR's UMLER 
reporting system to electronically track the performance of single car 
and repair track air brake test as well as other repair information. 
Based on the performance and use of this system over the last seven 
years, FRA believes that the AAR's UMLER system has proven itself 
effective for tracking the information required in this final rule and 
ensuring the timely performance of single car and repair

[[Page 4142]]

track air brake tests. Furthermore, FRA continues to believe that the 
information required to be tracked with regard to these tests is easily 
maintained through an electronic medium. Moreover, FRA has found no 
substantiated instances of railroads falsifying or altering the 
information monitored and tracked by AAR's UMLER system. Thus, the 
final rule permits railroad to utilize an electronic record keeping 
system to track single car and repair track air brake tests without 
obtaining prior FRA approval of the system. The final rule makes clear 
that FRA will monitor the performance of such systems and retains the 
right to revoke a railroad's authority to utilize the system if FRA 
finds that it is not properly secure, inaccessible to FRA or a 
railroad's employees, or fails to properly or adequately track and 
monitor the equipment.
    The final rule does not increase the proposed frequency at which 
the single car or repair track air brake tests are to be performed as 
recommended by some commenters. As noted above, the primary intent of 
the proposed provisions was to codify the existing requirements 
regarding the performance of single car and repair track air brake 
tests and prevent any unilateral changes to those requirements. FRA 
believes that the frequency at which these tests are currently required 
to be performed under industry standards has proven to be sufficient 
and a substantial economic burden would be imposed if the frequency 
were increased. The final rule also retains the requirement that these 
tests be conducted by a qualified person. FRA believes that the person 
performing these tests must be specifically trained and tested on how 
the test is to be performed and be able to determine the appropriate 
actions that must be taken based on the results of the test. FRA does 
not believe that the mere fact that a person is a carman or a QMI is 
sufficient to consider that person qualified to perform single car or 
repair track air brake tests. FRA believes that the training 
requirements contained in this final rule ensure that a person deemed 
qualified to perform these tests has been specifically trained and 
tested on the performance of the tests prior to being considered 
qualified.
    The final rule also retains the proposed provisions permitting cars 
to be moved from a location where necessary repairs are made to a 
location where a single car or repair track air brake test can be 
performed if it cannot be performed at the same location where the 
repairs are conducted. FRA disagrees with the assertion that air brake 
repairs should not be required at locations that lack the ability to 
perform single car or repair track air brake tests. FRA believes that 
position is not only contrary to the statutory mandates regarding the 
movement of equipment with defective brakes but would open the door to 
potential abuse by railroads. Furthermore, the operation of a car's 
brake system can generally be tested after a repair without performing 
a complete repair track air brake test. For the most part, single car 
and repair track air brake tests are intended to be maintenance 
requirements that attach based on a condition in which a car is found 
or on a repair that is required to be performed. If the condition of a 
car is such that a repair track air brake test is necessary to 
determine the defect, then the final rule would permit movement of the 
car to the nearest location where a repair track air brake test can be 
performed. However, FRA believes that most defective conditions can be 
easily determined without performing a repair track air brake test. 
Moreover, for years FRA has required the performance of repairs where 
they can be performed and has allowed such equipment to be moved to the 
next forward location for performance of a single car or repair track 
air brake test and has not found that such a practice has created any 
potential safety hazard.
    The final rule retains the proposed requirements for tagging 
equipment which is being hauled for the performance of a single car or 
repair track air brake test after the appropriate repairs have been 
conducted. FRA believes that the tags are necessary not only to provide 
notice to a railroad's ground forces as to the presence of the car but 
to ensure that railroads are properly performing the tests at 
appropriate locations. Furthermore, many railroads currently move 
equipment in this fashion, and there has been no indication that safety 
has been compromised. The final rule also retains the requirement that 
a copy or record of the tag be retained for 90 days and made available 
to FRA upon request. Contrary to the objections of some commenters, FRA 
continues to believe that the record keeping requirements are necessary 
so that there is accountability on the part of the railroads to conduct 
these tests at the proper locations and that equipment is not moved for 
extended periods without receiving its required maintenance. It should 
be noted that the final rule clarifies that the record or copy of the 
tag may be maintained either electronically or in writing provided all 
the required information is recorded. The final rule does not define or 
require identification of locations that can or will perform single car 
or repair track air brake tests as suggested by some commenters. FRA 
does not believe that such a requirement is necessary as the rule 
specifically establishes when the tests are to be performed and it is 
in the railroad's best interests to perform the tests in a timely 
manner.
    The final rule retains the proposed provisions requiring certain 
tests and inspections to be performed whenever a car is on a shop or 
repair track. Although the AAR asserts that it did away with the 
requirements to perform a set and release of the brakes and adjust 
piston travel on all cars on repair or shop tracks, the requirements 
are currently contained in power brake regulations separate and apart 
from any AAR requirements. See 49 CFR 232.17(a)(2)(ii), (iv). FRA 
believes that repair and shop tracks provide an ideal setting for 
railroads to conduct an individualized inspection on a car's brake 
system to ensure its proper operation and that such an inspection is 
necessary to reduce the potential of cars with excessive piston travel 
being overlooked when employees are performing the ordinary brake 
inspections required by this final rule. If any problems are detected 
at that location, the personnel needed to make any necessary 
corrections are already present. Furthermore, performing these 
inspections at this time ensures proper operation of the cars' brakes 
and eliminates the potential of having to cut cars out of an assembled 
train and, thus, should reduce inspection times and make for more 
efficient operations.
    The final rule adds two items to the inspections that are to be 
conducted when a car is on a shop or repair track. They are an 
inspection of a car's hand brake and an inspection of the accuracy and 
operation of any brake indicators on cars so equipped. The final rule 
does not provide for the specific inspection of these items during any 
of the other required brake tests. Consequently, FRA believes this is 
an ideal time for the railroad to inspect these items while imposing 
the least burden on the railroad's inspection and repair forces.
    As the final rule requires that certain inspections and tests be 
performed when a car is on a shop or repair track and because a repair 
track air brake test is required to be performed when a car is on a 
repair track and such a test has not been performed within the last 
twelve months, FRA believes it is necessary to clarify what constitutes 
a shop or repair track. This issue has become more prevalent over the 
last few years due to the growing use of mobile repair trucks and due 
to the requirements for conducting repair track

[[Page 4143]]

air brake tests. For years, many railroads have conducted minor repairs 
on tracks called ``expedite tracks.'' Generally, the types of repairs 
that were performed on these tracks were minor repairs that could be 
made quickly with a limited amount of equipment, and neither the 
railroads or FRA considered the tracks to be repair tracks. However, 
recently railroads have started performing virtually every type of 
repair on these expedite tracks. These tracks are no longer limited to 
minor repairs but are being used to perform heavy, complex repairs that 
require the jacking of entire cars or the disassembly and replacement 
of major portions of a car's truck or brake system. At many locations 
these expedite tracks are positioned next to operative repair shops. 
Furthermore, several railroads have closed previously existing repair 
shop facilities and are now using fully equipped mobile repair trucks 
to perform the same type of repairs that were previously performed in 
the shop or on established repair tracks and are attempting to call the 
tracks serviced by these mobile repair trucks ``expedite tracks.'' 
Thus, the line between what constitutes a repair or shop track and what 
constitutes an ``expedite track'' has become unclear, if not, 
nonexistent.
    FRA believes that the operational changes, noted above, are partly 
an attempt by the railroads to circumvent the requirements that 
currently apply when a car is on a shop or repair track. Currently, if 
a car is on a shop or repair track, it must have its brakes inspected, 
under 49 CFR 232.17(a)(2)(ii), (iv), and the car is to receive a repair 
track air brake test if it has not received one in the last twelve 
months under AAR Rule 3, Chart A. Some railroads contend that an 
expedite track is not a repair or shop track; therefore, the 
requirements of Sec. 232.17(a)(2)(ii), (iv) do not apply. FRA finds 
this interpretation to be unacceptable and believes that railroads are 
abusing the concept of expedite tracks to avoid performing required 
maintenance. Therefore, the industry's own actions have caused the need 
for FRA to clarify what constitutes a shop or repair track. 
Consequently, the final rule includes a definition of what FRA will 
consider to be repair or shop tracks requiring the performance of 
certain tests and inspections.
    The final rule makes clear that FRA will consider certain tracks to 
be repair or shop tracks based on the types of repairs that are made on 
the tracks, not necessarily the designation given by a railroad. The 
definition in the final rule also makes clear that it is the nature of 
the repairs being conducted on a certain track that is the determining 
factor not whether a mobile repair truck is being used to make the 
repairs. Due to the ability of mobile repair trucks to make virtually 
any type of repair necessary and due to their growing use, FRA does not 
believe that tracks regularly and continually serviced by these types 
of vehicles should be excepted from the definition of a repair track. 
FRA believes that if a track is designated by the railroad as an 
``expedite'' track (i.e., one where minor repairs will be conducted) 
then the railroad should ensure that only cars needing minor repairs be 
directed to that track for repair. The final rule does not eliminate 
the concept of expedite tracks but limits the use of such tracks to 
those types of repairs that are truly minor in nature and that require 
a limited amount of equipment to perform. At locations where a railroad 
conducts repairs of all types, either with fixed facilities or with 
mobile repair trucks, FRA would expect the railroad to designate 
certain trackage at the location as repair tracks and certain trackage 
as ``expedite tracks'' where only minor repairs would be conducted. In 
such circumstances, FRA would expect railroads to direct cars in need 
of heavier repairs, the kind that have been traditionally performed on 
a shop or repair track, to be directed to trackage designated at the 
location as a repair track.
    The final rule places the burden on the railroad to designate those 
tracks it will consider repair tracks at locations where it performs 
both minor and heavy repairs, and makes the railroad responsible for 
directing the equipment in need of repair to the appropriate trackage. 
If the railroad determines that repairs of a heavy nature will be 
performed on certain trackage, then the track should be treated as a 
repair track, and any car repaired on that trackage should be provided 
the attention required by this final rule for cars on a shop or repair 
track. Further, if a railroad determines that minor repairs will be 
performed on certain trackage, then the railroad bears the burden of 
ensuring that only cars needing minor repairs are directed to that 
trackage. If the railroad fails to adequately distinguish the tracks 
performing minor repairs from those tracks performing heavy repairs or 
improperly performs heavy repairs on a track designated as an 
``expedite track,'' then the railroad will be required to treat all 
cars on the trackage at the time that the heavy repairs are being 
conducted as though they are on a repair or shop track.
    It should be noted that the issue of what constitutes a repair or 
shop track for the purposes of 49 CFR 232.17(a)(2)(ii) and (iv) is 
completely separate and distinct from the issue of whether a location 
is a location where necessary repairs can be performed for purposes of 
49 U.S.C. 20303. Although an outlying location might be considered a 
location where certain brake repairs can be conducted, that does not 
mean the track where those repairs are performed should be considered a 
repair track. FRA does not intend for trackage located at outlying 
locations or sidings which are occasionally or even regularly serviced 
by mobile repair trucks to be considered repair tracks. FRA believes 
that repair or shop tracks should exist at locations that have fixed 
repair facilities and at locations where repairs of all types are 
performed on a regular and consistent basis regardless of whether the 
repairs are performed in fixed facilities or by mobile repair vehicles.
    The final rule also modifies some of the proposed provisions 
regarding the testing and calibration of single car test devices and 
other mechanical devices used to perform single car and repair track 
air brake tests. FRA's intent when proposing the requirements was to 
codify the current best practices of the industry. Thus, FRA did not 
intend to propose testing and calibration requirements that were more 
stringent that those currently imposed by AAR standards. Therefore, FRA 
agrees that the testing and calibration requirements for single car 
test devices should not be imposed until the devices are actually 
placed in service, which is consistent with current AAR requirements. 
FRA recognizes that the proposed calibration and testing requirements 
may have resulted the unnecessary acquisition of single car testing 
devices. Consequently, the final rule makes clear that the 92-day and 
the 365-day requirements related to single car test devices are to be 
calculated from the day on which the device is first placed in service.

III. Section-by-Section Analysis

Amendments to 49 CFR Part 229

    The amendments to part 229 contained in this final rule concern the 
testing of electronic gauges commonly used in electronically controlled 
locomotive brake systems. Currently, there are two electronically 
controlled locomotive brake systems in use on the nation's railroads, 
the Electro-Pneumatic Integrated Control (EPIC) system supplied by 
Westinghouse Air Brake Company and the Computer Controlled Brake (CCB) 
system developed by New York Air Brake Company. At this time, there are 
thousands of locomotives in service that

[[Page 4144]]

are equipped with either the CCB system or the EPIC system.
    The final rule retains the proposed requirements extending the 
testing cycles for the electronic gauges used in these types of 
locomotive brake systems. The final rule retains the proposed increase 
of the testing interval for these electronic gauges from 92 days to one 
year. Although certain labor representatives objected to the proposed 
increase in the testing interval, contending that the interval should 
be reduced due to problems encountered by numerous locomotive 
engineers, FRA continues to believe that technology incorporated into 
the electronic gauges used in these locomotive brake systems has 
significantly increased their reliability over standard mechanical 
gauges. Furthermore, the objections raised were not based on the proper 
operation or performance of the electronic gauges.
    The lengthening of the testing interval for these gauges is based 
on recommendations made by a committee formed to address issues related 
to the operation of electronically controlled locomotive brake systems 
as well as the training of those individuals using this new technology. 
In May of 1996, the RSAC Working Group decided to form a task force to 
consider issues related to electronically controlled locomotive brake 
systems. Rather than create an entirely new task force, the Working 
Group assigned the task to a group of individuals who were members of 
the previously established ``New Technology Joint Information 
Committee.'' This task force, comprised of representatives from the 
railroad industry, rail labor, air brake manufacturers, and locomotive 
manufacturers, addressed several issues related to these braking 
systems including: design; training; inspection and testing; and 
maintenance. The task force concluded that additional regulation of 
these types of locomotive braking systems was unnecessary since the 
current regulations or waivers sufficiently address the training, 
inspection, and maintenance of these systems and any additional design 
requirement would most likely not enhance safety and would probably 
restrict the advancement of new technology. The task force recommended 
that part 229 be revised to increase the testing interval for these 
electronic gauges from 92 days to an annual cycle. The task force based 
this recommendation on its finding that the electronic gauges used in 
these brake system are much more reliable than standard mechanical 
gauges due to the following: the electronic components have longer life 
cycles than those in mechanical gauges; the accuracy and durability of 
the transducer have been extended; and internal computer diagnostics 
detect inaccuracies before gauges becoming defective under federal 
regulations. FRA continues to agree with these findings and has 
retained the proposed extension in this final rule.
    The final rule does not include the proposed requirement that 
locomotive compressors be tested for capacity by orifice test during 
the annual test required by Sec. 229.27. FRA agrees that the 
requirement for orifice testing of locomotive air compressors was 
eliminated from part 229 in 1980. See 45 FR 21097. At that time, FRA 
found that such a test was not useful in detecting a bad compressor 
and, thus, found no reason to retain the requirement. Although the 
requirement to perform orifice testing remained in Sec. 232.10(c), 
FRA's elimination of the requirement from part 229 rendered the 
provision in part 232 meaningless. As no railroad has performed orifice 
testing since 1980 and because FRA is not aware of any safety hazard 
being created due to the elimination of such testing, FRA agrees that 
there is no justification for reinstating the requirement to perform 
such testing.

Amendments to 49 CFR Part 231

    The final rule retains the proposed clarifying changes in the 
applicability section of this part. FRA received no comments objecting 
to the proposed modifications. The changes are intended to make the 
regulatory exceptions consistent with the exceptions contained in the 
statute. The added exceptions are taken directly from 49 U.S.C. 20301 
(previously codified at 45 U.S.C. 6). It is noted that the words 
``freight and other non-passenger'' have been added to the exceptions 
in order to remain consistent with Congress' intent when the statutory 
exceptions were created. At the time that Congress provided an 
exception from the requirements of the Safety Appliance Acts, Congress 
did not and could not envision that the equipment used in these 
operations would be modified for the purposes of hauling passengers, 
which FRA has discovered with regard to four-wheel coal cars. 
Consequently, the final rule makes clear that FRA will except only 
freight operations or other non-passenger operations that employ the 
types of equipment contained in these amendments.
    The final rule also retains the proposed movement of the provisions 
related to drawbars from part 232, where they are currently contained, 
to this part. FRA believes that part 231 is a more logical place for 
the drawbar provisions to be located as they are not a brake system 
component but a generic safety appliance. Although the final rule 
adopts the drawbar provisions as proposed, the changes made to the 
language of those provisions when proposed in the NPRM were for clarity 
and readability and were not intended to change any of the basic 
drawbar requirements contained in part 232.

49 CFR Part 232

Subpart A--General

Section 232.1  Purpose and Scope

    Paragraph (a) contains a formal statement of the final rule's 
purpose and scope. FRA intends the final rule to cover all brake 
systems and brake components used in all freight train operations and 
all other non-passenger train operations.
    Paragraph (b) contains the dates upon which railroads covered by 
this part will be required to comply with the requirements contained in 
this final rule. FRA recognizes the interrelationship between the 
proper training of railroad personnel and implementation of many of the 
inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements contained in the 
final rule. FRA realizes that in order for railroads to comply with 
many of the requirements related to the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance of equipment and the requirements regarding the movement of 
defective equipment, the railroad and its contractors must first be 
provided sufficient time to assess its current training program and 
develop and implement a training program consistent with the 
requirements of this part. The railroad or contractor then needs time 
to provide the necessary training to its employees without causing 
manpower shortages in its operations. FRA also recognizes that the 
costs of the training requirements are somewhat substantial and may 
prevent a railroad or contractor from completing the necessary training 
in a short period of time. Therefore, this final rule provides 
railroads and contractors with three years to develop and implement the 
required training. This period is consistent with the time requested by 
the AAR and other railroads. It is also consistent with the requirement 
to provide refresher training at least every three years and will allow 
a railroad or contractor to have one-third of its inspection forces 
receive the necessary refresher training each year after the initial 
training period is complete. Consequently, FRA will require compliance 
with all the requirements contained in Sec. 232.15, subpart B,

[[Page 4145]]

subpart C, and subpart F of this final rule at the conclusion of the 
three-year period provided for conducting the required training.
    This paragraph makes clear that the maintenance requirements 
contained in subpart D will become applicable to all railroads to which 
this part applies approximately six months after the issuance of this 
final rule. Virtually all of the requirements contained in this subpart 
are existing regulatory requirements or prevailing industry practice, 
and FRA sees no reason to significantly delay their implementation. FRA 
notes that this subpart requires certain tasks to be performed by a 
``qualified person'; however, FRA will not subject railroads to the 
qualification and training requirements contained in this final rule 
for individuals performing these tasks until the conclusion of the 
three-year period provided for conducting the required training.
    This paragraph also clarifies that the general provisions contained 
in subpart A of this final rule regarding applicability, definitions, 
waivers, responsibility for compliance, penalties, preemptive effect, 
special approval procedures, availability of records, and information 
collection will become applicable approximately sixty days after the 
issuance of this final rule. Due to the enforcement implications 
connected with these provisions, it is both necessary and desirable to 
have the provisions become applicable as quickly as possible.
    This paragraph also makes clear that the requirements related to 
end-of-train devices contained in subpart E become applicable to all 
trains operating on track which is part of the general system of 
transportation approximately sixty days after issuance of the final 
rule. As the requirements related to these devices have existed for a 
number of years and because this final rule modifies those requirement 
to a very limited extent, FRA believes that railroads should have no 
problem complying with the requirements in this subpart in the period 
of time provided. Furthermore, the requirements contained in this 
subpart apply to both freight and passenger trains that operate on the 
general system of transportation and are not contingent on the 
performance of additional training.
    FRA also recognizes that there are certain aspects of this final 
rule that provide operational flexibility to the railroads. Due to this 
flexibility, FRA believes that some railroads will desire the authority 
to comply with the final rule as soon as their employees have been 
properly trained. Therefore, paragraph (c) contains a provision which 
allows a railroad to notify FRA in writing that it is willing to begin 
compliance with the requirements of the final rule sometime earlier 
than the three years provided. However, FRA wishes to make clear that 
it does not intend for railroads to take advantage of the flexibility 
provided under some of the provisions of the final rule unless the 
railroad is willing to comply with all the requirements contained in 
the final rule.
    Paragraph (d) of this section clarifies that any railroad that 
operates on the general railroad system of transportation that is not 
operating pursuant to the requirements contained in this final rule or 
the requirements contained in the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 
at 49 CFR part 238, shall continue to comply with the requirements 
contained in part 232 as it existed prior to the issuance of this final 
rule, which have been moved to Appendix B of the new part 232. Thus, a 
railroad will continue to be subject to the existing inspection, 
testing, and maintenance provisions contained in part 232 until the 
railroad is required to operate under the provisions of this final rule 
(i.e. three years for most requirements) or until the railroad 
voluntarily commits to operate under the provisions of this final rule, 
whichever comes first. FRA also intends for operations and trains which 
currently operate under the existing part 232 to continue to operate 
pursuant to those provisions if the operation is not addressed by 
either this final rule or part 238. It should be noted that FRA does 
not intend to extend the coverage of part 232 beyond the types of 
operations that are currently subject to the requirements of part 232. 
Thus, FRA has explicitly excluded railroads that operate only on track 
inside an installation that is not part of the general railroad system 
of transportation, rapid transit operations that are not connected with 
the general system, and operations specifically excluded by statute.

Section 232.3  Applicability

    As a general matter, paragraph (a) of this section establishes that 
this final rule applies to all railroads that operate freight or other 
non-passenger train service on standard gage track which is part of the 
general railroad system of transportation. In paragraph (b) of this 
section, FRA makes clear that subpart E of this final rule applies to 
all trains that operate on the general system regardless of whether the 
train is a freight or passenger train, unless it is specifically 
excepted by the provisions contained in subpart E. Subpart E contains 
the requirements regarding the use of two-way end-of-train devices 
which were issued on January 2, 1997 and became effective on July 1, 
1997. Although the final rule contains some minor changes to these 
requirements, principally for clarification, the provisions contained 
in Subpart E are very similar to the existing requirements.
    Paragraph (c) of this section contains a listing of those 
operations and equipment to which FRA does not intend this final rule 
to apply. These include: rapid transit operations not connected to the 
general system; commuter, intercity, and other short-haul passenger 
operations; and tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations. In 
1994, FRA issued a power brake NPRM in which FRA attempted to draft a 
proposal covering all railroad operations. FRA received a multitude of 
comments suggesting that similar treatment of passenger and freight 
operations was not a viable approach due to the significant differences 
in the operating environment and equipment used in these operations. 
Based on these comments, FRA decided to separate passenger and freight 
operations and FRA recently addressed the power brake issues related to 
passenger and commuter operations in a separate final rule specifically 
tailored to those types of operations. See 64 FR 25540. Similarly, the 
Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 directs FRA to 
examine the unique circumstances of tourist and historic railroads when 
establishing safety regulations. The Act, which amended 49 U.S.C. 
20103, states that:

    In prescribing regulations that pertain to railroad safety that 
affect tourist, historic, scenic, or excursion railroad carriers, 
the Secretary of Transportation shall take into consideration any 
financial, operational, or other factors that may be unique to such 
railroad carriers. The Secretary shall submit a report to Congress 
not later than September 30, 1995, on actions taken under this 
subsection.

Pub. L. 103-440, Sec. 217, 108 Stat. 4619, 4624, November 2, 1994.
    In response to this mandate, FRA submitted a report to Congress on 
June 11, 1996, outlining FRA's efforts to tailor its rail safety 
requirements to tourist, historic, scenic, and excursion railroads. 
Notably, FRA has established a Tourist and Historic Railroads Working 
Group formed under RSAC to specifically address the applicability of 
FRA's regulations to these unique types of operations. Consequently, 
any requirements issued by FRA for these types of operations will be 
part of a separate rulemaking proceeding. However, this final rule 
makes clear that

[[Page 4146]]

the provisions of part 232 as they existed prior to this issuance of 
this rule will continue to apply to such operations that are currently 
required to comply with the requirements in order to avoid regulatory 
gaps while power brake provisions for such service are finalized. Part 
232 as it existed prior to the issuance of this final rule is contained 
as appendix B to this new part 232.
    Similar to the amendments made to part 231, paragraphs (c)(6)-
(c)(8) of this section also contain the express exceptions currently 
contained in the statute for certain coal cars and logging cars. These 
provisions are intended to make the regulatory exceptions consistent 
with the exceptions contained in the statute. The exceptions are taken 
directly from 49 U.S.C. 20301 (previously codified at 45 U.S.C. 6). As 
was done in these amendments to part 231, the words ``freight and other 
non-passenger trains'' have been added to the exceptions in order to 
remain consistent with Congress' intent when the statutory exceptions 
were created. At the time that Congress created an exception from the 
requirements of the Safety Appliance Acts, Congress did not and could 
not envision that the equipment used in these operations would be 
modified for the purposes of hauling passengers, which FRA has 
discovered with regard to four-wheel coal cars. Consequently, FRA will 
only except freight and other non-passenger operations which employ the 
types of equipment contained in these amendments.
    Paragraph (d) of this section revokes the Interstate Commerce 
Commission Order 13528, of May 30, 1945, as amended (codified in 
existing Sec. 232.3 and appendix B to part 232), and codifies some of 
the relevant provisions of that Order. Thus, paragraph (d) of this 
section contains a list of pieces of equipment that were excepted from 
the Order's specifications and requirements for operating power-brake 
systems for freight service. FRA believes that the Order is no longer 
completely relevant or necessary and believes that the relevant 
provisions should be incorporated into this section. In addition, FRA 
references current industry standards containing performance 
specifications for freight power brakes in other portions of this final 
rule which mirror the provisions contained in the Order. FRA notes that 
locomotives were removed from the listing as this final rule contains 
various requirements which address locomotives.
    It should be noted that paragraph (a) of this section contains a 
specific reference to private cars and circus trains. As private cars 
are designed to carry passengers and are generally hauled in both 
freight and passenger trains, FRA intends that these types of cars be 
covered by both the recently issued Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards and this final rule. For example, these types of cars will be 
subject to the maintenance and equipment standards applicable to 
passenger equipment but will be covered by the inspection requirements 
contained in this final rule when hauled in a freight train. With 
regard to circus trains, FRA intends for these operations to be covered 
by this final rule due to the unique nature of this equipment and 
operations. Although a circus train carries some employees, the 
majority of the train is composed of freight-type equipment and is 
operated in a manner similar to a freight train. Thus, for consistency 
purposes, FRA intends that this final rule apply to circus train 
operations.

Section 232.5  Definitions

    This section contains an extensive set of definitions. FRA intends 
these definitions to clarify the meaning of important terms as they are 
used in the text of the final rule. The definitions are carefully 
worded in an attempt to minimize the potential for misinterpretation of 
the rule. The final rule retains most of the definitions proposed in 
the NPRM; however, based on the comments received a few new definitions 
have been added and other definitions previously included in the NPRM 
have been slightly modified for clarity. Several of the definitions 
introduce new concepts or new terminologies which require further 
discussion. The following discussion is arranged in the order in which 
the definitions appear in the rule text.
    ``Brake indicator'' means a device, actuated by brake cylinder 
pressure, which indicates whether brakes are applied or released on a 
car. The use of brake indicators in the performance of brake tests is a 
controversial subject. Rail labor organizations correctly maintain that 
brake indicators are not fully reliable indicators of brake application 
and release on each car in the train. Further, railroads correctly 
maintain that reliance on brake indicators is necessary because 
inspectors cannot always safely observe brake application and release. 
FRA believes that brake indicators can serve an important role in the 
performance of brake tests, particularly in those instances where the 
design of the equipment requires inspectors to place themselves in 
potentially dangerous position in order to observe the brake actuation 
or release.
    The definition of ``effective brake'' has been slightly modified 
from the definition proposed in the NPRM. The modification clarifies 
that a car's air brake will not be considered effective if its piston 
travel exceeds the specified limits or if it is not capable of 
producing its designed retarding force. FRA believes this clarifying 
language is necessary to address the concerns raised by certain 
commenters regarding the definitions of ``bind'' and ``foul'' contained 
in this final rule. The definitions of ``bind'' and ``foul'' have been 
retained as proposed in the NPRM. Contrary to the assertions made by 
some commenters, FRA believes that the definitions are sufficiently 
clear. Certain commenters contend that the definitions of these terms 
fail to address every possible condition that could affect the proper 
operation of a brake system. FRA believes that the conditions noted by 
several commenters as not being covered by these definitions are 
sufficiently covered by the clarified definition of ``effective brake'' 
contained in this final rule. Thus, even though a condition may not 
cause a brake to ``bind'' or ``foul'' the condition would cause the 
brake not to be an ``effective brake'' as defined in the final rule. 
Furthermore, FRA does not believe that the definitions of ``bind'' or 
``foul'' are overly broad, as suggested by some commenters, since the 
restrictions addressed are ones which affect the intended movement of a 
component. Therefore, if the restriction is one that does not restrict 
the component's intended movement, then it should not be considered to 
``bind'' or ``foul.''
    The final rule also includes a definition of ``inoperative dynamic 
brake'' which was not specifically contained in the NPRM. This 
definition has been added in response to comments that the term 
``ineffective dynamic brake'' contained in the NPRM was unclear and 
could lead to potential misunderstandings. These commenters contended 
that the rule should use the term ``inoperative dynamic brake'' and 
that its definition should be consistent with the definition of 
``inoperative brake.'' FRA agrees with these comments and thus, the 
final rule replaces the term ``ineffective dynamic brakes'' with the 
term ``inoperative dynamic brake.'' The term ``inoperative dynamic 
brake'' means any dynamic brake that no longer provides its designed 
retarding force on the train, for whatever reason. FRA agrees that the 
use of only this term clarifies the applicability of the requirements 
related

[[Page 4147]]

to dynamic brakes and prevents potential misunderstandings.
    The final rule also defines the term ``initial terminal'' to mean 
the location where a train is originally assembled. This definition is 
consistent with the definition contained in the existing power brake 
regulations. Furthermore, the final rule eliminates the term ``point of 
origin'' proposed in the NPRM. FRA agrees that the proposed definition 
of this term was duplicative of the term ``initial terminal'' and 
merely created potential misunderstandings. Moreover, FRA agrees that 
the problems attempted to be addressed by the use of this term are 
sufficiently addressed by the various inspections required in this 
final rule when adding cars to a train.
    The concept of ``ordered date'' or ``date ordered'' is vital to the 
correct application of this final rule. The terms mean the date on 
which notice to proceed is given by a procuring railroad to a 
contractor or supplier for new equipment. Some of the provisions of the 
final rule apply only to newly constructed equipment. When FRA applies 
a requirement only to equipment ordered on or after a specified date or 
placed in service for the first time on or after a specified date, FRA 
intends to exempt from the requirement, or ``grandfather'' any piece of 
equipment that is both ordered and placed in service for the first time 
before that date. FRA believes this approach will allow railroads to 
minimize, or avoid altogether, any costs associated with changing 
existing purchase orders and yet limit the delay in realizing the 
safety benefits of the requirements contained in this final rule.
    The definitions of ``qualified person'' and ``qualified mechanical 
inspector'' are vital to understanding the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance provisions contained in this final rule. In order to ensure 
a proper understanding of these terms, the final rule clarifies FRA's 
intent regarding the necessary training these individuals are to 
receive and further clarifies the designation of such individuals. 
Although FRA disagrees with the assertions of some commenters that a 
``qualified person'' should only be able to perform a limited number of 
tasks required by this final rule, FRA does agree that the definition 
of ``qualified person'' contained in the NPRM was overly vague and was 
susceptible to abuse and misunderstanding. Therefore, this final rule 
modifies the definition of a ``qualified person'' in order to more 
fully develop what is required by a railroad when designating a person 
as qualified to perform a particular task.
    The definition of ``qualified person'' contained in this final rule 
makes clear that the person is to receive training pursuant to the 
training, qualification, and designation program required under 
Sec. 232.203. The definition also makes clear that although a person 
may be deemed a ``qualified person'' for the performance of one task, 
that same person may or may not be considered a ``qualified person'' 
for the performance of another task. The rule requires that various 
tasks be performed by a ``qualified person.'' For example, these tasks 
include the performance of brake inspections, the handling of defective 
equipment, and the performance of single car tests. FRA would expect 
employees performing these various tasks to have different levels of 
training. For example, a person receiving appropriate training to be 
deemed a ``qualified person'' for the purpose of performing Class II 
brake tests should not be deemed a ``qualified person'' for the purpose 
of moving defective equipment or performing single car or repair track 
air brake tests, unless specific training is provided that individual 
which specifically covers those tasks. The final rule stresses that the 
individual must have received appropriate training to perform the task 
for which the railroad is assigning the person responsibility.
    Contrary to the assertions of certain commenters, FRA does not 
intend for term ``qualified person'' to be synonymous with the term 
train crew member. Although the NPRM discussed the fact that a train 
crew member could be considered a ``qualified person'' for performing 
many of the brake inspections required by the rule, FRA does not intend 
for a train crew member to be deemed a ``qualified person'' for 
performing every task covered by this final rule which is to be 
performed by a ``qualified person.'' There are various tasks covered by 
this final rule (i.e., single car and repair track air brake test) that 
must be performed by a ``qualified person'' which would require an 
individual to receive more specialized and in-depth training than that 
received by a person strictly performing brake inspections. For some 
tasks a ``qualified person'' may have to be an individual in the 
railroad's repair or mechanical department. The final rule makes clear 
that the railroad is responsible for determining that the person has 
the knowledge and skills necessary to perform the required function for 
which the person is assigned responsibility and for maintaining 
sufficient records documenting this knowledge and skill.
    The final rule also retains the proposed definition of ``qualified 
mechanical inspector'' (QMI) with slight modification to ensure clarity 
and avoid potential misunderstanding. The final rule defines a QMI as a 
``qualified person'' who as a part of the training, qualification, and 
designation program required under Sec. 232.203 has received 
instruction and training that includes ``hands-on'' experience (under 
appropriate supervision or apprenticeship) in one or more of the 
following functions: trouble-shooting, inspection, testing, 
maintenance, or repair of the specific train brake components and 
systems for which the inspector is assigned responsibility. This person 
shall also possess a current understanding of what is required to 
properly repair and maintain the safety-critical brake components for 
which the person is assigned responsibility. Further, a QMI shall be a 
person whose primary responsibility includes work generally consistent 
with the above-referenced functions.
    The definition contained in this final rule clarifies the intent of 
the NPRM by specifically stating that a QMI must be properly trained 
and have a primary responsibility in the function of trouble-shooting, 
inspection, testing, maintenance, or repair of the specific train brake 
systems for which the inspector is assigned responsibility. The 
definition also clarifies that a QMI must possess a current 
understanding of what is required to properly repair and maintain the 
safety-critical brake or mechanical components for which the person is 
assigned responsibility. The concept of QMI is premised on the idea 
that railroads will be permitted to move trains extended distances 
between brake inspections if the trains are inspected by highly 
qualified individuals. As no trains are currently permitted to move the 
distances between brake inspections permitted by this rule, FRA 
believes that the inspections these trains receive must be of very high 
quality and must be performed by individuals who can not only identify 
a particular defective condition but who have the knowledge and 
experience to know how the particular defective condition affects other 
parts of the brake system or mechanical components and who have an 
understanding of what might have caused a particular defective 
condition. FRA also believes that in order for a person to become 
highly proficient in the performance of a particular task that person 
must perform the task on a repeated and consistent basis. As it is 
almost impossible to develop and impose specific experience 
requirements, FRA believes that a requirement that the person's primary

[[Page 4148]]

responsibility be in one or more of the specifically identified work 
areas and that the person have a basic understanding of what is 
required to properly repair and maintain safety-critical brake 
components is necessary to ensure the high quality inspections 
envisioned by the rule.
    In order to clarify the meaning of ``primary responsibility'' as 
used in the definition of QMI, the final rule contains a definition of 
the term. As a rule of thumb FRA will consider a person's ``primary 
responsibility'' to be the task that the person performs at least 50 
percent of the time. Therefore, a person who spends at least 50 percent 
of the time engaged in the duty of either inspecting, testing, 
maintaining, troubleshooting, or repairing train brakes systems may be 
designated as a QMI; provided, the person is properly trained to 
perform the tasks assigned and possesses a current understanding of 
what is required to properly repair and maintain the safety-critical 
brake components for which he or she is assigned responsibility. 
However, FRA will consider the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding an employee's duties in determining a person's ``primary 
responsibility.'' For example, a person may not spend 50 percent of 
their day engaged in any one readily identifiable type of activity; in 
those situations FRA will have to look at the circumstances involved on 
a case-by-case basis.
    The definition of QMI largely rules out the possibility of train 
crew members being designated as these highly qualified inspectors 
since the primary responsibility, as defined above, of virtually all 
current train crew personnel is the operation of trains and for the 
most part train crew personnel do not possess a current understanding 
of what is required to properly repair and maintain the safety-critical 
brake components that are inspected during the various required brake 
tests. FRA provides a clear definition of qualified mechanical 
inspector so that a differentiation can be made between the 
comprehensive knowledge and training possessed by a professional 
mechanical employee, and the more specialized training and general 
knowledge possessed by train crews. FRA intends the definition to allow 
the members of the trades associated with the testing and maintenance 
of equipment such as carmen, machinists, and electricians to become 
qualified mechanical inspectors. However, membership in labor 
organizations or completion of apprenticeship programs associated with 
these crafts is not required to be a qualified mechanical inspector. 
The two primary qualifications are possession of the knowledge required 
to do the job and a primary work assignment inspecting, testing, 
maintaining, troubleshooting, or repairing the equipment.
    The definition of ``solid block of cars'' has been modified from 
that proposed in the NPRM. Although FRA believes the definition it 
proposed is consistent with current interpretations and enforcement of 
the existing requirement, FRA agrees with some of the commenters that 
the definition may have been too narrow and did not directly address 
FRA's primary concern, the block of cars itself. Rather than attempt to 
limit the addition of certain blocks of cars to a train by requiring 
that the entire train be reinspected if the block of cars is not 
composed of cars from only one other train, the final rule specifically 
addresses the inspection of a ``solid block of cars'' in the various 
inspection provisions based on the composition of the block. Thus, the 
final rule defines a ``solid block of cars'' as two or more freight 
cars consecutively coupled together and added to a train as a single 
unit. As FRA's primary concern is the condition of the block of cars 
being added to the train especially when the block of cars is made up 
of cars from more than one train, the final rule will permit a solid 
block of cars to be added to a train without triggering a requirement 
to perform a Class I brake test on the entire train. However, depending 
on the make-up of that block of cars, certain inspections will have to 
be performed on that block of cars at the location where it is added to 
the train. Therefore, the final rule places the emphasis on the 
inspection of the cars being added to the train rather than requiring a 
complete reinspection of the entire train.
    The final rule also adds a definition of ``unit train'' and ``cycle 
train'' in order to clarify the requirement regarding the performance 
of a Class I brake test on such a train every 3,000 miles. Although the 
preamble to the NPRM made clear that this requirement was intended to 
apply to trains that are operated in captive service, the proposed rule 
text failed to specifically identify which trains were required to 
receive such attention. Thus, in order to remain consistent with FRA's 
intent, the final rule text has been modified to include the term 
``unit or cycle train.'' ``Unit train'' or ``cycle train'' means a 
train that, except for the changing of locomotive power and the removal 
or replacement of defective equipment, remains coupled as a consist and 
continuously operates from location A to location B and back to 
location A. These trains are also referred to as captive service trains 
as they basically operate in one continuous loop. Currently, trains 
which operate in this fashion can operate almost indefinitely on one 
initial terminal inspection and then a continuing series of 1,000-mile 
inspections. FRA believes that it is necessary for these trains to 
receive comprehensive brake inspections on a periodic basis in order to 
ensure their safe and proper operation.
    The definitions of ``transfer train'' and ``switching service'' are 
somewhat interrelated since the determination as to whether, at a 
minimum, a transfer train brake test is required is based on whether 
the movement is a switching movement or a train movement. It is noted 
that the definition of ``yard train'' contained in the NPRM has been 
eliminated from this final rule. As the term was not used in the NPRM 
and has not been used in this final rule, FRA finds no need to retain 
the definition. Furthermore, the determination as to whether or not a 
yard train is required to be inspected and tested as a transfer train 
is based on whether the train is engaged in a train movement.
    The final rule slightly modifies the proposed definition of 
``transfer train'' to clarify that such a train may pick up and deliver 
freight equipment while en route to its destination. Such activity is 
currently conducted by these trains, and it was not FRA's intent when 
issuing the NPRM to prohibit these trains from being used in this 
fashion. The final rule also retains the definition of ``switching 
service,'' which is defined as the classification of cars according to 
commodity or destination; assembling of cars for train movements; 
changing the position of cars for purposes of loading, unloading, or 
weighing; placing of locomotives or cars for repair or storage; or 
moving of rail equipment in connection with work service that does not 
constitute a train movement. Thus, a train engaged in switching service 
carries the potential of becoming a transfer train, subject to a 
transfer train's testing requirements, if the movement it will be 
engaged in is considered a ``train movement'' rather than a ``switching 
movement.'' FRA's determination of whether the movement of cars is a 
``train movement,'' subject to the requirements of this section, or a 
``switching movement'' is and will be based on the voluminous case law 
developed by various courts of the United States.
    FRA's general rule of thumb as to whether a trip constitutes a 
``train movement'' requires five or more cars coupled together that are 
hauled a distance of at least one mile without a

[[Page 4149]]

stop to set off or pick up a car and not moving for the purpose of 
assembling or disassembling a train. However, FRA may consider 
movements of less than one mile ``train movements'' if various 
circumstances exist. In determining whether a particular movement 
constitutes a ``train movement,'' FRA conducts a multi-factor analysis 
based upon the discussions contained in various court decisions on the 
subject. See e.g. United States v. Seaboard Air Line R. R. Co., 361 
U.S. 78 (1959); Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Co. v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 543 (1919). The following factors are taken into 
consideration by FRA: The purpose of the movement; the distance 
traveled without a stop to set out or pick up cars; the number of cars 
hauled; and the hazards associated with the particular route traveled 
(e.g., the existence of public or private crossings with or without 
crossing protection, the steepness of the grade, the existence of 
curves, any other conditions that minimize the locomotive engineer's 
sight distance, and any other conditions that may create a greater need 
for power brakes during the movement). The existence of any of these 
hazards would tend to weigh towards the finding of a ``train 
movement,'' since these are the types of hazards against which the 
power brake provisions of the Federal rail safety laws were designed to 
give protection.

Section 232.7 Waivers

    This section sets forth the procedures for seeking waivers of 
compliance with the requirements of this rule. Requests for such 
waivers may be filed by any interested party. In reviewing such 
requests, FRA conducts investigations to determine if a deviation from 
the general criteria can be made without compromising or diminishing 
rail safety.

Section 232.9  Responsibility for Compliance

    General compliance requirements are contained in this section. In 
accordance with the ``use'' or ``haul'' language previously contained 
in the Safety Appliance Acts (49 U.S.C. chapter 203), and with FRA's 
general rulemaking authority under the Federal railroad safety laws, 
the final rule retains the proposed requirement that any train, 
railroad car, or locomotive covered by this part will be considered 
``in use'' prior to departure but after it receives or should have 
received the necessary tests and inspections required for movement. FRA 
will no longer necessarily wait for a piece of equipment with a power 
brake defect to be hauled before issuing a violation report and 
recommending a civil penalty, a practice frequently criticized by the 
railroads. FRA believes that this approach will increase FRA's ability 
to prevent the movement of defective equipment that creates a potential 
safety hazard to both the public and railroad employees. FRA does not 
feel that this approach increases the railroads' burden since equipment 
should not be operated if it is found in defective condition in the 
pre-departure tests and inspections, unless permitted by the 
regulations. In fact, this modification of FRA's perspectives as to 
when a piece of equipment will be considered ``in use'' was fully 
discussed by members of the Working Group and representatives of both 
rail labor and rail management supported this approach, agreeing that 
the current practice of waiting for a defective piece of equipment to 
depart from a location does very little to promote or ensure the safety 
of trains. FRA received no comments objecting to this approach in 
response to the NPRM.
    FRA currently interprets the ``use'' or ``haul'' language 
previously contained in the Safety Appliance Acts narrowly to require 
that a train or car not in compliance with the power brake regulations 
actually engage in a train movement before a violation under the power 
brake regulations could be assessed against a railroad. Although this 
interpretation is in accordance with existing case law, FRA believes 
that a broader interpretation is possible based upon the case law 
interpreting the ``use'' language contained in the Safety Appliance 
Acts and based upon FRA's general rulemaking authority under the 
Federal railroad safety laws. Based upon both these authorities, FRA 
finds that it is not necessary to require that a train or car engaged 
in a train movement prior to FRA assessing a violation under the power 
brake regulations. The fact that the train or car is being used by a 
railroad, has been or should have been inspected by the railroad, and 
will be engaged in a train movement while in non-compliance with the 
requirements contained in this part is sufficient to allow a violation 
to be assessed.
    This section also clarifies FRA's position that the requirements 
contained in these rules are applicable to any ``person,'' as broadly 
defined in Sec. 232.11, that performs any function required by the 
proposed rules. Although various sections of the final rule address the 
duties of a railroad, FRA intends that any person who performs any 
action on behalf of a railroad or any person who performs any action 
covered by the final rule is required to perform that action in the 
same manner as required of a railroad or be subject to FRA enforcement 
action. For example, private car owners and contract shippers that 
perform duties covered by these regulations would be required to 
perform those duties in the same manner as required of a railroad.
    Paragraph (c) states that any ``person'' as broadly defined in 
Sec. 232.11, that performs any function or task required by this part 
will be deemed to have consented to FRA inspection of the person's 
operation to the extent necessary to ensure that the function or task 
is being performed in accordance with the requirements of this part. 
This provision was contained in the NPRM, and FRA received no comments 
opposing the position. This provision is intended to put railroads, 
contractors, and manufacturers that elect to perform tasks required by 
this part on notice that they are consenting to FRA's inspection for 
rail safety purposes of that portion of their operation that is 
performing the function or task required by this part. In most cases, 
this function or task involves a contractor's performance of certain 
required brake inspections or the performance of specified maintenance 
on cars, such as conducting single car or repair track tests on behalf 
of a railroad. FRA believes that if a person is going to perform a task 
required by this part, FRA must have the ability to view the 
performance of such a task to ensure that it is conducted in compliance 
with federal regulations. Without such oversight, FRA believes that the 
requirements contained in this the regulation would become illusory and 
could be easily circumvented by some railroads. FRA believes that it 
has the statutory authority pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20107 to inspect any 
facility or operation that performs functions or tasks required under 
this part, and this provision is merely intended to make that authority 
clear to all persons performing such tasks or functions.

Section 232.11  Penalties

    This section identifies the penalties that may be imposed upon a 
person, including a railroad or an independent contractor providing 
goods or services to a railroad, that violates any requirement of this 
part. These penalties are authorized by 49 U.S.C. 21301, 21302, and 
21304. The penalty provision parallels penalty provisions included in 
numerous other safety regulations issued by FRA. Essentially, any 
person who violates any requirement of this part or causes the 
violation of any such requirement will be subject to a civil penalty of 
at least $500 and not more than $11,000 per violation. Civil penalties 
may be

[[Page 4150]]

assessed against individuals only for willful violations, and where a 
grossly negligent violation or a pattern of repeated violations creates 
an imminent hazard of death or injury to persons, or causes death or 
injury, a penalty not to exceed $22,000 per violation may be assessed. 
In addition, each day a violation continues will constitute a separate 
offense. It should be noted that, the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation 
Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-410 Stat. 890, 28 U.S.C. 2461 note, 
as amended by the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 Pub. L. 104-
134, April 26, 1996 required agencies to adjust for inflation the 
maximum civil monetary penalties within the agencies jurisdiction. See 
63 FR 11623. The resulting $11,000 and $22,000 maximum penalties noted 
in this section were determined by applying the criteria set forth in 
sections 4 and 5 of the statute to the maximum penalties otherwise 
provided for in the Federal railroad safety laws. Finally, paragraph 
(b) makes clear that a person may be subject to criminal penalties 
under 49 U.S.C. 21311 for knowingly and willfully falsifying reports 
required by these regulations. FRA believes that the inclusion of 
penalty provisions for failure to comply with the regulations is 
important in ensuring that compliance is achieved.
    The final rule includes a schedule of civil penalties in appendix A 
to this part. Because such penalty schedules are statements of policy, 
notice and comment were not required prior to its issuance. See 5 
U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A).

Section 232.13  Preemptive Effect

    This section informs the public as to FRA's intention regarding the 
preemptive effect of the final rule. While the presence or absence of 
such a section does not conclusively establish the preemptive effect of 
a final rule, it informs the public concerning the statutory provisions 
which govern the preemptive effect of the rule and FRA's intentions 
concerning preemption. Paragraph (a) points out the preemptive 
provision contained in 49 U.S.C. 20106, which provides that all 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary relating to railroad safety 
preempt any State law, regulation, or order covering the same subject 
matter, except a provision necessary to eliminate or reduce an 
essentially local safety hazard that is not incompatible with a Federal 
law, regulation, or order and that does not unreasonably burden 
interstate commerce. With the exception of a provision directed at an 
essentially local safety hazard that is not inconsistent with Federal 
law, regulation, or order and that does not unreasonably burden 
interstate commerce, 49 U.S.C. 20106 will preempt any State regulatory 
agency rule covering the same subject matter as the regulations 
contained in this final rule.
    Paragraph (b) of this section also informs the public of the 
potential for preemption under various other statutory and 
constitutional provisions. These include: the Locomotive Inspection Act 
(now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20701-20703), the Safety Appliance Acts (now 
codified at 49 U.S.C. 20301-20304), and the Commerce Clause. FRA is not 
expressing positions as to whether or to what extent preemption exists 
with regard to any of the provisions noted above because doing so 
requires a lengthy analysis for each component which, in the aggregate, 
would be so long as to impair the usefulness of this document for most 
readers. As FRA lacks the authority to make binding preemption 
determinations, FRA's purpose in identifying these provisions is merely 
to inform the public of the existence of these provisions and that 
voluminous case law exists regarding preemption under each of the 
provisions.
    Paragraph (c) further informs the public that FRA does not intend 
to preempt provisions of State criminal law that impose sanctions for 
reckless conduct that leads to actual loss of life, injury, or damage 
to property, whether such provisions apply specifically to railroad 
employees or generally to the public at large.

Section 232.15  Movement of Defective Equipment

    This section contains the provisions regarding the movement of 
equipment with defective brakes without civil penalty liability. Except 
as noted in the discussion below, the provisions contained in this 
section are almost identical to the provisions proposed in the 1998 
NPRM and incorporate the stringent conditions currently contained in 49 
U.S.C. 20302, 20303, 21302, and 21304 (previously codified at 45 U.S.C. 
13). The language used in some of the provisions has been slightly 
modified to ensure consistency with existing statutory requirements. As 
pointed out in the previous discussion, most of the alternative 
proposals received by FRA in response to the 1994 NPRM, the subsequent 
RSAC Working Group meetings, and the 1998 NPRM all contained provisions 
regarding the movement of equipment with defective brakes which are in 
direct conflict with the statutory requirements. See ``Overview of 
Comments and General FRA Conclusions'' portion of the preamble under 
the heading ``Movement of Equipment with Defective Brakes.'' FRA 
continues to believe that the requirements related to the movement of 
equipment with defective brakes retained in this final rule are not 
only consistent with the statutory requirements, but also ensure the 
safe and proper movement of defective equipment and clarify the duties 
imposed on a railroad when moving such equipment.
    Paragraph (a) of this section contains various parameters which 
must exist in order for a railroad to be deemed to be hauling a piece 
of equipment with defective brakes for repairs without civil penalty 
liability. The final rule modifies the language used in some of the 
proposed general provisions contained in this paragraph to accurately 
reflect the language contained in the existing statutory provisions 
pertaining to the movement of equipment with defective brakes. The 
final rule replaces the term ``repair location'' with the phrase 
``location where necessary repairs can be performed.'' FRA agrees with 
the comments of certain labor representatives that the proposed 
language could have been interpreted as being somewhat contrary to the 
language used in the existing statute, which was not FRA's intent.
    The vast majority of the requirements contained in this paragraph 
should pose absolutely no additional burden to railroads as they are 
merely a codification of existing statutory requirements. The only 
requirement being retained from the 1998 NPRM in this paragraph that is 
not currently mandated is the requirement that all cars or locomotives 
found with defective or inoperative braking equipment be tagged as bad 
ordered with a designation of the location where the necessary repairs 
can and will be effectuated and that a qualified person determine the 
safety parameters for moving a piece of defective equipment. Although 
these are new requirements, most railroads already tag defective brake 
equipment upon discovery of the defect. It should be noted that the 
final rule clarifies that the person required to make the 
determinations regarding the safe movement of defective equipment is to 
be a ``qualified person'' as defined in the final rule. The intent of 
FRA when issuing the NPRM was to require the determinations to be made 
by these individuals. FRA believes that the training requirements 
contained in the final rule for designating a person qualified to 
perform a specific task will ensure that the individual possesses the 
appropriate knowledge and skills to

[[Page 4151]]

perform the assigned task. Furthermore, the determinations that are 
required to be made in the final rule are currently made by individuals 
who FRA believes will be trained and designated under the final rule as 
qualified persons.
    In paragraph (a), FRA retains the existing and proposed requirement 
that equipment with defective brakes shall not depart from or be moved 
beyond a location where the necessary repairs to the equipment can be 
performed. Therefore, if a car or locomotive is found with defective 
brakes during any of the proposed brake inspections or while the piece 
of equipment is en route and the location where the defective equipment 
is discovered is a place where repairs of the type needed can be 
performed, that car or locomotive shall not be moved from that location 
until the necessary repairs are effectuated. However, if repairs to the 
defective condition cannot be performed at the location where the 
defect is discovered, or should have been discovered, the final rule 
makes clear that the railroad is permitted to move the equipment with 
the defective condition only to the nearest location where the 
necessary repairs can be performed.
    Paragraph (a) also retains the proposed codification and 
clarification of the statutory restrictions on the movement of 
equipment with defective brakes onto the line of a connecting railroad. 
Hence, the delivery of defective equipment in interchange is covered by 
these restrictions. In addition to fulfilling the other requirements 
set out in this section, a railroad seeking relief from civil penalty 
liability must show that the connecting railroad has elected to accept 
the non-complying equipment and that the point of repair on the 
connecting railroad's line, where the equipment will be repaired, is no 
further than the point where the repairs could have been made on the 
line where the equipment was first found to be defective.
    Paragraph (b) of this section contains the specific requirements 
regarding the tagging of equipment found with defective brake 
components. The requirements contained in this paragraph are very 
similar to the tagging requirements proposed in the NPRM and those 
currently contained in part 215, regarding the movement of equipment 
not in compliance with the Freight Car Safety Standards, and are 
generally consistent with how most railroads currently tag equipment 
found with defective brakes. The final rule retains the proposed 
requirement that a record or copy of each tag removed from a defective 
piece of equipment be retained for 90 days and made available to FRA 
within 15 days of request. FRA does not believe that the proposed time 
frames need to be expanded as suggested by some commenters. The 
provisions are identical to those contained in part 215, regarding 
freight car defects and they have proven to be sufficient to meet the 
needs of FRA. The record keeping requirements are intended to aid FRA 
in its enforcement of the regulations. As the agency is able to inspect 
and oversee only a small portion of the railroad operations taking 
place across the country at any one time, the need for railroads to 
maintain records of such operations is essential for FRA to carry out 
its mission of ensuring that all railroads are operating in the safest 
possible manner and that they comply with those minimum Federal 
standards designed to ensure that safety.
    Paragraph (b) also recognizes that the industry may attempt to 
develop some type of automated tracking system capable of retaining the 
information required by this section and tracking defective equipment 
electronically. Thus, this paragraph permits the use of an automated 
tracking system in lieu of directly tagging the equipment if the 
automated system is approved for use by FRA. Contrary to the 
recommendations of some commenters, FRA is not willing to permit the 
implementation of an automated tracking system without its approval. As 
an adequate automated system for tracking defective equipment does not 
currently exist on most railroads, FRA does not believe it is prudent, 
from a safety perspective, to allow implementation of a tracking system 
for which FRA would not have a prior opportunity to assess to ensure 
the system's accessibility, security, and accuracy. Furthermore, FRA 
tends to agree with the assertion of various labor representatives that 
the physical tagging of defective equipment provides a railroad's 
ground and operational forces the ability to visually locate and 
identify defective equipment at the time they see it rather than 
referring to an electronic database for such information.
    This paragraph also contains language not previously included in 
the NPRM regarding FRA's oversight of an automated tracking system that 
is approved by FRA. FRA believes these provisions as necessary to 
ensure the agency's ability to monitor such systems and potentially 
prohibit the use of the system if it is found deficient. The provisions 
make clear that an automated tracking system approved for use by FRA be 
capable of being reviewed and monitored by FRA at any time. This 
paragraph also notifies the railroads that FRA reserves the right to 
prohibit the use of a previously approved automated tracking system if 
FRA subsequently finds it to be insecure, inaccessible, or inadequate. 
Such a determination would have to be in writing and include the basis 
for taking such action.
    Paragraph (c) retains the proposed provision restricting the 
movement of a vehicle with defective brakes for the purpose of 
unloading or purging only if it is necessary for the safe repair of the 
car. This restriction is fully consistent with the statutory provisions 
regarding the movement of equipment with defective safety appliances.
    Paragraph (d) retains with slight modification the method of 
calculating the percentage of operative power brakes (operative primary 
brakes) in a train that was proposed in the NPRM. This paragraph 
retains the general method of calculating the percentage on a control 
valve basis. However, FRA agrees with the comments of the NTSB and 
certain labor representatives that the method proposed in the NPRM did 
not take into consideration the possibility of a control valve being 
cut in when the brakes it controls are inoperative. Therefore, this 
final rule clarifies that a control valve will not be considered cut-in 
if the brakes controlled by that valve are inoperative. Although the 
statute discusses the percentage of operative brakes in terms of a 
percentage of vehicles, the statute was written nearly a century ago, 
and at that time the only way to cut out the brakes on a car or 
locomotive was to cut out the entire unit. See 49 U.S.C. 
20302(a)(5)(B). Today, many types of freight equipment can have their 
brakes cut out on a per-truck basis, and FRA expects this trend to 
increase as the technology is applied to newly acquired equipment. This 
final rule merely adopts a method of calculating the percentage of 
operative brakes in a train based on the design of equipment used today 
and, thus, a means to more accurately reflect the true braking ability 
of the train as a whole. FRA believes that this method of calculation 
is consistent with the intent of Congress when it drafted the statutory 
requirement and simply recognizes the technological advancements made 
in braking systems over the last century.
    Paragraph (d) also retains the proposed list of conditions that are 
not to be considered inoperative power brakes for purposes of 
calculating the percentage of operative brakes. Certain commenters 
recommended that FRA eliminate the proposed listing of conditions that 
would not be considered as rendering the brakes inoperative, contending 
that the listed conditions

[[Page 4152]]

should not be excluded from consideration. FRA disagrees with these 
commenters. The purpose of the calculation is to determine the 
percentage of operative brakes, and the conditions listed in the 
proposal and retained in this final rule do not render the power brakes 
inoperative. Many of the listed conditions constitute a violation under 
other provisions contained in the final rule or another regulatory 
provision for which separate penalties are provided.
    A cut-out or ineffective power brake is an inoperative power brake, 
but the failure or cutting out of a secondary brake system does not 
result in inoperative power brakes; for example, failure of the dynamic 
brake does not render the power brake inoperative. Furthermore, 
inoperative handbrakes or power brakes overdue for maintenance or 
stenciling do not render the power brakes inoperative on the car and 
should not be deemed inoperative power brakes for purposes of the 
calculation. The final rule and other regulations contain separate 
penalties for operating a car that has an inoperative handbrake, is 
overdue for maintenance, or lacks the proper stenciling or marking if 
not being properly hauled for repairs. In addition, although a car may 
be found with piston travel that exceeds the Class I brake test limits, 
such excess travel does not render the brakes inoperative until the 
piston travel exceeds the outside limits established for that 
particular type of piston design. However, piston travel that exceeds 
the applicable Class I brake test limits would be considered a 
defective condition if the piston travel were not adjusted at the time 
that a Class I brake test were performed, and the final rule contains 
an appropriate penalty for such a condition.
    Paragraph (e) contains the requirements regarding the placement of 
cars in a train that have inoperative brakes. The requirements 
contained in this final rule are virtually identical to the 
requirements proposed in the NPRM. The restrictions contained in this 
paragraph are consistent with current industry practice and are part of 
almost every major railroad's operating rules. This paragraph prohibits 
the placing of a vehicle with inoperative brakes at the rear of the 
train. In addition, this paragraph retains the prohibition on the 
consecutive placing of more than two vehicles with inoperative brakes, 
as test track demonstrations have indicated that when three consecutive 
cars have their brakes cut-out it is not always possible to obtain an 
emergency brake application on trailing cars. However, as it was FRA's 
intent to incorporate current industry practice when proposing the 
requirements, the final rule slightly modifies the requirement 
regarding the placement of multi-unit articulated equipment. When 
proposing the restrictions regarding multi-unit articulated equipment, 
FRA extrapolated the restriction based on the requirements regarding 
the consecutive placing of defective cars. Based on its consideration 
of the comments, FRA has determined that the proposed requirement 
prohibiting the placement of such equipment with consecutive control 
valves cut out is more restrictive than current practice on many 
railroads, which was not FRA's intent when drafting the proposal. 
Consequently, in order to remain consistent with existing industry 
practice, the final rule requires that such equipment shall not be 
placed in a train if it has more than two consecutive individual 
control valves cut out or if the brakes controlled by the valve are 
inoperative.
    Paragraph (f) contains guidelines that FRA will consider when 
determining whether a location is one where necessary brake repairs can 
be performed and whether a location is the nearest location where such 
repairs can be effectuated. The preamble to the NPRM contained an 
extensive discussion regarding what factors should be considered when 
determining whether a particular location is one where brake system 
repairs should be performed and discussed the difficulties and pitfalls 
associated developing a standard applicable to all situations. See 63 
FR 48309. In the NPRM, FRA stated that the determinations as to what 
constitutes a location where necessary repairs can be performed had to 
be conducted on a case-by-case basis utilizing the criteria established 
in existing case law. A number of railroad representatives commented on 
this issue and recommended that FRA further clarify what constitutes a 
location where brake repairs must be conducted. These commenters 
claimed that leaving the determination solely to individual FRA 
inspectors creates inconsistent enforcement and makes it virtually 
impossible for railroads to comply. AAR and its members recommended 
that FRA allow railroads to designate locations where brake system 
repairs would be conducted. Conversely, representatives of rail labor 
objected to any approach that would permit railroads to designate 
repair locations, claiming that such an allowance would violate the 
statutory conditions regarding the movement of defective equipment.
    After consideration of these comments, FRA believes it is essential 
to further clarify to the regulated community what the agency's 
position will be for determining whether a location is a place where 
brake repairs are to be conducted. FRA does not agree that a railroad 
should be permitted to independently determine the locations it will 
consider capable of making brake system repairs. History shows that 
many railroads and FRA have widely different views on what should be 
considered a location where brake repairs can and should be 
effectuated. Furthermore, it is apparent to FRA that some railroads 
attempt to minimize or circumvent the requirements for conducting 
repairs in the name of convenience or efficiency. However, FRA also 
recognizes that the emergence of mobile repair trucks creates an 
ability to perform repairs that did not exist when Congress originally 
enacted the statutory requirements related to the movement of defective 
equipment. FRA acknowledges that every location where a mobile repair 
truck is capable of making repairs should not be considered a location 
where repairs must be conducted. However, FRA also disagrees with the 
contentions of some commenters that Congress only intended for fixed 
repair facilities to be considered when determining locations where 
brake repairs are to be performed and that mobile repair trucks should 
not be considered. FRA is aware of numerous locations where mobile 
repair trucks are being used in lieu of a fixed facility or where a 
fixed facility was eliminated and the repairs that were being performed 
by the fixed facility are now being performed at the same location with 
a fully equipped repair truck. Thus, FRA believes that locations where 
repair trucks are used in virtually the same manner as a fixed facility 
should be considered when determining whether the location is capable 
of making the necessary repairs.
    As noted in the NPRM, the determination as to what constitutes a 
location where necessary repairs can be performed is an issue that FRA 
has grappled with for decades. FRA continues to believe that the 
determination must be made on a case-by-case basis after conducting a 
multi-factor analysis. However, in an effort to better detail the items 
that will be considered by FRA in making a determination, paragraph (f) 
contains general guidelines that FRA will consider when determining 
whether a location is one which should be considered a location where 
at least some brake system repairs must be

[[Page 4153]]

made. FRA would expect a railroad to consider the guidance contained in 
this paragraph when making its decisions on where equipment containing 
brake defects will be repaired. The guidance contained in this 
paragraph is based upon, and consistent with, the voluminous case law 
which exists that establishes the guiding principles for determining 
whether a location constitutes a location where the necessary repairs 
can be made as well as previous enforcement actions taken and guidance 
provided by FRA regarding such locations. The final rule guidance 
incorporates the principles discussed in the ``Overview of Comments and 
General FRA Conclusions'' portion of the preamble under the heading 
``Movement of Equipment with Defective Brakes.''
    Paragraph (g) provides a method by which a railroad may designate 
locations where various brake system repairs will be conducted. 
Although FRA does not believe that railroads should be permitted to 
unilaterally designate locations where brake system repair will be 
conducted, FRA does believe that a railroad in cooperation with its 
employees could potentially develop a plan that designates locations 
where brake system repairs will be effectuated. This paragraph makes 
clear that such a plan would have to be consistent with the guidelines 
contained in paragraph (f) and that such plans would have to be 
approved by FRA prior to being implemented. This paragraph also makes 
clear that for FRA to entertain a proposal containing a plan which 
designates locations where brake system repairs will be conducted a 
railroad and representatives of its employees must submit the proposal 
jointly . FRA does not intend to consider proposals nominally submitted 
pursuant to this provision that are not supported by a railroad's 
employees and their representatives.

Section 223.17   Special Approval Process

    This section contains the procedures to be followed when seeking to 
obtain FRA approval of a pre-revenue service acceptance plan under 
Sec. 232.505 for completely new brake system technologies or major 
upgrades to existing systems or when seeking approval of an alternative 
to the test standard incorporated in Secs. 232.305 or 232.307. Several 
railroads and manufacturers contended, both in response to the 1994 
NPRM and at the RSAC Working Group meetings, that FRA needed to devise 
some sort of quick approval process in order to permit the industry to 
make modifications to incorporated standards or existing equipment 
based on the emergence of new technology. Thus, FRA proposed an 
approval process it believed should speed the process for taking 
advantage of new technologies over that which is currently available 
under the waiver process. However, in order to provide an opportunity 
for all interested parties to provide input for use by FRA in its 
decision making process, as required by the Administrative Procedure 
Act, FRA believes that any special approval provision must, at a 
minimum, provide proper notice to the public of any significant change 
or action being considered by the agency with regard to existing 
regulations.
    This section essentially retains the proposed special approval 
process. One private car owner commented that the procedures should 
require FRA to publish any petition received within 30 days of receipt 
and to rule on the petition within 30 days of receipt of the last 
comment. Certain representatives of rail labor asserted that the 
special approval procedures should be tightened to be consistent with 
the requirements for granting a waiver and that the comment period 
should be extended and expanded to provide adequate time for parties to 
prepare. As the special approval process only applies to pre-revenue 
testing plans and the procedures for conducting single car and repair 
track air brake tests and because the purpose of the process is to 
speed the decision making process, FRA does not believe it is necessary 
to further lengthen the comment periods proposed in the NPRM, and FRA 
thinks that the procedures provide an adequate opportunity for 
interested parties to comment. Furthermore, if the procedures for these 
special approvals are made overly burdensome then the speed intended to 
be gained through the process would be lost. However, FRA also does not 
believe that the proposed time frames provided for FRA's consideration 
of a petition should be reduced. FRA believes that the time frames 
included in the proposal for FRA consideration are necessary for FRA to 
fully consider all comments and information received.

Section 232.19   Availability of Records

    This section makes clear that unless otherwise provided by this 
part, the records and plans required to be developed and maintained by 
this part shall be made available to representatives of FRA and States 
participating under part 212 of this chapter for inspection and copying 
upon request. FRA has added this section to the final rule in order to 
specifically clarify the availability of such records while increasing 
the readability of the rule and reducing the unnecessary repetition of 
the requirement throughout the text of the rule.

Section 232.21   Information Collection

    This section indicates the provisions of this part that have been 
approved by the Office of Management and Budget for compliance with the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. See 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. A more 
detailed discussion of the information collection requirements 
contained in this part is provided in the ``Regulatory Impact'' portion 
of this preamble.

Subpart B--General Requirements

Section 232.101  Scope

    This section contains a formal statement of the scope of this 
specific subpart of the final rule. This subpart is intended to 
establish general operating, performance, and design standards for 
railroads that operate freight or other non-passenger trains and 
further contains specific requirements for equipment used in these 
types of operations.

Section 232.103  General Requirements for All Train Brake Systems

    This section contains general requirements that are applicable to 
all freight and non-passenger train brake systems. This section 
specifically includes certain basic train brake system practices and 
procedures that form the foundation for the safe operation of all types 
of trains. Some of these basic principles are so obvious that they have 
not been specifically included in past rules. For example, paragraphs 
(a)-(c) state the most basic safety requirements for all train brake 
systems, which include having the ability to stop a train within the 
existing signal spacing, maintaining and monitoring the integrity of 
the train brake communication line, and having the train brake system 
respond as intended to signals from the brake communication line. These 
basic requirements were proposed in the NPRM and have been retained in 
this final rule without change.
    Paragraph (d) contains the provision requiring trains to have 100 
percent operative and effective power brakes prior to use at, or 
departure, from certain locations and prohibiting the hauling of a car 
with inoperative or ineffective power brakes from certain under 49 
U.S.C. 20303. Paragraph (d) has been slightly modified from that

[[Page 4154]]

proposed in the NPRM in order to clarify that the requirement applies 
only to trains that are required to receive a Class I brake test at the 
location. This modification was made in order to specifically clarify 
that the 100 percent operative brake requirement is not intended to 
apply to transfer trains that originate at a location where the 
necessary brake repairs cannot be effectuated. FRA agrees with the 
concerns raised by various commenters that the proposed language could 
have been interpreted as applying to transfer trains. FRA agrees that 
the 100 percent requirement does not currently apply to such trains, 
and it was not FRA's intention when issuing the NPRM to extend its 
application to such trains. However, it should be noted that if a 
transfer train originates at a location where repairs to the equipment 
containing defective brakes can be effectuated, then the train would be 
required to have 100 percent operative brakes prior to being used or 
departing that location.
    Contrary to the contentions of certain commenters, FRA continues to 
believe that there is adequate justification for retaining the 100 
percent requirement. The requirement to have 100 percent operative 
brakes prior to departing a location where an initial terminal brake 
test is required to be performed has existed in the railroad industry 
for decades. FRA believes it is not only wise from a safety standpoint, 
as it ensures the proper operation of a train's brake system at least 
once during its existence, but the requirement sets the proper tone for 
what FRA expects to be accomplished at these locations. FRA believes 
that requiring 100 percent operative brakes on trains at their origin 
provides the railroads with a margin for failure of some brakes while 
the train is in transit (up to 15 percent) and tends to ensure that 
defective equipment is being repaired in a timely fashion. In addition, 
FRA believes that the 100 percent requirement is consistent not only 
with Congress' understanding of the AAR inspection standards that were 
adopted in 1958, but also with the intent of FRA, rail management, and 
rail labor as to what was to occur at initial terminals when the 
inspection interval was increased from 500 miles to 1,000 miles in 
1982. At that time, carrier representatives committed to the 
performance of quality initial terminal inspections in exchange for an 
extension in the inspection interval, for which FRA intends to hold 
them accountable.
    Some commenters recommended that FRA permit any and all trains that 
have 95 percent operative brakes to operate from their point of origin 
to destination and noted that Canada currently allows such operation. 
FRA believes that such an approach would be completely contrary to the 
existing statutory mandate regarding the movement of equipment with 
defective brakes. The existing statutory provision regarding the 
movement of equipment with defective brakes requires that such 
equipment be repaired at the nearest location where the necessary 
repairs can be performed. See 49 U.S.C. 20303. Consequently, trains 
that originate at or that operate through locations where the necessary 
brake repairs can be effectuated are clearly required by the statute to 
have 100 percent operative brakes prior to departing those locations.
    FRA realizes that the 100 percent requirement creates a somewhat 
illogical situation at some locations by requiring certain trains to 
have 100 percent operative brakes prior to departing the location and 
yet allowing other trains to pick up defective equipment at the same 
location. However, FRA believes that various safety benefits are 
created by retaining the 100 percent requirement. The public is assured 
that a train's brake system is in near perfect condition at the 
beginning of its journey, train crews are more cognizant of the 
presence of defective cars in the train when they are picked up en 
route, railroads are more likely to perform repairs at a location where 
trains are initiated in order to avoid breaking up trains to set out 
defective cars once the trains are assembled, and FRA retains a clear 
and consistent enforcement standard that can be easily understood by 
its inspectors and railroad industry employees.
    Although FRA recognizes that the 100 percent requirement may be 
somewhat burdensome for some railroads at certain locations, FRA 
believes that the number of locations involved is relatively low and 
should be handled on a case-by-case basis through the existing waiver 
process. FRA believes that many railroads have created their own 
problems by eliminating repair facilities and personnel at many of the 
outlying locations that the railroads now claim they lack the ability 
to make appropriate repairs. Furthermore, FRA believes that the best 
method of assessing the safety implications of permitting a location to 
operate trains with less than 100 percent operative brakes is for the 
railroad to provide information on how the railroad will handle the 
defective equipment based on the specific needs and operating 
characteristics of the railroad involved.
    In the NPRM, FRA provided various approaches under which it would 
potentially consider allowing a railroad to operate trains from their 
initial terminals with less than 100 percent operative brakes. See 63 
FR 48310. The methods suggested by FRA were rejected as being overly 
burdensome by several commenters. Therefore, FRA believes the burden 
falls on each railroad seeking relief from the 100 percent requirement 
at certain outlying locations to provide FRA with an operating plan 
that will ensure the safe operation of such trains and provide for the 
timely and certain repair of any defective equipment moved from those 
locations. Consequently, FRA believes that there are a few existing 
locations that may be candidates for receiving a waiver from the 100 
percent requirement, and FRA is willing to consider waivers for such 
locations; however the railroads applying for such waivers must be able 
to establish a true need for the exception and must be willing to 
provide alternative operating procedures that ensure the safety of the 
trains being operated from those locations.
    Paragraph (e) contains a clear and absolute prohibition on train 
movement if more than 15 percent of the cars in a train have their 
brakes cut out or have otherwise inoperative brakes. Although there is 
no explicit limit contained in the statute regarding the number of cars 
with inoperative brake equipment that may be hauled in a train, the 15-
percent limitation is a longstanding industry and agency interpretation 
of the hauling-for-repair provision currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 
20303, and has withstood the test of time. This interpretation is 
extrapolated from another statutory requirement which permits a 
railroad to use a train only if ``at least 50 percent of the vehicles 
in the train are equipped with power or train brakes and the engineer 
is using the power or train brakes on those vehicles and on all other 
vehicles equipped with them that are associated with those vehicles in 
a train.'' 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally enacted in 1903, 
section 20302 also granted the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) the 
authority to increase this percentage, and in 1910 the ICC issued an 
order increasing the minimum percentage to 85 percent. See 49 CFR 
232.1, which codified the ICC order. One labor representative 
recommended that this requirement be eliminated as it creates confusion 
regarding the movement of defective equipment. FRA believes that if the 
rule is read in its entirety there should be no

[[Page 4155]]

confusion as to the movement of defective equipment, and that this 
provision merely sets an outside limit on the percentage of cars that 
may be hauled in any train with inoperative brakes. Consequently, FRA 
believes the express prohibition is necessary and will continue to 
require that equipment with inoperative air brakes make up no more than 
15 percent of any train.
    As virtually all freight cars are presently equipped with power 
brakes and are operated on an associated trainline, the statutory 
requirement cited above is in essence a requirement that 100 percent of 
the cars in a train have operative power brakes, unless being hauled 
for repairs pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Therefore, paragraph (f) makes 
clear that a train's air brakes shall be in effective and operable 
condition unless a car is being hauled for repairs pursuant to the 
conditions contained in Sec. 232.15. This section retains the proposed 
standard for determining when a freight car's air brakes are not in 
effective operating condition based on piston travel. The piston travel 
limits for standard 12-inch stroke brake cylinders are the same as 
currently required under Sec. 232.11(c). Certain labor representatives 
asserted that the permissible piston travel for these brake cylinders 
should be reduced to 10 inches rather than the currently allowed 10\1/
2\ inches. These commenters provided no technical data to support such 
a change, and FRA is not aware of any problems or unsafe conditions 
resulting from the current 10\1/2\ inch piston travel allowance on such 
brake cylinders. Consequently, the final rule retains the existing 
piston travel limits for standard 12-inch stroke brake cylinders.
    Due to the proliferation of equipment with other than standard 12-
inch stroke brake cylinders, FRA has found that mechanical forces and 
train crew members performing brake system inspections often do not 
know the acceptable range of brake piston travel for this non-standard 
equipment. In an attempt to improve this situation and to ensure the 
proper operation of a car's brakes after being inspected, FRA proposed 
that vehicles equipped with other than standard 12-inch stroke brake 
cylinders have either the badge plate for the vehicle or a stencil, 
sticker, or marker indicate the acceptable range of piston travel for 
the brake equipment on that vehicle. FRA also proposed that the 
information on the badge plate, sticker, stencil, or marker include 
both the permissible brake cylinder piston travel range for the vehicle 
at Class I brake tests and the lengths at which the piston travel 
renders the brake ineffective. Paragraph (g) generally retains these 
proposed requirements. FRA continues to believe that this information 
is essential in order for a person to properly perform the brake 
inspections contained in this final due to the growing number of cars 
with other than standard brake designs. The requirement has been 
slightly modified from that proposed to require that the outside piston 
travel limit need only be provided if it is different from the Class I 
brake test limit. FRA agrees with the contentions of certain commenters 
that such information would be unnecessarily redundant if the limits 
are the same. Thus, if there is no outside limit indicated on the badge 
plate, stencil, sticker, or marker the piston travel limits indicated 
for the Class I/ initial terminal brake test for the vehicle will be 
considered the outside piston travel limits for that vehicle.
    The AAR recommends that, in addition to vehicles equipped with 
standard 12-inch stroke brake cylinders, FRA should also except 
vehicles equipped with WABCOPAC or NYCOPAC truck-mounted brake 
cylinders from the marking requirements contained in paragraph (g). The 
AAR contends that the stenciling or marking of the piston travel limits 
on these vehicles is unnecessary because the piston travel limits for 
these brake systems are well-known and nearly 30 percent of the fleet 
is equipped with them. FRA disagrees with this contention. Based on 
FRA's experience in monitoring the performance of various brake tests, 
FRA believes that many employees are not aware of the piston travel 
limits for the brake systems noted above. Furthermore, there are 
numerous truck-mounted brake cylinders currently in use that have 
piston travel limits which are different from those of the WABCOPAC and 
NYCOPAC truck-mounted systems. Thus, FRA believes all vehicles equipped 
with these brake systems need to be marked in order to avoid confusion 
by individuals inspecting the equipment and thus ensure the proper 
operation of the brakes on such cars. Moreover, FRA is aware that many 
vehicles equipped with the type of truck-mounted brake systems sought 
to be excepted by AAR, particularly privately owned vehicles, already 
have decals, stickers, or stencils containing the information required 
by this paragraph.
    The AAR also recommends that railroads be provided eight years in 
which to implement the marking requirements contained in this paragraph 
in order to perform the work during the required periodic single car or 
repair track air brake tests. FRA believes such an allowance of time is 
unnecessary and excessive. The reason FRA is permitting the information 
to be marked on the car with either a decal, stencil, or sticker is to 
provide the railroads with relatively simple and easy methods for bring 
cars into compliance without requiring them to be placed in a 
maintenance facility or on a repair track to have the information 
affixed. FRA believes that the three-year applicability period provided 
by this final rule provides railroads with sufficient time to mark cars 
as required. Furthermore, many cars are already properly marked with 
the necessary information as noted in the previous discussion.
    Paragraph (h) requires that all equipment ordered or placed in 
service for the first time on or after the specified dates, be designed 
not to require an inspector to place himself or herself on, under, or 
between components of the equipment to observe brake actuation or 
release. This paragraph allows railroads the flexibility of using a 
reliable indicator in place of requiring direct observation of the 
brake application or piston travel because the designs of some freight 
car brake systems make direct observation extremely difficult unless 
the inspector places himself or herself underneath the equipment. 
Indicators of brake system piston travel or piston cylinder pressure 
have been used with satisfactory results for many years. Although 
indicators do not provide 100 percent certainty that the brakes are 
effective, FRA believes that they have proven themselves effective 
enough to be preferable to requiring an inspector to assume a dangerous 
position. Some commenters recommended that the indicator alternative be 
eliminated and that railroads should not be allowed to rely on 
indicators. FRA believes that these commenters fail to recognize the 
need to provide some alternative to direct observation of the piston 
travel on certain equipment and fail to acknowledge the existence of 
new technologies available to the industry. Further, although the rule 
permits the use of an indicator for purposes of determining piston 
travel, the individual inspecting such equipment would be required to 
inspect all components of the brake system for proper operation.
    This requirement stems primarily from the brake system design of 
double-stack equipment currently used by several larger freight 
operations. Several commenters have indicated that the functioning of 
the brakes on this type of equipment cannot be observed without

[[Page 4156]]

inspectors placing themselves in potentially dangerous positions. In 
addition, a complete inspection of the brake equipment and systems used 
on double-stack equipment is time consuming. Consequently, inspectors 
are reluctant to conduct a complete brake inspection test on departing 
trains that contain this type of equipment. FRA thinks that double-
stack equipment is becoming a mainstay of the freight railroad industry 
and that this design deficiency must be corrected. Thus, FRA has 
attempted to make this a performance requirement by simply specifying 
how the equipment must function and allowing the industry to determine 
the method of compliance.
    Paragraph (i) retains the proposed requirement that an emergency 
brake application feature be available at any time and that it produce 
an irretrievable stop. This section merely codifies current industry 
practice and ensures that all equipment will continue to be designed 
with an emergency brake application feature. In the 1994 NPRM on power 
brakes, FRA proposed a requirement that all trains be equipped with an 
emergency application feature capable of increasing the train's 
deceleration rate a minimum of 15 percent. See 59 FR 47729. This 
proposed requirement merely restated the emergency specification 
currently contained in Appendix B to part 232. Comments received in 
response to that proposal indicated that some brake equipment currently 
in use or being developed could provide a deceleration rate with a full 
service application that is close to the emergency brake rate and that 
the proposed requirement would require the lowering of full service 
brake rates, thereby compromising safety and lowering train speeds. 
Consequently, the requirement proposed in the 1998 and retained in this 
final rule removes the 15-percent differential.
    Paragraphs (j) and (k), which were proposed as paragraphs (k) and 
(l), impose on the railroads the responsibility for determining maximum 
air brake system working pressure and maximum brake pipe pressure. 
These provisions were contained in both the 1994 and 1998 NPRM, and FRA 
received no comments objecting to their inclusion. See 59 FR 47743. 
Thus, FRA intends to continue to allow individual railroads the wide 
latitude currently permitted in determining these pressures.
    Paragraph (l), previously proposed as paragraph (m), provides that 
except as provided by other provisions of this part, all equipment used 
in freight or other non-passenger trains shall, at a minimum, meet the 
performance specification for freight brakes in AAR standard S-469-47. 
The AAR standard incorporated by reference in this paragraph contains 
all the provisions currently referenced in Sec. 232.3 and contained in 
existing Appendix B to part 232. In the NPRM, FRA sought comments from 
interested parties as to the necessity of referencing these standards 
as well as any information on any updated standards related to the 
performance of freight equipment that is currently being used 
throughout the industry. Although one commenter generally asserted that 
the standards should merely be included as a reference and that their 
inclusion would require retroactive validation of proven designs, FRA 
finds little merit in this contention since any existing equipment 
should already be designed to the specifications as they are currently 
part of the existing regulations. Except as noted below, FRA received 
no comments seeking specific changes to the referenced specifications 
or other objections to their inclusion.
    It should be noted that the provision previously proposed in 
paragraph (j) of this section requiring that the air brake components 
that control brake application and release be adequately sealed to 
prevent contamination by foreign material (63 FR 48359) has been 
removed due to its incorporation in another provision contained in this 
final rule. As the proposed requirement is contained in AAR standard S-
469-47 as one of the general specification requirements, there is no 
reason to retain the specific requirement in this final rule. Thus, 
although the requirement has been specifically removed from the rule 
text, it is retained by its inclusion in the referenced AAR standard. 
Furthermore, FRA finds AAR's objection to this requirement somewhat 
hard to understand. FRA is not imposing a new requirement but merely 
sets forth an existing requirement contained in an AAR standard. 
Contrary to the concerns raised by AAR, FRA does not intend to change 
the existing standard of compliance for this requirement.
    Paragraph (m), previously proposed as paragraph (n), retains the 
proposed requirement that if an en route train qualified by the Air 
Flow Method experiences a brake pipe air flow of greater than 60 CFM or 
brake pipe gradient of greater than 15 psi and the movable pointer does 
not return to those limits within a reasonable time the train must be 
stopped at the next available location and inspected for leaks in the 
brake system. This requirement one of the conditions of the general 
waiver granted to the AAR allowing the use of the air flow method to 
qualify train air brakes. FRA believes that this requirement is 
necessary to prevent trains with excessive leakage from continuing to 
operate. If a train has excessive leakage, the engineer may lack the 
ability to stop the train using the air brake system. Other than the 
general contention raised by certain labor representatives that the Air 
Flow Method not be allowed, FRA received no specific comments on the 
requirements contained in this paragraph.
    Paragraph (n), previously proposed as paragraph (o), contains 
requirements regarding the setting and releasing of hand brakes on 
equipment that is left unattended. The requirements contained in this 
paragraph differ from those previously proposed in the NPRM. In the 
NPRM, FRA proposed various requirements for securing standing 
equipment. The requirements proposed in the NPRM were basically a 
reiteration of the guidance issued by FRA in Safety Advisory 97-2 on 
September 15, 1997. See 62 FR 49046. The securement guidance contained 
in Safety Advisory 97-2 was based upon FRA's review of an incident that 
occurred on August 20, 1997 near Fort Worth, Texas, and its awareness 
of other incidents involving the improper securement of rolling 
equipment. The Safety Advisory was issued in order to provide the 
industry with some assistance and guidance regarding securement 
procedures and to provide information on current practices of the 
industry related to the securement of rolling stock. Id.
    The requirements proposed in the NPRM where also intended to 
address the practice known as ``bottling the air'' in a standing cut of 
cars, an issue related to improperly secured rail equipment. The 
practice of ``bottling the air'' occurs when a train crew sets out cars 
from a train with the air brakes applied and the angle cocks on both 
ends of the train closed, thus trapping the existing compressed air and 
conserving the brake pipe pressure in the cut of cars they intend to 
leave behind. This practice has the potential of causing, first, an 
unintentional release of the brakes on these cars and, ultimately, a 
runaway. Many railroad operating rules require that a 20-pound 
reduction in brake pipe pressure be made when stopping a train to 
remove a cut of cars from the train. Thus, if the trainman closes the 
angle cock where the cut is to be made before pressure equalizes in the 
trainline, an air wave action may form that can be of sufficient 
amplitude to initiate an unintentional release of the brakes.

[[Page 4157]]

    Brake pipe gradient is another factor that makes bottling the air 
dangerous. ``Normal gradient'' is a term used to express the difference 
between the higher pressure on the front end of the train and the lower 
pressure on the rear end of the train, which is dependent upon brake 
pipe leakage and train length. Each train establishes its own normal 
gradient value. ``Inverse gradients'' and ``False gradients'' are 
temporary gradients that are a result of brake operations. Inverse 
gradients occur when a brake pipe reduction is made, temporarily making 
the brake pipe pressure higher on the rear of the train. The false 
gradient is created anytime the train brakes are set and released, thus 
temporarily resulting in a higher than normal pressure differential 
between the front and rear end of the train as the brake pipe charges. 
Therefore, if the engineer sets and releases a train's brakes a 
sufficient number of times prior to stopping to remove a cut of cars, a 
false gradient could be established. Even if the engineer made a 20-
pound brake pipe reduction and listened for the air to stop exhausting 
at the automatic brake valve before giving the signal to the trainman 
to cut off the cars, the potential exists for an unintentional release 
of air brakes if the air on the cars is bottled. The false gradient 
could be of such magnitude that, as the trainline attempts to equalize, 
the higher pressure on the front end flowing to the rear will exceed 
the 1\1/2\ pound differential across the service piston and cause a 
release of air brakes. An inverse gradient can also create an 
unintentional release of brakes. As brake pipe pressure is reduced at 
the front of the train, the rear end temporarily has a higher pressure. 
As the trainline attempts to equalize, the pressure on the front end 
will rise. In some circumstances, this rise could be enough to initiate 
a release of air brakes.
    On June 5, 1998, the NTSB issued the following recommendation to 
FRA:

    Issue a regulation that requires the brake pipe pressure to be 
depleted to zero and an angle cock to remain open on standing 
railroad equipment that is detached from a locomotive controlling 
the brake pipe pressure.

(R-98-17). This recommendation was the result of NTSB's investigation 
of an incident that occurred on January 27, 1997, on the Apache Railway 
near Holbrook, Arizona. The incident involved the runaway of 77 cars 
down a 1.7 percent grade for 14 miles resulting in the eventual 
derailment of 46 cars and the release of hazardous materials. Although 
there were no fatalities, 150 people were evacuated from nearby 
residential areas. The NTSB determined that the 77 cars rolled away 
unattended because the conductor of the train had trapped the air in 
the brake system, i.e., ``bottled the air,'' which resulted in an 
undesired release of the brakes on the standing cars. In its 
recommendation the NTSB correctly noted that FRA statistics show that 
ten accidents occurred between 1994 and 1995 which were attributable to 
the practice of ``bottling the air.''
    FRA received numerous comments from the AAR and various other 
representatives of the railroads objecting to the proposed provisions 
regarding the securement of standing equipment. Although these 
commenters generally agreed with the intended purpose of the proposed 
requirements, they believed that the proposed provisions were 
overbroad, increased certain safety hazards, and exposed railroad 
employees to higher risk of injury. These commenters contend that the 
goals of FRA could be accomplished in a less burdensome fashion while 
increasing safety and reducing the potential for employee injuries. 
After reviewing the comments submitted by these parties, FRA agrees 
with most of the recommendations provided. Consequently, the provisions 
contained in this paragraph have been modified to reflect those 
recommendations.
    FRA agrees with the recommendation that the requirements contained 
in this paragraph should be applied only to unattended equipment rather 
than to standing equipment generally. FRA agrees that, if the train is 
attended, the setting of handbrakes serves no useful purpose and would 
result in an enormous cost to the industry. Therefore, paragraph (n) 
contains a definition of ``unattended equipment'' to clarify the 
applicability of the requirements contained in this paragraph. The term 
covers equipment left standing and unmanned in such a manner that the 
brake system of the equipment cannot be readily controlled by a 
qualified person.
    FRA also agrees that the proposed requirement that railroads 
develop a matrix to determine the number of hand brakes that are to be 
applied may not be the best approach to ensure that a sufficient number 
of hand brakes have been applied to a specific cut of unattended 
equipment. FRA agrees that the number of hand brakes required to be 
applied depends on a wide variety of factors not easily captured in a 
matrix format and that a matrix approach might result in either too few 
or too many hand brakes being applied. Thus, paragraph (n)(1) 
eliminates the requirement for developing a matrix and is modified to 
include a performance-based requirement that a sufficient number of 
hand brakes be applied to hold the equipment and a requirement that 
railroads develop and implement a process or procedure to verify that 
the applied hand brakes will sufficiently hold the equipment when the 
air brakes are released. This requirement will permit a railroad to 
develop appropriate operating rules to verify the sufficiency of the 
handbrakes applied which can be tailored to the specific territory and 
equipment operated by the railroad. On some railroads and at some 
locations, these operating rules may include the use of a matrix or 
some other type of set calculation.
    Paragraph (n)(2) addresses the issue of ``bottling air'' on 
unattended equipment. This paragraph requires that an emergency brake 
application be initiated on all equipment prior to its being left 
unattended. This paragraph no longer requires that the locomotive be 
detached to effectuate the emergency application as was proposed. FRA 
agrees with the concerns raised by certain parties that the proposed 
requirement to detach locomotives to allow an emergency application of 
the brakes is not appropriate or desirable in many circumstances. FRA 
agrees that it is not necessary to detach locomotives to initiate an 
emergency application, that it is safer to leave the locomotives 
attached due to redundant securement features on a locomotive, that an 
emergency application should not be made until it is known that the 
number of hand brakes set is sufficient, and that it would be very 
burdensome to detach locomotives every time a train is left unattended.
    Paragraphs (n)(3) and (n)(4) contain the requirements for securing 
unattended locomotives. FRA agrees with the recommendations made by 
various commenters that the proposed requirements regarding locomotive 
securement were over broad by failing to distinguish among (i) 
locomotives in the lead consist of a train, (ii) distributed power 
locomotives, and (iii) locomotives within yard limits. FRA agrees that 
these securement requirements contained in this final rule should not 
apply to distributed power locomotives. Consequently, these paragraphs 
establish specific securement requirements that apply only to 
locomotives in the lead consist of a train and are based on the 
location of the locomotive or locomotive consist when it is being left 
unattended.
    Paragraph (n)(5) retains the proposed and existing requirement that 
any hand brakes applied to secure unattended equipment not be released 
until it is

[[Page 4158]]

known that the air brake system is properly charged.
    It should be noted that paragraph (n) reflects FRA's agreement with 
the various concerns raised regarding the proposed requirements to use 
derails to secure unattended equipment and to chock and chain 
locomotives when left unattended on certain grades. FRA agrees that the 
use of derails, as proposed in the NPRM, could potentially create 
safety hazards if not properly removed and might expose employees to a 
greater potential for injury by increasing the handling and movement of 
derails. FRA also agrees that if handbrakes are properly applied on 
unattended locomotives there is little need to chock and chain 
locomotive wheels in most instances and such a requirement merely 
creates the potential of exposing railroad employees to unnecessary 
risks. Furthermore, FRA believes that the alternative approach 
submitted by the CAPUC regarding when and where derails should be 
applied is too complicated, requires further research, and might 
require unnecessary securement in many instances. Thus, the approach 
taken in this final rule is to provide requirements for the setting of 
hand brakes and require railroads to ensure the capability of those 
hand brakes to hold the equipment. If the applied hand brakes do not 
adequately hold the equipment, FRA would expect the railroad to utilize 
other methods of securement such as derails, skates, chains, and 
chocks.
    Paragraph (o), previously proposed as paragraph (p), requires that 
air pressure regulating devices be adjusted in accordance with the air 
pressures contained in the chart contained in this paragraph. The chart 
is very similar to that proposed in the NPRM, but has been slightly 
modified in response to the comments received. The references to 
equipment used in passenger operations has been eliminated, and the 
pressure of the self-lapping portion for independent air brake has been 
modified to read ``30 psi or less'' rather than the proposed ``30-72 
psi.''
    Paragraph (p) contains the proposed provision regarding the joint 
responsibility of supervisors and inspectors to ensure the proper 
condition and functioning of train brake systems. The provision 
contained in this paragraph has been slightly modified in order to 
remain consistent with the existing requirement regarding such joint 
responsibility contained at Sec. 232.11(a). These modifications clarify 
that joint responsibility exists to the extent that it is possible to 
detect defective equipment by the inspections and tests required by 
this part.

Section 232.105  General Requirements for Locomotives

    For the most part, this section contains general provisions related 
to locomotives that are either currently contained in Sec. 232.10 or 
that were previously proposed in the NPRM. As discussed in detail in 
the NPRM, FRA does not intend to include provisions in this final rule 
related to the inspection and maintenance of locomotive braking 
systems. FRA believes that these requirements are adequately addressed 
in part 229 and would only add to the complexity of this rule and 
potentially cause confusion or misunderstanding by members of the 
regulated community. Therefore, while many of the requirements 
currently contained in Sec. 232.10 are no longer necessary as they are 
adequately addressed in part 229, paragraphs (a) and (c) are provisions 
currently contained in Sec. 232.10 which FRA believes need to be 
retained. See 49 CFR 232.10(b) and (f)(2).
    Paragraph (c) retains the proposed requirement that the hand or 
parking brake on a locomotive be inspected and repaired, if necessary, 
at least every 368 days. It should be noted that paragraph (c) has been 
slightly modified from that proposed in order to allow the date of the 
last inspection of the hand brake to be entered on Form FRA F 6180-49A 
in lieu of stenciling such information on the car. As the current 
regulation permits either the stenciling or tagging of a locomotive 
with this information and because many railroads currently record the 
information on the form noted above, FRA believes it is appropriate to 
continue to allow such a practice. FRA continues to believe that this 
inspection requirement will have little or no impact on railroads as 
this inspection is intended to coincide with the annual locomotive 
inspection required under Sec. 229.27 and many railroads currently 
inspect these devices at this annual inspection. FRA also continues to 
believe that a thorough inspection of these devices on an annual basis 
is sufficient to ensure the proper and safe functioning of the devices.
    Paragraph (b) retains the proposed requirement that locomotives 
ordered or placed in service for the first time after the specified 
dates be equipped with a hand or parking brake. Although the final rule 
retains the requirements that the hand or parking brake be capable of 
being set and released manually, the final rule modifies the 
requirement regarding the holding capability of such brakes. Rather 
than requiring that the brake be capable of holding the equipment on 
the maximum grade anticipated by the operating railroad, the final rule 
requires that the brake be capable of holding the equipment on a three-
percent grade. Based on information provided by several locomotive 
manufacturers, FRA agrees that current locomotive hand and parking 
brakes are designed to achieve a three-percent holding capacity and 
that current operating practices are based on this capacity. Several 
manufacturers assert that if the holding capacity of these brakes had 
to be increased, then the cost of a locomotive would increase 
significantly as such an increase would require redesign of the 
foundation brake rigging. As the current designs have provided adequate 
safety and the enhanced design would be very expensive relative to the 
improvement in safety, this paragraph has been amended to require that 
the hand or parking brake be capable of holding the unit on a three 
percent grade.
    A hand or parking brake is an important safety feature that 
prevents the rolling or runaway of parked locomotives. The requirements 
contained in this paragraph represent current industry practice. In the 
1994 NPRM on power brakes, FRA proposed requiring that a hand brake be 
equipped on locomotives. See 59 FR 47729. FRA received several comments 
to that proposal suggesting that the term ``parking brake'' be added to 
the requirement since that is what is used on many newly built 
locomotives. A parking brake generally can be applied other than by 
hand, such as by spring pressure, by air pressure when the brake pipe 
air is depleted, or by an electrical motor. Parking brakes usually 
incorporate some type of manual application or release feature, 
although these features are generally more difficult to operate. FRA 
believes that parking brakes are the functional equivalent of a 
traditional hand brake and are capable of providing a similar level of 
security to stationary equipment. Consequently, FRA added the term 
``parking brake'' to the 1998 NPRM and has retained the term in this 
final rule.
    In paragraph (d), FRA requires that the leakage of air from 
equalizing reservoirs on locomotives and related piping be zero. The 
equalizing reservoir contains the controlling volume of air pressure, 
which is set to a desired pressure by the locomotive engineer by 
setting the regulating valve (also known as the ``feed valve'') on the 
automatic air brake system. When the automatic brake valve handle is 
moved to the release position, air supplied from the locomotive air 
compressor and the main air reservoirs is supplied to the equalizing 
reservoir through the

[[Page 4159]]

regulating valve. The brake pipe pressure will then be charged to the 
level of the air pressure contained in the equalizing reservoir. When 
an application of the train brakes is desired, the engineer moves the 
automatic brake valve handle into the application zone. The movement of 
the brake valve handle into the application zone shuts off the supply 
of air from the regulating valve to the equalizing reservoir, leaving 
the volume of air contained in the equalizing reservoir trapped in the 
equalizing reservoir. The pressure of the trapped air can then be 
reduced to a desired amount by movement of the automatic brake valve 
handle. This will result in the brake pipe pressure responding and 
being reduced to a pressure equal to the pressure contained in the 
equalizing reservoir. Furthermore, the air pressure in the brake pipe 
on most freight equipment will be maintained at the pressure in the 
equalizing reservoir due to the maintaining features of the brake 
system. Consequently, any leakage from the equalizing reservoir will 
affect the maintaining feature of the automatic air brake, causing the 
engineer to lose the ability to effectively maintain control of the 
brake pipe pressure and, thus, affecting the ability of the engineer to 
safely control the train in some circumstances.
    One manufacturer of locomotives commented on the requirement 
contained in this paragraph, contending that the requirement should not 
be applied to locomotives utilizing electronic braking systems because 
such leakage is not detectable by the locomotive engineer. This 
commenter contends that on these types of braking systems a continuous 
demand is made on the compressor to offset any leakage and if the 
compressor cannot offset the leakage the engineer is notified and the 
train is automatically stopped if necessary. Thus, the systems are 
designed to be fail-safe in the event of excessive leakage. This 
commenter believes that FRA should recognize these types of designs and 
except them from the requirement contained in this paragraph.
    FRA agrees that the electronic brake systems currently in use on 
some locomotives are designed to maintain equalizing reservoir pressure 
at a set limit. Because these systems are designed to offset equalizing 
reservoir leakage, the locomotive engineer would not experience any 
problem with the operation of the train's brakes if a minor leak 
occurs. However, if the leakage exceeds the ability of the system to 
maintain the pressure, a fault message would be displayed to the 
locomotive engineer and the train's brakes would be automatically 
applied, if necessary. Therefore, this section has been slightly 
modified from that proposed in the NPRM to allow locomotives that are 
equipped with these types of maintaining features to continue to 
operate with some leakage in the equalizing reservoir. However, this 
section makes clear that when such systems identify an equalizing 
reservoir leak, the railroad is to perform the repairs necessary to 
eliminate the leakage at the nearest forward location where such 
repairs can be made. Generally a leakage on these electronic braking 
systems will be discovered when maintenance personnel review the fault 
screen during routine inspections and tests. Therefore, if a locomotive 
is equipped with a braking system that has the ability to maintain 
equalizing reservoir pressure, with the automatic brake valve set in 
the freight position or direct release, an equalizing reservoir leak 
will generally not be required to be repaired until it is either 
identified by the inspection forces or until the locomotive engineer 
identifies the condition during the normal operation of the train.
    In paragraph (e), FRA retains the proposed prohibition on the use 
of ``feed or regulating valve braking,'' in which reductions and 
increases in the brake pipe pressure are effected by manually adjusting 
the feed valve. ``Feed valve braking'' has been recognized by both the 
railroad industry and FRA as an unsafe practice. Most railroads already 
have some type of operating rule prohibiting this type of braking. No 
comments were received objecting to the inclusion of this prohibition 
in response to the NPRM.
    In paragraph (f), FRA also retains the proposed prohibition on the 
use of the ``passenger'' position on the locomotive brake control stand 
on conventional freight trains when the trailing equipment is not 
designed for graduated brake release. The ``passenger'' position was 
intended only for use with equipment designed for graduated brake 
release. Therefore, use of the ``passenger'' position with other 
equipment can lead to potentially dangerous situations where undesired 
release of the brakes can easily occur due to the slightest movement of 
the automatic brake valve. In FRA's view, the only situation when the 
use of the passenger position might become necessary to safely control 
a train is when equalizing reservoir leakage occurs en route. If such a 
situation arises, this paragraph makes clear that the train may move 
only to the nearest forward location where the equalizing reservoir 
leakage can be corrected. No objections were received by FRA in 
response to the NPRM with regard to these requirements.
    Paragraph (g) contains an existing requirement which was 
inadvertently excluded from the NPRM. This paragraph makes clear that 
engineers must know that the brakes on locomotives of which they are 
taking charge are in operative condition. This requirement is currently 
contained at Sec. 232.10(l). Thus, FRA is not imposing a new burden by 
incorporating this requirement into the final rule. Furthermore, FRA 
does not intend to create a new inspection requirement by including 
this provision, but intends for it to be applied and enforced in the 
same manner as the existing requirement. If a locomotive engineer 
relieves another engineer, the condition of the brakes could be 
determined, based on a conversation or report from the engineer being 
relieved. The railroad may also elect to have mechanical forces inspect 
the locomotive for proper operation of the brakes and have the 
locomotive engineer accept the locomotives based on the mechanical 
department's inspection. However, a locomotive engineer may have to 
conduct a cursory inspection and perform a running test of the brake 
system to satisfy this requirement, if a prior inspection has not been 
performed.

Section 232.107  Air Source Requirements

    This section contains requirements directed at ensuring that 
freight brake systems are devoid, to the maximum extent practical, of 
water and other contaminates which could conceivably deteriorate 
components of the brake system and, thus, negatively impact the ability 
of the brake system to function as intended. The general preamble 
section of this rule provides a detailed discussion as to why FRA 
proposed many of the items contained in this paragraph. See discussion 
contained in ``Overview of Comments and General FRA Conclusions'' 
portion of the preamble under the heading ``Air Source Requirements.'' 
Based on the work performed by and information gathered by the RSAC 
Working Group and based on FRA field experience, FRA continues to 
believe that requiring locomotives to be equipped with air dryers would 
provide minimal safety benefits and would impose an enormous and 
unwarranted cost burden on the railroads. Further, FRA continues to 
believe that simply requiring that yard air sources be equipped with 
air dryers may not necessarily effectuate the

[[Page 4160]]

desired results unless the air dryers are appropriately placed to 
sufficiently condition the air source. Many yard air sources are 
configured such that a single air compressor services several branch 
lines used to charge train air brake systems and, therefore, multiple 
air dryers may be required to eliminate the introduction of wet air 
into the brake system. FRA believes that, as with locomotives, 
requiring yard air sources to be equipped with air dryers would likely 
impose a significant and unnecessary cost burden on the railroads.
    This section retains the basic requirements regarding yard air 
sources and cold weather operations that were proposed in the NPRM with 
minor modification based on the comments submitted in response to the 
proposal. Paragraph (a) retains the provisions requiring railroads to 
adopt and comply with a plan to monitor all yard air sources to ensure 
that the yard air sources operate as intended, are in proper condition, 
and do not introduce contaminants into the brake system of freight 
equipment. FRA intends to make clear that the inspections required 
under this paragraph are to be thorough inspections of the entire yard 
air source. This inspection would include all compressors, piping, 
hoses, valves, and any other component or part of the yard air source 
to ensure it is in proper condition and operates as intended.
    Paragraph (a) modifies some of the proposed requirements related to 
the yard air source monitoring plans. FRA agrees with the comments 
provided by several labor representatives that the proposed 
requirements did not establish a frequency with which inspections of 
yard air sources should be conducted. In proposing the requirement, FRA 
hoped that various commenters would recommend frequencies for 
conducting these inspections. This did not occur. FRA agrees that a set 
frequency needs to be established which will ensure that yard air 
sources are inspected in a timely manner during various climatic 
conditions. Therefore, paragraph (a)(2)(i) requires that the monitoring 
plan developed by a railroad ensure that each yard air source be 
inspected at least twice each calendar year and that two of the 
inspections be no less than five months apart. FRA intends for this 
requirement to result in yard air sources being inspected each year 
during two different seasonal periods.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) clarifies that remedial action under the 
monitoring plans is required only on those yard air sources that are 
not operating as intended or that are found introducing contaminants 
into brake systems. Thus, the final rule removes the word ``potential'' 
from the proposed language as FRA agrees that the proposed language was 
unclear and may have been over-inclusive. The final rule also 
eliminates the proposed requirement for railroads to conduct a detailed 
assessment of the remedial actions taken. FRA agrees with the 
assertions of AAR that this proposed requirement is unnecessary because 
railroads will be conducting regular inspections of the yard air 
sources on which they have conducted repairs or taken other remedial 
action and will be able to determine if the repair were effective 
through those inspections. Paragraph (a)(3) retains the other proposed 
record keeping requirements related to yard air monitoring plans but 
clarifies that the records can be maintained either electronically or 
in writing. FRA continues to believe that these records are necessary 
to ensure that railroads are properly conducting the required 
inspections and are taking timely and appropriate remedial action when 
a problem air source is detected.
    The final rule does not contain provisions requiring FRA approval 
of the yard air source monitoring plans prior to their implementation 
as suggested by some commenters. FRA does not have the personnel or 
resources to review and approve the plan of each railroad and does not 
believe such approval is necessary given the specific requirements 
contained in the final rule and the records that are required to be 
maintained. Although the final rule does not contain requirements 
regarding the use of air dryers on either locomotives or yard air 
sources, FRA advocates the use of air dryers when possible and agrees 
that they have proven effective in reducing the level of moisture 
introduced into the brake system. However, FRA believes that a railroad 
is in the best position to determine where these devices will provide 
the greatest benefit based on the railroad's operation. FRA notes its 
disagreement with AAR's contentions regarding both the time and the 
cost necessary to implement the required yard air source monitoring 
plans. FRA sees no reason why a railroad would need five years to 
implement a plan to inspect each of its yard air sources twice a year. 
These devices are used on a fairly regular, if not daily, basis and 
should not be that difficult to inspect. Consequently, FRA believes 
that railroads should easily be able to implement these monitoring 
plans by the three-year effective date provided in this final rule.
    Paragraphs (b) and (d) contain additional measures to minimize the 
possibility of moisture being introduced into the trainline. Paragraph 
(b) of this section reiterates the proposed and current requirement 
contained at Sec. 232.11(d), which requires that condensation be blown 
from the pipe or hose from which compressed air is taken prior to 
connecting the yard air line or motive power to the train. As an 
additional precaution, paragraph (d) of this section retains the 
proposed requirement that yard air reservoirs be equipped with an 
operable automatic drain system, or be manually drained at least once 
each day that the devices are used or more often when moisture is 
detected in the system.
    Paragraph (c) generally retains the proposed ban on the use of 
chemicals in a train air brake system. However, FRA agrees with the 
position asserted by several commenters that the proposed prohibition 
of all chemicals may have been somewhat overbroad and contrary to FRA's 
actual intent. In proposing the prohibition FRA intended to eliminate 
the use of chemicals, such as alcohol, which are known to degrade the 
rubber of a train's brake system. FRA agrees that there may be 
chemicals which are currently available or which are in the process of 
being developed which do not cause the problems associated with the use 
of alcohol. In fact, FRA believes there are products currently 
available which do not degrade a brake system's rubber components. FRA 
believes that several railroads are currently testing or using these 
chemical alternatives. Therefore, FRA believes that there are 
alternatives to using alcohol which currently exist or can be developed 
which would provide railroads the ability to address the rare instances 
where trainlines become frozen. Consequently, this paragraph slightly 
modifies the prohibition on the use of chemicals by imposing the 
prohibition on chemicals that are known to degrade or harm brake system 
components, such as alcohol.
    It should be noted that FRA recently published a final rule 
mandating the incorporation of two-way EOTs on a variety of freight 
trains, specifically those operating at speeds of 30 mph or greater or 
in heavy grade territories. See 62 FR 278. Two-way EOTs provide 
locomotive engineers with the capability of initiating an emergency 
brake application that commences at the rear of the train in the event 
of a blockage or separation in the train's brake pipe that would 
prevent the pneumatic transmission of the emergency brake application 
from the front of the train through the rest of the train. These 
devices consist of a front unit, located in the cab of the

[[Page 4161]]

controlling locomotive, and a rear unit, located in the rear of the 
train and attached to the brake pipe. Radio communication between the 
front and rear units is continually monitored and confirmed at regular 
intervals, and the rear unit is only activated when continuity of these 
radio transmissions is not maintained over a specified time interval. 
This discussion of two-way EOTs is particularly appropriate within the 
context of the air source requirements. In the unlikely event that 
compliance with the requirements contained in this section regarding 
dry air fails to sufficiently eliminate moisture from the trainline, 
and a restriction or obstruction in the form of ice develops as the 
result of freezing of this moisture during cold weather operations, the 
two-way EOT device becomes a first-order safety device and will 
initiate an emergency application of the brakes from the rear of train. 
As such, the vast majority of concerns associated with moisture in the 
trainline freezing during cold weather operations have been alleviated 
through the incorporation of this technology in most freight 
operations.
    Paragraph (e) retains the proposed requirement that a railroad 
adopt and comply with detailed written operating procedures tailored to 
the equipment and territory of the railroad to promote safe train 
operations during cold weather situations. In 1990, the NTSB, in 
response to an accident which occurred in Helena, Montana, recommended 
that FRA amend the power brake regulations to require additional 
testing of air brake systems when operating in extreme cold, especially 
when operated in mountain grade territory. See NTSB Recommendation R-
89-081 (February 12, 1990). In response to this recommendation and to 
various petitions for rulemaking requesting similar action, FRA in the 
1994 NPRM proposed various requirements regarding cold weather 
operations, which included: use of two-way EOTs; prohibition on the use 
of alcohol in trainlines; air dryers on locomotives; and requirements 
for railroads to develop procedures for operating during cold weather 
and in mountain grade territories. As noted previously, a final rule 
regarding the use of two-way EOTs has been issued and is in effect. 
This final rule also prohibits the use of certain anti-freeze 
chemicals, contains other requirements to ensure that dry air is being 
added to brake systems, and retains the previously proposed requirement 
that railroads adopt and comply with operating requirements for cold 
weather and heavy-grade operations.
    FRA recognizes that in the past there has been little support for 
mandating additional brake system testing during cold weather. FRA 
agrees that the development and use of welded pipe fittings, wide-lip 
hose couplings, and ferrule clamps have greatly reduced the effects of 
cold weather on the air brake system. However, FRA continues to believe 
that cold weather situations do involve added safety risks and need to 
be further addressed. FRA believes that requiring the development of 
written operating procedures will require railroads to go through the 
thought process necessary to analyze their operations during cold 
weather conditions in order to determine the inherent safety hazards 
involved and develop procedures to minimize those hazards. Due to the 
unique nature of each railroad and the difficulty in developing 
specific requirements that are applicable to all operations, FRA does 
not intend to mandate specific operating requirements at this time. 
However, FRA might consider mandating specific operating requirements 
that should be included in a railroad's cold weather operating 
practices if it is found that railroads do not develop sufficient 
requirements to address safe cold weather operations.
    FRA recognizes that some railroads have already developed certain 
cold weather operating procedures which might be useful as models on 
other similarly situated railroads. For example, BNSF has unilaterally 
instituted a cold weather operating plan for certain trains at specific 
locations in Montana. This plan requires trains with greater than 100 
tons per operative brake to be inspected or operated in a certain 
manner when temperatures fall below zero degrees. Part of the plan 
requires that after the performance of a 1,000-mile or initial terminal 
brake test on such trains, the brakes be reset and held for 30 minutes 
after which time the train is to be reinspected to ensure that 100 
percent of the brakes remained applied. Brakes found not to have 
remained applied must be set out of the train or repaired. FRA believes 
that procedures such as these could greatly enhance the safety of the 
trains operated in cold weather conditions. FRA recognizes that there 
may be other types of operating or inspection criteria that could be 
implemented in extreme cold weather instead of, or in addition to, that 
noted above; such as, limits on the length or tonnage of such trains, 
limits on the use of yard air sources, or other enhanced inspection 
criteria. At this time, FRA continues to believe that railroads are in 
the best position to determine what procedures are best suited to their 
operations.

Section 232.109  Dynamic Brake Requirements

    This section contains the operating requirements for trains 
equipped with dynamic brakes. Most, if not all, of the railroads 
participating in and commenting on this rulemaking have asserted that 
they do not consider dynamic brakes to be a safety device. However, 
these same commenters admit that they promote and encourage the use of 
dynamic brakes for purposes of fuel efficiency and to avoid wear to 
brake components. Due to this encouragement, dynamic brakes are relied 
on to control train speed and to provide assistance in controlling 
trains on heavy grades. Contrary to continued comments of several labor 
representatives, FRA does not feel that locomotives should be required 
to be equipped with dynamic brakes. FRA believes that the decision to 
equip a locomotive with dynamic brakes is mainly an economic one, best 
determined by each individual railroad. However, in order to prevent 
accidents and injuries that may result from an over-reliance on the 
dynamic brake, which may fail at any time, FRA believes that if the 
devices are available, engineers should be informed on their safe and 
proper use and be provided with information regarding the amount of 
dynamic braking power actually available on their respective trains. 
FRA continues to believe that by providing an engineer with as much 
information as possible on the status of the dynamic brakes on a train, 
a railroad better enables that engineer to operate the train in the 
safest and most efficient manner.
    Paragraph (a) generally retains the proposed requirement that a 
locomotive engineer be informed of the operational status of the 
dynamic brakes on the locomotives the engineer will be required to 
operate. This paragraph makes clear that the information is to be 
provided to the locomotive engineer at a train's initial terminal and 
at other locations where a locomotive engineer first begins operation 
of a train. This paragraph slightly modifies the proposed method for 
providing this information to the locomotive engineer. The NPRM 
proposed that the locomotive engineer be provided the required 
information in writing. The intent of the proposed requirement to 
notify the locomotive engineer in writing as to the operational status 
of the dynamic brakes was to ensure that the engineer had timely 
information on

[[Page 4162]]

the condition of the locomotives so he or she could operate the train 
in the safest possible manner based upon that information. Thus, FRA 
tends to agree with the comments of several railroads and their 
representatives that the manner in which the information is provided to 
the engineer should not be a major concern provided the information is 
accurate and up-to-date. Therefore, this paragraph allows railroads to 
provide a locomotive engineer with the required information by any 
means they deem appropriate. However, this paragraph also makes clear 
that a written or electronic record of the information provided shall 
be maintained in the cab of the controlling locomotive. This will 
ensure that relief or other oncoming engineer will have the information 
provided to the previous operator of the train.
    This paragraph also clarifies that the information is to be 
provided to the locomotive engineer at the train's initial terminal and 
at other locations where an engineer ``first begins operation'' of the 
train rather than where the engineer ``takes charge of the train.'' 
This clarification is in response to comments provided by certain labor 
representatives to prevent possible misinterpretation or abuse of the 
requirement since most railroads consider the conductor to be in charge 
of a train.
    Paragraph (b) retains the proposed requirement to repair a 
locomotive with inoperative dynamic brakes within 30 days of its being 
found inoperative or at the locomotive's next periodic inspection, 
whichever occurs first. There are currently no requirements governing 
the maintenance and repair of dynamic brakes. Experience has shown 
that, since railroads do not consider dynamic brakes to be a critical 
safety item, repairs are typically effectuated when it is convenient 
and economical for the railroad, with little regard for timeliness. FRA 
believes that, as railroads have become increasingly dependent on the 
use of dynamic brakes as an integral part of their published safe train 
handling procedures, it is a reasonable expectation on behalf of 
locomotive engineers to have operable dynamic brakes on those 
locomotive units which are so equipped. Due to the industry's reliance 
on these braking systems, as noted in the discussion above, FRA 
continues to believe they should be repaired as soon as possible after 
being found inoperative. FRA agrees that there must be an appropriate 
balance between the operational considerations important to the 
locomotive engineer and the logistical and repair considerations that 
will be imposed on the railroads. FRA continues to believe that 30 days 
provides a railroad with sufficient time to get a locomotive to a 
location where the dynamic brakes can be repaired and allows for the 
reallocation of motive power when necessary so as to cause minimal 
disruption to a railroad's operation. Although certain commenters 
requested that the period allowed for repair be reduced to 15 days or 
less, FRA believes such a reduction is unwise as it might jeopardize a 
railroad's access to available motive power and could cause delay in 
the movement of freight, consequences that may create safety hazards 
themselves.
    This paragraph also eliminates the use of the term ``ineffective 
dynamic brake'' and replaces it with the term ``inoperative dynamic 
brake.'' The term ``inoperative dynamic brake'' is defined in 
Sec. 232.5 of the final rule to mean any dynamic brake which no longer 
provides its designed retarding force on the train, for whatever 
reason. FRA agrees with the comment of the AAR that the use and meaning 
of the term ``ineffective dynamic brake'' in the proposal was unclear 
and had the potential of creating misunderstandings. Consequently, for 
clarity this section uses only the term ``inoperative dynamic brake'' 
to describe a defective dynamic brake.
    Paragraph (c) retains the proposed requirements related to the 
tagging of a locomotive found with inoperative dynamic brakes. FRA 
believes that the tags required by this paragraph are necessary to 
ensure the prompt and timely repair of locomotives found with defective 
dynamic brakes and also provide locomotive engineers and a railroad's 
ground forces with specific knowledge of the presence of such a 
locomotive. Contrary to the comments of some parties, FRA does not 
believe that the tagging provisions contained in this paragraph would 
require the development of new tags. This paragraph would allow the use 
of any type of tag provided it is placed in a conspicuous location on 
the cab of the locomotive and contains the required information.
    Paragraph (d) contains a requirement that an electronic or written 
record of repairs made to a locomotive's dynamic brakes be maintained 
and retained for a period of 92 days. Although this requirement was not 
proposed in the NPRM, FRA believes these records fall within the scope 
of the notice and are necessary to ensure that repairs are conducted on 
a locomotive's dynamic brakes in a timely fashion. FRA also believes 
that such a record will provide a railroad with information regarding 
the operation of the dynamic brakes and will potentially permit 
railroads to identify a repeated problem with a locomotive's dynamic 
brakes to prevent recurrences of the problem and thus, increase the 
utilization of a locomotive's dynamic brakes.
    The final rule continues to acknowledge that some railroads, 
primarily short lines, may own locomotives that are equipped with 
dynamic brakes but due to the physical terrain over which the railroad 
operates or the operating assignments of the particular locomotive, the 
railroad rarely, if ever, has the need to employ the dynamic braking 
capabilities of the individual locomotive. In these instances, the 
maintenance requirements discussed above become unnecessarily 
burdensome. Therefore, FRA continues to believe that relief is 
warranted in these situations provided a specified set of parameters is 
developed and adhered to that prevents direct and intentional 
circumvention of the proposed repair requirements. Therefore, paragraph 
(e) retains the proposed provision permitting a railroad to declare a 
locomotive's dynamic brakes ``deactivated'' if the following 
requirements are met: (i) The locomotive is clearly marked with the 
words ``dynamic brake deactivated'' in a conspicuous location in the 
cab of the locomotive; and (ii) the railroad has taken appropriate 
action to ensure that the deactivated locomotive is incapable of 
utilizing dynamic braking effort to retard or control train speed. It 
should be noted that the final rule eliminates the requirement to 
stencil the outside of a locomotive declared to have deactivated 
dynamic brakes. FRA agrees with the comments submitted by the AAR and 
other railroad representatives that defacing the exterior of the 
locomotive is unnecessary and would do little to inform the locomotive 
engineer of the deactivation of the dynamic brake. FRA believes that 
the requirements to notify the locomotive engineer of the operational 
status of the locomotives and to have the cab of the locomotive clearly 
marked that the locomotive's dynamic brakes are deactivated provide 
sufficient notice to the locomotive engineer as to the status of that 
locomotive.
    This paragraph does not prescribe the specific manner in which a 
locomotive is to be deactivated, so long as the unit is not physically 
capable of employing its dynamic brakes to aid in train handling. 
Although FRA does not envision a significant number of instances where 
a locomotive which has been declared ``deactivated'' would need to be 
``reactivated,'' FRA does

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recognize that some railroads may need to reactivate the dynamic brakes 
in some circumstances, such as changes in a locomotive's operating 
environment or situations where a locomotive with previously 
``deactivated'' dynamic brakes is purchased by another railroad. 
However, FRA intends to interpret the provision for ``deactivating'' a 
locomotive's dynamic brakes rather literally to minimize contentions 
that railroads are merely playing a cat and mouse game with the 
required maintenance interval to avoid repairing the units. 
Furthermore, FRA would expect the dynamic brakes on a locomotive to be 
fully functional at the time the locomotive is considered reactivated.
    Paragraph (f) contains specific requirements related to the use of 
a locomotive with inoperative, deactivated, or no dynamic brakes as a 
controlling locomotive. These requirements are based on FRA's review of 
the comments submitted in response to FRA's request regarding the 
positioning of such locomotives contained in the NPRM. See 63 FR 48314. 
FRA tends to agree that there are no technical reasons why a locomotive 
with inoperative dynamic brakes cannot function as the controlling 
locomotive provided it can control the dynamic brakes on trailing units 
in the locomotive consist. However, FRA also agrees that a locomotive 
engineer loses the physical sensation of the operation of the dynamic 
brakes when the unit the engineer is riding loses dynamic brake 
capability because the physical sensation of operating dynamic brakes 
provides the engineer with at least some assurance that the dynamic 
brakes on some of the units in the consist are operating. Thus, this 
paragraph makes clear that locomotives with inoperative, deactivated, 
or no dynamic brakes have the capability of controlling the dynamic 
brakes on trailing units when operating as the controlling locomotive, 
and that such locomotives also have the capability of displaying to the 
locomotive engineer the deceleration rate of the train or the total 
train dynamic brake retarding force. FRA believes this requirement will 
ensure that locomotive engineers have at least some information as to 
the operation of the dynamic brakes in the locomotive consist they are 
controlling. FRA intends that the information required by this 
provision be provided by a device known as an ``accelerometer'', 
``predictor'', or a similar type of device; or by a dynamic brake 
indicator capable of providing total train dynamic brake retarding 
force to the locomotive engineer. An ``accelerometer'' or ``predictor'' 
is a device currently used in the industry that indicates the predicted 
speed in miles per hour of the locomotive 60 seconds from the present, 
based on the computed acceleration or deceleration rate. This would 
provide the engineer with an indication of the retarding performance of 
the dynamic brakes and the train.
    Paragraph (g) contains provisions requiring new locomotives to be 
equipped with some sort of dynamic brake indicator. In the NPRM, FRA 
sought information and comments regarding the feasibility of dynamic 
brake indicators which continually monitor the operation of dynamic 
brakes in a train consist. See 63 FR 48334. The NTSB noted that the 
NPRM failed to address its recommendation resulting from its 
investigation of the January 12, 1997, freight train derailment near 
Kelso, California, that all locomotives equipped with dynamic brakes be 
equipped with a device in the cab of the controlling locomotive to 
indicate real-time condition of the dynamic brakes on each trailing 
unit. See NTSB Recommendation R-98-6. Based on a review of the comments 
and information provided, FRA continues to believe that the technology 
does not currently exist to economically equip existing locomotives 
with dynamic brake indicators. However, FRA does believe that the 
technology exists or is sufficiently developed to provide new 
locomotives with the ability to test the electrical integrity of the 
dynamic brakes at rest and to display the total train dynamic brake 
retarding force at various speed increments in the cab of the 
controlling locomotive. Consequently, this paragraph requires new 
locomotives to be equipped with such indicators. FRA recognizes that 
the industry will require a little time to incorporate the existing and 
developing technology into new locomotives. Therefore, the requirements 
contained in this paragraph will apply only to locomotives ordered one 
and one-half years after the issuance of this final rule and to 
locomotives placed in service for the first time three years after the 
effective date of the final rule.
    Paragraph (h) contains requirements for equipping rebuilt 
locomotives with devices to provide locomotive engineers with 
additional information on the operation of dynamic brakes on other 
locomotives in the train consist. This paragraph recognizes that not 
all locomotives being rebuilt are designed, or have the capability of 
being redesigned to have the capability to display the total train 
dynamic brake retarding force in the cab of the controlling locomotive. 
Thus, this paragraph allows rebuilt locomotives to be designed to 
display the train deceleration rate (i.e., to be equipped with an 
accelerometer, predictor, or similar device as described above) in lieu 
of being equipped with the dynamic brake indicator required on new 
locomotives. FRA believes that the information provided by these 
indicators is extremely useful to an engineer, will provide the 
engineer with ready access to real-time information on the operation of 
the dynamic brakes in a locomotive consist, and will permit the 
engineer to control and operate trains in the safest manner possible.
    Paragraph (i) acknowledges that the information provided to a 
locomotive engineer by a dynamic brake indicator would satisfy the need 
to provide the locomotive engineer with information regarding the 
operational status of the dynamic brakes when the engineer first begins 
operation of a train. As the indicators would provide real-time 
information to the engineer on the operation of the dynamic brakes in 
the train consist, a separate set of information received by the 
engineer when beginning operation would be unnecessary. Therefore, this 
paragraph carves out an exception to the requirement to inform 
locomotive engineers of the status of the dynamic brakes for situations 
when all of the locomotives in the lead consist are equipped with 
dynamic brake indicators of the type required for new locomotives. FRA 
believes that this exception makes sense from a practical perspective 
and also provides some incentive for railroads to equip existing 
equipment with such indicators where possible when the technology for 
doing so becomes economically feasible. It should be noted that there 
is no requirement that the dynamic brake status of distributed power 
units be provided in order to eliminate the need to provide dynamic 
brake information to the engineer. FRA agrees that the technology for 
transmitting that information to the engineer is not currently 
available in a cost effective and reliable manner.
    Paragraphs (j) and (k) retain the proposed provisions requiring 
railroads to adopt and comply with written operating rules governing 
the use of dynamic brakes and to incorporate training on those 
operating rules into the locomotive engineer certification program 
pursuant to 49 CFR part 240. Contrary to the assertions of some 
commenters FRA does not believe these requirements are unclear. FRA 
intends for each railroad to develop appropriate operating rules 
regarding train handling

[[Page 4164]]

procedures when utilizing dynamic brakes that cover the equipment and 
territory operated by the railroad. Many railroads already have these 
procedures in place and already provide training to their employees 
which adequately cover the requirements. FRA continues to believe that 
training on proper train handling procedures is essential to ensuring 
that locomotive engineers can properly handle their trains with or 
without dynamic brakes and in the event that these brake systems fail 
while the train is being operated. FRA also disagrees that it must 
specify the knowledge, skill, and ability criteria that a railroad must 
adopt into its training program. FRA believes that each railroad is in 
the best position to determine what these criteria should be and what 
training is necessary to provide that knowledge, skill, and ability to 
its employees.
    FRA continues to believe that the establishment of these 
comprehensive operating rules and their incorporation into a railroad's 
training plans is the most effective means by which to minimize the 
possibility of future accidents caused by excessive reliance on dynamic 
brakes by a train crew as a method of controlling the speed of a train 
in its descent through a difficult grade, as was the case in the San 
Bernardino incident. FRA views as unfortunate the number of existing 
train handling and power brake instructions issued by freight railroads 
that emphasize the use of dynamic brakes but do not include prominent 
warnings that such systems may not be relied upon to provide the margin 
of safety necessary to stop short of obstructions and control points or 
to avoid overspeed conditions. FRA believes that such instructions, 
while not misleading to seasoned locomotive engineers, could lead to an 
excessive reliance on these systems. Given the ever-increasing weight 
and length of freight trains, and the severe grades that they are often 
required to negotiate en route, the need for locomotive engineers who 
are thoroughly trained and knowledgeable in all aspects of train 
handling is paramount for continued safety in the rail industry.
    Paragraph (j)(2) requires that the operating rules developed by 
railroads under this section include a ``miles-per-hour-overspeed'' 
requirement that requires trains to be immediately stopped if they 
exceed the maximum authorized speed by more than 5 mph when descending 
grades of one percent or greater. The NTSB recommended that FRA adopt 
such a requirement as a result of its investigation of the freight 
train derailment near Kelso, California noted above. See NTSB 
Recommendation R-98-4. FRA agrees with NTSB's recommendation and also 
agrees with the comments provided by both the NTSB and the CAPUC that 
this requirement accomplishes a critical safety function and reduces 
the potential for runaways because it establishes a clear rule for 
stopping a train and removes any discretion from the operator to 
continue operation of a train. This paragraph makes clear that the 
five-mph limitation is a good base limitation which should be reduced 
by a railroad if it so desires or if a reduction is indicated by 
validated research. The five-mph limitation may only be increased with 
FRA approval. FRA notes that the operating rules of virtually every 
Class I railroad already include a five-mph-overspeed provision similar 
to that contained in this paragraph. Consequently, FRA's inclusion of 
the requirement in this final rule should impose little or no burden on 
the operations of most railroads.

Section 232.111  Train Information Handling

    This section retains the proposed requirements regarding the 
handling of train information, with slight modification in response to 
the comments submitted by interested parties. The purpose of the train-
information handling requirements contained in this section is to 
ensure that a train crew is provided accurate information on the 
condition of a train's brake system and other factors that affect the 
performance of a train's brake system when the crew assumes 
responsibility for a train. This section contains a list of the 
specific information railroads are to furnish train crew members about 
the train and the train's brake system at the time they take charge of 
the train. FRA continues to believe that train crews need this 
information in order to avoid potentially dangerous train handling 
situations and to be able to comply with various Federal safety 
standards. Many railroads already provide their train crews with most 
of the information required in this section or have a process set up 
that can transmit such information; thus, the impact of these 
requirements should be relatively minor.
    Paragraph (a) has been slightly modified to clarify that the 
information required to be provided in this section may be provided by 
any means determined appropriate by the railroad, provided, that a 
record of the information is maintained in the cab of the controlling 
locomotive. This requirement does not constitute a change from what was 
proposed in the NPRM but is merely a clarification to resolve an 
apparent misunderstanding of some parties. In the NPRM, FRA noted that 
it intended to leave the method in which the required information would 
be conveyed to train crews to the discretion of each railroad. FRA 
believed that each individual railroad is in the best position to 
determine the method in which to dispense the required information 
based on the individual characteristics of its operations. However, FRA 
noted that the means for conveying the required information would have 
to be part of the written operating requirements, and railroads would 
be required to follow their own requirements.
    Paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) have also been slightly modified, for 
purpose of clarity, from what was proposed in the NPRM. Paragraph 
(b)(1) clarifies that train crews are to be provided the required 
information when ``taking charge of a train'' rather than when ``coming 
on duty'' as was proposed. FRA agrees with the comments of the AAR that 
the modified language better clarifies when the required information is 
to be provided. Paragraph (b)(2) has been modified to clarify that the 
weight and length information to be provided should be based on the 
best information available to the railroad. FRA agrees with the 
comments of the AAR and several railroads that it is impossible to 
provide the exact weight of each car in a train because the facilities 
to weigh each car do not exist. FRA also agrees that it would be cost 
prohibitive and unrealistic to require that each car be weighed prior 
to being moved in a train. Consequently, the final rule makes clear 
that the weight of the train can be estimated based on the best 
information available to the railroad. It should be noted that FRA has 
eliminated the proposed requirement that train crews be provided a 
record of train configuration changes since performance of the last 
Class I brake test. FRA agrees that such information is not necessary 
based on the other information that is required to be provided and has 
the potential of creating information overload for the train crews.

Subpart C--Inspection and Testing Requirements

Section 232.201 Scope

    This section contains the general statement regarding the scope of 
this subpart, indicating that it contains the inspection and testing 
requirements for brake systems used in freight and other non-passenger 
trains. This section also

[[Page 4165]]

indicates that this subpart contains the general training requirements 
for railroad and contract personnel who perform the inspections and 
tests required by this part.

Section 232.203  Training Requirements

    This section contains the general training requirements for 
railroad employees and contractor employees that are used to perform 
the inspections required by this part. (See ``Overview of Comments and 
General FRA Conclusions'' portion of the preamble under the heading 
``V. Training and Qualifications of Personnel'' for a detailed 
discussion pertaining to the provisions contained in this section.) 
This section retains the basic structure and concepts regarding the 
training and qualification of individuals performing inspections and 
tests required by this part that were proposed in the NPRM. The 
training requirements contained in this final rule have been slightly 
revised from those proposed in the NPRM in order to clarify FRA's 
intent, to recognize existing training, and to reduce some of the 
burden that may have been inadvertently created by the proposed 
requirements.
    Paragraph (a) requires that each railroad and each contractor adopt 
and comply with a training, qualification, and designation program for 
railroad employees and contractor employees who perform air brake 
system tests, inspections and maintenance. This paragraph modifies the 
proposed provision that would have required a railroad to provide 
training to the personnel of a contractor whom the railroad uses to 
perform the various tasks required by the rule. This paragraph makes 
clear that the contractor is responsible for providing appropriate 
training to its employees and maintaining the required records and 
information. FRA agrees with the comments submitted on behalf of 
numerous railroads that asserted that railroads should not bear the 
burden of training the employees of a contractor. However, FRA notes 
that this change does not relieve the railroad from potential civil 
penalties for, e.g., failure to perform a proper Class I brake test, if 
the employees of a contractor are found not to be qualified to perform 
the task for which they are assigned responsibility. Both the railroad 
and the contractor would remain liable for potential civil penalties if 
the employees used to perform a particular task were not trained and 
qualified in accordance with the training requirements contained in 
this final rule.
    For purposes of this section, a ``contractor'' is defined as a 
person under contract with a railroad or a car owner or an employee of 
a person under contract with a railroad or a car owner. FRA intends for 
the training and qualification requirements to apply not only to 
railroad personnel but also to contract personnel that are responsible 
for performing brake system inspections, maintenance, or tests required 
by this part. FRA believes that railroads and contractors are in the 
best position to determine the precise method of training that is 
required for the personnel they use to conduct required brake system 
inspections, tests, and maintenance. Although FRA provides railroads 
and contractors with broad discretion to develop training programs 
specifically tailored to their operations and personnel, FRA will 
expect railroads and contractors to fully comply with the training and 
qualification plans they adopt. A critical component of this training 
will be making employees aware of specific Federal requirements that 
govern their work. Currently, many railroad training programs fail to 
distinguish Federal requirements from company policy.
    Paragraph (b) contains general requirements or elements which must 
be part of any training and qualification plan adopted by a railroad or 
contractor. FRA believes that the elements contained in this section 
are specific enough to ensure high quality training and broad enough to 
permit a railroad or contractor to adopt a training plan that is best 
suited to its particular operation. This paragraph retains the proposed 
requirement that the plan identify the tasks related to the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance of the brake system required to be performed 
by the railroad or contractor and identify the skills and knowledge 
necessary to perform each task. FRA believes that most railroads 
already have a training plan and would merely need to revise it to 
reflect changes made to existing requirements by this final rule. The 
final rule eliminates the proposed requirement to develop written 
procedures for performing each task identified. Although FRA believes 
that each railroad or contractor should and will develop such 
procedures, FRA does not believe it is necessary to require their 
development as FRA believes they will either be developed in the 
required training curricula or are sufficiently detailed in the 
regulation itself.
    This paragraph also clarifies that the required training is 
intended to provide employees with the skills and knowledge necessary 
to perform the tasks required by this final rule. FRA does not believe 
it is necessary to train an employee on every different type of 
equipment that a railroad operates or on each and every task an 
employees will be required to perform. FRA's intent when issuing the 
NPRM was to ensure that the training received by an employee provides 
that individual with the knowledge and skills needed to perform the 
tasks he or she is assigned on the various types of brake systems on 
the equipment the railroad operates. Therefore, this paragraph 
clarifies this intent by specifically stating that the training 
curriculum, the examinations, and the ``hands-on'' capability should 
address the skills and knowledge needed to perform the various required 
tasks rather than focusing strictly on the tasks themselves or on the 
specific types of equipment operated by the railroad. However, FRA does 
intend for the training developed by the railroad or contractor to 
address the various types of brake systems the employee will be 
required to inspect, test, or maintain. For example, if an employee 
were trained on how to perform a Class I brake test and demonstrated 
hands-on capability to perform that task, FRA would not expect the 
employee to demonstrate hands-on capability to perform a Class IA or 
Class II brake test since the components of a Class I brake test cover 
these other inspections. However, FRA would expect the employee to 
receive classroom training on when these other inspections are required 
and the tasks that are involved in each.
    This paragraph also clarifies that the training that an employee is 
required to receive need only address the specific skills and knowledge 
related to the tasks that the person will be required to perform under 
this part. Thus, a railroad or contractor may tailor its training 
programs to the needs of each of its employees based on the tasks that 
each of its employees will be required to perform. FRA tends to agree 
with several commenters that there is no reason for an individual who 
performs strictly brake inspections and tests to be as highly trained 
as a carman since carmen perform many other duties related to the 
maintenance and repair of equipment in addition to brake inspections.
    This paragraph also clarifies that previous training and testing 
received by an employee may be considered by the railroad. FRA did not 
intend to require the complete retraining of every employee performing 
a task required in this final rule. When proposing the training 
requirements, FRA intended for railroads to incorporate existing 
training

[[Page 4166]]

regimens and curricula into the proposed training programs. In order to 
clarify this intent, this paragraph permits railroads and contractors 
to incorporate an already existing training program, such as an 
apprenticeship program, and contains a specific provision which permits 
railroads and contractors to consider previous training and testing 
received by an employee when determining whether an employee is 
qualified to perform a particular task. Thus, railroads and contractors 
would most likely not need to provide much additional training, except 
training specifically addressing the new requirements contained in this 
part and possibly refresher training, to its carmen forces that have 
completed an apprentice program for their craft. However, the final 
rule also makes clear that any previous training or testing considered 
by a railroad or contractor must be documented as required in the final 
rule. Thus, previous training or testing which has not been properly 
documented cannot be considered. The final rule also makes clear that 
employees must be trained on the specific regulatory requirements 
contained in this final rule related to the tasks that the employee 
will be required to perform. Therefore, all employees will require at 
least some training which covers the specific requirements detailed in 
this final rule.
    This paragraph retains the proposed requirements that any program 
developed must include experiential or ``hands-on'' training as well as 
classroom instruction. FRA believes that classroom training by itself 
is not sufficient to ensure that an individual has retained or grasped 
the concepts and duties explained in a classroom setting. In order to 
adequately ensure that an individual actually understands the training 
provided in the classroom, some sort of ``hands-on'' capability must be 
demonstrated. FRA believes that the ``hands-on'' portion of the 
training program would be an ideal place for a railroad to fully 
involve its labor force in the training process. Appropriately trained 
and skilled employees would be perfectly suited to provide much of the 
``hands-on'' training envisioned by FRA. Consequently, FRA strongly 
suggests that railroads work in partnership with their employees to 
develop a training program which utilizes the knowledge, skills, and 
experience of the employees to the greatest extent possible.
    This paragraph also retains, with modification for clarity, the 
proposed requirement that employees pass either a written or oral 
examination and demonstrate ``hands-on'' capability. This paragraph 
clarifies that the tests and demonstration of ``hands-on'' capability 
cover the skills and knowledge the employee will need to possess in 
order to perform the tasks required by this part that the employee will 
be responsible for performing rather than focusing strictly on the 
tasks themselves or on the specific types of equipment operated by the 
railroad. However, FRA does intend for the testing and ``hands-on'' 
demonstration to cover the various types of brake systems the employee 
will be required to inspect, test, or maintain. FRA continues to 
believe that in order for a person to be adequately trained to perform 
a task, the individual must not only possess the knowledge of what is 
required to be performed but also must possess the capability of 
applying that knowledge.
    This paragraph also retains the proposed requirement regarding the 
performance of periodic refresher training and testing. The final rule 
retains the requirement that refresher training be provided at least 
once every three years and that it include both classroom and 
experiential ``hands-on'' training and testing. FRA continues to 
believe that periodic refresher training is essential to ensuring the 
continued ability of an employee to perform a particular task. FRA does 
not intend for such training to be as lengthy or as formal as the 
initial training originally provided, but believes that the training 
should reemphasize key elements of various tasks and focus on items or 
tasks that have been identified as being problematic or of poor quality 
by the railroad, contractor, or its employees through the periodic 
assessment of the training program. This paragraph makes clear that a 
railroad or contractor may use efficiency testing to meet the hands-on 
portion of the required refresher training provided such testing is 
properly documented and covers the necessary tasks to ensure retention 
of the knowledge and skill required to perform the employee's duties 
required by this part. FRA agrees that such testing provides the 
necessary assurances that the individual continues to have the 
knowledge and skills necessary to perform the task for which the 
employee is being tested.
    This paragraph contains a provision that was not specifically 
included in the NPRM but which was intended by FRA to be covered by the 
established training programs. This paragraph requires that new brake 
systems be added to training programs prior to their introduction into 
revenue service. Several labor representatives recommended that this 
provision be explicitly added to the training provisions, and FRA 
believes this requirement is only logical and makes sense. FRA believes 
that, prior to the introduction of any new brake system, the employees 
responsible for inspecting and maintaining the equipment need to be 
specifically trained on the systems in order to adequately perform 
their required tasks.
    This paragraph also retains the proposed requirement that 
supervisors exercise oversight to ensure that all identified tasks are 
performed in accordance with the railroad's procedures and the specific 
Federal regulatory requirements contained in this part. Although the 
final rule also does not specifically address the training that must be 
provided to supervisors as suggested by some commenters, FRA believes 
that supervisors are sufficiently covered by the requirements contained 
in this section. FRA believes that in order for a supervisor to 
properly exercise oversight of an employee's work, the supervisor must 
be trained and qualified to perform the tasks for which they have 
oversight responsibilities.
    Paragraph (c) requires each railroad that operates trains required 
to be equipped with two-way EOTs and each contractor that maintains 
such devices adopt and comply with a training program which 
specifically addresses the testing, operation, and maintenance of the 
devices. The final rule requiring the use of two-way EOTs became 
effective on July 1, 1997. Since that time, FRA has discovered numerous 
operating and mechanical employees who do not fully understand when the 
devices are required or how the inspection and testing of the devices 
are to be accomplished. Furthermore, FRA believes that it is vital for 
those employees responsible for the use of the devices (e.g. engineers 
and conductors) to be intimately familiar with the use and operation of 
the devices to ensure that the full safety potential of the devices is 
utilized and available. Consequently, FRA believes that adequate 
training must be provided to those employees responsible for the 
inspection, testing, operation and use of two-way EOTs.
    Paragraph (d) requires railroads that operate trains under 
conditions that require their employees to set retaining valves to 
develop training programs which specifically address the use of 
retainers and provide such training to those employees responsible for 
using or setting retainers. This provision has been added in response 
to an NTSB recommendation which FRA supports. See NTSB Recommendation 
R-98-7. The NTSB specifically suggested that an explicit requirement to 
provide this

[[Page 4167]]

training be contained in the final rule. The NTSB had previously 
recommended such a requirement in early 1998 based on its investigation 
of the 1997 derailment of a freight train near Kelso, California. Many 
railroads are currently providing such training based on that 
recommendation and FRA believes that a specific requirement to provide 
such training will ensure that all railroads that require their 
employees to set retainers adequately train their employees responsible 
for performing the task on the use of retainers.
    Paragraph (e) retains the record keeping requirements proposed in 
the NPRM with slight modification for consistency with the changes 
noted above regarding the application of the skills and knowledge 
necessary to perform a particular task. FRA continues to believe that 
the record keeping and designation requirements contained in this final 
rule are the cornerstone of the training requirements. Contrary to the 
views of some commenters, FRA believes that something more than mere 
lists of qualified employees is needed. Because the rule allows each 
railroad and contractor the flexibility to develop a training program 
that best fits its operation and does not impose specific curriculum or 
experience requirements, FRA continues to believe it is vital for 
railroads and contractors to maintain detailed records on the training 
they do provide. Such documentation will allow FRA to judge the 
effectiveness of the training provided and will provide FRA with the 
ability to independently assess whether the training provided to a 
specific individual adequately addresses the skills and knowledge 
required to perform the tasks that the person is deemed qualified to 
perform. Moreover, requiring these records will deter railroads and 
contractors from circumventing the training requirements and discourage 
them from attempting to utilize insufficiently trained personnel to 
perform the inspections and tests required by this rule.
    This paragraph makes clear that the required records may be 
maintained either electronically or on paper. Many railroads currently 
maintain their training records in an electronic format, and FRA sees 
no reason not to permit such a practice if the information can be 
provided to FRA in a timely manner upon request. The proposed provision 
requiring the railroad's chief mechanical or chief operating officer to 
sign a statement regarding each employee's qualifications has been 
modified in the final rule to merely require identification of the 
person or persons making the determination that the employee has 
completed the necessary training. This modification will permit the 
information to be maintained electronically and will still provide the 
accountability which FRA intended by the provision in the NPRM. FRA 
believes it is absolutely essential that those individuals making the 
determinations regarding an employee's qualification be identified in 
order to ensure the integrity of the training programs developed and to 
prevent potential abuses by a railroad or contractor.
    FRA also objects to the portrayal by some commenters that the 
requirement to maintain training records is overly burdensome. 
Virtually all of the items required to be recorded are currently 
maintained by most railroads in some fashion or another. Contrary to 
the concerns raised by some commenters, the rule does not require that 
the contents of each training program be maintained in each employee's 
file. Railroads are free to develop whatever type of cross-referencing 
system they desire, provided the contents of the training program are 
maintained in some fashion and can be readily retrieved. Furthermore, 
railroads currently maintain lists of individuals they deem to be 
qualified persons, and the companies inform those individuals as to 
their status to perform particular tasks. FRA believes this is a good 
practice and is necessary to ensure that individual employees do not 
attempt to perform, or are not asked to perform, tasks for which they 
have not been trained.
    Paragraph (e) requires that each railroad or contractor adopt and 
comply with a plan to periodically assess the effectiveness of its 
training program. This paragraph modifies the proposed requirement that 
railroads develop an internal audit process to evaluate the 
effectiveness of their training. Although FRA agrees that a formal 
audit process may not be necessary, FRA continues to believe that 
railroads and contractors should periodically assess the effectiveness 
of their training programs. However, rather than require a formal 
internal audit, FRA believes that periodic assessments may be conducted 
through a number of different means and each railroad or contractor may 
have a need to conduct the assessment in a different manner. This 
paragraph requires that a railroad or contractor institute a plan to 
periodically assess its training program and, as suggested by some 
commenters, the paragraph permits the use of efficiency tests or 
periodic review of employee performance as methods for conducting such 
review. FRA agrees that many railroads, due to their small size, are 
capable of assessing the quality of the training their employees 
receive by conducting periodic supervisory spot checks or efficiency 
tests of their employees' performance. However, FRA continues to 
believe that on larger railroads the periodic assessment of a training 
program should involve all segments of the workforce involved in the 
training. FRA believes it is vital that labor be intrinsically involved 
in the assessment process, from beginning to end. For example, 
evaluation of training techniques might best be approached through a 
``team'' method, where several observers, including labor 
representatives, periodically evaluate course or ``hands-on'' training 
content and presentation.

Section 232.205  Class I Brake Test-Initial Terminal Inspection

    This section describes the circumstances that would mandate the 
performance of a Class I brake test and outlines the tasks that must be 
performed when performing this inspection. Most of the provisions 
contained in this section are currently contained in Sec. 232.12(a) and 
(c)-(h) or were proposed in the 1998 NPRM in order to clarify existing 
requirements, to eliminate potential abuses, and to standardize certain 
provisions. Basically a Class I brake test is intended to be the 
functional equivalent to what is currently referred to as an ``initial 
terminal brake inspection.''
    Paragraph (a) identifies those trains that are required to receive 
a Class I brake test prior to movement from a location. The provisions 
contained in this paragraph are virtually identical to those proposed 
in the NPRM, with slight modification for clarity. Paragraph (a)(1) 
requires that a train receive a Class I brake test at the location 
where it is originally assembled. It should be noted that the final 
rule eliminates the term ``point of origin'' proposed in the NPRM. FRA 
agrees that the proposed definition of this term was duplicative of the 
term ``initial terminal'' and merely created potential 
misunderstandings. Moreover, FRA agrees that the problems attempted to 
be addressed by the use of this term are sufficiently addressed by the 
various inspections required in this final rule when cars are added to 
a train.
    Paragraph (a)(2) requires the performance of a Class I brake test 
when the train consist is changed other than by adding or removing a 
solid block of cars. Currently, there appears to be some confusion over 
what constitutes a ``solid block of cars.'' In order to clarify the

[[Page 4168]]

issue, FRA proposed a definition of ``solid block of cars'' in the 
NPRM. In response to numerous comments regarding the proposed 
definition and to further clarify the issue, FRA has modified the 
definition in this final rule and referenced that definition in this 
paragraph. Although FRA believes that the definition it proposed is 
consistent with current interpretations and enforcement of the 
requirement, FRA agrees with some of the commenters that the proposed 
definition may have been too narrow and did not directly address FRA's 
primary concern, the block of cars itself. FRA's primary concern is the 
condition of the block of cars being added to the train, especially 
when the block of cars is made up of cars from more than one train. 
Thus, the final rule will permit a solid block of cars to be added to a 
train without triggering a requirement to perform a Class I brake test 
on the entire train. However, depending on the make-up of that block of 
cars, certain inspections will have to be performed on that block of 
cars at the location where it is added to the train.
    FRA believes that limits have to be placed on the number of blocks 
of cars being added to a train in order to ensure that cars are being 
inspected in a timely manner and in accordance with the intent of the 
regulations. Some commenters suggest that a block of cars should be 
permitted to be added to a train with no inspection other than a 
continuity test regardless of the number of different trains the cars 
making up the block came from provided all the cars received a Class I 
brake test at their point of origin. Other commenters suggest that any 
number of blocks of cars should be permitted to be added to a train at 
a single location. FRA believes that to accept either of these 
positions would be tantamount to eliminating initial terminal and 
intermediate inspections and would drastically reduce the safety of 
freight trains being operated across the country. In FRA's view, both 
of the positions noted above are merely means to circumvent inspections 
and are akin to a practice known as ``block swapping'' in the 
mechanical inspection context, a practice that FRA does not permit. In 
FRA's opinion, the authority to add multiple blocks of cars to a train 
at one location or add a single block of cars to a train that is 
composed of cars from numerous different trains without inspecting the 
cars in those blocks, would essentially allow railroads to assemble new 
trains without performing any direct inspection of any of the cars in 
the train. Furthermore, if cars are permitted to be moved in and out of 
a train at will, determining when and where a Class IA brake test must 
be performed on the train will be impossible.
    This paragraph requires the performance of a Class I brake test at 
locations where more than one ``solid block of cars'' is added to or 
removed from a train. It should be noted that the final rule permits 
both the addition and the removal of a ``solid block of cars'' at a 
location without requiring the performance of a Class I brake test on 
the entire train. Although this practice is not permitted under the 
existing regulations, FRA believes that the inspection requirements 
contained in this final rule ensure the safety of cars being added and 
removed in this fashion. This paragraph also contains an additional 
caveat that will permit the removal of defective equipment at locations 
where other cars are added or removed without triggering the 
requirement to perform a Class I brake test on the entire train. FRA 
currently permits this practice, and it is consistent with the 
requirements aimed at having defective equipment repaired as quickly as 
possible.
    Paragraph (a)(3) incorporates FRA's longstanding administrative 
interpretation which permits trains to remain disconnected from a 
source of compressed air (``off air'') for a short length of time 
without having to be retested. Currently, FRA permits trains to remain 
``off air'' only for a period of approximately two hours before an 
initial terminal brake inspection must be performed. This paragraph 
retains the proposed extension of the permissible time ``off air'' to 
four hours. A detailed discussion regarding FRA's retention of the 
proposed extension of the permissible time cars may be left ``off-air'' 
is contained in the preceding ``Overview of Comments and General FRA 
Conclusions'' portion of the preamble under the heading ``II. C. 
Charging of Air Brake System.''
    Paragraph (a)(4) retains the proposed requirement that unit or 
cycle trains receive a Class I brake test every 3,000 miles. The final 
rule has been slightly modified from the provision contained in the 
NPRM to clarify that this requirement applies to unit or cycle trains. 
FRA has also added a definition of ``unit train'' and ``cycle train'' 
to the final rule in order to clarify the applicability of the 
requirement. Historically, these trains operate for extended periods of 
time with only a series of brake inspections similar to Class IA brake 
inspections. FRA believes that the proposed 3,000-mile limitation is 
appropriate as it represents the approximate distance that a train 
would cover when traveling from coast to coast. In addition, the 3,000-
mile requirement is consistent with the interval for performing Class 
IA brake tests and would equate to every third inspection on these 
trains being a Class I brake test rather than a Class IA brake test. 
Furthermore, AAR does not seek a moderate extension of a couple hundred 
miles so a few trains could complete their cycle, but seeks to extend 
the distance to more than 4,500 miles in many instances. FRA is not 
willing to modify the proposed requirement to that extent and believes 
that a 3,000-mile interval for these types of trains provides 
sufficient flexibility to the railroads to perform periodic Class I 
brake tests on these train in a cost-effective manner.
    Paragraph (a)(5) retains the proposed provisions for when trains 
received in interchange must receive a Class I brake test. These are 
similar to what is currently contained in Sec. 232.12(a)(1)(iii); 
however, this paragraph retains two proposed provisions that are not 
contained in the existing regulations. The final rule will permit 
trains received in interchange to have a previously tested solid block 
of cars added to the train without requiring the performance of a Class 
I brake test. Currently, the addition of these types of cars to a train 
received in interchange would require the performance of an initial 
terminal inspection. As long as the added block of cars has been 
previously tested, FRA sees no safety hazard in permitting the cars to 
be added to a train at an interchange location. Furthermore, the final 
rule will permit a train that is received in interchange, and that will 
travel no more than 20 miles from the interchange location, to have its 
consist changed other than as provided in paragraph (a)(5) without 
being required to receive a Class I brake test; provided that, any cars 
added to the consist at the interchange location receive at least a 
Class II brake test pursuant to Sec. 232.209. Historically, FRA has not 
had a problem with these shorter distance trains and believes that a 
Class II brake test on those cars added to the train is sufficient to 
ensure the safety of these operations.
    Paragraph (b) details the required tasks comprising a Class I brake 
test. A proper Class I brake test ensures that a train is in proper 
working condition and is capable of traveling to its destination with 
minimal problems en route. The final rule retains virtually all of the 
provisions proposed in the NPRM regarding the specific tasks that are 
to be part of the Class I brake test, which include most of the tasks 
currently

[[Page 4169]]

required by Sec. 232.12(c)-(h) for an initial terminal brake test, with 
some modification in the interest of standardization and clarity.
    The final rule retains a standardized brake-pipe reduction of 20 
psi for virtually all brake inspections and tests as was proposed in 
the 1994 and 1998 NPRMs. FRA agrees with both labor and management 
commenters that a standard brake-pipe reduction will simplify train 
brake tests and will make it easier to train workers. The 20-psi 
standardized reduction was suggested by both labor and management 
representatives.
    The brake-pipe leakage test will continue to be a valid method of 
qualifying brake systems. However, the final rule retains the air flow 
method of testing the condition of the brake pipe as an acceptable 
alternate to the brake-pipe leakage test. The air flow method (AFM) 
would be an alternative only for trains having a lead locomotive 
equipped with a 26-L brake valve or equivalent and outfitted with an 
EOT device. The maximum allowable flow would be 60 CFM. The AFM of 
qualifying train air brake systems has been allowed in Canada as an 
alternative to the leakage test since 1984. In addition, several 
railroads in the United States have been using the AFM since 1989 when 
FRA granted the AAR's petition for a waiver of compliance to permit the 
AFM as an alternative to the leakage test. FRA recognizes the concerns 
of several labor organization commenters opposing the adoption of the 
AFM; however, FRA believes these commenters' apprehension is based on 
their unfamiliarity with the method. As FRA pointed out in the ANPRM, 
the 1994 NPRM, and the 1998 NPRM, the AFM is a much more comprehensive 
test than the leakage test. See 57 FR 62551, 59 FR 47682-47683, 63 FR 
48305-06. The AFM tests the entire brake system just as it is used, 
with the pressure-maintaining feature cut in. FRA believes the AFM is 
an effective and reliable alternative method of qualifying train 
brakes. In the 1998 NPRM, FRA expressed some concern regarding the use 
of the AFM on short trains. However, based on consideration of the 
comments received and FRA's experiences in observing the use of the 
AFM, FRA agrees that the AFM should be permitted as an alternative on 
any train provided the 15 psi gradient is maintained on the train.
    The brake-pipe gradient of 15 psi has been retained for both the 
leakage and air flow method of train brake testing; however, the 
minimum rear-car pressure has been increased to at least 75 psi, which 
will require a locomotive brake-pipe pressure of at least 90 psi. FRA 
feels that the added margin of braking power justifies the increase in 
pressure. The final rule modifies the language used in the proposed 
provisions related to the air pressure at which the brake tests are to 
be conducted based on comments submitted by the NTSB. The NTSB noted 
that the language used by FRA in the NPRM to describe the air pressure 
settings for conducting the required brake tests would permit some road 
trains to be tested at a lower pressure than that at which the train 
would be operated. The NTSB contends that although most road freight 
trains operate at 90 psi, some road freight trains are operated at 100 
psi and the proposal would permit them to be tested at 90 psi. FRA 
agrees with NTSB's suggestion that a train's brake system should be 
tested at the pressure at which the train will operate and has modified 
the language of the final rule accordingly. Consequently, the final 
rule requires that the brake system be charged to the pressure at which 
the train will be operated and that the rear car pressure be within 15 
psi of that pressure and not less than 75 psi when conducting the 
required brake tests and inspections.
    Based on FRA's experience over the last several years and based on 
numerous comments received by FRA verifying the high reliability of the 
rear-car pressure transducers used in reporting brake-pipe pressure by 
an end-of-train (EOT) device, FRA now feels comfortable and justified 
in allowing the use of EOT devices in establishing the rear car 
pressure for Class I brake tests. FRA currently has requirements in 
place for the inspection and testing of EOT devices at the time of 
installation, which have been incorporated into subpart E of this 
proposal. However, in using an EOT to verify rear car pressure during a 
Class I brake test, the reading of the rear car air pressure is only 
permitted from the controlling or hauling locomotive of the train. 
Under no circumstances may train air brake pressure be read from a 
remote highway vehicle, another locomotive not attached to the train, 
or at any other location such as a remote unit installed in an office 
or shop.
    Paragraph (b)(2) retains the proposed language regarding the duties 
of individuals performing brake inspections contained in this final 
rule. The language in this paragraph is reiterated in the final rule 
provisions on both the Class IA and Class II brake tests in order to 
ensure the proper performance of brake inspections. Contrary to the 
assertions of some commenters, FRA believes that the proposed 
provisions sufficiently detailed how the various inspections were to be 
performed while providing flexibility for railroads to conduct the 
inspections in a manner most conducive to their operations. The methods 
of inspection proposed in the 1998 NPRM incorporated current practices 
and technical guidance previously issued by FRA.
    Over the last few years there has been extensive debate concerning 
what constitutes a proper train air brake test under the current 
provisions contained in part 232, particularly relating to the 
positioning of the person performing the brake inspection. In early 
1997, FRA issued a technical bulletin to its field inspectors in an 
attempt to clarify what must be done in order to properly perform a 
brake test. This technical bulletin stated that inspectors must 
position themselves in such a manner so as to be able to observe all of 
the movable parts of the brake system on each car. At a minimum, this 
requires that the inspector observe both sides of the equipment 
sometime during the inspection process. FRA continues to believe that 
both sides of the equipment must be observed sometime after the 
occurrence of activities that have the likelihood of compromising the 
integrity of the brake components of the equipment, such as: hump 
switching; multiple switching; loading; or unloading. FRA also agrees 
with the comments submitted by several railroad representatives that if 
one side of the equipment is inspected to ensure the proper attachment 
and condition of brake components and the proper condition of brake 
shoes on that side and the application of the brakes is observed from 
the other side of the equipment, then based on the design of brake 
systems today it can be safely assumed that in virtually every case an 
application of the brakes is occurring on the other side of the 
equipment. Consequently, FRA would like to again make clear that both 
sides of the equipment do not necessarily have to be inspected while 
the brakes are applied if an adequate inspection of the brake 
components was conducted on both sides of the equipment sometime during 
the inspection process. However, FRA also intends to make clear that 
the piston travel on each car must be inspected while the brakes are 
applied; thus, an inspector must take appropriate steps to make this 
observation.
    As indicated in the NPRM, FRA does not intend to mandate specific 
methods for how the various inspections are to be performed. FRA 
believes that each

[[Page 4170]]

railroad is in the best position to determine the method of inspection 
that best suits its operations at different locations. To require that 
all inspections be performed by walking the train, as suggested by 
several labor representatives, would impose a huge financial and 
operational burden on the railroads and would ignore the various 
different methods by which inspections are currently performed and have 
been performed for years. FRA has never mandated specific step-by-step 
procedures for conducting brake inspections but merely requires that, 
whichever method is used, it must ensure that all of the components 
required to be inspected will be so inspected.
    Paragraph (b)(4) contains the requirements for ensuring that a 
proper application of a car's brakes is made during the performance of 
brake inspections and provides the procedures for retesting a car found 
not to be properly applied during the initial performance of a brake 
inspection. In proposing the requirements contained in this paragraph, 
FRA attempted to clarify language contained in the current regulation 
which requires that the brakes ``apply.'' The existing language has 
been misinterpreted by some to mean that if the piston applies in 
response to a command from a controlling locomotive or yard test 
device, and releases before the release signal is given, the brake 
system on that car is in compliance with the regulation because the 
brake simply applied. The intent of the regulation has always been that 
the brakes apply and remain applied until the release signal is 
initiated from the controlling locomotive or yard test device. In order 
to eliminate any confusion, this paragraph requires that the brakes on 
a car must remain applied until the appropriate release signal is 
given. If the brakes on a car fail to do so, the car must either be 
removed from the train or repaired in the train and retested as 
discussed below.
    This paragraph retains the general concepts for retesting cars with 
brakes that are found not to apply or not to remain applied that were 
proposed in the NPRM. However, some of the specific requirements for 
performing a retest have been modified from those proposed in the NPRM 
based on FRA's consideration of the comments submitted and its 
determination that the proposed retesting provisions may have been 
overly restrictive. This paragraph modifies the proposed retest 
requirements by permitting any car found with brakes not applied during 
a required inspections to be retested rather than just cars with 
obvious defective conditions. FRA agrees with the assertions of several 
commenters that there are a number of circumstances where the reason 
for the failure of the brakes to apply is not readily apparent. This 
paragraph reduces the amount of time that the brakes on a retested car 
must remain applied to three minutes from the proposed five minutes. 
The final rule makes clear that the brakes on a retested car remain 
applied until the release is initiated and that the release be 
initiated no less than three minutes after the application of the 
brakes. FRA believes three minutes is consistent with the amount of 
time it would take a person to conduct a complete inspection of the 
retested car's brakes. This paragraph also permits a car to be retested 
with the use of a suitable device positioned at the car being retested 
rather than from the head of the consist or from the controlling 
locomotive. When a retest is performed in this fashion, the final rule 
requires that the compressed air be depleted from the car being 
retested prior to separating the train line to perform the retest in 
order to prevent potential injury to employees conducting the retest. 
This paragraph also makes clear that any retest performed must be 
conducted at the air pressure at which the train will be operated. The 
modifications made to the retesting requirements in this paragraph are 
reiterated or referenced in the other types of brake inspections 
required in this subpart. A detailed discussion regarding the 
modifications made to the retesting provision is contained in the 
preceding ``Overview of Comments and General FRA Conclusions'' portion 
of the preamble under the heading ``II. D. Retesting of Brakes.''
    Paragraph (b)(5) retains the proposed and current requirement that 
piston travel be adjusted during the performance of a Class I brake 
test if it is found outside the nominal limits established for standard 
8\1/2\ inch and 10-inch diameter brake cylinder or outside the limits 
established for other types, which will be contained on a stencil, 
sticker, or badge plate. This provision is identical to that proposed 
in the NPRM and is similar to the provision currently contained at 
Sec. 232.12(f). The major difference is that FRA has modified the 
existing provision to require that piston travel found to be less than 
7 inches or more than 9 inches must be adjusted nominally to 7\1/2\ 
inches. This change is based on a request by AAR to change the 
adjustment to 7\1/2\ inches from 7 inches as its member railroads were 
finding it extremely difficult to adjust the piston travel to precisely 
7 inches and that in some cases the adjustment would be marginally less 
than 7 inches, thus requiring a readjustment. Thus, AAR sought the 
extra \1/2\ inch in order to provide a small measure for error when the 
piston travel is adjusted. As FRA believes that AAR's concerns are 
validly placed and would have no impact on safety, FRA has accommodated 
the request.
    Paragraph (b)(7) retains the proposed provision which clarified 
that brake connection bottom rod supports will no longer be required on 
bottom connection rods secured with locking cotter keys. FRA recognizes 
that there is no need for bottom rod safety supports in these 
circumstances and intends to relieve railroads of this unnecessary 
expense, which will provide the industry a cost savings without 
compromising safety.
    Paragraph (b)(8) retains the proposed provisions relating to the 
performance of ``roll-by'' inspections of the release of the brakes on 
the cars of the train. This method of inspection has been used for 
years even though there is nothing in the current regulation which 
specifically addresses the method. The authority to use this method of 
inspection of the brake release permits railroads to expedite the 
movement of trains and has not proven to create a safety hazard. 
Therefore, this paragraph is intended to clarify the authority of 
railroads to use such a method and to ensure that the inspection is 
performed properly. This paragraph makes clear that when a railroad is 
performing a ``roll-by'' inspection of the brake release the train's 
speed shall not exceed 10 mph, that the qualified person performing the 
``roll-by'' inspection shall notify the engineer when and if the 
``roll-by'' has been successfully completed, and that the operator of 
the train shall note successful completion of the release portion of 
the inspection on the written or electronic notification required by 
this final rule. FRA intends to make clear that the notification to the 
engineer may be made through a hand held radio, a cellular telephone, 
or communication with a train dispatcher but that such information must 
be provided to the engineer prior to the train's departure. Based on 
the rationale provided for permitting only one side of a train to be 
inspected during the application of the brakes, FRA intends to make 
clear that only one side of the train must be inspected during the 
release portion of a brake test. However, paragraph (b)(2) makes clear 
that a ``roll-by'' inspection of the brake release shall not constitute 
an inspection of that side

[[Page 4171]]

for purposes of inspecting both sides during the inspection.
    Paragraph (c) generally retains the provision as it was proposed in 
the NPRM and as currently contained in Sec. 232.12(a), with slight 
modification for clarity, stating that a carman alone will be 
considered a qualified person if a railroad's collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA) provides that carmen are to perform the inspections and 
tests required by this section. FRA received a number of comments from 
various labor representatives objecting to FRA's proposed modification 
of the provision that currently exists in Sec. 232.12(a). These 
commenters contended that the proposed language would alter the meaning 
of the existing provision and effectively eliminate its enforceability. 
Particularly, they objected to the proposed addition of the word 
``only'' in the first sentence of the provision and the proposed 
elimination of the phrase ``existing or future collective bargaining 
agreement.'' They contend that no CBA provides that only a carman may 
perform the inspections and that it is unclear whether the provision 
will apply to future CBAs due to the elimination of the specific 
language to that effect. They also asserted that it is unnecessary to 
require that carmen be trained as a qualified person or a QMI since 
carmen were recognized as the craft qualified to perform the inspection 
in 1982.
    FRA's intent in proposing this provision was to clarify the meaning 
of the provision and explain FRA's ability to enforce the existing 
provision. FRA's intent was neither to expand nor reduce the 
applicability of the provision. FRA recognizes that its proposed 
addition of the word ``only'' could have the effect of altering the 
provision in a way that was not intended as FRA agrees that many 
existing CBAs do not require that only a carman perform the 
inspections. Thus, the language of the provision in this final rule 
eliminates the word ``only'' from the proposed clause, ``Where a 
railroad's collective bargaining agreement provides that only a carman 
is to perform the inspections and tests required by this section. * * 
*'' However, FRA does not agree that it is necessary to include the 
phrase ``existing or future collective bargaining agreement,'' as 
suggested by some commenters. FRA intends for the reference to a 
collective bargaining agreement to include any existing or future CBA. 
FRA believes that the inclusion of the suggested phrase is unnecessary 
because the plain meaning of the text is the CBA that applies at the 
time the issue arises. FRA sees no way to read the provision contained 
in this final rule as not to include both existing and future CBAs.
    FRA also believes that it is essential for railroads to ensure that 
the individuals required to perform the inspections covered by this 
provision are properly trained and qualified to perform the 
inspections. As the requirements contained in this final rule for 
performing these inspections differ somewhat from the existing 
regulation, FRA believes it is necessary for employees performing the 
inspections to be trained on these new requirements. This paragraph 
merely makes clear that, in circumstances where a collective bargaining 
agreement requires that a carman is to perform the inspections and 
tests required by this section, the railroad shall bear the 
responsibility of ensuring that the carman responsible for performing 
this task is properly trained and designated as qualified to perform 
the task. In these circumstances, FRA believes that the railroad must 
ensure that the employees with whom they have collectively bargained to 
perform the inspections and tests required by this section are properly 
trained and designated to perform the task. Furthermore, FRA believes 
that on virtually all railroads carmen will be sufficiently trained and 
experienced to be considered ``qualified persons'' and ``qualified 
mechanical inspectors'' as defined in this proposal, provided they 
receive some additional training on the specific requirements contained 
in this final rule.
    The original provision was added to the regulations in 1982 when 
the distance between brake inspections was increased from 500 miles to 
1,000 miles. The provision was included as part of an agreement between 
the railroads and rail labor for permitting the maximum distance 
between brake tests to be increased and was presented to FRA at the 
time. The language contained in that agreement was included in the 1982 
regulatory revisions without change by FRA. Consequently, due to the 
circumstances under which this provision was added to the regulations 
and because it has existed for over 16 years, FRA feels compelled to 
retain the language in this final rule. FRA will continue to interpret 
the provision as it has always interpreted the provision. In 
circumstances where a railroad's collective bargaining agreement 
requires that a carman perform the inspections and tests required by 
this section, a carman alone will be considered a qualified person. 
This has been FRA's approach to the provision since its inception.
    As FRA lacks the authority to issue binding interpretations of 
collective bargaining agreements, FRA lacks the authority to settle a 
dispute between a railroad and its employees as to which group of its 
employees is to perform what work. FRA intends to make clear, that in 
order for FRA to proceed with an enforcement action under the provision 
contained in this paragraph, one of the parties to the collective 
bargaining agreement would first have to obtain a decision from a duly 
authorized body interpreting the relevant agreement, specifically 
identifying the involved location, and adequately resolving all of the 
interpretative issues necessary for FRA to conclude that the work 
belongs to a particular group of employees.
    Paragraph (d) contains the requirement regarding the notification 
to the locomotive engineer and train crew of the successful completion 
of a Class I brake test by a qualified person. This paragraph slightly 
modifies the notification requirement from that proposed in the NPRM. 
In the NPRM, FRA proposed that the engineer be informed in writing of 
the successful completion of the Class I brake test. The intent of this 
proposed requirement was to ensure that the locomotive engineer was 
adequately informed of the results of the inspection; however, FRA 
recognizes that a requirement to provide the information in writing 
ignores technological advances and operational efficiencies. 
Consequently, this paragraph permits the notification to be made in 
whatever format the railroad deems appropriate; provided that the 
notification contains the proper information and a record of the 
notification and the requisite information is maintained in the cab of 
the controlling locomotive. FRA believes these changes are consistent 
with the intent and purpose of the proposed requirement for written 
notification and ensure necessary information is relayed to the 
operator of the train.
    Paragraph (f) retains the proposed and existing requirements 
relating to the adding of cars or blocks of cars while a train is en 
route. This paragraph informs railroads that cars picked up en route 
that have not been previously tested and kept connected to a source of 
compressed air are to receive a Class I brake test when added to the 
train. Alternatively, a railroad may elect to perform only a Class II 
brake test at the time that a car is added to the train en route, but 
FRA intends to make clear that if this option is elected then the cars 
added in this fashion must be given a Class I brake test at the next 
forward location where facilities are available for providing such 
attention.

[[Page 4172]]

Section 232.207  Class IA Brake Tests--1,000-Mile Inspection

    This section retains the proposed requirements related to the 
performance of a Class IA brake test. Many of the provisions contained 
in this section are currently contained at Sec. 232.12(b) regarding the 
performance of 1,000-mile inspections. FRA has modified some of the 
existing requirements for purposes of clarity and has added a few 
additional requirements in order to make the inspection requirement 
more enforceable and to prevent some of the current abuses which FRA 
field inspectors have observed in their enforcement activities.
    FRA recognizes that since 1982 new technologies and improved 
equipment have been developed that allow trains to operate longer 
distances with fewer defects. The data submitted by AAR appear to 
support this assertion, and FRA does not dispute the potential 
capability of certain equipment to travel distances in excess of 1,000 
miles without becoming defective. However, the capability of the 
equipment to travel extended distances safely is contingent on the 
condition of the equipment when it begins operation and on the nature 
of the operation in which it is to be engaged. FRA believes that in 
order for brake equipment to travel extended distances between brake 
inspections, the condition and planned operation of the equipment must 
be thoroughly assessed at the beginning of a train's journey through 
high quality inspections. As noted in the general preamble discussion 
above, FRA believes that railroads are not conducting high quality 
initial terminal inspections at many locations because the railroads 
are utilizing employees who are not sufficiently qualified or trained 
to perform the inspections. Therefore, FRA believes that the 1,000-mile 
brake inspection interval continues to be necessary and important to 
ensure the safe operation of trains inspected by qualified personnel 
pursuant to this final rule. Furthermore, no trains operated in the 
United States are currently permitted to travel greater than 1,000 
miles between brake inspections. Consequently, FRA is not willing to 
permit trains to travel in excess of 1,000 miles between brake 
inspections, except in the limited, controlled situations where data on 
the equipment can be gathered. (See discussion and provisions related 
to ``Extended Haul Trains.'') FRA notes that Canada eliminated 
intermediate inspections in 1994. However, Canada has different 
inspection requirements than those contained in this final rule and 
vastly different operating conditions and environments than those 
prevalent on most American railroads, operating conditions and 
environments that are more conducive to the inspection regimen imposed 
by that country.
    Paragraph (a) provides that each train shall receive a Class IA 
brake test at a location that is not more than 1,000 miles from the 
point where any car in the train last received a Class I or Class IA 
brake test. FRA intends to make clear that the most restrictive car or 
block of cars in the train will determine the location where this test 
must be performed. For example, if a train departs point A and travels 
500 miles to point B where it picks up a previously tested block of 
cars en route which has travelled 800 miles since its last Class I 
brake test and the crew does not perform a Class I brake test when 
entraining the cars, then the entire train must receive a Class IA 
brake test within 200 miles from point B even though that location is 
only 700 miles from point A.
    Paragraph (b) contains the tasks which must be performed when 
conducting a Class IA brake test. These task are virtually identical to 
some of the tasks required to be performed during a Class I brake test. 
A leakage or air flow test must be performed. Thus, when locomotives 
are equipped with a 26-L brake valve or equivalent, FRA will permit the 
use of the air flow method as an alternative to the brake pipe leakage 
test. This paragraph makes clear that the brakes shall apply on each 
car in the train in response to a 20-psi brake pipe reduction and shall 
remain applied until a release is initiated. In addition, the paragraph 
reiterates the parameters for performing a retest of the brakes on 
those cars found not to have sufficiently applied, which are contained 
in the Class I brake test requirements. It should be noted that, 
defective equipment may be moved from or past a location where a Class 
IA brake test is performed only if all of the requirements contained in 
Sec. 232.15 have been satisfied. The only change to the tasks contained 
in this paragraph from those proposed in the NPRM is the clarification 
that the brake system be charged to the pressure at which the train 
will be operated and that the rear car pressure be within 15 psi of 
that pressure and not less than 75 psi when conducting the required 
brake tests and inspections. This change is identical to the change 
made in the Class I brake test and is discussed in detail in that 
section.
    This paragraph also makes clear that in order to properly perform a 
Class IA brake test under this section both sides of the equipment must 
be observed sometime during the inspection process. FRA finds the 
comments of AAR and other railroad representatives contending that both 
sides of the equipment should not be required to be inspected at Class 
IA brake tests to lack merit. The Class IA brake test basically 
incorporates the current 1,000-mile brake inspection, which FRA 
believes requires an inspection of both sides of the equipment during 
the inspection process. The current 1,000-mile inspection requires that 
brake rigging be inspected to ensure it is properly secure and does not 
bind or foul and that the brakes apply on each car in the train. See 49 
CFR 232.12(b). In order to make these inspections properly, FRA 
believes that both sides of the equipment must be observed sometime 
during the inspection process and, to FRA's knowledge, railroads 
currently conduct these inspections in this manner. Thus, the NPRM and 
the final rule merely clarify what is required to be performed under 
the current regulations to properly perform a 1,000-mile inspection. 
Therefore, contrary to the contentions of certain commenters, retention 
of this current requirement does not impose any additional burden on 
the railroads.
    Paragraph (c) retains the proposed provision which would require 
railroads to maintain a list of locations where Class IA inspections 
will be performed and that FRA be notified at least 30 days in advance 
of any change to that list of locations. Based on a review of the 
comments submitted, FRA recognizes that the proposed requirement for 
designating locations where Class IA inspections will be performed was 
somewhat unclear and may have caused confusion. The intent of the 
proposed requirement was to ensure that FRA was informed of those 
locations where a railroad intends to perform Class IA brake 
inspections and that FRA had the information with which to hold the 
railroad responsible for conducting the inspections at those locations. 
FRA was not intending to require that railroad separately identify a 
specific Class IA inspection location for each train it operates. 
Consequently, this paragraph has been slightly modified from that 
proposed in order to make clear that the designation required is for 
locations where such inspections will be performed and permits deviance 
from those locations only in emergency situations.
    The current regulations merely require that railroads designate 
locations where intermediate 1,000-mile brake inspections will be 
performed but place no limitation on changing the locations. Therefore, 
FRA has found

[[Page 4173]]

some railroads changing the locations where these intermediate 
inspections are to occur on a daily basis which prevents FRA from 
observing these inspections being performed or avoids full performance 
of the required inspection by mechanical forces. In order to ensure 
that these types of inspections are being properly performed, FRA must 
be able to determine where the railroad plans to conduct these types of 
inspections. This paragraph recognizes that there may be occurrences or 
emergencies, such as derailments, that make it impossible or unsafe for 
a train to reach a location that the railroad has designated as a Class 
IA inspection site. Consequently, this paragraph permits railroads to 
bypass the 30-day written notification requirement in these instances 
provided FRA is notified within 24 hours after a designation has been 
changed. This paragraph also makes clear that failure to perform a 
Class IA brake test at a designated location will constitute a failure 
to properly perform the inspection.

Section 232.209  Class II Brake Tests--Intermediate Inspection

    This section contains the requirements related to the performance 
of Class II brake tests. The requirements contained in this section are 
similar to the proposed requirements and the requirements currently 
contained in Sec. 232.13(d) but have been slightly modified for clarity 
and to address situations where solid blocks of cars are added to an en 
route train. Paragraph (a) identifies those cars that are required to 
receive a Class II brake test when added to a train. This paragraph has 
been modified to address situations when certain ``solid blocks of 
cars'' are added to a train. As discussed previously, the final rule 
modifies the definition of ``solid block of cars'' from that proposed 
in the NPRM. (See section-by-section analysis of Sec. 232.5.) Although 
FRA believes the definition it proposed was consistent with current 
interpretations and enforcement of the requirement, FRA agrees with 
some of the commenters that the definition may have been too narrow and 
did not directly address FRA's primary concern, the block of cars 
itself. FRA's primary concern is the condition of the block of cars 
being added to the train especially when the block of cars is made up 
of cars from more than one train. Thus, the final rule permits a 
``solid block of cars'' to be added to a train without triggering a 
requirement to perform a Class I brake test on the entire train. 
However, this paragraph identifies the situations when ``solid blocks 
of cars'' must be inspected when added to a train.
    This paragraph makes clear that a car or a solid block of cars that 
has not previously received a Class I brake test or that has been off a 
source of compressed air for longer than four hours must, at a minimum, 
receive a Class II brake test when added to an en route train. This 
paragraph also makes clear that a Class II brake test is required to be 
performed on each ``solid block of cars'' added to a train which is 
composed of cars from more than one other train or that is composed of 
cars from only one other train but that have not remained continuously 
and consecutively coupled together. It should be noted that this 
paragraph specifically acknowledges that the removal of defective 
equipment from a solid block of cars will not result in the solid block 
of cars being considered not to be continuously and consecutively 
coupled together. FRA believes this approach is consistent with the 
intent of both FRA and Congress to have defective equipment repaired as 
quickly as possible.
    Paragraph (b) retains the proposed tasks which must be performed 
when conducting a Class II brake test. The only changes to the tasks 
contained in this paragraph from those proposed in the NPRM is the 
clarification that the brake system be charged to the pressure at which 
the train will be operated and that the rear car pressure be within 15 
psi of that pressure and not less than 75 psi when conducting the 
required brake tests and inspections and the procedures for performing 
retests on cars. These changes are identical to the changes made in the 
Class I and Class IA brake tests and are discussed in detail in those 
sections.
    A Class II brake test is intended to ensure that the brakes on 
those cars added apply and release and that the added cars do not 
compromise the integrity of the train's brake system. Therefore, a 
leakage or air flow test must be performed when the cars are added to 
the train to ensure the integrity of the train's brake system. This 
paragraph makes clear that in order to properly perform an inspection 
under this section both sides of the equipment must be observed 
sometime during the inspection process. This paragraph also makes clear 
that the brakes shall apply on each car added to the train and remain 
applied until a release is initiated and reiterates the parameters that 
are contained in the Class I brake test requirements for performing a 
retest on those cars whose brakes were found not to have sufficiently 
applied. It should be noted that, defective equipment may be moved from 
or past a location where a Class II brake test is performed only if all 
of the requirements contained in Sec. 232.15 have been satisfied. 
Paragraph (b) also requires that the release of the brakes on those 
cars added to the train and on the rear car of the train be verified 
and allows railroads to conduct ``roll-by'' inspections for this 
purpose.
    Paragraph (c) continues to permit the proposed and existing 
alternative to the rear car application and release portion of this 
test. This alternative permits the locomotive engineer to rely on a 
rear car gauge or end-of-train device to determine that the train's 
brake pipe pressure is being reduced by at least 5 psi and then 
restored by at least 5 psi in lieu of direct observation of the rear 
car application and release. Although certain labor representatives 
contended that this practice should not be allowed and that it is in 
violation of the existing regulations, this alternative has been 
permitted for years under the current regulations (Sec. 232.13(c)(1), 
(d)(1)) without any degradation of safety, and thus, FRA intends to 
permit the practice to continue.
    Paragraph (d) retains the proposed and existing requirements 
relating to the inspection of cars or blocks of cars added to a train 
while a train is en route. This paragraph makes clear that if cars are 
given a Class II brake test when added to a train then the cars added 
must receive a Class I brake test at the next forward location where 
the facilities are available for performing such an inspection.

Section  232.211  Class III Brake Tests--Trainline Continuity 
Inspection

    This section contains the requirements related to the performance 
of Class III brake tests. The requirements contained in this section 
are generally the same as those proposed, which incorporated the 
requirements currently contained in Sec. 232.13(c), but have been 
slightly modified for clarity and standardization with the changes made 
in other inspection requirements contained in this final rule. Some of 
the changes made in this section from that proposed clarify the need to 
perform a Class III brake test when a solid block of cars is added to a 
train which does not require the performance of either a Class I or 
Class II brake test. Paragraph (b) of this section has been modified to 
incorporate the clarification that the brake system be charged to the 
pressure at which the train will be operated and that the rear car 
pressure be within 15 psi of that pressure and not less than 75 psi 
when conducting the required inspection.

[[Page 4174]]

    The purpose of a Class III brake test is to ensure the integrity of 
the trainline when minor changes in the train consist occur. Basically, 
a Class III brake test ensures that the train brake pipe is properly 
delivering air to the rear of the train. FRA intends to make clear that 
this inspection is designed to be performed whenever the continuity of 
the brake system is broken or interrupted. For example, if a railroad 
disconnects a locomotive from a train consist to perform switching 
duties for a short period and then reattaches the locomotive to the 
consist, without any other change being made in the consist, the 
railroad would be required to perform a Class III brake test prior to 
the train's departure. Similarly, a Class III brake test would be 
required if a railroad disconnects a locomotive from the train and adds 
a different locomotive to the train, only to discover that the added 
locomotive is not operating properly, and thus, adds the original 
locomotive back into the consist. Because the continuity of the 
trainline was interrupted when the locomotive was removed and then 
placed back in the train, even though the same cars and locomotives 
remained in the consist, a Class III brake test must be performed.
    Paragraphs (b) and (c) contain the tasks related to the performance 
of a Class III brake test. These paragraphs require that the brakes on 
the rear car of the train apply in response to a 20-psi brake pipe 
reduction and that the brakes subsequently release on the rear car of 
the train when the release is initiated. Similar to a Class II brake 
test, paragraph (c) permits an alternative to direct observation of the 
application and release of the rear car's brakes by permitting the 
operator to rely on a rear car gauge or end-of-train device to 
determine that the brake pipe pressure is being reduced and restored in 
response to the controlling locomotive.

Section 232.213  Extended Haul Trains

    This section generally retains the proposed provisions, which 
permit an extension of the allowable maximum distance a train may 
travel between train brake system tests. After consideration of all the 
comments submitted on this matter, FRA continues to believe that if a 
train is properly and thoroughly inspected, with as many defective 
conditions being eliminated as possible, then the train is capable of 
traveling much greater than 1,000 miles between brake inspections. (A 
detailed discussion of the comments submitted on this issue is 
contained in the preceding ``Overview of Comments and General FRA 
Conclusions'' portion of the preamble under the heading ``II. B. 
Extended Haul Trains.'') Therefore, the final rule retains the 
provisions permitting railroads to designate trains as extended haul 
trains and allowing such trains to be operated up to 1,500 miles 
between brake inspections. Although FRA recognizes that retention of 
the 1,500-mile limitation may limit the utility of the provision on 
some railroads, FRA is not willing to increase the proposed mileage 
restriction at this time. Currently, no train is permitted to travel 
more than 1,000 miles without receiving an intermediate brake 
inspection. Therefore, FRA does not believe it would be prudent to 
immediately double or triple the currently allowed distance without 
evaluating the safety and operational effects of an incremental 
increase in the distance. Consequently, until sufficient information 
and data are collected on trains operating under the provisions 
contained in this final rule, FRA is not willing to permit trains to 
travel the distances suggested by some commenters without additional 
brake inspections. FRA continues to believe that the requirement for 
performing inbound inspections and the requirement to maintain records 
of all defective conditions discovered on these trains provides the 
basis for developing the information and data necessary to determine 
the viability of allowing greater distances between brake inspections.
    After consideration of the comments submitted, FRA agrees that the 
benefits estimated in the NPRM in association with the extended haul 
provisions may have been overstated. FRA realizes that the retention of 
the 1,500-mile limitation may eliminate certain trains from being 
operated pursuant to the extended haul provisions and reduce the 
benefits estimated at the NPRM stage of the proceeding. (See detailed 
discussion in the Regulatory Impact Analysis portion of the preamble 
below.) In order to increase the viability of the extended haul 
provisions, the final rule provides some flexibility for designating 
extended haul trains and allows for the limited pick-up and set-out of 
equipment as discussed below.
    Certain commenters have portrayed the provisions related to 
extended haul trains as merely being an extension of the current 
intermediate inspection distances. FRA objects to such a 
characterization. In FRA's view, the extended haul provisions contained 
in this section constitute a completely new inspection regimen. This 
section contains stringent inspection requirements, both brake and 
mechanical, by highly qualified inspectors and establishes stringent 
requirements whenever cars are added to or removed from such trains. 
This section also contains a means to assess the safety of such 
operations by requiring that records be maintained of the defective 
conditions that develop on these trains while en route. Consequently, 
FRA believes that the requirements related to extended haul trains not 
only ensure the safe operation of the trains operated under them, but 
actually increase the safety of such operations over that which is 
provided in the current regulations.
    In paragraph (a), FRA generally retains the proposed provisions 
permitting railroads to designate specific trains that will move up to 
1,500 miles between brake and mechanical inspections provided the 
railroad meets various stringent inspection and monitoring 
requirements, which FRA believes will ensure the safe and proper 
operation of these trains. FRA intends to make clear that a railroad 
must meet all of the requirements contained in this paragraph in order 
to designate a train as an extended haul train. Paragraph (a)(1) 
contains the requirements for designating trains a railroad intends to 
move in accordance with this section. Several commenters contended that 
the proposed provisions regarding the advance designation of extended 
haul trains would prohibit certain unscheduled trains from being 
operated as extended haul trains. In an effort to provided some 
flexibility in this area, this paragraph has been modified to allow 
railroads to designate certain locations as locations where extended 
haul trains will be initiated and requires railroads to describe those 
trains that will be so operated rather than requiring specific 
identification of every train. FRA believes this modification will 
allow railroads to capture some of their unscheduled trains by 
identifying the trains by the locations where they originate. This 
paragraph sets forth the information that must be provided to FRA in 
writing when designating a train or a location for such operation. The 
information required to be submitted is necessary to facilitate FRA's 
ability to independently monitor a railroad's operation of these 
extended haul trains.
    FRA continues to believe that in order for a train to be permitted 
to travel 1,500 miles between inspections, the train must receive 
inspections that ensure the optimum condition of both the brake system 
and the mechanical components. In paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(3), and 
(a)(8), FRA retains the proposed requirement that these inspections be 
performed by highly qualified and experienced

[[Page 4175]]

inspectors in order to ensure that quality inspections are being 
performed. As FRA intends the Class I brake tests that are required to 
be performed on these trains to be as in-depth and comprehensive as 
possible, FRA continues to believe that these inspections must be 
performed by individuals possessing not only the knowledge to identify 
and detect a defective condition in all of the brake equipment required 
to be inspected but also the knowledge to recognize the interrelational 
workings of the equipment as well as a general knowledge of what is 
required to repair the equipment. Therefore, paragraphs (a)(2) and 
(a)(8) retain the use of the term ``qualified mechanical inspector'' to 
identify and describe those individuals it believes possess the 
necessary knowledge and experience to perform the required Class I 
brake tests on these trains. A ``qualified mechanical inspector'' is a 
person with training or instruction in the troubleshooting, inspection, 
testing, maintenance, or repair of the specific train brake systems for 
which the person is assigned responsibility and whose primary 
responsibilities include work generally consistent with those 
functions. (See Sec. 232.5 of this section-by-section analysis for a 
more detailed discussion of ``qualified mechanical inspector.'') FRA 
also continues to believe these same highly qualified inspectors must 
be the individuals performing the required inbound inspection, 
contained in paragraph (a)(6) of this section, on these extended haul 
trains in order to ensure that all defective conditions are identified 
at the train's destination or 1,500 mile location. Similarly, in 
paragraph (a)(3), FRA requires that all of the mechanical inspections 
required to be performed on these trains be conducted by inspectors 
designated pursuant to 49 CFR 215.11, rather than train crew members, 
in order to ensure that all mechanical components are in proper 
condition prior to the trains departure.
    As discussed in detail above, FRA is not willing to allow more than 
1,500 miles between brake inspections until appropriate data are 
developed which establish that equipment moved under the criteria 
contained in this final rule remains in proper condition throughout the 
train's journey. FRA believes that the provisions contained in 
paragraphs (a)(6) and (a)(7), requiring the performance of an inbound 
inspection at destination or at 1,500 miles and requiring carriers to 
maintain records of all defective conditions discovered on these trains 
for a period of one year, create the basis for developing such data. 
FRA believes the information generated from these inbound inspections 
will be extremely useful in assessing the quality of a railroad's 
inspection practices and will help FRA identify any systematic brake or 
mechanical problems that may result in these types of operations. It 
should be noted that paragraph (a)(7) has been slightly modified from 
what was proposed in order to clarify that the required records may be 
maintained either electronically or on paper.
    Paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(8) retain the proposed requirements that 
these trains have 100 percent operative brakes and contain no cars with 
mechanical defects under part 215 at either the train's initial 
terminal or at the time of departure from a 1,500-mile point, if moving 
in excess of 1,000 miles from that location. FRA has modified the 
provision proposed in paragraph (a)(5) that restricted extended haul 
trains from conducting any pick-ups or set-outs en route, except for 
the removal of defective equipment. Paragraph (a)(5) is modified to 
permit extended haul trains the limited ability make one pick-up and 
one set-out while en route. This modification will provide railroads 
the flexibility to set out a block of cars at one location and pick up 
a block of cars at the same or another location. FRA believes that this 
limited ability provides the railroads with some flexibility to move 
equipment efficiently while minimizing the disruptions made to the 
train's brake system and ensuring that cars added to such trains can be 
adequately tracked and inspected. Paragraph (a)(5) makes clear that any 
cars added to extended haul trains must be inspected in the same manner 
as the cars at the train's initial terminal. This paragraph also makes 
clear that any car removed from the train must be inspected in the same 
manner as a car at the train's point of destination or 1,500-mile 
location.
    Paragraph (b) is retained as proposed and makes clear that failure 
to comply with any of the restrictions contained in this section will 
be considered an improper movement of a designated extended haul train 
for which appropriate civil penalties may be assessed. FRA has included 
specific civil penalties in appendix A to this final rule pertaining to 
the improper movement of these types of trains. In addition to the 
imposition of civil penalties, this paragraph makes clear that FRA 
reserves the right to revoke a railroad's authority to designate any or 
all trains for repeated or willful noncompliance with any of the 
provisions contained in this section.

Section 232.215  Transfer Train Brake Tests

    This section generally retains the proposed requirements related to 
the performance of transfer train brake tests. The final rule 
requirements have been slightly modified for consistency with other 
inspection requirements and to clarify when a transfer train brake test 
is to be performed. The requirements contained in this section 
generally incorporate the requirements currently contained in 
Sec. 232.13(e). ``Transfer train'' is defined in Sec. 232.5 of this 
final rule as a train that travels between a point of origin and a 
point of destination, located not more than 20 miles apart. The 
definition makes clear a transfer train may pick up or deliver freight 
equipment while en route to its destination. This final rule makes 
clear that the decision as to whether a particular consist is subject 
to the transfer train inspection requirements is primarily based on a 
determination that the movement the train is engaged in is considered a 
``train movement'' rather than a ``switching movement.'' FRA's 
determination of whether the movement of cars is a ``train movement,'' 
subject to the requirements of this section, or a ``switching 
movement'' is and will be based on the voluminous case law developed by 
various courts of the United States. (See section-by-section analysis 
for Sec. 232.5 for a detailed discussion of the terms ``train 
movement'' and ``switching movement.'')
    FRA intends to make clear that a train will be considered a 
transfer train only if the train moves no more than 20 miles between 
its point of origin and its point of final destination. If the train 
will move greater than 20 miles between the point of origin and point 
of final destination, it cannot be considered a transfer train, and a 
Class I brake test must be performed on the train prior to departure 
from its point of origin. Although cars may be added to a transfer 
train while the train is en route, as discussed below, with a transfer 
train brake test being performed on the cars added, the train is 
limited to a total of 20 miles from its point of origin, not from the 
location where new cars are added. The distance the entire train will 
move between its point of origin and point of final destination is the 
determinative factor in determining whether the train is a transfer 
train, cars dropped-off or picked-up en route do not affect this 
distance.
    Paragraph (a) retains the proposed tasks that are required to be 
performed when conducting a transfer train brake test. Due to the short 
distance these

[[Page 4176]]

types of trains will travel, FRA will continue to permit the brake 
system to be charged to only 60 psi but will make clear that this must 
be verified by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device. Although the 
current regulations do not require the use of a gauge or device, FRA is 
at a loss to understand how an inspector can know the pressure in the 
brake system without getting a reading from the rear of the train. This 
paragraph also retains the requirement that the brakes apply in 
response to a 15-psi brake pipe reduction. FRA continues to believe 
that the reduced pressure at which this test is performed (i.e., 60 psi 
rather than 75 psi) requires that an application be obtained with a 
smaller pressure reduction than that required for other brake tests. 
This paragraph also makes clear that the brakes shall apply on each car 
added to the train and remain applied until a release is initiated and 
reiterates the parameters for performing a retest on those cars found 
not to have sufficiently applied that are contained in the Class I 
brake test requirements.
    Paragraph (b) clarifies that cars may be added to a transfer train 
while it is en route to its destination. This activity is currently 
conducted by these trains, and it was not FRA's intent when issuing the 
NPRM to propose prohibiting these trains from being used in this 
fashion. This paragraph makes clear that when cars are added to a 
transfer train the added cars are to be inspected pursuant to the 
requirements contained in paragraph (a) of this section. This is 
generally consistent with what FRA currently requires when cars are 
added to a transfer train, and this paragraph has been added to clarify 
FRA's retention of the existing practice.

Section 232.217  Train Brake System Tests Conducted Using Yard Air

    This section contains the requirements for performing train brake 
system tests when using yard air. The requirements contained in this 
section have been modified from those proposed in the NPRM in response 
to the comments and recommendations received. Paragraph (a) retains the 
proposed requirements regarding the use of an engineer's brake valve or 
a suitable test device capable of making any increase or decrease of 
brake pipe air pressure at the same, or slower, rate as an engineer's 
brake valve when conducting brake tests utilizing yard air. The 
requirement to use such a device also applies when retesting cars 
during Class I, Class IA, Class II, and transfer train brake tests.
    Paragraph (b) generally retains the requirement to connect the air 
test device to the end of the cut of cars that will be nearest to the 
controlling locomotive. However, this paragraph permits the test device 
to be connected to other than the end nearest the controlling 
locomotive if a railroad has appropriate procedures in place to ensure 
the safety of such a practice. FRA recognizes that some currently 
existing yards are designed in such a manner so that performance of a 
test from the front of the consist is extremely difficult or 
impossible. FRA also recognizes that the safety concerns that arise 
when cars are charged from other than the head-end of the consist can 
be eliminated if proper procedures are in place to ensure that 
overcharge conditions do not occur. An ``overcharge condition'' 
describes a situation in which the brake equipment of cars, or 
locomotives, or both is charged to a higher pressure than the maximum 
brake pipe pressure that can normally be achieved in that part of the 
train; this may result in the locomotive engineer's lacking the ability 
to control the application or release of the brakes at the rear of the 
train. This paragraph recognizes that there are a number of operating 
or testing procedures which may be used to eliminate the existence of 
potential overcharge conditions. Rather than specify a procedure, this 
paragraph permits a railroad to adopt and comply with whatever 
procedure it determines is best suited to its operation. However, this 
paragraph makes clear that the procedure must be in writing and that 
the procedure must be followed by the railroad. Consequently, FRA will 
hold a railroad responsible for complying with whatever procedure it 
adopts.
    Paragraph (c) modifies some of the provisions related to conducting 
brake tests utilizing yard air sources that were proposed in the NPRM. 
Rather than requiring yard air tests to be performed at 80 psi as was 
proposed, this paragraph reduces the required pressure to 60 psi at the 
end of the consist as is currently required. FRA recognizes that many 
yard air sources and rental compressors are not capable of producing 80 
psi of air pressure. In order to address the concerns raised regarding 
the inadequacy of conducting a leakage or air flow test at this lower 
pressure, this paragraph includes a requirement that leakage and air 
flow tests be conducted at the operating pressure of the train. Thus, 
if the yard air is not capable of producing the air pressure at which 
the train will be operated, then the leakage or air flow test must be 
conducted when the locomotives are attached. This paragraph also 
retains the proposed requirement that a Class III brake test as 
proposed in Sec. 232.211 must be performed on cars tested with yard air 
at the time that the road locomotive is attached. This paragraph also 
retains the proposed requirement for retesting cars that remain 
disconnected from a source of compressed air for more than four hours.
    Paragraph (c) and (d) retain the proposed requirements regarding 
the calibration and accuracy of yard test devices and gauges with 
slight modification for clarity. Paragraph (c) requires that mechanical 
yard test devices and gauges be calibrated every 92 days and that 
electronic yard test devices and gauges be calibrated annually. Based 
on observations made by FRA's field inspectors, FRA has some concerns 
regarding the condition of many yard test devices and gauges. FRA has 
found numerous mechanical gauges the condition of which creates serious 
doubt as to the accuracy of the gauge. Mechanical gauges have been 
found with broken or missing glass which would allow moisture and other 
contaminates to be present in the gauge. As many of the yard test 
plants being used today are portable, they are exposed to a wide array 
of handling and environmental hazards while being transported from 
location to location. Therefore, this paragraph requires that 
mechanical devices and gauges be tested and calibrated every 92 days. 
On the other hand, electronic gauges and devices appear to have much 
less exposure to many of the hazards encountered by mechanical devices 
and gauges and tend to be much more reliable and accurate for a longer 
period of time. Consequently, this paragraph requires electronic yard 
test devices and gauges to be tested or calibrated, or both, on an 
annual basis. Paragraph (d) retains the proposed requirement that any 
yard air test device and any yard air test equipment used to test a 
train be accurate and function as intended. FRA will consider a device 
or gauge to be accurate if it is within the calibration parameters 
contained in paragraph (c) of this section.

Section 232.219  Double Heading and Helper Service

    This section contains the requirements related to double heading 
and helper service. This section has been modified from that proposed 
in order to clarify that the requirements contained in this section do 
not apply to distributed power units and to remove unnecessary 
provisions. Thus, the second sentence of proposed paragraph (a) has 
been removed as the brake valve on distributed power units

[[Page 4177]]

are left cut in to accelerate response time. In addition, proposed 
paragraph (b) has been eliminated as it was originally intended to 
apply to passenger equipment and is not applicable to freight 
operations. Paragraph (a) retains the proposed clarification regarding 
the inspection that is to be performed when a controlling locomotive is 
changed. Paragraph (a) clearly identifies that a Class III brake test 
pursuant to Sec. 232.211 must be performed when a new locomotive is 
placed in control of the train. FRA believes that the provisions 
retained in paragraph (a) are necessary and have been in place for 
years in order to ensure that locomotives taking control of a train 
have the ability to actually control the brakes on the train.
    Paragraph (b), previously proposed as paragraph (c), retains the 
proposed requirement aimed at ensuring that the brake systems on helper 
locomotives respond as intended to brake commands from the controlling 
locomotive at the time it is placed in the train. Although the brake 
system on locomotives are required to be inspected on a daily basis, 
FRA continues to believe that a visual confirmation of the proper 
operation of a helper locomotive's brakes should be made at the time 
the locomotive is added to a train. Failure of a helper locomotive to 
respond to the command of the controlling locomotive could result in a 
very serious safety hazard in that a helper locomotive may continue to 
push the rear of the train while the brakes are applied, potentially 
resulting in a derailment or other incident. FRA intends to make clear 
in this paragraph that a helper locomotive found with inoperative or 
ineffective brakes is to be repaired prior to use or else removed from 
the train.
    Paragraph (c) contains basic design and testing requirements for 
helper locomotives utilizing a Helper Link device or similar 
technology. The Helper Link device is an electronic device, mounted on 
the front end of the lead helper locomotive and is used to control the 
automatic air brakes on helper locomotive consists. When this device is 
used, the train's brake pipe is not connected between the rear car of 
the train being pushed and the helper locomotives. The end-of-train 
device, attached to the rear car of the train, sends a radio signal 
which is received by the Helper link device. The Helper Link device is 
connected to the brake pipe of the helper locomotives, and electronic 
commands from the EOT device cause the air pressure in the helper 
locomotive brake pipe to be reduced or increased, thus applying or 
releasing the brakes on the helper locomotives. A signal is transmitted 
from the EOT device to the Helper Link device at 10-second intervals to 
ensure communication. The Helper Link is also used to operate the 
uncoupling lever to detach the helper locomotives from the rear of the 
train without stopping the train.
    Based on information currently available to FRA, it appears that 
when there is a loss of communication between the EOT device and the 
Helper Link device, the engineer of the helper locomotive consist is 
not immediately aware of the failure. If the communication between the 
EOT device and the Helper Link is not reestablished within the next 40-
second communication cycle, the Helper Link device will automatically 
disable itself. Consequently, if the train experiences an emergency 
application of the air brakes while the Helper Link device is disabled, 
the brakes on the helper locomotives would not apply and would result 
in the helper locomotives continuing to push under power. Furthermore, 
in order for communications to be reestablished between the EOT and 
Helper Link, the engineer must leave the locomotive controls, exit the 
locomotive cab, and proceed to the front of the locomotive to manually 
press the reset buttons located on the Helper Link device itself. In 
addition, there are currently no regulations which address the use, 
testing, or calibration of these Helper Link devices.
    On August 22, 1996, the UTU submitted a petition for rulemaking 
with FRA regarding Helper Link devices raising many of the concerns 
noted above. See Petition for Proposed Rulemaking, Docket 96-1. In 
order to address the UTU petition in this rulemaking and to address the 
concerns of FRA noted above, FRA sought information and comment from 
persons interested in the NPRM. See 63 FR 48345. A presentation and 
discussion regarding the use, operation, and design of Helper Link 
devices was engaged in at the technical conference conducted in Walnut 
Creek, California, on November 23 and 24, 1998. Written comments 
regarding the device were also submitted by the manufacturer of the 
device. Based on consideration of this information, FRA has determined 
that certain minimum design and testing requirements should be included 
in this final rule to ensure the safety of those trains utilizing 
Helper Link technology.
    Paragraph (c) contains the design and testing requirements that FRA 
believes are appropriate when railroads utilize Helper Link devices or 
similar technology. This paragraph ensures that a locomotive engineer 
is notified by a distinctive alarm of any loss of communication for 
more than 25 seconds between the device and the two-way EOT. This 
paragraph also requires that the engineer be provided a method of 
resetting the device in the cab of the helper locomotive and that the 
device be tested and calibrated on an annual basis. Due to the limited 
number of Helper Link devices currently being used, FRA believes that 
the manufacturer of these devices can easily provide railroads 
utilizing the devices with the information and hardware to meet the 
requirements contained in this paragraph at a minimal cost to the 
railroad.

Subpart D--Periodic Maintenance and Testing Requirements

    This subpart provides the periodic brake system maintenance and 
testing requirements for equipment used in freight and other non-
passenger trains. As stated in the 1994 NPRM and 1998 NPRM, FRA firmly 
believes that the new repair track test and single car test, which have 
been used industry-wide since January of 1992, are a much better and 
more comprehensive method of detecting and eliminating defective brake 
equipment and components than the old, time-based COT&S requirements. 
FRA believes that performance of these tests has significantly reduced 
the number of defective components found and has dramatically increased 
the reliability of brake equipment. Through the implementation of the 
repair track and single car tests, the safety of both railroad 
employees and the public has greatly improved due to brake equipment 
being in better and safer condition. At the same time, however, FRA is 
cognizant that contentions by rail labor regarding the carrier's direct 
and intentional circumvention of these revised requirements through the 
elimination of repair tracks, by moving cars to expediter tracks for 
repair, or simply by making repairs in the field raise a legitimate 
concern that needs to be addressed to ensure that the industry fully 
benefits from the advantages of the improved tests.
    Although this subpart retains many of the proposed maintenance 
requirements, several modifications have been made in this final rule 
in response to comments received and based upon the current best 
practices occurring within the industry. FRA agrees that the proposed 
incorporation of AAR Rule 3, Chart A, is unnecessary as it would remove 
the determination of when certain maintenance is performed from the 
discretion of the railroads, and

[[Page 4178]]

would make it difficult for railroads to change the requirements 
related to the performance of that maintenance. FRA believes that a 
railroad is in the best position to determine when and where it will 
perform various maintenance on its equipment and should not have its 
hands tied in this area by overly prescriptive federal requirements. 
Furthermore, FRA's primary intent when proposing incorporation of AAR 
Rule 3, Chart A, was to codify the existing requirements for performing 
single car and repair track air brake tests and eliminate the ability 
of the industry to unilaterally change the frequency and method of 
performing these tests. As this subpart retains the requirements for 
when and how these tests are to be completed and retains certain 
inspections that are to be performed when equipment is on a shop or 
repair track, FRA believes that it is unnecessary to incorporate every 
maintenance procedure covered in AAR's Rule 3, Chart A. Consequently, 
the final rule does not incorporate AAR's Rule 3, Chart A, and 
continues to allow railroads some flexibility in determining 
appropriate maintenance practices. (A detailed discussion of the 
comments and recommendations submitted on the maintenance requirements 
contained in this subpart is contained in the preceding ``Overview of 
Comments and General FRA Conclusions'' portion of the preamble under 
the heading ``VII. Maintenance Requirements.'')

Section 232.303  General Requirements

    This section contains the general requirements regarding the 
maintenance, repair, and testing of freight cars. Paragraph (a) 
contains various definitions for determining whether a particular track 
or facility constitutes a shop or repair track. The definitions 
contained in this paragraph were not previously proposed in the NPRM 
but are consistent with current FRA enforcement policies and are 
necessary to clarify when various tests and inspections required in 
this section are to be performed.
    As the current regulations and this subpart require that certain 
inspections and tests are to be performed when a car is on a shop or 
repair track and because a repair track air brake test is required to 
be performed when a car is on a repair track and such a test has not 
been performed within the last twelve months, FRA believes it is 
necessary to clarify what constitutes a shop or repair track. This 
issue has become more prevalent over the last few years due to the 
growing use of mobile repair trucks and due to the requirements for 
conducting repair track air brake tests. For years, many railroads have 
conducted minor repairs on tracks called ``expedite tracks.'' 
Generally, the types of repairs that were performed on these tracks 
were minor repairs that could be made quickly with a limited amount of 
equipment, and neither the railroads or FRA considered the tracks to be 
repair tracks. However, recently railroads have started performing 
virtually every type of repair on these expedite tracks. These tracks 
are no longer limited to minor repairs but are being used to perform 
heavy, complex repairs that require the jacking of entire cars or the 
disassembly and replacement of major portions of a car's truck or brake 
system. At many locations these expedite tracks are positioned next to 
operative repair shops. Furthermore, several railroads have closed 
previously existing repair shop facilities and are now using fully 
equipped mobile repair trucks to perform the same type of repairs that 
were previously performed in the shop or on established repair tracks 
and are attempting to call the tracks serviced by these mobile repair 
trucks ``expedite'' or ``light repair'' tracks. Thus, the line between 
what constitutes a repair or shop track and what constitutes an 
``expedite'' or ``light repair'' track has become unclear or 
nonexistent.
    Appendix A of AAR's Field Manual of Interchange Rules provides a 
definition of both ``shop or repair track'' and ``expedite track.'' 
Although FRA does not consider these definitions to be controlling with 
regard to what constitutes a repair track under the current 
regulations, FRA does believe that AAR's definitions of the above terms 
have created confusion within the industry regarding what constitutes a 
repair track. If the AAR's definitions are read together they appear to 
exclude repairs made by mobile repair trucks, regardless of where they 
are made or the nature of the repairs conducted, from ever being 
considered as being performed on a repair track. FRA believes it is 
both illogical and inconsistent with the intent and meaning of the 
existing regulations and with the provisions proposed in the NPRM to 
exclude from the definition of ``shop or repair track'' tracks at 
locations where repairs of all types are regularly and consistently 
performed from merely because they are serviced by a mobile repair 
vehicle. Furthermore, it would be inconsistent with previous technical 
bulletins and enforcement guidance issued by FRA to allow major repair 
work to be performed on ``expedite'' or ``light repair'' tracks merely 
because the repairs are performed by a mobile repair vehicle.
    FRA believes that the operational changes, noted above, are partly 
an attempt by the railroads to circumvent the requirements that 
currently apply when a car is on a shop or repair track. Currently, if 
a car is on a shop or repair track, it must have its brakes inspected, 
under 49 CFR 232.17(a)(2)(ii), (iv), and the car is to receive a repair 
track air brake test if it has not received one in the last twelve 
months under AAR Rule 3, Chart A. Some railroads contend that an 
expedite track is not a repair or shop track; therefore, the 
requirements of Sec. 232.17(a)(2)(ii), (iv) and AAR Rule 3, Chart A, do 
not apply. FRA finds this practice and interpretation to be 
unacceptable and believes that railroads are abusing the concept of 
expedite tracks to avoid performing required maintenance. Therefore, 
the industry's own actions have caused the need for FRA to clarify what 
constitutes a shop or repair track. Consequently, paragraph (a) 
includes a definition of what FRA will consider to be repair or shop 
tracks requiring the performance of certain tests and inspections.
    Paragraph (a) makes clear that FRA will consider certain tracks to 
be repair or shop tracks based on the frequency and types of repairs 
that are made on the tracks, not necessarily the designation given by a 
railroad. The definitions in this paragraph also make clear that it is 
the nature of the repairs being conducted on a certain track that is 
the determining factor not whether a mobile repair truck is being used 
to make the repairs. Due to the ability of mobile repair trucks to make 
virtually any type of repair necessary and due to their growing use, 
FRA does not believe that tracks regularly and continually serviced by 
these types of vehicles should be excepted from the definition of 
``repair track.'' FRA believes that if a track is designated by the 
railroad as an ``expedite'' track (i.e., one where minor repairs will 
be conducted) then the railroad should ensure that only cars needing 
minor repairs are directed to that track for repair. FRA does not 
intend to eliminate the concept of expedite tracks but limits the use 
of such tracks to those types of repairs that are truly minor in nature 
and that require a limited amount of equipment to perform. At locations 
where a railroad conducts repairs of all types on a regular and 
consistent basis, either with fixed facilities or with mobile repair 
trucks, FRA would expect the railroad to designate certain trackage at 
the location as repair tracks and certain trackage as ``expedite 
tracks'' where only minor repairs would be conducted.

[[Page 4179]]

In such circumstances, FRA would expect railroads to direct cars in 
need of heavier repairs, the kind that have been traditionally 
performed on a shop or repair track, to be directed to trackage 
designated at the location as a repair track.
    Paragraph (a) places the burden on the railroad to designate those 
tracks it will consider repair tracks at locations where it performs 
both minor and heavy repairs on a regular and consistent basis, and 
makes the railroad responsible for directing the equipment in need of 
repair to the appropriate trackage. If the railroad determines that 
repairs of a heavy nature will be performed on certain trackage, then 
the track should be treated as a repair track, and any car repaired on 
that trackage should be provided the attention required by this final 
rule for cars on a shop or repair track. Further, if a railroad 
determines that minor repairs will be performed on certain trackage, 
then the railroad bears the burden of ensuring that only cars needing 
minor repairs are directed to that trackage. If the railroad fails to 
adequately distinguish the tracks performing minor repairs from those 
tracks performing heavy repairs or improperly performs heavy repairs on 
a track designated as an ``expedite track,'' then the railroad will be 
required to treat all cars on the trackage at the time that the heavy 
repairs are being conducted as though they are on a repair or shop 
track.
    It should be noted that the issue of what constitutes a repair or 
shop track for the purposes of this subpart is completely separate and 
distinct from the issue of whether a location is a location where 
necessary repairs can be performed for purposes of 49 U.S.C. 20303 and 
Sec. 232.15 of this final rule. Although an outlying location might be 
considered a location where certain brake repairs can be conducted, 
that does not mean the track where those repairs are performed should 
be considered a repair track. FRA does not intend for trackage located 
at outlying locations or sidings which are occasionally or even 
regularly serviced by mobile repair trucks to be considered repair 
tracks. FRA believes that repair or shop tracks should exist at 
locations that have fixed repair facilities and at locations where 
repairs of all types are performed on a regular and consistent basis 
regardless of whether the repairs are performed in fixed facilities or 
by mobile repair vehicles.
    Paragraphs (b)-(d) retain the proposed provisions requiring certain 
tests and inspections to be performed whenever a car is on a shop or 
repair track. Although the AAR asserts that it did away with the 
requirements to perform a set and release of the brakes and adjust 
piston travel on all cars on repair or shop tracks, the requirements 
are currently contained in power brake regulations separate and apart 
from any AAR requirements. See 49 CFR 232.17(a)(2)(ii), (iv). FRA 
believes that repair and shop tracks provide an ideal setting for 
railroads to conduct an individualized inspection on a car's brake 
system to ensure its proper operation and that such an inspection is 
necessary to reduce the potential of cars with excessive piston travel 
being overlooked when employees are performing the ordinary brake 
inspections required by this final rule. If any problems are detected 
at that location, the personnel needed to make any necessary 
corrections are already present. Furthermore, performing these 
inspections at this time ensures proper operation of the cars' brakes 
and eliminates the potential of having to cut cars out of an assembled 
train and, thus, should reduce inspection times and make for more 
efficient operations.
    Paragraph (b) retains the proposed requirement that a car on a shop 
or repair track be tested to determine that its air brakes apply and 
remain applied until a release is initiated. This paragraph requires 
that the air brakes remain applied until the release signal is 
initiated and is intended to maintain consistency with the requirement 
contained in Sec. 232.205(b)(4). Paragraph (b)(4) is an attempt to 
clarify language contained in the current regulation which require that 
the brakes ``apply.'' This language has been misinterpreted by some to 
mean that if the piston applies in response to a command from a 
controlling locomotive or yard test device, and releases before the 
release signal is given, the brake system on that car is in compliance 
with the regulation because the brake simply applied. The intent of the 
regulation has always been that the brakes apply and remain applied 
until the release signal is initiated from the controlling locomotive 
or yard test device. Therefore, clarifying language was proposed in 
this paragraph to eliminate all doubt as to what is required. 
Consequently, this paragraph makes clear that the brakes on a car must 
remain applied until the appropriate release signal is given. If it 
fails to do so, the car must be repaired and retested.
    Paragraph (c) retains the proposed requirement that if piston 
travel is found to be less than 7 inches or more than 9 inches, it must 
be adjusted to nominally 7\1/2\ inches, which is a change from the 7 
inches as currently required, in order to maintain consistency with the 
requirement proposed at Sec. 232.205(b)(5). This change was proposed in 
the NPRM and is based on a request by AAR to change the adjustment to 
7\1/2\ inches from 7 inches as its member railroads were finding it 
extremely difficult to adjust the piston travel to precisely 7 inches 
and that in some cases the adjustment would be marginally less than 7 
inches, thus requiring a readjustment. Therefore, AAR sought the extra 
\1/2\ inch in order to provide a small margin for error when the piston 
travel is adjusted. As FRA believes that AAR's concerns are validly 
placed and would have no impact on safety, FRA has accommodated the 
request.
    Paragraph (d) retains the proposed listing of brake system 
components that are to be inspected prior to a car being released from 
a shop or repair track. Many of the items contained in this paragraph 
are currently required to be inspected pursuant to 
Sec. 232.17(a)(2)(iv). It should be noted that the proposed 
requirement, retained in this final rule, regarding the proper 
functioning of angle cocks was modified in the NPRM from the existing 
requirement by clarifying that angle cocks must be inspected to ensure 
that they are properly positioned to allow maximum air flow. This is a 
clarification regarding the normal functioning of the angle cock, and 
should pose little, if any, additional inspection burden on the 
railroads. This paragraph adds two items to the inspections that are to 
be conducted when a car is on a shop or repair track. They are an 
inspection of a car's hand brake and an inspection of the accuracy and 
operation of any brake indicators on cars so equipped. As the final 
rule does not provide for the specific inspection of these items during 
any of the other required brake tests, FRA believes this is an ideal 
time for the railroad to inspect these items while imposing the least 
burden on the railroad's inspection and repair forces.
    Paragraph (e) retains the proposed provisions permitting cars to be 
moved from a location where necessary repairs are made to a location 
where a single car or repair track air brake test can be performed if 
it cannot be performed at the same location where the repairs are 
conducted. FRA disagrees with the assertions of some commenters that 
air brake repairs should not be required at locations that lack the 
ability to perform single car or repair track air brake tests. FRA 
believes that position is not only contrary to the statutory mandates 
regarding the movement of equipment with defective brakes but would 
open the door to potential abuse by railroads.

[[Page 4180]]

Furthermore, the operation of a car's brake system can generally be 
tested after a repair without performing a complete repair track air 
brake test. For the most part, single car and repair track air brake 
tests are intended to be maintenance requirements that attach based on 
a condition in which a car is found or on a repair that is required to 
be performed. If the condition of a car is such that a repair track air 
brake test is necessary to determine the defect, then the final rule 
would permit movement of the car to the nearest location where a repair 
track air brake test can be performed. However, FRA believes that most 
defective conditions can be easily determined without performing a 
repair track air brake test. Moreover, for years FRA has required the 
performance of repairs where they can be performed and has allowed such 
equipment to be moved to the next forward location for performance of a 
single car or repair track air brake test and has not found that such a 
practice has created any potential safety hazard.
    Paragraph (e) also retains the proposed requirements for tagging 
equipment which is being hauled for the performance of a single car or 
repair track air brake test after the appropriate repairs have been 
conducted. FRA believes that the tagging requirements are necessary not 
only to provide notice to a railroad's ground forces as to the presence 
of the car but also to ensure that railroads are properly performing 
the tests at appropriate locations. Furthermore, many railroads 
currently move equipment in this fashion, and there has been no 
indication that safety has been compromised. The final rule also 
retains the requirement that a copy or record of the tag be retained 
for 90 days and made available to FRA upon request. Contrary to the 
objections of some commenters, FRA continues to believe that the record 
keeping requirements are necessary so that there is accountability on 
the part of the railroads to conduct these tests at the proper 
locations and that equipment is not moved for extended periods without 
receiving its required maintenance. It should be noted that the final 
rule clarifies that the record or copy of the tag may be maintained 
either electronically or in writing provided all the required 
information is recorded. This paragraph retains the proposed 
alternative to the tagging requirements, which permits a railroad to 
utilize an automated tracking system to monitor these cars and ensure 
they receive the requisite tests as prescribed in this section provided 
the automated system is approved by FRA. It should be noted that the 
final rule does not define or require identification of locations that 
can or will perform single car or repair track air brake tests as 
suggested by some commenters. FRA does not believe that such a 
requirement is necessary because the rule specifically establishes when 
the tests are to be performed and it is in the railroad's best 
interests to perform the tests in a timely manner.
    Paragraph (f) contains the requirements for railroads to adequately 
track when single car or repair track air brake tests were last 
performed on a piece of equipment. This paragraph modifies the proposed 
requirements regarding the use of an automated tracking system in lieu 
of stenciling equipment with the date and location of the last single 
car or repair track test received. Since 1992, the industry has 
utilized the AAR's UMLER reporting system to electronically track the 
performance of single car and repair track air brake test as well as 
other repair information. Based on the performance and use of this 
system over the last seven years, FRA believes that the AAR's UMLER 
system has proven itself effective for tracking the information 
required in this paragraph and ensuring the timely performance of 
single car and repair track air brake tests. Furthermore, FRA continues 
to believe that the information required to be tracked in this 
paragraph with regard to these tests is easily maintained through an 
electronic medium. Moreover, FRA has found no substantiated instances 
of railroads falsifying or altering the information monitored and 
tracked by AAR's UMLER system. Thus, this paragraph permits railroads 
to utilize an electronic record keeping system to track single car and 
repair track air brake tests without obtaining prior FRA approval of 
the system. The final rule makes clear that FRA will monitor the 
performance of such systems and retains the right to revoke a 
railroad's authority to utilize the system if FRA finds that it is not 
properly secure, inaccessible to FRA or a railroad's employees, or 
fails to properly or adequately track and monitor the equipment.

Section 232.305  Repair Track Air Brake Tests and Section 232.307  
Single Car Tests

    These sections generally retain the proposed requirements related 
to the performance of single car and repair track air brake tests. 
Contrary to the assertions of some commenters, FRA continues to believe 
that certain maintenance procedures are critical to ensuring the safe 
and proper operation of the brake equipment on the nation's fleet of 
freight cars. FRA does not believe that the determination of what 
maintenance should be performed should be left solely to the discretion 
of the railroads operating the equipment in all circumstances. As 
periodic COT&S maintenance has been eliminated and replaced with the 
performance of single car and repair track tests, which FRA agrees is a 
better and more comprehensive method of detecting defective brake 
equipment and components, FRA believes that specific and determinable 
limits must be placed on the manner and frequency of performing these 
tests. Therefore, these sections generally retain the proposed 
requirements regarding the performance of single car and repair track 
brake tests.
    FRA recognizes that the procedures for performing single car and 
repair track tests proposed in the NPRM have been modified by the AAR 
since the issuance of the proposal. As it is FRA's intent to 
incorporate the most recent version of the single car and repair track 
air brake test procedures, paragraph (a) of each section incorporates 
by reference the test procedures that were issued by the AAR in April 
of 1999. These test procedures are contained in AAR standard S-486-99, 
Sections 3.0 and 4.0, which are located in the AAR's ``Manual of 
Standards and Recommended Practices, Section E'' (April 1999). Both 
these sections recognize that the industry may find it necessary to 
modify the test procedures from time to time in order to address new 
equipment or utilize new technology. Thus, paragraph (a) of each 
section permits railroads to seek approval of alternative procedures 
through the special approval process contained in Sec. 232.17 of this 
final rule. The special approval process is intended to speed FRA's 
consideration of a party's request to utilize an alternative procedure 
from the ones identified in the rule itself. FRA believes that it is 
essential for FRA to approve any change made in the procedures for 
conducting these safety-critical tests in order to prevent unilateral 
changes and to ensure consistency in the method in which the tests are 
performed.
    It should be noted that the incorporated procedures for performing 
single car and repair track air brake tests are the minimum 
requirements for performing such tests. The special approval process is 
required to be used only if the incorporated procedures are to be 
changed in some manner. For instance, if the industry were to elect to 
add a new test protocol to the incorporated procedures, there would be 
no need to seek approval of such an

[[Page 4181]]

addition as long as the procedures contained in the incorporated 
standard are still maintained. This final rule is not intended to 
prevent railroads from voluntarily adopting additional or more 
stringent maintenance standards provided they are consistent with the 
standards incorporated.
    Both sections retain the proposed frequency at which single car and 
repair track air brake tests are to be performed. As noted in the 
preceding discussion, the primary intent of the proposed provisions was 
to codify the existing requirements regarding the performance of single 
car and repair track air brake tests and prevent any unilateral changes 
to those requirements. FRA believes that the frequency at which these 
tests are currently required to be performed under industry standards 
has proven to be sufficient and a substantial economic burden would be 
imposed if the frequency were increased. Both sections also retain the 
requirement that these tests be conducted by a qualified person. FRA 
continues to believe that the person performing these tests must be 
specifically trained and tested on how the test is to be performed and 
be able to determine the appropriate actions that must be taken based 
on the results of the test. FRA does not believe that the mere fact 
that a person is a carman or a QMI is sufficient to make that person 
qualified to perform single car or repair track air brake tests. FRA 
believes that the training and testing requirements required by this 
final rule ensures that a person is qualified to perform these tests.
    Section 232.305(b) generally retains the proposed list of 
conditions that would require the performance of a repair track air 
brake test. However, two of the proposed conditions for when a repair 
track air brake test would be required to be performed have been 
slightly modified in order to make them consistent with the currently 
existing AAR requirements for performing these tests. FRA agrees that 
the proposed requirement to perform a repair track air brake test on 
any car removed from a train for a brake-related defect is overly 
restrictive and inconsistent with the requirements of AAR's Rule 3, 
Chart A. FRA agrees that the proposed requirement would require the 
performance of the test when minor brake system repairs are conducted, 
which is not the intent of the AAR's rule. Therefore, this paragraph 
modifies the proposed condition to require the performance of a repair 
track test on cars that have inoperative or cut-out air brakes when 
removed from a train. Furthermore, the proposed provisions requiring 
the performance of a repair track air brake test whenever a car is 
found with a wheel with built-up tread or slid flat have been slightly 
modified. Under the final rule, the test will not be required if the 
built-up tread or slid flat wheel is known to have been caused by a 
hand brake that was left applied. These modifications are consistent 
with what is currently required under AAR Rule 3, Chart A.
    Paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 232.305 retain the proposed 
requirements that each freight car receive a repair track air test 
within eight years from the date the car was built or rebuilt, and 
within every five years thereafter. FRA strongly believes that these 
minimum attention periods are sufficient to ensure the safety of the 
freight car fleet when considered in conjunction with the increased 
attention that freight cars receive when these types of tests are 
performed.
    Paragraph (c) of Sec. 232.307 retains the proposed requirement that 
a single car test be conducted by a qualified person prior to a new or 
rebuilt car being placed in or returned to revenue service. FRA 
believes that it is essential for new and rebuilt cars to receive this 
test prior to being placed in revenue service in order to ensure the 
proper operation of the brake system on the vehicle. Most railroads 
already require this attention to be given to new and rebuilt cars; 
thus, the cost of this requirement is minimal and merely incorporates 
the best practices currently in place in the industry.

Section 232.309   Repair Track Test and Single Car Test Equipment and 
Devices

    This section generally retains the proposed requirements for 
maintaining the equipment and devices used in performing repair track 
and single car air brake tests. This section modifies some of the 
proposed provisions regarding the testing and calibration of single car 
test devices and other mechanical devices used to perform single car 
and repair track air brake tests. FRA's intent when proposing the 
requirements contained in this section was to codify the current best 
practices of the industry. Thus, FRA did not intend to propose testing 
and calibration requirements that were more stringent that those 
currently imposed by AAR standards. Therefore, FRA agrees with the 
comments submitted by AAR that the testing and calibration requirements 
for single car test devices should not be imposed until the devices are 
actually placed in service, which is consistent with current AAR 
requirements. FRA recognizes that the proposed calibration and testing 
requirements may have resulted in the unnecessary acquisition of single 
car testing devices. Consequently, this section has been modified to 
clarify that the 92-day and the 365-day calibration and testing 
requirements related to single car test devices are to be calculated 
from the day on which the device is first placed in service. FRA 
continues to believes that the devices and equipment used to perform 
these single car and repair track air brake tests are safety-critical 
items. Consequently, FRA believes that these devices must be kept 
accurate and functioning properly in order to ensure that repair track 
and single car tests are properly performed.

Subpart E--End-of-Train Devices

    This subpart incorporates the design, performance, and testing 
requirements relating to end-of-train devices (EOTs) that were issued 
on January 2, 1997, which became effective for all railroads on July 1, 
1997, except for those for which the effective date was extended to 
December 1, 1997 by notice issued on June 4, 1997. See 62 FR 278 and 62 
FR 30461. This subpart also incorporates the recent modifications made 
to the two-way EOT requirements to clarify the applicability of the 
requirements to certain passenger train operations where multiple units 
of freight-type equipment, material handling cars, or express cars are 
part of a passenger train's consist. See 63 FR 24130.
    As noted in the discussion of the applicability provisions 
contained in Sec. 232.3 of this final rule, this subpart applies to all 
trains unless specifically excepted by the provisions contained in this 
subpart. As the provisions contained in this subpart were just recently 
issued, there is little need to discuss these requirements in detail as 
they were fully discussed in the publications noted above. However, 
after their issuance, FRA discovered that a few of the provisions were 
in need of minor modification for clarification purposes and to address 
some valid concerns that have been raised both internally by FRA 
inspectors and by outside parties. Consequently, in the NPRM FRA 
proposed various changes to the provisions related to end-of-train 
devices and discussed other issues which might require modification of 
the existing provisions. See 63 FR 48347-49. This discussion is 
intended to focus on the proposed changes and address those issues 
discussed in the preamble to the NPRM as well as address the issues 
raised at the public hearings and in written comments.

[[Page 4182]]

Section 232.405  Design and Performance Standards for Two-Way End-of-
Train Devices

    Paragraph (d) retains the proposed modification of the requirement 
relating to the diameter of the valve opening and hose on two-way EOTs, 
which is currently contained in Sec. 232.21(d). The current regulation 
requires that the valve opening and hose have a minimum diameter of \3/
4\ inch to effect an emergency application. FRA has discovered that 
sometime prior to the issuance of the final rule on two-way EOTs, Pulse 
Electronics began manufacturing its two-way EOT with the internal 
diameter of the hose being \5/8\ inch. Testing of the devices 
manufactured with these smaller diameter hoses showed that they met all 
criteria for emergency application capability based on standards and 
guidelines set forth by the AAR. Furthermore, testing of the devices at 
the Westinghouse facility in Wilmerding, Pennsylvania, demonstrated 
that the \5/8\ inch diameter hose permitted 14 consecutive 50-foot cars 
with cut-out control valves or 750 feet of brake pipe to be jumped. 
This is more than double the AAR standard for control valve 
requirements. Moreover, FRA's intent when issuing the two-way EOT 
design requirements was to incorporate designs that existed at the time 
the rule became effective. Consequently, paragraph (d) of this section 
is modified to permit the use of a \5/8\ inch internal diameter hose in 
the design of the devices.
    Paragraph (e) has been slightly modified, from what is currently 
required in Sec. 232.21(e), to permit the manually operated switch 
capable of initiating an emergency brake command to the rear unit to be 
located either on the front unit itself or on the engineer control 
stand. Several railroads and a manufacturer of locomotives recommended 
that the provision regarding the placement of the manually operated 
switch be modified to recognize existing designs of the devices and the 
locomotives on which they are placed. These commenters stated that many 
front units do not have the switch located directly on the front unit 
itself but that the switch is located on the engineer's control stand. 
FRA agrees with this recommendation and currently does not take 
exception to locomotives designed in the manner described above. 
Consequently, this paragraph permits the manually operated switch to be 
located either on the front unit itself or on the engineer's control 
stand.
    A new paragraph (f) has been added to this section which 
incorporates a recommendation from AAR and its member railroads that 
new locomotives be equipped with a means to automatically activate an 
emergency brake application from the rear unit whenever the locomotive 
engineer places the train air brakes in emergency. On June 1, 1998, FRA 
issued Safety Advisory 98-2, which recommended that railroads adopt a 
procedure to require activation of the rear unit to effectuate an 
emergency brake application either by using the manual toggle switch or 
through automatic activation, whenever it becomes necessary for a 
locomotive engineer to place the train air brakes in emergency using 
either the automatic brake valve or the conductor's emergency brake 
valve or whenever an undesired emergency application of the train air 
brakes occurs. See 63 FR 30808. FRA applauds the industry for taking 
the initiative to incorporate available technology on new locomotives 
and agrees with the representatives of the railroads that it is not 
economically feasible to require existing equipment to be retrofitted 
with this capability at this time. Furthermore, existing equipment is 
addressed in Sec. 232.407(f)(3), which retains the proposed requirement 
for the engineer to manually activate an emergency application from the 
rear unit when the engineer initiates an emergency application in the 
controlling locomotive if the locomotive is not equipped to do so 
automatically.
    FRA issued Safety Advisory 98-2 in response to several recent 
freight train incidents potentially involving the improper use of a 
train's air brakes, events that caused FRA to focus on railroad air 
brake and train handling procedures related to the initiation of an 
emergency air brake application, particularly as they pertain to the 
activation of the two-way EOT from the locomotive. The NPRM discussed 
four accidents in which a train was placed into emergency braking by 
use of the normal emergency brake valve handles on the locomotive, and 
although the train in each instance was equipped with an armed and 
operable two-way EOT, the device was not activated by the locomotive 
engineer. See 63 FR 48348. Preliminary findings indicate that in all of 
the incidents noted above, there was evidence of an obstruction 
somewhere in the train line, caused by either a closed or partially 
closed angle cock or a kinked air hose. This obstruction prevented an 
emergency brake application from being propagated throughout the entire 
train, front to rear, after such an application was initiated from the 
locomotive using either the engineer's automatic brake valve handle or 
the conductor's emergency brake valve. Furthermore, the locomotive 
engineers in each of the incidents stated that they did not think to 
use the two-way EOT, when asked why they failed to activate the device.

Section 232.407  Operations Requiring Use of Two-Way End-of-Train 
Devices; Prohibition on Purchase of Nonconforming Devices

    Paragraph (e) generally retains the proposed modification of the 
provision, currently contained in Sec. 232.23(e)(1), which excepts from 
the two-way EOT requirements trains operating with a locomotive capable 
of effectuating an emergency application located in the rear third of 
the train. In the NPRM, FRA proposed to modify this exception so that 
it would be applicable only to trains operating with a locomotive on 
the rear of the train. Data supplied by VOLPE demonstrates that 
stopping distances are greatly increased, and could potentially result 
in a runaway train or derailment depending on the length of the train, 
if an obstruction of the brake pipe were to occur directly behind a 
locomotive located in the rear third of the train. Therefore, FRA 
proposed that a train with a locomotive located in the rear third of 
the consist no longer be excepted from the two-way EOT requirements, 
unless the train qualifies for relief under one of the other specific 
exceptions contained in Sec. 232.407(e). Although FRA received no 
objections to this specific change, several commenters did recommend 
that the exception contained in paragraph (e)(1) be modified to include 
locomotive consists at the rear of a train. These commenters asserted 
that the existing rule needed to recognize that some locomotives have 
fuel tenders attached. FRA finds this requested modification to be 
sensible and logical. Consequently, paragraph (e)(1) has been retained 
as proposed, with a slight modification to clarify that the exception 
extends to trains with either a locomotive or a locomotive consist 
located at the rear of the train.
    A new exception to the two-way EOT requirements has been added at 
paragraph (e)(9) to address the practice of ``doubling a hill.'' The 
practice of ``doubling a hill'' occurs in situations where a train must 
be divided in two in order to traverse a particularly heavy grade due 
to the lack of sufficient motive power to haul the entire train up the 
grade. This issue was discussed in the NPRM and at the public technical 
conference conducted subsequent to the issuance of the NPRM. Initially, 
FRA believed that the two-way EOT should

[[Page 4183]]

be connected to that portion of the train traversing the grade. 
However, such an approach creates a multitude of operational as well as 
safety concerns. Such an approach would require train crews to 
repeatedly switch the rear unit from one portion of the train to 
another, which would require these individuals to repeatedly walk 
sections of the train at locations where it may not be safe to do so. 
Alternatively, such an approach might require some trains to carry 
extra devices while in transit. At the public technical conference, 
there was universal agreement between all representatives at the 
conference that the device should remain on the rear unit of the train 
in these circumstances. Consequently, paragraph (e)(9) has been added 
to except trains from the two-way EOT requirements that must be divided 
into two sections in order to traverse a grade. This paragraph makes 
clear that the exception only applies to the extent necessary to 
traverse the grade and only while the train is divided into two to 
conduct that movement.
    Paragraph (f)(1) has been slightly modified from what is currently 
contained Sec. 232.23(f)(1) in order to clarify and address an issue 
related to the ability of a railroad to dispatch a train with an 
inoperative two-way EOT from a location where the device is installed. 
Section 232.23(f)(1) of the current regulations, Sec. 232.407(f)(1) of 
the NPRM, requires that ``the device shall be armed and operable from 
the time the train departs from the point where the device is installed 
until the train reaches its destination.'' Therefore, the existing 
regulations clearly require a train to be equipped with an armed and 
operable two-way EOT when dispatched from a location where the device 
is installed. When issuing this requirement, FRA intended railroads to 
install repeater stations at locations where communication problems are 
prevalent.
    Several commenters, both at the public hearings and in written 
comments, assert that this requirement is impossible to meet at some 
locations regardless of whether repeater stations are installed. These 
commenters contend that certain locations have dead spots where it is 
impossible to establish communication between the front and rear unit. 
These parties recommend that some allowance be provided to permit 
trains at these locations to be moved a short distance to restore 
communication. FRA agrees that there are a few locations where dead 
spots exist which make it difficult if not impossible to establish 
communication between the two units when they are installed. Therefore, 
paragraph (f)(1) has been modified to allow a train that experiences a 
loss of communication or that fails to establish communication between 
the two units at the location where the device is installed to move up 
to one mile from that location in order to establish communication. FRA 
believes that this allowance should be sufficient at most locations to 
establish the required communication. Furthermore, if communication 
cannot be established within these limits, then FRA believes the 
railroad needs to install additional repeater stations. If additional 
repeater stations still fail to address the issue, then FRA believes 
that a railroad should be required to apply for a waiver of the 
requirement at a particular location, pursuant to the requirements of 
49 CFR part 211. This approach will allow FRA to address the unique 
circumstances of each location on a case-by-case basis and ensure that 
the railroad implements other operational safeguards to ensure the 
safety of those trains dispatched without armed and operable devices.
    Paragraph (f)(3) generally retains the proposed provision requiring 
the two-way EOT to be activated to effectuate an emergency brake 
application either by using the manual toggle switch or through 
automatic activation, whenever it becomes necessary for the locomotive 
engineer to initiate an emergency application of the train's air brakes 
using either the automatic brake valve or the conductor's emergency 
brake valve. As discussed previously in regard to the addition of 
Sec. 232.405(f), the proposed requirement incorporates the 
recommendations contained in FRA's Safety Advisory 98-2, issued on June 
1, 1998. See 63 FR 30808. FRA believes that the operational requirement 
contained in this paragraph must be stressed by the railroads when 
conducting the two-way EOT training required in Sec. 232.203 of this 
final rule. FRA continues to believe that the likelihood of future 
incidents, such as the ones described in the NPRM, will be greatly 
reduced if the train handling procedure contained in this paragraph is 
made part of a train crew's training and followed by members of the 
crew in emergency situations. FRA believes that this additional 
procedure, together with the required training, will not only ensure 
that an emergency brake application is commenced from both the front 
and rear of the train in emergency situations, but will familiarize the 
engineer with the activation and operation of the devices and will 
educate the engineer to react in the safest possible manner whenever 
circumstances require the initiation of an emergency brake application.
    FRA recognizes that a number of railroads have already adopted 
procedures similar to those required in this paragraph and commends 
such actions. Although this paragraph allows the device to be activated 
either manually or automatically, FRA intends to make clear that the 
front unit of the device or the engineer's control stand must be 
equipped with a manually operated switch. See Sec. 232.405(e). Although 
some railroads have developed, and this final rule requires, new 
locomotives to be equipped with a means by which the rear unit is 
automatically activated when an engineer makes an emergency application 
with the brake handle, FRA believes that an engineer must also be 
provided a separate, manually operated switch which is independent of 
any automatic system in order to ensure the activation of the rear unit 
in the event that the automatic system fails.
    It should be noted that the provision contained in paragraph (f)(3) 
has been slightly modified from that proposed in the NPRM. This final 
rule has eliminated the requirement to activate the rear unit when an 
undesired emergency brake application occurs to a train. FRA agrees 
with the assertions of various commenters that such a requirement might 
distract a locomotive engineer from performing other critical duties 
required to bring a train to a stop when an undesired emergency brake 
application occurs. As an undesired emergency brake application is not 
initiated by the locomotive engineer, such an event will usually take 
the engineer by surprise, and FRA agrees that the engineer's attention 
would be best focused on the activity of bringing the train to a stop 
in such circumstances. Furthermore, all of the instances where an 
engineer failed to activate the rear device that were discussed in the 
NPRM occurred in conjunction with an emergency brake application 
knowingly initiated by the engineer.
    Based on the above discussion regarding paragraph (e)(1) of this 
section, paragraph (g)(1) retains the proposed modification of the 
requirements for operating a train that experiences an en route failure 
of the two-way EOT over a section of track with an average grade of two 
percent or greater over a distance of two continuous miles. In the 
NPRM, FRA proposed modification of the alternative measure, currently 
contained at Sec. 232.23(g)(1)(iii), which permits the operation over 
such a grade if a radio-controlled locomotive is placed in the

[[Page 4184]]

rear third of the train consist and under the continuous control of the 
engineer in the head end of the train. FRA proposed modification of 
this alternative measure to permit such operation only if the radio-
controlled locomotive is placed at the rear of the train consist. This 
modification is retained in this final rule in order that the 
alternative methods of operation over a heavy grade remain consistent 
with the exception from the two-way EOT requirements contained in 
Sec. 232.407(e)(1) as discussed in the preceding paragraph. Although 
some commenters suggested elimination of all of the requirements 
related to operating a train experiencing an en route failure of its 
two-way EOT over heavy grades, FRA believes that the alternative 
methods are necessary to ensure the safety of such a train when 
descending a heavy grade and ensure that railroads properly maintain 
the required devices.
    Paragraphs (g)(1)(i)(A) and (B) have also been slightly modified to 
clarify the requirements that a train be stopped in certain situations 
where communication is lost between a helper locomotive and the 
controlling locomotive. The final rule makes clear that the stopping of 
trains in such circumstances should be in accordance with the 
railroad's operating rules. When issuing the two-way EOT requirements, 
FRA did not intend for engineers to place themselves in unsafe 
situations when they encounter an en route failure of the device when 
traversing a heavy grade. Although the existing rule prohibits the 
operation of a train over certain heavy grades when a failure of the 
device occurs en route, FRA did not intend that the train be 
immediately stopped when a failure of the device occurs while operating 
on a heavy grade. Rather, FRA intended for the locomotive engineer to 
conduct the movement in accordance with the railroad's operating rules 
for bringing the train safely to a stop at the first available 
location. Therefore, safety may require that the train continue down 
the grade or to a specific siding rather than come to an immediate 
halt. Consequently, the modifications contained in these paragraphs are 
intended to reflect FRA's expectations when issuing the two-way EOT 
regulations.
    Paragraph (g) has also been slightly modified in order to clarify 
what constitutes a loss of communication between the front and the rear 
units on two-way EOTs. The 16 minutes 30 seconds time period for 
determining when a loss of communication between the front and the rear 
unit was adopted based on the design of the devices, which 
automatically checks communication between the front and rear units 
every ten minutes. If no response is received, the front unit 
automatically requests communication from the rear unit 15 seconds 
later; if no response is received to that request, another request is 
made six minutes later; and if there is still no response, the front 
unit makes another request 15 seconds later. If there is still no 
response, a message is displayed to the locomotive engineer that there 
is a communication failure. This has caused some confusion in the 
industry, in that many people believe the 16 minutes and 30 seconds 
time frame should start when the message is first displayed on the 
front unit. This is incorrect. Based on the design of the currently 
operating devices, the 16 minutes and 30 seconds has elapsed when the 
failure message is broadcast. This paragraph has been modified to 
explain this design feature. Thus, appropriate action should be taken 
immediately upon receiving the failure message on the front unit. FRA 
also realizes that there may be some time lapse when the requests are 
made and the message is displayed, therefore the manufacturers of the 
devices should take care to factor any time lag into the 16 minute and 
30 second time frame designed into the devices.

Section 232.409  Inspection and Testing of End-of-Train Devices

    Paragraph (c) of this section regarding the notification of the 
locomotive engineer when the device is tested by someone other than a 
train crew member has been slightly modified from that proposed in the 
NPRM. In the NPRM, FRA proposed that the locomotive engineer be 
notified in writing in such circumstances. FRA agrees that this 
proposed requirement may have been overly burdensome and believes that 
the intent of the proposed requirement can be met without specifically 
requiring written notification. FRA's intent in proposing the written 
requirement was to ensure that locomotive engineers are provided 
sufficient information to confirm that the devices are properly 
inspected and tested and to provide locomotive engineers with a measure 
of confidence that the devices will work as intended. FRA believes 
these goals can be accomplished by permitting the required information 
to be provided by any means a railroad deems appropriate. FRA believes 
that the information required to be provided to an engineer (the date 
and time of the test, the location where the test was performed, and 
the name of the person performing the test) will ensure that the proper 
tests and inspections are performed. The modifications made in this 
paragraph make clear that a written or electronic record of the 
required information must be maintained in the cab of the controlling 
locomotive.
    Paragraph (d) retains the proposed changes to the language related 
to the annual calibration and testing of EOT devices currently 
contained at Sec. 232.25(d). The regulation currently states that the 
devices shall be ``calibrated'' annually. FRA intends to make clear 
that it intended for railroads to perform whatever tests or checks are 
necessary to ensure that the devices are operating within the 
parameters established by the manufacturers of the devices. Several 
railroads have attempted to ``sharp shoot,'' or narrowly interpret, the 
language currently contained in the regulation, claiming that the 
manufacturer states that front units do not need to be calibrated on an 
annual basis, in order to avoid doing any testing of the devices. 
Although FRA agrees that the front units may not have to be calibrated 
every year, the devices must be tested in some fashion to verify that 
they are operating within the manufacturer's specification with regard 
to radio frequency, signal strength, and modulation and do not require 
recalibration. FRA has been provided written instructions from the 
manufacturers of the devices which contain procedures for testing both 
the front and rear units. Furthermore, railroads using the devices in 
Canada acknowledge that the radio functions of the front and rear units 
are tested periodically. Consequently, this paragraph retains the 
proposed clarifying language in order to avoid any misconceptions as to 
what actions are required to be performed on these devices on an annual 
basis.
    Paragraph (d) has also been slightly modified to require the ready 
accessibility of the information regarding the calibration and testing 
of a front unit, which the current regulation requires to be placed on 
a sticker or other marking device affixed to the exterior of the front 
unit. Recently, FRA has discovered that some railroads have locked the 
cabinets that house the front units and that there is no way for either 
FRA or railroad operating crews to inspect the marking devices and 
verify the information required to be maintained. In order for the 
marking device to serve its intended purpose, it must be readily 
capable of being inspected by both FRA and railroad operating crews. 
FRA intends to make clear that the required information regarding the 
date and location that the unit was last calibrated is to be easily 
accessible to both FRA and train crews

[[Page 4185]]

for inspection either on the marking device attached to the outside of 
the front unit or, if the front unit is inaccessible, in a readily 
accessible location in the cab of the locomotive.
    In the NPRM, FRA discussed the potential need to amend paragraph 
(c) of this section by including specific provisions in this final rule 
to address the performance of bench testing on the front and rear units 
of two-way EOTs. See 63 FR 48322. After consideration of the comments 
received, FRA believes that specific regulatory requirements for 
performing these tests are unnecessary. FRA believes that its existing 
guidance, FRA Technical Bulletin MP&E 97-8, regarding the performance 
of bench tests on two-way EOTs is sufficient at this time. Since the 
issuance of this guidance on July 28, 1997, FRA has discovered very few 
instances where the issued guidance was not being followed and has 
found no evidence indicating that bench tests have compromised the 
proper operation of the devices. Consequently, FRA will not issue 
specific regulations regarding the performance of bench test at this 
time. However, FRA will continue to monitor the performance of these 
tests and will continue to expect railroads to perform the tests in 
accordance with the guidance previously issued by FRA.
    FRA issued Technical Bulletin MP&E 97-8 to its inspectors to 
clarify what is required when a railroad performs a bench test. In this 
guidance, FRA made clear that a bench test may be performed on both the 
front and rear units, independent of each other, if the test is 
performed within the yard limits or location where the unit will be 
installed on the train. In FRA's view, bench testing the rear unit 
requires applying air pressure to the device and then transmitting an 
emergency brake application from a front unit using the front unit 
manual switch; the individual performing the test would determine that 
the emergency valve functions properly either by observing the 
emergency indicator pop out or by observing brake pipe pressure at the 
rear device go to zero while hearing the exhaust of air from the 
device. On the other hand, bench testing the front unit would entail 
transmitting an emergency brake application from the front unit, using 
the front unit manual switch, and observing that a rear unit 
successfully receives the signal and activates the emergency air valve.
    The guidance also indicated that both tests must be performed 
within a reasonable time period prior to the device being armed and 
placed on the train. To determine a reasonable time period, the 
environment where the device is stored and the conditions the device is 
subjected to after completing a successful bench test have to be 
considered. If the device is tested and stored in a controlled 
environment that is free from weather elements, excessive dust, grease, 
and dirt prior to the immediate installation on a train, then four to 
eight hours would be acceptable. If the device is tested and 
haphazardly thrown into a corner of a shop or are placed in the rear of 
a truck to be bounced around a yard, one hour would likely be 
considered reasonable before installation. The guidance also made clear 
that bench tests must be performed at the location or yard where the 
device will be installed on a train.

Subpart F--Introduction of New Brake System Technology

    This subpart retains, without change, the proposed tests and 
procedures required to introduce new train brake system technology into 
revenue service. The technology necessary for the introduction of 
advanced braking systems is quickly developing. The new technology 
includes various forms of electronic braking systems, a variety of 
braking sensors, and computer-controlled braking systems. In order to 
allow and encourage the development of new technology, this subpart 
establishes tests and procedures for introducing new brake system 
technology. These provisions require the submission to FRA of a pre-
revenue service acceptance testing plan.
    FRA intends to make clear that this subpart applies only to new 
train brake system technology that complies with the statutory mandates 
contained in 49 U.S.C. 20102, 20301-20304, 20701-20703, 21302, and 
21304, but that is not specifically covered by this final rule. Any 
type of new train brake system that requires an exemption from the 
Federal railroad safety laws in order to be operated in revenue service 
may not be introduced into service pursuant to this section. In order 
to grant a waiver of the Federal railroad safety laws, FRA is limited 
by the specific statutory provisions contained in 49 U.S.C. 20306 as 
well as any FRA procedural requirements contained in this chapter.

Section 232.503  Process to Introduce New Brake System Technology

    This section retains the proposed procedural requirements which 
must be met when a railroad intends to introduce new brake system 
technology into its system. This section makes clear that the approval 
of FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety must be obtained by a 
railroad prior to the railroad's implementation of a pre-revenue 
service acceptance test plan and before introduction of new brake 
system technology into revenue service. This section requires that such 
approval be obtained pursuant to the special approval process contained 
in Sec. 232.17 of this final rule. FRA believes the special approval 
process should speed the process for taking advantage of new 
technologies over that which is currently available under the waiver 
process. However, in order to provide an opportunity for all interested 
parties to provide comment for use by FRA in its decision making 
process, as required by the Administrative Procedure Act, FRA believes 
that any special approval provision must, at a minimum, provide proper 
notice to the public of any significant change or action being 
considered by the agency with regard to existing regulations.

Section 232.505  Pre-Revenue Service Acceptance Testing Plan

    This section retains the proposed requirements for pre-revenue 
service testing of new brake system technology. These tests are 
extremely important in that they are intended to prove that the new 
brake system can be operated safely in its intended environment. For 
equipment that has not previously been used in revenue service in the 
United States, paragraph (a) requires the operating railroad to develop 
a pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan and obtain FRA approval 
of the plan under the procedures stated in Sec. 238.17 before beginning 
testing. Previous testing of the equipment at the Transportation Test 
Center, on another railroad, or elsewhere will be considered by FRA in 
approving the test plan. Paragraph (b) requires the railroad to fully 
execute the tests required by the plan, to correct any safety 
deficiencies identified by FRA, and to obtain FRA's approval to place 
the equipment in revenue service prior to introducing the equipment in 
revenue service. Paragraph (c) requires the railroad to comply with any 
operational limitations imposed by FRA. Paragraph (d) requires the 
railroad to make the plan available to FRA for inspection and copying. 
Paragraph (e) enumerates the elements that must be included in the 
plan. FRA believes this set of steps and the documentation required by 
this section are necessary to ensure that all safety risks have been 
reduced to a level that permits the new brake system technology to be 
used in revenue service. In lieu of the requirements of paragraphs (a) 
through (e), paragraph (f) provides for an abbreviated testing 
procedure for new brake system technology that has previously been

[[Page 4186]]

used in revenue service in the United States. The railroad need not 
submit a test plan to FRA; however, a description of the testing shall 
be maintained by the railroad and made available to FRA for inspection 
and copying.

IV. Regulatory Evaluation

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This final rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing 
policies and procedures and is considered to be significant under both 
Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and procedures (44 FR 11034; 
Feb. 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and placed in the docket a regulatory 
evaluation of this final rule. This evaluation estimates the costs and 
consequences of this final rule as well as its anticipated economic and 
safety benefits. It may be inspected and photocopied during normal 
business hours by visiting the FRA Docket Clerk at the Office of Chief 
Counsel, FRA, Seventh Floor, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., in Washington, 
DC. Photocopies may also be obtained by submitting a written request by 
mail to the FRA Docket Clerk at the Office of Chief Counsel, Federal 
Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Mail Stop 10, 
Washington, DC 20590.
    FRA believes that this rule will produce net benefits to society. 
The estimated Net Present Value (NPV) of the total 20-year costs 
associated with this final rule is approximately $109 million. The 
total 20-year benefits (safety and economic) consist of quantified 
benefits estimated at between approximately $112 and $130 million and 
various non-quantified benefits discussed in detail below. The 
following tables contain the estimated 20-year quantified costs and 
quantified benefits associated with this final rule.

                        Table 3.--Estimated Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Category                             NPV costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training................................................     $61,221,156
Retest..................................................       8,276,574
Piston Travel Stickers..................................       3,385,681
Air Quality.............................................       1,819,214
Dynamic Brake...........................................      11,657,846
Cycle Trains............................................      16,012,217
Class I Brake Test Notification.........................       4,414,173
Helper Locomotive Inspection............................       1,929,071
Helper Link.............................................         164,933
                                                         ---------------
      Total.............................................     108,880,865
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                      Table 4.--Estimated Benefits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Category                           NPV benefits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Extended Haul..........................................    $29,590,556--
                                                             $46,735,494
Safety Improvements....................................       57,460,452
EOT Use at Class I Brake Test..........................       22,070,863
Bottom Rod Safety Supports.............................        3,239,650
                                                        ----------------
      Total............................................    112,361,521--
                                                             129,506,459
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the quantified benefits of this final rule exceed the 
quantified costs of the rule, FRA believes that the quantified benefits 
significantly underestimate the total benefits of this rule for several 
reasons. The information available to FRA on the value of property 
damage significantly understates the true value of the damage in 
railroad accidents. The property damage estimate provided by the 
railroad(s) in the aftermath of an accident are only for ``railroad 
property damage'' (equipment, track, and structures). Although the 
numbers provided by the railroads regarding railroad property damage 
have been enhanced to account for chronic underestimation of these 
damages, the figures used by FRA do not include the costs of 
evacuations, individual (non-railroad employee) or community health 
expenses, environmental cleanup, the closure of adjacent roads, or any 
of the other potential costs which are borne by society after a 
railroad accident.
    A review of recent incidents that involve a train that loses its 
ability to stop or decrease speed show that there is a significant risk 
that such an occurrence could result in the release of large amounts of 
hazardous materials which, if the incident occurred in a densely 
populated or environmentally sensitive area, could produce truly 
catastrophic results. The costs of evacuation and medical treatment for 
those near the accident site could be substantial, and associated road 
closures could also produce significant economic impact to travelers 
and the communities nearby. Should a hazardous material release impact 
a river or stream, the consequences to wildlife in the area could also 
be severe and lasting. Furthermore, because derailments or collisions 
of trains which lose the ability to stop or decrease speed often occur 
due to overturning on curves or entering congested areas, third party 
casualties and property damage can also be substantial. As the 
inspection, testing, and maintenance provisions of this final rule are 
intended to ensure that the brakes on a train are effective and 
operable and because this final rule will ensure that a locomotive 
engineer is provided information regarding the condition of the brakes 
on the train they are operating, FRA believes that this final rule will 
reduce the number of instances where a train loses its ability to stop 
or decrease speed that create the potential for catastrophic 
consequences.
    An example of the catastrophic consequences that could result when 
a freight train loses the ability to stop or decrease speed occurred on 
February 1, 1996, in Cajon Pass in California. This accident resulted 
in two fatalities, 32 injuries (32 emergency responders required 
medical treatment due to inhalation of toxic chemicals), the release of 
hazardous materials, and the subsequent evacuation of the surrounding 
area. In addition, a 20 mile segment of Interstate 15, the main route 
between Los Angeles and Las Vegas, was closed for 5 days as a result of 
the hazardous materials release. The road closure forced 89,000 
vehicles a day to use detours. This added approximately 2 hours to the 
travel time between Las Vegas and Los Angeles. The losses to the 
surface transportation sector due to road and track closure, revenue 
losses to businesses and tourism, and the costs of emergency response 
related to this incident were not included in the estimated $15 million 
damage figure used by FRA when including this incident in the 
regulatory impact analysis of the two-way end-of-train device final 
rule. See 62 FR 291. FRA recognizes that an exact figure cannot be 
placed on these costs, but believes that the figure would be in the 
tens, if not hundreds, of millions of dollars. As devastating and 
costly as this incident was, it is probable that the results of this 
particular incident could have been much more disastrous. An Amtrak 
passenger train passed 17 minutes ahead of the train involved in the 
incident. Had the Amtrak train been stopped on the tracks or otherwise 
delayed, the consequences of the incident would have been much more 
severe, with the potential for scores of fatalities. (As illustration 
of potential consequences, a freight-to-passenger train collision at 
Hinton, Alberta, on February 8, 1986, resulted in 29 fatalities.)
    Other power-brake related accidents illustrate the potential for 
high severity when a heavy-tonnage freight train loses braking control. 
On May 12, 1989, a Southern Pacific Transportation Company train 
accelerated out of control descending a 2.2 percent grade into San 
Bernardino, California. Two employees were killed and three injured. 
The entire train was effectively

[[Page 4187]]

destroyed. The incident destroyed seven residences adjacent to the 
right-of-way, killing two residents and injuring a third. A 14-inch 
gasoline pipeline which may have been damaged in either the incident or 
the ensuing clean-up, ruptured 13 days later, resulting in the death of 
two additional residents, serious injuries to two residents, and minor 
injuries to 16 others. Eleven additional homes were destroyed, along 
with 21 motor vehicles.
    On February 2, 1989, near Helena, Montana, freight cars from a 
Montana Rail Link train rolled eastward down a mountain grade and 
struck a helper locomotive consist, slightly injuring two crewmembers. 
Hazardous materials in the consist which included hydrogen peroxide, 
isopropyl alcohol, and acetone were later released. The release of 
these hazardous materials resulted in a fire and explosions 
necessitating the evacuation of approximately 3,500 residents of Helena 
for over two days. According to the National Transportation Safety 
Board, railroad and other property damage alone exceeded $6 million, 
and all of the buildings of Carroll College sustained damage. 
Furthermore, the City of Helena received 154 reports of property damage 
from residents within a three-mile radius of the incident. 
Consequently, FRA believes that the potential unquantified benefits 
derived from the prevention of just one accident similar to the Cajon 
Pass incident or the other incidents noted above would most likely 
outweigh the potential costs of this final rule.
    In addition to the potential underestimation of the quantified 
safety benefits, there may also be significant non-quantified business 
benefits that may be available as a consequence of this rule. The 
quantified benefits from the extended haul provisions may be 
significantly understated. FRA's estimates for the number of trains 
eligible for this benefit, and the cost saving that it produces, were 
much higher in the NPRM than those supplied by AAR in response to the 
NPRM. While we have used the figures provided by AAR to develop a range 
for the benefits related to the extended haul provisions, FRA continues 
to believe that more potential benefits are available to the industry 
than have been quantified in the Regulatory Impact Analysis.
    Another business benefit for which FRA has insufficient information 
to form a credible estimate relates to the provision permitting 
previously tested cars to be added to trains received in interchange 
and the allowance to conduct a Class II brakes test on only those cars 
added to trains received in interchange that will move less than 20 
miles from the interchange location. Under the existing regulations the 
addition of cars to such trains would require the performance of either 
an initial terminal brake test or a transfer train brake test on the 
entire train. The industry may realize substantial cost savings by 
being permitted to add cars to such trains without inspection of the 
entire train. By permitting the addition of cars to trains received in 
interchange, FRA allows the railroads to save significant time (labor 
and train delay costs) by not having to inspect the entire train 
consist when such cars are added to these trains. Because FRA does not 
have information on the number of interchanged trains engaging in such 
activity (and none were provided in response to the NPRM), we have not 
estimated the extent of this potential benefit. Actual business 
benefits to be realized due to this rule, therefore, may be 
significantly understated.
    Moreover, Congress mandated that FRA review and revise the existing 
power brake regulations where necessary and specifically required that 
FRA prescribe standards regarding dynamic brakes, where applicable. 
Consequently, FRA believes that this final rule produces a net benefit 
to society. The costs that have been quantified represent the maximum 
that this rule is expected to cost, and the quantified projected 
benefits are the minimum which should be realized.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) 
requires an assessment of the impacts of proposed and final rules on 
small entities. FRA has conducted a regulatory flexibility analysis of 
this rule's impact on small entities, and the assessment has been 
placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.
1. Why Action By the Agency Is Being Considered
    In 1992, Congress amended the Federal rail safety laws by adding 
certain statutory mandates related to power brake safety. See 49 U.S.C. 
20141. These amendments specifically address the revision of the power 
brake regulations by adding a new subsection which states:

    (r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.--(1) The Secretary shall conduct a 
review of the Department of Transportation's rules with respect to 
railroad power brakes, and not later than December 31, 1993, shall 
revise such rules based on such safety data as may be presented 
during that review.
    (2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Secretary shall, where 
applicable, prescribe standards regarding dynamic brake equipment. * 
* * Pub. L. No. 102-365, section 7; codified at 49 U.S.C. 20141, 
superseding 45 U.S.C. 431(r).

    In addition to this statutory mandate, FRA received various 
recommendations and petitions for rulemaking, and determined on its own 
that the power brake regulations were in need of revision. FRA has been 
in the process of revising the power brake regulations since 1992. An 
ANPRM and two NPRMs revising the power brake regulations were 
previously issued on December 31, 1992, September 16, 1994, and 
September 9, 1998, respectively. See 57 FR 62546, 59 FR 47676, and 63 
FR 48294. A detailed discussion of the history leading up to this final 
rule is contained in the preamble. The reasons for the actual 
provisions of the action considered by the agency are explained in the 
body of the preamble and the section-by-section analysis.
2. The Objectives and Legal Basis for the Rule
    The objective of the rule is to enhance the safety of rail 
transportation, protecting both those people traveling and working on 
the system, and those people off the system who might be affected by a 
rail incident by revising the regulations related to the braking 
systems used and operated in freight and other non-passenger trains to 
address potential deficiencies in the existing regulations, better 
address the needs of contemporary railroad operations, and facilitate 
the use of advanced technologies. The legal basis for this action is 
reflected in the response to 1. above and in the preamble.
3. A Description of and an Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to 
Which the Final Rule Would Apply
    The Small Business Administration (SBA) uses an industry wide 
definition of ``small entity'' based on employment. Railroads are 
considered small by SBA definition if they employ fewer than 1,500 
people for line haul railroads, and 500 for switching and terminal 
railroads. An agency may establish one or more other definitions of 
this term, in consultation with the SBA and after an opportunity for 
public comment, that are appropriate to the agency's activities.
    The classification system used in this analysis is that of the FRA. 
Prior to the SBA regulations establishing size categories, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) developed a classification system 
for freight railroads as Class I, II, or III, based on annual operating 
revenue. A Class I railroad has

[[Page 4188]]

operating revenue of $250 million or more, a Class II railroad has 
operating revenue greater than $20 million dollars but less than $250 
million and a Class III railroad has operating revenue of $20 million 
or less. The Department of Transportation's Surface Transportation 
Board, which succeeded the ICC, has not changed these classifications. 
The ICC/STB classification system has been used pervasively by FRA and 
the railroad industry to identify entities by size. In the NPRM, FRA 
discussed these revenue thresholds in terms of the revenue levels 
actually achieved by these different classes of railroads rather than 
by the specific limits established in the Surface Transportation 
Board's regulations. See 49 CFR part 1201 1-1.
    After consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the SBA and as 
explained in detail in the ``Interim Policy Statement Concerning Small 
Entities Subject to the Railroad Safety Laws,'' published August 11, 
1997 at 62 FR 43024, FRA has decided to define ``small entity,'' on an 
interim basis, to include only those entities whose revenues would 
bring them within the Class III definition. In response to FRA's 
request for comments on its alternate definition, the American Short 
Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA) suggested that the 
definition include all Class II and Class III railroads. However, the 
ASLRRA offered no support for this request nor provided any rationale 
for why such a large number of railroads should be considered ``small 
entities.'' Consequently, this final rule retains the alternate 
definition of ``small entity'' which includes only Class III railroads.
    All of the small entities directly affected by this rule are Class 
III railroads. FRA certifies that this final rule is expected to have a 
significant impact on a substantial number of Class III railroads. 
Although FRA did not quantify the estimated annual cost or benefit to 
the average Class III railroad (of which there are approximately 600-
650 at any given time), the Regulatory Impact Analysis contains 
discussions and cost estimates for certain specific provisions where 
the impact could be estimated for non-Class I and Class III railroads.
    The only significant costs to Class III railroads imposed by this 
final rule are related to the training of employees. In the NPRM, FRA 
estimated that Class III railroads would absorb approximately 15 
percent of the training costs being imposed on non-Class I railroads. 
This estimate was based on the fact that Class III railroads employ 
approximately 15 percent of the employees on non-Class I railroads and 
because virtually all of the training costs are related to the number 
and types of employees employed by a railroad. FRA received no specific 
comment from any interested party objecting to this estimate. The final 
rule has been modified to reduce the potential impact of the training 
requirements on these small railroads based on comments received, by 
eliminating the need to develop internal audit programs and by allowing 
efficiency tests to be utilized to assess the effectiveness of a 
railroad's training program. Moreover, as discussed above and below, 
the training that employees of Class III railroads will be required to 
receive is significantly less than the required training of many 
employees on Class I and Class II railroads. Thus, although FRA 
believes that the actual cost to Class III railroads will be much less 
than the 15 percent originally assigned, FRA will retain the very 
conservative cost estimate related to training for Class III railroads 
of 15 percent of the training costs for non-Class I railroads which 
results in an estimated impact of approximately $740,579, or less than 
$1,200 for the average Class III railroad. These cost will be 
apportioned among the 600 to 650 Class III railroads, and will vary 
according to the number of employees each railroad must train. This is 
a rough estimate based on the number of Class III employees as a 
percentage of total employees. Actual impact should be less, as 
discussed below.
4. A Description of the Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other 
Compliance Requirements of the Final Rule, Including an Estimate of the 
Classes of Small Entities Which Will Be Subject to the Requirements and 
the Type of Professional Skills Necessary for Preparation of the Report 
or Record
    Other than the training requirements discussed above, this rule 
will have a de minimus impact on small entities. Most of the final rule 
provisions will not effect small railroad costs because of the nature 
and limits to their operations, or the small railroad costs are 
inseparable from the industry-wide costs. For example, small railroads 
do not generally operate helper locomotives, so they will not be 
subject to the costs associated with that new rule provision. In the 
case of provisions such as those requiring piston travel stickers, FRA 
has no basis for assigning to any particular segment of the industry 
the costs for equipping the entire fleet of non-standard piston travel 
cars with piston travel stickers. But in reality, it is unlikely that 
these costs will fall on the smaller railroads.
    In various places in the Regulatory Impact Analysis, FRA has 
attempted to assign burdens to the smaller members of the industry 
based on some measure of their size relative to the rest of the 
industry. In those cases, FRA has probably overestimated the burden for 
the smaller carriers. A good example is the requirement regarding the 
repair and documentation of dynamic brake failures. While FRA has 
assigned these costs based on the total number of locomotives operated 
by each segment of the industry, the reality is that few small 
railroads operate locomotives equipped with operative dynamic brakes 
and they will not actually be subject to these costs. The costs shown 
in the Regulatory Impact Analysis should be viewed as a maximum. 
Similarly, smaller railroads perform a limited number of Class I brake 
tests, do not generally own and operate yard air sources, and do not 
usually perform the type of maintenance that will trigger the new 
record keeping requirements, thus the reporting and record keeping 
requirements related to those activities will be minimal or non-
existent for these smaller carriers.
5. Federal Rules Which May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the 
Rule
    None.
    Significant Alternatives:
    1. Differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables 
which take into account the resources available to small entities:
    2. Clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance 
and reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities:
    3. Exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for 
such small entities:
    FRA considered the role that non-Class I railroads (Class II and 
III railroads) have in today's freight industry. FRA believes that the 
current marketplace requires Class I railroads and these smaller 
railroads to operate as an integrated system. Many of today's smaller 
railroads rely on Class I railroads for the training of their employees 
and the maintenance of their equipment. In addition, many non-Class I 
railroads and Class I railroads interchange and operate each other's 
equipment. Therefore, except in limited circumstances, it is 
impossible, from a regulatory standpoint, to separate these smaller 
railroads from the larger Class I railroads. Therefore, in order to 
ensure the safety and quality of train and locomotive power braking 
systems throughout the entire freight industry, this final rule 
generally imposes a consistent set of requirements on Class

[[Page 4189]]

I, II, and III railroads as a group. Although FRA recognizes that many 
of the operational benefits created by this final rule are not 
available to many of the smaller operations, FRA feels that the 
integrated nature of the freight industry requires that universally 
consistent requirements be imposed on both Class I and non-Class I 
railroads.
    Where possible, efforts were taken in this final rule to minimize 
the impact on non-Class I railroads. The dynamic brake provisions of 
this final rule provide railroads with the option of declaring the 
dynamic brake portion of a locomotive deactivated. Thus, smaller 
railroads which do not choose to utilize dynamic brakes are not 
required to incur the cost of maintaining the equipment. The final rule 
also eliminates the proposed requirement to stencil a locomotive with 
deactivated dynamic brakes which further reduces the cost to smaller 
railroads. The final rule permits railroads to perform Class II brake 
tests on cars added to a train received in interchange, if the train 
will travel a distance not to exceed 20 miles from the point at which 
it was received in interchange. The current regulations require the 
performance of at least a transfer train brake test on the entire 
train, rather than testing only those cars added. FRA believes this 
will provide a cost savings to smaller railroads as they generally move 
short distances from interchange points to destination. Furthermore, 
virtually all of the inspection and testing requirements imposed by 
this final rule on Class III railroads reflect current practices on 
those operations.
    The final rule also modifies some of the proposed training 
requirements in order to reduce the costs to smaller railroads based on 
comments received by the ASLRRA. The final rule eliminates the 
requirement that railroads develop an internal audit program to assess 
the effectiveness of their training programs and allows efficiency 
tests to be utilized to assess the effectiveness of such programs. This 
was a change requested by the ASLRRA and will reduce the impact of the 
training requirements by permitting smaller railroads to utilize 
existing supervisory oversight to assess the effectiveness of training. 
The final rule also clarifies that each employee need only be trained 
on the knowledge and skills necessary to perform the tasks they are 
required to perform. Because employees of Class III railroads generally 
are not required to perform many of the tasks covered by this final 
rule, these employees would not be required to be trained on those 
tasks. For example, Class III railroads generally do not operate a 
large variety of brake systems on their lines thus, their employees 
would only have to be trained on a limited number of different brake 
systems. In addition, the employees of Class III railroads generally 
will not be required to receive any training in the areas of EPIC 
brakes, dynamic brakes, two-way EOT devices, or on some of the brake 
tests and maintenance mandated in this final rule due to the limited 
distances traveled by trains on these operations, the low tonnages 
hauled, and because many of the maintenance functions on these smaller 
railroads are contracted out to larger railroads. Thus, the final rule 
has attempted to narrow the training requirements for employees of 
smaller railroads to only those tasks they are required to perform and 
thus, reduce the economic impact of the requirements.
4. Use of performance, rather than design standards:
    Where possible, especially with regard to advanced technologies and 
certain brake system components, an attempt was made to tie the 
proposed requirements to performance.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The information collection requirements in this final rule have 
been submitted for approval to the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. 
The sections that contain the new information collection requirements 
and the estimated time to fulfill each requirement are as follows:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                        Average time per     Total annual burden    Total annual burden
            CFR section                Respondent universe   Total annual responses         response                hours              cost (dollars)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
229.27--Annual tests...............  20,000 locomotives....  18,000 tests..........  15 minutes...........  4,500 hours..........  157,500
231.31--Drawbars for freight cars--  545 railroads.........  0 letters.............  N/A..................  N/A..................  N/A
 approval to operate on track with
 non-standard gage.
232.1--Purpose and Scope--Requests   545 railroads.........  4 requests/letters....  60 minutes...........  4 hours..............  180
 for Earlier Application to comply
 with Subparts D through F.
232.3--Applicability-- Export,       545 railroads.........  8 cards...............  10 minutes...........  1 hour...............  45
 industrial, & other cars not owned
 by railroads-identification.
232.7--Waivers.....................  545 railroads.........  10 petitions..........  40 hours.............  400 hours............  18,000
232.11--Penalties--Knowing           545 railroads.........  1 falsified recd/rpt..  10 minutes...........  .20 hour.............  9
 falsifying a record/report.
232.15--Movement of Defective
 Equipment:
    --Tags.........................  1,620,000 cars........  128,400 tags..........  2.5 minutes..........  5,350 hours..........  187,250
    -- Written Notification........  1,620,000 cars........  21,200 notices........  3 minutes............  1,060 hours..........  37,100
232.17--Special Approval Procedure:
    --Petitions for special          545 railroads.........  4 petition............   100 hours...........  400 hours............  18,000
     approval of safety-critical
     revision.
    --Petitions for special          545 railroads.........  2 petitions...........  100 hours............  200 hours............  9,000
     approval of pre-revenue
     service acceptance plan.
    --Service of petitions.........  545 railroads.........  6 petitions...........  40 hours.............  240 hours............  10,800
    --Statement of interest........  Public/railroads......  20 statements.........  8 hours..............  160 hours............  7,200
    --Comments.....................  Public/railroads......  15 comments...........  4 hours..............  60 hours.............   2,700

[[Page 4190]]

 
232.103--Gen'l requirements--all     1,600,000 cars........  246,866 stickers......  10 minutes...........  41,144 hours.........  835,156
 train brake systems:
    --Locomotives--1st Year--        545 railroads.........  50 procedures.........  4 hours..............  200 hours............  9,000
     Procedures.
    --Locomotives--Subsequent        25 new railroads......  1 procedure...........  4 hours..............  4 hours..............  180
     Years--Procedures.
232.105--Gen'l requirements for      545 railroads.........  20,000 insp. forms....  5 minutes............  1,667 hours..........  58,345
 locomotives-Inspection.
232.107--Air source requirements:..
    --1st Year.....................  545 railroads.........  50 plans..............  40 hours.............  2,000 hours..........  90,000
    --Subsequent Years.............  25 new railroads......  1 plan................  40 plans.............  40 hours.............  1,800
    --Amendments to Plan...........  50 existing plans.....  10 amendments.........  20 hours.............  200 hours............  9,000
    --Recordkeeping................  50 existing plans.....  1,150 records.........  20 hours.............  23,000 hours.........  1,035,000
    --Cold weather situations......  545 railroads.........  37 plans..............  20 hours.............  740 hours............  33,300
232.109--Dynamic brake
 requirements:.
    --status.......................  545 railroads.........  1,656,000 records.....  4 minutes............  110,400 hours........  3,864,000
    --Inoperative dynamic brakes...  20,000 locomotives....  6,358 repair recds....  4 minutes............  424 hours............  14,840
    --Tag bearing words              20,000 locomotives....  6,358 tags............  30 seconds...........  53 hours.............  1,855
     ``inoperative dynamic brakes''.
    --Deactivated dynamic brakes--   8,000 locomotives.....  2,800 stencilings.....  5 minutes............  233 hours............  8,155
     1st Year.
    --Subsequent Years.............  8,000 locomotives.....  20 stencilings........  5 minutes............  2 hours..............  70
    --Displays to Locomotive         8,000 locomotives.....  2,800,000 Disp........  .50 second...........  400 hours............  0
     Engineer-Deceleration rate.
    --Operating rules--1st Year....  545 railroads.........  300 oper. rules.......  4 hours..............  1,200 hours..........  54,000
    --Subsequent Years.............  5 new railroads.......  5 operating rules.....  4 hours..............  20 hours.............  900
    --Amendments...................  545 railroads.........  15 amendments.........  1 hour...............  15 hours.............  675
    --Miles-per-hour-overspeed-top   545 railroads.........  545 rules.............  60 minutes...........  545 hours............  24,525
     rule in operating proc..
    --Requests to increase 5 mph     545 railroads.........  5 requests/lttrs......  30 min. + 20 hrs.....  103 hours............  4,635
     overspeed restriction.
    --Knowledge criteria--           545 railroads.........  300 amendments........  16 hours.............  4,800 hours..........  216,000
     locomotive engineers--1st Year.
    --Subsequent Years.............  5 new railroads.......  5 amendments..........  16 hours.............  80 hours.............  3,600
232.111--Train information
 handling:
    --1st Year.....................  545 railroads.........  545 procedures........  50 hours.............  27,250 hours.........  1,226,250
    --Subsequent Years.............  10 new railroads......  10 procedures.........  40 hours.............  400 hours............  18,000
    --Amendments...................  100 railroads.........  100 amendments........  20 hours.............  2,000 hours..........  90,000
    --Report requirements to train   545 railroads.........  2,112,000 reports.....  10 minutes...........  352,000 hours........  12,320,000
     crew.
232.203--Training requirements--Tr.
 Prog.:
    --1st Year.....................  545 railroads.........  300 programs..........  100 hours............  30,000 hours.........  1,350,000
    --Subsequent years.............  15 railroads..........  1 program.............  100 hours............  100 hours............  4,500
    --Amendments to written program  545 railroads.........  545 amendments........  8 hours..............  4,360 hours..........  196,200
    --Training records.............  545 railroads.........  67,000 records........  8 minutes............  8,933 hours..........  312,655
    --Training notifications.......  545 railroads.........  67,000 notific........  3 minutes............  3,350 hours..........  117,250
    --Audit program................  545 railroads.........  545 plans.............  40 hours.............  21,800 hours.........  981,000
    --Amendment to audit program...  545 railroads.........  50 amendments.........  20 hours.............  1,000 hours..........  45,000
232.205--Class 1 brake test--        545 railroads.........  1,656,000 notific.....  45 seconds...........  20,700 hours.........  724,500
 Notifications.
232.207--Class 1A brake tests:       545 railroads.........  25 lists..............  30 minutes...........  13 hours.............  585
    --1st Year.....................  545 railroads.........  1 list................  1 hour...............  1 hour...............  45
    --subsequent years.............
    --Notification.................  545 railroads.........  5 amendments..........  1 hour...............  5 hours..............  225
232.209--Class II brake tests-       545 railroads.........  1,600,000 comnnt......  3 seconds............  1,333 hours..........  46,655
 intermediate inspection.
    --Operator of train............  545 railroads.........  1,600,000 comm........  2 seconds............  889 hours............  31,115
    --Electronic communication link  545 railroads.........  32,000 messages.......  2 seconds............  18 hours.............  630

[[Page 4191]]

 
232.211--Class II brake test-        545 railroads.........  500,000 commun........  5 seconds............  694 hours............  24,290
 trainline continuity insp..
    --Electronic communication link  545 railroads.........  5,000 messages........  5 seconds............  7 hours..............  245
232.213--Extended haul trains......  84,000 long dist.       70 letters............  15 minutes...........  18 hours.............  810
                                      mvmts..
    --Record of all defective/       84,000 long dist.       25,200 records........  20 minutes...........  8,400 hours..........  294,000
     inoperative brakes.              mvmts..
232.303--Gen'l requirements--single  1,600,000 frgt. cars..  5,600 tags............  5 minutes............  467 hours............  16,345
 car test.
    --Last repair track brake test/  1,600,000 frgt. cars..  320,000 stncl.........  5 minutes............  26,667 hours.........  993,345
     single car test.
232.307--Single Car................  545 railroads.........  Inc. under 232.17.....  Inc. under 232.17....  Inc. under 232.17....  Inc. under 232.17
232.309--Repair track brake test...  640 shops.............  5,000 tests...........  30 minutes...........  2,500 hours..........  87,500
232.403--Design stds--1 way end-of-  545 railroads.........  4 billion mess........  1/186,000 sec........  6 hours..............  0
 train (EOTs) dev..
    --Unique Code..................  545 railroads.........  12 requests...........  5 minutes............  1 hour...............  35
232.405--Design + Performance        545 railroads.........  8 billion mess........  1/186,000 sec........  12 hours.............  0
 stds.--2 way EOTs.
232.407--Operations 2-way EOTs.....  545 railroads.........  50,000 comm...........  30 seconds...........  417 hours............  14,595
232.409--Insp. and Testing of EOTs.  245 railroads.........  450,000 comm..........  30 seconds...........  3,750 hours..........  168,750
    --Telemetry Equipment--Testing   245 railroads.........  32,708 units..........  1 minute.............  545 hours............  24,525
     and Calibration.
232.503--Process to introduce new    545 railroads.........  1 letter..............  1 hour...............  1 hour...............  45
 brake technology.
    --Special approval.............  545 railroads.........  1 request.............  3 hours..............  3 hours..............  135
232.505--Pre-revenue service
 accept. test plan:
    --1st Yr.......................  545 railroads.........  1 main. procedure.....  160 hours............  160 hours............  7,200
    --Subsequent years.............  545 railroads.........  1 main. procedure.....  160 hours............  160 hours............  7,200
    --Amendments...................  545 railroads.........  1 main. procedure.....  40 hours.............  40 hours.............  1,800
    --Design description...........  545 railroads.........  1 petition............  67 hours.............  67 hours.............  3,015
    --Report to FRA Assoc. Admin..   545 railroads.........  1 report..............  13 hours.............  13 Hours.............  585
     for Safety.
    --Brake system technology        545 railroads.........  5 descriptions........  40 hours.............  200 hours............  9,000
     testing.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions; 
searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed 
data; and reviewing the information. For information or a copy of the 
paperwork package submitted to OMB contact Robert Brogan at 202-493-
6292.
    OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of 
information requirements contained in this final rule between 30 and 60 
days after publication of this document in the Federal Register.
    FRA cannot impose a penalty on persons for violating information 
collection requirements which do not display a current OMB control 
number, if required. This final rule has been assigned OMB control 
number 2130-0008.

D. Environmental Impact

    FRA has evaluated this final rule in accordance with its 
``Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts'' (FRA 
Procedures)(64 FR 28545, May 26, 1999) as required by the National 
Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other environmental 
statutes, Executive Orders, and related regulatory requirements. FRA 
has determined that this final rule is not a major FRA action 
(requiring the preparation of an environmental impact statement or 
environmental assessment) because it is categorically excluded from 
detailed environmental review pursuant to section 4(c) of FRA's 
Procedures. Section 4(c) of FRA's Procedures identifies twenty classes 
of FRA actions that are categorically excluded from the requirements 
for conducting a detailed environmental review. FRA further considered 
this final rule in accordance with section 4(c) and (e) of FRA's 
Procedures to determine if extraordinary circumstances exist with 
respect to this final rule that might trigger the need for a more 
detailed environmental review. After conducting this review, FRA has 
determined that extraordinary circumstances do not exist because this 
final rule: Is not judged to be environmentally controversial; is not 
inconsistent with Federal, State, or local laws, regulations, 
ordinances, or judicial or administrative determinations relating to 
environmental protection; will not have any significant adverse impact 
on any natural, cultural, recreational, or scenic environments; will 
not use protected properties, involve new construction in wetlands, or 
affect a base floodplain; and will not cause a significant short- or 
long-term increase in traffic congestion or other adverse environmental 
impact on any mode of transportation. As a result, FRA finds that this 
regulation is not a major Federal action significantly effecting the 
quality of the human environment.

[[Page 4192]]

E. Federalism Implications

    FRA believes it is in compliance with Executive Order 13132. This 
final rule will not have a substantial effect on the States, on the 
relationship between the national government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government. This final rule will not have federalism implications that 
impose substantial direct compliance costs on State and local 
governments. FRA notes that States involved in the State Participation 
Program, pursuant to 49 CFR part 212, may incur minimal costs 
associated with the training of their inspectors involved in the 
enforcement of this final rule. Meanwhile, State officials were 
consulted to a practicable extent through their participation in the 
RSAC, a federal advisory committee discussed earlier in the preamble. 
Although this rule was removed from the RSAC process prior to the 
issuance of the 1998 NPRM, representatives of state officials were 
represented in the RSAC Power Brake Working Group and the concerns and 
comments raised by these representatives during that process were fully 
considered during the development of both the 1998 NPRM and this final 
rule. Specifically, the National Association of Regulatory 
Commissioners, the American Association of State Highway and 
Transportation Officials, and the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CAPUC) were all represented when this rule was being 
considered by the RSAC Power Brake Working Group. The CAPUC submitted 
extensive comments in response to the 1998 NPRM which are detailed and 
addressed in the preamble to this final rule.
    In any event, Federal preemption of a State or local law occurs 
automatically as a result of the statutory provision contained at 49 
U.S.C. 20106 when FRA issues a regulation covering the same subject 
matter as a State or local law unless the State or local law is 
designed to reduce an essentially local safety hazard, is not 
incompatible with Federal law, and does not place an unreasonable 
burden on interstate commerce (see discussion in the section-by-section 
analysis of Sec. 232.13). It should be noted that the potential for 
preemption also exists under various other statutory and constitutional 
provisions. These include: the Locomotive Inspection Act (now codified 
at 49 U.S.C. 20701-20703), the Safety Appliance Acts (now codified at 
49 U.S.C. 20301-20304), and the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 229

    Railroad locomotive safety, Railroad safety.

49 CFR Part 231

    Railroad safety, Railroad safety appliances.

49 CFR Part 232

    Incorporation by reference, Railroad power brakes, Railroad safety, 
Two-way end-of-train devices.

The Rule

    In consideration of the following, FRA amends chapter II, subtitle 
B of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

Part 229--[AMENDED]

    1. The authority citation for part 229 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20107, 20133, 20137-20138, 
20143, 20701-20703, 21301-21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).


    2. Section 229.5 is amended by adding a new paragraph (p) to read 
as follows:


Sec. 229.5  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (p) Electronic air brake means a brake system controlled by a 
computer which provides the means for control of the locomotive brakes 
or train brakes or both.

    3. Section 229.25 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as 
follows:


Sec. 229.25  Tests: Every periodic inspection.

* * * * *
    (a) All mechanical gauges used by the engineer to aid in the 
control or braking of the train or locomotive, except load meters used 
in conjunction with an auxiliary brake system, shall be tested by 
comparison with a dead-weight tester or a test gauge designed for this 
purpose.
* * * * *

    4. Section 229.27 is amended by revising paragraph (b) to read as 
follows:


Sec. 229.27  Annual tests.

* * * * *
    (b) The load meter shall be tested. Each device used by the 
engineer to aid in the control or braking of the train or locomotive 
that provides an indication of air pressure electronically shall be 
tested by comparison with a test gauge or self-test designed for this 
purpose. An error of greater than five percent or three pounds per 
square inch shall be corrected. The date and place of the test shall be 
recorded on Form FRA F 6180-49A, and the person conducting the test and 
that person's supervisor shall sign the form.
* * * * *

    5. Section 229.53 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 229.53  Brake gauges.

    All mechanical gauges and all devices providing indication of air 
pressure electronically that are used by the engineer to aid in the 
control or braking of the train or locomotive shall be located so that 
they may be conveniently read from the engineer's usual position during 
operation of the locomotive. A gauge or device shall not be more than 
five percent or three pounds per square inch in error, whichever is 
less.

Part 231--[AMENDED]

    6. The authority citation for part 231 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20107, 20131, 20301-20303, 
21301-21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).


    7. Section 231.0 is amended by adding paragraphs (b)(3) through (5) 
and paragraph (g) to read as follows:


Sec. 231.0  Applicability and penalties.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) Freight and other non-passenger trains of four-wheel coal cars.
    (4) Freight and other non-passenger trains of eight-wheel standard 
logging cars if the height of each car from the top of the rail to the 
center of the coupling is not more than 25 inches.
    (5) A locomotive used in hauling a train referred to in paragraph 
(b)(4) of this section when the locomotive and cars of the train are 
used only to transport logs.
* * * * *
    (g) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, 
Sec. 231.31 also applies to an operation on a 24-inch, 36-inch, or 
other narrow gage railroad.

    8. Part 231 is further amended by adding Sec. 231.31 to read as 
follows:


Sec. 231.31  Drawbars for freight cars; standard height.

    (a) Except on cars specified in paragraph (b) of this section--
    (1) On standard gage (56\1/2\-inch gage) railroads, the maximum 
height of drawbars for freight cars (measured perpendicularly from the 
level of the tops of the rails to the centers of the drawbars) shall be 
34\1/2\ inches, and the minimum height of drawbars for freight cars on 
such standard gage railroads (measured in the same manner) shall be 
31\1/2\ inches.

[[Page 4193]]

    (2) On 36-inch gage railroads, the maximum height of drawbars for 
freight cars (measured perpendicularly from the level of the tops of 
the rails to the centers of the drawbars) shall be 26 inches, and the 
minimum height of drawbars for freight cars on such 36-inch gage 
railroads (measured in the same manner) shall be 23 inches.
    (3) On 24-inch gage railroads, the maximum height of drawbars for 
freight cars (measured perpendicularly from the level of the tops of 
the rails to the centers of the drawbars) shall be 17\1/2\ inches, and 
the minimum height of drawbars for freight cars on 24-inch gage 
railroads (measured in the same manner) shall be 14\1/2\ inches.
    (4) On railroads operating on track with a gage other than those 
contained in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3) of this section, the 
maximum and minimum height of drawbars for freight cars operating on 
those railroads shall be established upon written approval of FRA.
    (b) This section shall not apply to a railroad all of whose track 
is less than 24 inches in gage.

    9. Appendix A of Part 231 is amended by adding an entry for 
Sec. 231.31 to the end of the Schedule of Civil Penalties to read as 
follows:

Appendix A to Part 231--Schedule of Civil Penalties

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Willful
     FRA safety appliance defect code section       Violation  violation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
                  *        *        *        *        *
231.31  Drawbars, standard height.................     2,500      5,000
 
                  *        *        *        *        *
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    10. Part 232 is revised to read as follows:

PART 232--BRAKE SYSTEM SAFETY STANDARDS for FREIGHT and OTHER NON-
PASSENGER TRAINS and EQUIPMENT; END-of-TRAIN DEVICES

Subpart A--General

Sec.
232.1  Scope.
232.3  Applicability.
232.5  Definitions.
232.7  Waivers.
232.9  Responsibility for compliance.
232.11  Penalties.
232.13  Preemptive effect.
232.15  Movement of defective equipment.
232.17  Special approval procedure.
232.19  Availability of records.
232.21  Information collection.
Subpart B--General Requirements
232.101  Scope.
232.103  General requirements for all train brake systems.
232.105  General requirements for locomotives.
232.107  Air source requirements and cold weather operations.
232.109  Dynamic brake requirements.
232.111  Train handling information.
Subpart C--Inspection and Testing Requirements
232.201  Scope.
232.203  Training requirements.
232.205  Class I brake tests--initial terminal inspection.
232.207  Class IA brake tests--1,000-mile inspection.
232.209  Class II brake tests--intermediate inspection.
232.211  Class III brake tests--trainline continuity inspection.
232.213  Extended haul trains.
232.215  Transfer train brake tests.
232.217  Train brake tests conducted using yard air.
232.219  Double heading and helper service.
Subpart D--Periodic Maintenance and Testing Requirements
232.301  Scope.
232.303  General requirements.
232.305  Repair track air brake tests.
232.307  Single car tests.
232.309  Repair track air brake test and single car test equipment 
and devices.
Subpart E--End-of-Train Devices
232.401  Scope.
232.403  Design standards for one-way end-of-train devices.
232.405  Design and performance standards for two-way end-of-train 
devices.
232.407  Operations requiring use of two-way end-of-train devices; 
prohibition on purchase of nonconforming devices.
232.409  Inspection and testing of end-of-train devices.
Subpart F--Introduction of New Brake System Technology
232.501  Scope.
232.503  Process to introduce new brake system technology.
232.505  Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.

Appendix A--Schedule of Civil Penalties

Appendix B--49 CFR part 232 prior to April 1, 2001

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20301-
20303, 20306, 21301-21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).

Subpart A--General


Sec. 232.1  Scope.

    (a) This part prescribes Federal safety standards for freight and 
other non-passenger train brake systems and equipment. Subpart E of 
this part prescribes Federal safety standards not only for freight and 
other non-passenger train brake systems and equipment, but also for 
passenger train brake systems. This part does not restrict a railroad 
from adopting or enforcing additional or more stringent requirements 
not inconsistent with this part.
    (b) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this paragraph or 
in this part, railroads to which this part applies shall comply with 
all the requirements contained in subparts A through C and subpart F of 
this part beginning on April 1, 2004. Sections 232.1 through 232.13 and 
232.17 through 232.21 of this part will become applicable to all 
railroads to which this part applies beginning on April 1, 2001. 
Subpart D of this part will become applicable to all railroads to which 
this part applies beginning on August 1, 2001. Subpart E of this part 
will become applicable to all trains operating on track which is part 
of the general railroad system of transportation beginning on April 1, 
2001.
    (c) A railroad may request earlier application of the requirements 
contained in subparts A through C and subpart F of this part upon 
written notification to FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety. Such 
a request shall indicate the railroad's readiness and ability to comply 
with all of the requirements contained in those subparts.
    (d) Except for operations identified in Sec. 232.3(c)(1), (c)(4), 
and (c)(6) through (c)(8), all railroads which are part of the general 
railroad system of transportation shall operate pursuant to the 
requirements contained in this part 232 as it existed on April 1, 2001 
and included as Appendix B to this part until they are either required 
to operate pursuant to the requirements contained in this part or the 
requirements contained in part 238 of this chapter or they elect to 
comply earlier than otherwise required with the requirements contained 
in this part or the requirements contained in part 238 of this chapter.


Sec. 232.3  Applicability.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, 
this part applies to all railroads that operate freight or other non-
passenger train service on standard gage track which is part of the 
general railroad system of transportation. This includes the operation 
of circus trains and private cars when hauled on such railroads.
    (b) Subpart E of this part, ``End-of-Train Devices,'' applies to 
all trains operating on track which is part of the general railroad 
system of transportation unless specifically excepted in that subpart.
    (c) Except as provided in Sec. 232.1(d) and paragraph (b) of this 
section, this part does not apply to:

[[Page 4194]]

    (1) A railroad that operates only on track inside an installation 
that is not part of the general railroad system of transportation.
    (2) Intercity or commuter passenger train operations on standard 
gage track which is part of the general railroad system of 
transportation;
    (3) Commuter or other short-haul rail passenger train operations in 
a metropolitan or suburban area (as described by 49 U.S.C. 20102(1)), 
including public authorities operating passenger train service;
    (4) Rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not 
connected with the general railroad system of transportation;
    (5) Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations, whether on 
or off the general railroad system;
    (6) Freight and other non-passenger trains of four-wheel coal cars;
    (7) Freight and other non-passenger trains of eight-wheel standard 
logging cars if the height of each car from the top of the rail to the 
center of the coupling is not more than 25 inches; or
    (8) A locomotive used in hauling a train referred to in paragraph 
(c)(7) of this subsection when the locomotive and cars of the train are 
used only to transport logs.
    (d) The provisions formerly contained in Interstate Commerce 
Commission Order 13528, of May 30, 1945, as amended, now revoked, are 
codified in this paragraph. This part is not applicable to the 
following equipment:
    (1) Scale test weight cars.
    (2) Locomotive cranes, steam shovels, pile drivers, and machines of 
similar construction, and maintenance machines built prior to September 
21, 1945.
    (3) Export, industrial, and other cars not owned by a railroad 
which are not to be used in service, except for movement as shipments 
on their own wheels to given destinations. Such cars shall be properly 
identified by a card attached to each side of the car, signed by the 
shipper, stating that such movement is being made under the authority 
of this paragraph.
    (4) Industrial and other than railroad-owned cars which are not to 
be used in service except for movement within the limits of a single 
switching district (i.e., within the limits of an industrial facility).
    (5) Narrow-gage cars.
    (6) Cars used exclusively in switching operations and not used in 
train movements within the meaning of the Federal safety appliance laws 
(49 U.S.C. 20301-20306).


Sec. 232.5  Definitions.

    For purposes of this part--
    AAR means the Association of American Railroads.
    Air brake means a combination of devices operated by compressed 
air, arranged in a system, and controlled manually, electrically, 
electronically, or pneumatically, by means of which the motion of a 
railroad car or locomotive is retarded or arrested.
    Air Flow Indicator, AFM means a specific air flow indicator 
required by the air flow method of qualifying train air brakes (AFM). 
The AFM Air Flow Indicator is a calibrated air flow measuring device 
which is clearly visible and legible in daylight and darkness from the 
engineer's normal operating position. The indicator face displays:
    (1) Markings from 10 cubic feet per minute (CFM) to 80 CFM, in 
increments of 10 CFM or less; and
    (2) Numerals indicating 20, 40, 60, and 80 CFM for continuous 
monitoring of air flow.
    Bind means restrict the intended movement of one or more brake 
system components by reduced clearance, by obstruction, or by increased 
friction.
    Brake, dynamic means a train braking system whereby the kinetic 
energy of a moving train is used to generate electric current at the 
locomotive traction motors, which is then dissipated through resistor 
grids or into the catenary or third rail system.
    Brake, effective means a brake that is capable of producing its 
required designed retarding force on the train. A car's air brake is 
not considered effective if it is not capable of producing its designed 
retarding force or if its piston travel exceeds:
    (1) 10\1/2\ inches for cars equipped with nominal 12-inch stroke 
brake cylinders; or
    (2) the piston travel limits indicated on the stencil, sticker, or 
badge plate for that brake cylinder.
    Brake, hand means a brake that can be applied and released by hand 
to prevent or retard the movement of a locomotive.
    Brake indicator means a device which indicates the brake 
application range and indicates whether brakes are applied and 
released.
    Brake, inoperative means a primary brake that, for any reason, no 
longer applies or releases as intended.
    Brake, inoperative dynamic means a dynamic brake that, for any 
reason, no longer provides its designed retarding force on the train.
    Brake, parking means a brake that can be applied by means other 
than by hand, such as spring, hydraulic, or air pressure when the brake 
pipe air is depleted, or by an electrical motor.
    Brake pipe means the system of piping (including branch pipes, 
angle cocks, cutout cocks, dirt collectors, hoses, and hose couplings) 
used for connecting locomotives and all railroad cars for the passage 
of compressed air.
    Brake, primary means those components of the train brake system 
necessary to stop the train within the signal spacing distance without 
thermal damage to friction braking surfaces.
    Brake, secondary means those components of the train brake system 
which develop supplemental brake retarding force that is not needed to 
stop the train within signal spacing distances or to prevent thermal 
damage to wheels.
    Emergency application means an irretrievable brake application 
resulting in the maximum retarding force available from the train brake 
system.
    End-of-train device, one-way means two pieces of equipment linked 
by radio that meet the requirements of Sec. 232.403.
    End-of-train device, two-way means two pieces of equipment linked 
by radio that meet the requirements of Secs. 232.403 and 232.405.
    Foul means any condition which restricts the intended movement of 
one or more brake system components because the component is snagged, 
entangled, or twisted.
    Freight car means a vehicle designed to carry freight, or railroad 
personnel, by rail and a vehicle designed for use in a work or wreck 
train or other non-passenger train.
    Initial terminal means the location where a train is originally 
assembled.
    Locomotive means a piece of railroad on-track equipment, other than 
hi-rail, specialized maintenance, or other similar equipment, which may 
consist of one or more units operated from a single control stand--
    (1) With one or more propelling motors designed for moving other 
railroad equipment;
    (2) With one or more propelling motors designed to transport 
freight or passenger traffic or both; or
    (3) Without propelling motors but with one or more control stands.
    Locomotive cab means that portion of the superstructure designed to 
be occupied by the crew operating the locomotive.
    Locomotive, controlling means the locomotive from which the 
engineer exercises control over the train.
    Off air means not connected to a continuous source of compressed 
air of at least 60 pounds per square inch (psi).
    Ordered date or date ordered means the date on which notice to 
proceed is given by a procuring railroad to a contractor or supplier 
for new equipment.

[[Page 4195]]

    Piston travel means the amount of linear movement of the air brake 
hollow rod (or equivalent) or piston rod when forced outward by 
movement of the piston in the brake cylinder or actuator and limited by 
the brake shoes being forced against the wheel or disc.
    Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan means a document, as 
further specified in Sec. 232.505, prepared by a railroad that explains 
in detail how pre-revenue service tests of certain equipment 
demonstrate that the equipment meets Federal safety standards and the 
railroad's own safety design requirements.
    Previously tested equipment means equipment that has received a 
Class I brake test pursuant to Sec. 232.205 and has not been off air 
for more than four hours.
    Primary responsibility means the task that a person performs at 
least 50 percent of the time. The totality of the circumstances will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis in circumstances where an individual 
does not spend 50 percent of the day engaged in any one readily 
identifiable type of activity.
    Qualified mechanical inspector means a qualified person who has 
received, as a part of the training, qualification, and designation 
program required under Sec. 232.203, instruction and training that 
includes ``hands-on'' experience (under appropriate supervision or 
apprenticeship) in one or more of the following functions: 
troubleshooting, inspection, testing, maintenance or repair of the 
specific train brake components and systems for which the person is 
assigned responsibility. This person shall also possess a current 
understanding of what is required to properly repair and maintain the 
safety-critical brake components for which the person is assigned 
responsibility. Further, the qualified mechanical inspector shall be a 
person whose primary responsibility includes work generally consistent 
with the functions listed in this definition.
    Qualified person means a person who has received, as a part of the 
training, qualification, and designation program required under 
Sec. 232.203, instruction and training necessary to perform one or more 
functions required under this part. The railroad is responsible for 
determining that the person has the knowledge and skills necessary to 
perform the required function for which the person is assigned 
responsibility. The railroad determines the qualifications and 
competencies for employees designated to perform various functions in 
the manner set forth in this part. Although the rule uses the term 
``qualified person'' to describe a person responsible for performing 
various functions required under this part, a person may be deemed 
qualified to perform some functions but not qualified to perform other 
functions. For example, although a person may be deemed qualified to 
perform the Class II/intermediate brake test required by this part, 
that same person may or may not be deemed qualified to perform the 
Class I/initial Terminal brake test or authorize the movement of 
defective equipment under this part. The railroad will determine the 
required functions for which an individual will be deemed a ``qualified 
person'' based upon the instruction and training the individual has 
received pursuant to Sec. 232.203 concerning a particular function.
    Railroad means any form of non-highway ground transportation that 
runs on rails or electromagnetic guideways, including:
    (1) Commuter or short-haul railroad passenger service in a 
metropolitan or suburban area and commuter railroad service that was 
operated by the Consolidated Rail Corporation on January 1, 1979; and
    (2) High speed ground transportation systems that connect 
metropolitan areas, without regard to whether those systems use new 
technologies not associated with traditional railroads. The term 
``railroad'' is also intended to mean a person that provides 
transportation by railroad, whether directly or by contracting out 
operation of the railroad to another person. The term does not include 
rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not connected to the 
general railroad system of transportation.
    Rebuilt equipment means equipment that has undergone overhaul 
identified by the railroad as a capital expense under the Surface 
Transportation Board's accounting standards.
    Refresher training means periodic retraining required for employees 
or contractors to remain qualified to perform specific equipment 
troubleshooting, inspection, testing, maintenance, or repair functions.
    Respond as intended means to produce the result that a device or 
system is designed to produce.
    ``Roll-by'' inspection means an inspection performed while 
equipment is moving.
    Service application means a brake application that results from one 
or more service reductions or the equivalent.
    Service reduction means a decrease in brake pipe pressure, usually 
from 5 to 25 psi at a rate sufficiently rapid to move the operating 
valve to service position, but at a rate not rapid enough to move the 
operating valve to emergency position.
    Solid block of cars means two or more freight cars consecutively 
coupled together and added to or removed from a train as a single unit.
    State inspector means an inspector of a participating State rail 
safety program under part 212 of this chapter.
    Switching service means the classification of freight cars 
according to commodity or destination; assembling of cars for train 
movements; changing the position of cars for purposes of loading, 
unloading, or weighing; placing of locomotives and cars for repair or 
storage; or moving of rail equipment in connection with work service 
that does not constitute a train movement.
    Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations are railroad 
operations that carry passengers, often using antiquated equipment, 
with the conveyance of the passengers to a particular destination not 
being the principal purpose.
    Train means one or more locomotives coupled with one or more 
freight cars, except during switching service.
    Train line means the brake pipe or any non-pneumatic system used to 
transmit the signal that controls the locomotive and freight car 
brakes.
    Train, unit or train, cycle means a train that, except for the 
changing of locomotive power and the removal or replacement of 
defective equipment, remains coupled as a consist and continuously 
operates from location A to location B and back to location A.
    Transfer train means a train that travels between a point of origin 
and a point of final destination not exceeding 20 miles. Such trains 
may pick up or deliver freight equipment while en route to destination.
    Yard air means a source of compressed air other than from a 
locomotive.


Sec. 232.7  Waivers.

    (a) Any person subject to a requirement of this part may petition 
the Administrator for a waiver of compliance with such requirement. The 
filing of such a petition does not affect that person's responsibility 
for compliance with that requirement while the petition is being 
considered.
    (b) Each petition for waiver must be filed in the manner and 
contain the information required by part 211 of this chapter.
    (c) If the Administrator finds that a waiver of compliance is in 
the public interest and is consistent with railroad safety, the 
Administrator may grant the waiver subject to any conditions the 
Administrator deems necessary. If a waiver is granted, the 
Administrator

[[Page 4196]]

publishes a notice in the Federal Register containing the reasons for 
granting the waiver.


Sec. 232.9  Responsibility for compliance.

    (a) A railroad subject to this part shall not use, haul, permit to 
be used or hauled on its line, offer in interchange, or accept in 
interchange any train, railroad car, or locomotive with one or more 
conditions not in compliance with this part; however, a railroad shall 
not be liable for a civil penalty for such action if such action is in 
accordance with Sec. 232.15. For purposes of this part, a train, 
railroad car, or locomotive will be considered in use prior to 
departure but after it has received, or should have received, the 
inspection required for movement and is deemed ready for service.
    (b) Although many of the requirements of this part are stated in 
terms of the duties of a railroad, when any person performs any 
function required by this part, that person (whether or not a railroad) 
is required to perform that function in accordance with this part.
    (c) Any person performing any function or task required by this 
part shall be deemed to have consented to FRA inspection of the 
person's operation to the extent necessary to determine whether the 
function or task is being performed in accordance with the requirements 
of this part.


Sec. 232.11  Penalties.

    (a) Any person (including but not limited to a railroad; any 
manager, supervisor, official, or other employee or agent of a 
railroad; any owner, manufacturer, lessor, or lessee of railroad 
equipment, track, or facilities; any employee of such owner, 
manufacturer, lessor, lessee, or independent contractor) who violates 
any requirement of this part or causes the violation of any such 
requirement is subject to a civil penalty of at least $500, but not 
more than $11,000 per violation, except that: Penalties may be assessed 
against individuals only for willful violations, and, where a grossly 
negligent violation or a pattern of repeated violations has created an 
imminent hazard of death or injury to persons, or has caused death or 
injury, a penalty not to exceed $22,000 per violation may be assessed. 
Each day a violation continues shall constitute a separate offense. 
Appendix A to this part contains a schedule of civil penalty amounts 
used in connection with this rule.
    (b) Any person who knowingly and willfully falsifies a record or 
report required by this part is subject to criminal penalties under 49 
U.S.C. 21311.


Sec. 232.13  Preemptive effect.

    (a) Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of the regulations in this part 
preempts any State law, rule, regulation, order, or standard covering 
the same subject matter, except for a provision necessary to eliminate 
or reduce a local safety hazard if that provision is not incompatible 
with this part and does not impose an undue burden on interstate 
commerce.
    (b) Preemption should also be considered pursuant to the Locomotive 
Boiler Inspection Act (now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20701-20703), the 
Safety Appliance Acts (now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20301-20304), and the 
Commerce Clause based on the relevant case law pertaining to preemption 
under those provisions.
    (c) FRA does not intend by issuance of the regulations in this part 
to preempt provisions of State criminal law that impose sanctions for 
reckless conduct that leads to actual loss of life, injury, or damage 
to property, whether such provisions apply specifically to railroad 
employees or generally to the public at large.


Sec. 232.15  Movement of defective equipment.

    (a) General provision. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this 
section, a railroad car or locomotive with one or more conditions not 
in compliance with this part may be used or hauled without civil 
penalty liability under this part only if all of the following 
conditions are met:
    (1) The defective car or locomotive is properly equipped in 
accordance with the applicable provisions of 49 U.S.C. chapter 203 and 
the requirements of this part.
    (2) The car or locomotive becomes defective while it is being used 
by the railroad on its line or becomes defective on the line of a 
connecting railroad and is properly accepted in interchange for repairs 
in accordance with paragraph (a)(7) of this section.
    (3) The railroad first discovers the defective condition of the car 
or locomotive prior to moving it for repairs.
    (4) The movement of the defective car or locomotive for repairs is 
from the location where the car or locomotive is first discovered 
defective by the railroad.
    (5) The defective car or locomotive cannot be repaired at the 
location where the railroad first discovers it to be defective.
    (6) The movement of the car or locomotive is necessary to make 
repairs to the defective condition.
    (7) The location to which the car or locomotive is being taken for 
repair is the nearest available location where necessary repairs can be 
performed on the line of the railroad where the car or locomotive was 
first found to be defective or is the nearest available location where 
necessary repairs can be performed on the line of a connecting railroad 
if:
    (i) The connecting railroad elects to accept the defective car or 
locomotive for such repair; and
    (ii) The nearest available location where necessary repairs can be 
performed on the line of the connecting railroad is no farther than the 
nearest available location where necessary repairs can be performed on 
the line of the railroad where the car or locomotive was found 
defective.
    (8) The movement of the defective car or locomotive for repairs is 
not by a train required to receive a Class I brake test at that 
location pursuant to Sec. 232.205.
    (9) The movement of the defective car or locomotive for repairs is 
not in a train in which less than 85 percent of the cars have operative 
and effective brakes.
    (10) The defective car or locomotive is tagged, or information is 
recorded, as prescribed in paragraph (b) of this section.
    (11) Except for cars or locomotives with brakes cut out en route, 
the following additional requirements are met:
    (i) A qualified person shall determine--
    (A) That it is safe to move the car or locomotive; and
    (B) The maximum safe speed and other restrictions necessary for 
safely conducting the movement.
    (ii) The person in charge of the train in which the car or 
locomotive is to be moved shall be notified in writing and inform all 
other crew members of the presence of the defective car or locomotive 
and the maximum speed and other restrictions determined under paragraph 
(a)(11)(i)(B) of this section. A copy of the tag or card described in 
paragraph (b) of this section may be used to provide the notification 
required by this paragraph.
    (iii) The defective car or locomotive is moved in compliance with 
the maximum speed and other restrictions determined under paragraph 
(a)(11)(i)(B) of this section.
    (12) The defective car or locomotive is not subject to a Special 
Notice for Repair under part 216 of this chapter, unless the movement 
of the defective

[[Page 4197]]

car is made in accordance with the restrictions contained in the 
Special Notice.
    (b) Tagging of defective equipment.
    (1) At the place where the railroad first discovers the defect, a 
tag or card shall be placed on both sides of the defective equipment or 
locomotive and in the cab of the locomotive, or an automated tracking 
system approved for use by FRA shall be provided with the following 
information about the defective equipment:
    (i) The reporting mark and car or locomotive number;
    (ii) The name of the inspecting railroad;
    (iii) The name and job title of the inspector;
    (iv) The inspection location and date;
    (v) The nature of each defect;
    (vi) A description of any movement restrictions;
    (vii) The destination of the equipment where it will be repaired; 
and
    (viii) The signature, or electronic identification, of the person 
reporting the defective condition.
    (2) The tag or card required by paragraph (b)(1) of this section 
shall remain affixed to the defective equipment until the necessary 
repairs have been performed.
    (3) An electronic or written record or a copy of each tag or card 
attached to or removed from a car or locomotive shall be retained for 
90 days and, upon request, shall be made available within 15 calendar 
days for inspection by FRA or State inspectors.
    (4) Each tag or card removed from a car or locomotive shall contain 
the date, location, reason for its removal, and the signature of the 
person who removed it from the piece of equipment.
    (5) Any automated tracking system approved by FRA to meet the 
tagging requirements contained in paragraph (b)(1) of this section 
shall be capable of being reviewed and monitored by FRA at any time to 
ensure the integrity of the system. FRA's Associate Administrator for 
Safety may prohibit or revoke a railroad's authority to utilize an 
approved automated tracking system in lieu of tagging if FRA finds that 
the automated tracking system is not properly secure, is inaccessible 
to FRA or a railroad's employees, or fails to adequately track and 
monitor the movement of defective equipment. FRA will record such a 
determination in writing, include a statement of the basis for such 
action, and provide a copy of the document to the railroad.
    (c) Movement for unloading or purging of defective cars. If a 
defective car is loaded with a hazardous material or contains residue 
of a hazardous material, the car may not be placed for unloading or 
purging unless unloading or purging is consistent with determinations 
made and restrictions imposed under paragraph (a)(11)(i) of this 
section and the unloading or purging is necessary for the safe repair 
of the car.
    (d) Computation of percent operative power brakes.
    (1) The percentage of operative power brakes in a train shall be 
based on the number of control valves in the train. The percentage 
shall be determined by dividing the number of control valves that are 
cut-in by the total number of control valves in the train. A control 
valve shall not be considered cut-in if the brakes controlled by that 
valve are inoperative. Both cars and locomotives shall be considered 
when making this calculation.
    (2) The following brake conditions not in compliance with this part 
are not considered inoperative power brakes for purposes of this 
section:
    (i) Failure or cutting out of secondary brake systems;
    (ii) Inoperative or otherwise defective handbrakes or parking 
brakes;
    (iii) Piston travel that is in excess of the Class I brake test 
limits required in Sec. 232.205 but that does not exceed the outside 
limits contained on the stencil, sticker, or badge plate required by 
Sec. 232.103(g) for considering the power brakes to be effective; and
    (iv) Power brakes overdue for inspection, testing, maintenance, or 
stenciling under this part.
    (e) Placement of equipment with inoperative brakes.
    (1) A freight car or locomotive with inoperative brakes shall not 
be placed as the rear car of the train.
    (2) No more than two freight cars with either inoperative brakes or 
not equipped with power brakes shall be consecutively placed in the 
same train.
    (3) Multi-unit articulated equipment shall not be placed in a train 
if the equipment has more than two consecutive individual control 
valves cut-out or if the brakes controlled by the valves are 
inoperative.
    (f) Guidelines for determining locations where necessary repairs 
can be performed. The following guidelines will be considered by FRA 
when determining whether a location is a location where repairs to a 
car's brake system or components can be performed and whether a 
location is the nearest location where the needed repairs can be 
effectuated.
    (1) The following general factors and guidelines will be considered 
when making determinations as to whether a location is a location where 
brake repairs can be performed:
    (i) The accessibility of the location to persons responsible for 
making repairs;
    (ii) The presence of hazardous conditions that affect the ability 
to safely make repairs of the type needed at the location;
    (iii) The nature of the repair necessary to bring the car into 
compliance;
    (iv) The need for railroads to have in place an effective means to 
ensure the safe and timely repair of equipment;
    (v) The relevant weather conditions at the location that affect 
accessibility or create hazardous conditions;
    (vi) A location need not have the ability to effectuate every type 
of brake system repair in order to be considered a location where some 
brake repairs can be performed;
    (vii) A location need not be staffed continuously in order to be 
considered a location where brake repairs can be performed;
    (viii) The ability of a railroad to perform repair track brake 
tests or single car tests at a location shall not be considered; and
    (ix) The congestion of work at a location shall not be considered
    (2) The general factors and guidelines outlined in paragraph (f)(1) 
of this section should be applied to the following locations:
    (i) A location where a mobile repair truck is used on a regular 
basis;
    (ii) A location where a mobile repair truck originates or is 
permanently stationed;
    (iii) A location at which a railroad performs mechanical repairs 
other than brake system repairs; and
    (iv) A location that has an operative repair track or repair shop;
    (3) In determining whether a location is the nearest location where 
the necessary brake repairs can be made, the distance to the location 
is a key factor but should not be considered the determining factor. 
The distance to a location must be considered in conjunction with the 
factors and guidance outlined in paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) of this 
section. In addition, the following safety factors must be considered 
in order to optimize safety:
    (i) The safety of the employees responsible for getting the 
equipment to or from a particular location; and
    (ii) The potential safety hazards involved with moving the 
equipment in the direction of travel necessary to get the equipment to 
a particular location.
    (g) Based on the guidance detailed in paragraph (f) of this section 
and consistent with other requirements contained in this part, a 
railroad and the representatives of the railroad's

[[Page 4198]]

employees may submit, for FRA approval, a joint proposal containing a 
plan designating locations where brake system repairs will be 
performed. Approval of such plans shall be made in writing by FRA's 
Associate Administrator for Safety and shall be subject to any 
modifications or changes determined by FRA to be necessary to ensure 
consistency with the requirements and guidance contained in this part.


Sec. 232.17  Special approval procedure.

    (a) General. The following procedures govern consideration and 
action upon requests for special approval of an alternative standard 
under Secs. 232.305 and 232.307; and for special approval of pre-
revenue service acceptance testing plans under subpart F of this part.
    (b) Petitions for special approval of an alternative standard. Each 
petition for special approval of an alternative standard shall contain:
    (1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary 
person to be contacted with regard to review of the petition;
    (2) The alternative proposed, in detail, to be substituted for the 
particular requirement of this part;
    (3) Appropriate data or analysis, or both, for FRA to consider in 
determining whether the alternative will provide at least an equivalent 
level of safety; and
    (4) A statement affirming that the railroad has served a copy of 
the petition on designated representatives of its employees, together 
with a list of the names and addresses of the persons served.
    (c) Petitions for special approval of pre-revenue service 
acceptance testing plan. Each petition for special approval of a pre-
revenue service acceptance testing plan shall contain:
    (1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary 
person to be contacted with regard to review of the petition; and
    (2) The elements prescribed in Sec. 232.505.
    (d) Service.
    (1) Each petition for special approval under paragraph (b) or (c) 
of this section shall be submitted in triplicate to the Associate 
Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 7th 
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590.
    (2) Service of each petition for special approval of an alternative 
standard under paragraph (b) of this section shall be made on the 
following:
    (i) Designated employee representatives responsible for the 
equipment's operation, inspection, testing, and maintenance under this 
part;
    (ii) Any organizations or bodies that either issued the standard 
incorporated in the section(s) of the rule to which the special 
approval pertains or issued the alternative standard that is proposed 
in the petition; and
    (iii) Any other person who has filed with FRA a current statement 
of interest in reviewing special approvals under the particular 
requirement of this part at least 30 days but not more than 5 years 
prior to the filing of the petition. If filed, a statement of interest 
shall be filed with FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety and shall 
reference the specific section(s) of this part in which the person has 
an interest.
    (e) Federal Register notice. FRA will publish a notice in the 
Federal Register concerning each petition under paragraph (b) of this 
section.
    (f) Comment. Not later than 30 days from the date of publication of 
the notice in the Federal Register concerning a petition under 
paragraph (b) of this section, any person may comment on the petition.
    (1) A comment shall set forth specifically the basis upon which it 
is made, and contain a concise statement of the interest of the 
commenter in the proceeding.
    (2) The comment shall be submitted in triplicate to the Associate 
Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 7th 
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590.
    (3) The commenter shall certify that a copy of the comment was 
served on each petitioner.
    (g) Disposition of petitions.
    (1) If FRA finds that the petition complies with the requirements 
of this section and that the proposed alternative standard or pre-
revenue service plan is acceptable and justified, the petition will be 
granted, normally within 90 days of its receipt. If the petition is 
neither granted nor denied within 90 days, the petition remains pending 
for decision. FRA may attach special conditions to the approval of any 
petition. Following the approval of a petition, FRA may reopen 
consideration of the petition for cause.
    (2) If FRA finds that the petition does not comply with the 
requirements of this section and that the alternative standard or pre-
revenue service plan is not acceptable or justified, the petition will 
be denied, normally within 90 days of its receipt.
    (3) When FRA grants or denies a petition, or reopens consideration 
of the petition, written notice is sent to the petitioner and other 
interested parties.


Sec. 232.19  Availability of records.

    Except as otherwise provided, the records and plans required by 
this part shall be made available to representatives of FRA and States 
participating under part 212 of this chapter for inspection and copying 
upon request.


Sec. 232.21  Information Collection.

    (a) The information collection requirements of this part were 
reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and are 
assigned OMB control number 2130-0008.
    (b) The information collection requirements are found in the 
following sections: Secs. 229.27, 231.31, 232.1, 232.3, 232.7, 232.11, 
232.15, 232.17, 232.103, 232.105, 232.107, 232.109, 232.111, 232.203, 
232.205, 232.207, 232.209, 232.211, 232.213, 232.303, 232.307, 232.309, 
232.403, 232.405, 232.407, 232.409, 232.503, 232.505.

Subpart B--General Requirements


Sec. 232.101  Scope.

    This subpart contains general operating, performance, and design 
requirements for each railroad that operates freight or other non-
passenger trains and for specific equipment used in those operations.


Sec. 232.103  General requirements for all train brake systems.

    (a) The primary brake system of a train shall be capable of 
stopping the train with a service application from its maximum 
operating speed within the signal spacing existing on the track over 
which the train is operating.
    (b) If the integrity of the train line of a train brake system is 
broken, the train shall be stopped. If a train line uses other than 
solely pneumatic technology, the integrity of the train line shall be 
monitored by the brake control system.
    (c) A train brake system shall respond as intended to signals from 
the train line.
    (d) One hundred percent of the brakes on a train shall be effective 
and operative brakes prior to use or departure from any location where 
a Class I brake test is required to be performed on the train pursuant 
to Sec. 232.205.
    (e) A train shall not move if less than 85 percent of the cars in 
that train have operative and effective brakes.
    (f) Each car in a train shall have its air brakes in effective 
operating condition unless the car is being moved for repairs in 
accordance with Sec. 232.15. The air brakes on a car are not in 
effective

[[Page 4199]]

operating condition if its brakes are cut-out or otherwise inoperative 
or if the piston travel exceeds:
    (1) 10\1/2\ inches for cars equipped with nominal 12-inch stroke 
brake cylinders; or
    (2) The piston travel limits indicated on the stencil, sticker, or 
badge plate for the brake cylinder with which the car is equipped.
    (g) Except for cars equipped with nominal 12-inch stroke (8\1/2\ 
and 10-inch diameters) brake cylinders, all cars shall have a legible 
decal, stencil, or sticker affixed to the car or shall be equipped with 
a badge plate displaying the permissible brake cylinder piston travel 
range for the car at Class I brake tests and the length at which the 
piston travel renders the brake ineffective, if different from Class I 
brake test limits. The decal, stencil, sticker, or badge plate shall be 
located so that it may be easily read and understood by a person 
positioned safely beside the car.
    (h) All equipment ordered on or after August 1, 2002, or placed in 
service for the first time on or after April 1, 2004, shall have train 
brake systems designed so that an inspector can observe from a safe 
position either the piston travel, an accurate indicator which shows 
piston travel, or any other means by which the brake system is 
actuated. The design shall not require the inspector to place himself 
or herself on, under, or between components of the equipment to observe 
brake actuation or release.
    (i) All trains shall be equipped with an emergency application 
feature that produces an irretrievable stop, using a brake rate 
consistent with prevailing adhesion, train safety, and brake system 
thermal capacity. An emergency application shall be available at all 
times, and shall be initiated by an unintentional parting of the train 
line or loss of train brake communication.
    (j) A railroad shall set the maximum main reservoir working 
pressure.
    (k) The maximum brake pipe pressure shall not be greater than 15 
psi less than the air compressor governor starting or loading pressure.
    (l) Except as otherwise provided in this part, all equipment used 
in freight or other non-passenger trains shall, at a minimum, meet the 
Association of American Railroads (AAR) Standard S-469-47, 
``Performance Specification for Freight Brakes,'' contained in the AAR 
Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section E (April 1, 
1999). The incorporation by reference of this AAR standard was approved 
by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. You may obtain a copy of the incorporated 
document from the Association of American Railroads, 50 F Street, NW, 
Washington, DC. 20001. You may inspect a copy of the document at the 
Federal Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW, 
Suite 7000, Washington, DC or at the Office of the Federal Register, 
800 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20408.
    (m) If a train qualified by the Air Flow Method as provided for in 
subpart C of this part experiences a brake pipe air flow of greater 
than 60 CFM or brake pipe gradient of greater than 15 psi while en 
route and the movable pointer does not return to those limits within a 
reasonable time, the train shall be stopped at the next available 
location and be inspected for leaks in the brake system.
    (n) Securement of unattended equipment. A train's air brake shall 
not be depended upon to hold equipment standing unattended on a grade 
(including a locomotive, a car, or a train whether or not locomotive is 
attached). For purposes of this section, ``unattended equipment'' means 
equipment left standing and unmanned in such a manner that the brake 
system of the equipment cannot be readily controlled by a qualified 
person. Unattended equipment shall be secured in accordance with the 
following requirements:
    (1) A sufficient number of hand brakes shall be applied to hold the 
equipment. Railroads shall develop and implement a process or procedure 
to verify that the applied hand brakes will sufficiently hold the 
equipment with the air brakes released.
    (2) Where possible, an emergency brake application of the air 
brakes shall be initiated prior to leaving equipment unattended.
    (3) The following requirements apply to the use of hand brakes on 
unattended locomotives:
    (i) All hand brakes shall be fully applied on all locomotives in 
the lead consist of an unattended train.
    (ii) All hand brakes shall be fully applied on all locomotives in 
an unattended locomotive consist outside of yard limits.
    (iii) At a minimum, the hand brake shall be fully applied on the 
lead locomotive in an unattended locomotive consist within yard limits.
    (4) A railroad shall adopt and comply with a process or procedures 
to verify that the applied hand brakes will sufficiently hold an 
unattended locomotive consist. A railroad shall also adopt and comply 
with instructions to address throttle position, status of the reverse 
lever, position of the generator field switch, status of the 
independent brakes, position of the isolation switch, and position of 
the automatic brake valve on all unattended locomotives. The procedures 
and instruction required in this paragraph shall take into account 
winter weather conditions as they relate to throttle position and 
reverser handle.
    (5) Any hand brakes applied to hold unattended equipment shall not 
be released until it is known that the air brake system is properly 
charged.
    (o) Air pressure regulating devices shall be adjusted for the 
following pressures:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Locomotives                              PSI
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Minimum brake pipe air pressure:
    Road Service..............................  90
    Switch Service............................  60
(2) Minimum differential between brake pipe     15
 and main reservoir air pressures, with brake
 valve in running position.
(3) Safety valve for straight air brake.......  30-55
(4) Safety valve for LT, ET, No. 8-EL, No. 14   30-68
 El, No. 6-DS, No. 6-BL and No. 6-SL equipment.
(5) Safety valve for HSC and No. 24-RL          30-75
 equipment.
(6) Reducing valve for independent or straight  30-50
 air brake.
(7) Self-lapping portion for electro-pneumatic  50
 brake (minimum full application pressure).
(8) Self-lapping portion for independent air    30 or less
 brake (full application pressure).
(9) Reducing valve for high-speed brake         50
 (minimum).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (p) Railroad or contract supervisors shall be held jointly 
responsible with the inspectors and train crew members they supervise 
for the condition and proper functioning of train brake systems to the 
extent that it is possible

[[Page 4200]]

to detect defective equipment by the inspections and tests required by 
this part.


Sec. 232.105  General requirements for locomotives.

    (a) The air brake equipment on a locomotive shall be in safe and 
suitable condition for service.
    (b) All locomotives ordered on or after August 1, 2002, or placed 
in service for the first time on or after April 1, 2004, shall be 
equipped with a hand or parking brake that is:
    (1) Capable of application or activation by hand;
    (2) Capable of release by hand; and
    (3) Capable of holding the unit on a three (3) percent grade.
    (c) On locomotives so equipped, the hand or parking brake as well 
as its parts and connections shall be inspected, and necessary repairs 
made, as often as service requires but no less frequently than every 
368 days. The date of the last inspection shall be either entered on 
Form FRA F 6180-49A or suitably stenciled or tagged on the locomotive.
    (d) The amount of leakage from the equalizing reservoir on 
locomotives and related piping shall be zero, unless the system is 
capable of maintaining the set pressure at any service application with 
the brakes control valve in the freight position. If such leakage is 
detected en route, the train may be moved only to the nearest forward 
location where the equalizing-reservoir leakage can be corrected. On 
locomotives equipped with electronic brakes, if the system logs or 
displays a fault related to equalizing reservoir leakage, the train may 
be moved only to the nearest forward location where the necessary 
repairs can be made.
    (e) Use of the feed or regulating valve to control braking is 
prohibited.
    (f) The passenger position on the locomotive brake control stand 
shall be used only if the trailing equipment is designed for graduated 
brake release or if equalizing reservoir leakage occurs en route and 
its use is necessary to safely control the movement of the train until 
it reaches the next forward location where the reservoir leakage can be 
corrected.
    (g) When taking charge of a locomotive or locomotive consist, an 
engineer must know that the brakes are in operative condition.


Sec. 232.107  Air source requirements and cold weather operations.

    (a) Monitoring plans for yard air sources.
    (1) A railroad shall adopt and comply with a written plan to 
monitor all yard air sources, other than locomotives, to determine that 
they operate as intended and do not introduce contaminants into the 
brake system of freight equipment.
    (2) This plan shall require the railroad to:
    (i) Inspect each yard air source at least two times per calendar 
year, no less than five months apart, to determine it operates as 
intended and does not introduce contaminants into the brake system of 
the equipment it services.
    (ii) Identify yard air sources found not to be operating as 
intended or found introducing contaminants into the brake system of the 
equipment it services.
    (iii) Repair or take other remedial action regarding any yard air 
source identified under paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section.
    (3) A railroad shall maintain records of the information and 
actions required by paragraph (a)(2). These records shall be maintained 
for a period of at least one year from the date of creation and may be 
maintained either electronically or in writing.
    (b) Condensation and other contaminants shall be blown from the 
pipe or hose from which compressed air is taken prior to connecting the 
yard air line or motive power to the train.
    (c) No chemicals which are known to degrade or harm brake system 
components shall be placed in the train air brake system.
    (d) Yard air reservoirs shall either be equipped with an operable 
automatic drain system or be manually drained at least once each day 
that the devices are used or more often if moisture is detected in the 
system.
    (e) A railroad shall adopt and comply with detailed written 
operating procedures tailored to the equipment and territory of that 
railroad to cover safe train operations during cold weather. For 
purposes of this provision, ``cold weather'' means when the ambient 
temperature drops below 10 degrees Fahrenheit (F) (minus 12.2 degrees 
Celsius).


Sec. 232.109  Dynamic brake requirements.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (i) of this section, a 
locomotive engineer shall be informed of the operational status of the 
dynamic brakes on all locomotive units in the consist at the initial 
terminal or point of origin for a train and at other locations where a 
locomotive engineer first begins operation of a train. The information 
required by this paragraph may be provided to the locomotive engineer 
by any means determined appropriate by the railroad; however, a written 
or electronic record of the information shall be maintained in the cab 
of the controlling locomotive.
    (b) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, all 
inoperative dynamic brakes shall be repaired within 30 calendar days of 
becoming inoperative or at the locomotive's next periodic inspection 
pursuant to Sec. 229.23 of this chapter, whichever occurs first.
    (c) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, a 
locomotive discovered with inoperative dynamic brakes shall have a tag 
bearing the words ``inoperative dynamic brake'' securely attached and 
displayed in a conspicuous location in the cab of the locomotive. This 
tag shall contain the following information:
    (1) The locomotive number;
    (2) The name of the discovering carrier;
    (3) The location and date where condition was discovered; and
    (4) The signature of the person discovering the condition.
    (d) An electronic or written record of repairs made to a 
locomotive's dynamic brakes shall be retained for 92 days.
    (e) A railroad may elect to declare the dynamic brakes on a 
locomotive deactivated without removing the dynamic brake components 
from the locomotive, only if all of the following conditions are met:
    (1) The locomotive is clearly marked with the words ``dynamic brake 
deactivated'' in a conspicuous location in the cab of the locomotive; 
and
    (2) The railroad has taken appropriate action to ensure that the 
deactivated locomotive is incapable of utilizing dynamic brake effort 
to retard or control train speed.
    (f) If a locomotive consist is intended to have its dynamic brakes 
used while in transit, a locomotive with inoperative or deactivated 
dynamic brakes or a locomotive not equipped with dynamic brakes shall 
not be placed in the controlling (lead) position of a consist unless 
the locomotive has the capability of:
    (1) Controlling the dynamic braking effort in trailing locomotives 
in the consist that are so equipped; and
    (2) Displaying to the locomotive engineer the deceleration rate of 
the train or the total train dynamic brake retarding force.
    (g) All locomotives equipped with dynamic brakes and ordered on or 
after August 1, 2002, or placed in service for the first time on or 
after April 1, 2004, shall be designed to:
    (1) Test the electrical integrity of the dynamic brake at rest; and
    (2) Display the available total train dynamic brake retarding force 
at various speed increments in the cab of the controlling (lead) 
locomotive.

[[Page 4201]]

    (h) All rebuilt locomotives equipped with dynamic brakes and placed 
in service on or after April 1, 2004, shall be designed to:
    (1) Test the electrical integrity of the dynamic brake at rest; and
    (2) Display either the train deceleration rate or the available 
total train dynamic brake retarding force at various speed increments 
in the cab of the controlling (lead) locomotive.
    (i) The information required by paragraph (a) of this section is 
not required to be provided to the locomotive engineer if all of the 
locomotives in the lead consist of a train are equipped in accordance 
with paragraph (g) of this section.
    (j) A railroad operating a train with a brake system that includes 
dynamic brakes shall adopt and comply with written operating rules 
governing safe train handling procedures using these dynamic brakes 
under all operating conditions, which shall be tailored to the specific 
equipment and territory of the railroad. The railroad's operating rules 
shall:
    (1) Ensure that the friction brakes are sufficient by themselves, 
without the aid of dynamic brakes, to stop the train safely under all 
operating conditions.
    (2) Include a ``miles-per-hour-overspeed-stop'' rule. At a minimum, 
this rule shall require that any train, when descending a grade of 1 
percent or greater, shall be immediately brought to a stop, by an 
emergency brake application if necessary, when the train's speed 
exceeds the maximum authorized speed for that train by more than 5 
miles per hour. A railroad shall reduce the 5 mile per hour overspeed 
restriction if validated research indicates the need for such a 
reduction. A railroad may increase the 5 mile per hour overspeed 
restriction only with approval of FRA and based upon verifiable data 
and research.
    (k) A railroad operating a train with a brake system that includes 
dynamic brakes shall adopt and comply with specific knowledge, skill, 
and ability criteria to ensure that its locomotive engineers are fully 
trained in the operating rules prescribed by paragraph (j) of this 
section. The railroad shall incorporate such criteria into its 
locomotive engineer certification program pursuant to Part 240 of this 
chapter,


Sec. 232.111  Train handling information.

    (a) A railroad shall adopt and comply with written procedures to 
ensure that a train crew employed by the railroad is given accurate 
information on the condition of the train brake system and train 
factors affecting brake system performance and testing when the crew 
takes over responsibility for the train. The information required by 
this paragraph may be provided to the locomotive engineer by any means 
determined appropriate by the railroad; however, a written or 
electronic record of the information shall be maintained in the cab of 
the controlling locomotive.
    (b) The procedures shall require that each train crew taking charge 
of a train be informed of:
    (1) The total weight and length of the train, based on the best 
information available to the railroad;
    (2) Any special weight distribution that would require special 
train handling procedures;
    (3) The number and location of cars with cut-out or otherwise 
inoperative brakes and the location where they will be repaired;
    (4) If a Class I or Class IA brake test is required prior to the 
next crew change point, the location at which that test shall be 
performed; and
    (5) Any train brake system problems encountered by the previous 
crew of the train.

Subpart C--Inspection and Testing Requirements


Sec. 232.201  Scope.

    This subpart contains the inspection and testing requirements for 
brake systems used in freight and other non-passenger trains. This 
subpart also contains general training requirements for railroad and 
contract personnel used to perform the required inspections and tests.


Sec. 232.203  Training requirements.

    (a) Each railroad and each contractor shall adopt and comply with a 
training, qualification, and designation program for its employees that 
perform brake system inspections, tests, or maintenance. For purposes 
of this section, a ``contractor'' is defined as a person under contract 
with the railroad or car owner. The records required by this section 
may be maintained either electronically or in writing.
    (b) As part of this program, the railroad or contractor shall:
    (1) Identify the tasks related to the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance of the brake system required by this part that must be 
performed by the railroad or contractor and identify the skills and 
knowledge necessary to perform each task.
    (2) Develop or incorporate a training curriculum that includes both 
classroom and ``hands-on'' lessons designed to impart the skills and 
knowledge identified as necessary to perform each task. The developed 
or incorporated training curriculum shall specifically address the 
Federal regulatory requirements contained in this part that are related 
to the performance of the tasks identified.
    (3) Require all employees to successfully complete a training 
curriculum that covers the skills and knowledge the employee will need 
to possess in order to perform the tasks required by this part that the 
employee will be responsible for performing, including the specific 
Federal regulatory requirements contained in this part related to the 
performance of a task for which the employee will be responsible;
    (4) Require all employees to pass a written or oral examination 
covering the skills and knowledge the employee will need to possess in 
order to perform the tasks required by this part that the employee will 
be responsible for performing, including the specific Federal 
regulatory requirements contained in this part related to the 
performance of a task for which the employee will be responsible for 
performing;
    (5) Require all employees to individually demonstrate ``hands-on'' 
capability by successfully applying the skills and knowledge the 
employee will need to possess in order to perform the tasks required by 
this part that the employee will be responsible for performing to the 
satisfaction of the employee's supervisor or designated instructor;
    (6) Consider training and testing, including efficiency testing, 
previously received by an employee in order to meet the requirements 
contained in paragraphs (b)(3) through (b)(5) of this section; 
provided, such training and testing can be documented as required in 
paragraph (e) of this section;
    (7) Require supervisors to exercise oversight to ensure that all 
the identified tasks are performed in accordance with the railroad's 
written procedures and the specific Federal regulatory requirements 
contained in this part;
    (8) Require periodic refresher training at an interval not to 
exceed three years that includes classroom and ``hands-on'' training, 
as well as testing. Efficiency testing may be used to meet the ``hands-
on'' portion of this requirement; provided, such testing is documented 
as required in paragraph (e) of this section; and
    (9) Add new brake systems to the training, qualification and 
designation program prior to its introduction to revenue service.
    (c) A railroad that operates trains required to be equipped with a 
two-way

[[Page 4202]]

end-of-train telemetry device pursuant to Subpart E of this part, and 
each contractor that maintains such devices shall adopt and comply with 
a training program which specifically addresses the testing, operation, 
and maintenance of two-way end-of-train devices for employees who are 
responsible for the testing, operation, and maintenance of the devices.
    (d) A railroad that operates trains under conditions that require 
the setting of air brake pressure retaining valves shall adopt and 
comply with a training program which specifically addresses the proper 
use of retainers for employees who are responsible for using or setting 
retainers.
    (e) A railroad or contractor shall maintain adequate records to 
demonstrate the current qualification status of all of its personnel 
assigned to inspect, test, or maintain a train brake system. The 
records required by this paragraph may be maintained either 
electronically or in writing and shall be provided to FRA upon request. 
These records shall include the following information concerning each 
such employee:
    (1) The name of the employee;
    (2) The dates that each training course was completed;
    (3) The content of each training course successfully completed;
    (4) The employee's scores on each test taken to demonstrate 
proficiency;
    (5) A description of the employee's ``hands-on'' performance 
applying the skills and knowledge the employee needs to possess in 
order to perform the tasks required by this part that the employee will 
be responsible for performing and the basis for finding that the skills 
and knowledge were successfully demonstrated;
    (6) A record that the employee was notified of his or her current 
qualification status and of any subsequent changes to that status;
    (7) The tasks required to be performed under this part which the 
employee is deemed qualified to perform; and
    (8) Identification of the person(s) determining that the employee 
has successfully completed the training necessary to be considered 
qualified to perform the tasks identified in paragraph (e)(7) of this 
section.
    (9) The date that the employee's status as qualified to perform the 
tasks identified in paragraph (e)(7) of this section expires due to the 
need for refresher training.
    (f) A railroad or contractor shall adopt and comply with a plan to 
periodically assess the effectiveness of its training program. One 
method of validation and assessment could be through the use of 
efficiency tests or periodic review of employee performance.


Sec. 232.205  Class I brake test-initial terminal inspection.

    (a) Each train and each car in the train shall receive a Class I 
brake test as described in paragraph (b) of this section by a qualified 
person, as defined in Sec. 232.5, at the following points:
    (1) The location where the train is originally assembled (``initial 
terminal'');
    (2) A location where the train consist is changed other than by:
    (i) Adding a single car or a solid block of cars;
    (ii) Removing a single car or a solid block of cars;
    (iii) Removing cars determined to be defective under this chapter; 
or
    (iv) A combination of the changes listed in paragraphs (a)(2)(i) 
through (a)(2)(iii) of this section (See Secs. 232.209 and 232.211 for 
requirements related to the pick-up of cars and solid blocks of cars en 
route.);
    (3) A location where the train is off air for a period of more than 
four hours;
    (4) A location where a unit or cycle train has traveled 3,000 miles 
since its last Class I brake test; and
    (5) A location where the train is received in interchange if the 
train consist is changed other than by:
    (i) Removing a car or a solid block of cars from the train;
    (ii) Adding a previously tested car or a previously tested solid 
block of cars to the train;
    (iii) Changing motive power;
    (iv) Removing or changing the caboose; or
    (v) Any combination of the changes listed in paragraphs (a)(5) of 
this section.
    (A) If changes other than those contained in paragraph (a)(5)(i)-
(a)(5)(v) of this section are made to the train consist when it is 
received in interchange and the train will move 20 miles or less, then 
the railroad may conduct a brake test pursuant to Sec. 232.209 on those 
cars added to the train.
    (B) Reserved.
    (b) A Class I brake test of a train shall consist of the following 
tasks and requirements:
    (1) Brake pipe leakage shall not exceed 5 psi per minute or air 
flow shall not exceed 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM).
    (i) Leakage Test. The brake pipe leakage test shall be conducted as 
follows:
    (A) Charge the air brake system to the pressure at which the train 
will be operated, and the pressure at the rear of the train shall be 
within 15 psi of the pressure at which the train will be operated, but 
not less than 75 psi, as indicated by an accurate gauge or end-of-train 
device at the rear end of train;
    (B) Upon receiving the signal to apply brakes for test, make a 20-
psi brake pipe service reduction;
    (C) If the locomotive used to perform the leakage test is equipped 
with a means for maintaining brake pipe pressure at a constant level 
during a 20-psi brake pipe service reduction, this feature shall be cut 
out during the leakage test; and
    (D) With the brake valve lapped and the pressure maintaining 
feature cut out (if so equipped) and after waiting 45-60 seconds, note 
the brake pipe leakage as indicated by the brake-pipe gauge in the 
locomotive, which shall not exceed 5 psi per minute.
    (ii) Air Flow Method Test. When a locomotive is equipped with a 26-
L brake valve or equivalent pressure maintaining locomotive brake 
valve, a railroad may use the Air Flow Method Test as an alternate to 
the brake pipe leakage test. The Air Flow Method (AFM) Test shall be 
performed as follows:
    (A) Charge the air brake system to the pressure at which the train 
will be operated, and the pressure at the rear of the train shall be 
within 15 psi of the pressure at which the train will be operated, but 
not less than 75 psi, as indicated by an accurate gauge or end-of-train 
device at the rear end of train; and
    (B) Measure air flow as indicated by a calibrated AFM indicator, 
which shall not exceed 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM).
    (iii) The AFM indicator shall be calibrated for accuracy at 
periodic intervals not to exceed 92 days. The AFM indicator calibration 
test orifices shall be calibrated at temperatures of not less than 20 
degrees Fahrenheit. AFM indicators shall be accurate to within 
 3 standard cubic feet per minute (CFM).
    (2) The inspector shall position himself/herself, taking positions 
on each side of each car sometime during the inspection process, so as 
to be able to examine and observe the functioning of all moving parts 
of the brake system on each car in order to make the determinations and 
inspections required by this section. A ``roll-by'' inspection of the 
brake release as provided for in paragraph (b)(8) of this section shall 
not constitute an inspection of that side of the train for purposes of 
this requirement;
    (3) The train brake system shall be charged to the pressure at 
which the

[[Page 4203]]

train will be operated, and the pressure at the rear of the train shall 
be within 15 psi of the pressure at which the train will be operated, 
but not less than 75 psi, angle cocks and cutout cocks shall be 
properly positioned, air hoses shall be properly coupled and shall not 
kink, bind, or foul or be in any other condition that restricts air 
flow. An examination must be made for leaks and necessary repairs made 
to reduce leakage to the required minimum. Retaining valves and 
retaining valve pipes shall be inspected and known to be in proper 
condition for service;
    (4) The brakes on each car and shall apply in response to a 20-psi 
brake pipe service reduction and shall remain applied until a release 
of the air brakes has been initiated by the controlling locomotive or 
yard test device. The brakes shall not be applied or released until the 
proper signal is given. A car found with brakes that fail to apply or 
remain applied may be retested and remain in the train if the retest is 
conducted at the pressure the train will be operated from the 
controlling locomotive, head end of the consist, or a suitable test 
device, as described in Sec. 232.217(a) of this part, positioned at one 
end of the car(s) being retested and the brakes remain applied until a 
release is initiated after a period which is no less than three 
minutes. If the retest is performed at the car(s) being retested with a 
suitable device, the compressed air in the car(s) shall be depleted 
prior to disconnecting the hoses between the car(s) to perform the 
retest;
    (5) For cars equipped with 8\1/2\-inch or 10-inch diameter brake 
cylinders, piston travel shall be within 7 to 9 inches. If piston 
travel is found to be less than 7 inches or more than 9 inches, it must 
be adjusted to nominally 7\1/2\ inches. For cars not equipped with 8\1/
2\-inch or 10-inch diameter brake cylinders, piston travel shall be 
within the piston travel stenciled or marked on the car or badge plate. 
Minimum brake cylinder piston travel of truck-mounted brake cylinders 
must be sufficient to provide proper brake shoe clearance when the 
brakes are released. Piston travel must be inspected on each freight 
car while the brakes are applied;
    (6) Brake rigging shall be properly secured and shall not bind or 
foul or otherwise adversely affect the operation of the brake system;
    (7) All parts of the brake equipment shall be properly secured. On 
cars where the bottom rod passes through the truck bolster or is 
secured with cotter keys equipped with a locking device to prevent 
their accidental removal, bottom rod safety supports are not required; 
and
    (8) When the release is initiated by the controlling locomotive or 
yard test device, the brakes on each freight car shall be inspected to 
verify that it did release; this may be performed by a ``roll-by'' 
inspection. If a ``roll-by'' inspection of the brake release is 
performed, train speed shall not exceed 10 MPH and the qualified person 
performing the ``roll-by'' inspection shall communicate the results of 
the inspection to the operator of the train. The operator of the train 
shall note successful completion of the release portion of the 
inspection on the record required in paragraph (d) of this section.
    (c) Where a railroad's collective bargaining agreement provides 
that a carman is to perform the inspections and tests required by this 
section, a carman alone will be considered a qualified person. In these 
circumstances, the railroad shall ensure that the carman is properly 
trained and designated as a qualified person or qualified mechanical 
inspector pursuant to the requirements of this part.
    (d) A railroad shall notify the locomotive engineer that the Class 
I brake test was satisfactorily performed and provide the information 
required in this paragraph to the locomotive engineer or place the 
information in the cab of the controlling locomotive following the 
test. The information required by this paragraph may be provided to the 
locomotive engineer by any means determined appropriate by the 
railroad; however, a written or electronic record of the information 
shall be retained in the cab of the controlling locomotive until the 
train reaches its destination. The written or electronic record shall 
contain the date, time, number of freight cars inspected, and identify 
the qualified person(s) performing the test and the location where the 
Class I brake test was performed.
    (e) Before adjusting piston travel or working on brake rigging, 
cutout cock in brake pipe branch must be closed and air reservoirs must 
be voided of all compressed air. When cutout cocks are provided in 
brake cylinder pipes, these cutout cocks only may be closed and air 
reservoirs need not be voided of all compressed air.
    (f) Except as provided in Sec. 232.209, each car or solid block of 
cars, as defined in Sec. 232.5, that has not received a Class I brake 
test or that has been off air for more than four hours and that is 
added to a train shall receive a Class I test when added to a train. A 
Class III brake test as described in Sec. 232.211 shall then be 
performed on the entire new train.


Sec. 232.207  Class IA brake tests--1,000-mile inspection.

    (a) Except as provided in Sec. 232.213, each train shall receive a 
Class IA brake test performed by a qualified person, as defined in 
Sec. 232.5, at a location that is not more than 1,000 miles from the 
point where any car in the train last received a Class I or Class IA 
brake test. The most restrictive car or block of cars in the train 
shall determine the location of this test.
    (b) A Class IA brake test of a train shall consist of the following 
tasks and requirements:
    (1) Brake pipe leakage shall not exceed 5 psi per minute or air 
flow shall not exceed 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM). The brake pipe 
leakage test or air flow method test shall be conducted pursuant to the 
requirements contained in Sec. 232.205(b)(1);
    (2) The inspector shall position himself/herself, taking positions 
on each side of each car sometime during the inspection process, so as 
to be able to examine and observe the functioning of all moving parts 
of the brake system on each car in order to make the determinations and 
inspections required by this section;
    (3) The air brake system shall be charged to the pressure at which 
the train will be operated, and the pressure at the rear of the train 
shall be within 15 psi of the pressure at which the train will be 
operated, but not less than 75 psi, as indicated by an accurate gauge 
or end-of-train device at rear end of train;
    (4) The brakes on each car shall apply in response to a 20-psi 
brake pipe service reduction and shall remain applied until the release 
is initiated by the controlling locomotive. A car found with brakes 
that fail to apply or remain applied may be retested and remain in the 
train if the retest is conducted as prescribed in Sec. 232.205(b)(4); 
otherwise, the defective equipment may only be moved pursuant to the 
provisions contained in Sec. 232.15, if applicable;
    (5) Brake rigging shall be properly secured and shall not bind or 
foul or otherwise adversely affect the operation of the brake system; 
and
    (6) All parts of the brake equipment shall be properly secured.
    (c) A railroad shall designate the locations where Class IA brake 
tests will be performed, and the railroad shall furnish to the Federal 
Railroad Administration upon request a description of each location 
designated. A railroad shall notify FRA's Associate Administrator for 
Safety in writing 30 days prior to any change in the locations 
designated for such tests and inspections.

[[Page 4204]]

    (1) Failure to perform a Class IA brake test on a train at a 
location designated pursuant to this paragraph constitutes a failure to 
perform a proper Class IA brake test if the train is due for such a 
test at that location.
    (2) In the event of an emergency that alters normal train 
operations, such as a derailment or other unusual circumstance that 
adversely affects the safe operation of the train, the railroad is not 
required to provide prior written notification of a change in the 
location where a Class IA brake test is performed to a location not on 
the railroad's list of designated locations for performing Class IA 
brake tests, provided that the railroad notifies FRA's Associate 
Administrator for Safety and the pertinent FRA Regional Administrator 
within 24 hours after the designation has been changed and the reason 
for that change.


Sec. 232.209  Class II brake tests--intermediate inspection.

    (a) At a location other than the initial terminal of a train, a 
Class II brake test shall be performed by a qualified person, as 
defined in Sec. 232.5, on the following equipment when added to a 
train:
    (1) Each car or solid block of cars, as defined in Sec. 232.5, that 
has not previously received a Class I brake test or that has been off 
air for more than four hours;
    (2) Each solid block of cars, as defined in Sec. 232.5, that is 
comprised of cars from more than one previous train; and
    (3) Each solid block of cars that is comprised of cars from only 
one previous train but the cars of which have not remained continuously 
and consecutively coupled together with the train line remaining 
connected, other than for removing defective equipment, since being 
removed from its previous train.
    (b) A Class II brake test shall consist of the following tasks and 
requirements:
    (1) Brake pipe leakage shall not exceed 5 psi per minute or air 
flow shall not exceed 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM). The brake pipe 
leakage test or air flow method test shall be conducted on the entire 
train pursuant to the requirements contained in Sec. 232.205(b)(1);
    (2) The air brake system shall be charged to the pressure at which 
the train will be operated, and the pressure at the rear of the train 
shall be within 15 psi of the pressure at which the train will be 
operated, but not less than 75 psi, as indicated by an accurate gauge 
or end-of-train device at the rear end of train;
    (3) The brakes on each car added to the train and on the rear car 
of the train shall be inspected to ensure that they apply in response 
to a 20-psi brake pipe service reduction and remain applied until the 
release is initiated from the controlling locomotive. A car found with 
brakes that fail to apply or remain applied may be retested and remain 
in the train if the retest is conducted as prescribed in 
Sec. 232.205(b)(4); otherwise, the defective equipment may only be 
moved pursuant to the provisions contained in Sec. 232.15, if 
applicable;
    (4) When the release is initiated, the brakes on each car added to 
the train and on the rear car of the train shall be inspected to verify 
that they did release; this may be performed by a ``roll-by'' 
inspection. If a ``roll-by'' inspection of the brake release is 
performed, train speed shall not exceed 10 MPH, and the qualified 
person performing the ``roll-by'' inspection shall communicate the 
results of the inspection to the operator of the train; and
    (5) Before the train proceeds the operator of the train shall know 
that the brake pipe pressure at the rear of the train is being 
restored.
    (c) As an alternative to the rear car brake application and release 
portion of the test, the operator of the train shall determine that 
brake pipe pressure of the train is being reduced, as indicated by a 
rear car gauge or end-of-train telemetry device, and then that the 
brake pipe pressure of the train is being restored, as indicated by a 
rear car gauge or end-of-train telemetry device. (When an end-of-train 
telemetry device is used to comply with any test requirement in this 
part, the phrase ``brake pipe pressure of the train is being reduced'' 
means a pressure reduction of at least 5 psi, and the phrase ``brake 
pipe pressure of the train is being restored'' means a pressure 
increase of at least 5 psi). If an electronic communication link 
between a controlling locomotive and a remotely controlled locomotive 
attached to the rear end of a train is utilized to determine that brake 
pipe pressure is being restored, the operator of the train shall know 
that the air brakes function as intended on the remotely controlled 
locomotive.
    (d) Each car or solid block of cars that receives a Class II brake 
test pursuant to this section when added to the train shall receive a 
Class I brake test at the next forward location where facilities are 
available for performing such a test. A Class III brake test as 
described in Sec. 232.211 shall then be performed on the entire train.


Sec. 232.211  Class III brake tests-trainline continuity inspection.

    (a) A Class III brake test shall be performed on a train by a 
qualified person, as defined in Sec. 232.5, to test the train brake 
system when the configuration of the train has changed in certain ways. 
In particular, a Class III brake test shall be performed at the 
location where any of the following changes in the configuration of the 
train occur:
    (1) Where a locomotive or a caboose is changed;
    (2) Where a car or a block of cars is removed from the train with 
the consist otherwise remaining intact;
    (3) At a point other than the initial terminal for the train, where 
a car or a solid block of cars that is comprised of cars from only one 
previous train the cars of which have remained continuously and 
consecutively coupled together with the trainline remaining connected, 
other than for removing defective equipment, since being removed from 
its previous train that has previously received a Class I brake test 
and that has not been off air for more than four hours is added to a 
train;
    (4) At a point other than the initial terminal for the train, where 
a car or a solid block of cars that has received a Class I or Class II 
brake test at that location, prior to being added to the train, and 
that has not been off air for more than four hours is added to a train; 
or
    (5) Whenever the continuity of the brake pipe is broken or 
interrupted.
    (b) A Class III brake test shall consist of the following tasks and 
requirements:
    (1) The train brake system shall be charged to the pressure at 
which the train will be operated, and the pressure at the rear of the 
train shall be within 15 psi of the pressure at which the train will be 
operated, but not less than 75 psi, or 60 psi for transfer trains, as 
indicated at the rear of the train by an accurate gauge or end-of-train 
device;
    (2) The brakes on the rear car of the train shall apply in response 
to a 20-psi brake pipe service reduction and shall remain applied until 
the release is initiated by the controlling locomotive;
    (3) When the release is initiated, the brakes on the rear car of 
the train shall be inspected to verify that it did release; and
    (4) Before proceeding the operator of the train shall know that the 
brake pipe pressure at the rear of freight train is being restored.
    (c) As an alternative to the rear car brake application and release 
portion of the test, it shall be determined that the brake pipe 
pressure of the train is being reduced, as indicated by a rear car 
gauge

[[Page 4205]]

or end-of-train telemetry device, and then that the brake pipe pressure 
of the train is being restored, as indicated by a rear car gauge or 
end-of-train telemetry device. If an electronic or radio communication 
link between a controlling locomotive and a remotely controlled 
locomotive attached to the rear end of a train is utilized to determine 
that brake pipe pressure is being restored, the operator of the train 
shall know that the air brakes function as intended on the remotely 
controlled locomotive.


Sec. 232.213  Extended haul trains.

    (a) A railroad may be permitted to move a train up to, but not 
exceeding, 1,500 miles between brake tests and inspections if the 
railroad designates a train as an extended haul train. In order for a 
railroad to designate a train as an extended haul train, all of the 
following requirements must be met:
    (1) The railroad must designate the train in writing to FRA's 
Associate Administrator for Safety. This designation must include the 
following:
    (i) The train identification symbol or identification of the 
location where extended haul trains will originate and a description of 
the trains that will be operated as extended haul trains from those 
locations;
    (ii) The origination and destination points for the train;
    (iii) The type or types of equipment the train will haul; and
    (iv) The locations where all train brake and mechanical inspections 
and tests will be performed.
    (2) A Class I brake test pursuant to Sec. 232.205 shall be 
performed at the initial terminal for the train by a qualified 
mechanical inspector as defined in Sec. 232.5.
    (3) A freight car inspection pursuant to part 215 of this chapter 
shall be performed at the initial terminal for the train and shall be 
performed by an inspector designated under Sec. 215.11 of this chapter.
    (4) All cars having conditions not in compliance with part 215 of 
this chapter at the initial terminal for the train shall be either 
repaired or removed from the train. Except for a car developing such a 
condition en route, no car shall be moved pursuant to the provisions of 
Sec. 215.9 of this chapter in the train.
    (5) The train shall have no more than one pick-up and one set-out 
en route, except for the set-out of defective equipment pursuant to the 
requirements of this chapter.
    (i) Cars added to the train en route shall be inspected pursuant to 
the requirements contained in paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(5) of this 
section at the location where they are added to the train.
    (ii) Cars set out of the train en route shall be inspected pursuant 
to the requirements contained in paragraph (a)(6) of this section at 
the location where they are set out of the train.
    (6) At the point of destination, if less than 1,500 miles from the 
train's initial terminal, or at the point designated by the railroad 
pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(iv) of this section, not to exceed 1,500 
miles, an inbound inspection of the train shall be conducted by a 
qualified mechanical inspector to identify any defective, inoperative, 
or ineffective brakes or any other condition not in compliance with 
this part as well as any conditions not in compliance with part 215 and 
part 231 of this chapter.
    (7) The railroad shall maintain a record of all defective, 
inoperative, or ineffective brakes as well as any conditions not in 
compliance with part 215 and part 231 of this chapter discovered at 
anytime during the movement of the train. These records shall be 
retained for a period of one year and made available to FRA upon 
request. The records required by this section may be maintained either 
electronically or in writing.
    (8) In order for an extended haul train to proceed beyond 1,500 
miles, the following requirements shall be met:
    (i) If the train will move 1,000 miles or less from that location 
before receiving a Class IA brake test or reaching destination, a Class 
I brake test shall be conducted pursuant to Sec. 232.205 to ensure 100 
percent effective and operative brakes. The inbound inspection required 
by paragraph (a)(6) of this section may be used to meet this 
requirement provided it encompasses all the inspection elements 
contained in Sec. 232.205.
    (ii) If the train will move greater than 1,000 miles from that 
location without another brake inspection, the train must be identified 
as an extended haul train for that movement and shall meet all the 
requirements contained in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(7) of this 
section. Such trains shall receive a Class I brake test pursuant to 
Sec. 232.205 by a qualified mechanical inspector to ensure 100 percent 
effective and operative brakes, a freight car inspection pursuant to 
part 215 of this chapter by an inspector designated under Sec. 215.11 
of this chapter, and all cars containing non-complying conditions under 
part 215 of this chapter shall either be repaired or removed from the 
train. The inbound inspection required by paragraph (a)(6) of this 
section may be used to meet these inspection requirements provided it 
encompasses all the inspection elements contained paragraphs (a)(2) 
through (a)(4) of this section.
    (9) FRA inspectors shall have physical access to visually observe 
all brake and freight car inspections and tests required by this 
section.
    (b) Failure to comply with any of the requirements contained in 
paragraph (a) of this section will be considered an improper movement 
of a designated priority train for which appropriate civil penalties 
may be assessed as outlined in Appendix A to this part. Furthermore, 
FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety may revoke a railroad's 
ability to designate any or all trains as extended haul trains for 
repeated or willful noncompliance with any of the requirements 
contained in this section. Such a determination will be made in writing 
and will state the basis for such action.


Sec. 232.215  Transfer train brake tests.

    (a) A transfer train, as defined in Sec. 232.5, shall receive a 
brake test performed by a qualified person, as defined in Sec. 232.5, 
that includes the following:
    (1) The air brake hoses shall be coupled between all freight cars;
    (2) After the brake system is charged to not less than 60 psi as 
indicated by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device at the rear of 
the train, a 15-psi service brake pipe reduction shall be made; and
    (3) An inspection shall be made to determine that the brakes on 
each car apply and remain applied until the release is initiated by the 
controlling locomotive. A car found with brakes that fail to apply or 
remain applied may be retested and remain in the train if the retest is 
conducted as prescribed in Sec. 232.205(b)(4); otherwise, the defective 
equipment may only be moved pursuant to the provisions contained in 
Sec. 232.15, if applicable.
    (b) Cars added to transfer trains en route shall be inspected 
pursuant to the requirements contained in paragraph (a) of this section 
at the location where the cars are added to the train.
    (c) If a train's movement will exceed 20 miles or is not a transfer 
train as defined in Sec. 232.5, the train shall receive a Class I brake 
test in accordance with Sec. 232.205 prior to departure.


Sec. 232.217  Train brake tests conducted using yard air.

    (a) When a train air brake system is tested from a yard air source, 
an engineer's brake valve or a suitable test device shall be used to 
provide any increase or reduction of brake pipe air pressure at the 
same, or slower, rate as an engineer's brake valve.

[[Page 4206]]

    (b) The yard air test device must be connected to the end of the 
train or block of cars that will be nearest to the controlling 
locomotive. However, if the railroad adopts and complies with written 
procedures to ensure that potential overcharge conditions to the train 
brake system are avoided, the yard air test device may be connected to 
other than the end nearest to the controlling locomotive.
    (c) Except as provided in this section, when a yard air is used the 
train air brake system must be charged and tested as prescribed by 
Sec. 232.205(b) and when practicable should be kept charged until road 
motive power is coupled to train, after which, a Class III brake test 
shall be performed as prescribed by Sec. 232.211.
    (1) If the cars are off air for more than four hours, these cars 
shall be retested in accordance with Sec. 232.205(b) through (e).
    (2) At a minimum, yard air pressure shall be 60 psi at the end of 
the consist or block of cars opposite from the yard test device and 
shall be within 15 psi of the regulator valve setting on yard test 
device.
    (3) If the air pressure of the yard test device is less than the 
pressure at which the train will be operated, then a leakage or air 
flow test shall be conducted at the operating pressure of the train 
when the locomotives are attached in accordance with 
Sec. 232.205(b)(1).
    (d) Mechanical yard air test devices and gauges shall be calibrated 
every 92 days. Electronic yard test devices and gauges shall be 
calibrated annually. Mechanical and electronic yard air test devices 
and gauges shall be calibrated so that they are accurate to within 
 3 psi.
    (e) If used to test a train, a yard air test device and any yard 
air test equipment shall be accurate and function as intended.


Sec. 232.219  Double heading and helper service.

    (a) When more than one locomotive is attached to a train, the 
engineer of the controlling locomotive shall operate the brakes. In 
case it becomes necessary for the controlling locomotive to give up 
control of the train short of the destination of the train, a Class III 
brake test pursuant to Sec. 232.211 shall be made to ensure that the 
brakes are operative from the automatic brake valve of the locomotive 
taking control of the train.
    (b) When one or more helper locomotives are placed in a train, a 
visual inspection shall be made of each helper locomotive brake system 
to determine that the brake system operates as intended in response to 
a 20-psi reduction initiated from the controlling locomotive of the 
train. A helper locomotive with inoperative or ineffective brakes shall 
be repaired prior to use or removed from the train.
    (c) If a helper locomotive utilizes a Helper Link device or a 
similar technology, the locomotive and device shall be equipped, 
designed, and maintained as follows:
    (1) The locomotive engineer shall be notified by a distinctive 
alarm of any loss of communication between the device and the two-way 
end-of-train device of more than 25 seconds;
    (2) A method to reset the device shall be provided in the cab of 
the helper locomotive that can be operated from the engineer's usual 
position during operation of the locomotive;
    (3) The device shall be tested for accuracy and calibrated if 
necessary according to the manufacturer's specifications and procedures 
every 365 days. This shall include testing radio frequencies and 
modulation of the device. A legible record of the date and location of 
the last test or calibration shall be maintained with the device.

Subpart D--Periodic Maintenance and Testing Requirements


Sec. 232.301  Scope.

    This subpart contains the periodic brake system maintenance and 
testing requirements for equipment used in freight and other non-
passenger trains.


Sec. 232.303  General requirements.

    (a) Definitions. The following definitions are intended solely for 
the purpose of identifying what constitutes a shop or repair track 
under this subpart.
    (1) Shop or repair track means:
    (i) A fixed repair facility or track designated by the railroad as 
a shop or repair track;
    (ii) A fixed repair facility or track which is regularly and 
consistently used to perform major repairs;
    (iii) track which is used at a location to regularly and 
consistently perform both minor and major repairs where the railroad 
has not designated a certain portion of that trackage as a repair 
track;
    (iv) A track designated or used by a railroad to regularly and 
consistently perform minor repairs during the period when major repairs 
are being conducted on such a track; and
    (v) The facilities and tracks identified in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) 
through (a)(1)(iv) shall be considered shop or repair tracks regardless 
of whether a mobile repair vehicle is used to conduct the repairs.
    (2) Major repair means a repair of such a nature that it would 
normally require greater than four man-hours to accomplish or would 
involve the use of specialized tools and equipment. Major repairs would 
include such things as coupler replacement, draft gear repair, and 
repairs requiring the use of an air jack.
    (3) Minor repair means repairs, other than major repairs, that can 
be accomplished in a short period of time with limited tools and 
equipment. Minor repairs would include such things as safety appliance 
straightening, handhold replacement, air hose replacement, lading 
adjustment, and coupler knuckle or knuckle pin replacement.
    (b) A car on a shop or repair track shall be tested to determine 
that the air brakes apply and remain applied until a release is 
initiated.
    (c) A car on a shop or repair track shall have its piston travel 
inspected. For cars equipped with 8\1/2\-inch or 10-inch diameter brake 
cylinders, piston travel shall be within 7 to 9 inches. If piston 
travel is found to be less than 7 inches or more than 9 inches, it must 
be adjusted to nominally 7\1/2\ inches. For cars not equipped with 8\1/
2\-inch or 10-inch diameter brake cylinders, piston travel shall be 
within the piston travel stenciled or marked on the car or badge plate.
    (d) Before a car is released from a shop or repair track, a 
qualified person shall ensure:
    (1) The brake pipe is securely clamped;
    (2) Angle cocks are properly located with suitable clearance and 
properly positioned to allow maximum air flow;
    (3) Valves, reservoirs, and cylinders are tight on supports and the 
supports are securely attached to the car;
    (4) Hand brakes are tested, inspected, and operate as intended; and
    (5) Brake indicators, on cars so equipped, are accurate and operate 
as intended.
    (e) If the repair track air brake test or single car test required 
in Secs. 232.305 and 232.307 cannot be conducted at the point where 
repairs can be made to the car, the car may be moved after the repairs 
are effectuated to the next forward location where the test can be 
performed. Inability to perform a repair track air brake test or single 
car test does not constitute an inability to effectuate the necessary 
repairs.
    (1) If it is necessary to move a car from the location where the 
repairs are performed in order to perform a repair track air brake test 
or a single car test required by this part, a tag or card shall be 
placed on both sides of the equipment, or an automated tracking system 
approved for use by FRA, with

[[Page 4207]]

the following information about the equipment:
    (i) The reporting mark and car number;
    (ii) The name of the inspecting railroad;
    (iii) The location where repairs were performed and date;
    (iv) Indication whether the car requires a repair track brake test 
or single car test;
    (v) The location where the appropriate test is to be performed; and
    (vi) The name, signature, if possible, and job title of the 
qualified person approving the move.
    (2) The tag or card required by paragraph (e)(1) of this section 
shall remain affixed to the equipment until the necessary test has been 
performed.
    (3) An electronic or written record or copy of each tag or card 
attached to or removed from a car or locomotive shall be retained for 
90 days and, upon request, shall be made available within 15 calendar 
days for inspection by FRA or State inspectors.
    (4) The record or copy of each tag or card removed from a car or 
locomotive shall contain the date, location, and the signature or 
identification of the qualified person removing it from the piece of 
equipment.
    (f) The location and date of the last repair track brake test or 
single car test required by Secs. 232.305 and 232.307 of this part 
shall be clearly stenciled, marked, or labeled in two-inch high letters 
or numerals on the side of the equipment. Alternatively, the railroad 
industry may use an electronic or automated tracking system to track 
the required information and the performance of the tests required by 
Secs. 232.305 and 232.307 of this part.
    (1) Electronic or automated tracking systems used to meet the 
requirement contained in this paragraph shall be capable of being 
reviewed and monitored by FRA at any time to ensure the integrity of 
the system. FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety may prohibit or 
revoke the railroad industry's authority to utilize an electronic or 
automated tracking system in lieu of stenciling or marking if FRA finds 
that the electronic or automated tracking system is not properly 
secure, is inaccessible to FRA or railroad employees, or fails to 
adequately track and monitor the equipment. FRA will record such a 
determination in writing, include a statement of the basis for such 
action, and will provide a copy of the document to the affected 
railroads.
    (2) [Reserved.]


Sec. 232.305  Repair track air brake tests.

    (a) Repair track brake tests shall be performed by a qualified 
person in accordance with either Section 3.0, ``Procedures for Repair 
Track Test for Air Brake Equipment,'' of the Association of American 
Railroads Standard S-486-99, ``Code of Air Brake System Tests for 
Freight Equipment,'' contained in the AAR Manual of Standards and 
Recommended Practices, Section E (April 1, 1999) or an alternative 
procedure approved by FRA pursuant to Sec. 232.17. The incorporation by 
reference of this AAR standard was approved by the Director of the 
Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 
You may obtain a copy of the incorporated document from the Association 
of American Railroads, 50 F Street, NW., Washington, DC 20001. You may 
inspect a copy of the document at the Federal Railroad Administration, 
Docket Clerk, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Suite 7000, Washington, DC or 
at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., 
Suite 700, Washington, DC.
    (b) Except as provided in Sec. 232.303(e), a railroad shall perform 
a repair track brake test on a car when:
    (1) A car has its brakes cut-out or inoperative when removed from a 
train or when placed on a shop or repair track;
    (2) A car is on a repair or shop track, as defined in 
Sec. 232.303(a), for any reason and has not received a repair track 
brake test within the previous 12 month period;
    (3) A car is found with missing or incomplete repair track brake 
test information;
    (4) One or more of the following conventional air brake equipment 
items is removed, repaired, or replaced:
    (i) Brake reservoir;
    (ii) Control valve mounting gasket; or
    (iii) Pipe bracket stud.
    (5) A car is found with one or more of the following wheel defects:
    (i) Built-up tread, unless known to be caused by hand brake left 
applied;
    (ii) Slid flat wheel, unless known to be caused by hand brake left 
applied; or
    (iii) Thermal cracks.
    (c) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, each car 
shall receive a repair track brake test no less than every 5 years.
    (d) Each car shall receive a repair track brake test no less than 8 
years from the date the car was built or rebuilt.


Sec. 232.307  Single car tests.

    (a) Single car tests shall be performed by a qualified person in 
accordance with either Section 4.0, ``Tests-Standard Single Capacity 
Freight Brake Equipment (Single Car Test),'' of the Association of 
American Railroads Standard S-486-99, ``Code of Air Brake System Tests 
for Freight Equipment,'' contained in the AAR Manual of Standards and 
Recommended Practices, Section E (April 1, 1999) or an alternative 
procedure approved by FRA pursuant to Sec. 232.17. The incorporation by 
reference of this AAR standard was approved by the Director of the 
Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 
You may obtain a copy of the incorporated document from the Association 
of American Railroads, 50 F Street, NW., Washington, DC 20001. You may 
inspect a copy of the document at the Federal Railroad Administration, 
Docket Clerk, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Suite 7000, Washington, DC or 
at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., 
Suite 700, Washington, DC.
    (b) Except as provided in Sec. 232.303(e), a railroad shall perform 
a single car test on a car when one or more of the following 
conventional air brake equipment items is removed, repaired or 
replaced:
    (1) Service portion;
    (2) Emergency portion; or
    (3) Pipe bracket.
    (c) A single car test pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section 
shall be performed on a new or rebuilt car prior to placing or using 
the car in revenue service.


Sec. 232.309  Repair track air brake test and single car test equipment 
and devices.

    (a) Test equipment and devices used to perform repair track air 
brake tests or single car tests shall be tested for correct operation 
at least once each calendar day of use.
    (b) Except for single car test devices, mechanical test devices 
such as pressure gauges, flow meters, orifices, etc. shall be 
calibrated once every 92 days.
    (c) Electronic test devices shall be calibrated at least once every 
365 days.
    (d) Test equipment and single car test devices placed in service 
shall be tagged or labeled with the date its next calibration is due.
    (e) Each single car test device shall be tested not less frequently 
than every 92 days after being placed in service and may not continue 
in service if more than one year has passed since its last 92-day test.
    (f) Each single car test device shall be disassembled and cleaned 
not less frequently than every 365 days after being placed in service.

[[Page 4208]]

Subpart E--End-of-Train Devices


Sec. 232.401  Scope.

    This subpart contains the requirements related to the performance, 
operation, and testing of end-of-train devices. Unless expressly 
excepted in this subpart, the requirements of this subpart apply to all 
trains operating on track which is part of the general railroad system 
of transportation.


Sec. 232.403  Design standards for one-way end-of-train devices.

    (a) General. A one-way end-of-train device shall be comprised of a 
rear-of-train unit (rear unit) located on the last car of a train and a 
front-of-train unit (front unit) located in the cab of the locomotive 
controlling the train.
    (b) Rear unit. The rear unit shall be capable of determining the 
brake pipe pressure on the rear car and transmitting that information 
to the front unit for display to the locomotive engineer. The rear unit 
shall be--
    (1) Capable of measuring the brake pipe pressure on the rear car 
with an accuracy of 3 pounds per square inch (psig) and 
brake pipe pressure variations of 1 psig;
    (2) Equipped with a ``bleeder valve'' that permits the release of 
any air under pressure from the rear of train unit or the associated 
air hoses prior to detaching the rear unit from the brake pipe;
    (3) Designed so that an internal failure will not cause an 
undesired emergency brake application;
    (4) Equipped with either an air gauge or a means of visually 
displaying the rear unit's brake pipe pressure measurement; and
    (5) Equipped with a pressure relief safety valve to prevent 
explosion from a high pressure air leak inside the rear unit.
    (c) Reporting rate. Multiple data transmissions from the rear unit 
shall occur immediately after a variation in the rear car brake pipe 
pressure of 2 psig and at intervals of not greater than 70 
seconds when the variation in the rear car brake pipe pressure over the 
70-second interval is less than 2 psig.
    (d) Operating environment. The rear unit shall be designed to meet 
the performance requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section 
under the following environmental conditions:
    (1) At temperatures from -40 deg.C to 60 deg.C;
    (2) At a relative humidity of 95% noncondensing at 50 deg.C;
    (3) At altitudes of zero to 12,000 feet mean sea level;
    (4) During vertical and lateral vibrations of 1 to 15 Hz., with 0.5 
g. peak to peak, and 15 to 500 Hz., with 5 g. peak to peak;
    (5) During the longitudinal vibrations of 1 to 15 Hz., with 3 g. 
peak to peak, and 15 to 500 Hz., with 5 g. peak to peak; and
    (6) During a shock of 10 g. peak for 0.1 second in any axis.
    (e) Unique code. Each rear unit shall have a unique and permanent 
identification code that is transmitted along with the pressure message 
to the front-of-train unit. A code obtained from the Association of 
American Railroads, 50 F Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036 shall be 
deemed to be a unique code for purposes of this section. A unique code 
also may be obtained from the Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance 
(RRS-10), Federal Railroad Administration, Washington, DC 20590.
    (f) Front unit. (1) The front unit shall be designed to receive 
data messages from the rear unit and shall be capable of displaying the 
rear car brake pipe pressure in increments not to exceed one pound.
    (2) The display shall be clearly visible and legible in daylight 
and darkness from the engineer's normal operating position.
    (3) The front device shall have a means for entry of the unique 
identification code of the rear unit being used. The front unit shall 
be designed so that it will display a message only from the rear unit 
with the same code as entered into the front unit.
    (4) The front unit shall be designed to meet the requirements of 
paragraphs (d)(2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section. It shall also be 
designed to meet the performance requirements in this paragraph under 
the following environmental conditions:
    (i) At temperatures from 0 deg.C to 60 deg.C;
    (ii) During a vertical or lateral shock of 2 g. peak for 0.1 
second; and
    (iii) During a longitudinal shock of 5 g. peak for 0.1 second.
    (g) Radio equipment. (1) The radio transmitter in the rear unit and 
the radio receiver in the front unit shall comply with the applicable 
regulatory requirements of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
and use of a transmission format acceptable to the FCC.
    (2) If power is supplied by one or more batteries, the operating 
life shall be a minimum of 36 hours at 0 deg.C.


Sec. 232.405  Design and performance standards for two-way end-of-train 
devices.

    Two-way end-of-train devices shall be designed and perform with the 
features applicable to one-way end-of-train devices described in 
Sec. 232.403, except those included in Sec. 232.403(b)(3). In addition, 
a two-way end-of-train device shall be designed and perform with the 
following features:
    (a) An emergency brake application command from the front unit of 
the device shall activate the emergency air valve at the rear of the 
train within one second.
    (b) The rear unit of the device shall send an acknowledgment 
message to the front unit immediately upon receipt of an emergency 
brake application command. The front unit shall listen for this 
acknowledgment and repeat the brake application command if the 
acknowledgment is not correctly received.
    (c) The rear unit, on receipt of a properly coded command, shall 
open a valve in the brake line and hold it open for a minimum of 15 
seconds. This opening of the valve shall cause the brake line to vent 
to the exterior.
    (d) The valve opening shall have a minimum diameter of \3/4\ inch 
and the internal diameter of the hose shall be \5/8\ inch to effect an 
emergency brake application.
    (e) The front unit shall have a manually operated switch which, 
when activated, shall initiate an emergency brake transmission command 
to the rear unit or the locomotive shall be equipped with a manually 
operated switch on the engineer control stand designed to perform the 
equivalent function. The switch shall be labeled ``Emergency'' and 
shall be protected so that there will exist no possibility of 
accidental activation.
    (f) All locomotives ordered on or after August 1, 2001, or placed 
in service for the first time on or after August 1, 2003, shall be 
designed to automatically activate the two-way end-of-train device to 
effectuate an emergency brake application whenever it becomes necessary 
for the locomotive engineer to place the train air brakes in emergency.
    (g) The availability of the front-to-rear communications link shall 
be checked automatically at least every 10 minutes.
    (h) Means shall be provided to confirm the availability and proper 
functioning of the emergency valve.
    (i) Means shall be provided to arm the front and rear units to 
ensure the rear unit responds to an emergency command only from a 
properly associated front unit.


Sec. 232.407  Operations requiring use of two-way end-of-train devices; 
prohibition on purchase of nonconforming devices.

    (a) Definitions. The following definitions are intended solely for 
the purpose of identifying those operations subject to the requirements 
for the use of two-way end-of-train devices.

[[Page 4209]]

    (1) Heavy grade means:
    (i) For a train operating with 4,000 trailing tons or less, a 
section of track with an average grade of two percent or greater over a 
distance of two continuous miles; and
    (ii) For a train operating with greater than 4,000 trailing tons, a 
section of track with an average grade of one percent or greater over a 
distance of three continuous miles.
    (2) Train means one or more locomotives coupled with one or more 
rail cars, except during switching operations or where the operation is 
that of classifying cars within a railroad yard for the purpose of 
making or breaking up trains.
    (3) Local train means a train assigned to perform switching en 
route which operates with 4,000 trailing tons or less and travels 
between a point of origin and a point of final destination, for a 
distance that is no greater than that which can normally be operated by 
a single crew in a single tour of duty.
    (4) Work train means a non-revenue service train of 4,000 trailing 
tons or less used for the administration and upkeep service of the 
railroad.
    (5) Trailing tons means the sum of the gross weights--expressed in 
tons--of the cars and the locomotives in a train that are not providing 
propelling power to the train.
    (b) General. All trains not specifically excepted in paragraph (e) 
of this section shall be equipped with and shall use either a two-way 
end-of-train device meeting the design and performance requirements 
contained in Sec. 232.405 or a device using an alternative technology 
to perform the same function.
    (c) New devices. Each newly manufactured end-of-train device 
purchased by a railroad after January 2, 1998 shall be a two-way end-
of-train device meeting the design and performance requirements 
contained in Sec. 232.405 or a device using an alternative technology 
to perform the same function.
    (d) Grandfathering. Each two-way end-of-train device purchased by 
any person prior to July 1, 1997 shall be deemed to meet the design and 
performance requirements contained in Sec. 232.405.
    (e) Exceptions. The following types of trains are excepted from the 
requirement for the use of a two-way end-of-train device:
    (1) Trains with a locomotive or locomotive consist located at the 
rear of the train that is capable of making an emergency brake 
application, through a command effected by telemetry or by a crew 
member in radio contact with the controlling locomotive;
    (2) Trains operating in the push mode with the ability to 
effectuate an emergency brake application from the rear of the train;
    (3) Trains with an operational caboose placed at the rear of the 
train, carrying one or more crew members in radio contact with the 
controlling locomotive, that is equipped with an emergency brake valve;
    (4) Trains operating with a secondary, fully independent braking 
system capable of safely stopping the train in the event of failure of 
the primary system;
    (5) Trains that do not operate over heavy grades and do not exceed 
30 mph;
    (6) Local trains, as defined in paragraph (a)(3) of this section, 
that do not operate over heavy grades;
    (7) Work trains, as defined in paragraph (a)(4) of this section, 
that do not operate over heavy grades;
    (8) Trains that operate exclusively on track that is not part of 
the general railroad system;
    (9) Trains that must be divided into two sections in order to 
traverse a grade (e.g., doubling a hill). This exception applies only 
to the extent necessary to traverse the grade and only while the train 
is divided in two for such purpose;
    (10) Passenger trains in which all of the cars in the train are 
equipped with an emergency brake valve readily accessible to a crew 
member;
    (11) Passenger trains that have a car at the rear of the train, 
readily accessible to one or more crew members in radio contact with 
the engineer, that is equipped with an emergency brake valve readily 
accessible to such a crew member; and
    (12) Passenger trains that have twenty-four (24) or fewer cars (not 
including locomotives) in the consist and that are equipped and 
operated in accordance with the following train-configuration and 
operating requirements:
    (i) If the total number of cars in a passenger train consist is 
twelve (12) or fewer, a car located no less than halfway through the 
consist (counting from the first car in the train) must be equipped 
with an emergency brake valve readily accessible to a crew member;
    (ii) If the total number of cars in a passenger train consist is 
thirteen (13) to twenty-four (24), a car located no less than two-
thirds (\2/3\) of the way through the consist (counting from the first 
car in the train) must be equipped with an emergency brake valve 
readily accessible to a crew member;
    (iii) Prior to descending a section of track with an average grade 
of two percent or greater over a distance of two continuous miles, the 
engineer of the train shall communicate with the conductor, to ensure 
that a member of the crew with a working two-way radio is stationed in 
the car with the rearmost readily accessible emergency brake valve on 
the train when the train begins its descent; and
    (iv) While the train is descending a section of track with an 
average grade of two percent or greater over a distance of two 
continuous miles, a member of the train crew shall occupy the car that 
contains the rearmost readily accessible emergency brake valve on the 
train and be in constant radio communication with the locomotive 
engineer. The crew member shall remain in this car until the train has 
completely traversed the heavy grade.
    (f) Specific requirements for use. If a train is required to use a 
two-way end-of-train device:
    (1) That device shall be armed and operable from the time the train 
departs from the point where the device is installed until the train 
reaches its destination. If a loss of communication occurs at the 
location where the device is installed, the train may depart the 
location at restricted speed for a distance of no more than one mile in 
order to establish communication. When communication is established, 
the quantitative values of the head and rear unit shall be compared 
pursuant to Sec. 232.409(b) and the device tested pursuant to 
Sec. 232.409(c), unless the test was performed prior to installation.
    (2) The rear unit batteries shall be sufficiently charged at the 
initial terminal or other point where the device is installed and 
throughout the train's trip to ensure that the end-of-train device will 
remain operative until the train reaches its destination.
    (3) The device shall be activated to effectuate an emergency brake 
application either by using the manual toggle switch or through 
automatic activation, whenever it becomes necessary for the locomotive 
engineer to initiate an emergency application of the air brakes using 
either the automatic brake valve or the conductor's emergency brake 
valve.
    (g) En route failure of device on a freight or other non-passenger 
train. Except on passenger trains required to be equipped with a two-
way end-of-train device (which are provided for in paragraph (h) of 
this section), en route failures of a two-way end-of-train device shall 
be handled in accordance with this paragraph. If a two-way end-of-train 
device or equivalent device fails en route (i.e., is unable to initiate 
an emergency brake application from the rear of the train due to 
certain losses of communication (front to rear) or due to

[[Page 4210]]

other reasons, the speed of the train on which it is installed shall be 
limited to 30 mph until the ability of the device to initiate an 
emergency brake application from the rear of the train is restored. 
This limitation shall apply to a train using a device that uses an 
alternative technology to serve the purpose of a two-way end-of-train 
device. With regard to two-way end-of-train devices, a loss of 
communication between the front and rear units is an en route failure 
only if the loss of communication is for a period greater than 16 
minutes and 30 seconds. Based on the existing design of the devices, 
the display to an engineer of a message that there is a communication 
failure indicates that communication has been lost for 16 minutes and 
30 seconds or more.
    (1) If a two-way end-of-train device fails en route, the train on 
which it is installed, in addition to observing the 30-mph speed 
limitation, shall not operate over a section of track with an average 
grade of two percent or greater for a distance of two continuous miles, 
unless one of the following alternative measures is provided:
    (i) Use of an occupied helper locomotive at the end of the train. 
This alternative may be used only if the following requirements are 
met:
    (A) The helper locomotive engineer shall initiate and maintain two-
way voice radio communication with the engineer on the head end of the 
train; this contact shall be verified just prior to passing the crest 
of the grade.
    (B) If there is a loss of communication prior to passing the crest 
of the grade, the helper locomotive engineer and the head-end engineer 
shall act immediately to stop the train until voice communication is 
resumed, in accordance with the railroad's operating rules.
    (C) If there is a loss of communication once the descent has begun, 
the helper locomotive engineer and the head-end engineer shall act to 
stop the train, in accordance with the railroad's operating rules, if 
the train has reached a predetermined rate of speed that indicates the 
need for emergency braking.
    (D) The brake pipe of the helper locomotive shall be connected and 
cut into the train line and tested to ensure operation.
    (ii) Use of an occupied caboose at the end of the train with a 
tested, functioning brake valve capable of initiating an emergency 
brake application from the caboose. This alternative may be used only 
if the train service employee in the caboose and the engineer on the 
head end of the train establish and maintain two-way voice radio 
communication and respond appropriately to the loss of such 
communication in the same manner as prescribed for helper locomotives 
in paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this section.
    (iii) Use of a radio-controlled locomotive at the rear of the train 
under continuous control of the engineer in the head end by means of 
telemetry, but only if such radio-controlled locomotive is capable of 
initiating an emergency application on command from the lead 
(controlling) locomotive.
    (2) [Reserved.]
    (h) En route failure of device on a passenger train.
    (1) A passenger train required to be equipped with a two-way end-
of-train device that develops an en route failure of the device (as 
explained in paragraph (g) of this section) shall not operate over a 
section of track with an average grade of two percent or greater over a 
distance of two continuous miles until an operable two-way end-of-train 
device is installed on the train or an alternative method of initiating 
an emergency brake application from the rear of the train is achieved.
    (2) Except as provided in paragraph (h)(1) of this section, a 
passenger train required to be equipped with a two-way end-of-train 
device that develops an en route failure of the device (as explained in 
paragraph (g) of this section) shall be operated in accordance with the 
following:
    (i) A member of the train crew shall be immediately positioned in 
the car which contains the rearmost readily accessible emergency brake 
valve on the train and shall be equipped with an operable two-way radio 
that communicates with the locomotive engineer; and
    (ii) The locomotive engineer shall periodically make running tests 
of the train's air brakes until the failure is corrected; and
    (3) Each en route failure shall be corrected at the next location 
where the necessary repairs can be conducted or at the next location 
where a required brake test is to be performed, whichever is reached 
first.


Sec. 232.409  Inspection and testing of end-of-train devices.

    (a) After each installation of either the front or rear unit of an 
end-of-train device, or both, on a train and before the train departs, 
the railroad shall determine that the identification code entered into 
the front unit is identical to the unique identification code on the 
rear unit.
    (b) After each installation of either the front or rear unit of an 
end-of-train device, or both, on a train and before the train departs, 
the functional capability of the device shall be determined, after 
charging the train, by comparing the quantitative value of the air 
pressure displayed on the front unit with the quantitative value of the 
air pressure displayed on the rear unit or on a properly calibrated air 
gauge. The end-of-train device shall not be used if the difference 
between the two readings exceeds three pounds per square inch.
    (c) A two-way end-of-train device shall be tested at the initial 
terminal or other point of installation to ensure that the device is 
capable of initiating an emergency power brake application from the 
rear of the train. If this test is conducted by a person other than a 
member of the train crew, the locomotive engineer shall be notified 
that a successful test was performed. The notification required by this 
paragraph may be provided to the locomotive engineer by any means 
determined appropriate by the railroad; however, a written or 
electronic record of the notification shall be maintained in the cab of 
the controlling locomotive and shall include the date and time of the 
test, the location where the test was performed, and the name of person 
conducting the test.
    (d) The telemetry equipment shall be tested for accuracy and 
calibrated if necessary according to the manufacturer's specifications 
and procedures at least every 365 days. This shall include testing 
radio frequencies and modulation of the device. The date and location 
of the last calibration or test as well as the name of the person 
performing the calibration or test shall be legibly displayed on a 
weather-resistant sticker or other marking device affixed to the 
outside of both the front unit and the rear unit; however, if the front 
unit is an integral part of the locomotive or is inaccessible, then the 
information may be recorded on Form FRA F6180-49A instead, provided the 
serial number of the unit is recorded.

Subpart F--Introduction of New Brake System Technology


Sec. 232.501  Scope.

    This subpart contains general requirements for introducing new 
brake system technologies. This subpart is intended to facilitate the 
introduction of new complete brake system technologies or major 
upgrades to existing systems which the current regulations do not 
adequately address (i.e., electronic brake systems). This subpart is 
not intended for use in the introduction of a new brake component or 
material.

[[Page 4211]]

Sec. 232.503  Process to introduce new brake system technology.

    (a) Pursuant to the procedures contained in Sec. 232.17, each 
railroad shall obtain special approval from the FRA Associate 
Administrator for Safety of a pre-revenue service acceptance testing 
plan, developed pursuant to Sec. 232.505, for the new brake system 
technology, prior to implementing the plan.
    (b) Each railroad shall complete a pre-revenue service 
demonstration of the new brake system technology in accordance with the 
approved plan, shall fulfill all of the other requirements prescribed 
in Sec. 232.505, and shall obtain special approval from the FRA 
Associate Administrator for Safety under the procedures of Sec. 232.17 
prior to using such brake system technology in revenue service.


Sec. 232.505  Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.

    (a) General; submission of plan. Except as provided in paragraph 
(f) of this section, before using a new brake system technology for the 
first time on its system the operating railroad or railroads shall 
submit a pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan containing the 
information required by paragraph (e) of this section and obtain the 
approval of the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety, under the 
procedures specified in Sec. 232.17.
    (b) Compliance with plan. After receiving FRA approval of the pre-
revenue service testing plan and before introducing the new brake 
system technology into revenue service, the operating railroad or 
railroads shall:
    (1) Adopt and comply with such FRA-approved plan, including fully 
executing the tests required by the plan;
    (2) Report to the FRA Associate Administrator for Safety the 
results of the pre-revenue service acceptance tests;
    (3) Correct any safety deficiencies identified by FRA in the design 
of the equipment or in the inspection, testing, and maintenance 
procedures or, if safety deficiencies cannot be corrected by design or 
procedural changes, agree to comply with any operational limitations 
that may be imposed by the Associate Administrator for Safety on the 
revenue service operation of the equipment; and
    (4) Obtain FRA approval to place the new brake system technology in 
revenue service.
    (c) Compliance with limitations. The operating railroad shall 
comply with each operational limitation, if any, imposed by the 
Associate Administrator for Safety.
    (d) Availability of plan. The plan shall be made available to FRA 
for inspection and copying upon request.
    (e) Elements of plan. The plan shall include all of the following 
elements:
    (1) An identification of each waiver, if any, of FRA or other 
Federal safety regulations required for the tests or for revenue 
service operation of the equipment.
    (2) A clear statement of the test objectives. One of the principal 
test objectives shall be to demonstrate that the equipment meets the 
safety design and performance requirements specified in this part when 
operated in the environment in which it is to be used.
    (3) A planned schedule for conducting the tests.
    (4) A description of the railroad property or facilities to be used 
to conduct the tests.
    (5) A detailed description of how the tests are to be conducted. 
This description shall include:
    (i) An identification of the equipment to be tested;
    (ii) The method by which the equipment is to be tested;
    (iii) The criteria to be used to evaluate the equipment's 
performance; and
    (iv) The means by which the test results are to be reported to FRA.
    (6) A description of any special instrumentation to be used during 
the tests.
    (7) A description of the information or data to be obtained.
    (8) A description of how the information or data obtained is to be 
analyzed or used.
    (9) A description of any criteria to be used as safety limits 
during the testing.
    (10) A description of the criteria to be used to measure or 
determine the success or failure of the tests. If acceptance is to be 
based on extrapolation of less than full level testing results, the 
analysis to be done to justify the validity of the extrapolation shall 
be described.
    (11) A description of any special safety precautions to be observed 
during the testing.
    (12) A written set of standard operating procedures to be used to 
ensure that the testing is done safely.
    (13) Quality control procedures to ensure that the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance procedures are followed.
    (14) Criteria to be used for the revenue service operation of the 
equipment.
    (15) A description of all testing of the equipment that has 
previously been performed, if any.
    (f) Exception. For brake system technologies that have previously 
been used in revenue service in the United States, the railroad shall 
test the equipment on its system, prior to placing it in revenue 
service, to ensure the compatibility of the equipment with the 
operating system (track, signals, etc.) of the railroad. A description 
of such testing shall be retained by the railroad and made available to 
FRA for inspection and copying upon request.

Appendix A to Part 232--Schedule of Civil Penalties \1\

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                     Willful
                                    Section                                        Violation        violation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              Subpart A--General
 
232.15  Movement of power brake defects:
    (a) Improper movement, general............................................              (1)              (1)
        (11) Failure to make determinations and provide notification of en               $2,500           $5,000
         route defect.........................................................
    (b) Complete failure to tag...............................................            2,500            5,000
        (1) Insufficient tag or record........................................            1,000            2,000
        (2), (4) Improper removal of tag......................................            2,000            4,000
        (3) Failure to retain record of tag...................................            2,000            4,000
    (c) Improper loading or purging...........................................            2,500            5,000
    (e) Improper placement of defective equipment.............................            2,500            5,000
232.19  Availability of records...............................................              (1)              (1)
 
                        Subpart B--General Requirements
 
232.103  All train brake systems:
    (a)-(c), (h)-(i) Failure to meet general design requirements..............            2,500            5,000
    (d) Failure to have proper percentage of operative brakes from Class I                5,000            7,500
     brake test...............................................................
    (e) Operating with less than 85 percent operative brakes..................            5,000            7,500
    (f) Improper use of car with inoperative or ineffective brakes............            2,500            5,000
    (g) Improper display of piston travel.....................................            2,500            5,000

[[Page 4212]]

 
    (m) Failure to stop train with excess air flow or gradient................            2,500            5,000
    (n) Securement of unattended equipment:...................................
        (1) Failure to apply sufficient number of hand brakes; failure to                 5,000            7,500
         develop or implement procedure to verify number applied..............
        (2) Failure to initiate emergency.....................................            2,500            5,000
        (3) Failure to apply hand brakes on locomotives.......................            2,500            5,000
        (4) Failure to adopt or comply with procedures for securing unattended            5,000            7,500
         locomotive...........................................................
    (o) Improper adjustment of air regulating devices.........................            2,500            5,000
    (p) Failure to hold supervisors jointly responsible.......................            2,500            5,000
232.105  Locomotives:
    (a) Air brakes not in safe and suitable condition.........................           1,000-           2,000-
                                                                                          5,000            7,500
    (b) Not equipped with proper hand or parking brake........................            5,000            7,500
    (c)(1) Failure to inspect/repair hand or parking brake....................            2,500            5,000
        (2) Failure to properly stencil, tag, or record.......................            2,000            4,000
    (d) Excess leakage from equalizing reservoir..............................            2,500            5,000
    (e) Improper use of feed or regulating valve braking......................            2,500            5,000
    (f) Improper use of passenger position....................................            2,500            5,000
    (g) Brakes in operative condition.........................................            2,500            5,000
232.107  Air sources/cold weather operations:
    (a)(1), (2) Failure to adopt or comply with monitoring program for yard               5,000            7,500
     air sources..............................................................
        (3) Failure to maintain records.......................................            2,500            5,000
    (b) Failure to blow condensation..........................................            2,500            5,000
    (c) Use of improper chemicals.............................................            5,000            7,500
    (d) Failure to equip or drain yard air reservoirs.........................            2,500            5,000
    (e) Failure to adopt or comply cold weather operating procedures..........            5,000            7,500
232.109  Dynamic brakes:
    (a) Failure to provide information........................................            5,000            7,500
    (b) Failure to make repairs...............................................            5,000            7,500
    (c) Failure to properly tag...............................................            2,500            5,000
    (d) Failure to maintain record of repair..................................            2,000            4,000
    (e) Improper deactivation.................................................            2,500            5,000
    (f) Improper use of locomotive as controlling unit........................            2,500            5,000
    (g) Locomotive not properly equipped with indicator.......................            2,500            5,000
    (h) Rebuilt locomotive not properly equipped..............................            2,500            5,000
    (j) Failure to adopt or comply with dynamic brake operating rules.........            5,000            7,500
    (k) Failure to adopt or comply with training on operating procedures......            5,000            7,500
232.111  Train handling information:
    (a) Failure to adopt and comply with procedures...........................            5,000            7,500
    (b) Failure to provide specific information...............................            2,500            5,000
 
                Subpart C--Inspection and Testing Requirements
 
232.203  Training requirements:
    (a) Failure to develop or adopt program...................................            7,500           11,000
    (b)(1)-(9) Failure to address or comply with specific required item or                5,000            7,500
     provision of program.....................................................
    (c) Failure to adopt or comply with two-way EOT program...................            5,000            7,500
    (d) Failure to adopt or comply with retaining valve program...............            5,000            7,500
    (e) Failure to maintain adequate records..................................            5,000            7,500
    (f) Failure to adopt and comply with periodic assessment plan.............            7,500           11,000
232.205  Class I brake test--initial terminal inspection:
    (a) Complete failure to perform inspection................................         1 10,000           15,000
    (b)(1)-(4), (6)-(8) Partial failure to perform inspection.................            5,000            7,500
    (b)(5) Failure to properly adjust piston travel (per car).................            2,500            5,000
    (c) Failure to use carman when required...................................            5,000            7,500
    (d) Failure to provide proper notification................................            2,500            5,000
    (e) Failure to void compressed air........................................            2,500            5,000
    (f) Failure to perform inspection on cars added...........................            5,000            7,500
232.207  Class IA brake tests--1,000-mile inspection:
    (a) Complete failure to perform inspection................................         1 15,000            7,500
    (b)(1)-(6) Partial failure to perform inspection..........................            2,500            5,000
    (c) Failure to properly designate location................................            5,000            7,500
    (c)(1) Failure to perform at designated location..........................            5,000            7,500
    (c)(2) Failure to provide notification....................................            2,500            5,000
232.209  Class II brake tests--intermediate inspection:
    (a) Complete failure to perform inspection................................          1 5,000            7,500
    (b)(1)-(5), (c) Partial failure to perform inspection.....................            2,500            5,000
232.211  Class III brake tests--trainline continuity inspection:
    (a) Complete failure to perform inspection................................            5,000            7,500
    (b)(1)-(4), (c) Partial failure to perform inspection.....................            2,500            5,000
232.213  Extended haul trains:
    (a)(1) Failure to properly designate an extended haul train...............            5,000            7,500
    (a)(2)-(3), (5)(i), (8) Failure to perform inspections....................              (2)              (2)
    (a)(4) Failure to remove defective car (per car)..........................            2,000            4,000
    (a)(5)(ii), (6) Failure to conduct inbound inspection.....................            5,000            7,500
    (a)(7) Failure to maintain record of defects (per car)....................            2,000            4,000

[[Page 4213]]

 
232.215  Transfer train brake tests:
    (a) Failure to perform inspection.........................................            5,000            7,500
    (b) Failure to perform on cars added......................................            2,500            5,000
232.217  Train brake system tests conducted using yard air:
    (a) Failure to use suitable device........................................            2,500            5,000
    (b) Improper connection of air test device................................            5,000            7,500
    (c) Failure to properly perform inspection................................              (2)              (2)
    (d) Failure to calibrate test device......................................            2,500            5,000
    (e) Failure to use accurate device........................................            2,500            5,000
232.219  Double heading and helper service:
    (a) Failure to perform inspection or inability to control brakes..........            2,500            5,000
    (b) Failure to make visual inspection.....................................            2,500            5,000
    (c) Use of improper helper link device....................................            2,500            5,000
 
           Subpart D--Periodic Maintenance and Testing Requirements
 
232.303  General requirements:
    (b)-(d) Failure to conduct inspection or test when car on repair track....            2,500            5,000
    (e) Improper movement of equipment for testing............................            2,500            5,000
    (e)(1) Failure to properly tag equipment for movement.....................            2,000            5,000
    (e)(2)-(4) Failure to retain record or improper removal of tag or card....            2,000            4,000
    (f) Failure to stencil or track test information..........................            2,500            5,000
232.305  Repair track air brake tests:
    (a) Failure to test in accord with required procedure.....................            2,500            5,000
    (b)-(d) Failure to perform test...........................................            2,500            5,000
232.307  Single car tests:
    (a) Failure to test in accord with required procedure.....................            2,500            5,000
    (b)-(c) Failure to perform test...........................................            2,500            5,000
232.309  Repair track air brake test and single car test equipment and
 devices:
    (a)-(f) Failure to properly test or calibrate.............................            2,500            5,000
 
                        Subpart E--End-of-Train Devices
 
232.403  Design standards for one-way devices:
    (a)-(g) Failure to meet standards.........................................            2,500            5,000
232.405  Design standards for two-way devices:
    (a)-(i) Failure to meet standards.........................................            2,500            5,000
232.407  Operating requirements for two-way devices:
    (b) Failure to equip a train..............................................            5,000            7,500
    (c) Improper purchase.....................................................            2,500            5,000
    (f)(1) Failure of device to be armed and operable.........................            5,000            7,500
    (f)(2) Insufficient battery charge........................................            2,500            5,000
    (f)(3) Failure to activate the device.....................................            2,500            5,000
    (g) Improper handling of en route failure, freight or other non-passenger.            5,000            7,500
    (h) Improper handling of en route failure, passenger......................            5,000            7,500
232.409  Inspection and testing of devices:
    (a) Failure to have unique code...........................................            2,500            5,000
    (b) Failure to compare quantitative values................................            2,500            5,000
    (c) Failure to test emergency capability..................................            5,000            7,500
    (d) Failure to properly calibrate.........................................            2,500            5,000
 
            Subpart F--Introduction of New Brake System Technology
 
232.503  Process to introduce new technology:
    (b) Failure to obtain FRA approval........................................           10,000           15,000
232.505  Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan:
    (a) Failure to obtain FRA approval........................................            5,000            7,500
    (b) Failure to comply with plan...........................................            2,500            5,000
    (f) Failure to test previously used technology............................            5,000           7,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 A penalty may be assessed against an individual only for a willful violation. Generally when two or more
  violations of these regulations are discovered with respect to a single unit of equipment that is placed or
  continued in service by a railroad, the appropriate penalties set forth above are aggregated up to a maximum
  of $11,000 per day. An exception to this rule is the $15,000 penalty for willful violation of Sec.  232.503
  (failure to get FRA approval before introducing new technology) with respect to a single unit of equipment; if
  the unit has additional violative conditions, the penalty may routinely be aggregated to $15,000. Although the
  penalties listed for failure to perform the brake inspections and tests under Sec.  232.205 through Sec.
  232.209 may be assessed for each train that is not properly inspected, failure to perform any of the
  inspections and tests required under those sections will be treated as a violation separate and distinct from,
  and in addition to, any substantive violative conditions found on the equipment contained in the train
  consist. Moreover, the Administrator reserves the right to assess a penalty of up to $22,000 for any violation
  where circumstances warrant. See 49 CFR part 209, appendix A.
Failure to observe any condition for movement of defective equipment set forth in Sec.  232.15(a) will deprive
  the railroad of the benefit of the movement-for-repair provision and make the railroad and any responsible
  individuals liable for penalty under the particular regulatory section(s) concerning the substantive defect(s)
  present on the equipment at the time of movement.
Failure to provide any of the records or plans required by this part pursuant to Sec.  232.19 will be considered
  a failure to maintain or develop the record or plan and will make the railroad liable for penalty under the
  particular regulatory section(s) concerning the retention or creation of the document involved.
Failure to properly perform any of the inspections specifically referenced in Sec.  232.213 and Sec.  232.217
  may be assessed under each section of this part or this chapter, or both, that contains the requirements for
  performing the referenced inspection.


[[Page 4214]]

    Appendix B to Part 232--Part 232 Prior to April 1, 2001

PART 232--RAILROAD POWER BRAKES AND DRAWBARS

Sec.
232.0   Applicability and penalties.
232.1   Power brakes; minimum percentage.
232.2   Drawbars; standard height.
232.3   Power brakes and appliances for operating power-brake 
systems.
232.10   General rules; locomotives.
232.11   Train air brake system tests.
232.12   Initial terminal road train airbrake tests.
232.13   Road train and intermediate terminal train air brake tests.
232.14   Inbound brake equipment inspection.
232.15   Double heading and helper service.
232.16   Running tests.
232.17   Freight and passenger train car brakes.
232.19   End of train device.
232 App A   Appendix A to Part 232
232 App B   Appendix B to Part 232


    Authority: 45 U.S.C. 1, 3, 5, 6, 8-12, and 16, as amended; 45 
U.S.C. 431, 438, as amended; 49 app. U.S.C. 1655(e), as amended; 
Pub. L. 100-342; and 49 CFR 1.49(c), (g), and (m).


Sec. 232.0  Applicability and penalties.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), this part applies to 
all standard gage railroads.
    (b) This part does not apply to:
    (1) A railroad that operates only on track inside an 
installation which is not part of the general railroad system of 
transportation; or
    (2) Rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not 
connected with the general railroad system of transportation.
    (c) As used in this part, carrier means ``railroad,'' as that 
term is defined below.
    (d) Railroad means all forms of non-highway ground 
transportation that run on rails or electromagnetic guideways, 
including (1) commuter or other short-haul rail passenger service in 
a metropolitan or suburban area, and (2) high speed ground 
transportation systems that connect metropolitan areas, without 
regard to whether they use new technologies not associated with 
traditional railroads. Such term does not include rapid transit 
operations within an urban area that are not connected to the 
general railroad system of transportation.
    (e) Any person (including a railroad and any manager, 
supervisor, official, or other employee or agent of a railroad) who 
violates any requirement of this part or causes the violation of any 
such requirement is subject to a civil penalty of at least $250 and 
not more than $10,000 per violation, except that: Penalties may be 
assessed against individuals only for willful violations, and, where 
a grossly negligent violation or a pattern of repeated violations 
has created an imminent hazard of death or injury to persons, or has 
caused death or injury, a penalty not to exceed $20,000 per 
violation may be assessed. Each day a violation continues shall 
constitute a separate offense.


Sec. 232.1  Power brakes; minimum percentage.

    On and after September 1, 1910, on all railroads used in 
interstate commerce, whenever, as required by the Safety Appliance 
Act as amended March 2, 1903, any train is operated with power or 
train brakes, not less than 85 percent of the cars of such train 
shall have their brakes used and operated by the engineer of the 
locomotive drawing such train, and all power-brake cars in every 
such train which are associated together with the 85 percent shall 
have their brakes so used and operated.


Sec. 232.2  Drawbars; standard Height.

    Not included in this Appendix. Moved to 49 CFR part 231.


Sec. 232.3  Power brakes and appliances for operating power-brake 
systems.

    (a) The specifications and requirement for power brakes and 
appliances for operating power-brake systems for freight service set 
forth in the appendix to the report on further hearing, of May 30, 
1945, are hereby adopted and prescribed. (See appendix to this part 
for order in Docket 13528.)

Rules for Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Air Brake Equipment


Sec. 232.10  General rules; locomotives.

    (a) Air brake and hand brake equipment on locomotives including 
tender must be inspected and maintained in accordance with the 
requirements of the Locomotive Inspection and United States Safety 
Appliance Acts and related orders and regulations of the Federal 
Railroad Administrator (FRA).
    (b) It must be known that air brake equipment on locomotives is 
in a safe and suitable condition for service.
    (c) Compressor or compressors must be tested for capacity by 
orifice test as often as conditions require but not less frequently 
than required by law and orders of the FRA.
    (d) Main reservoirs shall be subjected to tests periodically as 
required by law and orders of the FRA.
    (e) Air gauges must be tested periodically as required by law 
and orders of the FRA, and whenever any irregularity is reported. 
They shall be compared with an accurate deadweight tester, or test 
gauge. Gauges found inaccurate or defective must be repaired or 
replaced.
    (f)(1) All operating portions of air brake equipment together 
with dirt collectors and filters must be cleaned, repaired and 
tested as often as conditions require to maintain them in a safe and 
suitable condition for service, and not less frequently than 
required by law and orders of the FRA.
    (2) On locomotives so equipped, hand brakes, parts, and 
connections must be inspected, and necessary repairs made as often 
as the service requires, with date being suitably stenciled or 
tagged.
    (g) The date of testing or cleaning of air brake equipment and 
the initials of the shop or station at which the work was done shall 
be placed on a card displayed under transparent covering in the cab 
of each locomotive unit.
    (h)(1) Minimum brake cylinder piston travel must be sufficient 
to provide proper brake shoe clearance when brakes are released.
    (2) Maximum brake cylinder piston travel when locomotive is 
standing must not exceed the following:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Inches
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Steam locomotives:
    Cam type of driving wheel brake.....................          3\1/2\
    Other types of driving wheel brakes.................               6
    Engine truck brake..................................               8
    Engine trailer truck brake..........................               8
    Tender brake (truck mounted and tender bed mounted).               8
    Tender brake (body mounted).........................               9
Locomotives other than steam:
    Driving wheel brake.................................               6
    Swivel type truck brake with brakes on more than one               7
     truck operated by one brake cylinder...............
    Swivel type truck brake equipped with one brake                    8
     cylinder...........................................
    Swivel type truck brake equipped with two or more                  6
     brake cylinders....................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (i)(1) Foundation brake rigging, and safety supports, where 
used, must be maintained in a safe and suitable condition for 
service. Levers, rods, brake beams, hangars and pins must be of 
ample strength and must not bind or foul in any way that will affect 
proper operation of brakes. All pins must be properly applied and 
secured in place with suitable locking devices. Brake shoes must be 
properly applied and kept approximately in line with treads of 
wheels or other braking surfaces.

[[Page 4215]]

    (2) No part of the foundation brake rigging and safety supports 
shall be closer to the rails than specified by law and orders of the 
FRA.
    (j)(1) Main reservoir leakage: Leakage from main air reservoir 
and related piping shall not exceed an average of 3 pounds per 
minute in a test of three minutes' duration, made after the pressure 
has been reduced 40 percent below maximum pressure.
    (2) Brake pipe leakage: Brake pipe leakage must not exceed 5 
pounds per minute after a reduction of 10 pounds has been made from 
brake pipe air pressure of not less than 70 pounds.
    (3) Brake cylinder leakage: With a full service application of 
brakes, and with communication to the brake cylinders closed, brakes 
must remain applied not less than five minutes.
    (4) The main reservoir system of each unit shall be equipped 
with at least one safety valve, the capacity of which shall be 
sufficient to prevent an accumulation of pressure of more than 10 
pounds per square inch above the maximum setting of the compressor 
governor fixed by the chief mechanical officer of the carrier 
operating the locomotive.
    (5) A suitable governor shall be provided that will stop and 
start the air compressor within 5 pounds above or below the 
pressures fixed.
    (6) Compressor governor when used in connection with the 
automatic air brake system shall be so adjusted that the compressor 
will start when the main reservoir pressure is not less than 15 
pounds above the maximum brake-pipe pressure fixed by the rules of 
the carrier and will not stop the compressor until the reservoir 
pressure has increased not less than 10 pounds.
    (k) The communicating signal system on locomotives when used in 
passenger service must be tested and known to be in a safe and 
suitable condition for service before each trip.
    (l) Enginemen when taking charge of locomotives must know that 
the brakes are in operative condition.
    (m) In freezing weather drain cocks on air compressors of steam 
locomotives must be left open while compressors are shut off.
    (n) Air pressure regulating devices must be adjusted for the 
following pressures:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Pounds
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Locomotives:
    (1) Minimum brake pipe air pressure:
        Road Service....................................              70
        Switch Service..................................              60
    (2) Minimum differential between brake pipe and main              15
     reservoir air pressures, with brake valve in
     running position...................................
    (3) Safety valve for straight air brake.............           30-55
    (4) Safety valve for LT, ET, No. 8-EL, No. 14 El,              30-68
     No. 6-DS, No. 6-BL and No. 6-SL equipment..........
    (5) Safety valve for HSC and No. 24-RL equipment....           30-75
    (6) Reducing valve for independent or straight air             30-50
     brake..............................................
    (7) Self-lapping portion for electro-pneumatic brake              50
     (minimum full application pressure)................
    (8) Self-lapping portion for independent air brake             30-50
     (full application pressure)........................
    (9) Reducing valve for air signal...................           40-60
    (10) Reducing valve for high-speed brake (minimum)..              50
Cars:
    (11) Reducing valve for high-speed brake............           58-62
    (12) Safety valve for PS, LN, UC, AML, AMU and AB-1-           58-62
     B air brakes.......................................
    (13) Safety valve for HSC air brake.................           58-77
    (14) Governor valve for water raising system........              60
    (15) Reducing valve for water raising system........           20-30
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 232.11  Train Air Brake System Tests.

    (a) Supervisors are jointly responsible with inspectors, 
enginemen and trainmen for condition of train air brake and air 
signal equipment on motive power and cars to the extent that it is 
possible to detect defective equipment by required air tests.
    (b) Communicating signal system on passenger equipment trains 
must be tested and known to be in a suitable condition for service 
before leaving terminal.
    (c) Each train must have the air brakes in effective operating 
condition, and at no time shall the number and location of operative 
air brakes be less than permitted by Federal requirements. When 
piston travel is in excess of 10\1/2\ inches, the air brakes cannot 
be considered in effective operating condition.
    (d) Condensation must be blown from the pipe from which air is 
taken before connecting yard line or motive power to train.


Sec. 232.12  Initial Terminal Road Train Airbrake Tests.

    (a)(1) Each train must be inspected and tested as specified in 
this section by a qualified person at points--
    (i) Where the train is originally made up (initial terminal);
    (ii) Where train consist is changed, other than by adding or 
removing a solid block of cars, and the train brake system remains 
charged; and
    (iii) Where the train is received in interchange if the train 
consist is changed other than by--
    (A) Removing a solid block of cars from the head end or rear end 
of train;
    (B) Changing motive power;
    (C) Removing or changing the caboose; or
    (D) Any combination of the changes listed in (A), (B), and (C) 
of this subparagraph.
    Where a carman is to perform the inspection and test under 
existing or future collective bargaining agreement, in those 
circumstances a carman alone will be considered a qualified person.
    (2) A qualified person participating in the test and inspection 
or who has knowledge that it was made shall notify the engineer that 
the initial terminal road train air brake test has been 
satisfactorily performed. The qualified person shall provide the 
notification in writing if the road crew will report for duty after 
the qualified person goes off duty. The qualified person also shall 
provide the notification in writing if the train that has been 
inspected is to be moved in excess of 500 miles without being 
subjected to another test pursuant to either this section or 
Sec. 232.13 of this part.
    (b) Each carrier shall designate additional inspection points 
not more than 1,000 miles apart where intermediate inspection will 
be made to determine that--
    (1) Brake pipe pressure leakage does not exceed five pounds per 
minute;
    (2) Brakes apply on each car in response to a 20-pound service 
brake pipe pressure reduction; and
    (3) Brake rigging is properly secured and does not bind or foul.
    (c) Train airbrake system must be charged to required air 
pressure, angle cocks and cutout cocks must be properly positioned, 
air hose must be properly coupled and must be in condition for 
service. An examination must be made for leaks and necessary repairs 
made to reduce leakage to a minimum. Retaining valves and retaining 
valve pipes must be inspected and known to be in condition for 
service. If train is to be operated in electro-pneumatic brake 
operation, brake circuit cables must be properly connected.
    (d)(1) After the airbrake system on a freight train is charged 
to within 15 pounds of the setting of the feed valve on the 
locomotive, but to not less than 60 pounds, as indicated by an 
accurate gauge at rear end of train, and on a passenger train when 
charged to not less than 70 pounds, and upon receiving the signal to 
apply brakes for test, a 15-pound brake pipe service reduction must 
be made in automatic brake operations, the brake valve lapped, and 
the number of pounds of brake pipe leakage per minute noted as

[[Page 4216]]

indicated by brake pipe guage, after which brake pipe reduction must 
be increased to full service. Inspection of the train brakes must be 
made to determine that angle cocks are properly positioned, that the 
brakes are applied on each car, that piston travel is correct, that 
brake rigging does not bind or foul, and that all parts of the brake 
equipment are properly secured. When this inspection has been 
completed, the release signal must be given and brakes released and 
each brake inspected to see that all have released.
    (2) When a passenger train is to be operated in electro-
pneumatic brake operation and after completion of test of brakes as 
prescribed by paragraph (d)(1) of this section the brake system must 
be recharged to not less than 90 pounds air pressure, and upon 
receiving the signal to apply brakes for test, a minimum 20 pounds 
electro-pneumatic brake application must be made as indicated by the 
brake cylinder gage. Inspection of the train brakes must then be 
made to determine if brakes are applied on each car. When this 
inspection has been completed, the release signal must be given and 
brakes released and each brake inspected to see that all have 
released.
    (3) When the locomotive used to haul the train is provided with 
means for maintaining brake pipe pressure at a constant level during 
service application of the train brakes, this feature must be cut 
out during train airbrake tests.
    (e) Brake pipe leakage must not exceed 5 pounds per minute.
    (f)(1) At initial terminal piston travel of body-mounted brake 
cylinders which is less than 7 inches or more than 9 inches must be 
adjusted to nominally 7 inches.
    (2) Minimum brake cylinder piston travel of truck-mounted brake 
cylinders must be sufficient to provide proper brake shoe clearance 
when brakes are released. Maximum piston travel must not exceed 6 
inches.
    (3) Piston travel of brake cylinders on freight cars equipped 
with other than standard single capacity brake, must be adjusted as 
indicated on badge plate or stenciling on car located in a 
conspicuous place near the brake cylinder.
    (g) When test of airbrakes has been completed the engineman and 
conductor must be advised that train is in proper condition to 
proceed.
    (h) During standing test, brakes must not be applied or released 
until proper signal is given.
    (i)(1) When train airbrake system is tested from a yard test 
plant, an engineer's brake valve or an appropriate test device shall 
be used to provide increase and reduction of brake pipe air pressure 
or electro-pneumatic brake application and release at the same or a 
slower rate as with engineer's brake valve and yard test plant must 
be connected to the end which will be nearest to the hauling road 
locomotive.
    (2) When yard test plant is used, the train airbrakes system 
must be charged and tested as prescribed by paragraphs (c) to (g) of 
this section inclusive, and when practicable should be kept charged 
until road motive power is coupled to train, after which, an 
automatic brake application and release test of airbrakes on rear 
car must be made. If train is to be operated in electro-pneumatic 
brake operation, this test must also be made in electro-pneumatic 
brake operation before proceeding.
    (3) If after testing the brakes as prescribed in paragraph 
(i)(2) of this section the train is not kept charged until road 
motive power is attached, the brakes must be tested as prescribed by 
paragraph (d)(1) of this section and if train is to be operated in 
electro-pneumatic brake operation as prescribed by paragraph (d)(2) 
of this section.
    (j) Before adjusting piston travel or working on brake rigging, 
cutout cock in brake pipe branch must be closed and air reservoirs 
must be drained. When cutout cocks are provided in brake cylinder 
pipes, these cutout cocks only may be closed and air reservoirs need 
not be drained.


Sec. 232.13    Road train and intermediate terminal train air brake 
tests.

    (a) Passenger trains. Before motive power is detached or angle 
cocks are closed on a passenger train operated in either automatic 
or electro-pneumatic brake operation, except when closing angle 
cocks for cutting off one or more cars from the rear end of train, 
automatic air brake must be applied. After recouping, brake system 
must be recharged to required air pressure and before proceeding and 
upon receipt of proper request or signal, application and release 
tests of brakes on rear car must be made from locomotive in 
automatic brake operation. If train is to be operated in electro-
pneumatic brake operation, this test must also be made in electro-
pneumatic brake operation before proceeding. Inspector or trainman 
must determine if brakes on rear car of train properly apply and 
release.
    (b) Freight trains. Before motive power is detached or angle 
cocks are closed on a freight train, brakes must be applied with not 
less than a 20-pound brake pipe reduction. After recoupling, and 
after angle cocks are opened, it must be known that brake pipe air 
pressure is being restored as indicated by a rear car gauge or 
device. In the absence of a rear car gauge or device, an air brake 
test must be made to determine that the brakes on the rear car apply 
and release.
    (c)(1)At a point other than an initial terminal where a 
locomotive or caboose is changed, or where one or more consecutive 
cars are cut off from the rear end or head end of a train with the 
consist otherwise remaining intact, after the train brake system is 
charged to within 15 pounds of the feed valve setting on the 
locomotive, but not less than 60 pounds as indicated at the rear of 
a freight train and 70 pounds on a passenger train, a 20-pound brake 
pipe reduction must be made and it must be determined that the 
brakes on the rear car apply and release. As an alternative to the 
rear car brake application and release test, it shall be determined 
that brake pipe pressure of the train is being reduced as indicated 
by a rear car gauge or device and then that brake pipe pressure of 
the train is being restored as indicated by a rear car gauge or 
device.
    (2) Before proceeding it must be known that brake pipe pressure 
as indicated at rear of freight train is being restored.
    (3) On trains operating with electro-pneumatic brakes, with 
brake system charged to not less than 70 pounds, test must be made 
to determine that rear brakes apply and release properly from a 
minimum 20 pounds electro-pneumatic brake application as indicated 
by brake cylinder gauge.
    (d)(1) At a point other than a terminal where one or more cars 
are added to a train, after the train brake system is charged to not 
less than 60 pounds as indicated by a gauge or device at the rear of 
a freight train and 70 pounds on a passenger train. A brake test 
must be made by a designated person as described in Sec. 232.12 
(a)(1) to determine that brake pipe leakage does not exceed five (5) 
pounds per minute as indicated by the brake pipe gauge after a 20-
pound brake pipe reduction has been made. After the test is 
completed, it must be determined that piston travel is correct, and 
the train airbrakes of these cars and on the rear car of the train 
apply and remain applied, until the release signal is given. As an 
alternative to the rear car brake application and release portion of 
the test, it shall be determined that brake pipe pressure of the 
train is being reduced as indicated by a rear car gauge or device 
and then that brake pipe pressure of the train is being restored as 
indicated by a rear car gauge or device. Cars added to a train that 
have not been inspected in accordance with Sec. 232.12 (c) through 
(j) must be so inspected and tested at the next terminal where 
facilities are available for such attention.
    (d)(2)(i) At a terminal where a solid block of cars, which has 
been previously charged and tested as prescribed by Sec. 232.13 (c) 
through (j), is added to a train, it must be determined that the 
brakes on the rear car of the train apply and release. As an 
alternative to the rear car application and release test, it shall 
be determined that brake pipe pressure of the train is being reduced 
as indicated by a rear car gauge or device and then that brake pipe 
pressure of the train is being restored as indicated by a rear car 
gauge or device.
    (d)(2)(ii) When cars which have not been previously charged and 
tested as prescribed by Sec. 232.12 (c) through (j) are added to a 
train, such cars may either be given inspection and tests in 
accordance with Sec. 232.12 (c) through (j), or tested as prescribed 
by paragraph (d)(1) of this section prior to departure in which case 
these cars must be inspected and tested in accordance with 
Sec. 232.12 (c) through (j) at next terminal.
    (3) Before proceeding it must be known that the brake pipe 
pressure at the rear of freight train is being restored.
    (e)(1) Transfer train and yard train movements not exceeding 20 
miles, must have the air brake hose coupled between all cars, and 
after the brake system is charged to not less than 60 pounds, a 15 
pound service brake pipe reduction must be made to determine that 
the brakes are applied on each car before releasing and proceeding.
    (2) Transfer train and yard train movements exceeding 20 miles 
must have brake inspection in accordance with Sec. 232.12 (c)-(j).
    (f) The automatic air brake must not be depended upon to hold a 
locomotive, cars or train, when standing on a grade, whether 
locomotive is attached or detached from cars

[[Page 4217]]

or train. When required, a sufficient number of hand brakes must be 
applied to hold train, before air brakes are released. When ready to 
start, hand brakes must not be released until it is known that the 
air brake system is properly charged.
    (g) As used in this section, device means a system of components 
designed and inspected in accordance with Sec. 232.19.
    (h) When a device is used to comply with any test requirement in 
this section, the phrase brake pipe pressure of the train is being 
reduced means a pressure reduction of at least five pounds and the 
phrase brake pipe pressure of the train is being restored means a 
pressure increase of at least five pounds.


Sec. 232.14  Inbound Brake Equipment Inspection.

    (a) At points where inspectors are employed to make a general 
inspection of trains upon arrival at terminals, visual inspection 
must be made of retaining valves and retaining valve pipes, release 
valves and rods, brake rigging, safety supports, hand brakes, hose 
and position of angle cocks and make necessary repairs or mark for 
repair tracks any cars to which yard repairs cannot be promptly 
made.
    (b) Freight trains arriving at terminals where facilities are 
available and at which special instructions provide for immediate 
brake inspection and repairs, trains shall be left with air brakes 
applied by a service brake pipe reduction of 20 pounds so that 
inspectors can obtain a proper check of the piston travel. Trainmen 
will not close any angle cock or cut the locomotive off until the 20 
pound service reduction has been made. Inspection of the brakes and 
needed repairs should be made as soon thereafter as practicable.


Sec. 232.15  Double Heading and Helper Service.

    (a) When more than one locomotive is attached to a train, the 
engineman of the leading locomotive shall operate the brakes. On all 
other motive power units in the train the brake pipe cutout cock to 
the brake valve must be closed, the maximum main reservoir pressure 
maintained and brake valve handles kept in the prescribed position. 
In case it becomes necessary for the leading locomotive to give up 
control of the train short of the destination of the train, a test 
of the brakes must be made to see that the brakes are operative from 
the automatic brake valve of the locomotive taking control of the 
train.
    (b) The electro-pneumatic brake valve on all motive power units 
other than that which is handling the train must be cut out, handle 
of brake valve kept in the prescribed position, and air compressors 
kept running if practicable.


Sec. 232.16  Running Tests.

    When motive power, engine crew or train crew has been changed, 
angle cocks have been closed except for cutting off one or more cars 
from the rear end of train or electro-pneumatic brake circuit cables 
between power units and/or cars have been disconnected, running test 
of train air brakes on passenger train must be made, as soon as 
speed of train permits, by use of automatic brake if operating in 
automatic brake operation or by use of electro-pneumatic brake if 
operating in electro-pneumatic brake operation. Steam or power must 
not be shut off unless required and running test must be made by 
applying train air brakes with sufficient force to ascertain whether 
or not brakes are operating properly. If air brakes do not properly 
operate, train must be stopped, cause of failure ascertained and 
corrected and running test repeated.


Sec. 232.17  Freight and passenger train car brakes

    (a) Testing and repairing brakes on cars while on shop or repair 
tracks. (1) When a freight car having brake equipment due for 
periodic attention is on shop or repair tracks where facilities are 
available for making air brake repairs, brake equipment must be 
given attention in accordance with the requirements of the currently 
effective AAR Code of Rules for cars in interchange. Brake equipment 
shall then be tested by use of a single car testing device as 
prescribed by the currently effective AAR Code of Tests.
    (2)(i) When a freight car having an air brake defect is on a 
shop or repair track, brake equipment must be tested by use of a 
single car testing device as prescribed by currently effective AAR 
Code of Tests.
    (ii) All freight cars on shop or repair tracks shall be tested 
to determine that the air brakes apply and release. Piston travel on 
a standard body mounted brake cylinder which is less than 7 inches 
or more than 9 inches must be adjusted to nominally 7 inches. Piston 
travel of brake cylinders on all freight cars equipped with other 
than standard single capacity brake, must be adjusted as indicated 
on badge plate or stenciling on car located in a conspicuous place 
near brake cylinder. After piston travel has been adjusted and with 
brakes released, sufficient brake shoe clearance must be provided.
    (iii) When a car is equipped for use in passenger train service 
not due for periodical air brake repairs, as indicated by stenciled 
or recorded cleaning dates, is on shop or repair tracks, brake 
equipment must be tested by use of single car testing device as 
prescribed by currently effective AAR Code of Tests. Piston travel 
of brake cylinders must be adjusted if required, to the standard 
travel for that type of brake cylinder. After piston travel has been 
adjusted and with brakes released, sufficient brake shoe clearance 
must be provided.
    (iv) Before a car is released from a shop or repair track, it 
must be known that brake pipe is securely clamped, angle cocks in 
proper position with suitable clearance, valves, reservoirs and 
cylinders tight on supports and supports securely attached to car.
    (b)(1) Brake equipment on cars other than passenger cars must be 
cleaned, repaired, lubricated and tested as often as required to 
maintain it in a safe and suitable condition for service but not 
less frequently than as required by currently effective AAR Code of 
Rules for cars in interchange.
    (2) Brake equipment on passenger cars must be clean, repaired, 
lubricated and tested as often as necessary to maintain it in a safe 
and suitable condition for service but not less frequently than as 
required in Standard S-045 in the Manual of Standards and 
Recommended Practices of the AAR.
    (3) Copies of the materials referred to in this section can be 
obtained from the Association of American Railroads, 1920 L Street, 
NW., Washington, DC 20036.


Sec. 232.19 through Sec. 232.25  Provisions related to end-of-train 
devices.

    Not included in this Appendix as they are contained in Subpart E 
of this rule.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on January 4, 2001.
John V. Wells,
Acting Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration.
[FR Doc. 01-606 Filed 1-16-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P