[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 7 (Wednesday, January 10, 2001)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 1810-1827]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-608]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

10 CFR Part 830

RIN 1901-AA34


Nuclear Safety Management

AGENCY: Department of Energy

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) adopts, with minor changes, the 
interim final rule published on October 10, 2000, to amend the DOE 
Nuclear Safety Management regulations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This final rule is effective on February 9, 2001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard Black, Director, Office of 
Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy, 270CC, Department of Energy, 19901 
Germantown Road, Germantown, MD 20874; telephone: 301-903-3465; e-mail: 
[email protected]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction and Summary

    On October 10, 2000, the Department of Energy (DOE) published an 
interim final rule in the Federal Register (65 FR 60291) that amended 
DOE's nuclear safety regulations in 10 CFR Part 830 (Interim Final 
Rule). DOE provided a 30-day public comment period for the Interim 
Final Rule and subsequently received comments to the rule from over 30 
parties. As a result of the comments that were received to that Interim 
Final Rule, DOE became aware of a number of minor errors in the 
published version of the rule and the preamble, as well as a number of 
minor changes to the rule that would clarify and simplify 
implementation of the amended rule. We are republishing the rule as a 
final rule with those changes. Finally, we are summarizing the issues 
raised in the comments to the Interim Final Rule and providing DOE's 
responses to the major issues. Many of the comments concerned rule 
implementation issues that will be addressed in the rule implementation 
guides.

II. Discussion of Changes to the Rule

    The following changes to 10 CFR Part 830 are being made in response 
to comments to the Interim Final Rule.

A. Changes to Sec. 830.2, Exclusions

    We are amending paragraph 830.2(d) to exclude the mixed oxide fuel 
fabrication and irradiation facilities that the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) has the authority to license and regulate under 
Sec. 3134 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261). Section 3134 amends the Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974 to add Sec. 202(5) (42 U.S.C. 5842). This 
exclusion will make clear that these facilities will be licensed by the 
NRC and must be designed and constructed to meet NRC regulations. Thus, 
these facilities are excluded from the requirement to meet 10 CFR Part 
830 before and after a license is issued by the NRC.

B. Changes to Sec. 830.3, Definitions.

    We are revising the following definitions in Sec. 830.3:
1. Safety Class Structures, Systems, and Components
     We are revising the words ``identified by the documented safety 
analysis'' to ``determined from safety analyses'' to make the 
definition consistent with those for ``safety structures, systems, and 
components'' and ``safety significant structures, systems, and 
components.''
2. Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs)
    We are revising the definition of TSRs to express it more clearly. 
As revised, the definition of TSRs means the limits, controls, and 
related actions that establish the specific parameters and requisite 
actions for the safe operation of a nuclear facility and include, as 
appropriate for the work and the hazards identified in the documented 
safety analysis for the facility: Safety limits, operating limits, 
surveillance requirements, administrative and management controls, use 
and application provisions, and design features, as well as a bases 
appendix. The documented safety analysis identifies the need for TSRs, 
but the actual limits are identified in the TSRs. The revisions make 
clear that the TSRs address the specific numerical limits and related 
actions necessary for safe operation of a nuclear facility. Because the 
TSRs identify the limits and actions necessary in specific situations, 
it is not appropriate to use the graded approach to justify the use of 
different limits and actions than those set forth in the TSRs. The 
change made to the graded approach section is consistent with this 
change.

C. Changes to Sec. 830.7, Graded Approach

    We received a number of comments requesting us to clarify where a 
contractor must use a graded approach and how the graded approach 
documentation should be submitted. We are revising the language in 
Sec. 830.7 to clarify that a contractor may not use a graded approach 
in implementing the unreviewed safety question (USQ)

[[Page 1811]]

process or in implementing the technical safety requirements. We are 
addressing the documentation question in Section III. I of this 
preamble.

D. Changes to Subpart B, Safety Basis

1. Section 830.203  Unreviewed Safety Question Process
    a. Unreviewed safety question (USQ) procedure. In Sec. 830.203 of 
the Interim Final Rule we stated that the contractor must submit a USQ 
``process.'' In fact, the document that specifies how the USQ process 
is to be performed is the USQ ``procedure.'' We are changing the rule 
language in Sec. 830.203 to reflect that a contractor is to submit ``a 
procedure for its USQ process,'' rather than a ``USQ process.'' 
Conforming changes are being made in Appendix A to Subpart B as well. 
These changes should be considered when reading the USQ discussions in 
the preamble to the Interim Final Rule.
    b. Existing USQ procedure. In Sec. 830.203, we deleted the words 
``DOE-approved'' from the requirement for contractors to continue to 
use their existing USQ procedure pending approval of the USQ procedure 
to be submitted under the rule by April 10. This will ensure that 
contractors who have not received DOE-approval for their current USQ 
procedures will continue to use their existing USQ procedures.
    c. Editorial changes. We made some editorial changes to 
Sec. 830.203 to make it easier to read.
2. Section 830.206  Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis
    We received a number of comments on the application of the 
requirements for a preliminary documented safety analysis to new 
nuclear facilities and major modifications to nuclear facilities that 
were nearly ready to operate. We agree that the purpose of the 
requirement is to ensure that DOE and the contractor agree on design 
considerations during the design and early construction phases of the 
modification, and that the final documented safety analysis will 
document those considerations during the final construction efforts. 
Consequently, we are revising Sec. 830.206 to apply to hazard category 
1, 2, and 3 new nuclear facilities and major modifications for which 
construction begins after December 11, 2000.
3. Section 830.207 DOE Approval of Safety Basis
    We are adding the words, ``or as approved by DOE on a later date,'' 
to paragraph 830.207(b) to clarify that the contractor must perform 
work to the approved safety basis in effect on October 10, 2000 unless 
there is a more recent DOE-approved safety basis. The applicable safety 
basis for the nuclear facility is the latest DOE-approved safety basis.

E. Appendix A to Subpart B to Part 830--General Statement of Safety 
Basis Policy

    1. We are adding two ``safe harbor'' provisions for transportation 
activities in Table 2. This change is discussed in more detail in the 
response to comments.
    2. We are making conforming changes in the appendix to be 
consistent with the change to the definition of TSRs.
    3. Editorial Changes.
    a. We are adding a reference to Table 1 in paragraph C in Appendix 
A to Subpart B, Scope.
    b. We are revising language in paragraph C in Appendix A to Subpart 
B to read, ``all DOE nuclear facilities, including radiological 
facilities,* * *'' to clarify that radiological facilities are 
considered to be a subset of nuclear facilities.
    c. We are adding a ``3'' to the last item of Table 1 in Appendix A 
to Subpart B where it was inadvertently omitted.
    d. We are editing Table 2 in Appendix A to Subpart B to correct the 
alignment and to correct language in paragraph (6)(2) of the table.
    e. We are changing the reference to ``DOE-STD-3009-94'' to read 
``DOE-STD-3009, Change Notice 1, January 2000,'' throughout the rule.

III. Response to Comments on the Interim Final Rule

    DOE received written comments from over 30 interested organizations 
(primarily DOE contractors) and individuals on the amendments in the 
Interim Final Rule for the DOE Nuclear Safety Management requirements 
of 10 CFR Part 830. You may examine written comments between 9 AM and 4 
PM at the U.S. Department of Energy Freedom of Information Reading 
Room, Room 1E-190, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, 
(202) 586-3142.
    This section of the Supplementary Information summarizes the issues 
raised in the comments and gives DOE's response. Many of the comments 
raised questions and positions related to the implementation of the 
requirements. These comments will be considered in the development of 
the implementation guides that were discussed in the preamble to the 
Interim Final Rule.

Preamble

    A. Comment: In the Summary of Changes in the preamble to the 
Interim Final Rule, paragraph G, several commentors noted that the 
paragraph that reads ``The USQ process has two steps * * *'' is 
incorrect and should be entirely deleted.
    Response: We agree.
    B. Comment: Several commentors provided editorial corrections.
    Response: We agree with the following editorial corrections to the 
preamble:
    1. In the ``Summary of Changes'' in the preamble to the Interim 
Final Rule, paragraph II.D.f, ``Existing DOE nuclear facility and new 
DOE nuclear facility,'' the date for new nuclear facilities was 
erroneously listed as April 9, 2000. The correct date is April 9, 2001.
    2. In the ``Summary of Changes'' in the preamble to the Interim 
Final Rule, paragraph II.D.2.d.vi, on page 60297, ``electronic 
microscopes'' should be ``electron microscopes.''

830.1, Scope

    C. Comment: A number of commentors objected to expanding the scope 
of the rule to cover activities performed offsite. One commentor 
suggested limiting the offsite applicability by setting a dollar 
threshold for procurement actions, exempting procurement of commercial 
items, limiting the applicability to components having nuclear safety 
significance, or reducing fines for offsite work.
    Response: We have considered the suggestions for limiting the 
applicability of the rule offsite and do not agree that such 
limitations should be adopted. In 1995, we gave notice that we were 
considering an option that would expand the scope of Part 830 to cover 
conduct that could affect the safe management of nuclear facilities 
without any limitation that such conduct must occur at nuclear 
facilities. See the Notice of Limited Reopening of the Comment Period, 
60 FR 45381, 45384 (Aug. 31, 1995). In adopting this option to cover 
offsite activities, we noted that the scope of the rule would apply not 
only to prime contractors responsible for a nuclear facility, but also 
to subcontractors, suppliers, and other contractors, including those 
who provide items (such as pumps, valves, waste containers, piping, and 
electrical or mechanical devices) or services (such as design, 
engineering, maintenance, and welding) that affect, or may affect, 
nuclear safety of DOE nuclear facilities. Thus, the provision of items 
and services taking place offsite which affect

[[Page 1812]]

nuclear safety would be covered by the rule. DOE expects that 
contractors will establish specifications and standards in their 
procurement documents and flow them down to all tiers of subcontractors 
and suppliers, regardless of whether items will be provided or services 
will be performed onsite or offsite.
    We also recognize that in some cases contractors may not flow down 
specifications but may choose to procure commercial grade items and 
materials and to perform the tests or other actions that are necessary 
to upgrade these materials or items to allow them to be used as items 
important to nuclear safety. Contractors may choose to perform the 
required actions to upgrade these materials or items either for 
economic reasons or because qualified vendors cannot be found. In these 
cases, the supplier is responsible for meeting the requirements for 
commercial grade materials or items as specified in the procurement 
documents and the contractor is responsible for ensuring the 
requirements are met for using these materials or items as items 
important to nuclear safety.
    We believe that the alternatives suggested for limiting the offsite 
application of the rule are not necessary or advisable. Commercial 
products as well as small dollar purchases may affect nuclear safety of 
DOE nuclear facilities depending on their intended use. All the facts 
and circumstances involved in the failure of an item procured from an 
offsite vendor or supplier will be looked at in any subsequent 
enforcement action. Civil penalties can be appropriately mitigated or 
adjusted in accordance with the enforcement discretion in 10 CFR Part 
820.
    D. Comment: A number of commentors questioned how they should apply 
the requirements of this rule to transportation activities not 
regulated by the Department of Transportation (DOT).
    Response: We are amending the rule to add two additional ``safe 
harbor'' methods in Table 2 of Appendix A to Subpart B for 
transportation activities covered by this rule. The new safe harbor 
methods will endorse the methods and processes described in DOE-O-
460.1A, Packaging and Transportation Safety, and its associated guide 
and DOE-O-461.1, Packaging and Transportation of Materials of National 
Security Interest, and its associated manual, as acceptable ways to 
satisfy the rule requirements for transportation activities covered by 
the provisions of this rule.

830.2, Exclusions

    E. Comment: A commentor stated that an exclusion to the 
requirements of this rule should be provided for the mixed plutonium-
uranium oxide fuel fabrication and irradiation facilities for the 
period prior to licensing by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
    Response: We already exclude any activity licensed by the NRC in 
paragraph 830.2(a). The NRC has licensing and related regulatory 
authority for any facility under contract with DOE that is used for the 
express purpose of fabricating mixed plutonium-uranium oxide nuclear 
reactor fuel for use in a commercial nuclear reactor licensed under the 
AEA, other than any such facility that is utilized for research, 
development, demonstration, testing or analysis purposes. See Section 
3134(a) of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1999 (Pub. L. 105-261) which amends the Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974 to add Section 202(5) (42 U.S.C. 5842). The 
design and construction of these facilities will be required to meet 
NRC nuclear safety regulations and, therefore, we are revising 
Sec. 830.2 to make clear that we are excluding these facilities from 
the provisions of 10 CFR Part 830. This exclusion is similar to the 
exclusion for activities under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

830.3, Definitions

    F. Comment: A commentor stated that the terms ``safety analysis,'' 
``documented safety analyses,'' and ``hazard analyses'' are used 
inconsistently in the definitions of ``safety class structures, 
systems, and components;'' ``safety significant structures, systems, 
and components;'' and ``safety structures, systems, and components.''
    Response: We are revising the words ``Documented safety analysis'' 
to ``safety analyses'' to make the definition consistent with those for 
``safety structures, systems, and components'' and ``safety significant 
structures, systems, and components.''
    G. Comment: A number of commentors noted that some terms used in 
the rule, such as the terms ``limited operational life'' and ``short 
remaining operational period'' are not defined in the rule and guidance 
should be provided on what these terms mean.
    Response: We agree with the comment and we will address these and 
other terms in the implementation guides for this rule.

830.7, Graded Approach

    H. Comment: A number of commentors raised questions regarding the 
use of the graded approach and the appropriate place to document it.
    Response: We received a number of comments requesting us to clarify 
where a contractor must use a graded approach and how the graded 
approach documentation should be submitted. As stated in the preamble 
to the Interim Final Rule, contractors are already required to 
implement the quality assurance requirements using a graded approach. 
In the appendix, we stated that DOE expects a contractor to use a 
graded approach to develop a documented safety analysis and describe 
how the graded approach was applied. The preamble provided that use of 
the graded approach is not appropriate in implementing the USQ process 
or in implementing technical safety requirements. We are revising the 
requirements in Sec. 830.7 to add a sentence to clarify that the graded 
approach is not appropriate in implementing the USQ process or in 
implementing technical safety requirements. The graded approach remains 
applicable to the implementation of quality assurance and to the 
documented safety analysis.
    We also received comments concerning the documentation requirements 
explaining how the graded approach was applied. Section 830.7 requires 
a contractor to document the basis of the graded approach used and to 
submit that documentation to DOE. While the rule does not prescribe 
when and where such documentation should be submitted, it is expected 
that the documentation and justification for grading would be submitted 
in the documents in which it is used. Grading methodology and its 
application would then be reviewed by the DOE officials who have the 
authority to approve the documents. Grading approaches for site-wide 
programs or facility-specific applications are explained further in 
guidance documents.

Subpart A, Quality Assurance

    I. Comment: Several comments expressed concern that failure to 
perform work consistent with all ``contract'' requirements might be 
subject to enforcement actions under the provisions of the Price-
Anderson Amendments Act of 1988 (PAAA).
    Response: Paragraph 830.122(e)(1) of Subpart A of the rule requires 
contractors to: ``Perform work consistent with technical standards, 
administrative controls, and other hazard controls adopted to meet 
regulatory or contract

[[Page 1813]]

requirements, using approved instructions, procedures, or other 
appropriate means.'' However, both this rule and the DOE PAAA 
enforcement process in 10 CFR Part 820 are limited to contractor 
activities that affect, or may affect, the safety of DOE nuclear 
facilities. Thus, contract requirements that do not have an effect on 
nuclear safety are not subject to the work process provisions of 
Subpart A of this rule and will not be subject to PAAA enforcement. DOE 
has other contract remedies to address noncompliance with contract 
requirements and work processes that have no affect on nuclear safety.
    J. Comment: A number of comments questioned how the work process 
requirements apply to subcontractors and suppliers.
    Response: Section 830.121(a) is explicit that all contractors, 
including subcontractors and suppliers, must conduct work in accordance 
with the quality assurance criteria listed in Sec. 830.122, including 
the work processes criteria in paragraph 830.122(e). Moreover, the 
general rule in paragraph 830.4(a) is clear that subcontractors and 
suppliers may not take any action inconsistent with the requirements in 
Part 830. In addition to these direct requirements, paragraph 
830.121(c)(4) makes the prime contractor responsible for ensuring 
subcontractors and suppliers satisfy the quality assurance criteria of 
paragraph 830.122(e). DOE expects that in most cases, prime contractors 
would satisfy this requirement through the flowdown of requirements and 
standards in procurement documents. The prime contractor will be 
subject to regulatory enforcement if a subcontractor or supplier does 
not meet the quality assurance criteria when providing items and 
services that could affect nuclear safety of DOE nuclear facilities. 
This responsibility of the prime contractor, however, does not relieve 
the subcontractors and suppliers from the requirements imposed directly 
upon them.
    K. Comment: A number of commentors asked why DOE is requiring 
contractors to identify consensus standards that are used in the 
Quality Assurance Program (QAP).
    Response: DOE has a long history of requiring the use of 
appropriate national and international standards for implementing its 
quality assurance requirements. DOE is strongly committed to this 
philosophy to ensure that its contractors develop and implement 
effective and efficient QAPs. Each DOE quality assurance criterion is 
stated as a performance expectation and does not specify the methods to 
achieve the desired performance result. National and international 
standards (e.g., ASME NQA-1, ASQ E-4, or ISO 9001) and their 
supplemental guidance include a number of proven methods for achieving 
DOE's performance expectations. DOE has found cases where failure to 
use these standards to develop implementing processes has led to 
noncompliance with the DOE quality assurance criteria. DOE is concerned 
that all of its contractors are not taking full advantage of the 
benefits standards offer. Use of national and international standards 
will help contractors to develop effective and efficient QAPs that are 
also aligned with their customer's and supplier's QAPs. The DOE 
implementation guide for the quality assurance requirements in the 
rule(DOE-G-414.1-2) includes a discussion of standards use and 
references to the most widely accepted national and international 
standards for quality assurance. Contractor use of this implementation 
guide and the clear identification and the documented use of standards 
will also help DOE meet its responsibilities to review contractor QAPs 
to ensure that they meet the rule requirements and to oversee 
contractors to ensure that they fully implement their DOE-approved 
QAPs.

Subpart B, Safety Basis

    L. Comment: A commentor stated that Sec. 803.201 does not add to 
the rule's substantive requirements, and because the word ``work'' is 
not defined, it could lead to unjustified applications or too narrow 
interpretations.
    Response: Other sections of the safety basis requirements (Subpart 
B) define the requirements for derivation and documentation of the 
safety basis for a nuclear facility. Section 803.201 requires that the 
activities within them must be conducted in accordance with the safety 
basis. It is essential to have this element for the safety basis 
requirements be more than a paper exercise.
    M. Comment: Several commentors asked how the authorization basis is 
different from the safety basis.
    Response: The rule defines the safety basis as the documented 
safety analysis and the hazard controls that provide reasonable 
assurance that a DOE nuclear facility can be operated safely and in a 
manner that adequately protects workers, the public, and the 
environment. The authorization basis is defined in DOE-G-450.4-1A, 
Integrated Safety Management System Guide for Use with Safety 
Management System Policies (DOE-P-450.4, DOE-P-450.5, and DOE-P-450.6); 
the Functions, Responsibilities, And Authorities Manual (DOE-M-411.1-
1B); and the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) 48 CFR 
970.5223-1, as safety documentation that supports the decision to allow 
a process or facility to operate. Included are corporate operational 
and environmental requirements as found in regulations and specific 
permits, and, for specific activities, work packages or job safety 
analyses. In general, the safety basis as defined in the rule is a 
subset of the authorization basis as the authorization basis includes 
documents relating to environmental issues, such as permits, as well as 
safety documentation.
    N. Comment: Several commentors asked why DOE-STD-1027 is listed as 
a requirement for hazard categorization, instead of a safe harbor 
method.
    Response: In general, each of the safe harbor standards listed in 
Table 2 of Appendix A to Subpart B of the rule can be effectively 
applied to specified types of facilities and activities. In allowing 
the contractor to choose the appropriate safe harbor standard for 
developing the safety basis, DOE expects the contractor to select the 
standard that best fits the application. However, DOE wants contractors 
to be consistent when determining the hazard classification for its 
nuclear facilities; hence we are requiring the consistent use of DOE-
STD-1027 which has an established history for this purpose.
    O. Comment: A commentor asked what is a ``below hazard category 3'' 
nuclear facility.
    Response: In DOE-STD-1027, these facilities are categorized as 
having no potential for significant offsite, onsite, or localized 
consequences. A ``below hazard category 3'' nuclear facility is a DOE 
facility or activity that meets the definition of a nuclear facility 
but does not meet the threshold in DOE-STD-1027 for a hazard category 3 
nuclear facility. These facilities are sometimes referred to as 
``radiological facilities.'' See also Table 1 in Appendix A to Subpart 
B of the rule.
    P. Comment: Two commentors questioned a statement in the preamble 
to the Interim Final Rule, in paragraph III.D on segmentation that said 
``If a hazardous materials could be transported to other segments by 
common confinement systems or the lack of other physical barriers, the 
facility cannot be segmented for the purposes of this rule.''
    Response: We agree that the statement could be misleading and the 
individual circumstances would need to be evaluated to determine the 
effect on operations in the other segment before

[[Page 1814]]

making the determination of whether segmentation would be permitted for 
purposes of categorizing the facility and establishing an appropriate 
safety basis. Additional discussion on segmenting nuclear facilities 
can be found in DOE-STD-1027.
    We emphasize, however, that in considering segmentation a 
contractor must be mindful of its overriding obligation to ensure 
adequate protection of workers, the public, and the environment. A 
contractor will have the burden of proof to demonstrate that 
segmentation is appropriate.
    Q. Comment: A commentor stated that USQ determinations related to 
potential inadequacies of the safety analysis (PISA) are not always 
done in a timely manner and a definite time period for the performance 
of a USQ determination should be provided in paragraph 830.203(e)(3).
    Response: The implementation guide for the USQ requirements of the 
rule (DOE-G-424.X) will provide DOE's expectation that the contractor's 
USQ procedure should define the period for the performance of a USQ 
determination related to a PISA and that this time period should be on 
the order of days, not weeks or months.
    R. Comment: Several commentors asserted that a PISA should not be 
classified as a USQ until a USQ determination confirms that the safety 
analysis is inadequate.
    Response: The fact that the safety analysis could be inadequate, 
either because of a deficiency in the analysis or because of an as-
found condition, indicates that there is a safety question that has not 
yet been reviewed (in other words, a USQ). When a contractor discovers 
a PISA, DOE requires the contractor to take action to place the 
facility in a safe condition and to notify DOE of the potential 
inadequacy. The performance of a subsequent USQ determination is to 
confirm a positive USQ determination or a negative USQ determination 
through the application of the risk-related criteria for a USQ. If the 
finding is negative, this would support a request to DOE to remove any 
operational restrictions imposed when the PISA was discovered.
    S. Comment: Section 830.203 requires contractors for existing 
nuclear facilities to continue to use their existing DOE-approved USQ 
procedure. One commentor asked what it should do if DOE has not yet 
approved its USQ procedure.
    Response: We have deleted the word ``DOE-approved'' from the 
requirement. Contractors are expected to continue to use their existing 
USQ procedures pending DOE approval of the USQ procedure to be 
submitted to DOE for approval by April 10, 2001 under the rule.
    T. Comment: The definition of a USQ in Sec. 830.3 of the rule 
states that a situation involves a USQ if a margin of safety could be 
reduced. A commentor proposed that the margins of safety described in 
the bases appendix to be considered should be limited to the margins of 
safety described in the bases section of the technical safety 
requirements.
    Response: Not all nuclear facilities are required to have technical 
safety requirements. For example, certain environmental restoration 
activities are not required to develop technical safety requirements. 
The safety basis implementation guides will clarify how the margin of 
safety criterion should be implemented.
    U. Comment: A commentor stated that paragraph 830.204(b)(2), should 
specify that the documented safety analysis must address both hazards 
for the facilities and the activities therein, instead of just the 
hazards associated with the facility.
    Response: We agree. In fact, the definition for a nonreactor 
nuclear facility includes facilities, activities, and operations. No 
change to the rule is necessary.
    V. Comment: Several commentors questioned why a contractor must 
submit a preliminary documented safety analysis for a major 
modification rather than using the USQ process to address the changes.
    Response: Several commentors recommended that contractors use the 
USQ process and modify an existing documented safety analysis, rather 
than submitting a preliminary documented safety analysis for a major 
modification. This suggestion would defeat the purpose of the review 
and approval of the safety aspects of design of the modification prior 
to procurement and construction, which is to ensure that DOE agrees 
with the design before the modification is implemented. If the 
contractor proceeded to modify the existing documented safety analysis 
for the facility and submit it for approval, prior to design and 
construction, the documented safety analysis would be instantly out of 
compliance because it would no longer reflect the current configuration 
of the nuclear facility.
    W. Comment: Several commentors indicated that by tying the 
definition for a major modification to the initial operation date, 
rather than the design date, contractors could be required to develop 
preliminary documented safety analyses for major modifications that 
were already designed by now and possibly under construction, and for 
which documented safety analysis would also be required. A commentor 
recommended that the requirement for a preliminary documented safety 
analyses for a major modification or new facility be linked to the 
initiation of conceptual design.
    Response: The purpose of the preliminary documented safety analysis 
is to ensure that DOE and the contractor agree on design considerations 
during the design and early construction phases of the modification. We 
are, therefore, amending Sec. 830.206 to apply to hazard category 1, 2, 
and 3 new DOE nuclear facilities and major modifications for which 
construction begins after December 11, 2000.
    X. Comment: A commentor stated that the preliminary documented 
safety analysis should identify safety systems in addition to safety 
programs.
    Response: Safety systems will, of necessity, be identified as part 
of the safety analysis that derives the aspects of design that are 
necessary to satisfy the nuclear safety design criteria. This is 
expressed in the definition of preliminary documented safety analysis.
    Y. Comment: Several commentors asked if a preliminary documented 
safety analysis is needed for environmental restoration, and 
decontamination and decommissioning?
    Response: As stated in paragraph F.6 of Appendix A to Subpart B of 
the rule, as a general matter, DOE does not expect preliminary 
documented safety analyses to be needed for activities that do not 
involve significant construction such as environmental restoration 
activities, decontamination and decommissioning activities, specific 
nuclear explosives operations, or transition surveillance and 
maintenance activities.
    Z. Comment: One commentor stated that we should discuss how the 
integrated safety management principles would be used for design.
    Response: The implementation guide for the documented safety 
analysis (DOE-G-421.X, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing 
Documented Safety Analyses to Meet Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 830) 
specifies that a preliminary documented safety analysis should show how 
the nuclear safety design criteria of DOE Order 420.1 (DOE-O-420.1), 
Facility Safety, will be satisfied. The implementation guide for DOE-O-
420.1 says that an iterative process between safety analysis and design 
should begin as early as possible so safety is integrated into the 
design process as early as possible. This is consistent with the 
integrated safety management system process.

[[Page 1815]]

    AA. Comment: A number of commentors asked how contractors should 
address normal and abnormal conditions in a documented safety analysis.
    Response: Contractors should refer to DOE implementation guides for 
additional information on how to meet DOE's expectations regarding the 
requirements in this rule. In particular, contractors should refer to 
DOE-STD-3009, section 3.3, page 35 for additional information on how to 
address normal and abnormal conditions in the documented safety 
analysis. This section of the standard describes how all modes of 
normal operation are to be considered.
    BB. Comment: Several commentors asked how a contractor should 
ensure that a safety basis contains all the required contents of the 
rule when using a ``safe harbor'' standard to prepare a documented 
safety analysis.
    Response: In general, ``safe harbor'' standards listed in Table 2 
of Appendix A to Subpart B of the rule are the standards currently used 
in the DOE complex to develop documented safety analyses and they 
reflect years of experience developing adequate documented safety 
bases. DOE is confident that these standards provide good methods for 
developing a documented safety analysis. If a contractor uses a ``safe 
harbor'' methodology, that methodology should result in a contractor 
satisfying the regulatory requirements for a documented safety 
analysis. However, the contractor is responsible for meeting the 
requirements of the rule, even if it uses a safe harbor standard to 
prepare its documented safety analysis.
    CC. Comment: A commentor asked what a contractor should do if it 
developed a documented safety analysis using a safe harbor method, but 
did not meet every criterion of a safe harbor method.
    Response: As discussed in the preamble to the Interim Final Rule, 
if a contractor uses a method other than a safe harbor method it must 
obtain DOE approval of the method before developing the documented 
safety analysis. If a contractor uses a safe harbor method to develop 
the documented safety analysis, but does not follow the method 
completely, the contractor should request DOE approval of the method 
with the specific deviations identified.
    DD. Comment: Section 830.204 of the rule does not limit the 
documented safety analysis to only nuclear hazards. Several commentors 
asked if controls for non-nuclear hazards are enforceable.
    Response: As stated in paragraph V.F of the preamble to the Interim 
Final Rule, we expect our contractors to address all radioactive and 
nonradioactive hazards, as well as the controls necessary to provide 
adequate protection to the public, the workers, and the environment 
from these hazards, in the documented safety analysis for category 1, 
2, or 3 nuclear facilities. However, as stated in the General Statement 
of Enforcement Policy (Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 820), we will only 
pursue enforcement actions through the procedures in Part 820 for those 
noncompliances that have nuclear safety significance.
    EE. Comment: A commentor asked why DOE listed criticality safety 
requirements separately in Sec. 830.204.
    Response: DOE chose to specifically call out certain content 
requirements for the documented safety analysis in the rule because of 
their importance to nuclear safety. Among these are the criticality 
safety requirements. The criticality safety requirements in 
Sec. 830.204 are consistent with the current criticality safety 
requirements in DOE-O-420.1 which is listed as a safe harbor method for 
the design criteria for a new nuclear facility. In addition, DOE-G-
421.X, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Documented Safety 
Analyses to Meet Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 830, will address the role of 
criticality safety.
    FF. Comment: A commentor stated that we should specifically 
incorporate the criticality standards identified in DOE-O-420.1 in the 
requirements for the documented safety analysis in Sec. 830.204.
    Response: The rule addresses this issue in several ways. First, 
DOE-O-420.1 is invoked in Sec. 830.206 relative to the design criteria 
to be used for the preliminary documented safety analysis. DOE-O-420.1 
addresses the design features important for criticality safety. Second, 
Appendix A to Subpart B invokes DOE-O-420.1 in two places: (1) 
paragraph F.6 of the appendix describes the design criteria for a 
preliminary documented safety analysis and (2) section G of the 
appendix states that ``Order 420.1 provides DOE's expectations with 
respect to fire protection and criticality safety.'' DOE-G-421.X will 
provide additional discussion of the importance of DOE-O-420.1 with 
respect to criticality safety standards. We believe these requirements 
and associated guidance provide sufficient direction to contractors 
regarding DOE's expectations for criticality safety.
    GG. Comment: A commentor asked if the rule permits a documented 
safety analysis to reflect a final categorization that would permit 
segmentation or the application of unmitigated release parameters more 
appropriate to the actual situation.
    Response: Yes. Several commentors misinterpreted the requirement in 
Sec. 830.202 for classification according to DOE-STD-1027 as not 
allowing for documented safety analysis to contain a final 
categorization that would permit segmentation or the application of 
unmitigated release parameters more appropriate to the actual 
situation. The suggestion was made to allow for these modifications as 
part of the initial categorization. However, no change to the rule is 
needed because DOE-STD-1027 does permit these modifications as part of 
a safety analysis, and DOE-STD-3009 calls for final categorization as 
part of the documented safety analysis.
    HH. Comment: Paragraph 830.205(c) should include reference to DOE-
STD-1120.
    Response: Section 830.205 does not reference DOE-STD-1120. However, 
DOE-STD-1120 is referenced in Table 2 of Appendix A to Subpart B to the 
rule as a safe harbor for environmental restoration activities. We 
believe that this is the appropriate reference to DOE-STD-1120 for the 
rule.
    II. Comment: Several commentors stated that including design 
features as a section in the technical safety requirements, instead of 
allowing the design features to be included in the documented safety 
analysis, is expensive and provides no safety benefit.
    Response: It is important that certain design features be included 
in the technical safety requirements. The design features to be 
included in a section of the technical safety requirements are those 
which are regarded as important in establishing the safety basis. These 
design features should not be changed without DOE approval. Since 
changes to the technical safety requirements must be approved by DOE, 
any changes to design features identified as technical safety 
requirements would require prior DOE approval. If these important 
design features are just included in the description of the facility in 
the documented safety analysis, alterations would be subject to the USQ 
process. If the contractor determines that the change does not involve 
a USQ, then the change may not be submitted for prior DOE approval.
    JJ. Comment: Several commentors asked why a contractor is required 
to submit the annual update of the documented safety analysis to DOE 
for approval when DOE will have already

[[Page 1816]]

approved any changes to be incorporated in the documented safety 
analysis through the USQ process.
    Response: DOE requires contractors to obtain DOE approval of the 
annual update of the documented safety analysis to assure that both the 
changes made pursuant to the USQ process and any changes not covered by 
the USQ process have been properly included in the update. If the USQ 
process has been followed properly, the annual approval of the 
documented safety analysis should require minimal effort. The annual 
update will not require DOE to review USQs already approved by DOE.
    KK. Comment: A commentor asked if DOE has already approved a safety 
basis, does the contractor need to resubmit the safety basis for 
approval.
    Response: Yes. However, if a contractor determines that its current 
safety basis meets the requirements of the rule, it may request DOE to 
approve that safety basis under the rule through the provisions in 
paragraph 830.207(c).
    LL. Comment: A commentor asked what safety basis applies if a 
contractor has submitted a new safety basis to DOE for approval as of 
October 10, 2000, but DOE has not yet approved it.
    Response: The effective safety basis is the DOE-approved safety 
basis. When DOE approves a new safety basis, that becomes the new 
effective safety basis as of the date of the approval. We are adding 
the words, ``or as approved by DOE at a later date,'' to paragraph 
830.207(b) to clarify that a safety basis may be superseded by later 
revisions with DOE approval.
    MM. Comment: Paragraph 830.207(c) states that if a contractor 
believes that its current safety basis meets the rule, it should notify 
DOE by April 9, 2001 and request DOE to approve the safety basis under 
the rule. Further, it states that if DOE does not issue a safety 
evaluation report (SER) by October 10, 2001, a contractor must submit a 
safety basis to DOE for approval. Several commentors suggested that 
existing safety bases which are asserted to be compliant with the rule 
should be assumed to be approved by DOE if DOE does not issue an SER by 
October 10, 2001, instead of being assumed to be deficient. A commentor 
also suggested that DOE might not approve the safety basis within 6 
months because of lack of resources.
    Response: It is desired that both the contractor and DOE take 
positive action in establishing safety bases under the rule. The 
contractor should maintain cognizance of the status of DOE reviews and 
work with DOE to resolve the status of the safety basis submitted in a 
timely fashion. If the safety basis was originally developed using one 
of the safe harbors of the rule, the safety evaluation report for the 
safety basis was issued approving the safety basis and the safety basis 
and the safety evaluation report are current, then the DOE effort to 
verify compliance with rule provisions should be small.

Appendix A to Subpart B

    NN. Comment: A commentor stated that in Appendix A, paragraph G 
should refer to ``requirements'' in DOE-O-420.1, not ``expectations.''
    Response: We agree that the provisions in DOE-O-420.1 are 
requirements if the order is included in a contract for the facility or 
if the order is adopted by the contractor in its work processes. If 
not, the order still provides DOE's expectations.
    OO. Comment: A commentor noted that the sentence preceding Table 3 
in Appendix A to Subpart B of the rule says that Table 3 defines the 
specific nuclear facilities referenced in Table 2 that are not defined 
in Sec. 830.3; however, Table 3 defines both facilities and activities. 
Consequently, the commentor stated that the reference should state it 
defines ``facilities or activities.''
    Response: The commentor is correct that the table refers to both 
facilities and activities. However, the term used is ``nuclear 
facilities.'' Nuclear facilities, as defined in the rule, includes both 
reactor and nonreactor nuclear facilities. The definition of 
``nonreactor nuclear facilities'' includes facilities, operations, and 
activities. Therefore, no change is required.
    PP. Comment: One commentor stated that DOE should make the safety 
bases documents available to the public and a second commentor 
expressed concern that DOE protect classified documents from being 
released.
    Response: As stated in the last paragraph of Appendix A to Subpart 
B, DOE will maintain a public list on the internet that provides the 
status of the safety basis for each hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 
nuclear facility and, to the extent practicable, provides information 
on how to obtain a copy of the safety basis and related documents for a 
facility. In accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and 
directives, DOE will not release classified documents to the public. 
However, many of the safety basis documents are not classified and, 
therefore, can be made available to the public.

General

    QQ. Comment: A commentor asked, if there is no single contractor 
responsible for a facility, who is responsible to ensure the 
requirements of the rule are met?
    Response: At some DOE sites, management and operating (M&O) 
contractors or management and integration (M&I) contractors are 
responsible for ensuring that the responsibilities of an activity are 
properly integrated. In such cases, the M&O contractor or the M&I 
contractor, respectively, would be responsible for ensuring the 
requirements at a facility, including the safety bases requirements of 
Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 830 are met. For other facilities, DOE may 
have assumed the role of the integrator and may be responsible to 
ensure that the requirements are met. During an enforcement action, DOE 
will weigh the facts and circumstances surrounding an action to 
determine the responsible party.
    RR. Comment: A commentor asked if DOE expects contractors to modify 
contracts and Safety Management Systems to include the new requirements 
in the rule.
    Response: Regulatory requirements are legal requirements and they 
apply whether or not they are incorporated in contracts or Safety 
Management Systems. In addition, Department of Energy Acquisition 
Regulation (DEAR) 48 CFR 970.5204-2 (Laws Clause) states that a 
contractor is obligated to comply with applicable Federal, state, and 
local laws and regulations, unless relief has been granted in writing 
by the appropriate regulatory agency and to flow down applicable 
regulations to subcontractors and suppliers. It further states that 
omission of any applicable law or regulation from List A does not 
affect the obligation of the contractor to comply with such law or 
regulation.
    SS. Comment: A commentor asked if contractors and subcontractors 
are required to report defects and operational events through the 
Occurrence and Processing Reporting System (ORPS).
    Response: DOE expects its prime contractors to continue to report 
defects and operational events through ORPS, as required by contracts. 
Use of this system may be enforceable through the quality assurance 
requirements of Subpart A, but the particular circumstances of the 
situation would need to be assessed. Subcontractors will continue to 
report through the prime contractors. Both DEAR 48 CFR 970.5223-1 and 
the procurement requirements of Subpart A, require prime contractors to 
flowdown requirements to subcontractors.
    TT. Comment: A commentor asked if exemptions granted to contractors 
under

[[Page 1817]]

DOE order requirements would be automatically continued under the rule.
    Response: No. New exemptions will need to be requested under the 
provisions of Subpart E of 10 CFR Part 820.

IV. Regulatory and Procedural Requirements

A. Review Under the National Environmental Policy Act

    We have reviewed this amendment to 10 CFR Part 830 under the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et 
seq.) and the Council on Environmental Quality regulations for 
implementing NEPA (40 CFR Part 1500). Prior to publishing the notice of 
proposed rulemaking to add Part 830 to Title 10 of the CFR, and under 
the NEPA procedures then in existence, we concluded that the potential 
environmental impacts of Part 830 would be clearly insignificant. We 
decided that neither an environmental impact statement nor an 
environmental assessment was required in connection with the 
promulgation of this rule. Since that time, we have issued regulations 
establishing implementing procedures for complying with NEPA's 
requirements [See 10 CFR Part 1021]. We have further considered Part 
830 under these regulations. The regulations include a list of typical 
classes of actions, referred to as categorical exclusions, that 
normally do not require the preparation of either an environmental 
impact statement or an environmental assessment. Part 830 is covered by 
several categorical exclusions including, among others, information 
gathering, data analysis, and document preparation (A9); training 
exercises and simulations (B1.2); routine maintenance activities and 
custodial services (B1.3); and site characterization and environmental 
monitoring (B3.1) [See 10 CFR Part 1021, Appendices A and B to Subpart 
D].
    We have concluded that the amendment to 10 CFR Part 830 does not 
represent a major federal action having significant impact on the 
environment under NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (1976)), the Council on 
Environmental Quality's regulations (40 CFR Parts 1500-08), and DOE's 
implementing regulations (10 CFR Part 1021). Therefore, the amendment 
to this rule does not require an environmental impact statement or an 
environmental assessment pursuant to NEPA.

B. Review Under Executive Order 12866

    This regulatory action has been determined not to be ``a 
significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866, 
``Regulatory Planning and Review'' (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993). 
Accordingly, this action was not subject to review under that Executive 
Order by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB).

C. Review Under Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., requires that 
a Federal agency prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for any rule 
for which the agency is required to publish a general notice of 
proposed rulemaking. The requirement to prepare an analysis does not 
apply, however, if the agency certifies that a rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
5 U.S.C. 605(b). The impact of the changes to Part 830 are primarily 
with respect to major contractors. Subcontractors and suppliers are 
expected to satisfy the provisions of Part 830 primarily through the 
programs and procedures established by prime contractors. Consequently, 
the impacts to small entities with respect to changes to Part 830 are 
expected to be minor. The economic impact on contractors of this filing 
requirement is negligible. On this basis, DOE certifies that the rule 
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities and, therefore, no analysis has been prepared.

D. Review Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

    The information collection provisions of this rule are not 
substantially different from those contained in DOE contracts with DOE 
prime contractors covered by this rule and were previously approved by 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and assigned OMB Control No. 
1910-0300. Accordingly, no additional Office of Management and Budget 
clearance is required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 
3501 et seq.) and the procedures implementing that Act, 5 CFR 1320.1 et 
seq.

E. Review Under Executive Order 13132

    Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999), requires 
agencies to develop an accountable process to ensure meaningful and 
timely input by State and local officials in the development of 
regulatory policies that have ``federalism implications.'' Policies 
that have federalism implications are defined in the Executive Order to 
include regulations that have substantial direct effects on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government. DOE has examined the changes to Part 830 and 
determined that they do not have a substantial direct effect on the 
States, on the relationship between the national government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among 
various levels of government. No further action is required by 
Executive Order 13132.

F. Review Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. 1531 
et seq., requires each Federal agency, to the extent permitted by law, 
to prepare a written assessment of the effects of any Federal mandate 
in an agency rule that may result in the expenditure by State, local, 
and tribal governments, in the aggregate or by the private sector, of 
$100 million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. 
This rule amends 10 CFR Part 830, and applies only to activities 
conducted by or for DOE. Any costs resulting from implementation of 
DOE's management, operation, and enforcement of its nuclear safety 
program are ultimately borne by the Federal government. Therefore, the 
requirements of Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do 
not apply.

G. Review Under Executive Order 12988

    With respect to the review of existing regulations and the 
promulgation of new regulations, section 3(a) of Executive Order 12988, 
``Civil Justice Reform'' (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996) imposes on 
Executive agencies the general duty to (1) eliminate drafting errors 
and ambiguity; (2) write regulations to minimize litigation; and (3) 
provide a clear legal standard for affected conduct rather than a 
general standard and promote simplification and burden reduction. 
Section 3(c) of Executive Order 12988 requires Executive agencies to 
review regulations in light of applicable standards in section 3(a) and 
section 3(b) to determine whether they are met. DOE has completed the 
required review and determined that, to the extent permitted by law, 
Part 830 meets the relevant standards of Executive Order 12988.

H. Review Under Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 
1996

    As required by 5 U.S.C. 801, DOE will report to Congress on the 
promulgation of the rule prior to its effective date. The

[[Page 1818]]

report will state that it has been determined that the rule is not a 
``major rule'' as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(3).

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 830

    DOE contracts, Environment, Federal buildings and facilities, 
Government contracts, Nuclear energy, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power 
plants and reactors, Nuclear safety, Penalties, Public health, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, and Safety.

    Issued in Washington, DC on January 4, 2001.
T. J. Glauthier,
Deputy Secretary, Department of Energy.

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, Part 830 of chapter III, 
title 10, of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as set forth 
below.
    Accordingly, the interim final rule for 10 CFR Part 830 which was 
published at 65 FR 60291 on October 10, 2000 is adopted as a final rule 
with minor changes as set forth below.

    1. Part 830 is revised to read as follows:

PART 830--NUCLEAR SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Sec.
830.1   Scope.
830.2   Exclusions.
830.3   Definitions.
830.4   General requirements.
830.5   Enforcement.
830.6   Recordkeeping.
830.7   Graded approach.
Subpart A--Quality Assurance Requirements
830.120   Scope.
830.121   Quality Assurance Program (QAP).
830.122   Quality assurance criteria.
Subpart B--Safety Basis Requirements
830.200   Scope.
830.201   Performance of work.
830.202   Safety basis.
830.203   Unreviewed safety question process.
830.204   Documented safety analysis.
830.205   Technical safety requirements.
830.206   Preliminary documented safety analysis.
830.207   DOE approval of safety basis.

Appendix A to Subpart B to Part 830--General Statement of Safety Basis 
Policy


    Authority: 42 U.S.C. 2201; 42 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.; and 50 U.S.C. 
2401 et seq.


Sec. 830.1  Scope.

    This part governs the conduct of DOE contractors, DOE personnel, 
and other persons conducting activities (including providing items and 
services) that affect, or may affect, the safety of DOE nuclear 
facilities.


Sec. 830.2  Exclusions.

    This part does not apply to:
    (a) Activities that are regulated through a license by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) or a State under an Agreement with the NRC, 
including activities certified by the NRC under section 1701 of the 
Atomic Energy Act (Act);
    (b) Activities conducted under the authority of the Director, Naval 
Nuclear Propulsion, pursuant to Executive Order 12344, as set forth in 
Public Law 106-65;
    (c) Transportation activities which are regulated by the Department 
of Transportation;
    (d) Activities conducted under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 
1982, as amended, and any facility identified under section 202(5) of 
the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; and
    (e) Activities related to the launch approval and actual launch of 
nuclear energy systems into space.


Sec. 830.3  Definitions.

    (a) The following definitions apply to this part:
    Administrative controls means the provisions relating to 
organization and management, procedures, recordkeeping, assessment, and 
reporting necessary to ensure safe operation of a facility.
    Bases appendix means an appendix that describes the basis of the 
limits and other requirements in technical safety requirements.
    Critical assembly means special nuclear devices designed and used 
to sustain nuclear reactions, which may be subject to frequent core and 
lattice configuration change and which frequently may be used as 
mockups of reactor configurations.
    Criticality means the condition in which a nuclear fission chain 
reaction becomes self-sustaining.
    Design features means the design features of a nuclear facility 
specified in the technical safety requirements that, if altered or 
modified, would have a significant effect on safe operation.
    Document means recorded information that describes, specifies, 
reports, certifies, requires, or provides data or results.
    Documented safety analysis means a documented analysis of the 
extent to which a nuclear facility can be operated safely with respect 
to workers, the public, and the environment, including a description of 
the conditions, safe boundaries, and hazard controls that provide the 
basis for ensuring safety.
    Environmental restoration activities means the process(es) by which 
contaminated sites and facilities are identified and characterized and 
by which contamination is contained, treated, or removed and disposed.
    Existing DOE nuclear facility means a DOE nuclear facility in 
operation before April 9, 2001.
    Fissionable materials means a nuclide capable of sustaining a 
neutron-induced chain reaction (e.g., uranium-233, uranium-235, 
plutonium-238, plutonium-239, plutonium-241, neptunium-237, americium-
241, and curium-244).
    Graded approach means the process of ensuring that the level of 
analysis, documentation, and actions used to comply with a requirement 
in this part are commensurate with:
    (1) The relative importance to safety, safeguards, and security;
    (2) The magnitude of any hazard involved;
    (3) The life cycle stage of a facility;
    (4) The programmatic mission of a facility;
    (5) The particular characteristics of a facility;
    (6) The relative importance of radiological and nonradiological 
hazards; and
    (7) Any other relevant factor.
    Hazard means a source of danger (i.e., material, energy source, or 
operation) with the potential to cause illness, injury, or death to a 
person or damage to a facility or to the environment (without regard to 
the likelihood or credibility of accident scenarios or consequence 
mitigation).
    Hazard controls means measures to eliminate, limit, or mitigate 
hazards to workers, the public, or the environment, including
    (1) Physical, design, structural, and engineering features;
    (2) Safety structures, systems, and components;
    (3) Safety management programs;
    (4) Technical safety requirements; and
    (5) Other controls necessary to provide adequate protection from 
hazards.
    Item is an all-inclusive term used in place of any of the 
following: appurtenance, assembly, component, equipment, material, 
module, part, product, structure, subassembly, subsystem, system, unit, 
or support systems.
    Limiting conditions for operation means the limits that represent 
the lowest functional capability or performance level of safety 
structures, systems, and components required for safe operations.
    Limiting control settings means the settings on safety systems that 
control process variables to prevent exceeding a safety limit.

[[Page 1819]]

    Low-level residual fixed radioactivity means the remaining 
radioactivity following reasonable efforts to remove radioactive 
systems, components, and stored materials. The remaining radioactivity 
is composed of surface contamination that is fixed following chemical 
cleaning or some similar process; a component of surface contamination 
that can be picked up by smears; or activated materials within 
structures. The radioactivity can be characterized as low-level if the 
smearable radioactivity is less than the values defined for removable 
contamination by 10 CFR Part 835, Appendix D, Surface Contamination 
Values, and the hazard analysis results show that no credible accident 
scenario or work practices would release the remaining fixed 
radioactivity or activation components at levels that would prudently 
require the use of active safety systems, structures, or components to 
prevent or mitigate a release of radioactive materials.
    Major modification means a modification to a DOE nuclear facility 
that is completed on or after April 9, 2001 that substantially changes 
the existing safety basis for the facility.
    New DOE nuclear facility means a DOE nuclear facility that begins 
operation on or after April 9, 2001.
    Nonreactor nuclear facility means those facilities, activities or 
operations that involve, or will involve, radioactive and/or 
fissionable materials in such form and quantity that a nuclear or a 
nuclear explosive hazard potentially exists to workers, the public, or 
the environment, but does not include accelerators and their operations 
and does not include activities involving only incidental use and 
generation of radioactive materials or radiation such as check and 
calibration sources, use of radioactive sources in research and 
experimental and analytical laboratory activities, electron 
microscopes, and X-ray machines.
    Nuclear facility means a reactor or a nonreactor nuclear facility 
where an activity is conducted for or on behalf of DOE and includes any 
related area, structure, facility, or activity to the extent necessary 
to ensure proper implementation of the requirements established by this 
Part.
    Operating limits means those limits required to ensure the safe 
operation of a nuclear facility, including limiting control settings 
and limiting conditions for operation.
    Preliminary documented safety analysis means documentation prepared 
in connection with the design and construction of a new DOE nuclear 
facility or a major modification to a DOE nuclear facility that 
provides a reasonable basis for the preliminary conclusion that the 
nuclear facility can be operated safely through the consideration of 
factors such as
    (1) The nuclear safety design criteria to be satisfied;
    (2) A safety analysis that derives aspects of design that are 
necessary to satisfy the nuclear safety design criteria; and
    (3) An initial listing of the safety management programs that must 
be developed to address operational safety considerations.
    Process means a series of actions that achieves an end or result.
    Quality means the condition achieved when an item, service, or 
process meets or exceeds the user's requirements and expectations.
    Quality assurance means all those actions that provide confidence 
that quality is achieved.
    Quality Assurance Program (QAP) means the overall program or 
management system established to assign responsibilities and 
authorities, define policies and requirements, and provide for the 
performance and assessment of work.
    Reactor means any apparatus that is designed or used to sustain 
nuclear chain reactions in a controlled manner such as research, test, 
and power reactors, and critical and pulsed assemblies and any assembly 
that is designed to perform subcritical experiments that could 
potentially reach criticality; and, unless modified by words such as 
containment, vessel, or core, refers to the entire facility, including 
the housing, equipment and associated areas devoted to the operation 
and maintenance of one or more reactor cores.
    Record means a completed document or other media that provides 
objective evidence of an item, service, or process.
    Safety basis means the documented safety analysis and hazard 
controls that provide reasonable assurance that a DOE nuclear facility 
can be operated safely in a manner that adequately protects workers, 
the public, and the environment.
    Safety class structures, systems, and components means the 
structures, systems, or components, including portions of process 
systems, whose preventive or mitigative function is necessary to limit 
radioactive hazardous material exposure to the public, as determined 
from safety analyses.
    Safety evaluation report means the report prepared by DOE to 
document
    (1) The sufficiency of the documented safety analysis for a hazard 
category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility;
    (2) The extent to which a contractor has satisfied the requirements 
of Subpart B of this part; and
    (3) The basis for approval by DOE of the safety basis for the 
facility, including any conditions for approval.
    Safety limits means the limits on process variables associated with 
those safety class physical barriers, generally passive, that are 
necessary for the intended facility function and that are required to 
guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactive materials.
    Safety management program means a program designed to ensure a 
facility is operated in a manner that adequately protects workers, the 
public, and the environment by covering a topic such as: quality 
assurance; maintenance of safety systems; personnel training; conduct 
of operations; inadvertent criticality protection; emergency 
preparedness; fire protection; waste management; or radiological 
protection of workers, the public, and the environment.
    Safety management system means an integrated safety management 
system established consistent with 48 CFR 970.5223-1.
    Safety significant structures, systems, and components means the 
structures, systems, and components which are not designated as safety 
class structures, systems, and components, but whose preventive or 
mitigative function is a major contributor to defense in depth and/or 
worker safety as determined from safety analyses.
    Safety structures, systems, and components means both safety class 
structures, systems, and components and safety significant structures, 
systems, and components.
    Service means the performance of work, such as design, 
manufacturing, construction, fabrication, assembly, decontamination, 
environmental restoration, waste management, laboratory sample 
analyses, inspection, nondestructive examination/testing, environmental 
qualification, equipment qualification, repair, installation, or the 
like.
    Surveillance requirements means requirements relating to test, 
calibration, or inspection to ensure that the necessary operability and 
quality of safety structures, systems, and components and their support 
systems required for safe operations are maintained, that facility 
operation is within safety limits, and that limiting control settings 
and limiting conditions for operation are met.
    Technical safety requirements (TSRs) means the limits, controls, 
and related actions that establish the specific

[[Page 1820]]

parameters and requisite actions for the safe operation of a nuclear 
facility and include, as appropriate for the work and the hazards 
identified in the documented safety analysis for the facility: Safety 
limits, operating limits, surveillance requirements, administrative and 
management controls, use and application provisions, and design 
features, as well as a bases appendix.
    Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) means a situation where
    (1) The probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an 
accident or the malfunction of equipment important to safety previously 
evaluated in the documented safety analysis could be increased;
    (2) The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different 
type than any evaluated previously in the documented safety analysis 
could be created;
    (3) A margin of safety could be reduced; or
    (4) The documented safety analysis may not be bounding or may be 
otherwise inadequate.
    Unreviewed Safety Question process means the mechanism for keeping 
a safety basis current by reviewing potential unreviewed safety 
questions, reporting unreviewed safety questions to DOE, and obtaining 
approval from DOE prior to taking any action that involves an 
unreviewed safety question.
    Use and application provisions means the basic instructions for 
applying technical safety requirements.
    (b) Terms defined in the Act or in 10 CFR Part 820 and not defined 
in this section of the rule are to be used consistent with the meanings 
given in the Act or in 10 CFR Part 820.


Sec. 830.4  General requirements.

    (a) No person may take or cause to be taken any action inconsistent 
with the requirements of this part.
    (b) A contractor responsible for a nuclear facility must ensure 
implementation of, and compliance with, the requirements of this part.
    (c) The requirements of this part must be implemented in a manner 
that provides reasonable assurance of adequate protection of workers, 
the public, and the environment from adverse consequences, taking into 
account the work to be performed and the associated hazards.
    (d) If there is no contractor for a DOE nuclear facility, DOE must 
ensure implementation of, and compliance with, the requirements of this 
part.


Sec. 830.5  Enforcement.

    The requirements in this part are DOE Nuclear Safety Requirements 
and are subject to enforcement by all appropriate means, including the 
imposition of civil and criminal penalties in accordance with the 
provisions of 10 CFR Part 820.


Sec. 830.6  Recordkeeping.

    A contractor must maintain complete and accurate records as 
necessary to substantiate compliance with the requirements of this 
part.


Sec. 830.7  Graded approach.

    Where appropriate, a contractor must use a graded approach to 
implement the requirements of this part, document the basis of the 
graded approach used, and submit that documentation to DOE. The graded 
approach may not be used in implementing the unreviewed safety question 
(USQ) process or in implementing technical safety requirements.

Subpart A--Quality Assurance Requirements


Sec. 830.120  Scope.

    This subpart establishes quality assurance requirements for 
contractors conducting activities, including providing items or 
services, that affect, or may affect, nuclear safety of DOE nuclear 
facilities.


Sec. 830.121  Quality Assurance Program (QAP).

    (a) Contractors conducting activities, including providing items or 
services, that affect, or may affect, the nuclear safety of DOE nuclear 
facilities must conduct work in accordance with the Quality Assurance 
criteria in Sec. 830.122.
    (b) The contractor responsible for a DOE nuclear facility must:
    (1) Submit a QAP to DOE for approval and regard the QAP as approved 
90 days after submittal, unless it is approved or rejected by DOE at an 
earlier date.
    (2) Modify the QAP as directed by DOE.
    (3) Annually submit any changes to the DOE-approved QAP to DOE for 
approval. Justify in the submittal why the changes continue to satisfy 
the quality assurance requirements.
    (4) Conduct work in accordance with the QAP.
    (c) The QAP must:
    (1) Describe how the quality assurance criteria of Sec. 830.122 are 
satisfied.
    (2) Integrate the quality assurance criteria with the Safety 
Management System, or describe how the quality assurance criteria apply 
to the Safety Management System.
    (3) Use voluntary consensus standards in its development and 
implementation, where practicable and consistent with contractual and 
regulatory requirements, and identify the standards used.
    (4) Describe how the contractor responsible for the nuclear 
facility ensures that subcontractors and suppliers satisfy the criteria 
of Sec. 830.122.


Sec. 830.122  Quality assurance criteria.

    The QAP must address the following management, performance, and 
assessment criteria:
    (a) Criterion 1--Management/Program.
    (1) Establish an organizational structure, functional 
responsibilities, levels of authority, and interfaces for those 
managing, performing, and assessing the work.
    (2) Establish management processes, including planning, scheduling, 
and providing resources for the work.
    (b) Criterion 2--Management/Personnel Training and Qualification.
    (1) Train and qualify personnel to be capable of performing their 
assigned work.
    (2) Provide continuing training to personnel to maintain their job 
proficiency.
    (c) Criterion 3--Management/Quality Improvement.
    (1) Establish and implement processes to detect and prevent quality 
problems.
    (2) Identify, control, and correct items, services, and processes 
that do not meet established requirements.
    (3) Identify the causes of problems and work to prevent recurrence 
as a part of correcting the problem.
    (4) Review item characteristics, process implementation, and other 
quality-related information to identify items, services, and processes 
needing improvement.
    (d) Criterion 4--Management/Documents and Records.
    (1) Prepare, review, approve, issue, use, and revise documents to 
prescribe processes, specify requirements, or establish design.
    (2) Specify, prepare, review, approve, and maintain records.
    (e) Criterion 5--Performance/Work Processes.
    (1) Perform work consistent with technical standards, 
administrative controls, and other hazard controls adopted to meet 
regulatory or contract requirements, using approved instructions, 
procedures, or other appropriate means.
    (2) Identify and control items to ensure their proper use.
    (3) Maintain items to prevent their damage, loss, or deterioration.
    (4) Calibrate and maintain equipment used for process monitoring or 
data collection.

[[Page 1821]]

    (f) Criterion 6--Performance/Design.
    (1) Design items and processes using sound engineering/scientific 
principles and appropriate standards.
    (2) Incorporate applicable requirements and design bases in design 
work and design changes.
    (3) Identify and control design interfaces.
    (4) Verify or validate the adequacy of design products using 
individuals or groups other than those who performed the work.
    (5) Verify or validate work before approval and implementation of 
the design.
    (g) Criterion 7--Performance/Procurement.
    (1) Procure items and services that meet established requirements 
and perform as specified.
    (2) Evaluate and select prospective suppliers on the basis of 
specified criteria.
    (3) Establish and implement processes to ensure that approved 
suppliers continue to provide acceptable items and services.
    (h) Criterion 8--Performance/Inspection and Acceptance Testing.
    (1) Inspect and test specified items, services, and processes using 
established acceptance and performance criteria.
    (2) Calibrate and maintain equipment used for inspections and 
tests.
    (i) Criterion 9--Assessment/Management Assessment. Ensure managers 
assess their management processes and identify and correct problems 
that hinder the organization from achieving its objectives.
    (j) Criterion 10--Assessment/Independent Assessment.
    (1) Plan and conduct independent assessments to measure item and 
service quality, to measure the adequacy of work performance, and to 
promote improvement.
    (2) Establish sufficient authority, and freedom from line 
management, for the group performing independent assessments.
    (3) Ensure persons who perform independent assessments are 
technically qualified and knowledgeable in the areas to be assessed.

Subpart B--Safety Basis Requirements


Sec. 830.200  Scope.

    This Subpart establishes safety basis requirements for hazard 
category 1, 2, and 3 DOE nuclear facilities.


Sec. 830.201  Performance of work.

    A contractor must perform work in accordance with the safety basis 
for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility and, in 
particular, with the hazard controls that ensure adequate protection of 
workers, the public, and the environment.


Sec. 830.202  Safety basis.

    (a) The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 
nuclear facility must establish and maintain the safety basis for the 
facility.
    (b) In establishing the safety basis for a hazard category 1, 2, or 
3 DOE nuclear facility, the contractor responsible for the facility 
must:
    (1) Define the scope of the work to be performed;
    (2) Identify and analyze the hazards associated with the work;
    (3) Categorize the facility consistent with DOE-STD-1027-92 
(``Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for 
compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports,'' 
Change Notice 1, September 1997);
    (4) Prepare a documented safety analysis for the facility; and (5) 
Establish the hazard controls upon which the contractor will rely to 
ensure adequate protection of workers, the public, and the environment.
    (c) In maintaining the safety basis for a hazard category 1, 2, or 
3 DOE nuclear facility, the contractor responsible for the facility 
must:
    (1) Update the safety basis to keep it current and to reflect 
changes in the facility, the work and the hazards as they are analyzed 
in the documented safety analysis;
    (2) Annually submit to DOE either the updated documented safety 
analysis for approval or a letter stating that there have been no 
changes in the documented safety analysis since the prior submission; 
and
    (3) Incorporate in the safety basis any changes, conditions, or 
hazard controls directed by DOE.


Sec. 830.203  Unreviewed safety question process.

    (a) The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 
nuclear facility must establish, implement, and take actions consistent 
with a USQ process that meets the requirements of this section.
    (b) The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 
existing nuclear facility must submit for DOE approval a procedure for 
its USQ process by April 10, 2001. Pending DOE approval of the USQ 
procedure, the contractor must continue to use its existing USQ 
procedure. If the existing procedure already meets the requirements of 
this section, the contractor must notify DOE by April 10, 2001 and 
request that DOE issue an approval of the existing procedure.
    (c) The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 
new nuclear facility must submit for DOE approval a procedure for its 
USQ process on a schedule that allows DOE approval in a safety 
evaluation report issued pursuant to section 207(d) of this Part.
    (d) The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 
nuclear facility must implement the DOE-approved USQ procedure in 
situations where there is a:
    (1) Temporary or permanent change in the facility as described in 
the existing documented safety analysis;
    (2) Temporary or permanent change in the procedures as described in 
the existing documented safety analysis;
    (3) Test or experiment not described in the existing documented 
safety analysis; or (4) Potential inadequacy of the documented safety 
analysis because the analysis potentially may not be bounding or may be 
otherwise inadequate.
    (e) A contractor responsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 
nuclear facility must obtain DOE approval prior to taking any action 
determined to involve a USQ.
    (f) The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 
nuclear facility must annually submit to DOE a summary of the USQ 
determinations performed since the prior submission.
    (g) If a contractor responsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 
DOE nuclear facility discovers or is made aware of a potential 
inadequacy of the documented safety analysis, it must:
    (1) Take action, as appropriate, to place or maintain the facility 
in a safe condition until an evaluation of the safety of the situation 
is completed;
    (2) Notify DOE of the situation;
    (3) Perform a USQ determination and notify DOE promptly of the 
results; and (4) Submit the evaluation of the safety of the situation 
to DOE prior to removing any operational restrictions initiated to meet 
paragraph (g)(1) of this section.


Sec. 830.204  Documented safety analysis.

    (a) The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 
nuclear facility must obtain approval from DOE for the methodology used 
to prepare the documented safety analysis for the facility unless the 
contractor uses a methodology set forth in Table 2 of Appendix A to 
this Part.
    (b) The documented safety analysis for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 
DOE nuclear facility must, as appropriate for the complexities and 
hazards associated with the facility:

[[Page 1822]]

    (1) Describe the facility (including the design of safety 
structures, systems and components) and the work to be performed;
    (2) Provide a systematic identification of both natural and man-
made hazards associated with the facility;
    (3) Evaluate normal, abnormal, and accident conditions, including 
consideration of natural and man-made external events, identification 
of energy sources or processes that might contribute to the generation 
or uncontrolled release of radioactive and other hazardous materials, 
and consideration of the need for analysis of accidents which may be 
beyond the design basis of the facility;
    (4) Derive the hazard controls necessary to ensure adequate 
protection of workers, the public, and the environment, demonstrate the 
adequacy of these controls to eliminate, limit, or mitigate identified 
hazards, and define the process for maintaining the hazard controls 
current at all times and controlling their use;
    (5) Define the characteristics of the safety management programs 
necessary to ensure the safe operation of the facility, including 
(where applicable) quality assurance, procedures, maintenance, 
personnel training, conduct of operations, emergency preparedness, fire 
protection, waste management, and radiation protection; and
    (6) With respect to a nonreactor nuclear facility with fissionable 
material in a form and amount sufficient to pose a potential for 
criticality, define a criticality safety program that:
    (i) Ensures that operations with fissionable material remain 
subcritical under all normal and credible abnormal conditions,
    (ii) Identifies applicable nuclear criticality safety standards, 
and
    (iii) Describes how the program meets applicable nuclear 
criticality safety standards.


Sec. 830.205  Technical safety requirements.

    (a) A contractor responsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 
nuclear facility must:
    (1) Develop technical safety requirements that are derived from the 
documented safety analysis;
    (2) Prior to use, obtain DOE approval of technical safety 
requirements and any change to technical safety requirements; and
    (3) Notify DOE of any violation of a technical safety requirement.
    (b) A contractor may take emergency actions that depart from an 
approved technical safety requirement when no actions consistent with 
the technical safety requirement are immediately apparent, and when 
these actions are needed to protect workers, the public or the 
environment from imminent and significant harm. Such actions must be 
approved by a certified operator for a reactor or by a person in 
authority as designated in the technical safety requirements for 
nonreactor nuclear facilities. The contractor must report the emergency 
actions to DOE as soon as practicable.
    (c) A contractor for an environmental restoration activity may 
follow the provisions of 29 CFR 1910.120 or 1926.65 to develop the 
appropriate hazard controls (rather than the provisions for technical 
safety requirements in paragraph (a) of this section), provided the 
activity involves either:
    (1) Work not done within a permanent structure, or
    (2) The decommissioning of a facility with only low-level residual 
fixed radioactivity.


Sec. 830.206  Preliminary documented safety analysis.

    If construction begins after December 11, 2000, the contractor 
responsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 new DOE nuclear facility 
or a major modification to a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear 
facility must:
    (a) Prepare a preliminary documented safety analysis for the 
facility, and
    (b) Obtain DOE approval of:
    (1) The nuclear safety design criteria to be used in preparing the 
preliminary documented safety analysis unless the contractor uses the 
design criteria in DOE Order 420.1, Facility Safety; and
    (2) The preliminary documented safety analysis before the 
contractor can procure materials or components or begin construction; 
provided that DOE may authorize the contractor to perform limited 
procurement and construction activities without approval of a 
preliminary documented safety analysis if DOE determines that the 
activities are not detrimental to public health and safety and are in 
the best interests of DOE.


Sec. 830.207  DOE approval of safety basis.

    (a) By April 10, 2003, a contractor responsible for a hazard 
category 1, 2, or 3 existing DOE nuclear facility must submit for DOE 
approval a safety basis that meets the requirements of this Subpart.
    (b) Pending issuance of a safety evaluation report in which DOE 
approves a safety basis for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 existing DOE 
nuclear facility, the contractor responsible for the facility must 
continue to perform work in accordance with the safety basis for the 
facility in effect on October 10, 2000, or as approved by DOE at a 
later date, and maintain the existing safety basis consistent with the 
requirements of this Subpart.
    (c) If the safety basis for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 existing 
DOE nuclear facility already meets the requirements of this Subpart and 
reflects the current work and hazards associated with the facility, the 
contractor responsible for the facility must, by April 9, 2001, notify 
DOE, document the adequacy of the existing safety basis and request DOE 
to issue a safety evaluation report that approves the existing safety 
basis. If DOE does not issue a safety evaluation report by October 10, 
2001, the contractor must submit a safety basis pursuant to paragraph 
(a) of this section.
    (d) With respect to a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 new DOE nuclear 
facility or a major modification to a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE 
nuclear facility, a contractor may not begin operation of the facility 
or modification prior to the issuance of a safety evaluation report in 
which DOE approves the safety basis for the facility or modification.

Appendix A to Subpart B to Part 830--General Statement of Safety Basis 
Policy

A. Introduction

    This appendix describes DOE's expectations for the safety basis 
requirements of 10 CFR Part 830, acceptable methods for implementing 
these requirements, and criteria DOE will use to evaluate compliance 
with these requirements. This Appendix does not create any new 
requirements and should be used consistently with DOE Policy 450.2A, 
``Identifying, Implementing and Complying with Environment, Safety 
and Health Requirements'' (May 15, 1996).

B. Purpose

    1. The safety basis requirements of Part 830 require the 
contractor responsible for a DOE nuclear facility to analyze the 
facility, the work to be performed, and the associated hazards and 
to identify the conditions, safe boundaries, and hazard controls 
necessary to protect workers, the public and the environment from 
adverse consequences. These analyses and hazard controls constitute 
the safety basis upon which the contractor and DOE rely to conclude 
that the facility can be operated safely. Performing work consistent 
with the safety basis provides reasonable assurance of adequate 
protection of workers, the public, and the environment.
    2. The safety basis requirements are intended to further the 
objective of making safety an integral part of how work is performed 
throughout the DOE complex. Developing a thorough understanding of a 
nuclear facility, the work to be performed, the associated hazards 
and the needed hazard controls is essential to integrating safety 
into

[[Page 1823]]

management and work at all levels. Performing work in accordance 
with the safety basis for a nuclear facility is the realization of 
that objective.

C. Scope

    1. A contractor must establish and maintain a safety basis for a 
hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility because these 
facilities have the potential for significant radiological 
consequences. DOE-STD-1027-92 (``Hazard Categorization and Accident 
Analysis Techniques for compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear 
Safety Analysis Reports,'' Change Notice 1, September 1997) sets 
forth the methodology for categorizing a DOE nuclear facility (see 
Table 1). The hazard categorization must be based on an inventory of 
all radioactive materials within a nuclear facility.
    2. Unlike the quality assurance requirements of Part 830 that 
apply to all DOE nuclear facilities (including radiological 
facilities), the safety basis requirements only apply to hazard 
category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities and do not apply to nuclear 
facilities below hazard category 3.

                                 Table 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A DOE nuclear facility categorized as *
                  * *                      Has the potential for * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hazard category 1......................  Significant off-site
                                          consequences.
Hazard category 2......................  Significant on-site
                                          consequences beyond localized
                                          consequences.
Hazard category 3......................  Only local significant
                                          consequences.
Below category 3.......................  Only consequences less than
                                          those that provide a basis for
                                          categorization as a hazard
                                          category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear
                                          facility.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Integrated Safety Management

    1. The safety basis requirements are consistent with integrated 
safety management. DOE expects that, if a contractor complies with 
the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) clause on 
integration of environment, safety, and health into work planning 
and execution (48 CFR 970.5223-1, Integration of Environment, Safety 
and Health into Work Planning and Execution) and the DEAR clause on 
laws, regulations, and DOE directives (48 CFR 970.5204-2, Laws, 
Regulations and DOE Directives), the contractor will have 
established the foundation to meet the safety basis requirements.
    2. The processes embedded in a safety management system should 
lead to a contractor establishing adequate safety bases and safety 
management programs that will meet the safety basis requirements of 
this Subpart. Consequently, the DOE expects if a contractor has 
adequately implemented integrated safety management, few additional 
requirements will stem from this Subpart and, in such cases, the 
existing safety basis prepared in accordance with integrated safety 
management provisions, including existing DOE safety requirements in 
contracts, should meet the requirements of this Subpart.
    3. DOE does not expect there to be any conflict between 
contractual requirements and regulatory requirements. In fact, DOE 
expects that contract provisions will be used to provide more detail 
on implementation of safety basis requirements such as preparing a 
documented safety analysis, developing technical safety 
requirements, and implementing a USQ process.

E. Enforcement of Safety Basis Requirements

    1. Enforcement of the safety basis requirements will be 
performance oriented. That is, DOE will focus its enforcement 
efforts on whether a contractor operates a nuclear facility 
consistent with the safety basis for the facility and, in 
particular, whether work is performed in accordance with the safety 
basis.
    2. As part of the approval process, DOE will review the content 
and quality of the safety basis documentation. DOE intends to use 
the approval process to assess the adequacy of a safety basis 
developed by a contractor to ensure that workers, the public, and 
the environment are provided reasonable assurance of adequate 
protection from identified hazards. Once approved by DOE, the safety 
basis documentation will not be subject to regulatory enforcement 
actions unless DOE determines that the information which supports 
the documentation is not complete and accurate in all material 
respects, as required by 10 CFR 820.11. This is consistent with the 
DOE enforcement provisions and policy in 10 CFR Part 820.
    3. DOE does not intend the adoption of the safety basis 
requirements to affect the existing quality assurance requirements 
or the existing obligation of contractors to comply with the quality 
assurance requirements. In particular, in conjunction with the 
adoption of the safety basis requirements, DOE revised the language 
in 10 CFR 830.122(e)(1) to make clear that hazard controls are part 
of the work processes to which a contractor and other persons must 
adhere when performing work. This obligation to perform work 
consistent with hazard controls adopted to meet regulatory or 
contract requirements existed prior to the adoption of the safety 
basis requirements and is both consistent with and independent of 
the safety basis requirements.
    4. A documented safety analysis must address all hazards (that 
is, both radiological and nonradiological hazards) and the controls 
necessary to provide adequate protection to the public, workers, and 
the environment from these hazards. Section 234A of the Atomic 
Energy Act, however, only authorizes DOE to issue civil penalties 
for violations of requirements related to nuclear safety. Therefore, 
DOE will impose civil penalties for violations of the safety basis 
requirements (including hazard controls) only if they are related to 
nuclear safety.

F. Documented Safety Analysis

    1. A documented safety analysis must demonstrate the extent to 
which a nuclear facility can be operated safely with respect to 
workers, the public, and the environment.
    2. DOE expects a contractor to use a graded approach to develop 
a documented safety analysis and describe how the graded approach 
was applied. The level of detail, analysis, and documentation will 
reflect the complexity and hazard associated with a particular 
facility. Thus, the documented safety analysis for a simple, low 
hazard facility may be relatively short and qualitative in nature, 
while the documented safety analysis for a complex, high hazard 
facility may be quite elaborate and more quantitative. DOE will work 
with its contractors to ensure a documented safety analysis is 
appropriate for the facility for which it is being developed.
    3. Because DOE has ultimate responsibility for the safety of its 
facilities, DOE will review each documented safety analysis to 
determine whether the rigor and detail of the documented safety 
analysis are appropriate for the complexity and hazards expected at 
the nuclear facility. In particular, DOE will evaluate the 
documented safety analysis by considering the extent to which the 
documented safety analysis (1) satisfies the provisions of the 
methodology used to prepare the documented safety analysis and (2) 
adequately addresses the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 830.204(b). 
DOE will prepare a Safety Evaluation Report to document the results 
of its review of the documented safety analysis. A documented safety 
analysis must contain any conditions or changes required by DOE.
    4. In most cases, the contract will provide the framework for 
specifying the methodology and schedule for developing a documented 
safety analysis. Table 2 sets forth acceptable methodologies for 
preparing a documented safety analysis.

[[Page 1824]]



                                 Table 2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            May prepare its documented
  The contractor responsible for * * *       safety analyses by * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) A DOE reactor......................  Using the method in U.S.
                                          Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                                          Regulatory Guide 1.70,
                                          Standard Format and Content of
                                          Safety Analysis Reports for
                                          Nuclear Power Plants, or
                                          successor document.
(2) A DOE nonreactor nuclear facility..  Using the method in DOE-STD-
                                          3009, Change Notice No. 1,
                                          January 2000, Preparation
                                          Guide for U.S. Department of
                                          Energy Nonreactor Nuclear
                                          Facility Safety Analysis
                                          Reports, July 1994, or
                                          successor document.
(3) A DOE nuclear facility with a        Using the method in either:
 limited operational life.               (1) DOE-STD-3009-, Change
                                          Notice No. 1, January 2000, or
                                          successor document, or
                                         (2) DOE-STD-3011-94, Guidance
                                          for Preparation of DOE 5480.22
                                          (TSR) and DOE 5480.23 (SAR)
                                          Implementation Plans, November
                                          1994, or successor document.
(4) The deactivation or the transition   Using the method in either:
 surveillance and maintenance of a DOE   (1) DOE-STD-3009, Change Notice
 nuclear facility.                        No. 1, January 2000, or
                                          successor document, or
                                         (2) DOE-STD-3011-94 or
                                          successor document.
(5) The decommissioning of a DOE         (1) Using the method in DOE-STD-
 nuclear facility.                        1120-98, Integration of
                                          Environment, Safety, and
                                          Health into Facility
                                          Disposition Activities, May
                                          1998, or successor document;
                                         (2) Using the provisions in 29
                                          CFR 1910.120 (or 29 CFR
                                          1926.65 for construction
                                          activities) for developing
                                          Safety and Health Programs,
                                          Work Plans, Health and Safety
                                          Plans, and Emergency Response
                                          Plans to address public
                                          safety, as well as worker
                                          safety; and
                                         (3) Deriving hazard controls
                                          based on the Safety and Health
                                          Programs, the Work Plans, the
                                          Health and Safety Plans, and
                                          the Emergency Response Plans.
(6) A DOE environmental restoration      (1) Using the method in DOE-STD-
 activity that involves either work not   1120-98 or successor document,
 done within a permanent structure or     and
 the decommissioning of a facility with  (2) Using the provisions in 29
 only low-level residual fixed            CFR 1910.120 (or 29 CFR
 radioactivity.                           1926.65 for construction
                                          activities) for developing a
                                          Safety and Health Program and
                                          a site-specific Health and
                                          Safety Plan (including
                                          elements for Emergency
                                          Response Plans, conduct of
                                          operations, training and
                                          qualifications, and
                                          maintenance management).
(7) A DOE nuclear explosive facility     Developing its documented
 and the nuclear explosive operations     safety analysis in two pieces:
 conducted therein.                      (1) A Safety Analysis Report
                                          for the nuclear facility that
                                          considers the generic nuclear
                                          explosive operations and is
                                          prepared in accordance with
                                          DOE-STD-3009, Change Notice
                                          No. 1, January 2000, or
                                          successor document, and
                                         (2) A Hazard Analysis Report
                                          for the specific nuclear
                                          explosive operations prepared
                                          in accordance with DOE-STD-
                                          3016-99, Hazards Analysis
                                          Reports for Nuclear Explosive
                                          Operations, February 1999, or
                                          successor document.
(8) A DOE hazard category 3 nonreactor   Using the methods in Chapters
 nuclear facility.                        2, 3, 4, and 5 of DOE-STD-
                                          3009, Change Notice No. 1,
                                          January 2000, or successor
                                          document to address in a
                                          simplified fashion:
                                         (1) The basic description of
                                          the facility/activity and its
                                          operations, including safety
                                          structures, systems, and
                                          components;
                                         (2) A qualitative hazards
                                          analysis; and
                                         (3) The hazard controls
                                          (consisting primarily of
                                          inventory limits and safety
                                          management programs) and their
                                          bases.
(9) Transportation activities..........  (1) Preparing a Safety Analysis
                                          Report for Packaging in
                                          accordance with DOE-O-460.1A,
                                          Packaging and Transportation
                                          Safety, October 2, 1996, or
                                          successor document and
                                         (2) Preparing a Transportation
                                          Safety Document in accordance
                                          with DOE-G-460.1-1,
                                          Implementation Guide for Use
                                          with DOE O 460.1A, Packaging
                                          and Transportation Safety,
                                          June 5, 1997, or successor
                                          document.
(10) Transportation and onsite transfer  (1) Preparing a Safety Analysis
 of nuclear explosives, nuclear           Report for Packaging in
 components, Navel nuclear fuel           accordance with DOE-O-461.1,
 elements, Category I and Category II     Packaging and Transportation
 special nuclear materials, special       of Materials of National
 assemblies, and other materials of       Security Interest, September
 national security.                       29, 2000, or successor
                                          document and
                                         (2) Preparing a Transportation
                                          Safety Document in accordance
                                          with DOE-M-461.1-1, Packaging
                                          and Transfer of Materials of
                                          National Security Interest
                                          Manual, September 29, 2000, or
                                          successor document.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    5. Table 2 refers to specific types of nuclear facilities. These 
references are not intended to constitute an exhaustive list of the 
specific types of nuclear facilities. Part 830 defines nuclear 
facility broadly to include all those facilities, activities, or 
operations that involve, or will involve, radioactive and/or 
fissionable materials in such form and quantity that a nuclear or a 
nuclear explosive

[[Page 1825]]

hazard potentially exists to the employees or the general public, 
and to include any related area, structure, facility, or activity to 
the extent necessary to ensure proper implementation of the 
requirements established by Part 830. The only exceptions are those 
facilities specifically excluded such as accelerators. Table 3 
defines the specific nuclear facilities referenced in Table 2 that 
are not defined in 10 CFR 830.3

                                 Table 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     For purposes of Table 2, * * *                means * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Deactivation.......................  The process of placing a
                                          facility in a stable and known
                                          condition, including the
                                          removal of hazardous and
                                          radioactive materials
(2) Decontamination....................  The removal or reduction of
                                          residual radioactive and
                                          hazardous materials by
                                          mechanical, chemical, or other
                                          techniques to achieve a stated
                                          objective or end condition
(3) Decommissioning....................  Those actions taking place
                                          after deactivation of a
                                          nuclear facility to retire it
                                          from service and includes
                                          surveillance and maintenance,
                                          decontamination, and/or
                                          dismantlement.
(4) Environmental restoration            The process by which
 activities.                              contaminated sites and
                                          facilities are identified and
                                          characterized and by which
                                          existing contamination is
                                          contained, or removed and
                                          disposed
(5) Generic nuclear explosive operation  A characterization that
                                          considers the collective
                                          attributes (such as special
                                          facility system requirements,
                                          physical weapon
                                          characteristics, or quantities
                                          and chemical/physical forms of
                                          hazardous materials) for all
                                          projected nuclear explosive
                                          operations to be conducted at
                                          a facility
(6) Nuclear explosive facility.........  A nuclear facility at which
                                          nuclear operations and
                                          activities involving a nuclear
                                          explosive may be conducted
(7) Nuclear explosive operation........  Any activity involving a
                                          nuclear explosive, including
                                          activities in which main-
                                          charge, high-explosive parts
                                          and pits are collocated.
(8) Nuclear facility with a limited      A nuclear facility for which
 operational life.                        there is a short remaining
                                          operational period before
                                          ending the facility's mission
                                          and initiating deactivation
                                          and decommissioning and for
                                          which there are no intended
                                          additional missions other than
                                          cleanup
(9) Specific nuclear explosive           A specific nuclear explosive
 operation.                               subjected to the stipulated
                                          steps of an individual
                                          operation, such as assembly or
                                          disassembly
(10) Transition surveillance and         Activities conducted when a
 maintenance activities.                  facility is not operating or
                                          during deactivation,
                                          decontamination, and
                                          decommissioning operations
                                          when surveillance and
                                          maintenance are the
                                          predominant activities being
                                          conducted at the facility.
                                          These activities are necessary
                                          for satisfactory containment
                                          of hazardous materials and
                                          protection of workers, the
                                          public, and the environment.
                                          These activities include
                                          providing periodic
                                          inspections, maintenance of
                                          structures, systems, and
                                          components, and actions to
                                          prevent the alteration of
                                          hazardous materials to an
                                          unsafe state
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    6. If construction begins after December 11, 2000, the 
contractor responsible for the design and construction of a new DOE 
nuclear facility or a major modification to an existing DOE nuclear 
facility must prepare a preliminary documented safety analysis. A 
preliminary documented safety analysis can ensure that substantial 
costs and time are not wasted in constructing a nuclear facility 
that will not be acceptable to DOE. If a contractor is required to 
prepare a preliminary documented safety analysis, the contractor 
must obtain DOE approval of the preliminary documented safety 
analysis prior to procuring materials or components or beginning 
construction. DOE, however, may authorize the contractor to perform 
limited procurement and construction activities without approval of 
a preliminary documented safety analysis if DOE determines that the 
activities are not detrimental to public health and safety and are 
in the best interests of DOE. DOE Order 420.1, Facility Safety, sets 
forth acceptable nuclear safety design criteria for use in preparing 
a preliminary documented safety analysis. As a general matter, DOE 
does not expect preliminary documented safety analyses to be needed 
for activities that do not involve significant construction such as 
environmental restoration activities, decontamination and 
decommissioning activities, specific nuclear explosive operations, 
or transition surveillance and maintenance activities.

G. Hazard Controls

    1. Hazard controls are measures to eliminate, limit, or mitigate 
hazards to workers, the public, or the environment. They include (1) 
physical, design, structural, and engineering features; (2) safety 
structures, systems, and components; (3) safety management programs; 
(4) technical safety requirements; and (5) other controls necessary 
to provide adequate protection from hazards.
    2. The types and specific characteristics of the safety 
management programs necessary for a DOE nuclear facility will be 
dependent on the complexity and hazards associated with the nuclear 
facility and the work being performed. In most cases, however, a 
contractor should consider safety management programs covering 
topics such as quality assurance, procedures, maintenance, personnel 
training, conduct of operations, criticality safety, emergency 
preparedness, fire protection, waste management, and radiation 
protection. In general, DOE Orders set forth DOE's expectations 
concerning specific topics. For example, DOE Order 420.1 provides 
DOE's expectations with respect to fire protection and criticality 
safety.
    3. Safety structures, systems, and components require formal 
definition of minimum acceptable performance in the documented 
safety analysis. This is accomplished by first defining a safety 
function, then describing the structure, systems, and components, 
placing functional requirements on those portions of the structures, 
systems, and components required for the safety function, and 
identifying performance criteria that will ensure functional 
requirements are met. Technical safety requirements are developed to 
ensure the operability of the safety structures, systems, and 
components and define actions to be taken if a safety structure, 
system, or component is not operable.
    4. Technical safety requirements establish limits, controls, and 
related actions necessary for the safe operation of a nuclear 
facility. The exact form and contents of technical safety 
requirements will depend on the circumstances of a particular 
nuclear facility as defined in the documented safety analysis for 
the nuclear facility. As appropriate,

[[Page 1826]]

technical safety requirements may have sections on (1) safety 
limits, (2) operating limits, (3) surveillance requirements, (4) 
administrative controls, (5) use and application, and (6) design 
features. It may also have an appendix on the bases for the limits 
and requirements. DOE Guide 423.X, Implementation Guide for Use in 
Developing Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) provides a complete 
description of what technical safety requirements should contain and 
how they should be developed and maintained.
    5. DOE will examine and approve the technical safety 
requirements as part of preparing the safety evaluation report and 
reviewing updates to the safety basis. As with all hazard controls, 
technical safety requirements must be kept current and reflect 
changes in the facility, the work and the hazards as they are 
analyzed in the documented safety analysis. In addition, DOE expects 
a contractor to maintain technical safety requirements, and other 
hazard controls as appropriate, as controlled documents with an 
authorized users list.
    6. Table 4 sets forth DOE's expectations concerning acceptable 
technical safety requirements.

                                 Table 4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     As appropriate for a
    particular DOE nuclear
 facility, the section of the      Will provide information on * * *
technical safety requirements
           on * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Safety limits............  The limits on process variables
                                associated with those safety class
                                physical barriers, generally passive,
                                that are necessary for the intended
                                facility function and that are required
                                to guard against the uncontrolled
                                release of radioactive materials. The
                                safety limit section describes, as
                                precisely as possible, the parameters
                                being limited, states the limit in
                                measurable units (pressure, temperature,
                                flow, etc.), and indicates the
                                applicability of the limit. The safety
                                limit section also describes the actions
                                to be taken in the event that the safety
                                limit is exceeded. These actions should
                                first place the facility in the safe,
                                stable condition attainable, including
                                total shutdown (except where such action
                                might reduce the margin of safety) or
                                should verify that the facility already
                                is safe and stable and will remain so.
                                The technical safety requirement should
                                state that the contractor must obtain
                                DOE authorization to restart the nuclear
                                facility following a violation of a
                                safety limit. The safety limit section
                                also establishes the steps and time
                                limits to correct the out-of-
                                specification condition.
(2) Operating limits.........  Those limits which are required to ensure
                                the safe operation of a nuclear
                                facility. The operating limits section
                                may include subsections on limiting
                                control settings and limiting conditions
                                for operation.
(3) Limiting control settings  The settings on safety systems that
                                control process variables to prevent
                                exceeding a safety limit. The limited
                                control settings section normally
                                contains the settings for automatic
                                alarms and for the automatic or
                                nonautomatic initiation of protective
                                actions related to those variables
                                associated with the function of safety
                                class structures, systems, or components
                                if the safety analysis shows that they
                                are relied upon to mitigate or prevent
                                an accident. The limited control
                                settings section also identifies the
                                protective actions to be taken at the
                                specific settings chosen in order to
                                correct a situation automatically or
                                manually such that the related safety
                                limit is not exceeded. Protective
                                actions may include maintaining the
                                variables within the requirements and
                                repairing the automatic device promptly
                                or shutting down the affected part of
                                the process and, if required, the entire
                                facility.
(4) Limiting conditions for    The limits that represent the lowest
 operations.                    functional capability or performance
                                level of safety structures, systems, and
                                components required to perform an
                                activity safely. The limiting conditions
                                for operation section describes, as
                                precisely as possible, the lowest
                                functional capability or performance
                                level of equipment required for
                                continued safe operation of the
                                facility. The limiting conditions for
                                operation section also states the action
                                to be taken to address a condition not
                                meeting the limiting conditions for
                                operation section. Normally this simply
                                provides for the adverse condition being
                                corrected in a certain time frame and
                                for further action if this is
                                impossible.
(5) Surveillance requirements  Requirements relating to test,
                                calibration, or inspection to assure
                                that the necessary operability and
                                quality of safety structures, systems,
                                and components is maintained; that
                                facility operation is within safety
                                limits; and that limiting control
                                settings and limiting conditions for
                                operation are met. If a required
                                surveillance is not successfully
                                completed, the contractor is expected to
                                assume the systems or components
                                involved are inoperable and take the
                                actions defined by the technical safety
                                requirement until the systems or
                                components can be shown to be operable.
                                If, however, a required surveillance is
                                not performed within its required
                                frequency, the contractor is allowed to
                                perform the surveillance within 24 hours
                                or the original frequency, whichever is
                                smaller, and confirm operability.
(6) Administrative controls..  Organization and management, procedures,
                                recordkeeping, assessment, and reporting
                                necessary to ensure safe operation of a
                                facility consistent with the technical
                                safety requirement. In general, the
                                administrative controls section
                                addresses (1) the requirements
                                associated with administrative controls,
                                (including those for reporting
                                violations of the technical safety
                                requirement); (2) the staffing
                                requirements for facility positions
                                important to safe conduct of the
                                facility; and (3) the commitments to the
                                safety management programs identified in
                                the documented safety analysis as
                                necessary components of the safety basis
                                for the facility.
(7) Use and application        The basic instructions for applying the
 provisions.                    safety restrictions contained in a
                                technical safety requirement. The use
                                and application section includes
                                definitions of terms, operating modes,
                                logical connectors, completion times,
                                and frequency notations.
(8) Design features..........  Design features of the facility that, if
                                altered or modified, would have a
                                significant effect on safe operation.

[[Page 1827]]

 
(9) Bases appendix...........  The reasons for the safety limits,
                                operating limits, and associated
                                surveillance requirements in the
                                technical safety requirements. The
                                statements for each limit or requirement
                                shows how the numeric value, the
                                condition, or the surveillance fulfills
                                the purpose derived from the safety
                                documentation. The primary purpose for
                                describing the basis of each limit or
                                requirement is to ensure that any future
                                changes to the limit or requirement is
                                done with full knowledge of the original
                                intent or purpose of the limit or
                                requirement.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Unreviewed Safety Questions

    1. The USQ process is an important tool to evaluate whether 
changes affect the safety basis. A contractor must use the USQ 
process to ensure that the safety basis for a DOE nuclear facility 
is not undermined by changes in the facility, the work performed, 
the associated hazards, or other factors that support the adequacy 
of the safety basis.
    2. The USQ process permits a contractor to make physical and 
procedural changes to a nuclear facility and to conduct tests and 
experiments without prior approval, provided these changes do not 
cause a USQ. The USQ process provides a contractor with the 
flexibility needed to conduct day-to-day operations by requiring 
only those changes and tests with a potential to impact the safety 
basis (and therefore the safety of the nuclear facility) be approved 
by DOE. This allows DOE to focus its review on those changes 
significant to safety. The USQ process helps keep the safety basis 
current by ensuring appropriate review of and response to situations 
that might adversely affect the safety basis.
    3. DOE Guide 424.X, Implementation Guide for Addressing 
Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) Requirements, provides DOE's 
expectations for a USQ process. The contractor must obtain DOE 
approval of its procedure used to implement the USQ process.

I. Functions and Responsibilities

    1. The DOE Management Official for a DOE nuclear facility (that 
is, the Assistant Secretary, the Assistant Administrator, or the 
Office Director who is primarily responsible for the management of 
the facility) has primary responsibility within DOE for ensuring 
that the safety basis for the facility is adequate and complies with 
the safety basis requirements of Part 830. The DOE Management 
Official is responsible for ensuring the timely and proper (1) 
review of all safety basis documents submitted to DOE and (2) 
preparation of a safety evaluation report concerning the safety 
basis for a facility.
    2. DOE will maintain a public list on the internet that provides 
the status of the safety basis for each hazard category 1, 2, or 3 
DOE nuclear facility and, to the extent practicable, provides 
information on how to obtain a copy of the safety basis and related 
documents for a facility.

[FR Doc. 01-608 Filed 1-9-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P