[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 9 (Friday, January 12, 2001)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 3388-3437]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-973]
[[Page 3387]]
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Part XIII
Department of Transportation
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
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49 CFR Part 575
Consumer Information Regulations; Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards; Rollover Resistance; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 9 / Friday, January 12, 2001 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 3388]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Part 575
[Docket No. NHTSA-2000-8298]
Consumer Information Regulations; Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards; Rollover Resistance
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.
ACTION: Response to Comments, Notice of Final Decision.
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SUMMARY: The agency has concluded that consumer information on the
rollover risk of passenger cars and light multipurpose passenger
vehicles and trucks will reduce the number of rollover crashes and the
number of injuries and fatalities from rollover crashes. This
information will enable prospective purchasers to make choices about
new vehicles based on differences in rollover risk and serve as a
market incentive to manufacturers in striving to design their vehicles
with greater rollover resistance. The consumer information program will
also inform drivers, especially those who choose vehicles with poorer
rollover resistance, that their risk of harm can be greatly reduced
with seat belt use to avoid ejection.
The agency has decided to use the Static Stability Factor to
indicate rollover risk in single-vehicle crashes and to incorporate the
new rating into NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP). As part of
these ratings, the agency also has decided to note vehicles that are
equipped with ``electronic stability control'' technology, which may
reduce the risk of a vehicle getting into an incipient rollover
situation. This notice summarizes the comments received in response to
the agency's June 1, 2000 Request for Comment regarding the addition of
rollover ratings based on SSF to NCAP, our response to those comments,
and the procedures and protocol we will use to implement a new rollover
consumer information program.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For the most up to date vehicle star
ratings call the Auto Safety Hotline at 888-327-4236 or refer to
NHTSA's website at www.nhtsa.dot.gov. For technical questions you may
contact Gayle Dalrymple, NPS-23, Office of Safety Performance
Standards, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh
Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590. Ms. Dalrymple can be reached by phone
at (202) 366-5559 or by facsimile at (202) 493-2739. For public
comments and other information related to previous notices on this
subject, please refer to:
DOT Docket No. NHTSA-2000-6859, Docket Management, Room PL-401, 400
Seventh Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 20590 (hours 10:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. Monday through Friday) or on the internet at www.dms.gov/search,
and Docket No. 91-68; Notice 3, NHTSA Docket, Room 5111, 400 Seventh
Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590. NHTSA Docket hours are from 9:30 am
to 4:00 pm Monday through Friday.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
II. Background
III. Discussion of Commenters' Issues
A. SSF as a Measure of Rollover Risk
B. NHTSA's Statistical Analysis Linking SSF to Rollover Rates
C. Comments on Practical Problems with SSF Ratings
D. Consumer's Ability to Understand SSF as a Measure of Rollover
Risk in the Event of a Single-vehicle Crash
E. The Question of Electronic Stability Control
F. Alternative Programs Suggested by Commenters
G. Commenters' Desire for a Minimum Standard Based on a Dynamic
Test
IV. Rollover Information Dissemination using SSF in NCAP
V. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
Appendix I Statistical Analysis in Response to Comments
Appendix II Proposed List of Test Vehicles for MY2001
I. Introduction
This notice outlines the plan the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) will use to incorporate a new rollover rating of
new cars and light trucks into its existing New Car Assessment Program
(NCAP). NCAP currently gives consumers crashworthiness ratings for new
light vehicles in frontal and side crashes. The ratings are based on
vehicle performance with respect to occupant injury criteria gathered
in crash tests and are presented using one to five stars, one star for
the highest risk and five for the lowest. We intend to use the same
star rating system to present the risk of rollover in the event of a
single-vehicle crash. One star would represent a Static Stability
Factor (SSF) corresponding to a 40 percent or greater risk of a single-
vehicle crash resulting in rollover, while five stars would represent
an SSF corresponding to a risk of less than 10 percent. Static
Stability Factor is one-half the track width of a vehicle divided by
the height of its center of gravity. As part of the rating based on
SSF, the agency also has to note vehicles that are equipped with
``electronic stability control'' technology, which may reduce the risk
of a vehicle getting into an incipient rollover situation.
The agency requested comments on its tentative decision to
implement such a program on June 1, 2000.\1\ The closing date for
comments was August 30, 2000. Twenty-five commenters responded. This
notice addresses the major issues presented by the commenters, our
response to those comments, and the procedures and protocol we will use
to implement a rollover consumer information program based on SSF. For
complete background and rationale for the program, please see the June
1, 2000 notice.
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\1\ 65 FR 34999 (June 1, 2000).
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II. Background
Rollover crashes are complex events that reflect the interaction of
driver, road, vehicle, and environmental factors. We can describe the
relationship between these factors and the risk of rollover using
information from the agency's crash data programs. We limit our
discussion here to light vehicles, which consist of (1) passenger cars
and (2) multipurpose passenger vehicles and trucks under 4,536
kilograms (10,000 pounds) gross vehicle weight rating (collectively,
``light trucks'').\2\
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\2\ Light trucks include vans, minivans, sport utility vehicles
(SUVs), and pickup trucks under 4,536 kilograms (10, 000 pounds)
gross vehicle weight rating.
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According to the 1999 Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS),
10,142 people were killed as occupants in light vehicle rollovers,
including 8,345 killed in single-vehicle rollovers. Eighty percent of
the people who died in single-vehicle rollovers were not using a seat
belt, and 64 percent were ejected from the vehicle (including 53
percent who were completely ejected). FARS shows that 55 percent of
light vehicle occupant fatalities in single-vehicle crashes involved
rollover. The proportion differs greatly by vehicle type: 46 percent of
passenger car occupant fatalities in single-vehicle crashes involved
rollover, compared to 63 percent for pickup trucks, 60 percent for
vans, and 78 percent for sport utility vehicles (SUVs).
Using data from the 1995-1999 National Automotive Sampling System
(NASS) we estimate that 253,000 light vehicles were towed from a
rollover crash each year (on average), and that 27,000 occupants of
these vehicles were seriously injured (defined as an Abbreviated Injury
Scale (AIS) rating of at least 3).\3\ This includes 205,000
[[Page 3389]]
single-vehicle tow-away rollovers with 19,000 serious injuries. Sixty-
five percent of those people who suffered a serious injury in single-
vehicle tow-away rollovers were not using a seat belt, and 50 percent
were ejected (including 41 percent who were completely ejected).
Estimates from NASS are that 81 percent of tow-away rollovers occurred
in single-vehicle crashes, and 87 percent (178,000) of the single-
vehicle rollover crashes occurred after the vehicle left the roadway.
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\3\ A broken hip is an example of an AIS 3 injury.
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Based on the 1995-1999 General Estimates System (GES) data we
estimate that 241,000 light vehicles rolled over each year (on average)
in police-reported crashes, and that 57,000 occupants in rollover
crashes received injuries rated as K or A on the police injury scale.
(The police KABCO scale calls these injuries ``incapacitating,'' but
their actual severity depends on local practice. ``Incapacitating''
injury may mean that the injury was visible to the reporting officer or
that the officer called for medical assistance.) This includes 205,000
single-vehicle rollovers with 46,000 K or A injuries. Fifty-four
percent of those with K or A injury in single-vehicle rollovers were
not using a seat belt, and 20 percent were ejected from the vehicle
(including 18 percent who were completely ejected). Estimates from GES
are that 16 percent of light vehicles in police-reported single-vehicle
crashes rolled over. The estimated risk of rollover differs by vehicle
type: 13 percent of cars and 14 percent of vans in police-reported
single-vehicle crashes rolled over, compared to 24 percent of pickup
trucks and 32 percent of SUVs.
The data presented above demonstrate that rollover crashes create a
serious safety problem and that a reduction in the number of rollovers
can make a significant contribution to motor vehicle safety.
III. Discussion of Commenters' Issues
The Request for Comment (RFC) was published June 1, 2000. The
comment period closed August 30, 2000. Twenty-five commenters replied.
The respondents were vehicle manufacturers and their associations,
testing laboratories, independent researchers, consumer safety groups,
an insurance association, a trial attorney, and two consumers. Two
commenters agreed with the inclusion of rollover rating in NCAP as it
was presented in the RFC. The other commenters were divided among those
who opposed the plan (manufacturers, dealers, testing labs) and those
who thought it did not go far enough that a minimum standard, based on
a dynamic test, is needed for rollover (trial attorney, consumer
groups). The commenters raised issues in four areas:
The suitability of SSF as a measure of rollover risk,
Whether NHTSA's statistical analysis linking SSF to
single-vehicle rollover rates was correct,
Whether consumers are capable of understanding the concept
of single-vehicle crash as exposure to rollover, and
The need for a minimum standard, or consumer information,
for rollover based on a dynamic test.
Alternative consumer information programs for rollover prevention were
also offered by some commenters. Those four issues and the alternative
programs are discussed in this section.
A. SSF as a Measure of Rollover Risk
Many respondents to the RFC believe that SSF is not a good measure
of rollover risk for various reasons. Comments and the parties that
made them were the following:
NHTSA has exaggerated the importance of SSF in rollover
crashes. Vehicles have little to do with rollover; the driver and road
conditions bear so much of the blame that the vehicles should not be
rated for rollover.--The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
(Alliance), Association of Import Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM)
Isuzu SSF is too simplistic. SSF ignores tire properties,
suspension compliance, handling characteristics, antilock brakes,
electronic stability control, vehicle shape and structure (post-impact
rollover), and tripping factors (tires).--Alliance, University of
Michigan Transportation Research Institute, JCW Consulting, SiSan,
Automotive Testing Inc., Toyota, Isuzu, Honda
1. Origin of Static Stability Factor
Static Stability Factor is not a measure of rollover resistance
invented by the agency. It was introduced to the agency in 1973 by
vehicle manufacturers as a scientifically valid potential substitute
for the dynamic maneuver tests the agency wanted to develop regarding
untripped on-road rollover.\4\ The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association (which has evolved into the present Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers) stated the following about SSF, ``Although this method
does not embrace all vehicle factors relating to rollover resistance,
it does involve the basic parameters of [sic] influencing resistance.''
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\4\ In 1973, NHTSA published an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on Rollover Prevention (38 FR 9598, April 18, 1973). The
comments cited here can be found in NHTSA Docket No. 73-10; Notice
1, comments 11 (MVMA) and 14 (GM).
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In 1973, all of the manufacturers opposed NHTSA's plans for a
standard regarding rollover prevention in extreme accident avoidance
maneuvers because of their expectation of negligible benefits, concern
about banning vehicle types, degradation of vehicle capabilities
including braking traction and handling performance, and unresolved
problems with maneuver testing. General Motors presented a very
detailed set of comments that remain relevant today. For example, its
observations on the effect of restraint use on rollover fatality rates
and on the breakdown of the rollover problem between multi-vehicle and
single-vehicle crashes and on-road and off-road incidences are largely
supported by present data. Likewise, its discussion of the problems of
maintaining consistent pavement surface and tire traction properties,
the use of automatic controls and outriggers, the types of maneuvers
and their relationship to real crashes is still meaningful. We also
think its comments regarding SSF (which it called geometric stability
measurement) are still accurate. General Motors said:
Resistance to rollover is mainly influenced by the following
factors:
1. Height of the center of gravity.
2. Horizontal distance from center of gravity to wheel track.
3. Capability for generating large forces in the lateral
direction of the tire contacts due to high tire friction.
Lateral forces sufficient for rollover can result from severe
maneuvers under high tire-road friction conditions; from collisions
with other vehicles, curbs, or road furniture (signs, lamp posts,
guard rails), and from maneuvers in roadside soil capable of
sustaining high lateral forces.
General Motors qualified the discussion as pertaining to relatively
simple maneuvers, but cautioned against the use of ``special'' braking
and steering inputs for rollover maneuver tests as unrepresentative of
vehicle operation. It also discussed the relative importance of
secondary vehicle characteristics other than those above which are the
components of SSF.
It was noted in a previous section that the dominant factors in
flat road rollover resistance are the center of gravity height,
track width, and the ability of the tire-road interface to generate
high levels of lateral force. Suspension geometry, component
stiffness factors, allowable ride travel, and tire stiffness factors
also exert a measurable influence on rollover performance. But,
these latter factors are considered to be of secondary importance.
It should be noted that in many cases, very careful laboratory tests
are required to establish the influence of suspension modifications
on rollover resistance.
[[Page 3390]]
In its conclusions, General Motors maintained that there was no safety
need for the on-road rollover resistance standard the agency intended
to propose and that, if the agency decided to act at all, it should
pursue consumer information based on SSF.
If any regulation is required, some benefit may be derived at
minimal cost by better informing the customer of relative product
rollover performance, so he can assess this vehicle performance
factor in making his selection in a free market. This information
could be based on geometric stability measurements for the full
range of highway vehicles.
This comment was made before the NCAP program was established to
provide consumer information on safety performance and before the
consumer was faced with such a large range of geometric stability (SSF)
in non-commercial passenger vehicles. Also, most of the practical
difficulties in seeking objective, relevant and repeatable driving
maneuver tests discussed by General Motors in 1973 remain unsolved.
Note that GM suggested the static laboratory measurement as a
substitute for maneuver tests when only on-road untripped rollover was
under consideration. This is an even stronger endorsement of static
measurements than that represented by NHTSA's reasons for using SSF for
consumer information on all single-vehicle rollovers, tripped and
untripped.\5\
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\5\ Untripped rollover is a rollover induced by tire friction
with the driving surface alone, resulting from a driving maneuver
and usually occurring on the roadway. Tripped rollovers usually
occur when a vehicle runs off the roadway and the tires and wheels
contact a tripping mechanism (curb, soft soil, pavement drop off)
which causes the vehicle to roll. A much smaller number of tripped
rollovers occur on the road as a result of the wheel rim digging
into the pavement during an extreme maneuver. Whether or not a
vehicle rolls when it encounters a tripping mechanism is highly
dependent on the geometric properties represented by SSF. In an
untripped rollover, SSF is still very important, but other factors
come into play (such as tire properties). Therefore, GM's suggestion
to use SSF to characterize a vehicle's tendency for untripped
rollover was a very strong endorsement of the relationship between
SSF and vehicle rollover.
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We view the rollover safety problem as 95 percent a problem of
tripped rollover and five percent a problem of on-road untripped
rollover.\6\ Maneuver tests do not represent tripped rollover. Once the
vehicle is in a tripping situation (e.g., has left the road), tire
traction is largely irrelevant to tripped rollover. Center of gravity
height and track width (and to a much lesser extent roll moment of
inertia) are the only vehicle properties with general applicability to
tripped rollover situations. So, in 95 percent of rollovers, these
vehicle properties would be the most relevant vehicle influences on the
likelihood of rollover. In the five percent of the problem involving
untripped rollover, a choice exists between using static measurements
and performance in maneuver tests. To get data to make an informed
choice between the two, NHTSA conducted a maneuver test program using
12 vehicles in 1998. That testing confirmed General Motors' opinion of
25 years earlier that the static measurements correspond well to
dynamic maneuver tests.\7\ It also confirmed that the problems with
maneuver testing identified by GM in 1973 are still largely unresolved
today. Accordingly, we concluded in our June 2000 notice that there
were no practical improvements in rating overall rollover resistance to
be gained at this time by using something other than static
measurements.
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\6\ In 1998, the agency was performing research on driving
maneuvers to see if we could develop a way to ameliorate the
incidence of onroad, untripped rollover, which we estimated at the
time to be less than 10 percent of rollover crashes. The American
Automobile Manufacturers Association (one of the predecessors of the
Alliance) contracted with Calspan Corporation to review all the
cases in NHTSA's Crashworthiness Data System coded as untripped to
try to demonstrate that we were misplacing our research funds on a
very small problem. Consequently our National Automotive Sampling
System team did its own audit of the 1992-96 rollover data and
concluded that some tripped rollovers were miscoded as untripped
rollovers (typically these were onroad rollovers in which the
vehicle was sliding sideways and tripped on its own wheel rim).
Using corrected 1992-96 data, our National Center for Statistics and
Analysis estimated that 3.7 percent of rollovers are untripped and
3.5 percent are both untripped and onroad, while 4.4 percent of
single-vehicle rollovers are untripped. (Research Note, ``Passenger
Vehicles in Untripped Rollovers,'' September 1999.)
\7\ See the June 1, 2000 Request for Comments for a summary of
that research.
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2. The Importance of the Effect of SSF on Rollover Rate
When the agency first sought public comment on rollover issues in
1973, the industry's position was that the frequency of untripped on-
road rollovers was too low to justify significant vehicle modifications
and constraints on future vehicle design. The vehicle manufacturers
questioned the benefit/cost relationship and practicability of a
minimum standard on rollover resistance, but they did not deny the
relationship between SSF and rollover crashes. The agency's June 2000
plan for consumer information on rollover resistance expressed
considerable agreement with the 1973 industry position on rollover and
offered a statistical study of modern crash data in order to quantify
the relationship between SSF and the incidence of rollovers occurring
in single-vehicle crashes. The Alliance responded in August 2000 with
the position that vehicle characteristics are now deemed largely
irrelevant to the occurrence of rollover crashes and consumer
information on vehicle rollover resistance is inherently misleading.
The Alliance provided a statistical study purporting to demonstrate
that the influence of SSF was limited to three to eight percent of the
variability between vehicles in rollover crashes.
While the laws of physics prove beyond question that vehicles with
low SSF roll over at lower lateral accelerations than vehicles with
high SSF, the effect of SSF must be shown to have a significant
influence on the outcome of actual crashes (rollover vs. no rollover)
to be worth using for consumer information. It is a fact that types of
vehicles with SSFs lower than passenger cars, as a group, have greater
numbers of rollover crashes than passenger cars, either as a percentage
of all crashes (passenger cars, 1.6 percent; vans, 2.0 percent; pickup
trucks, 3.7 percent; SUVs, 5.1 percent) or as a percentage of single-
vehicle crashes (passenger cars, 13 percent; vans, 14 percent, pickup
trucks, 24 percent; SUVs, 32 percent). The Alliance attributes these
differences primarily to differences in the driver and road conditions
associated with the various vehicle types, rather than to the
characteristics of the vehicles. For example, if young males using
alcohol and driving on rural roads with high speed limits are over-
represented as drivers of four-wheel drive pickup trucks in crashes,
could these road-use variables outweigh the vehicle property to the
point of insignificance? According to the current industry view, the
correlation between the SSF of a vehicle and its ability to attract
risky drivers who operate vehicles under adverse road conditions is the
fundamental reason vehicles with low SSF are involved in a higher
proportion of rollover crashes.
The agency agrees that driver behavior and road conditions are
significant factors in understanding why single-vehicle crashes of any
type occur, and that they have a strong influence on whether single-
vehicle crashes result in rollover. However, we think that the rollover
resistance of the vehicle represented by SSF also exerts a strong
influence on whether single-vehicle crashes result in rollover. The
statistical study in our previous notice attempted to address the
important question of whether road-use differences between vehicles
relegate their difference in
[[Page 3391]]
rollover resistance to insignificance in actual crash experiences. We
analyzed state accident reports in six states (1994-1997) on 184,726
single-vehicle crashes with 36,575 rollovers involving 100 vehicle
make/models. The road-use variables available in all six states
identified male drivers, young drivers, alcohol involvement, darkness,
wet or icy surface, speed limit 55 mph or greater, storm, hill, and
curve. We used multiple linear regression because its ``R-squared
statistic'' provided an intuitive method of comparing the explanatory
power of individual variables and because we could control the effect
of the large differences in the number of crash samples for the various
vehicles. Each vehicle was represented by its SSF and the average of
each road-use variable over the number of crashes in each state.
Systematic differences between states in rollover rate due to factors
such as accident reporting thresholds were accommodated by the
inclusion of a dummy variable for each state. The ``R-squared
statistic'' for the complete model was 0.88, indicating that the model
explained 88 percent of the observed differences in rollover rate per
single-vehicle crash between the vehicle make/models.
The linear regression that used only the SSF and the state dummy
variables as predictor variables had an ``R-squared'' of 0.73, which
means that almost three-quarters of the variability in rollover risk
between vehicle models is explained by the SSF plus the adjustments for
state-to-state differences in crash reporting. This is greater than the
``R-squared'' for the best model that used only the road-use variables
plus the state dummy variables (0.58). Thus, the SSF appears to have
greater explanatory value than the combination of the road-use
variables. We conclude that the SSF is not relegated to insignificance
by the road-use variables in describing rollover risk.
The Alliance comment criticized the agency's use of linear
regression because it operates on averages of road-use variables and
cannot consider the possible interaction among variables. For example,
the linear regression model would consider that the crashes of a
particular make/model may involve 30 percent young drivers, 20 percent
with alcohol involvement and 15 percent on curves, but it cannot
distinguish crashes in which all of the factors were present
simultaneously. The Alliance used logistic regression rather than
linear regression in its analysis. Logistic regression operates on
every individual crash circumstance sampled, rather than on averages of
the road-use variables for crashes of each make/model, and thus can
consider interactions among variables. It is a popular statistical tool
in the health sciences. The Alliance also introduced the concept of
scenario risk in its logistic regression model. In this technique, each
combination of road-use variables (with some states providing as many
as 14 variables) is a scenario. Scenario risk becomes a continuous
variable.
Appendix I of this notice presents a new statistical study which
adds another year of state crash data to the database of our previous
notice and contrasts analyses of the crash data using logistic
regression of individual variables and risk scenarios to the linear
regression method used in the previous notice. We found that it made
very little difference to the logistic regression models whether the
road-use variables were used as individual variables or combined to
form risk scenarios, but that the curve estimating rollovers per
single-vehicle crash produced by the logistic regression was slightly
different from that previously reported for linear regression.
The estimated risk of rollovers per single-vehicle crash is six
times as high for a vehicle with an SSF of 1.00 as for a vehicle with
an SSF of 1.53 (the range of the observed data) based on the linear
regression model. The average slope of the rollover risk versus SSF
curve for the linear regression model (Figure 1) in the range of
observed data was -0.713. The slope of the corresponding curve of the
logistic models is -0.598 or -0.580, depending on whether we use the
individual variables or the scenario-risk variable. Both the linear and
logistic approaches produced models that fit the data well, and both
estimated a coefficient for the SSF term that was very important (in
terms of statistical significance and the magnitude of the effect).
The linear regression is judged by the ``R-squared'', a measure of
fit that is familiar to many people. The logistic regression is less
well known, but it also has a standard measure of fit, the association
of predicted probabilities and observed responses. The percentage of
concordant pairs for our logistic models was very high (for example, it
was 71.4 percent for the six-state combined model).
We can also measure the ``Chi-square'' value for the coefficient of
the SSF term in each model to describe the significance of that term.
Logistic regression models were calculated for the original six states,
plus Ohio and New Mexico, which report rollover only if it is the first
harmful event. In seven of the eight states, the ``Chi-square''
statistic for SSF is greater than for any of the other variables in the
logistic model using individual variables. In the logistic model using
scenario risk to combine all the variables except SSF, the ``Chi-
square'' statistic for SSF is greater than that of the scenario risk
variable in three of the eight states. This result also contradicts the
Alliance's assertion that SSF is relegated to insignificance by the
importance of road-use variables on the rollover experience of vehicles
in use.
The Alliance's assertion that the effect of SSF on rollover is
negligible was not a consequence of the possible superiority of
logistic regression over linear, nor of the use of scenario risk rather
than individual variables. Instead, the Alliance assertion depends upon
a subtle change in the definition of the variables which serve as
alternatives to SSF in explaining rollovers.
NHTSA used the number of police-reported single-vehicle crashes as
a measure of each make/model's exposure to rollover risk. We did not
include collisions with pedestrians or animals in the roadway in our
definition of single-vehicle crashes because, while those crashes
generate a police report, the collision itself poses no risk of
rollover of the vehicle. Our sample size was large enough that we did
not need to further investigate pedestrian and animal crashes for
relevance. We did include collisions with parked vehicles because they
represented a type of roadway departure and a collision with a fixed
object, although these collisions offer the least exposure to typical
tripping mechanisms.
Our analysis examined the effects of road-use variables because
their correlations with SSF were the basis of an alternative theory of
rollover causation. It is plausible that the greater rate of rollover
of vehicles with low SSF is not caused by low SSF but rather by
characteristics of drivers and roads which happen to be correlated with
low SSF vehicles. The example of young males being the predominant
driver population of particularly low SSF pickup trucks shows that this
alternative has plausibility.
However, the Alliance departed from the road-use variables as
alternative causes of rollover. The Alliance analysis was not an
explanation of alternative theories of rollover causation but rather an
attempt to show that there is little, if any, effect of SSF on rollover
causation. To do this, the Alliance created a category of ``non-
vehicle'' variables. This category allowed the addition of one variable
whose effect overwhelmed the effects of all other
[[Page 3392]]
variables. That variable was ``first harmful event, collision with a
traffic unit.'' It separated crashes which were collisions with
pedestrians, animals or parked vehicles from other single-vehicle
crashes. In essence, the extra variable separates crashes with minimum
exposure to tripping mechanisms from all other single-vehicle crashes.
This would seem to be a meaningless addition because there is no reason
to expect a significant correlation between SSF and collisions with
pedestrians, animals and parked vehicles. However, it sets up what the
Alliance calls its ``low risk scenario'' which serves as a basis for
comparison of rollover risk factors.
The Alliance then compared the effect on rollover risk of increased
SSF to the effect on rollover risk made by moving from the scenarios of
actual crashes to the ``low risk scenario''. The effect on rollover
risk of moving actual crash scenarios to the ``low risk scenario'' is
essentially the effect on rollover risk of eliminating tripping
mechanisms. The effect is huge. In simplified terms, the Alliance has
argued that the effect on tripped rollover gained by an increase of SSF
is minimal compared to the effect on tripped rollover of removing
tripping mechanisms. The statistical study in Appendix I includes a
discussion of how this type of analysis, in which characteristics of
the crash itself are used to define the risk scenarios, is equally
useful for ``demonstrating'' that seat belts have negligible safety
benefit.
We do not find the Alliance analysis persuasive. It may well be
true that changing a single-vehicle run-off-the-road crash (where there
is a high risk of rollover) into a crash in which the vehicle, for
example, hits an animal in the road (where there is no risk of
rollover) virtually eliminates the risk of rollover, and may do far
more to minimize rollover risk than changing any single vehicle or
driver factor. However, the point of this is unclear. One could also
show that if vehicles could fly, there would be far fewer rollover
crashes, based on the experience of actual aircraft. Since vehicles can
not fly, and run-off-the-road crashes can not be changed into different
types of crashes, positing these impossibilities as a means of
analyzing, or addressing, the real world problem of more than 10,000
Americans dying each year in rollover crashes does not seem either
helpful or insightful.
NHTSA seeks ways to address real world safety problems
constructively. In the real world, driver and roadway factors are
certainly important factors in all crashes, including rollovers. That
is why NHTSA spends so much effort to increase belt use, reduce
speeding, eliminate impaired driving, and so forth. However, the
vehicle is also a significant factor in crash safety. If we take the
driver and roadway conditions as givens (for example, a young male
driver in a rural area), the physical attributes of different vehicles
determine different outcomes when, for example, the vehicle drops two
wheels off the road, and the driver responds incorrectly. Some vehicles
will roll over much more often than others in these situations. Such
vehicle differences have been shown to strongly correlate with rollover
resistance expressed by SSF. We believe the American public should have
this information available to consider when making purchase decisions.
B. NHTSA's Statistical Analysis Linking SSF to Rollover Rates
The Alliance commented that the method NHTSA used to analyze the
statistical relationship between state crash data and SSF used in the
RFC failed to take into account possible interactions between the
various non-vehicle variables, and therefore underestimated the role of
the non-vehicle factors in rollover risk. The possible interaction
between alcohol involvement and the crash occurring on a curve in a
particular crash was given as an example. The commenter suggested using
logistic regression to resolve the problem of variable interaction.
As introduced in the previous section, Appendix I of this notice
presents a new statistical study which adds another year of state crash
data to the database relied on in our previous notice and contrasts
analyses of the crash data using logistic regression of individual
variables and risk scenarios to the linear regression method used in
the previous notice. The model curves estimating rollovers per single-
vehicle crash using logistic regression were nearly identical
regardless of whether the road-use variables were entered individually
or as combinations in risk scenarios. However, logistic regression does
produce a slightly different curve estimating rollovers per single-
vehicle crash from that previously reported for linear regression.
Figure 1 shows the comparison between the updated linear regression
analysis of the summarized data and the two logistic models (the six-
state models using either the individual variables or the scenario-risk
variable). The linear regression curve of the previous notice was
essentially unchanged by the addition of another year of state crash
data (for a total of 226,117 single-vehicle crashes with 45,574
rollovers). The logistic models are very similar to each other, and all
the models indicate that the SSF is very important in understanding
rollover risk. As noted previously, the average slope of the rollover
risk vs. SSF curve estimated by the linear regression model in the
range of observed data was -0.713, and the average slope of the
corresponding curve of the logistic models is -0.598 or -0.580,
depending on whether we use the individual variables or the scenario-
risk variable. Also, logistic regression estimates a greater risk of
rollover than does linear regression for vehicles with SSFs higher than
1.10.
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The logistic regression and linear regression separate the effects
of vehicle rollover resistance and those of road-use variables by
different processes, and the logistic regression predicts a curve with
a lower average slope. The Alliance commented that logistic regression
considers the potential effect of variables in combination which may
intensify or dilute their individual effects, but that linear
regression would neglect combination effects. With this possibility in
mind, we considered whether the use of the curve corresponding to
logistic regression on individual variables would serve as a better
basis of rollover risk for the vehicle star ratings than the linear
regression curve proposed in our June 1, 2000 notice.
The proposed rating system was based on equal intervals of risk and
positioned the five-star level at a value of SSF achievable by
favorably designed family sedans. It also positioned the one-star range
where it captured some popular SUVs and pickup trucks of the recent
past. The manufacturers of the one-star vehicles generally have
improved the current versions of the equivalent vehicles to the two-
star level, but we believe the one-star rating ceiling would be
stringent enough to discourage companies from returning to old design
practices or from importing less advanced vehicles. A fortuitous
feature of the ratings based on the linear regression curve was that
reasonable one-star and five-star SSF boundaries occurred at predicted
levels of rollover risk of 10 percent and 40 percent, permitting three
equal intervals of risk between them divisible by ten for the two-star,
three-star and four-star boundaries. Having the star rating intervals
bounded at 10, 20, 30 and 40 percent rollover risk levels would make
the meaning of the ratings easier to explain to consumers. Figure 2
presents the proposed rating system in graphical form. The updated
linear regression curve in Figure 1 is nearly identical to the linear
regression curve in Figure 2, except that it would set the one star
boundary for 40 percent rollover risk at 1.03 instead of 1.04.
[[Page 3394]]
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We considered the merits of the various ways in which the rollover
risk versus SSF curve produced by logistic regression (Figure 1,
Individual Variables) could be used to replace that produced by linear
regression (also in Figure 1) as the basis for defining rollover risk
in the rating system. If the proposed rating intervals in terms of SSF
(1.04, 1.12, 1.24, 1.45) were maintained, they would no longer satisfy
their rationale of representing equal increments of rollover risk in a
single-vehicle crash. Conversely, if the risk intervals at 10, 20, 30
and 40 percent are maintained, the one-star SSF level would become 1.01
and the five-star level would become 1.51. A one-star level of 1.01 is
so low that we know of only one vehicle (not in current production)
that it would describe. Similarly, a five-star level of 1.51 appears to
be out of reach for even the most stable family sedans which have
demonstrated very good performance in resisting rollover. We believe
that maintaining the 10, 20, 30 and 40 percent star boundaries with the
logistic regression curve would have the practical effect of replacing
the five-star rating system with a three-star rating system. At the low
end of the SSF scale, the distinction between some historically poor
performing vehicles and their improved replacements would be lost. At
the higher end of the SSF scale, the distinction between some very good
performing mid-sized and large sedans and some clearly poorer
performing sub-compacts would be lost.
It would appear that the best way to incorporate the rollover risk
levels estimated by logistic regression while maintaining the
usefulness of the rating system to the consumer is to maintain the
proposed one-star and five-star boundaries as closely as possible. This
approach would require adjustment of the equal risk intervals between
the one-and five-star boundaries to reflect the difference in average
slope between the linear regression curve and the logistic regression
curve. A five-star boundary of 1.46 corresponds to a rollover risk of
less than 12 percent on the logistic regression curve. (The previous
boundary of 1.45 would require a statement of risk of 12.1 percent
which would not be desirable for consumer information). Similarly, a
one-star boundary of 1.05 would correspond to a rollover risk greater
than 36 percent. These one-star and five-star boundaries would allow
for equal risk intervals of eight percentage points between the other
star boundaries. A change from 10 percent risk intervals to eight
percent risk intervals would be proportional to the difference in
average slope between the linear regression curve and the logistic
regression curve. Figure 3 illustrates this idea for using the logistic
curve in a revised rating system in a graphical form comparable to
Figure 2.
[[Page 3395]]
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However, this idea also has serious drawbacks. It would move the
three star level from 1.13 SSF to 1.17 and the four star level from
1.25 to 1.29 because the logistic regression shows less of the
asymptotic shape of the raw data (Figure 1 of Appendix 1) than does the
linear regression (of the log of SSF) curve previously proposed. This
is troubling for two reasons. The shape of the original linear
regression curve conforms better than does the logistic regression
curve to the expectation that a given increase in SSF produces a
substantially greater benefit for a vehicle with a low SSF than for one
with a high SSF. Also, NHTSA believes that the proposed star rating
levels may have become design goals for manufacturers seeking to
improve rollover resistance. A change in star rating levels at this
time may have the counterproductive effect of denying manufacturers
recognition for substantial improvements in rollover resistance of
vehicle designs.
While we do not deny the theoretical advantages of logistic
regression cited by the Alliance regarding interactions between road
use variables, the similarity in curves describing rollover risk as a
function of SSF in the linear and logistic regression approaches
suggests that such interactions do not exert a great influence on the
effect of SSF. Therefore, we do not believe that the difference in risk
analysis methods is great enough to compel a change in the proposed
star rating levels to the detriment of manufacturers who are trying to
achieve them and to the detriment of consumers who we believe will find
the proposed rating system simpler. We also note that the linear
regression curve presents a more conservative estimate of rollover risk
for vehicles with SSF greater than 1.10, and we anticipate vehicles
with SSF lower than 1.10 becoming rare in light of manufacturers'
reported efforts at improving rollover resistance.
The rating system that NHTSA will use to define rollover risk and
assign star rating is based on the updated linear regression curve in
Figure 1 of this section. It would be described verbally as follows:
One Star : Risk of Rollover 40 percent or greater in a
single-vehicle crash is associated with SSF 1.03 or less.
Two Stars : Risk of Rollover 30 percent or greater but
less than 40 percent is associated with SSF 1.04 to 1.12.
Three Stars : Risk of Rollover 20 percent or
greater but less than 30 percent is associated with SSF 1.13 to 1.24.
Four Stars : Risk of Rollover 10 percent or
greater but less than 20 percent is associated with SSF 1.25 to 1.44.
Five Stars : Risk of Rollover less
than 10 percent is associated with SSF 1.45 or more.
C. Comments on Practical Problems with SSF Ratings
1. Difficulty of Improving Vehicles
The Alliance and the import manufacturers' organization, AIAM,
asserted that improvements in a vehicle's SSF are not practicable since
SSF is largely determined by its vehicle type. That is, the track
widths and c.g. heights of pickups, SUVs, vans, and passenger cars are
more or less fixed within certain limits. Significant changes to those
measurements would simply eliminate the vehicle attributes which are
common to the category and which are presumably desirable to consumers.
These comments noted, for example, that significantly lowering the c.g.
(thus raising the SSF) of an SUV could be accomplished by decreasing
ground clearance, but doing so might make it unappealing compared to
other vehicles in the SUV category. Conversely, the comments contended
that marginal changes to track width and c.g. height small enough to
maintain attributes in a vehicle category would not improve rollover
risk. They conclude that SSF is not a useful design
[[Page 3396]]
criterion, and it lacks the potential to reduce rollover rates if
current vehicle types are to be preserved.
We disagree that significant improvement in SSF will necessarily
eliminate desirable attributes within a class of vehicles. We are aware
of a recent redesign of a production SUV \8\ in the U.S. that achieved
a decrease in c.g. height of approximately 2.0 inches (along with a
significant increase in track width) while actually increasing the
ground clearance. We estimate those changes represent an improvement in
SSF equivalent to at least one star rating interval, and we would
expect a significant decrease in rollover risk in single-vehicle
crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Mitsubishi Montero redesign from model year (MY) 1991-99
design to MY 2000 version of the same nameplate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also would note that passenger car-based SUV's with
significantly better SSFs than traditional, truck-based SUVs have been
gaining popularity in the absence of any consumer information program
for rollover. The range of SSF among ten SUVs in our 1998 SSF
measurements of a group of 32 then-new vehicles was equivalent to a
rollover risk reduction of approximately 14 percent using the
predictive curve from the linear regression analysis explained in this
notice. So-called ``crossover'' vehicles promise even greater
improvement. While these vehicles may offer less of some attributes of
traditional SUVs, like overall ride height, the increasing popularity
of crossover vehicles indicates that those attributes may be less
important to consumers than the ones which they maintain in common with
traditional SUVs, such as cargo room and traction on snowy roads. Thus,
the suggestion that no changes to current vehicle designs are possible
without significant customer resistance appears to be an assertion
unsupported by what has happened recently in the market.
On the other hand, one of the models that scored highest among the
ten SUVs in the 1998 measurements was a more or less traditional
design, i.e., it was not passenger car-based.\9\ This gives evidence
that more stable light truck design is not incompatible with
traditional design attributes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Isuzu Rodeo.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fact that SUVs are seldom used off-road indicates that not all
SUV buyers really want off-road capability. Buyers who are aware of the
tradeoff in risk of rollover that such off-road capability usually
entails, may decide they can obtain the attributes they want or need in
a more rollover-resistant vehicle. As a contrasting example, buyers who
desire passenger and cargo capacity may choose a van or minivan over a
conventional station wagon after deciding that their priorities
outweigh the increase in rollover risk associated with that choice.
We believe that vehicle modifications to improve rollover
resistance ratings are both achievable and beneficial. Press accounts
suggest that manufacturers are, in fact, making such modifications as
they redesign their light trucks. However, the ratings do not force
manufacturers to modify vehicles, nor do they force consumers to accept
only certain vehicle alternatives. The ratings will have a positive
effect on the light vehicle rollover problem by making consumers more
aware of trade offs in rollover stability, allowing consumers to make
more informed purchase decisions, and influencing their awareness of
the need to wear seat belts to prevent ejection in rollover crashes.
This improvement will accrue even if the manufacturers make no changes
to vehicles whatsoever in response to the program.
2. Possible Consequences of Improving SSF
Honda and the Alliance also suggested that, with a design criterion
like a rollover rating based on SSF, manufacturers may be inclined to
``design for the test.'' The manufacturer of a vehicle whose score
falls just below a rating cutoff point might be able to make design
adjustments that shift the vehicle's score into the next higher
category. We believe there is no reason to discourage manufacturers
from taking such actions because an improvement in SSF will result in a
corresponding improvement in rollover risk. In fact, we believe that a
major advantage of SSF, one that distinguishes it from other measures
of rollover resistance, is that it ``does no harm.'' Since SSF is a
fundamental measure of inherent vehicle stability, there is no
realistic risk that increasing SSF will degrade actual rollover rate or
have other unintended, negative consequences. In contrast, improvement
in other metrics can result in trade-offs that compromise overall
safety. For example, maximizing a vehicle's Tilt Table Ratio can be
accomplished by trading off some vehicle directional control
(oversteer/understeer) characteristics. As another example, it is
apparent that the Stability Margin metric can be improved by reducing
tire grip, which could decrease driver control of the vehicle.\10\
Furthermore, SSF is relevant to stability under virtually any
circumstance, whether it be a run-off-the-road crash, an obstacle
avoidance scenario, or even collisions with objects or other vehicles,
though it is obviously more significant in some of those events, i.e.,
single-vehicle crashes, than in others, i.e., collisions, where impact
forces can overwhelm other factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ These metrics are explained in detail in the June 1, 2000
notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was suggested in the comments that vehicle characteristics which
an SSF-based rating ignores, like body shape and tire profile,
influence rollover rate because they determine how a vehicle interacts
with roadside objects and terrain during a crash event. As an example,
Honda suggested that lowering a vehicle's c.g., thus improving its SSF,
by equipping it with low-profile tires could increase the risk of
tripped rollover by making sideward wheel contact with tripping
mechanisms more likely. This is speculative and not persuasive. Each
single-vehicle crash is, more or less, a unique event, because of the
variety and complexity of circumstances involved. Although we agree
that tripping usually initiates through interaction of a vehicle's
wheels (i.e., tires and/or rims) with the roadway environment,
generalizations about the influence of low-profile tires, or
differences in body shape, on tripping frequency are extremely
difficult to substantiate, given the limitless combinations of terrain,
pavement condition, shoulder design, barriers, soil, vegetation, etc. A
vehicle feature like taller, more flexible tire sidewalls may help
avoid tripping in a few crashes, but is likely to be ineffective in the
vast majority of others, and may be counterproductive in some cases.
Even if it were possible for a manufacturer to identify tires and rims
that were supposedly more resistant to tripping, safe handling and road
holding considerations should certainly weigh more heavily in tire and
rim selection.
A notable exception to this involves the problem of tire debeading.
Clearly, a wheel rim that becomes exposed when a tire debeads either as
a precursor to a single-vehicle crash or in the course of one, can
become a primary tripping mechanism. We believe that tire and rim
combinations that are more resistant to debeading may indeed lessen the
risk of rollover in a single-vehicle crash. The agency is already
planning to improve debeading requirements in FMVSS No. 109.
A further difficulty in identifying vehicle features that might
improve tripping resistance is that crash data is limited. The minute
level of detail required to thoroughly analyze the interaction of a
vehicle's wheels,
[[Page 3397]]
undercarriage, body components, etc., with the roadway environment in a
run-off-the-road event is generally unavailable in state or national
crash databases. NHTSA's NASS-CDS database does contain a high level of
detail, but it focuses on a relatively small sampling of crashes. In
contrast, the SSF of vehicles in crashes can be determined as long as
the data contain a few details about the vehicle, like make and model.
Availability of extensive crash data is important for analyses like
NHTSA's statistical analysis of crashes in six U.S. states as reported
in the RFC and in Appendix I here.
Honda also suggested that problematic suspension behavior such as
``suspension-jacking'' can lead to a higher risk of rollover regardless
of SSF, and that this exemplifies why SSF alone is not an adequate
indicator of rollover resistance. Although vehicles with particular
suspensions, most notably ``swing-axle'' designs, historically may have
been associated with rollover, we believe those represent relatively
few cases out of a very large population of rollover crashes and that
such examples of suspension design are uncommon in current vehicles.
Furthermore, suspension behavior is less important than SSF once a
vehicle has left the roadway, where factors like shoulder condition and
terrain interact with the basic stability characteristics of the
vehicle to determine crash outcome.
3. SSF Measurement Accuracy
Honda stated in response to the RFC that the Vehicle Inertia
Measurement Facility(VIMF) that NHTSA will use to ascertain SSF is not
accurate enough to repeatably give useful vehicle ratings. Honda
suggested that for c.g. height measurement the measurement error is the
sum of 0.5 percent ``repeatability'' error and 0.5 percent ``accuracy''
error, giving a total measurement error of 1.0 percent of
the measured value. Honda believes an error of that magnitude is
significant, compared to the small differences between vehicles being
compared, and that a vehicle could be assigned an incorrect number of
stars due to measurement error.
Honda appears to have misinterpreted the published reports
available on the VIMF. The document cited in Footnote 19 of the RFC
does indicate, in Table 1, ``error bounds'' for c.g. height of
0.5 percent of the measured value.\11\ Other
documents,\12,\ \13,\ \14\ describing the design of the VIMF give the
same value for ``repeatability'' or ``two standard deviation error''
for c.g. height measurements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Heydinger, G.J., et al; ``Measured Vehicle Inertial
Parameters--NHTSA's Data through November 1998''; Society of
Automotive Engineers 1999-01-1336; March, 1999.
\12\ Heydinger, G.J., et al; ``The Design of Vehicle Inertia
Measurement Facility''; SAE Paper 950309; February 1995.
\13\ Bixel, R.A., et al; ``Developments in Vehicle Center of
Gravity and Inertial Parameter Estimation and Measurement''; SAE
Paper 950356; February 1995.
\14\ Heydinger, G.J., et al; ``An Overview of a Vehicle Inertia
Measurement Facility''; Intl. Symposium on Automotive Technology;
Paper 94SF034; October 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basically, ``repeatability,'' as used in the referenced documents
in regard to the VIMF, is not separate from the ``accuracy'' of the
system. It is incorrect to assume that the total VIMF system error in
c.g. height measurements is the sum of the 0.5 percent repeatability
and 0.5 percent accuracy, for a total system error of one percent in
c.g. height measurements. The total system error of the VIMF for c.g.
height measurement is 0.5 percent or less, as explained below.
When the VIMF was under development, an error analysis was
conducted based on experience with NHTSA's Inertial Parameter
Measurement Device (IPMD), a precursor to the VIMF. Over the course of
several years, the IPMD underwent successive updates and improvements,
culminating in a fifth and final version of the machine that ultimately
served as a model for the VIMF. The error analysis accounted for all
the known sources of error arising from each system component, for
example, platform deflection and vehicle restraint rigidity, as
experience with the IPMD had indicated. By mathematical modeling, the
contribution of each component to the whole system error was
determined. The final design specifications for the VIMF were set by
that analysis. Each component was selected or fabricated so as to limit
the combined error from all the known contributions to 0.5 percent of
the measured value for c.g. height. The details of the error analysis
are discussed in the referenced documents.
Since it was designed and constructed, the accuracy of the VIMF has
been evaluated using a custom-built calibration fixture with a known
c.g. location. This fixture is a heavy weldment made from stock steel
plates and box section beams whose individual c.g. locations are easily
determined by geometry. Because it is a very rigid body and is
fabricated from such geometrically simple components, the calibration
fixture's c.g. location, as well as its mass moments of inertia, are
known theoretically, and it is thus a benchmark for reckoning the
accuracy of the VIMF. The calibration fixture can be set up in either a
light or heavy configuration, the latter achieved by adding weight in
precise locations to increase the c.g. height by a known amount. In the
light configuration, the fixture is representative of the mass and c.g.
height of a mid-size passenger car. In the heavy configuration, it is
representative of a light truck.
In calibration tests using this fixture, the VIMF consistently
measures the c.g. location to within 0.5 percent of the known value.
Tables 6 and 7 of the 1995 Heydinger paper cited here indicate that the
VIMF was able to measure the c.g. height of the fixture to within 0.46
percent (2.6 mm in 561.2 mm) and 0.32 percent (2.6 mm in 809.2 mm) of
its theoretically known values in the light and heavy configurations,
respectively. Those results correspond well with the VIMF error
analysis which predicts that the degree of accuracy should be somewhat
higher when measuring heavier, higher c.g. vehicles. That is, the
measurement accuracy for vehicles which are likely to fall into the
lower SSF categories is significantly better than 0.5 percent.
While we believe the NHTSA measurements will be sufficiently
accurate, no degree of measurement accuracy can prevent borderline
cases. There is always a possibility of a vehicle score falling so
close to a cutoff point between star ranges that applying even a small
amount of measurement uncertainty to the score results in ambiguity
about the category to which the vehicle belongs. This situation is
characteristic of any rating scheme and is no different from what
currently exists in the NHTSA frontal and side NCAP. We plan to use
conventional rounding methodology to determine the SSF of each test
vehicle to two decimal places and assign stars based on that result.
If a manufacturer determined that one of its models was on the
border between star levels, the manufacturer could, if it wished, make
changes to the vehicle to improve its SSF to the point where it falls
comfortably in the higher category. If the vehicle was indeed on the
border, the changes necessary would probably be very minor, and it
would be voluntary, not mandatory.
D. Consumers' Ability to Understand SSF as a Measure of Rollover Risk
in the Event of a Single-vehicle Crash
Some commenters had misgivings about consumers' abilities to
understand and use the new rollover rating information in three areas.
They believe:
Consumers are not capable of understanding that the star
rating
[[Page 3398]]
describes the risk of rollover in the event that the vehicle is
involved in a single-vehicle crash.
Consumers will not find the information useful in making a
vehicle choice.
Even if consumers use the information, the new program
will not lead to a decrease in rollover crashes.
Each of these areas are discussed and responded to below.
1. Are Consumers Capable of Understanding That the Star Rating
Describes the Risk of Rollover in the Event That the Vehicle Is
Involved in a Single-vehicle Crash?
Auto manufacturers and the National Automobile Dealers' Association
(NADA) believe that consumers are not capable of understanding that the
star rating describes the risk of rollover in the event that the
vehicle is involved in a single-vehicle crash. The following is a list
of comments and the commenters who made them:
Consumers will be confused because the rollover ratings
are not in terms of injury risk like other NCAP ratings--Alliance
Consumers will not understand that the rollover ratings do
not include crashworthiness attributes--AIAM
Consumers will think the rollover risk is the life-time
rollover risk from driving the vehicle or the risk of rollover each
time they drive the vehicle--Alliance, Suzuki, Toyota, Honda
Consumers will think risk is the same for all drivers in
all conditions and have the false impression that the vehicle design is
the principal cause of rollover--Suzuki, NADA
The language that will be used in consumer information products
concerning this rollover rating (see Section IV) was developed using
the outcome of focus group testing. As discussed in the June 2000
notice, in April 1999 NHTSA conducted a series of six focus groups to
examine ways of presenting comparative rollover information. As a
result of the comments to our June 2000 notice, NHTSA conducted another
series of focus groups in November 2000. Two versions of explanatory
language were presented to a total of 12 groups of nine consumers each
in two different cities. NHTSA asked the focus groups to evaluate a
short version of rollover rating explanatory language that read as
follows:
Description of Rollover Resistance Rating
Most rollover crashes occur when a vehicle runs off the road and is
tripped by a ditch, soft soil, a curb or other object causing it to
roll over. These are called single-vehicle crashes because the crash
did not involve a crash with another vehicle. The Rollover Rating is an
estimate of your risk of rolling over if you have a single-vehicle
crash. The Rollover Rating essentially measures how ``top-heavy'' a
vehicle is. The more ``top-heavy'' the vehicle, the more likely it is
to roll over. The lowest rated vehicles (1-star) are at least 4 times
more likely to roll over than the highest rated vehicles (5-stars).
Here are the Rollover Ratings:
In A Single-vehicle Crash, a vehicle with a rating of:
Five Stars
Has a risk of rollover of less than 10%
Four Stars
Has a risk of rollover greater than 10% but less than 20%
Three Stars
Has a risk of rollover greater than 20% but less than 30%
Two Stars
Has a risk of rollover greater than 30% but less than 40%
One Star
Has a risk of rollover greater than 40%
We also asked the focus groups to evaluate the following longer
version:
Description of Rollover Resistance Rating
Thousands of crashes occur each year when a driver loses
control of his/her vehicle and runs off the road. These are called
single-vehicle crashes because the crash did not involve a collision
with another vehicle. Once the vehicle leaves the road it can hit an
object (pole, tree, guardrail, etc.), or the wheels can contact a
ditch, soft soil, a curb or other object, tripping the vehicle and
causing it to roll over. Single-vehicle rollovers can also occur on the
road, but most rollover crashes occur when a vehicle runs off the road,
usually sliding sideways.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
has provided consumers with frontal and side impact crash test ratings
for several years. Because more than 10,000 people die each year in
rollover crashes, NHTSA has added a Rollover Rating to provide
consumers with better overall safety information on new vehicles.
The Rollover Rating is an estimate of your risk of rolling
over if you have a single-vehicle crash. If that happens, the risk of
rollover for the highest rated vehicles (5-star) is less than 10%, but
that risk factor increases by a factor of 3 to 4 for the lowest rated
vehicles (1-star).
The Rollover Rating essentially measures how ``top-heavy''
a vehicle is. The more ``top-heavy'' the vehicle, the more likely it is
to roll over. Based on a study of 185,000 single-vehicle crashes, this
measurement has been shown to relate very closely to the real-world
rollover experience of vehicles.
NHTSA's Front and Side Crash Test Ratings predict a
vehicle occupant's chance of serious injury if the vehicle is involved
in that type of crash. The Rollover Rating predicts the risk of a
rollover if your vehicle is involved in a single-vehicle crash. (It
does not, however, predict the likelihood of that crash.)
While the Rollover Rating does not directly predict the
risk of injury or death, keep in mind that rollovers have a higher
fatality rate than other kinds of crashes. Even the highest rated
vehicle can roll over, but you can reduce your chance of being killed
in a rollover by about 75% just by wearing your seat belt.
Here are the Rollover Ratings:
In A Single-vehicle Crash, a vehicle with a rating of:
Five Stars
Has a risk of rollover of less than 10%
Four Stars
Has a risk of rollover greater than 10% but less than 20%
Three Stars
Has a risk of rollover greater than 20% but less than 30%
Two Stars
Has a risk of rollover greater than 30% but less than 40%
One Star
Has a risk of rollover greater than 40%
The focus group testing pointed out areas of difficulty in
comprehension that were addressed in writing the final language.
Focus group participants felt that while the shorter explanation
was too short to fully comprehend the rating, the longer version was
overwhelming and included unnecessary information. Based on the focus
group inputs, we have developed the following language:
Description of Rollover Resistance Rating
Most rollover crashes occur when a vehicle runs off the
road and is tripped by a ditch, curb, soft soil, or other object
causing it to roll over. These crashes are usually caused by driver
behavior such as speeding or inattention. These are called single-
vehicle crashes because the crash did not involve a collision with
another vehicle. More than 10,000 people die each year in all rollover
crashes.
The Rollover Resistance Rating is an estimate of your risk
of rolling over if you have a single-vehicle crash. It
[[Page 3399]]
does not predict the likelihood of that crash. The Rollover Resistance
Rating essentially measures vehicle characteristics of center of
gravity and track width to determine how ``top-heavy'' a vehicle is.
The more ``top-heavy'' the vehicle, the more likely it is to roll over.
The lowest rated vehicles (1-star) are at least 4 times more likely to
roll over than the highest rated vehicles (5-stars).
The Rollover Resistance Ratings of vehicles were compared
to 220,000 actual single-vehicle crashes, and the ratings were found to
relate very closely to the real-world rollover experience of vehicles.
While the Rollover Resistance Rating does not directly
predict the risk of injury or death, keep in mind that rollovers have a
higher fatality rate than other kinds of crashes. Remember: Even the
highest rated vehicle can roll over, but you can reduce your chance of
being killed in a rollover by about 75% just by wearing your seat belt.
Here are the Rollover Resistance Ratings:
In A Single-Vehicle Crash, a vehicle with a rating of:
Five Stars
Has a risk of rollover of less than 10%
Four Stars
Has a risk of rollover between 10% and 20%
Three Stars
Has a risk of rollover between 20% and 30%
Two Stars
Has a risk of rollover between 30% and 40%
One Star
Has a risk of rollover greater than 40%
The length of the final version is midway between the two versions
tested. It adds information not included in the tested short version
that participants felt was particularly important in understanding the
information and/or particularly compelling to cause them to pay
attention to the information. It deletes information in the tested long
version that participants felt was unnecessary and/or confusing. In
addition, the explanation of the star ratings was simplified because
the original format seemed to cause some confusion about whether more
stars or less stars was a better rating. Finally, NHTSA has chosen to
use the term ``Rollover Resistance Rating'' rather than ``Rollover
Rating'' as this seemed to help participants understand the rating.
The potential confusions cited by the commenters did not occur in
the focus groups. From the discussions during the focus groups, it is
clear that participants are aware that rollover is heavily influenced
by driver and road characteristics. In almost all groups the first
cause of rollover cited by participants was speed. Participants also
mentioned road conditions and driver behavior and/or experience as
factors. However, the participants also seemed to understand that the
vehicle can also play a part in determining whether or not a rollover
occurs, and that this rating was only a measure of that factor.
NHTSA notes that the explanatory language will be used in the
Buying a Safer Car brochure, and other places that present the star
ratings. This brochure's primary focus is how a person can purchase a
safer vehicle. It does not include extensive discussion of driver
behaviors that can increase safety, as those types of issues tend to be
addressed by other agency programs. NHTSA will include additional
information about rollover in the form of Q&A's on the agency's
website, and is considering developing additional rollover consumer
information, both of which would be more appropriate places for
discussion of other factors that can reduce the risk of rollover.
2. Will Consumers Find the Information Useful in Making a Vehicle
Choice?
The commenters listed below believe that even if consumers do
understand the risk represented by the stars, this information will not
be useful to them in choosing a vehicle. They assert the following:
Consumers pick a vehicle class before they select a
particular model. There are not enough differences in star ratings
among vehicles in the same class to make the information useful to
consumers. The stars reflect only tiny differences on each side of the
dividing line.--Alliance, Ford, BMW, CU
The difference in SSF made by options and configurations
available on a single vehicle are too great to allow meaningful
ratings--Alliance
While it is true that many consumers limit their vehicle choices
early in the purchase-decision process (e.g., must be an SUV), many
others are also considering vehicles in more than one class (e.g., a
van or an SUV). As the availability of rollover resistance rating
information becomes more widely known, consumers will begin to know
that certain types of vehicles have better ratings than others. In
addition, while we cannot predict the final spread of ratings for the
2001 models that will be tested, in our research there was usually a
two- to three-star rating range for each class. Thus, by his or her
vehicle choice alone, a consumer could reduce his or her chance of a
rollover in a single-vehicle crash by up to 24% in some cases.
In addition, another safety benefit of the NCAP program is the
general improvements manufacturers have made to vehicles as the result
of publishing such ratings. These improvements benefit all consumers
regardless of their choice of vehicle. Over the years, manufacturers
have responded to the frontal NCAP program and as a result the number
of models achieving a five-star rating today is 2.7 times what it was
when the program started in 1979. As for the criticism that star
ratings do not indicate the tiny difference among vehicles near the
dividing lines, this is also true for the frontal and side NCAP
ratings. Just as with these ratings, the actual scores for the vehicles
will be available on the NCAP website to anyone who is interested.
Finally, with regard to comments that options can cause wide
difference in the rating for a specific model, over the years that we
have been researching vehicle inertial parameters, four-wheel drive is
the only equipment option for which we have observed a large potential
effect on SSF. NHTSA intends to test the most common versions of all
vehicles. Where two- and four-wheel drive versions of the same vehicle
are available, we will test them both and report them as separate
models. We will accurately describe the actual test vehicle in the
literature reporting the rating.
Manufacturers who believe there are significant differences in SSF
for different vehicle configurations may fund an optional NCAP
measurement, just as they may fund optional frontal or side NCAP tests.
Then if the difference in equipment or configuration makes a difference
in the SSF, that difference will be available to the public.
3. Even If Consumers Use the Information, Will the New Program Lead to
a Decrease in Rollover Crashes?
Some commenters believe that even if consumers do use the new
ratings, the outcome of that use will be other than what we desire. The
following are comments and who made them.
Rollover ratings will encourage consumers to purchase cars
instead of trucks and cars are less safe than trucks.--Alliance
A system based on RO/SVC may cause the choice of a less-
safe vehicle because it doesn't take the make/model's risk of becoming
involved in a crash into account.--Suzuki, Tenneco
Consumers will think that if they drive a vehicle with a
high SSF they
[[Page 3400]]
will be immune to rollover and this will lead them to drive unsafely--
Alliance
There is no demonstrated safety benefit of rollover
rating.--Alliance, BMW
The best indicator of the potential benefits of any new ratings
program is the frontal NCAP program. As discussed previously, there are
now many more five-star vehicles than when the frontal NCAP program
started. Research also indicates that a five-star rating correlates to
enhanced real-world safety. Therefore, all consumers benefit from these
improvements in the vehicle fleet even if they don't make purchase
decisions based on the star ratings. Both of these types of analysis
will be possible for side impact and rollover NCAP after an adequate
number of years of experience. There is no evidence that consumers have
responded to vehicles with high frontal NCAP scores or other safety
features by riskier driving behavior, and no reason to believe that
they will respond differently to rollover ratings. Similarly, there is
no indication that consumers believe they are immune to injury by
driving a vehicle with a five-star frontal or side NCAP rating or with
additional safety features.
NHTSA disagrees that cars are less safe than light trucks. Occupant
fatality rates (average 1991-98, FARS data) across all crash types
indicates that large cars have a lower fatality rate than SUV's and
small pickup trucks, and the same as the rate for standard pickups.
Medium cars have a rate about the same as SUV's and lower than the rate
for small pickup trucks. Small cars and small pickup trucks have about
the same rate. See Figure 4. If we narrow the picture to rollover
crashes, as in Figure 5, we see that SUV's and small pickups have the
highest rates, at least 75 percent higher than the rate for small cars.
The rates for medium and large cars are below any of the light truck
types.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR12JA01.045
[[Page 3401]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR12JA01.046
BILLING CODE 4910-59-C
However, NHTSA is aware that as we expand the areas in which we
provide consumer information ratings, it is becoming more and more
important to provide consumers with guidance on how to weigh ratings in
different categories. For example, it is quite common for SUVs to
receive five-star ratings in side impact NCAP, but our research
indicates that these vehicles will have rollover ratings in the one- to
three-star range. NHTSA can help consumers understand these differences
by providing them with information on the frequency of various crash
types, as we have been doing with the front and side impact NCAP
ratings, and we plan to do for rollover crashes. In addition, NHTSA has
been considering possible ways to provide consumers with a single
summary rating of a vehicle's safety.
E. The Question of Electronic Stability Control
Continental Teves objected to the use of SSF to rate rollover
resistance because the ratings would not reward manufacturers for
equipping vehicles with Electronic Stability Control (ESC). It was also
dissatisfied with language in the notice promising consumer information
about ESC as part of the rating presentation after there is some
evidence of its effectiveness. BMW, Toyota, Isuzu, Tenneco and the
Alliance offered similar comments. All expressed confidence that the
technology would reduce the number of on-road loss-of-control
situations that often result in off-road tripped rollovers. The
Alliance suggested that ESC may also reduce the risk of untripped
rollover, and Continental believes that it may help drivers regain
control after they leave the roadway. Many commented that ratings based
on SSF would stifle and undercut advanced vehicle technology. The
notice specifically asked commenters to share any data they may
[[Page 3402]]
have on the effectiveness of stability control technologies in
preventing single-vehicle crashes, but none did so.
The NCAP program rates the risk of rollover in the event of a
single-vehicle crash. Most of these single-vehicle crashes involve
hitting a curb or running off the road accidently and encountering soft
soil, a ditch or something that trips the vehicle. To repeat, 95
percent of rollovers are tripped. Once a vehicle is in this situation
and strikes a tripping mechanism, its chances of rolling over depend
heavily on its SSF.
The promise of ESC is not that it can change what happens when a
vehicle hits a tripping mechanism but that it may help the driver to
avoid going off the roadway in the first place. ESC can apply one or
more brakes automatically to keep the yaw rate of the vehicle
proportional to its speed and lateral acceleration. Essentially, it
corrects for vehicle understeer or oversteer, and some systems may
override a driver's failure to brake when in fear of losing control.
This benefit could minimize the driver's chances of compounding his or
her driving errors in a panic situation. However, it cannot keep a
vehicle from leaving the roadway if the vehicle is going too fast for
the maneuver the driver is attempting.
Like frontal and side NCAP ratings, the Rollover Resistance Rating
is concerned with vehicle attributes that affect the outcome of a
crash. None of the present ratings attempt to describe the probability
of a vehicle's involvement in a crash. For example, the frontal
crashworthiness star rating does not reward manufacturers who equip
vehicles with advanced braking systems. Also, the agency cannot rely on
skid pad demonstrations to determine the effectiveness of a safety
device in the hands of the public. Anti-lock brakes were once
considered likely to reduce rollover crashes because they had the
potential to reduce the number of vehicles exiting the road sideways as
a result of rear brake lock-up. This expectation has not been realized
in passenger cars according to years of crash statistics. There has
actually been an increase in the rollover rate of passenger cars
equipped with anti-lock brakes that researchers have not yet been able
to explain.
The commenters suggest that NHTSA should abandon SSF as a basis for
rollover rating because it does not reward ESC in the star rating and
that without such a reward the use of the technology would be in doubt.
The importance of SSF to rollover resistance is supported by abundant
real-world evidence, while there is no data on the effectiveness of
ESC. Based on the relative data available, it would not be appropriate
to abandon SSF. We encourage manufacturers to assist us in determining
the effectiveness of ESC by identifying optional ESC systems in VIN
codes and sharing available data. We will continually monitor data on
the real-world effectiveness of ESC and make appropriate changes based
on that data. We do not expect that manufacturers will abandon ESC,
since they express so much confidence in its ultimate effectiveness.
NHTSA wants to encourage technological applications that enhance
vehicle stability, provide drivers with more control of their vehicle,
and help prevent rollover and other crashes. For ESC in particular, it
is reasonable to assume that it will help some drivers use the
available traction to stay on the road in circumstances that would
otherwise result in panic-driven errors and roadway departure. We have
asked the National Academy of Sciences to recommend ways of combining
the effect of ESC on exposure to single-vehicle crashes, with the
effect of SSF on rollover resistance in a single-vehicle crash, as part
of its Congressionally-mandated study of rollover consumer information.
We do not expect that a recommendation can be implemented without some
determination of ESC's real-world effectiveness, but in the meantime we
will identify in our Buying a Safer Car brochure the vehicles for which
ESC is available and provide an explanation of these systems. The
identification of vehicles with ESC will start in the December 2000
issue of Buying a Safer Car. The April 2001 issue of Buying a Safer Car
will also present Rollover Resistance Ratings.
The first presentation of Rollover Resistance Ratings will be on
the NHTSA website. The website will also present Questions and Answers
regarding rollover crashes including one discussing the effect of ESC
and its relationship to the Rollover Resistance Ratings. Until the
Rollover Resistance Ratings are integrated into Buying a Safer Car, the
NHTSA website will provide a chart of rated vehicles which will include
a column indicating the availability of ESC. The heading of that column
will provide a link to the Q&A about ESC.
The Q&A section will include the following discussion:
Question: How does Electronic Stability Control affect rollover,
and what is its relationship to the Rollover Resistance Ratings?
Answer: Most rollovers occur when a vehicle runs off the road
and strikes a curb, soft shoulder, guard rail or other object that
``trips'' it. The Rollover Resistance Ratings estimate the risk of
rollover in event of a single vehicle crash, usually when the
vehicle runs off the road. Electronic Stability Control (which is
offered under various trade names) is designed to assist drivers in
maintaining control of their vehicles during extreme steering
maneuvers. It senses when a vehicle is starting to spin out
(oversteer) or plow out (understeer), and it turns the vehicle to
the appropriate heading by automatically applying the brake at one
or more wheels. Some systems also automatically slow the vehicle
with further brake and throttle intervention. What makes Electronic
Stability Control promising is the possibility that with its aid
many drivers will avoid running off the road and having a single
vehicle crash in first place. However, ESC cannot keep a vehicle on
the road if its speed is simply too great for the available traction
and the maneuver the driver is attempting or if road departure is a
result of driver inattention. In these cases, a single vehicle crash
will happen, and the Rollover Resistance Rating will apply as it
does to all vehicles in the event of a single vehicle crash.
A similar discussion will accompany the rollover resistance ratings
in the April issue of Buying a Safer Car.
F. Alternative Programs for Rollover Consumer Information Suggested by
Commenters
Three commenters to the RFC presented ideas for consumer
information programs to be used in place of the agency's proposal to
use SSF to rate vehicles. The Alliance had four suggestions:
Cause drivers to obey the speed limits, be alert and
unimpaired, and use proper restraints, and provide driver training in
off-road recovery and crash avoidance maneuvering.
Improve the roadways with paved shoulders to eliminate
road edge drop-offs and provide road edge rumble strips to help alert
drivers.
Promote Electronic Stability Control.
Promote crashworthiness improvements including active
restraint systems, tubular and side curtain air bags, new belt reminder
systems, structural crashworthiness improvements, FMVSS 201 interior
protection, new locks and latches and alternative glazings.
Ford and Suzuki commented that SSF should be used only to rate
vehicle classes and should not be used to show distinctions between
make/models in the same class. These commenters also believe that the
program should not present the risk of rollover quantitatively.
The NADA recommended that NHTSA put more emphasis on the seat belt
message in the context of rollover,
[[Page 3403]]
including child safety restraints and suggested that manufacturers
include in their vehicles' owners manuals material about crash
avoidance driving practices. The manufacturers' association, the
Alliance, on the other hand, wanted to see seat belt information only
in a general sense, not specifically referring to rollover.
The major flaw with all of these suggestions is that they do not
deliver what the consumer wants--definitive, comparative, information
about the relative risk of rollover in specific vehicles. We have
shown, in the previous sections of this notice and the notices that
have preceded it, that we can link rollover risk to the SSF of specific
make/models. Any rollover-specific consumer information product that
NHTSA develops in the future will mention driving habits that
contribute to rollover prevention and emphasize the importance of seat
belt use. However, the focus of the present action is on allowing
consumers to make an informed choice about the safety of the vehicles
they purchase, both by class and by model.
G. Commenters Preference for a Minimum Standard Based on a Dynamic Test
Tab Turner, a plantiff's attorney, and Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety, Consumers Union, and Advocates for Highway and Auto
Safety, stated in their comments that, while they had no objection to
using SSF to provide consumer information, an information program was
not sufficient to address the rollover problem. They believe a federal
motor vehicle safety standard, based on a dynamic track test of
vehicles, is needed.
Notwithstanding the recent Transportation Recall Enhancement,
Accountability, and Documentation Act (TREAD) \15\ which requires the
agency to issue ratings based on a dynamic test within two years, we
believe that consumer information based on SSF is an appropriate way to
proceed at this time to address rollover. Two issues are involved here:
the issue of a minimum standard versus consumer information, and the
issue of dynamic testing versus a static metric. Both of these issues
were addressed at length in the RFC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ P.L. 106-414, November 1, 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We agree that it would be desirable to have a standard to address a
safety issue as significant as rollover resistance. However, as
explained in the RFC, NHTSA previously decided not to set a vehicle
rollover standard at a level that would effectively force nearly all
light trucks to be redesigned to be more like passenger cars.\16\ NHTSA
also previously decided not to set a vehicle rollover standard at a
level that would effectively force a redesign even of certain vehicle
types like small pickups and small SUVs \17\ because it would not be
appropriate to prohibit the manufacture and sale of those vehicles
without some predictable benefit commensurate with the cost of that
action. However, we can still provide accurate and meaningful
information about rollover resistance to allow the public to make fully
informed choices when selecting a new vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Denial of the Wirth petition, 52 FR 49033 (December 29,
1987).
\17\ Termination to establish a minimum vehicle standard for
rollover resistance based on TTR or CSV, 59 FR 33254 (June 28,
1994.)
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IV. Rollover Information Dissemination using SSF in NCAP
The agency has decided to go forward with a pilot consumer
information program on vehicle rollover resistance, using the SSF as a
basis for the rating system. This program will be part of NCAP, which
currently gives consumers information on frontal and side-impact
crashworthiness. Today we are announcing the 2001 model year vehicles
to be tested and how the information will be disseminated to the
public.
There are two activities ongoing in NHTSA that may change this
pilot program: the study by the National Academy of Science mandated by
Congress in the Department's Fiscal Year 2001 appropriations bill \18\
and the Congressional requirement contained in the TREAD Act that the
agency develop a dynamic test for consumer information on rollover,
conduct the tests, and determine how best to disseminate the test
results to the public by November 1, 2002. Changes or additions to this
program will be developed if necessary to conform to the requirements
of these two statutes.
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\18\ P.L. 106-346, October 23, 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The rollover information program will operate just as the current
frontal and side NCAP does. New models are selected for testing before
the beginning of the model year. Selection is based primarily on
production levels predicted by the manufacturers and submitted to the
agency confidentially. Consideration is given also to vehicles
scheduled for major changes, or new models with specific features that
may affect their SSF's. The vehicles chosen for NCAP testing will be
obtained and measured by NHTSA, as the vehicles become available.
Vehicles are obtained with popular equipment, typical of a rental
fleet, and the equipment with possible influence on SSF will be
included in the vehicle description when the rating is reported. Two-
wheel drive and four-wheel drive versions of a vehicle are treated as
separate models, because a four-wheel drive option can have a
significant effect on SSF. As provided for in the frontal and side
NCAP, manufacturers can, at their option, pay for tests of vehicles,
models, or configurations not included in NHTSA's test plan, if they
wish to inform consumers about those vehicles through the program.\19\
The SSF will be converted to a star rating according to the curve
presented in Section III and Appendix I at the intervals specified in
Section III. The rollover rating information will be available on the
agency's website, and will be included in all NHTSA publications and
press releases which use NCAP data. The brochures and the website
presentation will explain the basis of the ratings, present the SSF
measurements, and discuss the magnitude of rollover harm prevention
provided by seat belt use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ The manufacturer pays for the vehicle and the test,
however, actual vehicle leasing and testing is done by a testing
laboratory under contract to NHTSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As part of the presentation on rollover the following explanatory
text will be used:
Description of Rollover Resistance Rating
Most rollover crashes occur when a vehicle runs off the
road and is tripped by a ditch, curb, soft soil, or other object
causing it to roll over. These crashes are usually caused by driver
behavior such as speeding or inattention. These are called single-
vehicle crashes because the crash did not involve a collision with
another vehicle. More than 10,000 people die each year in all rollover
crashes.
The Rollover Resistance Rating is an estimate of your risk
of rolling over if you have a single-vehicle crash. It does not predict
the likelihood of that crash. The Rollover Resistance Rating
essentially measures vehicle characteristics of center of gravity and
track width to determine how ``top-heavy'' a vehicle is. The more
``top-heavy'' the vehicle, the more likely it is to roll over. The
lowest rated vehicles (1-star) are at least 3 times more likely to roll
over than the highest rated vehicles (5-stars).
The Rollover Resistance Ratings of vehicles were compared
to 220,000 actual single-vehicle crashes, and the ratings were found to
relate very closely to the real-world rollover experience of vehicles.
[[Page 3404]]
While the Rollover Resistance Rating does not directly
predict the risk of injury or death, keep in mind that rollovers have a
higher fatality rate than other kinds of crashes.
Remember: Even the highest rated vehicle can roll over, but you can
reduce your chance of being killed in a rollover by about 75% just
by wearing your seat belt.
Here are the Rollover Resistance Ratings:
In A Single-Vehicle Crash, a vehicle with a rating of:
Five Stars
Has a risk of rollover of less than 10%
Four Stars
Has a risk of rollover between 10% and 20%
Three Stars
Has a risk of rollover between 20% and 30%
Two Stars
Has a risk of rollover between 30% and 40%
One Star
Has a risk of rollover greater than 40%
As part of these ratings, the agency also has decided to note vehicles
that are equipped with ``electronic stability control'' technology,
which may reduce the risk of a vehicle getting into an incipient
rollover situation.
Appendix II contains a preliminary list of vehicles we will measure
and for which we will report SSF and star ratings. The vehicles will be
tested as they become available to the test facility. As of today 24
vehicles have been tested; the results are available from the Auto
Safety Hotline (888-327-4236) or on the NHTSA website at
www.nhtsa.dot.gov. The remainder of the test results and star ratings
for the 2001 model year will be available by April 30, 2001.
V. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
Executive Order 12866
This notice was not reviewed under Executive Order 12866
(Regulatory Planning and Review). NHTSA has analyzed the impact of this
decision and determined that it is not a ``significant regulatory
action'' within the meaning of Executive Order 12866. The agency
anticipates that providing information on rollover risk under NHTSA's
New Car Assessment Program would impose no regulatory costs on the
industry.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30117, and 32302; delegation of
authority is at 49 CFR 1.50 and 49 CFR 501.8.
Issued on: January 8, 2001.
Stephen R. Kratzke,
Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards.
Appendix I: Statistical Analysis in Response to Comments
Response to Comments of the Alliance of Automotive Manufacturers
based on a Study by Exponent Failure Analysis Associates, Inc.
titled: The Relative Importance of Factors Related to the Risk of
Rollover Among Passenger Vehicles
Background
The agency has proposed expanding the New Car Assessment Program
(NCAP), which tests vehicle performance in front and side crashes,
to include information on rollover resistance. We proposed a
rollover metric for consumer information based on the Static
Stability Factor (SSF) and described the approach in a Request for
Comments, Notice for Rollover NCAP (``the Notice,'' docket NHTSA
2000-6859, item 1, June 1, 2000). The Appendix to the Notice
described a statistical analysis of four years of data (1994 to
1997) from six states (Florida, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Utah), and we provided more details of the
analysis (definitions, programming statements, and computer output)
in another submission to the Rollover NCAP docket (item 4). The
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (``the Alliance'') reviewed the
Notice and the supplemental material and submitted their comments to
that docket (item 25).
Appendix 4 of their comments is a paper prepared for the
Alliance by Exponent Failure Analysis Associates, Inc. (``the
Exponent report'') on The Relative Importance of Factors Related to
the Risk of Rollover Among Passenger Vehicles (Alan C. Donelson,
Farshid Forouhar, and Rose M. Ray, in a paper dated August 30,
2000). The Exponent report critiqued our linear regression analysis
of the summarized crash data and suggested an alternative approach
based on logistic regression analysis of individual crash events.
This paper is a comparison of the two approaches (the linear model
from summarized data and the logistic model of individual crash
events) in response to those comments.
Overview
The Exponent report listed four goals for their study (page 4 of
that report), and we will address their conclusions in our response.
The four goals were as follows:
(1) ``To evaluate the statistical study offered by NHTSA as a
basis for comparative 'ratings' [emphasis in original] of rollover
risk,''
(2) ``To gauge the strength of SSF as a predictor of rollover
relative to the influence of non-vehicular factors,''
(3) ``To quantify the relationship between SSF and risk of
rollover after adjusting for the influence of non-vehicular
factors,'' and
(4) ``To estimate the magnitude and reliability of apparent
changes in rollover risk with changes in SSF.''
The Exponent report offered three corrections to our vehicle
group definitions, questioned the use of linear models of summarized
data, and recommended logistic models of individual crash events as
an improvement (their goals 1 and 2). In response, we have made the
suggested corrections, used updated VIN-decoded data, added a year
of data (the 1998 calendar year data are now available for all six
states used in our original analysis), and refit the model. Details
on the data definitions are included below in ``Available Data,''
and the results of are described in ``Refitting the Linear Model.''
We have also used our data to fit logistic regression models, and
these results are described in ``Fitting Logistic Models.'' A
comparison of the two approaches is provided in ``Comparing the
Models.''
Our logistic models produced results that were similar to those
produced by our linear model of summarized data and to the logistic
models described in the Exponent report (which were based on a
slightly different group of states, calendar years, and explanatory
variables). That is, the choice of model form and data source do not
affect our essential conclusion: the SSF is strongly related (both
in terms of statistical significance and magnitude of effect) to
rollover risk. However, there are some differences among the models
in the estimated sensitivity of rollover risk to changes in the SSF.
Where we disagree most with the Exponent report is in the
interpretation of the results. The authors of the Exponent report
argue that the SSF plays a smaller role in rollover causation than
do driver and other road-use factors (their goals 2 and 4). Goal 2
(gauging the relative strength of the SSF and non-vehicle factors)
is so important to the authors that they used it as the title of
their report. We believe that our analysis indicates that the SSF is
very important in describing rollover risk, as measured by the fit
of each model, the significance of the coefficient of the SSF term,
and the magnitude of the coefficient of the SSF term. We do
recognize that driver and other road-use variables are also
important. Federal, state, and local education and enforcement
programs are all aimed at the vulnerability of road users to human
error, and we recognize that the driver plays a large role in
causing or avoiding crashes. However, what we set out to address in
the Notice is whether the SSF provides information that is useful to
consumers--information they can use in selecting a vehicle, deciding
whether to use seat belts and child seats, and adapting their
driving style to a new vehicle. We describe this point in more
detail below, in ``Interpreting the Analytical Results,'' using an
example based on the relationship between crash severity, belt use,
and injury severity.
In summary, we believe that our statistical models (both the
linear model of summarized data and the logistic models of
individual crash events) and the statistical models offered in the
Exponent report support our conclusion that the SSF is a useful
measure of rollover risk that will help the consumer choose a new
vehicle and use it wisely.
Available Data
The analysis described in the Notice was based on single-vehicle
crashes, which we
[[Page 3405]]
defined to exclude crashes with another motor vehicle in transport
or with a nonmotorist (such as a pedestrian or pedalcyclist),
animal, or train. We eliminated vehicles without a driver and all
vehicles that were parked, pulling a trailer, designed for certain
special or emergency uses (ambulance, fire, police, or military), or
on an emergency run at the time of the crash. Our only criterion for
including a vehicle model in the analysis was a reliable measure of
the SSF. The 100 vehicle groups we identified were described in the
Notice, and the definitions for these groups were included in
another submission to the same docket (item 4).
Exponent reviewed this information and pointed out three errors
in the specifications of the vehicle groups (page 37). First,
vehicle group 65 should have been defined as model years 1990-1995
(not 1988-1996). Second, vehicle group 66 should have been defined
as model years 1996-1998 (not 1997-1998). And third, vehicle group
91 should have included model code ``SKI'' (not ``SCI''), as defined
by the output from The Polk Company's PC VINA software
(PC VINA for Windows User's Manual, October 20, 1998).
We also found a typographical error in the specification of vehicle
group 79: the number of drive wheels should have been specified as
``not equal to 4'' (rather than ``equal to 4''). We corrected these
mistakes in the list and computer programs, and the corrected list
of vehicles is included here as Tables 1 through 4.
Our understanding of some important differences in state crash
reporting are included in Table 5. The Notice described our criteria
for including a state in the analysis, which were as follows:
(1) Data availability (the state must participate in the
agency's State Data System (SDS) and have provided the 1997 data),
(2) VIN reporting (the vehicle identification number (VIN) must
be coded on the electronic file), and
(3) Rollover identification (we must be able to determine
whether a rollover occurred, regardless of whether it was a first or
subsequent event in the crash).
Six states (Florida, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Utah) met all three criteria. Two states (New
Mexico and Ohio) met two of the three criteria; these states
participate in the SDS and the VIN is available on the electronic
file, but rollovers are identified only if they are reported as the
first harmful event in the crash. We have made some use of all eight
states in this updated analysis, but most of the analysis is based
on the six states with the best rollover reporting. These are the
six states that were the basis for the analysis described in the
Notice.
For this analysis, we used the SDS data and the VIN-decoded data
available on NHTSA's Research and Development Local Area Network (
LAN). The National Center for Statistics and Analysis (NCSA, an
office in R&D) recently rebuilt the 1997 VIN files for Maryland and
Missouri, and the numbers of relevant cases differ slightly from
those reported in the Notice. The major changes were a slightly
more-conservative approach to dealing with mistakes in VIN
transcription and some additional vehicle-make codes. We also
expanded somewhat our definition of ``rollover'' in North Carolina
(adding information from the four impact-type variables), which
increased the number of rollovers in that state over what was
reported in the Notice. The number of relevant vehicles identified
for each state and calendar year are shown as Table 6. Note that
Ohio reported a relatively small percentage of VINs in 1998 (about
29 percent of vehicles had a VIN on the electronic file), so case
counts for the vehicles relevant to this study are low. Our analysis
is not too sensitive to missing VIN information because it is based
on internal comparisons of the crash data (specifically, on
rollovers per single-vehicle crash); this would not be the case if
we were basing our analysis on comparisons with an external source,
such as rollovers per registered vehicle.
We added a calendar year of data (1998) for the six states used
in the analysis described in the Notice. However, Pennsylvania no
longer includes on the electronic file some environmental variables
that we need for this analysis (specifically, CURVE and GRADE), so
we could not use the 1998 Pennsylvania data in the analysis. The
variables available for this analysis are shown as Table 7. We
calculated the SSF to two decimal places (with observed values
between 1.00 and 1.53), we defined NUMOCC as the count of occupants
in each vehicle, and we defined all the other road-use factors as
dichotomous variables (with ``0'' coded for ``no,'' and ``1'' coded
for ``yes'').
All eight states reported the following data: ROLL, SSF, DARK,
STORM, FAST, HILL, CURVE, BADSURF, MALE, YOUNG, OLD, and DRINK.
Speed limit is not reported in New Mexico, so we defined FAST based
on the roadway function class after reviewing the relationship
between these two variables among New Mexico cases in the 1994-1998
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) data. We assumed, based on
our review of the FARS data, that (1) interstate and rural arterial
roads had a speed limit of at least 55 mph, (2) local roads and
urban arterial roads, collectors, and ramps had a speed limit of no
more than 50 mph, and (3) the speed limit was unknown for all other
roads. RURAL was unavailable for two states (Maryland and Missouri),
BADROAD was unavailable for two states (Missouri and Pennsylvania),
NOINSURE was unavailable for three states (Maryland, North Carolina,
and Utah), and NUMOCC was unavailable for Missouri (where uninjured
passengers need not be reported).
Refitting the Linear Model
We refit the linear model using the approach described in the
Notice. There were 241,036 single-vehicle crashes available for this
analysis (that is, involving a vehicle in one of the 100 vehicle
groups, occurring between 1994 and 1998, and occurring in the six
states we studied in preparing the Notice (Florida, Maryland,
Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Utah), and 48,996 of
these (20.33 percent) involved rollover. We eliminated the 1998
Pennsylvania data because CURVE and GRADE are not available on the
electronic file, and this left 227,194 single-vehicle crashes, of
which 45,880 (20.19 percent) involved rollover.
We summarized the data for each vehicle group in each state,
which produced 599 summary records (there were no reported single-
vehicle crashes involving vehicle group 54 in Utah). As with the
earlier analysis, we eliminated any summary record that was based on
fewer than 25 cases because we thought estimates based on smaller
samples were too unreliable. This left us with 518 summary records,
representing the experiences of 226,117 single-vehicle crashes,
including 45,574 (20.16 percent) rollovers. Figure 1 shows the
rollover rate (rollovers per single-vehicle crash) as a function of
the SSF plotted for each of the 100 vehicle groups. These data have
not been adjusted for differences in vehicle use or state reporting
practices, but they do show a strong tendency for lower rollover
rates with higher values of the SSF.
[[Page 3406]]
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We used the 1994-1998 General Estimates System (GES) for a
comparison with the six-state rollover rate for the study vehicles
as a group. The five years of GES data include 9,910 sampled
vehicles that we identified as being in one of the 100 vehicle
groups (based on decoding the VIN with the PC VINA
software for those states that include the VIN on their police
reports) involved in a single-vehicle crash, and 2,377 of these
rolled over. Weighting the GES data to reflect the sample scheme
(but not adjusting for missing VIN data) produces estimates of
1,185,474 single-vehicle crashes per year, of which 236,335 (19.94
percent) involved rollover. That is, the six states in our study
have a rollover rate for police-reported crashes that is essentially
the same as the national estimate produced from the GES data (with
the qualification that the GES estimate is based on data from just
those states that include the VIN on the police report).
We defined the dependent variable ROLL as the fraction of
single-vehicle crashes that involved rollover. The independent
(explanatory) variables in the six-state combined model were those
available in all six states. They were expressed as the fraction of
single-vehicle crashes that involved each of the following ten
situations: DARK, STORM, FAST, HILL, CURVE, BADSURF, MALE, YOUNG,
OLD, and DRINK. We also defined dummy variables for five states
(DUMMY__FL, DUMMY__MD, DUMMY__NC, DUMMY__PA, and DUMMY__UT, with
Missouri used as the baseline case) to capture state-to-state
differences in reporting thresholds and definitions. These variables
have the value ``1'' if the crash occurred in that state (for
example DUMMY__MD = 1 for all Maryland crashes), and they have the
value ``0'' otherwise (for example, DUMMY__MD = 0 for all crashes in
Florida, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Utah). These
are the fourteen variables we used in the earlier analysis
(described in the Notice), plus the variable OLD.
We ran the stepwise linear regression analysis against these 518
summary records to describe the natural logarithm of rollovers per
single-vehicle crash, which we call LOGROLL, as a function of a
linear combination of the explanatory variables. (To avoid losing
information on vehicle models with a low risk of rollover, we set
ROLL to 0.0001 if there were no rollovers represented by the summary
record.) We used the option that gives more weight to data points
that are based on more observations, so vehicle groups with more
crashes count for more in the analysis. Each data point was weighted
by the number of single-vehicle crashes it represented, but the
weighting was capped at 250. That is, data points based on more than
250 observations were weighted by 250. Our rationale was that we
wanted the model to fit well across the full range of SSF values, so
we did not want to over-weight the data for the most-common models
on the road.
We ran a preliminary model using the SSF and the five state
dummies to estimate LOGROLL. The model had an R2 of 0.73,
and the coefficient of the SSF term (-2.8634) was highly significant
(the t-statistic indicates that the probability that the coefficient
is really zero is less than 0.0001); the details are included as
Table 8a. Thus, it appears that the SSF is very useful in
understanding rollover risk. We then performed a stepwise linear
regression (using forward variable selection and a significance
level of 0.15 for entry and removal from the model) on the six-state
data; this is the same approach we used for the analysis described
in the Notice. The stepwise regression procedure with the SSF chose
three variables that describe the driving situation (DARK, FAST, and
CURVE), three variables that describe the driver (MALE, YOUNG, and
DRINK), and all five state dummy variables. The F-statistic for the
model as a whole was 311, and the probability of a value this high
by chance alone is less than 0.0001. The model had an R2
of 0.88 and the coefficient of the SSF term (-3.3760) was highly
significant; more details on the fit of the model are included as
Table 8b. Note that adding the road-use variables increased both the
model R2 (from 0.73 to 0.88) and the absolute value of
the coefficient of the SSF term (from -2.8634 to -3.3760). That is,
the effect of the SSF on rollover risk is estimated to be even
greater after adjusting for differences in road use.
We used the results of the model to adjust the observed number
of rollovers per single-vehicle crash to account for differences
among vehicle groups in their road-use characteristics in single-
vehicle crashes. For each of the 518 summary records, we used the
regression results and the typical road use to estimate what LOGROLL
would have been if road use for that vehicle group had been the
typical road use observed for all the vehicles in the study. The
approach is the one used in the Notice. We used an intermediate step
to account for differences in road use and adjust the data towards
the average experience for the study vehicles:
ADJ__LOGROLLi
=LOGROLLi
BETA__DARK x (DARKi - MEAN__DARK)
-BETA__FAST x (FASTi - MEAN__FAST)
-BETA__CURVE x (CURVEi - MEAN__CURVE)
-BETA__MALE x (MALEi - MEAN__MALE)
-BETA__YOUNG x (YOUNGi - MEAN__YOUNG)
[[Page 3407]]
-BETA__DRINK x (DRINKi - MEAN__DRINK)
-BETA__DUMMY--FL x DUMMY__FLi
-BETA__DUMMY__MD x DUMMY__MDi
-BETA__DUMMY__NC x DUMMY__NCi
-BETA__DUMMY__PA x DUMMY__PAi
-BETA__DUMMY__UT x DUMMY__UTi
+ MEAN__DUMMIES,
where:
ADJ__LOGROLLi is the estimate of what LOGROLL would
have been for each summary record if all vehicles were used the same
way,
LOGROLLi is the value of LOGROLL observed for each
summary record,
BETA__DARK through BETA__DRINK are the coefficients (Beta-
values) of the road-use variables, DARK through DRINK, that were
produced by the model (as shown in Table 8b),
BETA__DUMMY__FL through BETA__DUMMY__UT are the coefficients of
the state dummy variables, DUMMY__FL through DUMMY__UT, that were
produced by the model,
DARKi through DRINKi are the values of the
road-use variables observed for each summary record,
DUMMY__FLi through DUMMY__UTi are the
values of the state dummy variables for each summary record (with no
more than one of these equal to ``1,'' and all the rest equal to
``0''),
MEAN__DARK through MEAN__DRINK are the average values of the
road-use variables observed in the study data (with
MEAN__DARK=0.4314,
MEAN__FAST=0.4807, MEAN__CURVE=0.3315, MEAN__MALE = 0.6276,
MEAN__YOUNG=0.3987, and MEAN__DRINK=0.1509), and
MEAN__DUMMIES is the average state adjustment in the study data.
MEAN__DUMMIES was calculated for these 226,117 single-vehicle
crashes from the coefficient of the state dummy variables and the
number of cases in each state as follows:
(1.2253 x number of Florida cases
+0.6933 x number of Maryland cases
+0.0000 x number of Missouri
+0.6969 x number of North Carolina cases
+1.2449 x number of Pennsylvania cases
+0.8622 x number of Utah cases)
/Total number of cases
=0.8019,
The adjusted rollover rate for each vehicle group is then
estimated by:
ADJ__ROLL=e(ADJ__\\\)
This is our estimate of what the rollover rate would have been if
all vehicle groups were used in the same way, and it reflects the
average use patterns of all vehicles in the study. The adjusted
rollover rates are shown in Figure 2.
The average adjusted number of rollovers per single-vehicle
crash for all the study vehicles in the six states is 0.1982, which
is essentially the same as the rollover rate in the original study
data (0.2016) and the rollover rate estimated from the GES data
(0.1994) for these 100 vehicle groups. A linear model fit through
the adjusted data is described by the equation:
LOGROLL = 2.5861--3.3760 x SSF.
The model has an R2 of 0.85, and the coefficient of
the SSF term was highly significant. Details on the fit of the model
through the adjusted rollover rates are included as Table 8c.
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Exponentiating both sides of the equation produces an estimate that
the number of rollovers per single-vehicle crash is approximated by
the curve:
ROLL = 13.28 x e(-3.3760 x SSF).
The estimated rollover rates for the SSF values between 0.95 and
1.55 are shown in Table 19 in the column labeled ``Model 1,'' and
the estimates for the observed range (SSF values from 1.00 to 1.53)
are shown as Figure 2. This model form has very useful properties.
The increase in the SSF that is associated with halving the number
of rollovers per single-vehicle crash is estimated as 0.21. For
example, the number of rollovers per single-vehicle crash under
average conditions is estimated as:
0.44 for a SSF of 1.01
0.23 for a SSF of 1.22, and
[[Page 3408]]
0.11 for a SSF of 1.43.
Thus, rollover risk drops by a half when the SSF increases from 1.01
to 1.22, and it drops in half again when the SSF increases from 1.22
to 1.43.
The SSF is both highly significant in the model and very
important in describing rollover risk (the estimated rollover risk
increases by a factor of 6.0 over the observed range of the data,
from a SSF of 1.00 to 1.53). This means that changes in the SSF (or
changes in how vehicles with low SSF values are used) has the
potential for large reductions in rollover risk.
Fitting Logistic Models
The Exponent report questioned the validity of using a linear
regression analysis of summarized data, though they noted the
advantages of this approach for describing the data. They suggested
using a logistic regression analysis with the SSF and road-use
variables, and they also suggested (as a way of dealing with
potential cross-correlations) an approach that uses crash-risk
scenarios in place of the road-use variables. They provided results
from the states they used in their analysis, and we did a similar
analysis of the eight states available to us. The data for two
states, New Mexico and Ohio, were not combined with the data from
the other six states because a rollover is reported in New Mexico or
Ohio only if it is considered to have been the first harmful event
in the crash. However, we did look briefly at these data because we
were curious about how the rollover definition affects the analysis.
We wanted to see how the risk of a rollover occurring as the first
harmful event in a single-vehicle crash varies as a function of the
SSF as reported in these two states.
We ran a logistic regression analysis for each state to model
rollover as a function of the SSF and the road-use variables. For
each state, we used the explanatory variables available for the
linear regression analysis plus other variables that were available
in each state, as described in Table 7. The fits of the models are
summarized in Tables 9a through 16a. Each model seems to fit the
data well. The coefficient of the SSF term varies from (-3.0800) in
North Carolina to (-4.3908) in Florida. The values for New Mexico
(-3.0809) and Ohio (-4.3642) fall in this range, which suggests that
the choice between ``all rollovers'' and ``first harmful event
rollovers'' may not be critical for a basic understanding of the
sensitivity of rollover risk to the SSF (though the choice is
important in determining the absolute level of rollover risk). In
all cases, the coefficient of the SSF term was highly significant;
the probability of a chi-square this large by chance alone (the
smallest chi-square values were 209 for New Mexico and 416 for Utah)
was estimated as less than 0.0001.
We then combined the data from the six states that have the best
rollover reporting (that is, data that were not limited to first-
harmful-event rollovers) and used them together in a logistic model,
using the explanatory variables they have in common. We used the
approach Charles Kahane described in his study of the safety effects
of vehicle size. He used dummy variables to capture reporting
differences in a logistic model of state data, and the results are
included in Relationships between Vehicle Size and Fatality Risk in
Model Year 1985-93 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks (Charles J.
Kahane, Evaluation Division, Office of Plans and Policy, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT HS 808 570, January
1997). The results of the six-state combined model are shown as
Table 17a. The model fits the data well, and the SSF is highly
significant in the model (with a chi-square value of 7,230).
The coefficient of the SSF term in the logistic model for each
state and for the six-state combined model describes the
relationship between the rollover rates for any two values of the
SSF, and we can use this relationship to estimate the rollover rate
under average road-use conditions for each value of the SSF. We used
the method that Ellen Hertz described in her study of the safety
effects of vehicle weight. She estimated injury risk based on a
logistic model of state data, and the results are included in A
Collection of Recent Analyses of Vehicle Weight and Safety (T.M.
Klein, E. Hertz, and S. Borener, Mathematical Analysis Division,
National Center for Statistics and Analysis, Research and
Development, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT HS
807 677, May 1991). We defined:
BETASSF = the coefficient of the SSF term in the logistic model for
a state,
ROLLSSF = the rollover rate at a specific value of the
SSF, and
ODDSSSF = the odds of rollover at a specific value of the
SSF.
We choose a SSF of 1.00 as the basis for the calculations. The
relationship between ROLL1.00 and any other
ROLLSSF can be calculated for each state as follows:
ROLLSSF = ODDSSSF / (1 + ODDSSSF)
where
ODDSSSF = e ((SSF - 1.00) x BETASSF) x
ROLL1.00 / (1 - ROLL1.00).
The results of the logistic analysis of the Florida data are shown
in Table 9a, including an estimate that:
BETASSF = (-4.3908),
so all we need for rollover rate estimates across the range of the
SSF is an estimate of ROLL1.00 in Florida. We estimated
ROLL1.00 using the following approach. For each state, we defined:
ODDSALL = odds of rollover for the study vehicles as a
group,
LOGODDSALL = the natural logarithm of ODDSALL,
and
MEANSSF = the average SSF for the study vehicles.
The model says that:
LOGODDS = T + (BETASSF x SSF),
where
T = a linear function of the explanatory variables,
and we solved for the ``average'' value of T such that:
LOGODDSALL = T + (BETASSF x MEANSSF).
That is, we assumed that the results of the logistic model apply to
the average rollover rate and SSF value for the vehicles as a group,
and this means that:
T = LOGODDSALL - (BETASSF x MEANSSF).
The rollover rate for all the vehicles included in the Florida study
was 0.2044 and their average SSF was 1.2894, which means that:
T = loge(0.2044/0.7956) - (-4.3908 x 1.2894) and
T = 4.3025 at the average rollover odds and SSF values.
We call this specific value of the function T, ``T0.'' Then, after
controlling for other factors, LOGODDSSSF is estimated
as:
LOGODDSSSF = T0 + (BETASSF x SSF),
and at SSF=1.00 in Florida, this is calculated as:
LOGODDS1.00 = 4.3025 - (4.3908 x 1.00),
so
LOGODDS1.00 = (-0.0883).
ROLL1.00 is estimated from the LOGODDS1.00 as:
ex/(1 + e x),
where x is the LOGODDS1.00, so the rollover rate at a SSF
value of 1.00 is estimated as 0.4778 rollovers per single-vehicle
crash. The rollover rate for all other values of the SSF can be
estimated using:
ODDSSSF = e((SSF - 1.00) x BETASSF) x
ROLL1.00/(1 - ROLL1.00)
and
ROLLSSF = ODDSSSF/(1 + ODDSSSF).
We used this approach for each state and for the six-state
combined model. The average rollover rate and SSF for each state and
for the six-state combined data are shown in Table 18, along with
the estimated rollover rates for a SSF of 1.00. For example, the
rollover risk for the six-states combined is estimated as 0.4031 at
an SSF of 1.00, and it is shown in the column for the results of the
models based on ``individual variables.'' (The results of the models
based on ``crash scenarios'' are described below.) The results for
each value of the SSF are shown in the column labeled ``Model 2'' in
Table 19.
As a check of the six-state combined model, we calculated the
average rollover risk for each value of the SSF based on the
individual state models. For example, we calculated the average
rollover rate for a vehicle with a SSF of 1.00 by taking the average
of the estimates for these six states (that is, Florida, Maryland,
Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Utah), weighted by the
size of each state (as measured by the number of single-vehicle
crashes involving any study vehicle in each state). The result is an
estimated risk of 0.4101 rollovers per single-vehicle crash for an
SSF of 1.00, and the same procedure was applied to each value of the
SSF from 0.95 to 1.55. The results are shown as the column labeled
``Model 3'' in Table 19.
The Exponent report also suggested using an approach they called
a ``crash scenario analysis'' to address possible interactions among
the explanatory variables. This idea is interesting and conceptually
simple. The single-vehicle crashes from each state are categorized
into cells defined by the possible combinations of the road-use
variables. For example, the Florida logistic analysis used 14 road-
use variables: DARK, STORM, RURAL, FAST, HILL, CURVE, BADROAD,
BADSURF,
[[Page 3409]]
MALE, YOUNG, OLD, NOINSURE, DRINK, and NUMOCC. NUMOCC is the count
of occupants in each vehicle, and the other 13 variables take on the
value ``0'' or ``1'' (indicating ``no'' or ``yes''). This produces a
large number of possible combinations of the variable values:
213 x the number of levels of NUMOCC.
Converting NUMOCC into a dichotomous variable (for example, one
that identifies vehicles with at least three occupants) yields 14
dichotomous variables, which means 214 combinations of these
variables, or 16,384 cells for the various crash scenarios. In
practice, not all combinations will occur (there were 2,034 non-zero
cells in the Florida data), and some non-zero cells have very low
counts (there were 267 cells in the Florida data with at least 25
observations). The rollover rate for each cell can be calculated
from these data, and this is a measure of the risk associated with
that scenario. This rate can be used in place of all the road-use
explanatory variables (for example, in place of the 14 original
road-use variables in the Florida analysis). The Exponent report
recommends a refinement to this calculation so that the scenario-
risk variable for each specific vehicle reflects the rollover rate
for all other vehicles in its cell. For example, in a cell with 100
vehicles and 20 rollovers, the scenario-risk variable (SCENRISK)
will be calculated as:
20/(100 - 1) for each nonrollover vehicle
and as
(20 - 1)/(100 - 1) for each rollover vehicle.
Using a crash-scenario variable is an interesting idea, even
though the analytical results in the Exponent report seem to show
that the individual-variable and crash-scenario logistic models
produced very similar results. The standardized estimates for the
coefficients of the SSF term produced by the two approaches (and our
own results) are shown in Table 20. We attempted to duplicate the
crash-scenario analysis based on the description provided in the
Exponent report. The concept seems clear and logical, and we made
the following decisions in implementing it for this analysis. First,
we reviewed the output from the logistic regression on individual
variables for each state and selected those for which the
probability of a greater chi-square value was less than 0.20. We
reasoned that using a large number of variables to define the crash
scenarios would tend to produce many cells with small sample sizes,
and that the variables with smaller chi-square values would be
missed less. A review of Tables 9a through 16a shows that this
eliminated only one variable in Florida (DARK), but it eliminated
five variables in Utah (STORM, HILL, MALE, YOUNG, and OLD). Second,
we converted NUMOCC into MANYOCC (with value ``1'' meaning three or
more occupants, and ``0'' meaning one or two occupants). Again, the
purpose of this was to reduce the number of cells with small sample
counts, while retaining the essential information.
Third, we tabulated the number of single-vehicle crashes
(SVACCS) and the number of rollovers (ROLLACCS) for each combination
of DARK, STORM, RURAL, FAST, HILL, CURVE, BADROAD, BADSURF, MALE,
YOUNG, OLD, NOINSURE, DRINK, and MANYOCC that had been selected for
inclusion in each state. We eliminated any combination (that is, any
crash scenario) with fewer than 25 observations. The results are
summary data describing the experience of all vehicles in each crash
scenario. Fourth, we merged the crash-scenario summary data for each
state back onto the original data (that is, the data for each
individual single-vehicle crash), so that each crash was linked to a
count of the total number of single-vehicle crashes and the total
number of rollovers that occurred in its crash scenario (its cell).
We defined the scenario-risk variable, SCENRISK, as the rollover
rate for all other vehicles in that crash scenario in that state.
The calculation was as follows:
SCENRISK = (ROLLACCS - ROLL)/(SVAACCS - 1).
Recall that ROLL is coded as ``1'' if the vehicle rolled over and
``0'' if it did not, so this equation produces an estimate of the
rollover rate for all vehicles in the crash scenario except for the
one case under study; this was the method recommended by the
Exponent report. This scenario-specific rollover rate is calculated
for each vehicle on the file and is then available as an explanatory
variable for a logistic model.
We ran a logistic regression analysis against the data for each
state and for the six-state combined data to model rollover risk as
a function of two variables: the SSF and SCENRISK. The fits of the
models are summarized in Tables 9b through 17b. Each table shows the
number of crash scenarios with at least 25 observations and the
total number of crashes in these more-frequent scenarios. Each model
seems to fit the data well. The coefficient of the SSF term in the
crash-scenario logistic model for each state describes the
relationship between any two values of the SSF. We applied the
approach we used for the individual-variable logistic model to
estimate the rollover risk for each value of the SSF and to combine
the values across states. The rollover rates at a SSF of 1.00 are
shown in Table 18, and the estimated rollover rates as a function of
the SSF are shown in Table 19. The column labeled ``Model 4'' shows
the results for the six-state model, and the column labeled ``Model
5'' shows the average of the individual models for the six states.
Note that the individual-variable and the crash-scenario approaches
produce very similar numbers. This is consistent with the results
reported in the Exponent report (and summarized in Table 20, using
the standardized estimates of the coefficients).
Comparing the Models
The rollover rates estimated across the range of SSF values for
the six states combined are shown in Table 19 for all five
statistical models (the linear model of summarized data and the four
versions of the logistic model), and the estimates for the observed
values of the SSF are plotted in Figure 3. The five models are as
follows:
Model 1: Linear model of the summarized data,
Model 2: Logistic model of the six-state combined data, based on
individual variables,
Model 3: Average of the logistic models for the six states, based on
individual variables,
Model 4: Logistic model of the six-state combined data, based on
crash scenarios, and
Model 5: Average of the logistic models for the six states, based on
crash scenarios.
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There are important similarities between the estimates produced by
the two approaches: both the linear model of summarized data and the
logistic models suggest a strong relationship (in terms of
statistical significance and in terms of the magnitude of the
effect) between the SSF and rollover risk. The average slope across
the range of the observed SSF values (from 1.00 to 1.53) shown in
Figure 3 is -0.713 for the linear model; the logistic models produce
estimates of a slightly smaller effect, with average slopes between
-0.598 and -0.555. Both types of models agree in estimating a large
increased risk for vehicles with a low SSF. The four logistic models
produce very similar results, and each suggests that rollover risk
is very sensitive to the SSF (only slightly less so than estimated
from the results of the linear model of the summarized data).
Figure 3 shows that the greatest absolute differences in the
rollover rate estimates are at the lowest values of the SSF. The
values of the rollover rate estimated for a SSF of 1.00 were as
follows:
Model 1 = 0.4551 (linear model of the summarized data),
Model 2 = 0.4101 (logistic model of the six-state combined data with
individual variables),
Model 3 = 0.4031 (average of the logistic models for the six states
with individual variables),
Model 4 = 0.3999 (logistic model of the six-state combined data with
crash scenarios), and
Model 5 = 0.3929 (average of the logistic models for the six states
with crash scenarios),
The results of the four logistic models are almost indistinguishable
in Figure 3: the crash-scenario approach produces results that are
only slightly different from the individual-variable approach (the
former are a little lower at a SSF of 1.00 and little higher at an
SSF of 1.53), and the average of the logistic models for the six
states produces results that are only slightly different from the
logistic model of the six-state combined data (the former are a
little lower at a SSF of 1.00 and little higher at an SSF of 1.53).
The results of our logistic analyses seem to differ only
slightly from those described in the Exponent report, and much of
the difference may be the result of our decision to omit wheelbase
from the models. We did not include wheelbase as an explanatory
variable because we could not identify any physical reason for an
effect on rollover risk. However, we reran each analysis with the
addition of wheelbase to test the sensitivity of the results to this
decision. In every case, adding wheelbase to the model produced a
higher estimate of the effect of the SSF on rollover risk and a
higher estimate of rollover risk for the lowest values of the SSF.
This occurred for all 18 models (those estimated using both the
individual-variable and crash-scenario approaches for each of the
eight states and for the six-state combined data), despite a
negative value for the coefficient of the wheelbase term in each
model. That is, the coefficient of the SSF term was negative in each
of the original models, it became more negative in the presence of
wheelbase, and wheelbase itself had a negative coefficient in each
model in which it was included.
Adding wheelbase seemed to produce results closer to those in
the Exponent report. That report does not include the estimates of
the variable coefficients, but it does include the standardized
coefficients. These are shown in our Table 20, along with the
corresponding values from our analysis. For example, when we ran the
logistic regression analysis on the Florida data and used wheelbase
as one of the explanatory variables, we obtained values of (-0.392)
and (-0.374) for the standardized coefficients from the individual-
variable and crash-scenario models, respectively. These are higher
than the values we obtained without wheelbase, (-0.349) and
(-0.327), and they are very close to the values in the Exponent
report, (-0.383) and (-0.381). Adding wheelbase to our models
produced higher estimates of the coefficient for the SSF term and
higher estimated rollover rates for vehicles with lower SSF values.
For example, the six-state models that included wheelbase produced
estimates that the coefficients of the SSF term are (-3.9525) and
(-3.7918) and the estimated rollover rates for a SSF of 1.00 are
0.4338 and 0.4228 for the individual-variable and crash-scenario
approaches, respectively.
There is also one important difference between the linear
analysis of summary data and the logistic analysis of individual
crashes. We limited the summary data to those based on at least 25
observations and
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we capped the weighting at 250 to avoid over-emphasizing the more-
popular vehicles. However, the logistic regression analysis on
individual crashes uses all observations equally. When we removed
the two thresholds from the linear analysis, we obtained slightly
lower estimates of the effect of the SSF on rollover risk, and the
relationship between the adjusted rollover rates and the SSF is
described by:
ROLL = 10.99e (- 3.2356 x SSF)
This model produces an estimate of 0.4323 rollovers per single-
vehicle crash at an SSF of 1.00, which is closer to the estimates
from our logistic models (and essentially the same as the estimates
from the logistic models that include wheelbase as an explanatory
variable).
Interpreting the Analytical Results
Many of the comments in the Exponent report reflect an interest
in evaluating the relative strength of the driver and vehicle
contributions to rollover risk. We agree that this is an interesting
question, but it is not the one we set out to address. Our
perspective is that of a person choosing a new vehicle who wants to
know how his choice of vehicle will affect his risk of being
involved in a rollover. We are interested in eliminating the
confounding effects of road use so we can isolate the effect of the
vehicle on rollover risk. The importance of road-use factors does
not preclude a role for vehicle-specific information.
Also, a factor can be important without suggesting an easy
remedy. Consider two factors that increase the risk of rollover
given a single-vehicle crash: driver age (specifically, the effect
of young, inexperienced drivers) and curved roads. We do have some
influence over their effect on rollover risk: better driver training
and better road design can help reduce rollovers even among young
drivers on curved roads. However, some additional risk is a given
for people who are still gaining on-road experience, and curved
roads are a necessity in many places. So, while driver and other
road-use factors are important to understanding rollover risk, this
is not the same as saying that all rollovers can be prevented by
driver and other road-use remedies. Vehicle design plays an
important role in understanding and mitigating rollover risk even
among young drivers on curved roads by making vehicles more-
forgiving of driver and road limitations, and our analysis describes
the magnitude of that effect.
Another comparison may help clarify why we believe that the SSF
can be useful even though driver and other road-use factors are such
valuable predictors of rollover risk. Using the same approach
Exponent used for SSF and other factors involved in rollover, one
can statistically demonstrate that seat belt use is insignificant in
preventing injuries from a crash. The 1998-1999 National Automotive
Sampling System (NASS) data include 7,631 investigated unbelted
drivers of light passenger vehicles that were towed from a frontal
nonrollover crash (Table 22), and weighting these data to reflect
the sampling plan produces an annual average estimate of 171,284
drivers involved each year. An estimated 11,569 of these were
seriously injured (that is, they died or received an injury rated as
three or higher on the Abbreviated Injury Scale). The overall risk
of serious injury was 6.75 percent, but the risk varied greatly as a
function of the change in vehicle velocity during the impact (that
is, the delta V). For delta V less than 10 mph, the risk of serious
injury was 0.76 percent.
If all 171,284 drivers in these towaway crashes had been injured
at the same rate as those in the lowest delta V range, we would have
seen:
0.0076 x 171,284 = 1,302 serious injuries
among unbelted drivers in frontal crashes. Half of these (601
serious injuries) could have been prevented if the drivers had used
a lap-and-shoulder belt. Thus, we have the following:
171,284 serious injuries among unbelted drivers, of which 1,202
would have occurred if delta V was low, of which 601 would have
occurred if belts were used.
According to the logic proposed by Exponent, we would interpret
the results as follows:
99.30 percent of serious injuries are attributable to high crash
speeds, and 0.35 percent are attributable to neglecting to use
belts.
Clearly this is nonsense. Belt use will prevent serious injury
even among those in higher-speed crashes (half of the 11,569 serious
injuries that did occur among unbelted drivers at any crash speed
could have been prevented by belt use, for a reduction of 5,784
serious injuries from belt use). More importantly, belts offer a
practical solution, while there is no practical way to reduce all
crash speeds to less than 10 mph.
Note that this is comparable to the approach that the Exponent
report used in arguing that the value of the SSF in understanding
rollover risk was in the range of 3-8 percent. They estimated the
relative risk of the lowest-risk scenario, estimated how many
rollovers could be prevented if all single-vehicle crashes occurred
with the risk of the lowest-risk scenario, and relegated the
importance of the SSF to a fraction of the small amount of risk that
remained. The lowest-risk scenario that they use as their standard
appears to be (based on the table on page 31 of their report)
crashes that did not involve a vehicle defect and that did involve a
mature driver who had not been drinking or engaged in risky driving,
on a straight, urban road with a speed limit of 50 mph or less, and
for which the first harmful event was a collision with a traffic
unit in a single-vehicle crash; the bulk of these crashes may be
collisions with pedestrians and pedalcyclists, which would tend to
be reported because of the injuries to the non-motorists.
These are crashes with almost no chance of rollover, and so they
are essentially irrelevant to a rollover-prevention program. Also
note that some of these factors can be addressed by the driver
(driving more carefully and when fully sober), but others are beyond
the control of the driver (roads are curved, through rural areas,
and with speed limits of 55 mph so traffic can move efficiently
through all parts of the country). Young drivers gain experience
through driving, and they eventually become mature drivers; in the
meantime, they also benefit from more-stable vehicles. It is
difficult to see how Exponent's the low-risk scenario could be used
as an alternative to the SSF as the basis for a rollover safety
program.
The approach described in the Exponent report (comparing the
risk associated with the SSF to all the risks associated with road-
use factors) would suggest, in our example based on NASS data, that
reducing delta V should be a higher safety priority than increasing
belt use. (To use an extreme example to make a point, using the
approach described in the Exponent report for a study of air crashes
would suggest that preventing gravity is more important than regular
maintenance of the airplane.) However, belt use programs have been
successful because the remedy is simple and cost-effective and
because the importance of delta V does not reduce the importance of
belt use in preventing injury. We believe a similar argument can be
made for focusing on the SSF, while agreeing that driver and other
road-use variables may be the basis for other safety improvements.
Conclusion
The Exponent report acknowledged the potential advantages of
multiple linear analysis, and their recommendation is relevant here:
Multiple regression analysis can have some value as an explanatory
tool for describing factors related to vehicle rollover. Linear
regression analysis, however, must only be used in this heuristic
way and only when prior research has demonstrated that linear
regression produced essentially the same results as did a rigorous
and valid statistical analysis. [page 28]
Table 19, Figure 3, and the sensitivity analyses described above
suggest that the linear and logistic regression approaches produce
essentially the same results. The Exponent report recommended a
logistic approach and concluded that the linear approach based on
summarized data overstated the value of the SSF in understanding
rollover risk. This does not seem to be the case. The linear
approach produces estimates of rollover risk that are a little more
conservative (in the sense that they are lower) than those from the
logistic models for most observed values of the SSF and for most
vehicles on the road today. The Exponent report included much lower
estimates for rollover risk across the range of SSF values, but this
was not a result of the logistic approach. Rather, it was the result
of tying the estimates to the low-risk scenario (where rollover is
unlikely).
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Appendix II: List of Test Vehicles for MY2001 Rollover Resistance
Ratings
NHTSA expects to measure the Static Stability Factor and provide
rollover resistance ratings for each of the following model year
2001 vehicles. For pickups and SUVs, the agency plans to measure and
report separately on both two-wheel-drive and four-or all-wheel-
drive variants of each model, where applicable. In no case will a
two-wheel-drive measurement be applied to a four-or all-wheel-drive
variant, or vice versa. The agency may need to make substitutions
for some of the models listed depending on availability. The list is
arranged largely alphabetically within each vehicle category, and
passenger cars are sorted by class according to the classifications
used in the NHTSA NCAP frontal and side crash test programs. The
order in which vehicles will be tested will be determined by the
test laboratory and will depend primarily on model availability.
The following class abbreviations are used:
LPC = light passenger car
CPC = compact passenger car
MPC = medium passenger car
HPC = heavy passenger car
SUV = sport utility vehicle
LT = light truck
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[FR Doc. 01-973 Filed 1-9-01; 2:33 pm]
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