[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 236 (Thursday, December 7, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 76672-76675]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-31157]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-305]


Nuclear Management Company, LLC; Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant; 
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering 
issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-43 
issued to the Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC or the licensee), 
for operation of the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP or Kewaunee), 
located in Kewaunee County, Wisconsin.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

    The proposed action would increase the number of fuel assemblies 
that can be stored in the Kewaunee spent fuel pools (SFPs) from 990 
fuel assemblies to 1,205 fuel assemblies, an increase of 215 fuel 
assemblies, by installing 215 new spent fuel storage racks in the new 
north canal pool. In addition, the new spent fuel storage racks will 
use Boral as the neutron absorber material.
    The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's 
application for amendment dated November 18, 1999, as supplemented by 
letter dated August 7, 2000.

The Need for the Proposed Action

    KNPP is a pressurized water reactor (PWR) which commenced 
commercial operation in 1974, and its current operating license will 
expire in December 2013. Initially, KNPP was designed to accommodate 
168 spent fuel assemblies (SFAs). The last phase of re-racking the SFP 
at KNPP was completed in 1987, which provided for the current storage 
capacity of 990 SFAs. Currently, KNPP has two storage pools. The larger 
south pool contains racks with a storage capacity for 720 SFAs, and the 
smaller north pool contains racks with a storage capacity for 270 SFAs. 
There are presently 718 SFAs stored in the south pool and 106 SFAs 
stored in the north pool. As a result of the present unavailability of 
an off-site spent fuel

[[Page 76673]]

storage facility and the current rate of fuel discharge (approximately 
40 assemblies per cycle), KNPP will currently lose full-core reserve 
capability after the Fall 2001 outage. The addition of the 215 storage 
locations in the new north canal pool will extend the full-core reserve 
capability until after the 2009 outage, and increase the total capacity 
to 1205 SFAs.
    The proposed action is needed to provide additional spent fuel 
storage capacity to extend the full-core reserve capability beyond the 
Fall 2001 outage.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

Radioactive Wastes
    The Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant uses waste treatment systems 
designed to collect and process gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that 
might contain radioactive material. These radioactive waste treatment 
systems were evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) dated 
December 1972. The proposed SFP expansion will not involve any change 
in the waste treatment systems described in the FES.
Radioactive Material Released into the Atmosphere
    The expanded fuel storage capacity obtained by installing new fuel 
racks into the transfer canal is not expected to affect the release of 
radioactive gases from the SFP. Gaseous fission products such as 
Krypton-85 and Iodine-131 are produced by the fuel in the core during 
reactor operation. A small percentage of these fission gases are 
released to the reactor coolant from the small number of fuel 
assemblies which are expected to develop leaks during reactor 
operation. During refueling operations, some of these fission products 
enter the SFP and are subsequently released into the air of the spent 
fuel building. Gaseous releases from the fuel storage area are combined 
with other plant exhausts. If radio-iodine levels become too high, the 
air can be diverted to charcoal filters for the removal of radio-iodine 
before release to the environment. Normally, the radioactive gas 
contribution from the fuel storage area is negligible compared to the 
gaseous releases from other areas of the plant. Since the frequency of 
refueling (and therefore the number of freshly off loaded spent fuel 
assemblies stored in the SFP at any one time) will not increase, there 
will be no increase in the amounts of these types of fission products 
released to the atmosphere as a result of the increased SFP fuel 
storage capacity.
    Tritium gases contained in the SFP are produced from two sources. 
The first source is the tritium from the reactor coolant system (RCS), 
which is a result of neutron capture in the reactor core by Boron-10. 
Tritium produced in this manner can only enter the spent fuel pool 
during refueling outages when the SFP and the RCS are interconnected. 
Since the proposed amendment does not increase the frequency of 
refueling outages, this source of tritium does not change. The second 
source of tritium is a result of neutron capture by Boron-10 in the SFP 
water. The decay neutron flux from the old fuel in the SFP is 
considerably smaller than the neutron flux in the core of an operating 
reactor. Due to the small neutron flux associated with the fuel to be 
stored in the new racks, the effect on tritium production will be 
insignificant. Therefore, the release of tritium from the storage of 
additional spent fuel assemblies in the transfer canal will be 
insignificant.
    In addition, the plant radiological effluent Technical 
Specifications, which are not being changed by this action, restrict 
the total releases of gaseous activity from the plant (including the 
SFP).
Solid Radioactive Wastes
    Independent of the proposed modification, the concentration of 
radionuclides in the SFP is controlled by the filters and demineralizer 
of the SFP purification system as well as by the decay of short-lived 
isotopes. Spent resins are generated by the processing of SFP water 
through the SFP purification system. Both spent resins and filters are 
disposed of as solid radioactive waste. Since the frequency of 
refueling outages is unchanged by the proposed action, the activity in 
the SFP is not expected to increase significantly above its current 
value. Thus, the radioactivity collected on the spent fuel resins and 
filters is not expected to significantly increase above its current 
value as a result of the storage capacity increase. The cumulative 
amount of radioactivity collected on the spent fuel resins over time 
will increase slightly with an increase in the amount of spent fuel 
that is added to the SFP; however, this increase is expected to be 
insignificant.
    The licensee will use a vacuum to clean the floor of the fuel 
transfer canal following the drying of the canal prior to installing 
the new fuel racks. Vacuuming of the canal floor will remove any 
extraneous debris and crud. Filter bags from the vacuum will be 
disposed of as solid radioactive waste. Depending on the waste 
characterization of these filters, the licensee will dispose of them 
utilizing shielded canisters and high integrity containers which will 
then be stored onsite or shipped for burial accordingly. However, this 
amount of solid radioactive waste is expected to be negligible in 
comparison with other sources of solid radioactive wastes generated at 
the plant (it is expected that the total volume of low level 
radioactive waste generated due to this project will be less than 50 
cubic feet).
    Therefore, the staff does not expect that the additional fuel 
storage capacity made possible by the addition of fuel racks in the 
north portion of the Kewaunee fuel transfer canal will result in a 
significant change in the generation of solid radwaste at the Kewaunee 
Nuclear Power Plant.
Liquid Radioactive Wastes
    The SFP ion exchanger resins that are part of the SFP water cleanup 
system remove soluble radioactive materials from the SFP water. When 
the resins are changed out, the small amount of resin sluice water 
which is released is processed by the liquid radwaste system before any 
water is discharged to Lake Michigan. The resin in the spent fuel pool 
demineralizer is typically replaced every 12 to 15 months. It is 
possible that fuel movement may stir up a small amount of settled 
contamination during loading of the fuel into the new racks. However, 
it is expected that this will have an insignificant effect on the 
frequency of resin change out. Therefore, the installation of the new 
fuel racks is not expected to increase the amount of liquid radioactive 
wastes generated at the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant.
    In addition, the plant radiological effluent Technical 
Specifications, which are not being changed by this action, restrict 
the total releases of activity in liquids from the plant.
Radiological Impact Assessment
    Radiation protection personnel will provide constant coverage, 
including dose monitoring, for the majority of the work. Since this 
license amendment does not involve the removal of any spent fuel racks, 
the licensee does not plan on using divers for this project. However, 
if it becomes necessary to utilize divers to remove any interferences 
which may impede the installation of the new fuel racks, the licensee 
will equip each diver with radiation detectors with remote, above 
surface, readouts which will be continuously monitored by Radiation 
Protection personnel. The total occupational dose to plant workers as a 
result of the SFP expansion operation is estimated to be between 0.7 
and 1.3

[[Page 76674]]

person-rem. This dose estimate is lower than doses for SFP 
modifications performed at other plants. The upcoming SFP rack 
installation will follow detailed procedures prepared with full 
consideration of as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles.
    On the basis of our review of the licensee's proposal, the staff 
concludes that the KNPP SFP expansion can be performed in a manner that 
will ensure that doses to workers will be maintained as low as is 
reasonably achievable and within the limits of 10 CFR part 20. The 
estimated dose of 0.7 to 1.3 person-rem to perform the proposed SFP 
expansion operation is a small fraction of the annual collective dose 
accrued at the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant.
    Furthermore, as stated previously, the concentration of 
radionuclides in the SFP is not expected to increase beyond its present 
value as a result of the proposed action. Therefore, doses to workers 
are not expected to increase above their current values. However, since 
additional spent fuel will be added to the SFP, cumulative doses over 
time may increase slightly, although this increase is expected to be 
insignificant with annual doses remaining below regulatory limits.
Accident Considerations
    The licensee evaluated criticality safety calculations for normal 
conditions, criticality safety calculations for accident conditions, 
long-term reactivity changes, calculation of the transient decay heat 
load in the SFPs, calculation of the resulting maximum SFPs bulk 
temperature, calculation of the time-to-boil after a loss of forced 
cooling or makeup water capability, rack seismic/structural 
evaluations, rack fatigue analysis, SFP structural evaluation, bearing 
pad analysis, and liner integrity analysis, shallow drop event, deep 
drop event, and object drop event. The proposed modification increases 
the spent fuel storage capacity, but it does not change the frequency 
or probability or method for handling spent fuel assemblies.
    The proposed expansion of the SFP will not affect any of the 
assumptions or inputs used in evaluating the dose consequences of a 
fuel handling accident and therefore will not result in an increase in 
the doses from a postulated fuel handling accident.
Environmental Impact Conclusions
    The proposed action will not significantly increase the probability 
or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of 
any effluents that may be released off site, and there is no 
significant increase in occupational or public exposure. Therefore, 
there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated 
with the proposed action.
    With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed 
action does not involve any historic sites. It does not affect 
nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impacts. 
Therefore, there are no significant nonradiological environmental 
impacts associated with the proposed action.
    Accordingly, the NRC concludes that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with this action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Shipping Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility
    Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility 
is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity. 
However, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) high-level radioactive 
waste repository is not expected to begin receiving spent fuel until 
approximately 2010, at the earliest. To date, no location has been 
identified and an interim federal storage facility has yet to be 
identified in advance of a decision on a permanent repository. 
Therefore, shipping the spent fuel to the DOE repository is not 
considered an alternative to increased onsite fuel storage capacity at 
this time.
Shipping Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility
    Reprocessing of spent fuel from Kewaunee is not a viable 
alternative since there are no operating commercial reprocessing 
facilities in the United States. Therefore, spent fuel would have to be 
shipped to an overseas facility for reprocessing. However, this 
approach has never been used and it would require approval by the 
Department of State as well as other entities. Additionally, the cost 
of spent fuel reprocessing is not offset by the salvage value of the 
residual uranium; reprocessing represents an added cost.
Shipping the Fuel Offsite to Another Utility, another NMC Site, or 
Private Fuel Storage Facility
    The shipment of fuel to another utility or transferring fuel to 
another of the licensee's facilities would provide short-term relief 
from the problems at Kewaunee. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 
Subtitle B, Section 131(a)(1), however, clearly places the 
responsibility for the interim storage of spent fuel with each owner or 
operator of a nuclear plant. The SFPs at the other reactor sites were 
designed with capacity to accommodate spent fuel from those particular 
sites. Therefore, transferring spent fuel from Kewaunee to other sites 
would create storage capacity problems at those locations. The shipment 
of spent fuel to another site or transferring it to another NMC site is 
not an acceptable alternative because of increased fuel handling risks 
and additional occupational radiation exposure, as well as the fact 
that no additional storage capacity would be created.
    The shipment of fuel to a private fuel storage facility is an 
alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity. 
However, a private fuel storage facility is not licensed at this time. 
Therefore, shipping the spent fuel to a private fuel storage facility 
is not considered an alternative to increased onsite fuel storage 
capacity at this time.
Alternatives Creating Additional Storage Capacity
    Alternative technologies that would create additional storage 
capacity include rod consolidation, dry cask storage, modular vault dry 
storage, and constructing a new pool. Rod consolidation involves 
disassembling the spent fuel assemblies and storing the fuel rods from 
two or more assemblies into a stainless steel canister that can be 
stored in the spent fuel racks. Industry experience with rod 
consolidation is currently limited, primarily due to concerns for 
potential gap activity release due to rod breakage, the potential for 
increased fuel cladding corrosion due to some of the protective oxide 
layer being scraped off, and because the prolonged consolidation 
activity could interfere with ongoing plant operations. Dry cask 
storage is a method of transferring spent fuel, after storage in the 
pool for several years, to high capacity casks with passive heat 
dissipation features. After loading, the casks are stored outdoors on a 
seismically qualified concrete pad. Concerns for dry cask storage 
include the need for special security provisions and high cost. Vault 
storage consists of storing spent fuel in shielded stainless steel 
cylinders in a horizontal configuration in a reinforced concrete vault. 
The concrete vault provides missile and earthquake protection and 
radiation shielding. Concerns for vault dry storage include security, 
land consumption, eventual decommissioning of the new vault, the 
potential for fuel or clad rupture due to high temperatures, and high 
cost. The alternative of constructing and licensing new spent fuel 
pools is not practical for Kewaunee because such an effort would

[[Page 76675]]

require about 10 years to complete and would be an expensive 
alternative.
    The alternative technologies that could create additional storage 
capacity involve additional fuel handling with an attendant opportunity 
for a fuel handling accident, involve higher cumulative dose to workers 
affecting the fuel transfers, require additional security measures that 
are significantly more expensive, and would not result in a significant 
improvement in environmental impacts compared to the proposed reracking 
modifications.
Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation
    Generally, improved usage of the fuel and/or operation at a reduced 
power level would be an alternative that would decrease the amount of 
fuel being stored in the SFPs and thus, increase the amount of time 
before the maximum storage capacities of the SFPs are reached. With 
extended burnup of fuel assemblies, the fuel cycle would be extended 
and fewer off-loads would be necessary. This is not an alternative for 
resolving the loss of full core off-load capability that will occur as 
a result of the Kewaunee refueling outage scheduled for the Fall 2001, 
because the spent fuel to be transferred to the pool for storage has 
almost completed its operating history in the core. In addition, 
operating the plant at a reduced power level would not make effective 
use of available resources and would cause unnecessary economic 
hardship on the licensee and its customers. Therefore, reducing the 
amount of spent fuel generated by increasing burnup further or reducing 
power is not considered a practical alternative.

The No-Action Alternative

    Also, the NRC staff considered denial of the proposed action (i.e., 
the ``no-action'' alternative). Denial of the application would result 
in no significant change in current environmental impacts. The 
environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative 
actions are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

    This action does not involve the use of any resources not 
previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for 
Kewaunee.

Agencies and Persons Contacted

    In accordance with its stated policy, on October 12, 2000, the NRC 
staff consulted with the Wisconsin State official, S. Jenkins of the 
Wisconsin Public Service Commission, regarding the environmental impact 
of the proposed action. The state official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

    On the basis of the environmental assessment, the NRC concludes 
that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the NRC has determined 
not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed 
action.
    For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
licensee's letter dated November 18, 1999, as supplemented by letter 
dated August 7, 2000, which are available for public inspection at the 
NRC's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available 
records will be accessible electronically from the ADAMS Public Library 
component on the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov (the Electronic 
Reading Room).

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of November, 2000.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Claudia M. Craig,
Section Chief, Section 1, Project Directorate III, Division of 
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 00-31157 Filed 12-6-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P