[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 238 (Monday, December 11, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 77252-77259]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-31478]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. NM175; Special Conditions No. 25-169-SC]


Special Conditions: Boeing Model 777-200 Series Airplanes; 
Overhead Crew Rest Compartment

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions.

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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Boeing Model 777-
200 series airplanes, modified by Flight Structures, Inc. The 
modification consists of the installation of a crew rest compartment 
located in the vicinity of door three in the overhead area of the 
passenger compartment. The crew rest compartment is to be certified for 
a maximum of ten occupants for use only during flight. The applicable 
airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety 
standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the 
additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary 
to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the 
existing airworthiness standards.

EFFECTIVE DATE: December 1, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jayson Claar, FAA, Transport Standards 
Staff, ANM-115, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 
Renton, Washington, 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-2194; facsimile 
(425) 227-1320.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On June 25, 1999, Flight Structures, Inc., 4407 172 Street NE, 
Arlington, Washington, 98223, applied for a supplemental type 
certificate to install an overhead crew rest compartment in Boeing 
Model 777-200 series airplanes. The Boeing Model 777-200 series 
airplane is a large twin-jet engine transport airplane with four pairs 
of Type A exits, a passenger capacity of 440, and a range of 5000 
miles. The overhead crew rest compartment is a single compartment 
located above the main passenger compartment in the vicinity of door 
three. The crew rest compartment will contain eight private bunks and 
two seats, and is to be certified for a maximum of ten occupants. A 
stairwell entering from the door three aisle is the main entry. Two 
escape hatches are located on either side of the entryway door. These 
special conditions are written for an overhead crew rest compartment 
that will be occupied only in flight, not during taxi, takeoff, or 
landing.

Type Certification Basis

    Under the provisions of Sec. 21.101, Flight Structures, Inc., must 
show that the Boeing Model 777-200 series airplane, as changed, 
continues to meet the applicable provisions of the regulations 
incorporated by reference in Type Certificate No. T00001SE or the 
applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the 
change. The regulations incorporated by reference in the type 
certificate are commonly referred to as the ``original type 
certification basis.'' The regulations incorporated by reference in 
Type Certificate No. T00001SE for the Boeing Model 777-200 series 
airplanes include 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 
25-82. The U.S. type certification basis for the Boeing Model 777-200 
series airplanes is established in accordance with 14 CFR 21.29 and 
21.17 and the type certification application date. The type 
certification basis is listed in Type Certificate Data Sheet No. 
T00001SE.
    If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness 
regulations (i.e., part 25) do not contain adequate or appropriate 
safety standards for the Model 777-200 series airplanes because of a 
novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed 
under the provisions of Sec. 21.16.
    In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special 
conditions, Boeing Model 777-200

[[Page 77253]]

series airplane must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission 
requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements 
of 14 CFR part 36.
    Special conditions, as appropriate, are issued in accordance with 
Sec. 11.49, after public notice, as required by Secs. 11.28 and 
11.29(b), and become part of the type certification basis in accordance 
with Sec. 21.101(b)(2).
    Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which 
they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type 
certificate to modify any other model included on the same type 
certificate to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, 
the special conditions would also apply to the other model under the 
provisions of Sec. 21.101(a)(1).

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    While the installation of a crew rest compartment is not a new 
concept for large transport category airplanes, each compartment design 
has unique features by virtue of its design, location, and use on the 
airplane. Previously, crew rest compartments have been evaluated that 
are installed within the main passenger compartment area of the Boeing 
Model 777-200 and Model 777-300 series airplanes; other crew rest 
compartments have been installed below the passenger cabin area, within 
the cargo compartment. Similar overhead crew rest compartments have 
also been installed on the Boeing Model 747 airplane. The interfaces of 
the modification are evaluated within the interior and assessed in 
accordance with the certification basis of the airplane. However, part 
25 does not provide the requirements for crew rest compartments within 
the overhead area of the passenger compartment for the Boeing Model 
777-200 series airplanes.
    This is a compartment that has never been used for this purpose in 
any previous Boeing Model 777-200 series airplanes. Due to the novel or 
unusual features associated with the installation of this crew rest 
compartment, special conditions are considered necessary to provide a 
level of safety equal to that established by the airworthiness 
regulations incorporated by reference in the type certificate.

Discussion of Comments

    Notice of proposed special conditions No. 25-00-02-SC for the 
Boeing Model 777-200 series airplanes modified with a Flight 
Structures, Inc., overhead crew rest compartment was published in the 
Federal Register on September 25, 2000 (65 FR 57564). Six commenters 
responded to the Notice.

Special Condition No. 1

    Two comments address special condition no. 1(a)(2), concerning a 
placard near the crew rest compartment entrance stating that occupants 
must be trained in crew rest compartment evacuation procedures. One 
commenter proposes that the placarding include the reference to the 
training material document. The commenter states that this would be 
consistent with the 747 door 5 overhead crew rest compartment special 
conditions.
    The 747 door 5 overhead crew rest special conditions, issued 
November 13, 1987, do not include a requirement to have a placard near 
the entrance of the crew rest compartment stating that occupants must 
be trained in crew rest compartment evacuation procedures.
    The requirement that the occupants must be trained in the 
evacuation procedures for the Boeing Model 777-200 series airplane crew 
rest compartment is contained in special condition no. 2(d). After 
further consideration, the FAA agrees with the recommendation to modify 
the placarding requirement of special condition no. 1(a)(2) to include 
``that are trained in the evacuation procedures for the overhead crew 
rest compartment,'' but not to include the reference to the training 
material document.
    One comment raises the question that if lighted ``No Smoking'' 
signs are provided in addition to the ``No Smoking'' placarding in 
special condition no. 1(a)(4) then the signs and placarding could 
provide conflicting and confusing information. If the lighted signs are 
switchable then this would be confusing to the occupants of the crew 
rest compartment since the lighted signs when not illuminated would 
allow smoking and the placarding would prohibit smoking. The commenter 
recommends that if lighted signs are provided that they remain on at 
all times.
    The FAA agrees that if lighted ``No Smoking'' signs are provided 
that they should remain on at all times.

Special Condition No. 2

    One comment addresses special condition no. 2, concerning the 
requirement that the evacuation from the crew rest compartment must be 
rapid, which implies an undefined time restraint that is not well 
understood or required in other special conditions for similar designs 
of remote compartments. The commenter proposes removing the word 
``rapidly'' from the special conditions.
    The FAA does not agree with the comment that ``rapidly'' should be 
removed from the special conditions. The wording in the special 
conditions is consistent with the evacuation requirements for other 
remote compartments. The regulation for lower deck service 
compartments, 14 CFR 25.819, has the same requirement that is addressed 
in special condition no. 2, including the requirement for rapid 
evacuation from the compartment to the main deck. The crew rest 
compartment evacuation must be rapid to reduce the amount of time 
between the detection of smoke and initiation of fire fighting 
procedures. Also, rapid evacuation would reduce the amount of time that 
smoke from the crew rest compartment could enter the passenger cabin 
through the open evacuation route.
    Two comments address special condition no. 2(a), concerning the 
requirement that the two evacuation routes be located on opposite sides 
of the crew rest compartment, with sufficient separation within the 
compartment to minimize the possibility of an event rendering both 
routes inoperative. They note the words ``opposite sides of the crew 
rest'' do not add to the level of safety for the occupants of the crew 
rest over that provided by the evacuation routes that have ``sufficient 
separation within the compartment to minimize the possibility of an 
event rendering both routes inoperative.''
    Previous special conditions for overhead crew rest compartments 
have given the option for evacuation routes to be located on opposite 
sides of the crew rest, or to have sufficient separation within the 
compartment to minimize the possibility of an event rendering both 
routes inoperative. The FAA agrees with the comment that the words 
``opposite sides of the crew rest'' do not add to the level of safety 
for the occupants of the crew rest when the routes must have 
``sufficient separation within the compartment to minimize the 
possibility of an event rendering both routes inoperative.'' Evacuation 
routes located on opposite sides of the crew rest compartment may be 
located in an area where both routes could be rendered inoperative. The 
final special conditions will be revised to remove the words ``opposite 
sides of the crew rest.''
    Five comments address special condition no. 2(b), concerning the 
location of crew rest compartment evacuation paths entering the main 
deck. One commenter proposes clarification to the times that must be 
considered for normal movement of passengers that would affect the 
evacuation from the crew rest compartment by adding the following words 
``during times in which

[[Page 77254]]

occupancy is allowed'' in the crew rest compartment. The commenter 
states that since the crew rest compartment is not occupied during 
taxi, takeoff and landing, egress from the compartment during an 
emergency evacuation of the airplane is not relevant.
    The FAA agrees with the comment that passenger movement during in-
flight conditions needs to be considered since the crew rest may only 
be occupied during flight. The special conditions will be revised to 
reflect this clarification, that normal movement by passengers when 
crew rest compartment occupancy is allowed must be considered.
    A second commenter states that the limitations for the location of 
one of the two evacuation routes are too restrictive and proposes some 
changes. The commenter suggests that during flight the normal passenger 
movement would be greatest in the main aisle and galley complex areas 
and the movement in a cross aisle would be much less. The commenter 
proposes allowing the evacuation routes to open into cross aisles 
provided there were procedures that would require verification that 
area below the emergency hatch is clear of passengers before 
evacuating.
    The FAA does not agree with the concern that requiring one 
evacuation route not to open into a cross aisle is overly restrictive. 
The special conditions require that one evacuation route be located 
such that normal passenger movement would not block the route, but 
allows the other route(s) to be located where they could be blocked by 
normal passenger movement. A compartment design that would allow both 
evacuation routes to be blocked by normal passenger movement does not 
provide an acceptable level of safety.
    A third commenter notes that passenger movement is low enough when 
the crew rest compartment is occupied that the cabin crew could clear 
the area under or adjacent to an emergency escape route quickly, 
regardless of its location. The commenter proposes a change to the 
special conditions requiring procedures for clearing the area of the 
evacuation route in the event an evacuation is necessary and there is 
passenger movement in the evacuation route.
    The FAA has considered the proposal to have the main deck cabin 
crew clear passengers out of the evacuation path prior to evacuation 
from the crew rest compartment. The reliance on the main deck cabin 
crew to take some action before the crew rest compartment can be 
evacuated is not acceptable. In cases when the main deck cabin crew is 
involved with an emergency, they may not be available to clear the 
passengers out of the area of the evacuation path. This includes 
evacuation paths into an aisle, cross aisle, galley complex, or over 
passenger seats.
    A fourth commenter states that if the evacuation path is over an 
area where there are passenger seats, then several items need to be 
considered including: the number of passengers that would need to be 
displaced, the relocation of these displaced passengers, passenger 
displacement during turbulence, the possibility of the evacuees 
stepping on the passenger seats, and addressing the strength of these 
passengers seats. The fifth commenter provides some responses to the 
fourth commenter's concerns.
    The FAA agrees that an evacuation path over an area where the 
passengers must be relocated is a concern. The FAA has considered this 
type of evacuation path and has determined that a maximum of one row of 
seats may be displaced.
    The FAA agrees that if the evacuation procedure includes having the 
evacuee step on a seat, then it must be shown the seat will not be 
damaged to the extent that it is unsafe for the emergency landing 
conditions.

Special Condition No. 3

    Three commenters address special condition no. 3 concerning the 
evacuation of an incapacitated person from the crew rest compartment. 
One commenter raises a concern that limiting the procedure to a single 
person assisting the evacuation of an incapacitated occupant was too 
restrictive. The commenter suggests that a procedure that requires more 
than one person assisting should be acceptable.
    The FAA does not agree with the comment concerning the assistance 
of a single person to demonstrate that they can evacuate an 
incapacitated occupant from the crew rest compartment is too 
restrictive. In the event there are only two occupants of the crew rest 
compartment and one becomes incapacitated, the other occupant must be 
able to evacuate the incapacitated occupant to the main deck of the 
airplane.
    The second commenter questions the need to have the evacuation 
demonstration conducted for each of the evacuation paths and proposes 
that the demonstration be limited to the most critical evacuation path.
    The FAA does not agree with the comment that only the most critical 
evacuation path for the incapacitated occupant must be demonstrated, 
unless the paths are identical to each other including but not limited 
to size, assist means, access, and available room around the evacuation 
path. It is very difficult to evaluate which evacuation route would be 
the most critical path to demonstrate the evacuation of an 
incapacitated occupant. Therefore, the FAA will require that all routes 
be demonstrated.
    The third commenter proposes that the evacuation procedures should 
be transmitted to the operator as part of the training evacuation 
procedure.
    The FAA concurs with the comment that the procedures for the 
evacuation of an incapacitated occupant should be part of the training 
requirements for the occupants of the crew rest compartment.

Special Condition No. 4

    One comment addresses special condition no. 4(a), concerning the 
requirement for at least one exit sign to be located near each exit. 
The commenter proposes that only the primary evacuation route be 
equipped with an exit sign meeting the requirements of 
Sec. 25.812(b)(1)(i). The commenter believes that having exit signs at 
both primary and secondary exits may cause confusion during an 
evacuation.
    The FAA disagrees with the comment to have an exit sign only at the 
primary exit path. The basic reason for the requirement to have an exit 
sign meeting the requirements of Sec. 25.812(b)(1)(i) located near each 
exit is to identify the emergency exits. When there is an emergency 
that requires the evacuation of the crew rest compartment, the 
occupants must be provided the greatest opportunity to evacuate the 
compartment as quickly as possible. Identifying all of the evacuation 
routes with an exit sign provides the evacuees with visible signs that 
locate the available exits. With this knowledge they can assess the 
conditions and determine the best route for evacuation based on the 
conditions present in the compartment.
    Three comments address special condition no. 4(d) concerning the 
illumination of the exit handles and instruction placards. Two of the 
commenters recommend that the special conditions be revised to clarify 
what instruction placards are being addressed by the special 
conditions.
    The FAA agrees that special condition no. 4(d) should be revised to 
identify what instruction placards must be illuminated to at least 160 
microlamberts under emergency lighting conditions. The intent is to 
have the instruction placards for the operation and use of the escape 
paths be addressed by the illumination

[[Page 77255]]

requirements of these special conditions.
    The third commenter proposes that special condition no. 4(d) be 
deleted and special condition no. 4(c) be revised to read as follows: 
``Placards and exit handles must be visible and readable from a 
distance of 30 inches under emergency lighting conditions.''
    The FAA disagrees with the proposal to delete special condition no. 
4(d) and revise the requirements of special condition no. 4(c) to 
address the visibility of the instruction placards under emergency 
lighting conditions. The FAA requires a specific measurable 
illumination level because it is the best way to eliminate judgement 
calls that would result from the proposal that requires the placard be 
readable from a distance of 30 inches under emergency lighting 
conditions.

Special Condition No. 7

    Two comments address special condition no. 7 concerning the use of 
the public address and crew interphone as the means of alerting the 
occupants of the crew rest compartment of an emergency. The commenters 
state that the current public address and crew interphone designs do 
not differentiate between normal and emergency communications and that 
each airline has a protocol and procedures for emergency 
communications.
    The FAA is concerned that during normal operation the public 
address system would not be active in the crew rest compartment. In an 
emergency, the system would need to be active in the crew rest 
compartment. Therefore, means need to be provided for differentiating 
between normal and emergency communications. The FAA also has a similar 
concern that the chime system on the crew interphone system does not 
provide an adequate means of differentiating between normal and 
emergency communications.

Special Condition No. 9

    Two comments address special condition no. 9 concerning providing 
protective clothing for a person fighting a fire in the crew rest 
compartment. One commenter proposes that protective clothing be 
provided for the designated fire fighter. The other commenter argues 
against that type of requirement.
    The FAA has determined that the minimum equipment required to fight 
a fire in the crew rest compartment is a fire extinguisher and 
protective breathing equipment.

Special Condition No. 10

    One comment addresses special condition no. 10(c) concerning the 
smoke detection warning provided in the main passenger cabin. The 
commenter suggests that the special condition be changed from ``A 
warning in the main passenger cabin * * *'' to ``A visual and/or aural 
warning in the main passenger cabin. * * *'' It is the commenter's 
contention that both means would provide an acceptable warning.
    The FAA agrees that either a visual or aural warning could be found 
acceptable, however, the current wording does allow both types of 
warnings or combinations of the warnings. Therefore, no change to the 
special conditions wording is required.

Special Condition No. 11

    Five comments address special condition no. 11 concerning fire 
control in the overhead crew rest. One commenter disagrees with 
handling fire control without entering the overhead crew rest area. The 
commenter states that this does not provide an acceptable level of 
safety and that manual fire fighting does provide an acceptable level 
of safety. The commenter states that Halon stratification from a built-
in system would settle in the vestibule area of the overhead crew rest 
and prevent proper concentration in the entire area that would be 
needed to control the fire.
    The FAA disagrees with the comment that a built-in fire 
extinguishing system does not provide an acceptable level of safety. 
The FAA would require a test to show that for any built-in fire 
extinguishing system, the concentration during the initial introduction 
of Halon 1301 or equivalent is a minimum of five percent by volume and 
that it is sustained at a minimum level of three percent for the 
maximum diversion in still air (including an allowance for 15-minute 
holding and/or approach and land) for the airplane. The applicant's 
design must ensure that in the event the vestibule door is damaged, the 
extinguishing agent concentration of Halon 1301 is not compromised. The 
door would be placarded for crew access only and access will be limited 
by a mechanism to prevent ``accidental opening.''
    One comment mentions a concern about products of thermal 
decomposition of Halon when exposed to a fire, and the impact of this 
on passengers.
    The FAA agrees that the built-in fire extinguishing system must not 
introduce a hazard to the occupants or airplane structure. Section 
25.851(b) would apply to any built-in fire extinguishing system. The 
issue of toxicity of fire extinguishing agents has been previously 
explored as in Amendment 25-74, Airplane Cabin Fire Protection, 
adopted: April 4, 1991, effective May 16, 1991, as published in the 
Federal Register 56 FR 15450, April 16, 1991.
    One comment expresses concern over the operation of the vent system 
used to evacuate smoke when smoke is present in the overhead crew rest. 
A system that evacuates smoke during a fire would also evacuate the 
fire suppression agents used to control the fire in the compartment.
    The FAA agrees with the comment that a ventilation system within a 
compartment that has a fire suppression system can have a negative 
affect on the fire suppression system. The design of the ventilation 
system would need to ensure that the ventilation flow can be controlled 
in such a way during a fire that the fire suppression agent used 
remains in the compartment. There is no requirement to clear smoke from 
the crew rest area, however, there is a requirement to clear the smoke 
that has entered the main passenger compartment during the evacuation 
of the crew rest compartment and/or during the process of fighting the 
fire.
    One commenter addresses concerns regarding the access provisions 
required for the crew rest compartment and timely access of the crew 
member with the fire fighting equipment and proposes changes to the 
special condition. The commenter believes that ``unrestricted access'' 
is too restrictive a requirement and the ``sufficient access'' provides 
an acceptable level of safety.
    The FAA disagrees with the comment that the current language is 
inappropriate. The use of ``unrestricted access'' related to 
``crewmembers equipped for fire fighting''. The intent of this 
requirement is to ensure that the aircraft design will accommodate the 
entrance to enable ``crewmembers equipped for fire fighting'' to gain 
entrance to the crew rest area in a minimum amount of time.
    One comment suggests that a built-in fire extinguishing system is 
not warranted.
    The FAA does not concur with the comment. The special condition as 
written allows either a built-in system or crew entry and extinguishing 
of fire directly. This is left to the applicant to propose and 
demonstrate a suitable solution. The overhead crew rest area poses some 
challenges but a successful applicant should be able to design the crew 
rest area and associated ventilation system and smoke/detection and 
fire suppression system architecture to ensure that FAA requirements 
are met. Therefore, the FAA believes that the

[[Page 77256]]

current language in the special condition is appropriate.
    One commenter suggests the special condition should be revised to 
reflect the type of fire most likely to occur within the crew rest 
compartment and associated detection times.
    The FAA disagrees that the special conditions should be revised to 
reflect the type of fires most likely to occur within the crew rest 
compartment. The special conditions must reflect all expected fire 
threat scenarios. It should be noted that the crew rest area will not 
be carrying flammable fluids, explosives, or other dangerous cargo. The 
requirements to enable crewmember(s) quick entry to the crew rest 
compartment and to locate a fire source inherently places limits on the 
amount of baggage that may be carried and the size of the crew rest 
area. The applicant must accommodate these requirements and the 
appropriate Aircraft Certification Office must require suitable means 
of compliance and may elect to limit an investigation to a ``worse case 
fire threat'' scenario.
    One commenter suggests having a trained crewmember for manual fire 
fighting as the most effective means for controlling a fire in an 
overhead crew rest compartment. The commenter recommends that only the 
manual fire fighting be accepted for the crew rest compartment.
    The special condition allows the applicant to select an appropriate 
means to meet the requirement. While the presence of a ``trained 
crewmember'' may be very effective, the FAA position is that a properly 
designed smoke detection and fire suppression system with sufficient 
quantity of smoke detectors, smoke detector placement, quantity and 
placement of fire extinguishing nozzles, control of ventilation, etc; 
can provide an effective means to control and suppress a fire threat in 
any crew rest area.
    One commenter suggests that the critical design issue for effective 
manual fire fighting is unrestricted access to the compartment.
    The FAA concurs that the time element is a critical issue for 
effective control and suppression of any fire threat for both a built-
in smoke detection and fire suppression system and a manual fire 
fighting system.
    One comment states that ``the time for the compartment to become 
smoke-filled, * * *'' is vague and open to numerous interpretations.
    The FAA disagrees. Performance based wording is deliberately used 
to convey to the applicant a broad spectrum of requirements that the 
regulation intends. The FAA does agree that there needs to be a common 
understanding of the requirements and that they need to be consistently 
applied to each applicant that has a similar installation.
    One comment states that it is not clear if a flight test is 
required for the crew intervention option in special condition no. 11. 
The commenter believes that it is possible this may be the more 
limiting test condition and should therefore be required.
    The FAA concurs, and an aircraft certification office may require 
flight testing to demonstrate an acceptable means of compliance.
    One comment states that there is no evaluation of the effectiveness 
of fire fighting procedures. The commenter questions whether it is 
sufficient to determine that the option of crew intervention provides 
an equivalent level of safety to the installation of a fire suppression 
system.
    The FAA concurs that the special conditions as written focus on the 
requirement that a crewmember be able to quickly enter the crew rest 
compartment prepared to locate the smoke source. Inherent in the action 
of locating the smoke source is the action of suppression/
extinguishment of the smoke source that should be no different than 
utilizing a fire extinguisher in the cabin. The key issue is the 
response time. As previously mentioned, the time required to gain 
access and determine the smoke source must be short enough to prevent 
the fire from propagating and threatening continued safe flight and 
landing. The applicant must evaluate the kinds of fires likely to occur 
and ensure that the appropriate fire extinguishers are provided per the 
requirements given in Sec. 25.851. In addition, FAA has begun internal 
discussions to develop guidance on acceptable means of compliance. 
These discussions have included issues such as the required level of 
smoke concentration, the possible use of a low light level source to 
simulate a visual cue from a ``smoldering source,'' placement of the 
smoke source, and test conditions. The FAA will issue applicable 
guidance material when it becomes available or is required.

Special Condition No. 14

    Five comments address special condition no. 14(a) concerning the 
manual release of the oxygen system in the crew rest compartment. 
Several of the comments state that the design in previous remote crew 
rest compartments has been an extension of the system provided in the 
passenger compartment. The oxygen system has an automatic and a manual 
release method. With the automatic release method, whenever the 
altitude in the cabin goes higher than a preset amount, the oxygen 
masks are automatically deployed. With the manual method, the flight 
crew can deploy the oxygen masks. The commenters question the need to 
have a method for the crew rest occupants to manually deploy the oxygen 
masks.
    The FAA agrees with the commenters that the system should be 
similar to the main deck passenger oxygen system and there must be a 
means for the oxygen masks to be manually deployed from the flight 
deck.
    One comment addresses special condition no. 14(c)(5) and (f)(7). 
The commenter interprets a section as a common area in the crew rest 
area that contains seats and/or bunks that can be closed off for 
privacy * * * and a smoke detection system in that section that ties 
into the entire crew rest smoke detection system. The commenter 
suggests changing the wording in the special conditions to read 
``Testing of the smoke detection system will demonstrate that a fire 
can be detected in each individual bunk.''
    The FAA agrees with the interpretation but disagrees with the need 
to adopt the suggested language. The FAA interpretation of the 
requirements for built-in smoke detection and fire suppression/
extinguishing systems inherently includes the need for detection and 
for suppression/extinguishment to encompass the entire area in 
question.
    One comment recommends a general change to the special conditions 
concerning the approval of all normal, abnormal and emergency 
procedures and their training be approved by the Authority under which 
the airplane is operated. The commenter proposes that a statement to 
that effect be included in the special conditions.
    The FAA agrees with the comment that the Authority under which the 
airplane is operated approves all normal, abnormal and emergency 
procedures and their training. However, the FAA disagrees that the 
special conditions must include that requirement. The modification to 
install the overhead crew rest area would be considered a major 
modification that would require the approval of the Authority under 
which the airplane is operated to return the airplane to service after 
the modification. This approval to return the airplane to service would 
include review and approval of all normal, abnormal and emergency 
procedures and their training changes made as a result of the 
modification.

[[Page 77257]]

Discussion of the Special Conditions

    In general, the requirements listed in these special conditions are 
similar to those previously approved in earlier certification programs, 
such as the Boeing Model 747 overhead crew rest compartment. These 
special conditions establish seating, communication, lighting, personal 
safety, and evacuation requirements for the overhead crew rest 
compartment. When applicable, the requirements parallel the existing 
requirements for a lower deck service compartment and provide an 
equivalent level of safety to that provided for main deck occupants.
    Seats and berths must be certified to the maximum flight loads. Due 
to the location and configuration of the crew rest compartment, 
occupancy during taxi, takeoff, and landing would be prohibited, and 
occupancy limited to crewmembers during flight. Occupancy would be 
limited to either ten persons, or the combined total of approved seats 
and berths, whichever is less.
    To preclude occupants from being trapped in the crew rest 
compartment in the event the main entryway is blocked, two evacuation 
routes, including the entryway, would be required. Each evacuation 
route must be designed to allow for removal of an incapacitated person 
from the crew rest compartment to the main deck.
    In addition, passenger information signs, supplemental oxygen, and 
a seat or berth for each occupant of the crew rest compartment would be 
required. These items are necessary because of turbulence and/or 
decompression.
    To prevent the occupants from being isolated in a dark area due to 
loss of the crew rest compartment lighting, either a second independent 
source of normal lighting or emergency lighting would be required. An 
emergency lighting system, which is activated under the same conditions 
as the main deck emergency lighting system, would also be required.
    Two-way voice communications and public address speaker(s) would be 
required to alert the occupants to an inflight emergency. Also, a 
system to alert the occupants of the crew rest compartment in the event 
of decompression and to don oxygen masks would be required.
    Special condition No. 8 requires a means, readily detectable by 
seated or standing occupants of the crew rest compartment, which 
indicates when seat belts should be fastened. The requirement for 
visibility of the sign by standing occupants may be met by a general 
area sign that is visible to occupants standing in the main floor area 
or corridor of the crew rest area. It will not be essential to be 
visible from every possible location in the crew rest area; however, 
the location should not be easily obscured or remotely located.
    Since the overhead crew rest compartment is remotely located from 
the main passenger cabin and will not always be occupied, a smoke 
detection system and fire-fighting equipment will be required to 
minimize the hazards associated with a fire in the crew rest 
compartment. The smoke detection system must be capable of detecting a 
fire in each area of the compartment created by the installation of a 
curtain or partition. The materials in the crew rest compartment must 
meet the flammability requirements of Sec. 25.853(a), and the 
mattresses must meet the fire blocking requirements of Sec. 25.853(c).
    The crew rest compartment must be designed such that fires within 
the compartment can be controlled without having to enter the 
compartment; or, the design of the access provisions must allow crew 
equipped for fire fighting to have unrestricted access to the 
compartment. The time for a crewmember on the main deck to react to the 
fire alarm, to don the fire fighting equipment, and to gain access must 
not exceed the time for the crew rest compartment to become smoke 
filled, making it difficult to locate the fire source. If the means of 
controlling the fire within the compartment is a Halon 1301 or 
equivalent fire suppression system, the system should be designed 
similar to a cargo compartment fire suppression system. Advisory 
Circular 120-42, titled ``Extended Range Operation With Two-Engine 
Airplanes (ETOPS)'' provides guidance on fire suppression systems in 
cargo compartments.
    This special condition requirement concerning fires within the 
compartment was developed for, and applied to, Boeing Model 777-200 and 
Model 777-300 series airplanes lower lobe crew rest compartment; it was 
not applied to the overhead crew rest compartment in earlier 
certification programs such as the Boeing Model 747. The Model 747 
special conditions were issued before the new flammability requirements 
were developed. This requirement originated from a concern that a fire 
in an unoccupied crew rest compartment could spread into the passenger 
compartment, or affect other vital systems, before it could be 
extinguished. The special condition would require either the 
installation of a manually activated fire containment system that is 
accessible from outside the crew rest compartment, or a demonstration 
that the crew could satisfactorily perform the function of 
extinguishing a fire under the prescribed conditions. The manually 
activated fire containment system would be required only if it could 
not be demonstrated that a crewmember responding to the alarm could not 
locate the fire source and successfully extinguish the fire.
    These special conditions provide the regulatory requirements 
necessary for certification of this modification. Other special 
conditions may be developed, as needed, based on further FAA review and 
discussions with the applicant, manufacturer, and civil aviation 
authorities.

Applicability

    As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to 
Boeing Model 777-200 series airplanes. Should Flight Structures, Inc., 
apply at a later date for a supplemental type certificate to modify any 
other model included on Type Certificate No. T00001SE to incorporate 
the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would 
apply to that model as well under the provisions of Sec. 21.101(a)(1).

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features 
on Boeing Model 777-200 series airplanes. It is not a rule of general 
applicability, and it affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA 
for approval of these features on the airplane.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.
    The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:


    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by 
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of 
the type certification basis for Boeing Model 777-200 series airplanes, 
as modified by Flight Structures, Inc., with overhead crew rest 
compartments.
    1. Occupancy of the overhead crew rest compartment is limited to a 
maximum of ten occupants. There must be an approved seat or berth able 
to withstand the maximum flight loads when occupied for each occupant 
permitted in the crew rest compartment.
    (a) There must be appropriate placards, inside and outside to 
indicate:
    (1) The maximum number of occupants allowed,

[[Page 77258]]

    (2) That occupancy is restricted to crewmembers that are trained in 
the evacuation procedures for the overhead crew rest compartment,
    (3) That occupancy is prohibited during taxi, take-off and landing, 
and
    (4) That smoking is prohibited in the crew rest compartment.
    (b) There must be at least one ashtray on the inside and outside of 
any entrance to the crew rest compartment.
    (c) There must be a means to prevent passengers from entering the 
compartment in the event of an emergency or when no flight attendant is 
present.
    (d) There must be a means for any door installed between the crew 
rest compartment and passenger cabin to be capable of being quickly 
opened from inside the compartment, even when crowding occurs at each 
side of the door.
    (e) For all doors installed, there must be a means to preclude 
anyone from being trapped inside the compartment. If a locking 
mechanism is installed, it must be capable of being unlocked from the 
outside without the aid of special tools. The lock must not prevent 
opening from the inside of the compartment at any time.

    2. There must be at least two emergency evacuation routes that 
could be used by each occupant of the crew rest compartment to rapidly 
evacuate to the main cabin. In addition--
    (a) The routes must be located with sufficient separation within 
the compartment, and between the evacuation routes, to minimize the 
possibility of an event rendering both routes inoperative.
    (b) The routes must be designed to minimize the possibility of 
blockage, which might result from fire, mechanical or structural 
failure, or persons standing below or against the escape route. One of 
two evacuation routes may not be located where, during times in which 
occupancy is allowed, normal movement by passengers occurs (i.e., main 
aisle, cross aisle, or galley complex) that would impede egress of the 
crew rest compartment. If there is low headroom at or near the 
evacuation route, provisions must be made to prevent or to protect 
occupants from head injury. The use of evacuation routes must not be 
dependent on any powered device. If the evacuation procedure involves 
the evacuee stepping on seats, the seats must not be damaged to the 
extent that they would not be acceptable for occupancy during an 
emergency landing.
    (c) Emergency evacuation procedures and the evacuation of 
incapacitated occupants must be established and transmitted to the 
operators for incorporation into their training programs and 
appropriate operational manuals.
    (d) There must be a limitation in the Airplane Flight Manual or 
other suitable means requiring that crewmembers be trained in the use 
of evacuation routes.

    3. There must be a means for the evacuation of an incapacitated 
person (representative of a ninety-fifth percentile male) from the crew 
rest compartment to the passenger cabin floor. The evacuation must be 
demonstrated for all evacuation routes. A flight attendant or other 
crewmember (a total of one assistant) may provide assistance in the 
evacuation. Procedures for the evacuation of an incapacitated person 
from the crew rest compartment must be established.

    4. The following signs and placards must be provided in the crew 
rest compartment:
    (a) At least one exit sign, located near each exit, meeting the 
requirements of Sec. 25.812(b)(1)(i).
    (b) An appropriate placard defining the location and the operating 
instructions for each evacuation route.
    (c) Placards must be readable from a distance of 30 inches under 
emergency lighting conditions.
    (d) The exit handles and evacuation path operating instruction 
placards must be illuminated to at least 160 microlamberts under 
emergency lighting conditions.

    5. There must be a means in the event of failure of the airplane's 
main power system, or of the normal crew rest compartment lighting 
system, for emergency illumination to be automatically provided for the 
crew rest compartment.
    (a) This emergency illumination must be independent of the main 
lighting system.
    (b) The sources of general cabin illumination may be common to both 
the emergency and the main lighting systems if the power supply to the 
emergency lighting system is independent of the power supply to the 
main lighting system.
    (c) The illumination level must be sufficient for the occupants of 
the crew rest compartment to locate and transfer to the main passenger 
cabin floor by means of each evacuation route.

    6. There must be means for two-way voice communications between the 
crewmembers on the flight deck and the occupants of the crew rest 
compartment. There must also be two-way communications between the 
occupants of the crew rest compartment and each flight attendant 
station required to have a public address system microphone per 
Sec. 25.1423(g) in the passenger cabin.

    7. There must be a means for manual activation of an aural 
emergency alarm system, audible during normal and emergency conditions, 
to enable crewmembers on the flight deck and at each pair of required 
floor level emergency exits to alert occupants of the crew rest 
compartment of an emergency situation. Use of a public address or crew 
interphone system will be acceptable, providing an adequate means of 
differentiating between normal and emergency communications is 
incorporated. The system must be powered in flight, after the shutdown 
or failure of all engines and auxiliary power units, or the 
disconnection or failure of all power sources dependent on their 
continued operation, for a period of at least ten minutes.

    8. There must be a means, readily detectable by seated or standing 
occupants of the crew rest compartment, which indicates when seat belts 
should be fastened. Seat belt type restraints must be provided for 
berths and must be compatible for the sleeping attitude during cruise 
conditions. There must be a placard on each berth requiring that seat 
belts must be fastened when occupied. If compliance with any of the 
other requirements of these special conditions is predicated on 
specific head location, there must be a placard identifying the head 
position. In the event there are no seats, at least one sign must be 
provided to cover anticipated turbulence.

    9. The following equipment must be provided in the crew rest 
compartment:
    (a) At least one approved hand-held fire extinguisher appropriate 
for the kinds of fires likely to occur;
    (b) One protective breathing equipment device approved to Technical 
Standard Order (TSO)-C116 or equivalent, suitable for fire fighting; 
and
    (c) One flashlight.

    10. A smoke detection system (or systems) must be provided that 
monitors each area within the crew rest compartment, including those 
areas partitioned by curtains. Flight tests must be conducted to show 
compliance with this requirement. Each system (or systems) must 
provide:
    (a) A visual indication to the flight deck within one minute after 
the start of a fire;
    (b) An aural warning in the crew rest compartment; and
    (c) A warning in the main passenger cabin. This warning must be 
readily detectable by a flight attendant, taking

[[Page 77259]]

into consideration the positioning of flight attendants throughout the 
main passenger compartment during various phases of flight.

    11. The crew rest compartment must be designed such that fires 
within the compartment can be controlled without a crewmember having to 
enter the compartment, or the design of the access provisions must 
allow crewmembers equipped for firefighting to have unrestricted access 
to the compartment. The time for a crewmember on the main deck to react 
to the fire alarm, to don the fire fighting equipment, and to gain 
access must not exceed the time for the compartment to become smoke-
filled, making it difficult to locate the fire source.

    12. There must be a means provided to exclude hazardous quantities 
of smoke or extinguishing agent originating in the crew rest 
compartment from entering any other compartment occupied by crewmembers 
or passengers. The means must include the time periods during the 
evacuation of the crew rest compartment and, if applicable, when 
accessing the crew rest compartment to manually fight a fire. Smoke 
entering any other compartment occupied by crewmembers or passengers 
must dissipate within 5 minutes after closing the access to the crew 
rest compartment. Flight tests must be conducted to show compliance 
with this requirement.

    13. There must be a supplemental oxygen system equivalent to that 
provided for main deck passengers for each seat and berth in the crew 
rest compartment. The system must provide:
    (a) An aural and visual warning to the occupants of the crew rest 
compartment to don oxygen masks in the event of decompression; and
    (b) A decompression warning that activates before the cabin 
pressure altitude exceeds 15,000 feet. The warning must sound 
continuously until a reset pushbutton in the crew rest compartment is 
depressed.

    14. The following requirements apply to a crew rest compartment 
that is divided into several sections by the installation of curtains 
or partitions:
    (a) To compensate for sleeping occupants, there must be an aural 
alert that can be heard in each section of the crew rest compartment 
that accompanies automatic presentation of supplemental oxygen masks. 
Two supplemental oxygen masks are required in each section whether or 
not seats or berths are installed in each section. There must also be a 
means by which the oxygen masks can be manually deployed from the 
flight deck.
    (b) A placard is required adjacent to each curtain that visually 
divides or separates, for privacy purposes, the overhead crew rest 
compartment into small sections. The placard must require that the 
curtain(s) remain open when the private section it creates is 
unoccupied. The vestibule section adjacent to the stairway is not 
considered a private area and, therefore, does not require a placard.
    (c) For each crew rest section created by the installation of a 
curtain, the following requirements of these special conditions must be 
met with the curtain open or closed:
    (1) No smoking placard (special condition no. 1),
    (2) Emergency illumination (special condition no. 5),
    (3) Emergency alarm system (special condition no. 7),
    (4) Seat belt fasten signal (special condition no. 8), and
    (5) The smoke or fire detection system (special conditions no.'s 
10, 11, and 12).
    (d) Overhead crew rest compartments visually divided to the extent 
that evacuation could be affected must have exit signs that direct 
occupants to the primary stairway exit. The exit signs must be provided 
in each separate section of the crew rest compartment, and must meet 
the requirements of Sec. 25.812(b)(1)(i).
    (e) For sections within an overhead crew rest compartment that are 
created by the installation of a rigid partition with a door physically 
separating the sections, the following requirements of these special 
conditions must be met with the door open or closed:
    (1) There must be a secondary evacuation route from each section to 
the main deck, or alternatively, it must be shown that any door between 
the sections has been designed to preclude anyone from being trapped 
inside the compartment.
    (2) Any door between the sections must be shown to be openable when 
crowded against, even when crowding occurs at each side of the door.
    (3) There may be no more than one door between any seat or berth 
and the primary stairway exit.
    (4) There must be exit signs in each section meeting the 
requirements of Sec. 25.812(b)(1)(i) that direct occupants to the 
primary stairway exit.
    (f) For each smaller section within the main crew rest compartment 
created by the installation of a partition with a door, the following 
requirements of these special conditions must be met with the door open 
or closed:
    (1) No smoking placards (special condition no. 1),
    (2) Emergency illumination (special condition no. 5),
    (3) Two-way voice communication (special condition no. 6),
    (4) Emergency alarm system (special condition no. 7),
    (5) Seat belt fasten signal (special condition no. 8),
    (6) Emergency fire fighting and protective equipment (special 
condition no. 9), and
    (7) Smoke or fire detection system (special conditions no.'s 10, 
11, and 12).

    15. The requirements of two-way voice communication with the flight 
deck and provisions for emergency firefighting and protective equipment 
are not applicable to lavatories or other small areas that are not 
intended to be occupied for extended periods of time.

    16. Where a waste disposal receptacle is fitted, it must be 
equipped with an automatic fire extinguisher that meets the performance 
requirements of Sec. 25.854(b).

    17. Materials (including finishes or decorative surfaces applied to 
the materials) must comply with the flammability requirements of 
Sec. 25.853(a), as amended by Amendment 25-83. Mattresses must comply 
with the flammability requirements of Sec. 25.853(c), as amended by 
Amendment 25-83.

    Issued in Renton, Washington on December 1, 2000.
Donald L. Riggin,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service, ANM-100.
[FR Doc. 00-31478 Filed 12-8-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-U